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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gesserunt. Nam neque validiores opibus ullis inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virtutum aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico consecravit bello; odia etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. lib. 21.

VOL. V.

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Universal
Joy in the
British
Islands at
the termination
of the war.

UNBOUNDED was the joy, unlimited the hopes, conceived in Europe upon the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. Ten years of ceaseless effusion of blood had tamed the fiercest spirits, and hushed the strongest passions; the finances of all the parties in the strife had become grievously embarrassed; and the people of every country, yielding to the joyful illusion, fondly imagined that the years of discord had terminated, and a long season of peace and prosperity was to obliterate the traces of human suffering. They did not reflect on the unstable basis on which this temporary respite was rested; they did not consider that it was not from the causes of hostility having ceased, but the means of carrying it on having been exhausted, that a truce had been obtained; that the elements of a yet greater conflagration lay smouldering in the ashes of that which was past, that discordant passions had been silenced, not extinguished; irreconcilable interests severed, not adjusted. Little anticipating the dreadful calamities which yet awaited them, the population of Paris forgot, in the glitter of reviews, and the splendour of

military pageantry, all the calamities of the Revolution; the inhabitants of Vienna enjoyed with unwonted zest the respite from anxiety and exertion which the suspension of hostilities afforded them; and the youth of Britain hastened in crowds to the French metropolis, to gratify their curiosity by the sight of the scenes which had so long been the theatre of such tragic events, and the heroes who had gained immortality in such glorious achievements.

*Repetition
mediates an
expedition
to St.-Do-
mingo.*

But not one instant's respite did the First Consul allow to his own active and indefatigable mind. Deeming nothing done while aught remained to do, he had no sooner arrived at the highest point of military glory, than he turned his attention to the restoration of naval power, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity which the suspension of maritime hostilities afforded to revive that decayed but indispensable part of public strength. Wisely deeming the recovery of the French colonies the only means that could be relied on for the permanent support of his marine forces, he projected, on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, an expedition for the recovery of St.-Domingo, the once great and splendid possession of France in the Gulf of Mexico, long nursed by the care and attention of the monarchy, at once lost by the reckless innovations of the Constituent Assembly.

*Diminished
efforts of the
St.-Domingo
revolt to the
French
navy.*

It would seem as if the laws of Providence, in nations not less than individuals, have provided for the certain ultimate punishment of inordinate passions, in the consequences flowing from their own indulgence. Long before the war commenced, or the fleets of France had felt the weight of British strength; before one shot had been fired on the ocean, or one harbour blockaded by a hostile squadron, the basis on which the French maritime power rested had been destroyed. Not the conquest of the Nile, or the conflagration of Toulon; not the catastrophe of Camperdown, or the thunderbolt of Trafalgar, ruined the navy of France. Severe as these blows were, they were not irremediable; while her colonies remained, the means of repairing them existed. It was the rashness of ignorant legislation which inflicted the fatal wound, the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm which produced consequences that could never be repaired.

*Description
of St.-Do-
mingo*

St.-Domingo, the greatest, with the exception of Cuba, and, beyond all question, before the Revolution, the most flourishing of the West India islands, is about an hundred marine leagues, or three hundred English miles in length, and its mean breadth is about thirty leagues, or ninety miles. It contains three thousand square leagues, of which two-thirds were, in 1789, in the hands of the Spaniards, and one-third in those of the French. Although the French portion was the smallest, yet it was incomparably the most productive, both from the nature of the soil, and the cultivation bestowed on the surface. The Spanish consisted for the most part of sterile mountains, clothed with forests, or rising into naked cliffs, in the centre of the island; whereas the French lay in the plains and valleys at their feet, and had the advantage both of the numerous streams which, in that humid climate, descended from their wooded sides, and the frequent bays and gulfs which the ocean had formed in its deeply indented shore (1).

The French possession of their portion of the island commenced in 1664, and notwithstanding the frequent interruption of their colonial trade during the wars with England, its prosperity increased in a most extraordinary degree, and in a ratio far beyond that of any other of the West India islands. As usual in all the colonies of that part of the world, the inhabitants consisted

of whites, mulattoes, and negro slaves; the former were about 40,000, the latter 60,000; but the slave population exceeded 500,000. Such a disproportion was in itself a most perilous element in social prosperity; but it was much increased by the habits and prejudices of the European race, who were exposed to so many dangers. A large portion of the property of the island was in the hands of an inconsiderable number of great and old families, whose fortunes were immense, prejudices strong, and luxury extreme; while a far more numerous but less opulent body, under the name of *Petits Blancs*, were gradually rising into importance, and, like the Tiers-État in the mother country, felt far more jealousy of the great proprietors than apprehensions of the consequences of political innovation. Not a few also of the great proprietors were overwhelmed with debt, the natural consequence of long continued extravagance; and experience soon proved, that not less in the new than the old world, it was in that class that the most ardent and dangerous partisans of revolutionary change were to be found (1).

Its statistical details.

The produce of the island, and the commerce which it maintained with the mother country before the commencement of the troubles, was immense. The French part alone raised a greater quantity of colonial produce than the whole British islands taken together. Its exports amounted to the enormous value of 168,000,000 francs, or L.6,720,000; and the gross produce, including the Spanish portion, amounted to 460,000,000 francs, or L.18,400,000, while its imports, in manufactures of the parent state, were no less than 250,000,000 or L.10,000,000 sterling. More than half of this immense produce was re-exported from France to other states, and the commerce thence arising was the chief support of its maritime power. Sixteen hundred vessels, and twenty-seven thousand sailors, were employed in conducting all the branches of this vast colonial traffic. With so magnificent a possession, France had no occasion to envy the dependencies of all other states put together (2). It was this splendid and unequalled colonial possession which the French nation threw away and destroyed at the commencement of the Revolution, with a recklessness and improvidence of which the previous history of the world had afforded no example.

Origin of the Revolution in that island.

Hardly had the cry of liberty and equality been raised in France when it responded warmly and vehemently from the shores of St.-Domingo. Independently of the natural passion for liberty, which must ever exist among those who are subjected to the restraints of servitude, the slave population of this colony were rapidly assailed by revolutionary agents and emissaries, and the workshops and fields of the planters overrun by heated missionaries, who poured into an ignorant and ardent multitude the new-born ideas of European freedom. The planters were far from appreciating the danger with which they were menaced. On the contrary, a large proportion of the smaller class took part, as usual in revolutionary convulsions, with the popular party, and aided in the propagation of principles destined soon to exterminate themselves with slaughter and conflagration. All united in regarding the crisis in the mother country as a favourable opportunity for asserting their independence, and emancipating themselves from those restraints which the jealousy of her policy had imposed on their commerce (3).

(1) Dum. viii. 460, 464.

(2) Dum. viii. 112, 113. Jom. xiv. 445. Bing. li. 407.

The produce of the whole British West India islands exported is now L.8,448,839; the British manufactures they consume, is L.3,988,286; the shipping employed in their trade 249,079 tons; the

seamen, 13,691 in the outward, 14,000 in the homeward voyages. The total gross agricultural produce of the islands is about L.23,000,000.—See *Parl. Return*, 4th June, 1803; and *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 64.

(3) Dum. viii. 112, 113.

March 8.
1790.
Rash measures of the French Constituent Assembly.

By a decree on March 8, 1790, the Constituent Assembly had empowered each colony belonging to the Republic to make known its wishes on the subject of a constitution, and that these wishes should be expressed by colonial assemblies, freely elected and recognized by their citizens. This privilege excited the most ruinous divisions among the inhabitants of European descent, already sufficiently menaced by the ideas fermenting in the negro population. The whites claimed the exclusive right of voting for the election of the members of this important assembly; while the mulattoes strenuously asserted their title to an equal share in the representation; and the blacks, intoxicated with the novel doctrines so keenly discussed by all classes of society, secretly formed the project of ridding themselves of both. This decree of the National Assembly was brought out to the island by Lieutenant-Colonel Ogé, a mulatto officer in the service of France, who openly proclaimed the opinion of the parent legislature, that the half-caste and free negroes were entitled to their full share in the election of the representatives. The jealousy of the planters was immediately excited. They refused to acknowledge the decree of the Assembly, constituted themselves into a separate legislature (1), and having seized Ogé in the Spanish territory, put him to death by the torture of the wheel, under circumstances of atrocious cruelty.

Freedom is conferred on all persons of colour.

This unpardonable proceeding, as is usually the case with such acts of barbarity, aggravated instead of stifling the prevailing discontents, and the heats of the colony soon became so vehement, that the Constituent Assembly felt the necessity of taking some steps to allay the ferment. The moderate and violent parties in that body took different sides, and all Europe looked on with anxiety upon a debate so novel in its kind, and fraught with such momentous consequences to a large portion of the human race. Barnave, Malouet, Alexandre Lameth, and Clermont-Tonnerre strongly argued, that men long accustomed to servitude could not receive the perilous gift of liberty with safety either to themselves or others, but by slow degrees, and that the effect of suddenly admitting that bright light upon a benighted population would be to throw them into inevitable and fatal convulsions. But Mirabeau, the master-spirit of the Assembly, and the only one of its leaders who combined popular principles with a just appreciation of the danger of pushing them to excess, was no more, and the declamations of Brissot and the Girondists prevailed over these statesman-like ideas. By a decree on 15th May, 1791, the privileges of equality were conferred indiscriminately on all persons of colour born of a free father and mother (2).

May 15th,
1791.

The insurrection breaks out.

Far from appreciating the hourly increasing dangers of their situation, and endeavouring to form with the new citizens an organized body to check the farther progress of levelling principles, the planters openly endeavoured to resist this rash decree. Civil war was preparing in this once peaceful and beautiful colony; arms were collecting; the soldiers, caressed and seduced by both parties, were wavering between their old feelings of regal allegiance and the modern influence of intoxicating principles, when a new and terrible enemy arose, who speedily extinguished in Aug. 22, 1791. blood the discord of his oppressors. On the night of the 22d August, the negro revolt, long and secretly organized, at once broke forth, and wrapt the whole northern part of the colony in flames. Jean-François, a slave of vast penetration, firm character, and violent passions, not unmingled

(1) *Ibid.* vii. 120, 123.

(2) *Ibid.* viii. 123, 126.

with generosity; was the leader of the conspiracy; his lieutenants were Biasson and TOUSSAINT. The former, of gigantic stature, Herculean strength, and indomitable ferocity, was well fitted to assert that superiority which such qualities seldom fail to command in savage times; the latter, gifted with rare intelligence, profound dissimulation, boundless ambition, and heroic firmness, was fitted to become at once the Numa and the Romulus of the sable republic in the southern hemisphere (1).

This vast conspiracy, productive in the end of calamities unparalleled even in the long catalogue of European atrocity, had for its objects the total extirpation of the whites, and the establishment of an independent black government over the whole island. So inviolable was the secrecy, so general the dissimulation of the slaves, that this awful catastrophe was noways apprehended by the European proprietors; and a conspiracy, which embraced nearly the whole negro population of the island, was revealed only by the obscure hints of a few faithful domestics, who, without betraying their comrades, warned their masters of their danger. The explosion was sudden and terrible. In a moment, the beautiful plains in the north of the island were covered with fires—the labour of a century was devoured in a night; while the negroes, like unchained tigers, precipitated themselves on their masters, seized their arms, massacred them without pity, or threw them into the flames. From all quarters the terrified planters fled to Cape Town, already menaced by ten thousand discontented slaves in its own bosom; while fifteen thousand insurgents surrounded the city, threatening instant destruction to the trembling fugitives within its walls (2).

Its progress and horrors. The cruelties exercised on the unhappy captives on both sides, in this disastrous contest, exceeded any thing recorded in history. The negroes marched with spiked infants on their spears instead of colours; they sawed asunder the male prisoners, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands. Nor were the whites slow in taking vengeance for these atrocities. In several sallies from Cape Town, the discipline and courage of the Europeans prevailed. Numerous prisoners were made, who were instantly put to death, and the indiscriminate rage of the victors extended to the old men, women, and children of the insurgent race, who had taken no part in the revolt (3).

While these disasters were overwhelming the northern part of the island, the southern was a prey to the fierce and increasing discord of the planters and people of colour. At length the opposite parties came into open collision. The mulattoes, aided by a body of negroes, blockaded Port-au-Prince; while the whites of that town and its vicinity, supported by the national guard and troops of the line, assembled their forces to raise the siege. The black army was commanded by a chief named Hyacinthe, who displayed in the action an uncommon degree of skill and intrepidity. The shock was terrible; but at length the planters were overthrown, and their broken remains forced back to the town. In other quarters similar actions took place, with various success, but the same result; the whites were finally forced into the cities, and the plains irrevocably overrun by the insurgent forces (4).

Overwhelmed with consternation at these disastrous events, the Constituent Assembly endeavoured, when it was too late, to retrace their steps. Barnave, who had so ably resisted the precipitate emancipation of the mu-

(1) Dum. viii. 125, 127. Big. ii. 395.

(2) Dum. viii. 127, 129.

(3) Ibid. viii. 129, 130. Rep. à l'Assemblée Const. 23, 27.

(4) Dum. viii. 130, 138.

The Constituent Assembly in vain try to retract their steps. Sept. 24. 1791. **latto race, and clearly predicted the consequences to which it would lead, prevailed upon them, in those brief days of returning moderation which signalized the close of their career, to pass a decree, which declared in substance that the external relations and commerce of the colonies should alone be subject to the direct legislation of the National Assembly in the parent state, and that the Colonial Assemblies should have the exclusive right of legislating, with the approbation of the king, for the internal condition and rights of the different classes of inhabitants. But it was too late. This wise principle, which, if embraced earlier in the discussion, might have averted all the disasters, only added fuel to the flames which were consuming the unhappy colony. The planters, irritated by injury and hardened by misfortune, positively refused to make any dispositions for the gradual extinction of slavery (1), and insisted upon the immediate and unqualified submission of the whole insurgents, mulatto and negro; while the slaves, imboldened by unlooked-for success, openly asserted their determination to come to no accommodation but on terms of absolute freedom.**

French delegates in vain endeavour to settle differences. **Three delegates of the Convention, with a reinforcement of three thousand men, were despatched in November, 1791, to endeavour to re-establish the affairs of the colony, and reconcile its discordant inhabitants; but they soon found, that the passions excited on both sides were so vehement as to be incapable of adjustment. They arrived at Cape Town, where they found the remnant of the white population blockaded by the negro forces. They were received by the members of the Colonial Legislature covered with black, and those of the municipality arrayed in red crape; while instruments of punishment, gibbets and scaffolds erected in the market place, too surely told the bloody scenes which the island had recently witnessed. Their first step was to proclaim a general amnesty which was received with apparent thankfulness in the insurgent camps, and cold distrust by the Colonial Legislature. Toussaint repaired to the town, where he professed the desire of the negroes to return to their duty, if their rights, as proclaimed by the mother country, were recognized; but his language was not that of rebels negotiating an amnesty for their offences, but an independent power, actuated by a desire to stop the effusion of blood. As such, it excited the indignation of the planters, who insisted on the unqualified submission of the slaves, and the punishment of the authors of the revolt; demands which so enraged the negroes (2), that it was with difficulty Toussaint could prevent them from giving it vent by the indiscriminate massacre of all the prisoners in their hands.**

The insurrection becomes universal. **The Constituent Assembly had flattered itself that its last decree, which put the fate of the mulatto and negro population into the hands of the Colonial Legislature, would have had the effect of inducing the latter to concede emancipation to the half-caste race, and of conciliating the former, through gratitude for so great a benefit conferred on them by their former masters; but in forming that hope, they proved their ignorance of the effect of concessions dictated by alarm, of which their own institutions were soon to afford so memorable an example. The Colonial Legislature, aware, from dear bought experience, that the prospect of such acquisitions in that moment of excitement would only inflame with tenfold fury all who had a drop of negro blood in their veins, resolutely refused to make any concessions even to the mulatto population. The commissioners of**

(1) *Ibid.* viii. 136, 142.(2) *Ibid.* viii. 143, 145.

the National Assembly openly took part with that unhappy body of men, thus deprived of the benefit conferred on them by the mother country, in consequence of which, the war, which had subsided during the progress of the negotiation, broke out again with redoubled fury, and the mulattoes every where joined their skill and intelligence to the numbers and ferocity of the negroes. A large body of whites were massacred in the church of Ouanaminthe by the Africans, whom the mulattoes had the cruelty to introduce; and Cape Town itself was nearly surprised by Biassou and Toussaint, at the head of a chosen body of their followers. The contest had no longer a semblance of equality. The insurrection broke out on every side, extended into every quarter; fire and sword devoured the remains of this once splendid colony; the wretched planters all took shelter in Cape Town; and the slaves, deprived of the means of subsistence by their own excesses, dispersed through the woods, reverting to the chase or plunder for a precarious existence (1).

The Girondists resolve upon unlimited concessions.

Meanwhile the Legislative Assembly, which had succeeded the Constituent, a step farther advanced in revolutionary violence, were preparing ulterior measures of the most frantic character. Irritated at the Colonial Legislature for not having followed up their intentions, and instigated by the populace, whom the efforts of Brissot and the Society at Paris *des Amis des Noirs* had roused to a perfect frenzy on the subject, they revoked the decree of the 24th September preceding, which had conferred such ample powers on the Colonial Legislatures, dissolved the Assembly at Cape Town, and despatched three new commissioners, Arthaux, Sonthonax, and Polverel, with unlimited powers to settle the affairs of the colony. In vain Barnave and the remnant of the constitutional party in the Assembly strove to moderate these extravagant proceedings: the violence of the Jacobins bore down all opposition. "Don't talk to us of danger," said Brissot, "let the colonies perish, rather than one principle be abandoned (2)."

May 1793. The proceedings of the new commissioners speedily brought matters to a crisis. They arrived first at Port-au-Prince, and in conformity with the secret instructions of the Government, which were to dislodge the whites from that stronghold, they sent off to France the soldiers of the regiment of Artois, established a Jacobin club, transported to France or America thirty of the leading planters, and issued a proclamation, in which they exhorted the colonists "to lay aside at last the prejudices of colour." Having thus laid the revolutionary train at Port-au-Prince, they embarked for Cape Town, where

June 10th, 1793. they arrived in the middle of June. Matters had by this time reached such a height there as indicated the immediate approach of a crisis.

The intelligence of the execution of the king, and proclamation of a Republic, had roused to the very highest pitch the democratic passions of all the inferior classes. The planters, with too good reason, apprehended that the Convention which had succeeded the Legislative Assembly would soon outstrip them in violence, and put the finishing stroke to their manifold calamities, by at once proclaiming the liberty of the slaves, and so destroying the remnant of property which they still possessed. But their destruction was nearer at hand than they supposed. On the 20th June, a

June 20th, 1793. quarrel accidentally arose between a French naval captain and a mulatto officer in the service of the Colonial Government; the commissioners ordered them both into their presence, without regard to the distinction of colour, and this excited the highest indignation in the officers of the marine, who landed with their crews to take vengeance for the in-

(1) Dum. viii. 145, 151.

(2) Ibid. viii. 151, 152, Toul. iv. 172.

dignity done to one of their members. The colonists loudly applauded their conduct, and invoked their aid as the saviours of St.-Domingo : the exiles brought from Port-au-Prince fomented the discord as the only means of effecting their liberation : a civil war speedily ensued in the blockaded capital, and for two days blood flowed in torrents in these insane contests between the sailors of the fleet and the mulatto population (4).

Storming and massacre of Cape Town. The negro chiefs, secretly informed of all these disorders, resolved to profit by the opportunity of finally destroying the whites thus afforded to them. Three thousand insurgents penetrated through the works, stript of their defenders during the general tumult; and, making straight for the prisons, delivered a large body of slaves who were there in chains. Instantly the liberated captives spread themselves over the town, set it on fire in every quarter, and massacred the unhappy whites when seeking to escape from the conflagration. A scene of matchless horror ensued : twenty thousand negroes broke into the city, and with the torch in one hand and the sword in the other, spread slaughter and devastation around. Hardly had the strife of the Europeans with each other subsided, when they found themselves overwhelmed by the vengeance which had been accumulating for centuries in the African breast. Neither age nor sex were spared ; the young were cut down in striving to defend their houses, the aged in the churches where they had fled to implore protection ; virgins were immolated on the altar ; weeping infants hurled into the fires. Amidst the shrieks of the sufferers and the shouts of the victors, the finest city in the West Indies was reduced to ashes : its splendid churches, its stately palaces, were wrapt in flames ; thirty thousand human beings perished in the massacre, and the wretched fugitives who had escaped from this scene of horror on board the ships were guided in their passage over the deep by the prodigious light which arose from their burning habitations. They almost all took refuge in the United States, where they were received with the most generous hospitality (2); but the frigate *la Fine* foundered on the passage, and five hundred of the survivors from the flames perished in the waves.

The universal freedom of the blacks is proclaimed, June 3, 1793. Thus fell the queen of the Antilles, the most stately monument of European opulence that had yet arisen in the New World. Nothing deterred, however, by this unparalleled calamity, the Commissioners of the Republic pursued their frantic career; and, amidst the smoking ruins of the capital, published a decree which proclaimed the freedom of all the blacks who should enrol themselves under the standards of the Republic; a measure which was equivalent to the instant abolition of slavery over the whole island. Farther resistance was now hopeless; the Republican authorities became the most ardent persecutors of the planters; pursued alike by Jacobin frenzy and African vengeance, they fled in despair. Polverel proclaimed the liberty of the blacks in the west, and Montbrun gave free vent to his hatred of the colonists, by compelling them to leave Port-au-Prince, which had not yet fallen into the hands of the negroes. Every where the triumph of the slaves was complete, and the authority of the planters for ever destroyed (3).

But although the liberation of the negroes was effected, the independence of the island was not yet established. The English regarded with the utmost jealousy this violent explosion in their vicinity; and the leaders of the insurgents soon perceived that they could maintain their freedom only by an alli-

(4) *Dum.* viii. 152, 159.

(2) *Toul.* iv. 257, 260. *Dum.* viii. 157, 160.

(3) *Dum.* viii. 160, 164. by Google

ance with the French Government. Toussaint, influenced by these views, passed into the service of France, with the rank of colonel, and the blacks began to be organized into regiments under the standards of the republic (1).

The English
obtain a
foothing on
the island.

The English before long appeared as actors on this theatre of devastation. They were naturally apprehensive of the utmost danger to their West Indian possessions, from the establishment of so great a revolutionary outpost in the centre of the Gulf of Mexico; and entertained a hope that, by allying themselves with the remnant of the planters, they might not only extinguish that frightful volcano, but possibly wrest the island with all its commerce from the French Republic. A British squadron appeared off Port-au-Prince early in 1794, and took possession of that town in the June following. They afterwards obtained the mole of St.-Nicolas, the principal harbour of the island; and the negro chief Hyacinthe passed into their service with 12,000 blacks. Encouraged by this great reinforcement, they commenced a systematic warfare for the reduction of the island; but Toussaint, at the head of the French forces and the great majority of the negroes, still maintained the standard of independence: the blacks soon deserted the British standard, the deadly climate mowed down the European troops, they were gradually pressed backward to the sea-coast, and at length the mole of St.-Nicholas, their principal stronghold, capitulated to the victorious negro chief (2).

Furious
civil wars
between the
negroes and
mulattoes.

No sooner were they delivered from external enemies, than the parties in the island broke out into furious hostility with each other. The mulattoes beheld with undisguised apprehension the preponderance which the negroes had acquired in the late contests, and arrayed themselves under General Rigaud, and Hédouville, the Commissioner of the French Government, to resist Toussaint, who was at the head of the African population. A frightful civil war ensued, which was long carried on with various success: but at length the mulattoes were overcome, and Rigaud forced to take refuge in the walls of Cayes, the sole fortress on the island which still acknowledged his authority. Toussaint, who still professed himself a lieutenant of the French Republic, now undisputed master of the field, immediately turned his forces against the Spanish part of the colony, which had been ceded to France by the treaty of Basle. He marched at the same time against Port-au-Prince and Cape Town; his progress was one continued triumph; the Spanish territory received him without resistance, and in December, 1800, his authority was obeyed from one end of the territory to the other (3).

Napoléon
confirms
Toussaint in
his com-
mand.

Matters were in this situation when Napoléon, who had now succeeded to the helm of government, began to turn his attention to the affairs of this long neglected and now ruined colony. Entirely directed by military ideas, he immediately conceived the design of regaining the French dominion over the island by means of Toussaint, who had now concentrated in his own hands all its forces, and for this purpose lent a willing ear to the representations of Colonel Vincent, whom the negro chief had sent to Paris to lay the state of its affairs before the First Consul. Influenced by these views, he sent back Colonel Vincent with a decree, confirming Toussaint in his command as general-in-chief, establishing the constitution there, which in France followed the 18th Brumaire, and a proclamation, in which he called on the " brave blacks to remember that France alone had recog-

(1) Ibid. viii. 164, 166.

(2) *Ibid.* viii. 167, 171. *Ibid.* ii. 396, 397.

(3) *Jom.* xiv. 430, 434.

nized their freedom." This proclamation cut off all hopes from Rigaud and the remnant of the mulatto population, who immediately, in despair, embarked from Cayes, and dispersed themselves over the West India Islands, abandoning for ever their country to the insurgent population for whom they had made so many sacrifices; the usual fate of those in the middling ranks who stir up the passions of the lowest (1).

Vigorous measures of the Negro chief in the administration.

Toussaint, now undisputed governor of the whole island, adopted the most vigorous measures to put an end to the public discord. While he himself published a general amnesty, and paraded in triumph through the island, attended by all the pomp of European splendour, he committed to his ferocious lieutenant, Dessalines, the task of extinguishing the remains of the hostile party. That chief executed the duty with scrupulous exactness; the method of destroying provinces by means of noyades, imported from France by the revolutionary agents, was practised with fatal success, and African vengeance availed itself of the means of destruction which revolutionary cruelty had invented. While Toussaint was received with discharges of cannon and every demonstration of public joy in the principal cities of the island, ten thousand unhappy captives perished by the orders of the ferocious Dessalines, and the remains of the ardent race of mulattoes, whose ambition had first disturbed the peace of the island, perished by the hands of the servile crowd whom they had themselves elevated into irresistible power (2).

His agricultural policy; and is appointed President for life of the island.

Delivered by this bloody execution from almost all his enemies. Toussaint applied himself, with his wonted vigour, to restore the cultivation of the island, which, amidst the public calamities, had been almost totally abandoned. Imitating the feudal policy, he distributed the unoccupied buildings and lands among his military followers, and their authority having compelled the common men to work, the level parts of the country soon assumed a comparatively flourishing appearance. 21st July, 1801. At the same time an assembly of the leading chiefs of the country was convoked at Cape Town, who drew up a constitution for the inhabitants, and conferred on Toussaint unlimited authority, under the title of President and Governor for life, with the right of nominating his successor. Colonel Vincent was immediately despatched to Paris with the new constitution, and a letter from Toussaint to the First Consul, beginning with the words, "the first of blacks to the first of whites (3)."

Napoleon instantly resolves to subdue the island.

This unexpected intelligence was a severe blow to the First Consul. He at once perceived that Toussaint had no intention of remaining his lieutenant; that the feeling of independence had taken root; and that, unless a blow was immediately struck, the colony was for ever lost to the French empire. Colonel Vincent arrived with this despatch on the 14th October, 1801, just thirteen days after the signature of the preliminaries of peace with England, and when the now pacified ocean afforded him the means of at once reasserting the French dominion over the island. He immediately resolved to subdue the colony by force of arms, and restore to France those inestimable maritime advantages which its possession had so long secured to the monarchy. The idea of regaining a commerce which with the addition of the Spanish part of the island, might be expected to amount to sixteen millions sterling, employ two thousand ships, and thirty thousand seamen, was irresistible to a sovereign who felt his deficiency in these particulars to be the only impediment to universal dominion (4).

(1) *Jom. xiv. 435, 440. Big. ii. 398, 399.*
(2) *Big. ii. 399, 400.*

(3) *Jom. xiv. 444, 445. Big. ii. 401, 402. Dum. viii. 176, 177.*
(4) *Big. ii. 402. Jom. xiv. 446.*

Increasing
prosperity of
the island
under Tou-
ssaint's admin-
istration.

Meanwhile, under the stern and severe government of the African chief, the fields of St.-Domingo began to regain part of their once smiling aspect. The military discipline which, during the long previous wars, he had been enabled to diffuse among his followers, afforded him the means of establishing that forced cultivation, without which experience has never found the negro race capable of pursuing the labour of civilized life. The mulattoes, compelled to engage in the most degrading occupations bitterly lamented the insupportable black yoke they had imposed upon themselves; the negroes, forced to re-enter their fields and workshops, found that their dreams of liberty had vanished into air, and they had only made, for the worse, an exchange of masters. Their comfortable dwellings, their neat gardens, their substantial fare, had disappeared, and there remained only the bitterness of servitude without either its protection or its compensations. But, amidst the most acute individual suffering, the rigid government of Toussaint succeeded in restoring, in part, the cultivation of the colony. The negroes were detained, by the terrors of military execution, in the most complete subordination. The chiefs to whom the lands were allotted submitted to the rule of a master whom they at once feared and admired. Commerce with the adjoining islands and the United States began to revive from its ashes; and out of the surplus produce and customs of the island, the Government obtained the means of maintaining a respectable military establishment. Eighteen thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred mounted gendarmes preserved order in the colony. Toussaint, amidst other great projects, had conceived the design of purchasing slaves from the adjoining states. His authority was absolute and universal; and the convulsions of St.-Domingo added another to the numerous proofs furnished by history, that revolutionary movements, under whatever circumstances commenced, can terminate only in establishing the unlimited despotism of a single individual (1).

But it was no part of the designs of the First Consul to allow this magnificent colony to slip out of the grasp of France, or its reviving commerce nourish only the navy of Britain. Hardly was the ink of his signature to the preliminaries of a maritime peace dry, when he turned all his attention to the conquest of the island. Independently of the maritime and political advantages to be derived from such a measure, he entertained the most sanguine hopes of the accession of influence which he would obtain from the disposal of the immense possessions, belonging chiefly to the emigrant noblesse, which would be recovered in the southern hemisphere. Having taken his resolution, he proceeded, with his wonted vigour and ability, in preparing the means of its execution. An extraordinary degree of activity immediately was manifested in the dockyards of Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, Toulon, Havre, Flushing, and Cadiz. Land forces began to diverge towards these different points of embarkation, and the destination of the armament was announced in the following proclamation issued by Government 22d Nov. 1801. ment :—"At St.-Domingo, systematic acts have disturbed the political horizon. Under *equivocal appearances*, the Government has wished to see only the ignorance which confounds names and things, which usurps when it seeks to obey; but a fleet and an army, which are preparing in the harbours of Europe, will soon dissipate these clouds, and St.-Domingo will be

(1) *Dam. viii. 177, 178.*

The American war of independence is no exception. It was not a revolutionary movement, but a regular war between one distant power and another;

and, but for the boundless issue of the back settlements, it is more than doubtful whether even there the same results would not have taken place.

reduced, in whole, to the government of the Republic. In the proclamation addressed to the blacks, it was announced by the same authority:—"Whatever may be your origin or your colour, you are Frenchmen, and all alike free and equal before God and the Republic. At St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe slavery no longer exists—all are free—all shall remain free. At Martinique different principles must be observed (1)."

Immense
naval and
military
forces as-
sembled.

The forces collected in the different harbours of the Republic for this purpose were the greatest that Europe had ever yet sent forth to the New World. Thirty-five ships of the line, twenty-one frigates, and above eighty smaller vessels, having on board twenty-one thousand land troops, were soon assembled. They resembled rather the preparations for the subjugation of a rival power, than the forces destined for the reduction of a distant colonial settlement. The fleet was commanded by Villaret-Joyeuse; the army by Le Clerc, the brother-in-law of Napoléon and husband of the Princess Pauline, whose exquisite figure has since been immortalized by the chisel of Canova. The land forces were almost all composed of the conquerors of Hohenlinden. The First Consul gladly availed himself of this opportunity to rid himself of a large portion of the veterans most adverse to his authority. The most distinguished generals of Moreau's army, Richepanse, Rochambeau, Lapoype, and their redoubtable comrades, were employed in the same destination. In the selection of the general-in-chief, the First Consul was not less influenced by private considerations. He was desirous of giving the means of enriching themselves to two relations, whose passion for dress and extravagant habits had already occasioned repeated and disagreeable pecuniary demands to the public treasury (2).

British
Government
make no
opposition.

The British Government naturally conceived no small disquietude at the preparation of so great an armament, at the very time when the signature of the preliminaries rendered it difficult to imagine what could be its destination. They demanded, accordingly, explanations on the subject, and the Cabinet of the Tuileries at once unfolded the object of the expedition. Not deeming themselves entitled to interfere between France and her colonies, and perhaps not secretly disinclined to the subjugation of so formidable a neighbour as an independent negro state in the close vicinity of her slave colonies, Great Britain abstained from any farther opposition, and merely took the precautionary measures of assembling a powerful fleet of observation in Bantry Bay (3), and greatly strengthening the naval force in the West Indies.

Expedition
sails, and
arrives off
St.-Domingo.

The fleets from Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, all set sail on the 14th December, 1801. The land forces they had on board, under the immediate command of Le Clerc, amounted only to 10,000, but they were followed by reinforcements from Cadiz, Brest, Havre, and Holland; which swelled the troops ultimately to 35,000 men. The first division of this formidable force appeared off the island in the beginning of February. So completely was the government of St.-Domingo at fault as to the object of the expedition, that had it not been for fifteen days which were lost in the Bay of Biscay in assembling the different divisions of the fleet, Toussaint would have been surprised without any preparations whatever for his defence. No sooner, however, did he receive intelligence from an American vessel of the appearance of the fleet in the southern latitudes, than he instantly took his line, despatched messengers in all directions to

(1) *Dum.* viii. 192, 194. *Big.* 408, 409.

(3) *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 335. *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 90.

(2) *Duchess d'Ang.* vi. 92, 99. *Nouv.* ii. 194. *Dum.* viii. 202, 203. *Big.* 411.

assemble his forces, and announced his heroic resolution in these memorable words:—"A dutiful son, without doubt, owes submission and obedience to his mother; but if that parent should become so unnatural as to aim at the destruction of its own offspring, nothing remains but to intrust vengeance to the hands of God. If I must die, I will die as a brave soldier and a man of honour. I fear no one (1)."

First terro-
rization, but
final success
of Toussaint

But events quickly succeeded each other, which warned the negro chief of the desperate nature of the contest to which he was committed. He had recently before concluded a convention for mutual assistance with General Nugent, the governor of Jamaica, and, with reason, placed great reliance on the efficacious support of the English naval power to protect his dominions from the threatened invasion, when the intelligence of the peace of Amiens, followed by accounts of the arrival of the French fleet in the neighbourhood of the island, at once dissipated these expectations. He hastened to Cape Samana to obtain with his own eyes a view of the formidable armament of which report had so magnified the terrors; and was struck with astonishment at the sight, covering, as it did, the ocean with its sails, and so much beyond any thing yet seen in these latitudes. For a moment he hesitated on the part he should adopt. "We must die," said he; "France in a body has come to St.-Domingo. We have been deceived; they are determined to take vengeance and enslave the blacks." Recovering, however, soon after, his wonted resolution, he mournfully cast his eyes over the interminable fleet, whose sails, as far as the eye could reach, covered the ocean, and despatched couriers in all directions to rouse the most determined resistance. His forces, however, even with all the advantages of climate and local knowledge, were scarce equal to the magnanimous resolution. They hardly exceeded twenty thousand men, dispersed over the whole island; and whatever their courage may have been, they could not be expected to stand the shock of the troops with whom the Austrian monarchy had contended in vain (2).

The French
land, and
Cape Town
is burnt by
the blacks.

Le Clerc gave orders to commence the disembarkation at Cape Town on the 1st February, where Christophe commanded, but difficulties arose in consequence of the impossibility of finding a pilot who would guide the vessels into the harbour. At length the admiral seized upon the harbour-admiral, a mulatto, named Sangos, put a rope about his neck, and threatened him with instant death if he did not shew the way, and a bribe of 50,000 francs (L.2000) if he would; but nothing could induce him to betray his country. The precious time thus gained was turned to a good account by Christophe. He rapidly organized every thing for burning what yet remained of the town, which had been in part rebuilt since the sack ten years before; removed all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and all the stores which could be of service to the enemy, and only waited the signal of disembarkation to apply the torch in every direction. On the 4th the division of Hardy effected a landing on the one side of the capital, and Rochambeau on the other, under cover of a brisk cannonade from the fleet; on the same night the town was set on fire, and burnt with the utmost fury; out of eight hundred houses scarce sixty were standing on the following morning, and the first struggles of African independence were signalized by an act of devotion, of which European patriotism has exhibited few examples. The generous sacrifice was

(1) *Jom.* xv. 41, 42. *Dum.* viii. 205, 206. *Le Clerc*, i. 117, 132.

(2) *Dum.* viii. 206, 207. *Jom.* xv. 42, 43, 48. *Le Clerc*, i. 19, 35.

not made in vain; both stores and provisions, which might have furnished invaluable supplies to the army, were destroyed, and out of the ruins of the city arose those pestilential vapours which afterwards proved more fatal to the troops than all the forces which Toussaint could assemble for their destruction (1).

But the French generally prevail in the end.

This sinister commencement, so ominous of the desperate nature of the resistance which they might expect, was not, however, immediately followed by the disasters which were apprehended. European skill and discipline soon asserted their wonted superiority over the military efforts of the other quarters of the globe; and how could the blacks, but recently emancipated from the lash of slavery, be expected to withstand, in regular combat, the conquerors of Hohenlinden? General Kerviseau without difficulty made himself master of the Spanish part of the island, which had unwillingly submitted to the negro government. Boudet and Latouche landed at Port-au-Prince in the harbour, in the face of the enemy, and pursued them so rapidly into the town, as to save it from the conflagration with which it was menaced by the savage Dessalines, while the whole southern part of the island submitted at once to the authority of the invaders, and was thus saved from impending destruction. The important harbour of the mole of St.-Nicholas was occupied without opposition; but Dessalines, who had failed in accomplishing that object at Port-au-Prince, did not abandon Saint-Marc till he had reduced it to ashes. On all sides the plains and sea-coast fell into the hands of the Europeans, and the black forces were driven back into the impracticable and wooded mountain ridges in the central parts of the island (2).

Description of the mountainous interior to which the negroes retire.

But this apparent triumph was the result chiefly of the profound and resolute system of defence adopted by the black government, which consisted in destroying the cities on the coast, ruining the cultivated plains which might afford supplies to the enemy, and retiring into the woody fastnesses in the interior, called, in the emphatic language of the country, "the Grand Chaos," where the system of bush fighting might render unavailing the discipline and experience of the European soldiers. There is nothing in the temperate zone comparable to the difficulty and intricacy of these primeval forests, where enormous trees shoot up to the height of two hundred feet from the ground, and their stems are enveloped in an impenetrable thicket of creepers and underwood, which flourish under the rays of a vertical sun. No roads, few paths, traverse this savage district; almost the only mode of penetrating through it is by following the beds of the torrents, which in that humid climate frequently furrow the sides of the mountains, where a column of regular soldiers is exposed to a murderous fire from the unseen bands stationed in the overhanging woods. It was Toussaint's design to maintain himself in these impenetrable fastnesses, sending forth merely light parties to harass the flanks and rear of the enemy, until the pestilential season of autumn arrived, and the heavy rains had generated those noxious vapours, which in that deadly climate so rapidly prove

(1) Dum. viii. 208, 218. Jom. xv. 46, 47, 48. Herv. ii. 207.

The parallel conflagrations of Numanium, Cape Town, and Moscow, prove, that whatever may be their deficiency in industry, or the habits of persevering exertion, the negro race is as capable as the European of the sacrifices required by patriotic spirit. When we recollect that it was in a comparatively rude state of society that all these heroic deeds were done, and that the history of civilization

has afforded no similar examples, we are led to the conclusion, that the progress of refinement, by extending the influence of artificial wants, and strengthening the bonds by which men are bound to their individual possessions, gradually weakens the chords of public feelings, and that a foundation is thus laid for the decay of empires in the very consequences of their extension and greatness.

(2) Jom. xv. 50, 53. Herv. ii. 207, 209. Dign. ii. 415, 416. Dum. viii. 220, 230.

fatal to European constitutions. He had only twelve thousand regular troops remaining, but they were aided by the desultory efforts of the negroes in the plains, who were ever ready, like the peasants of la Vendée, to answer his summons, though apparently engaged only in agricultural pursuits; and with such auxiliaries, and the prospect of approaching pestilence, his resources were by no means to be despised, even by the best appointed European army. All the blacks were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit, for the intentions of the invader were no longer doubtful, and the tenor of the last instructions to Le Clerc had transpired, which were to re-establish slavery throughout the whole island (1).

Fruitless attempt to induce Toussaint to submit. Penetrated with the difficulty of the novel species of warfare on which he was about to enter, Le Clerc tried to prevail on the negro chief, by conciliatory measures and the force of his paternal affections, to lay down his arms. For this purpose, he sent to him his two sons, whom he had brought with him from Paris, along with their crafty preceptor M. Colsnon, and a letter from the First Consul, in which he acknowledged his great services to France, and offered him the command of the colony, if he would submit to the laws of the Republic. With no small difficulty the children made their way to the habitation of Toussaint at Ennery, thirty leagues from Cape Town, in the mountains. Their mother wept for joy on beholding her long-lost offspring; and the chief himself, who was absent on their arrival, fell on their necks on his return, and for a moment was shaken in his resolution to maintain the independence of his country, by the flood of parental affection. He soon, however, recovered the wonted firmness of his character. In vain his sons embraced his knees, and implored him to accede to the proposition of the First Consul; in vain his wife and family added their tears. He saw through the artifice of his enemies, and clearly perceived that his submission would be the signal for the re-establishment of slavery throughout the colony. In the generous contention, patriotic duty Feb. 12, 1802. prevailed over parental love. He sent back his sons to Le Clerc, with an evasive letter proposing an armistice; the French General granted him four days to determine, and again restored them to their father. Toussaint, upon this, retained his sons, and returned no answer to Le Clerc, who forthwith declared him a rebel, and prepared to carry on the war to the last extremity (2).

Feb. 17. General and successful attack on his position. A few days afterwards the Toulon squadron arrived, bringing a reinforcement of six thousand men; and the French General, finding himself at the head of fifteen thousand effective men, prepared for a concentric attack from all quarters on the wooded fastnesses still in the hands of the negro chief. It took place on the 17th, with the greatest success. Toussaint himself, intrenched with 2500 of his best troops, Feb. 28. supported by 2000 armed negroes, in a strong position at the ravine of Couleuvre, at the entrance of the thickets, was attacked and defeated by Rochambeau, with the loss of 700 men. His Lieutenant, Maurepas, who had gained an important success at Grosse Morne, was by this advantage placed between two fires, and forced to surrender; and soon after entered, with all his followers, into the service of the Republic. Dessalines, defeated by Boudet in the neighbourhood of St.-Marc, with his own hands set fire to his dwelling. All his officers followed his example, and the retreat of the blacks towards the mountains in the south was preceded by the massacre of twelve hundred

(1) *Norv.* ii. 207. *Jom.* xv. 53, 55. *Dum.* viii. 230, 232. *Le Clerc*, 171, 180.

(2) *Dum.* viii. 232, 235. *Jom.* xv. 55, 59. *Norv.* ii. 209, 210. *Franklin's Hayti*, 149.

whites, and clouds of smoke which announced the destruction of all the plantations in that part of the island (4).

Desperate defence of a fort in the mountains. Nothing daunted by these calamities, Dessalines had no sooner reached a place of security in the hills, than he meditated an expedition against Port-au-Prince, from which the French troops had been in a great measure withdrawn; but it was defeated by the skill and valour of Latouche-Tréville, and he was compelled to fall back to the mountains. The beaten remains of the blacks now assembled at the fort of Crête à Pierrot, an inconsiderable stronghold erected by the English at the confluence of two streams, in a position deemed inaccessible. Here, however, they were assaulted by two brigades of the French army, under Debelle; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the blacks with grape and musketry, that

March 2. the attempt to carry it by a *coup de main* failed, and the assailants were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred of their bravest troops. Le Clerc, upon this, concentrated all his disposable forces for the attack of this important point. The divisions both of Hardy and Rochambeau were brought up to support that of Debelle, and an escalade was again tried with the victorious troops of Rochambeau, who were a second time repulsed with severe loss. Le Clerc now despaired of reducing it but by regular approaches; and heavy artillery having, with infinite difficulty, been at length planted against it, the defences of the fort were battered in breach, and every thing disposed

March 23. for an assault. Conceiving themselves unable to resist the attack of so considerable a body, the negroes, during the night, fell furiously upon the blockading forces, cut their way through, and got clear off, highly elated at having arrested the whole French army above three weeks, and inflicted on them a loss of fifteen hundred men, in the attack of a fort so inconsiderable, that fifteen pieces of cannon only were found mounted on the ramparts (2).

The war assumes a guerrilla character. Meanwhile Toussaint was again rallying his broken divisions in the rear of the besieging force, and had spread terror in every direction through the conquered territory. His Lieutenant, Christophe, carried his nocturnal incursions as far as Cape Town, and kept in constant alarm the feeble garrison which was left amidst its ruins. The division Hardy in consequence fell back to their assistance, and, reinforced by two thousand five hundred fresh troops, which had just disembarked from the Dutch fleet, its brave commander issued forth, and took the field against Christophe; but the blacks, taught by experience, nowhere appeared in large bodies, and kept up such a murderous guerilla warfare upon the invaders, that without making any sensible progress, they sustained a very serious diminution. Christophe at length retired to his old and formidable positions of Dondon and La Grande Rivière, at the entrance of the woody defiles. He was there attacked by Hardy, but the French were defeated, with heavy loss (3).

Negotiations for the termination of hostilities. Both parties were now exhausted with this deadly strife. The negroes, driven from the rich and cultivated part of the island into the sterile and intricate woody fastnesses, saw no resources for successfully prolonging the contest. Their means of subsistence must soon be expected to fail in these savage thickets; they had beheld with astonishment the agility and courage with which the French soldiers pursued them into their most inaccessible retreats, and began to despair of successfully

(1) *Jour. xv. 68, 62. Dum. viii. 286, 245. Novv. ii. 211, 212.*

(2) *Dum. viii. 244, 249. Jour. xv. 64, 70. Novv. ii. 212.*

(3) *Dum. viii. 249, 255. Jour. xv. 70, 72. Novv. ii. 214.*

maintaining the contest with an enemy who was continually receiving reinforcements from apparently interminable squadrons. On the other hand, Le Clerc was not less desirous to come to an accommodation. Although, in a campaign of six weeks, he had, by great exertions, surmounted incredible difficulties, yet it could not be dissembled, that these advantages had been gained by enormous sacrifices; the reinforcements received from France were far from compensating the losses which had been sustained; the soldiers, worn out with fatigue, and disgusted with an inglorious warfare, passionately longed for repose; their republican principles revolted at shedding their blood so profusely for the re-establishment of slavery; the military chest was exhausted, and the unhealthy season was fast approaching, which would mow down the troops yet faster than the deadly aim of the negroes. These feelings at length led to an accommodation. The French General secretly entered into a separate negotiation with the leaders of the enemy; Christophe and Dessalines followed the example of Maurepas, and went over with their forces to the French service, where they received their former rank and appointments; and the heroic Toussaint was left, with a few thousand devoted followers, to make head not only against the European invaders, but the faithless Africans who had ranged themselves on their side. Borne down by necessity, the negro chief was at length forced to submit; but, in doing so, he maintained the dignity of his character, and, instead of accepting the rank and emoluments which had seduced the fidelity of his followers, returned to his mountain farm of Ennery, and resumed, like Cincinnatus, the occupations of rural life (1).

Dignified
conduct of
Toussaint.
May 6, 1802.

General Pacification.

This pacification was complete; and every thing promised a successful issue to this hazardous expedition. The negro chiefs rivalled each other in deeds testifying the reality of their submission. Christophe, Dessalines, Maurepas, zealously performed all the duties imposed on them by the French general. Thirty thousand muskets were surrendered in the department of the north alone, and stored up in the magazines of Cape Town. The French even found themselves compelled to restrain the ferocious zeal of their new allies, who put to death, without mercy, all the negroes who evaded the general disarming. Every where the blacks returned to their usual occupations. The workshops, the fields, were filled with labourers; foreign ships began to frequent the harbours, and commerce to give an air of returning prosperity to the scene of desolation. The regulations chalked out by Toussaint were for the most part adopted; the officers he had selected confirmed in their respective commands; and the foundations of a judicious system of colonial administration laid, by an assembly convoked at Cape Town. As the public treasury was exhausted, General Le Clerc pledged his private credit for these beneficent undertakings (2): a generous confidence, which was returned by the French Government by a base disavowal, which involved his family in total ruin (3).

(1) Bign. ii. 423, 424. Dum. viii. 254, 257. Jom. xv. 72, 75.

(2) Novv. H. 210. Dum. viii. 257, 261. Jom. xv. 73, 75.

(3) The regulations of Toussaint had converted personal into rural servitude. The negroes were compelled to work in common by their overseers and officers, and received in return a fourth of the produce, which fourth was divided among them, according to the skill and strength of each individual. The inspectors exercised a summary jurisdic-

tion over the labourers. All delinquencies were brought before them by the proprietors, and they forthwith investigated and punished the offence with rigid severity. Free labour was unknown, and continues so, generally speaking, to this day. It was the reality of slavery without its name. These regulations were so judicious, among a people invariably averse to voluntary exertion, that they were immediately adopted by the French General.—See DUMAS, viii. 263, 269.

The secret instructions of the First Consul directed the Commander-in-chief to engage all the negro chiefs to accept situations in the French service, and to send them over to receive employment, according to their rank, in the French continental armies (1). It was not very likely that the soldiers of Marengo and Hohenlinden would have submitted to be commanded by negro officers, or that the place of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Richepanse could have been supplied by the sable generals of division from Toussaint's army. Napoleon's real design was to deprive the blacks of their efficient leaders, and so pave the way for the re-establishment of slavery and the ancient proprietors. This was soon made manifest by what occurred at Guadaloupe. The proclamation of the First Consul had announced to the blacks the same treatment in St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe; and the re-establishment of servitude in the latter island revealed to the African race the fate which awaited them under the French Government (2).

Perfidious arrest of Toussaint by the French authorities. During the two months which followed the pacification, Toussaint lived in profound retirement in his country residence at Ennery. Meanwhile, however, the yellow fever broke out at Cape Town, and the hospitals were speedily crowded with French soldiers, several hundred of whom died every day. The sight of this catastrophe excited the hopes of the negroes, and some insurrectionary movements manifested themselves among them in the mountains, not far from Toussaint's dwelling. Le Clerc immediately called upon Toussaint to disarm these assemblages, and he formed a detachment for that purpose; but the French, being suspicious of its destination, surrounded and disarmed it; and soon after, the General-in-chief, conceiving apprehensions of the fidelity of the negro leader, had him arrested and brought to Cape Town. The grounds on which this perfidious act was justified were so flimsy as to be incapable of deceiving any one (3); but it can hardly be made a subject of reproach against Le Clerc, for his instructions were positive, in one way or another to transport to France all the leaders of the blacks. Its infamy rests on the government of Napoleon, on whom the subsequent fate of this great man has affixed a lasting stain, which the consequent destruction of the expedition has inadequately expiated (4).

Dreadful atrocities on both sides in Guadaloupe. While these events were in progress in St.-Domingo, changes which ultimately were productive of the most important consequences took place in Guadaloupe. This island had revolted and fallen under the dominion of the blacks by a process extremely analogous to, though less bloody than, that which had obtained in its larger neighbour. The mulattoes, under a renowned leader named Pélage, had risen in insur-

(1) Nap. in Month.

(2) Dum. viii. 262, 263. Nov. ii. 219. Jom. xv. 75, 76.

(3) The ground set forth by the French Government was, that in one of his letters which they intercepted, addressed to one of his old aides-de-camp, he had congratulated him "that at length Providence had come to their succour." La Providence was the name of the great hospital at Cape Town; and from this ambiguous expression the French authorities concluded that he viewed with satisfaction the progress of the malady which was consuming them; a supposition probably not far from the truth, but which could never justify the arrest of the sable hero, while living quietly on his estate on the faith of a treaty solemnly concluded with the French Government. The mode of Toussaint's arrest added to the atrocity of the deed. Instead of sending a detachment to Ennery to seize him, he was called to

Gonaives by General Brunck. The unsuspecting African fell into the snare, trusted to French honour, and was betrayed. He was forthwith sent to France, and confined in the castle of Joux, in the Jura, where he died soon after, whether by natural or violent means is unknown. This castle is situated on a rocky eminence, in a defile of those romantic mountains on the road from Besançon to Lausanne. Among the numerous spots illustrated by these memorable wars, not the least interesting is the scene of the imprisonment and death of the greatest of African heroes; and it were well for the memory of Napoleon, if it could be cleared of the obliquity arising from the sudden death, about the same time, of so many eminent men in the state prisons of France.—See NOUV. ii. 21; JOMIN, xv. 77; DUMAS, 271, 272.

(4) Dum. viii. 270, 271. Jom. xv. 77, 78.

rection in October 1801, against the European Governor, and speedily made themselves masters of the island; but hardly had they got possession of the reins of power, when they found themselves threatened by a formidable conspiracy of the slaves, and narrowly escaped being butchered a few days after May 5, 1802. in the seats of their newly acquired power. The island was in a state of anarchy, divided between rival authorities, when Admiral Bouvet arrived with the division Richepanse, 3500 strong, which had mainly contributed to the great victory of Hohenlinden. Pélagé, whose terrors were fully awakened by the fervour of the insurgent slave population, immediately ranged himself under his command, and manifested in the short campaign which followed the most distinguished bravery: but the slaves resisted, and Basseterre, the capital, was only taken after a bloody conflict. Though driven to the mountains, however, the negroes maintained a desperate conflict; an inconsiderable fort in the woods held out long, and was only reduced by a regular siege: Ignatius, a determined chief, was at length destroyed at Petit Bourg after a frightful slaughter: and another leader, named Delgrasse, blew himself up, with three hundred of his followers, rather than surrender to the enemy. These bloody catastrophes, however, extinguished the revolt in the Aug. 5, 1802. island: but they were followed by measures of unpardonable and ruinous severity. Twelve hundred prisoners were drowned in cold blood by Lacrosse, who took the command of the island; and soon after, by a proclamation issued in the name of the First Consul, slavery and the whole ancient régime was solemnly re-established. A few days afterwards, Richepanse was cut off by the yellow fever: a lamentable fate for so distinguished an European officer, to perish by an inglorious death in the midst of colonial atrocity (1).

Perfidious
conduct of
the French
towards that
island.

The intelligence of these alarming events produced the utmost agitation in St.-Domingo. The re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe, to which liberty had been promised equally as to St.-Domingo in the proclamation of the First Consul (2), naturally excited the utmost apprehensions in the blacks as to the fate which was reserved for themselves, in the event of the French authority being firmly re-established in the larger island. A stifled insurrection soon broke out, which speedily spread over the whole colony; although Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines vied with each other in acts of severity against the insurgents. Dessalines even went so far as to arrest Charles Belais, Toussaint's nephew, who was conducted to the Cape, and sentenced to death by a military commission composed of mulatto officers. But the enthusiasm soon became universal, as the mask of profound dissimulation which they had so long worn fell from the faces of the negro chiefs. On the night of the 14th October, Clervaux, Christophe, and Paul Louverture, joined the insurgents in the north, and their example was shortly afterwards followed by Dessalines with all the forces in the west (3).

General re-
volt in St.-
Domingo in
consequence.

Death of
Le Clerc,
and ruin of
the army.

The situation of the French army was now critical in the extreme. By the losses of the campaign their troops had been reduced to thirteen thousand men, and of these five thousand were in the hospitals; so that there remained only eight thousand capable of bearing arms; a force totally inadequate to maintain the whole country against an exasperated black population of several hundred thousand souls. Le Clerc therefore directed a concentration of all the disposable troops at Cape Town

(1) Dum. viii. 238, 301. Jom. xv. 80, 85.

(2) "At St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe, slavery no longer exists: all are free, and shall remain so. At Martinique, different principles must prevail:

slavery continues there, and must continue."—*Proclam. Nov. 1801.*—Dumas, viii. 238.

(3) Dum. viii. 273, 277. Jom. xv. 85, 87. Norv-
ii, 223, 224.

and Port-au-Prince; but in doing this, they were severely pressed by the insurgents, who increased immensely when their retreat had become manifest; and in the midst of this hazardous operation he was seized with the yellow fever, which had already proved fatal to Hardy, Debelle, and his best officers. The violence of the malady, and the anxiety consequent on so responsible a situation, triumphed over the natural strength of his constitution, and he died on the 2d of November, leaving the remains of the army in the deepest state of dejection (1).

Continued success of the negroes. Rochambeau succeeded to the command; but though by no means destitute of military talents, he hastened the approaching dissolution of the French authority in the island, by the violence and injustice of his civil administration. Instead of cultivating the mulatto population, who had rendered such important services to his predecessor, he for ever alienated the affections of this numerous body, by the arrest and execution of Bardet, one of the half caste chiefs who had rendered the most efficient aid to the French. Such was the exasperation occasioned by this atrocious proceeding, that it instantly threw the mulattoes into the arms of the negroes, and the flames of insurrection shortly spread through the southern and eastern parts of the island, where that mixed race chiefly prevailed. Encouraged by these successes, Christophe and Dessalines made a nocturnal attack on Cape Town in the middle of February; they surprised Fort Belair, and put the garrison to the sword; and their assault on the body of the place was only defeated by an uncommon exertion of vigour and courage on the part of the French general. Exasperated at these disasters, Rochambeau renewed his severities on the mulatto race; two of their chiefs, Prosper and Brachas, were seized and drowned; and this so enraged their countrymen, that they all left the colours of France, to which they had hitherto rendered essential service, and joined the negro standards. Informed of these disasters, Rochambeau embarked in person for Port-au-Prince, with twelve hundred fresh troops recently arrived from France: but no sooner had he advanced into the open country around that town, than his troops fell into an ambuscade, and were driven back with great loss into its walls (2).

The rupture of the peace of Amiens totally destroys the French. Matters were in this disastrous state when the finishing blow was put to the affairs of the colony, by the rupture of the peace of Amiens and renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain. The insurgents, supplied with arms and ammunition by the English cruisers, speedily became irresistible: all the fortified ports in the south and west fell into their hands. Lavalette, at Port-au-Prince, capitulated to Dessalines, and was fortunate enough to reach the Havanna with the greater part of his troops. Rochambeau, blockaded in Cape Town by the blacks on the land side, and the English at sea, was obliged, after a gallant resistance, to surrender at discretion, and was conducted to Jamaica; while the Viscount de Noailles, who last maintained the French standard on the island, escaped under false colours, dexterously eluded the vigilance of the English cruisers, and surprised one of their corvettes, but was wrecked on the Coast of Cuba, as if it had been ordained that no part of that ill-fated expedition should escape destruction (3).

Reflections on the expedition. Thus terminated this melancholy expedition, in which one of the finest armies that France ever sent forth perished, the victims of fatigue, disease, and the perfidy of its Government. The loss sustained was

(1) *Dum.* viii. 277, 279. *Jom.* xv. 87, 92.

(3) *Jom.* xv. 98, 99. *Norv.* li. 230, 231. *Dum.*

(2) *Dum.* 303, 315. *Jom.* xv. 92, 93. *Big.* ii. viii. 336, 339.

immense. Out of thirty-five thousand land troops embarked, scarce seven thousand ever regained the shores of France. The history of Europe can hardly afford a parallel instance of so complete a destruction of so vast an armament. Nevertheless the First Consul is not chargeable with any want of skill or foresight in the conduct of the expedition, or any Machiavelian design to get quit of the soldiers of a rival chief, in its original conception. The object of regaining possession of so great a colony was well worth the incurring even of considerable risk; the forces employed apparently adequate to the end; the period of the year selected the best adapted for the conduct of warlike operations. In ability of design and wisdom of execution, Napoléon never was deficient. It was the insensibility to any moral government of mankind, springing out of the irreligious habits of a revolution, that occasioned all his misfortunes. St.-Domingo, in fact, was conquered, when it was lost by his deceit and perfidy; by the iniquitous seizure of Toussaint when relying on the faith of a solemn treaty, and the re-establishment of slavery in Guadaloupe in violation of the promises of the French Government, contained in a proclamation signed by the First Consul (1).

Degraded
state of St.-
Domingo
ever since
that time.

Since the expulsion of the French from the island, St.-Domingo has been nominally independent; but slavery has been far indeed from being abolished, and the condition of the people any thing but ameliorated by the change. Nominally free, the blacks have remained really enslaved. Compelled to labour, by the terrors of military discipline, for a small part of the produce of the soil, they have retained the severity, without the advantages of servitude; the industrious habits, the flourishing aspect of the island, have disappeared; the surplus wealth, the agricultural opulence of the fields, have ceased; from being the greatest exporting island in the West Indies, it has ceased to raise any sugar (2); and the inhabitants, reduced to half their former amount, and bitterly galled by their republican task-masters, have relapsed into the indolence and inactivity of savage life (2).

(1) Bign. ii. 445.

Napoléon admitted subsequently that he was wrong in his conduct to St.-Domingo. "I have to reproach myself," said he, "for that expedition in the time of the Consulate. It was a great fault to try to subject it by force. I should have been contented with the intermediate government of Toussaint. Peace was not then sufficiently established with England: the territorial wealth to which I looked in trying to subject it, would have only enriched our enemies. It was undertaken against my opinion, in conformity to the wishes of the Council of State, who were carried away by the cries of the colonists."

—LAS CARRAS, ii. 179.

(2) Mac-kenzie's St.-Domingo, l. *passim*.

And of the measure which it affords of the capacity of the negroes. (3) The revolution of St.-Domingo has demonstrated that the negroes can occasionally exert all the vigour and heroism which distinguish the European character; but there is as yet no reason to suppose that they are capable of the continued efforts, the sustained and persevering toil, requisite to erect the fabric of civilized freedom. An observation of Gibbon seems decisive on this subject. "The inaction of the negroes does not seem to be the effect either of their virtue or of their pusillanimity. They indulge, like the rest of mankind, their passions and appetites, and the adjacent tribes are engaged in frequent acts of hostility. But this rude ignorance has never invented any effectual weapons of defence or destruction, they appear incapable of forming any extensive plans of government or conquest, and the obvious inferiority of

their mental faculties has been discovered and abused by the nations of the temperate zone. Sixty thousand blacks are annually embarked from the coast of Guinea, but they embark in chains, never to return to their native country; and this constant emigration, which, in the space of two centuries, might have furnished armies to overrun the globe, accuses the guilt of Europe and the weakness of Africa." [Gibbon, c. 25, vol. iv. 311.] If the negroes are not inferior, either in vigour, courage, or intelligence, to the Europeans, how has it happened that, for six thousand years, they have remained in the savage state? What has prevented mighty empires arising on the banks of the Niger, the Quarré, or the Congo, in the same way as on those of the Euphrates, the Ganges, and the Nile? Heat of climate, intricacy of forests, extent of desert, will not solve the difficulty, for they exist to as great an extent in the plains of Mesopotamia or Hindostan as in Central Africa. It is in vain to say the Europeans have retained the Africans in that degraded condition, by their violence, injustice, and the slave trade. How has it happened that the inhabitants of that vast and fruitful region have not risen to the government of the globe, and inflicted on the savages of Europe the evils now set forth as the cause of their depression? Did not all nations start alike in the career of infant improvement? and was not Egypt, the cradle of civilization, nearer to Central Africa than the shores of Britain? In the earliest representations of nations in existence, the paintings on the walls of the tombs of the kings of Egypt, the distinct races of the Asiatics, the Jews, the Hottentots, and the

Ambitious
designs of
Napoleon in
Europe.

But it was not only in the southern hemisphere that the vast designs of the First Consul were manifested. Europe also was the theatre of his ambition; and the preliminaries of Amiens were hardly signed, when his conduct gave unequivocal proof that he was resolved to be fettered by no treaties, and that to those who did not choose to submit to his authority, no alternative remained but the sword.

By the 11th article of the treaty of Lunéville, it had been provided, that "the contracting parties shall mutually guarantee the independence of the Batavian, Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right to the people who inhabit them to adopt whatever form of government they think fit." The allies, of course, understood by this clause real independence; in other words, a liberation of these republics from the influence of France; but it soon appeared that Napoléon affixed a very different meaning to it, and that what he intended was the establishment of constitutions in them all, which should absolutely subject them to his power.

Holland is
again revo-
lutionized.

Holland was the first of the affiliated republics which underwent the change consequent on the establishment of the consular power in France. For this purpose, the French ambassador, Schimmelpennick, repaired to the Hague, to prepare a revolution which should assimilate the government of the Batavian to that of the French republic. So devoted was the Directory at the Hague to his will, that they voluntarily became the instrument of their own destruction. On the 17th September, the French ambassador sent the constitution, ready made, to the legislative body, with the intimation, that they had nothing to do but affix to it the seal of their approbation, as it had already received the sanction of the people. In fact, on the same day, it was published to the nation, and the Directory took for granted that it would be approved. The Dutch legislature, however, were not prepared for this degradation; and the last act of their existence did honour to their memory: they decreed the suppression of the illegal acts of the Directory. Forthwith a *coup d'état* was put in force. The Directory, by Sept. 18, 1802. a violent act, dissolved the Chambers; their doors were closed by French bayonets, the guards absolved from their oaths, and all the persons in the employment of the Government dismissed. Shortly after the new constitution was published by the Directory, alike without the knowledge or concurrence of the people—but it was a nearer approximation to the habits and wishes of the respectable classes than the democratic institutions which had preceded it—a legislative body, composed of five and thirty members, in a slight degree recalled the recollection of the old States-General. The division

Europeans, are clearly marked; but the blue-eyed and white-haired sons of Japhet are represented in cow-shins, with the hair turned outwards, in the primitive state of pastoral life, while the Hottentots are already clothed in the garb of civilised existence. What since has given so mighty an impulse to European civilization, and retained in a stationary or declining state the immediate neighbours of Egyptian and Carthaginian greatness? It is impossible to arrive at any other conclusion, but that in

the qualities requisite to create and perpetuate civilization, the African is decidedly inferior to the European race; and if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by the subsequent history and present state of the Haytian republic.—See *Mackenzie's St. Domingo*, vol. ii. 280, 321.

The following table contains the comparative wealth, produce, and trade of St. Domingo, before 1789, and in 1832, after forty years of nominal freedom.

St. Domingo.

	1789.	1832.
Population,	600,000	280,000
Sugar exported,	672,000,000 lbs.	None.
Coffee,	86,789,000 lbs.	32,000,000 lbs.
Ships employed in trade,	1680	1
Sailors,	27,000	167
Exports to France,	L.6,720,000	None.
Imports from ditto,	4,890,000	None.

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of provinces was the same as in the United States; but the Council of State, of twelve members, with a president changing every three months, was possessed of much more absolute power than ever belonged to the Stadtholder, while the frequent change of the president prevented any one from acquiring such a preponderance as might render him formidable to the authority of the First Consul. The form of submitting the constitution to the people was gone through. Out of 416,419 citizens having a right to vote, 52,219 rejected it. The immense majority who declined to vote was assumed to be favourable to the change, and the new government was solemnly proclaimed. The conduct of the Dutch on this occasion affords a striking proof of the impossibility of eradicating, by external violence, the institutions which have grown with the growth and strengthened with the strength of a free people. In vain they were subdued by the armies of France, and democratic institutions forced upon them, with the loud applause of the indigent rabble in power. The great mass of the inhabitants, and almost the whole proprietors; withdrew altogether from public situations, and took no share whatever in the changes which were imposed upon their country. In the seclusion of private life, they retained the habits, the affections, and the religious observances of their forefathers; their children were nursed in these patriotic feelings, untainted by the revolutionary passions which agitated the surrounding states; and when the power of Napoléon was overthrown, the ancient government was re-established, with as much facility, and as universal satisfaction, as the English constitution on the restoration of Charles II (1).

And the
Cisalpine
Republic
again re-
modelled.

Having thus established a government in Holland, entirely subservient to his will, and in harmony with the recent institutions in France, the next care of the First Consul was to remodel the Cisalpine republic in such a way as to render it, too, analogous to the parent state, and equally submissive to his authority. For this purpose, early in November, 1801, the French authorities began to prepare the inhabitants of the infant Republic for the speedy fixing of their destinies, and the formation of a new constitution better adapted to their more matured state of existence; and, on the 14th of the same month, a proclamation of the Extraordinary Commission of Government announced the formation of an Assembly of 480 deputies at Lyon, in the end of December, to deliberate on the approaching constitution. The place assigned for their meeting sufficiently indicated the influence intended to be exercised over their deliberations; and it was openly avowed in the proclamation, which "invited the First Consul to suspend the immense labours of his magistracy, to share with the members of the Assembly the important duties which awaited them." To render the members more docile to his will, and prepare the scenes in the drama which was to be performed before the audience of Europe, two of the ablest statesmen of France, M. Talleyrand and M. Chaptal, preceded the First Consul at Lyon, and arranged every thing before his arrival in a way perfectly conformable to his will (2).

The Convocation was opened on the 31st December, at Lyon, with extraordinary pomp. The unwonted concourse of strangers, both from France and Italy; the extraordinary number of the most illustrious characters of both countries who were assembled, gave that city the air of the capital of southern Europe; the splendour of the processions with which the proceedings were opened, excited the utmost enthusiasm among the inhabitants. On the 11th

(1) Dum. viii. 39, 42. Norv. ii. 174, 175.

(2) Bot. iii. 416. Bign. ii. 152, 153. Norv. ii. 175, 176.

Entry of Napoleon into
Lyon. Senate-
Consultum
there set-
tling the
Cisalpine
government.

January the First Consul made his triumphal entry into the city, escorted by a brilliant troop of one hundred and fifty young men of the first consideration, and was every where received with the most enthusiastic acclamations. Fêtes, spectacles, and theatrical representations succeeded each other without interruption, and universal transports attended the opening of a council fraught with the fate of the Italian peninsula. The few deputies attached to republican principles soon perceived that their visions of democracy were vanishing into air; but unable to stem the torrent, they were constrained to devour their vexation in secret, and join in the external acts of homage to the First Consul. But amidst the fumes of incense and the voice of adulation, Napoléon never for one instant lost sight of the important object of establishing his authority in Italy; and the Jan. 25, 1802. report of the committee to whom the formation of a constitution had been referred, soon unfolded the extent of his views. They reported that reasons of policy and state necessity forbade the evacuation of the Cisalpine territory by the French troops; that the infant Republic "had need of a support which should cause it to be respected by the powers who have not yet recognized its existence; that it absolutely required a man, who, by the ascendant of his name and power, might give it the rank and consideration which it could no otherwise attain; and therefore that General Bonaparte should be invited to honour the Cisalpine Republic by continuing to govern it, and by blending with the direction of the Government in France the charge of its affairs, as long as he might deem necessary for uniting all the parts of its territory under the same political institutions, and causing it to be recognized by all the powers of Europe." Napoléon accepted without hesitation the duty thus imposed upon him. He replied—"The choice which I have hitherto made of persons to fill your principal offices has been independent of every feeling of party or local interests; but as to the office of President of the Republic, I can discover no one among you who has sufficient claims on the public gratitude, or is sufficiently emancipated from party feelings, to deserve that trust. I yield, therefore, to your wishes, and I shall preserve, as long as circumstances shall require it, the lead in your affairs." Loud applauses followed every part of this well-conceived pageant; and, at the conclusion of the address, the whole Assembly rose and demanded that the name of "Cisalpine" should be changed into that of "Italian Republic," an important alteration, which revealed the secret design, already formed by the ruler of France, of converting the whole peninsula into one state in close alliance with the great nation (1).

Manner of the new constitution. The new constitution of the Italian Republic, "prepared in the cabinet of the First Consul, and to which the representatives of that state were not permitted to offer any opposition," was founded upon different principles from any yet promulgated in Europe. Three electoral colleges were formed; one composed of proprietors, one of persons of the learned professions, one of the commercial interest, whose numbers were invariably to remain the same. The legislative body consisted of seventy-five persons, elected by these colleges; while the vice-president, secretary of state, and all the members of the executive, were appointed by the First Consul. This constitution, so different from the democratic institutions which had preceded it, in some respects merits the eulogy of the Italian historian, as being "the best which Napoléon had ever conceived (2);" and unquestion-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1802, 78. Bot. iii. 416, 417. Novv. ii. 176, 177. Bigu. ii. 154, 157.

(2) Bot. iii. 416.

ably, in the restriction of the elective franchise to the most respectable members of these different classes, an important step was made towards that establishment of political power, on the basis of property and intelligence, which is the only foundation on which that admirable part of a limited government can be securely rested. Melzi, a great proprietor in Lombardy, was appointed vice-president of the republic, with every demonstration of regard from the First Consul; a judicious choice, well deserved by the character and patriotism of that illustrious nobleman; and in that appointment, not less than the general character of the constitution, the democratic party perceived a death-blow to all the hopes they had formed (1).

The success of this measure for the thorough subjection of the Italian Republic to his will, led, shortly after, to another still more audacious, and which at any other period would have instantly lighted in Europe the flames of a general war. On the 11th September, Piedmont was, by a formal decree, annexed to the French Republic, the First Consul alleging, that the absence of any stipulation in his favour, in the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, was equivalent to a permission for him to absorb it in the growing dominion of France. The principle was thus openly acted upon, that the republic was at liberty to incorporate with its dominions any lesser state, whose integrity was not expressly guaranteed by the greater powers. By this bold measure, all the north of Italy, from the summit of the Maritime Alps to the shores of the Mincio, was directly subjected to French influence; and Austria beheld at Milan a second French capital, almost within sight of the frontier of its Italian possessions. Thus Sardinia, which was the first of the European states which had submitted to the power of Napoléon, which, after a fortnight's struggle, opened its gates to the youthful conqueror, and had since, through every change of fortune (2), remained faithful to his cause, was rewarded for its early submission and long fidelity by being the first to be destroyed; and the keys of Italy were placed without opposition in the hands of the French republic.

Formidable as these acquisitions to France were, they were rendered doubly so from the measures taken at the same time by the enterprising spirit and vast conceptions of the First Consul to secure these important Transalpine acquisitions to his dominions. Louis XIV had said, after the family compact was concluded, "There are no longer any Pyrenees;" but with greater reason Napoléon might say, after the roads over the Simplon and Mont-Cenis were formed, "There are no longer any Alps." The Valais, an integral part of Switzerland, but of great importance in a military point of view, as commanding the direct route from France to Italy, both by the Great St.-Bernard and the Simplon, was erected into a separate republic, entirely under French influence, under the denomination of the "Republic of the Valais." The object of detaching this considerable state from the Helvetic confederacy was soon apparent. French engineers began to work on the northern side of the Simplon; Italian, to surmount the difficulties of the long ravine on the south; and soon that magnificent road was formed which leads from the rugged banks of the Rhône to the smiling shores of the Lago Maggiore, and has revealed to the eyes of an admiring world the stupendous grandeur of the defile of Gondo. Similar works were undertaken at the same time up the valley of the Isère and over Mont-Cenis, as well as from the Rhône over Mont-Genevre to Turin.

Sept. 11, 1802.
Annexation
of Piedmont
to France.

Construc-
tion of the
roads over
Mont-Cenis
and the
Simplon.

July 2, 1802.

(1) Dum. viii. 56, 57. Bign. ii. 157, 158. Norv. ii. 177, 178.

(2) Dum. ix. 66, 67. Jom. xv.

The Alps, traversed by three splendid roads, ceased to present any obstacle to an invading army (1); and works, greater than the Roman Emperors achieved in three centuries of their dominion in Italy, were completed by Napoléon in the three first years of his consular government.

The command of Savoy, Piedmont, the Pays de Vaud, and the Valais, gave France a ready entrance through these new roads into Italy; but not content with this, the First Consul rapidly extended his dominions through the centre of the peninsula. A new constitution was given to the Ligurian Republic, which brought Genoa more immediately under French influence.

Parma and Placentia are occupied, with Elba. The secret treaty of March 12, 1801, with Spain, by which Parma and Placentia were ceded to the Italian Republic, was made public, and the French troops took possession of that state, as well as the island of Elba, on the shores of Tuscany; while the King of Etruria, at Florence, a creature of his creation, preserved entire the ascendancy of the First Consul in the centre of Italy. Thus not only was the authority of Napoléon obeyed, but almost his dominion extended from the North Sea to the Roman states; while the Pope and the King of Naples, trembling for their remaining possessions, had no alternative but entire submission to the irresistible power in the north of the peninsula (2).

These rapid and unparalleled encroachments would, notwithstanding the bad success of their former efforts, have led to a fresh coalition of the continental powers against France, if they had not been intent at that moment upon the important subject of indemnities to be provided for the German princes, and divided by the fatal apple of discord which French diplomacy had thus contrived to throw between the rival powers of Prussia and Austria.

Progress of the negotiations for the German indemnities. When the conquests of France were extended to the Rhine, and all the territories on the left bank were permanently annexed to the Republic, not only a host of small German princes were dispossessed of their estates, but several of the greater powers lost valuable appendages of their dominions, situated on the same side of the river. To soften the effects of this deprivation, it was provided by the treaty of Lunéville, that indemnities should be obtained by the sovereigns who had suffered on the occasion, and for this purpose a Congress be opened in some convenient part of the German empire. But how were the sufferers to be indemnified, when the whole territories on the right bank were already appropriated by lay or ecclesiastical princes; and no one could receive an indemnity without some party being spoliated to give him admission? To solve the difficulty, it was agreed by the greater powers to *secularize*, as it was called, a large proportion of the ecclesiastical sovereignties of the empire. In other words, to confiscate a considerable part of the church property, and out of the spoils thus acquired provide equivalents for the conquests gained by the French Republic. Thus the dangerous precedent was established, of indemnifying the stronger power at the expense of the weaker, a species of iniquity of which France and Austria had set the first example, in their atrocious convention for the partition of the Venetian territories, and which, by shewing the German princes that they could place no reliance on the support of the great powers in a moment of danger, gave an irremediable wound to the constitution of the empire.

As it was early foreseen that the partition of these indemnities would form a most important subject of discussion, and that by dexterous negotiation on that subject more might be gained than by a successful campaign, the great

(1) Dum. ix. 81. Ann. Reg. 1802, 90.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1802, 88, 89. Dum. ix. 81, 82.

powers soon began to strengthen themselves by secret alliances. Preparatory to the approaching contention, and before entering that great field of diplomacy, France and Russia inserted, with this view, in the secret treaty, Oct. 8, 1801. 8th October, 1801, already mentioned, between the two powers, a stipulation, by which it was provided that the two Cabinets "should pursue a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to the adoption of their plans in the partition of the indemnities, which have for an invariable object the maintenance of a just equilibrium between the houses of Prussia and Austria (1)." Shortly before, a treaty had been concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the First Consul guaranteed all the possessions of the latter, and engaged to support his claim for indemnities with all the influence in his power. Prussia might already calculate with certainty upon the support of France, not only from general principles of policy and common jealousy of the Emperor, but from the express stipulations in the treaty of Basle, in 1795, and the secret convention of 1796, in virtue of which she had maintained an ambiguous neutrality, of essential service to the Republic in the subsequent desperate struggles with the Imperial forces. The Prussian Cabinet accordingly received the warmest assurances of support from the First Consul in the approaching negotiations; and the idea of a triple alliance between the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and St.-Petersburg was even talked of and seriously entertained at all these capitals; insomuch, that the French envoy, General Hédouville, and the Prussian at Paris, the Marquis Lucchesini, received orders from their respective Courts to make every exertion to bring about this object. At length, on May 23, 1802. the 23d May, 1802, a treaty was concluded at Paris between France and Prussia, without the privy of the Russian Ambassador, which settled the amount of the Prussian indemnity and that of the Prince of Orange; and such was the address of the First Consul and his Ambassador at St.-Petersburg, that the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander to its provisions was obtained without difficulty, notwithstanding the slight thus offered to his influence. By this convention it was stipulated that Prussia should obtain the bishoprics of Paderborn and Hildesheim, L'Eschefeld, the town and territory of Erfurth, the city of Munster, with the greater part of its territory, and other cities and abbacies, to the amount of more than four times what she had lost on the left bank of the Rhine. In return for these large acquisitions at the expense of neutral states, Prussia "guaranteed to the French Republic the arrangements made in Italy, viz.—the existence of the kingdom of Etruria, that of the Italian Republic, and the annexation of the 27th military division (Piedmont) to the French territory." By a treaty, signed on 4th June, 1802, between France and Austria, it was stipulated that these two powers should act together in regulating the matter of the indemnities; and the Emperor Alexander, when he ratified the treaty, provided for a compensation to the King of Sardinia for his continental possessions, and to the Duke of Holstein Oldenburg for his losses under the new arrangement. Thus was Prussia rewarded for her impolitic desertion of the European alliance and seven years of discreditable neutrality, by the acquisition of extensive territorial possessions adjoining her own dominions; thus did Napoléon, who had first bribed Austria to wink at his Italian conquests by the confiscation of the whole continental possessions of Venice, now reward the defection of Prussia by the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire. The parties to this general system of

Cordial
union of
France and
Prussia in
this matter.

In return
for which
Prussia
guarantees
the French
acquisitions
in Italy.

June 4, 1802.

spoliation, linked as they were together, seemed to be beyond the reach of punishment; but Providence was preparing for them all, in consequence of their iniquity, the means of ultimate retribution—for Austria the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz; for Prussia the catastrophe of Jena and treaty of Tilsit; for Napoléon the retreat from Moscow and rock of St.-Helena (1).

Policy of
Austria in
this negoti-
ation :

The views of Austria in this negotiation were widely different. Intent upon gaining a large indemnity for herself, and desirous even of extending her frontier from the Inn to the Iser at the expense of Bavaria, in exchange for her possessions in Swabia, she was yet opposed to the system of secularization, and desirous that the compensations should break up as little as possible the old and venerable constitution of the Germanic empire. This policy, which duty equally with interest prescribed to the head of that great confederation, was directly opposite to that which France and Prussia pursued. The former of these powers was anxious to augment her own strength by the acquisition of as many of the ecclesiastical possessions as possible, and increase her influence by the enrichment, at the expense of the church, of the princes who were included in the line of neutrality protected by her power; the latter looked only to breaking up the German confederation, and creating a circle of little sovereigns round the frontiers of the Republic dependent on its support for the maintenance of its

recent acquisitions. Russia took under its especial protection, after the share of Prussia was secured by the treaty of May, 1802, the interests of Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and Baden; and France cordially united in their support; foreseeing already, in the extension of these powers through revolutionary influence, the formation of an outpost which might at all times open an entrance for its armies into the heart of Germany, and counterbalance all the influence of the Emperor in its defence. Thus was Austria, the power best entitled, both from the dignity of the Imperial crown and the magnitude of its possessions in the empire, to a preponderating voice in the negotiation, thrown into the shade in the deliberations, and thus did Russia and Prussia unite with the First Consul in laying the foundation of that CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, from which, as a hostile outwork, he was afterwards enabled to lead his armies to Jena, Friedland, and the Kremlin (2).

Secret views
of the latter
power.

It was not without ulterior views to her own advantage that Russia supported in this extraordinary manner the pretensions of France in the affairs of Germany. The French ambassador at St.-Petersburg, M. Hédouville, received instructions from the First Consul to assure the Emperor of his "sincere desire to obtain for Russia the entire and free navigation of the Black Sea;" while, at the same time, Colonel Caulaincourt was commissioned at Paris to communicate to Napoléon the desire of the Czar to favour the extension of French commerce in the Black Sea; M. Hédouville was also enjoined to open a negotiation for "the triumph of liberal principles in the navigation and commerce of neutral vessels." Thus Napoléon shook for a moment the firm purpose of the Emperor Alexander, by artfully presenting to his youthful imagination the objects of ambition long cherished by his predecessors, Catherine and Paul—afterwards, in part, attained by his successor, Nicholas (3).

Convinced at length, from the intelligence communicated by his ambassadors at St.-Petersburg, Paris, and Berlin, of the perfect accord between these powers, the Emperor of Austria deemed it high time to take some step

(1) Bign. ii. 304, 325. Journ. xv. 23, 27. Dum. vii. 10, 23.

(2) Dum. vii. 23, 40. Bign. ii. 325, 332. Journ. xv. 26, 29.

(3) Bign. ii. 320, 321.

which should vindicate his authority as the head of the empire, and shew the coalesced powers that they would not succeed in maintaining all their proposed acquisitions but by force of arms. By an imperial decree

July 23, 1801.

Courageous
act of Aus-
tria in occu-
pying Passau.

he directed that the deputation of the interested powers should meet at Ratisbon on the 3d August. This deputation consisted of four electors, viz. Mayence, Saxony, Bohemia, and Brandenburg, and four members of the College of Princes, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, and Hesse Cassel. It was universally known that a decided majority of this assembly was in the interests of France; and in effect so little did the coalesced powers attempt to disguise their designs, that the parties whom they supported had taken possession of the provinces allotted to them in the secret treaties before the Congress at Ratisbon assembled. The King of Prussia, on July 3d, took possession of the territories assigned to him, in conformity with a proclamation issued on the 6th June, and the Elector of Bavaria, following the example, seized on the territories he was to receive on the 17th July, and was proceeding to occupy Passau, when the emperor, who regarded that important city with reason as one of the bulwarks of his hereditary states, anticipated him by marching the Austrian forces into it, as well as into the archbishopric and city of Saltzburg (1).

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Angry correspondence in consequence between France and Austria. This courageous act, which seemed at first sight to set at defiance the whole power of Russia, Prussia, and France, was in reality levelled at the First Consul, who had, by secret instructions not communicated to the other powers, enjoined this extravagant prejudication of the deliberations of the Congress. Desirous, however, if possible, to avoid coming to an open rupture with France, the Emperor instructed his ambassador at Paris to soften as much as possible the hostile act, by representing that the town in dispute was only taken possession of in a provisional manner, till its destiny was finally determined by the Congress. An angry interchange of notes ensued between the French and Imperial ambassadors, during which, the first Consul deemed the opportunity favourable to draw still closer his relations with the Prussian Cabinet. In consequence, Sept. 5, 1802. a treaty was concluded, on the 5th September, between France, Prussia, and Bavaria, by which it was stipulated, that if "within sixty days the Emperor should not evacuate the town of Passau and its dependencies, the French and Prussian Governments should unite their forces to compel him to do so, as well as to maintain the ancient possessions of Bavaria on the right bank of the Inn." To this convention the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg acceded, stipulating only as the condition of its concurrence, an adequate compensation to the Grand Duke of Tuscany (2).

Aug. 18. Conferences at Ratisbon. Meanwhile the conferences at Ratisbon were opened, and the fruit of the secret negotiations which had so long been depending became manifest. Immediately after it met, the ministers of France and Russia laid on the table a joint plan for the partition of the indemnities, and insisted that the matters submitted to their deliberations should be finally adjusted within the space of sixty days. This haughty interference on the part of stranger powers was in the highest degree grating to the feelings of the Austrian Cabinet, but, with the usual prudence of their administration, they resolved to dissemble their resentment. Having recourse again to negotiation, they assailed the Cabinet of the Tuileries by the same artifices with which the First

(1) Dum. vii. 42, 45. Join. xv. 28, 29. Bigu. ii. 333, 335.

(2) Bigu. ii. 335, 338. Dum. viii. 44, 51.

The principle of compensation is admitted.

Dec. 26, 1802.

Consul had succeeded so well at St.-Petersburg and Berlin, and offered, on condition of obtaining some advantages in Germany, to recognize his recent strides in Italy. This proposal had the desired effect. Two conventions were concluded at Paris, in the end of December, between Austria and France, which settled the affairs both of Italy and Germany. By the first, the compensations in which the Imperial family was interested were fixed. The Bisgraw and Ortenaw were conferred upon the Duke of Modena, in lieu of the states he had lost in Italy, and the Emperor received in exchange the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which were severed from the church for that purpose, while Passau was ceded to Bavaria, and in exchange, the bishopric of Aichstedt conferred upon Austria. By the second, the Emperor recognized the King of Etruria, and all the changes which had taken place in Italy since the treaty of Lunéville (1).

The shares of the greater powers being settled, the claims of the minor states were easily disposed of, and the indemnities finally adjusted by a recess of 25th February, 1803. By this arrangement, the most important which had taken place since the treaty of Westphalia, the old Germanic constitution was entirely overturned, and a new division made which for ever destroyed the fundamental principles of the empire. It was easy to perceive, on comparing the compensations dealt out to the different states, the influence which had preponderated in the deliberations, and the gross injustice with which those states who had inclined, in the preceding contests, to the interests of France, were enriched at the expense of those who had stood by the Imperial fortunes. The Grand Duke of Tuscany received hardly a fourth—the Duke of Modena little more than a third of what they had respectively lost; while Prussia acquired four times, and Bavaria nearly twice, the amount of their ceded provinces on the left bank of the Rhine (2).

(1) Bign. ii. 343, 345. Jom. xv. 31, 32.

(2) Dam. vii. 48, 49. Jom. xv. 32, 33. Bign. i. 344, 349.

By this treaty, the equivalents settled upon the principal powers, out of the ecclesiastical spoils of the empire, were thus adjusted.

I. Prussia, by the treaty of Basle, had ceded to the Republic her provinces on the left of the Rhine, including the duchy of Gueldres, the principality of Moeris, and part of the duchy of Cleves, containing in all

Proportion in which the several powers gained acquisition.	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	137,000	1,400,000 florins.
Gained,	526,000	3,800,000
So gained,	389,000	2,400,000

Her acquisitions, which made up this great addition, consisted of the free towns of Malhausen, Nordhausen, and Gualar. The bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and part of Munster, and many other abbeys and church lands.

II. Bavaria had lost, beyond the Rhine, the duchy of Deux Ponts, that of Juliers, and the palatinate of the Rhine. She received in stead the important free towns of Ulm, Memmingen, Nordlingen, the bishoprics of Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Augsbourg, and Passau, and a vast many rich abbeys and monasteries. Her losses and gains stood thus—

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	580,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	854,500	6,607,000
Gained,	274,500	2,801,000

III. Wirtemberg, for its possessions in Alsace and Franche-Comté, obtained nine Imperial cities and eight abbeys.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
She lost,	14,000	240,000 florins.
Gained,	120,000	612,000
Gained,	106,000	372,000

While such were the portions allotted to the states under the protection of France or Russia, who were to be rewarded for preceding neutrality, and form the basis of a counterpoise to the power of Austria, the indemnities allotted to the connections of that power were of the most meagre description. For example, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had lost in Italy the beautiful duchy of Tuscany, and he

Disastrous
moral effects
of this gene-
ral spoliation
of the eccle-
siastical
Princes.

But it was not merely by the augmentation of some and diminution of other states, and the formation of a body of sovereigns in the empire, dependent on France for the maintenance of their acquisitions, that this partition of the indemnities was fatal to the best interests of Europe. Moral effects far more disastrous resulted from this great act of diplomatic spoliation. In all ages, indeed, the maxim *vae victis* has been the rule of war; and injury or subjugation formed the lot of the conquered. But in all such cases, not even excepting the recent and flagrant partition of Poland, it was on the belligerent states only that these consequences fell; and the adjoining nations were exempt from the effects of the tempest which had overthrown their less fortunate neighbour. It was reserved for an age in which the principles of justice, freedom, and civil right were loudly invoked on both sides, to behold the adoption of a different principle, and see belligerent states indemnify themselves for their losses in war, at the expense not of the vanquished, but of neutral and weaker powers which had taken no part in the contest. This monstrous injustice, of which Napoléon gave the first example, in the cession of Venice, precipitated into hostile measures by his intrigues, to Austria, was immediately adapted and acted upon by all the great powers; and at the Congress of Ratisbon their frontiers were rounded, and strength augmented, by the spoils of almost all the ecclesiastical princes, and a great number of the free cities of the empire. This, too, was done, not by conquerors with arms in their hands, not in the heat of victory, or triumph of conquest, but by calculating diplomatists, in the bosom of peace, without any inquiry into the interest or wishes of the transferred people, and guided only by an arithmetical estimate in cold blood of the comparative acquisitions by each power in revenue, subjects, and territory. All ideas of public right, of a system of international law, or the support of the weaker against the greater powers, were overturned by this deliberate act of spoliation. Woful experience diffused an universal conviction of the lamentable truth, that the lesser states had never so much cause for alarm as when the greater were coming to an accommodation. Neutrality, it was seen, was the most perilous course which could be adopted, because it interested no one in the preservation of the weaker states; and all Europe prepared to follow the banners of one or other of the rival chiefs, who, it was foreseen, must soon contend for the empire of the world in the centre of Germany. It is the glory of England that she alone has never acceded to this system of international spoliation; but on the contrary resisted it, on every occasion, to the utmost of her power: that her acquisitions and losses have been all at the expense of her enemies or herself: that no friendly or neutral power has had cause to rue the day that she signed her treaties; and that so far from gaining at the expense of lesser states, she has repeatedly made sacrifices of enormous magnitude, to soften the consequences of their adverse fortune—a memorable instance of the effects of real freedom and a constitutional government in subduing the desire of gain and elevating the standard of public virtue, and of the difference of

received the archbishopric of Saltabourg, the bishopric of Aichstedt, part of that of Passau, and the valley of Beretolsgraden.

	Inhabitants.	Revenue.
He lost,	1,150,000	3,800,000 florins.
Gained,	286,000	2,150,000
Lost,	864,000	1,650,000

—See BIEZOR, ii. 349, 351; and JOMINI, xv. 32, 37.

its effects from all that the fumes of revolutionary enthusiasm or the ambition of despotic power are capable of producing!

Projects of
Napoleon
against Swit-
zerland.

While the continental powers were intent on the acquisition of ill-gotten gains in the centre of Germany, Napoléon had leisure to pursue his projects of ambition in the mountains of Switzerland. His conduct towards the inhabitants of that country led to important consequences, as it first unfolded, even to his warmest admirers, the insatiable spirit of aggrandizement by which he was actuated, and was one of the immediate causes of the renewal of the war.

Advantages
of the federal
system in
that coun-
try.

When republican institutions are established in a country of considerable extent and varied productions, it is by the *federal system*—in other words, a congregation of independent states, having each the power of internal legislation—that the national integrity can alone for any length of time be preserved. The reason is, that separate interests are there brought to bear directly on the conduct of public affairs; and if those interests are adverse, which must frequently be the case, the despotism of the stronger over the weaker power speedily becomes insupportable. A monarch equally removed from both, and equally dependent upon either for his support, may dispense equal justice between the contending interests of separate provinces or classes of society; but it is in vain to expect any thing like equity in the judgment formed by one of these provinces or classes upon the rival pretensions of the other. To do so is to expect that men will judge equally and impartially in their own cause; a pitch of perfection to which human nature never has, and never will arrive. The Autocrat of Russia, or the Emperors of Rome, may deal out impartial justice in determining on the rival and conflicting interests of the different provinces of their vast dominions; but it is quite extravagant to look for a just decision by one of these provinces or its representatives upon the other. Power, superiority of votes or influence, will ever form the basis of their decision; the majority, as Tocqueville tells us it now is in America, will become despotic; and that power will never be yielded up but to the sword. The unchangeable division in Great Britain between the manufacturing and agricultural classes on the subject of the corn laws, and the threatened dissolution of the American confederacy by the collision of the Southern and Northern Provinces on the subject of the tariff on English goods, are so many instances of the operation of the simple principle, that no man can judge impartially in his own cause; and which, when applied to nations, forbids the extension of democratic institutions for any great length of time beyond the limits of a single city or particular class of society (1).

Interest, accordingly, universally leads the holders of considerable property, in all countries where democratic institutions prevail, to support the system of federal union, in preference to that of a central and universally diffused authority; because they find that it is in small states where the interests of the inhabitants are nearly the same, and in such states only, that their influence can be felt, or their wants receive due consideration. On the other hand, the democratic party in such communities are generally at first desirous of the concentration of power in a central government, and the con-

(1) Sparta, Athens, Carthage, Rome, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, are instances of the government of a subject-territory by the citizens of a single town: Holland, of the ascendancy of one commercial class in society: Great Britain, from 1688 to 1832, of a government substantially vested

in the representatives of the great properties and interests of the state. It is not difficult to foresee what must be the result of the subsequent transference of political power from the proprietors to the multitude in an empire composed of such widely separated and discordant materials.

currence of all the representatives in its formation : these being the circumstances in which the influence of the leaders of the multitude is most effectually exercised, and the ascendancy of towns, where their partisans are chiefly to be found, most thoroughly established.

Its adaptation to the varieties of their physical condition.

Though not extensive in point of superficial surface, Switzerland embraced such an extraordinary variety of climate, soil, and occupation, as rendered the rule of a single central democratic government in an especial manner vexatious. The habits and interests of the vine-growers in the Pays de Vaud are as much at variance with those of the shepherds of Glarus, as those of the intellectual city of Geneva or the aristocratic society of Berne are with the manufacturers of Soleure, or the chestnut-fed inhabitants of the Italian bailiwicks. Nor were the habits and ideas of the people less at variance than the physical features of the districts in which they dwelt. Their lineage, their language, their religion, their affinities were different. Perched on the summit of the Alps, they partook of the varied character of the races of mankind who met at their feet and ran up the valleys to their highest summits.

Different characters of the races which composed its inhabitants.

The inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud, speaking the French tongue, shared in the feelings and excitement which the Revolution had produced to the north of the Jura. Those who dwelt on the Ticino and the Misocco betrayed, in their harmonious language, enthusiastic feelings, and indolent habits, the influence of Italian descent; while the brave Switzers to the north of the St.-Gothard evinced, in their independent spirit, rough manners, cleanly habits, and persevering character, the distinguishing features which in every age have distinguished the nations of German or Gothic descent. To establish one uniform democratic government for a country so situated, is as great an absurdity as it would be to propose the same political institutions for the English, trained to habits of order by centuries of freedom; the French, impetuous by nature, and unrestrained by custom; and the Russians, but recently emerged, under the rule of despotism, from savage life.

Discontent which the central democratic government produced.

The natural and unavoidable consequence of the establishment of a central democratical government, in a country composed of such various and discordant materials, was the entire subjugation of the rural districts by the inhabitants of the great towns. The peasants of Underwalden, the shepherds of Glarus, in vain attempted a contest with the citizens of Berne, Lausanne, or Zurich, speaking a different language, trained to habits of business, and closely congregated round the seat of government. In the unequal struggle they were speedily cast down; and thus the unity of the republic was but another expression to them for the practical loss of all their political franchises. The circumstances, too, under which this constitution had been forced upon them—the cruel devastation of their country, by which it had been preceded—the odious foreign yoke which it had brought upon their necks—the unheard-of contributions and spoliation by which it had been followed—had produced indelible feelings of aversion among the mountaineers,—a race of men resolute in their ideas, tenacious of their habits, and more jealous of their independence than any other people in Europe. Hence the singular fact, that the most ardent opponents of the new central government were to be found among the partisans of the most opposite former constitutions; and that, beside the oligarchy of Berne and Zurich, where political power was confined to a limited number of families, were to be found the peasants of the Forest Cantons, who exercised indiscriminately, under the canopy of heaven, all the functions of government (4).

After the forcible proclamation of the new constitution imposed by the Directory upon Switzerland in 1798, the country remained for four years the theatre of interminable contests and intrigues. The success of the allies in 1799 having brought their forces into the mountains, and the Archduke Charles having, by proclamation, invited the people to re-establish their ancient form of government, an insurrection broke out simultaneously in every part of the country; but the allies being unable to render them any assistance, or advance any distance into their territory, it was speedily suppressed, without difficulty, by the armed force organized in the towns in the

Violent internal dissensions of the Swiss Cantons. French interest. Overwhelmed with astonishment at the immense bodies of men who contended for the empire of Europe amid their mountains, sensible of their own insignificance amidst such prodigious masses, and equally pillaged by friend and foe, the Swiss took hardly any farther share in the contest, and resigned themselves, in hopeless despair, to a yoke which, in the circumstances of the world, appeared inevitable. But the passions, restrained from breaking out into open hostilities with foreign powers, burned only the more fiercely in the internal dissensions which tore every part of the republic. So furious did the spirit of party become, and so vehement the reproaches addressed by the adverse factions to each other, that the historian would be at a loss to recognize the features of the Swiss character, were it not in the lenity of them all, when victorious, to their fallen adversaries,—a moderation so remarkable, and so analogous to what took place in Holland during all the convulsions subsequent to the Revolution, and in England throughout the Great Rebellion, that it encourages the pleasing hope, that such tempering of savage inclination is either the blessed result of long-established freedom and religious habits, or is an inherent quality in the nations of Gothic descent (4).

Arguments adduced by the partisans of France. Without pursuing the complicated thread of Helvetic revolution during the four disastrous years that followed the French invasion, it will be more serviceable to give a summary of the arguments urged respectively by the partisans of the new constitution and the ancient government. On the part of the French supporters it was urged, "that nothing could be so extravagant as to hear the federal party invoke the popular welfare, when they were in reality advancing the interests only of oligarchy and fanaticism. How dare they make use of the sacred name of freedom, when, under the name of a popular government, two or three families have been for above a century in possession of all the offices of administration? It is in vain that they impose so far upon the public credulity as to style the central government a thousand times more burdensome than the ancient régime, when the slightest observation must be sufficient to shew that the burdens which have pressed so severely upon all classes have been owing solely to the evils inseparable from foreign warfare. And are the expenses of a few additional regiments, and of a central administration, composed at most of eighty or a hundred individuals, to be put in comparison with at least twenty separate governments, embracing, with their subordinate agents, several thousand persons? Disguise it as you will, it is not the feelings of patriotism or the public interest which occasion all the outcry, but selfish

(4) *Jom.* xiv. 410, 411. *Bigr.* ii. 361. *Dum.* viii. 33, 37.

The usual course with the victorious party was to banish their fallen antagonists to Basle or Lausanne; and, after a few months, even this severity was relaxed, and the proscribed families returned to their

homes and usual avocations. What a contrast to the proscriptions of the Convention, and transportation of the Directory, in the capital styling itself the centre of European civilization!—See, *Bignon*, ii. 361.

consideration and private advantage. Thinking, like Cæsar, that it is better to be the first at Praenesté than the second at Rome, these popular despots would rather reign unmolested in their little valleys than be blended in the general administration of Switzerland, where they would speedily be reduced to their proper level, and where their voices, drowned in the minority, would cease to give them the consideration to which they aspire, under the mask of disinterested patriotism (1).

Answers
made by the
partisans of
the old insti-
tutions.

It was impossible to deny that there was some truth in these insinuations; but the opposite party, at the head of which Aloys Reding, chief of the Canton of Schwytz—a chief of an energetic and noble character—did not fail to retort upon their adversaries arguments of an opposite kind, to which the recent calamities gave additional weight. They urged, “that if the misfortunes of Switzerland, since it had been exposed to revolutionary agitation, would not convince the partisans of a central government of their errors, neither would they be convinced though one rose from the dead. Since the disastrous period when the French troops entered Switzerland and proclaimed that form of administration amidst the blood of thousands, and by the light of burning villages, what had been witnessed in their once happy and united territory but rancour, hatred, and dissention? It is idle to ascribe that continued exasperation to the clamour of interested individuals; it has extended infinitely beyond the persons dispossessed by the recent changes, and embraces, in fact, the whole population, with the exception of that limited class in the towns to whom the central system has given the entire government of the country. Every one knows that Helvetia has paid more in taxes and contributions since the French invaded it than in a century before; and, in fact, it could hardly have been credited that such vast sums existed in the country as the republican agents have contrived to extract from its industrious inhabitants. It is in vain to allege that these calamities have been the result of war. The worst of them have arrived, not in war, but in peace; and have been, not contributions levied by soldiers, with arms in their hands, but exactions made by the cupidity of revolutionary agents, armed with the powers of the Central Government. It is utterly impracticable that such a system of administration can answer in a country so peculiarly situated as our Cantons are; the universal reprobation in which it is held is a sufficient proof of its total failure. In fact, the interested motives, so liberally insinuated on the other side, truly govern those who, for the sake of a constitution in which they have contrived to obtain lucrative situations, oppose themselves to the unanimous wish of their fellow-citizens (2).

Matters were brought to a crisis by a solemn recognition of the central authority by the Assembly, which met at Berne on the 1st August, 1801. The representatives of the lesser Cantons, and of the aristocratic party, protested against that resolution, and also against the power of redeeming tithes, inserted in the new constitution. Deeming opposition fruitless in an assembly ruled by a revolutionary majority, the deputies of nine Cantons separated from the remainder of the body, and finding that their absence only rendered the opposite party more precipitate in their measures, they had recourse to a *coup d'état* to accomplish their subversion. On the night of the 28th of Oc-

Oct. 28, 1801.
Revolution
effected by
the aid of
the French
troops.

tober, a part of the legislative body met, and gave full power to Dolder and Savary, two leading members of the ancient executive council, to accomplish the revolution. They immediately had recourse to the French troops, who had secret orders from the First

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(1) *Journ.* xiv. 411, 412.

(2) *Journ.* xiv. 412, 414. *Dum.* ix. 16.

Consul to support the movement ; the posts of Government were all forced, the Legislative Assembly was dissolved, and a Provisional Government, with Reding at its head, proclaimed (1).

The object of Napoléon in supporting this counter-revolution at Berne, was to establish a government in that country more in harmony with the monarchical institutions, now in the course of reconstruction at Paris, than the Democratic Assembly convened during the first fervour of the Helvetic Revolution ; but he soon experienced some difficulty in steering between the opposite extremes into which the country was divided. Reding, the head of the Provincial Government, repaired to Paris, where the First Consul immediately impressed upon him the necessity of proceeding upon the principle of fusing together the different parties, on which he himself had proceeded in the formation of the Consular Government ; and therefore required, as the

Nov. 29, 1801. But it does not answer the views of Napoléon. condition of his farther support, the admission of six of the most moderate of the opposite party into the Government. Reding was coldly received at the Tuileries. His energetic and ardent character was little suited to the First Consul, who had no intention of reinstating the aristocratic party, who necessarily inclined to Austria, on that defenceless part of the French territory. He returned therefore to Berne, disappointed in his hopes, and applied without success to Austria and Prussia to obtain that support which he despaired of receiving from the French Government (2).

On his return, Reding found the new Government destitute both of power and consideration, and discord breaking out more fiercely than ever between the adverse factions. The Senate appointed by the Revolution of 28th Octo-

Feb. 17, 1802. The new government is again deposed. ber promulgated a new constitution, professed to be based on the principles laid down by the First Consul ; but it neither satisfied either of the parties in Switzerland, nor accorded with the views on which his administration was founded. Deeming the time now arrived, therefore, when his interference was loudly called for, Napoléon instigated Dolder and the six persons admitted into the Government at his suggestion, to accomplish another revolution. They took advantage of the moment when Reding and the deputies of the Forest Cantons had returned,

April 17, 1802. And a new constitution framed by Napoléon. with patriarchal simplicity to their valleys, to celebrate the festival of Easter, and effected the object without difficulty. The Government were deposed, the constitution of 17th February was abolished, and an Assembly of forty Notables, specified in a list furnished by the French ambassador, appointed to meet at Berne on the 28th April, to put a final stop to the dissensions of the country. The new constitution, framed by Napoléon upon principles infinitely superior to any which had yet been extracted out of the revolutionary crucible, was proclaimed at

May 19. Berne on the 19th May. It consisted of an Executive, composed of a Landamman and two Lieutenants, appointed for nine years ; a Senate of fifty-six members, who proposed all changes in the laws ; and a National Diet which sanctioned them. The sense of the citizens was forthwith taken upon this constitution. It appeared that out of 330,000 persons entitled to vote, 92,000 rejected it, 72,000 supported it, and 170,000 abstained from voting. A majority of votes, therefore, were for rejection : but the Government, proceeding on the principle that those who withdrew were favourable to the change, proclaimed its adoption by a large majority. The lesser Cantons

(1) Dum. viii. 37, 39. Bign. ii. 368, 369. Jom. xiv. 416, 419.

(2) Dum. ix. 19, 20. Bign. ii. 370, 371. Jom. xiv. 420, 421.

loudly announced their determination of seceding from the confederacy, if it was forced upon them; but the aristocratic Cantons, influenced by the promise that if agreed to the French troops would be withdrawn, at length agreed to its adoption (1).

Deeming the result of the last revolution sufficiently favourable to his views, Napoléon thought it no longer advisable to continue the French troops in Switzerland, where they had remained in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, for two years, to the evident dissatisfaction both of England and Austria. On the 20th July, accordingly, the retreat of the Republicans was proclaimed by the First Consul, and at the same time, the erection of the Valais into a separate Republic announced. This measure, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, and evidently in connection with the formation of the great military road over the Simplon, announced but too clearly to the Swiss the state of dependence under which they were to be placed to France by the new government they had obtained, and contributed not a little to the explosion which immediately followed the removal of the French forces (2).

The Government at Berne, aware of the slight hold which they had of the affections of the great majority of the inhabitants, were thunderstruck by the intelligence that the French troops were to be withdrawn, and loudly remonstrated against the adoption of a measure so fatal to their interests; but the First Consul, tired of the incessant changes of rulers in the Swiss states, and desirous of a pretext for interfering with decisive effect in a country so important to his military operations, persevered in his resolution, and the evacuation in good earnest commenced. The Government, despairing of any support from the national troops, eagerly solicited the aid of the Helvetic brigades, which was granted them by the First Consul: but before they had time to arrive, the insurrection had broken out in the small Cantons, and the constitution approached its dissolution. In a letter addressed to the French ambassador, on the 13th July, they openly announced their resolution to withdraw from the Helvetic confederacy, and renew the ancient league of the Waldstätten, under which they had in early times maintained their independence (3).

In this important and touching manifesto, the shepherds of the Alps asserted, by unanswerable arguments, their right to that freedom in the choice of their government for which the French had so long and justly contended, and which had been expressly guaranteed to them by the treaty of Lunéville. But the Administration of Berne an-

July 20, 1802. French troops are withdrawn, and the independence of the Valais proclaimed.

Upon which the Government at Berne is overturned.

The mountaineers prepare for war. Aug. 17, 1802.

(1) *Jom. xiv. 424, 425. Dum. viii. 19, 20. Bign. ii. 371, 372.*

(2) *Jom. xv. 109. Dum. ix. 20, 21.*

(3) "We have in vain endeavoured," heroic proclamation said they, "for four successive years, the Forest Cantons to extricate ourselves from a constitution which, from its origin, and still more from the violence with which it was established, could not fail to be insupportable. It is in vain that we have constantly hoped that the Helvetic Government, instructed by the calamitous events of the last four years, would at length find that our separation from the Republic was that which was most wise and suitable for both parties; and that the wish which we have so often and so strongly expressed for our ancient liberty, would have induced them to abandon the hope that these three Cantons would ever voluntarily accept any other constitution than that which has always been considered as the only one suited to these states, and for that reason

so highly prized by ourselves and our ancestors. Our reunion with Helvetia, which has been stained with so much blood, is perhaps the most cruel example of constraint that history can offer.

"In the conviction, therefore, that for a forced and unfortunate marriage divorce is the only reasonable remedy, and that Helvetia and ourselves cannot recover repose and contentment except by the dissolution of this forced tie, we are firmly resolved to labour at that separation with all possible activity; and we think it best to address that authority which for four years past has united us, in spite of ourselves, to the Helvetic Republic. As to any thing farther, we only wish to preserve uninterrupted harmony and good understanding with all our neighbours. In listening to our just demands, the Helvetic Republic will find the only means of preserving with us the relation of brotherhood and kindly neighbours."—See *Ann. Reg. 1802. p. 227.*

wered them by a proclamation, in which they announced their resolution to maintain by force the unity of the Republic. Upon this the Forest Cantons Aug. 17, 1802. convoked a diet at Schwytz, which abolished all privileges, and re-established the ancient democratic constitution; in which they were immediately joined by the neighbouring Cantons of Zug, Glarus, Appenzel, and the Rheinthal. "The treaty of Lunéville," said they, "allows us the free choice of our institutions: we are at liberty therefore to overturn those which have been forced upon us." The opposite parties now openly prepared for war; magazines were formed, arms collected on both sides; and while the mountaineers on the Lake of Lucerne were rousing themselves, under their former magistrates, for the assertion of their ancient democratic rights, the peasants of the Oberland were secretly conspiring with the patricians of Berne for the re-establishment of the former aristocratic privileges of that oligarchy; an union at which the French writers are never weary of expressing their astonishment, not perceiving that it was formed on true conservative principles, and for the re-establishment of a government in both situations recommended by experience, and suited to the interests and habits of the people.

Aug. 28.
Hostilities
commence.
Great early
success of the
mountaineers.

Hostilities were commenced in the Forest Cantons, by an attack on the advanced guard of the troops of the Helvetic Republic, near the foot of Mount Pilatus, who were repulsed in an attempt to penetrate from the north into the Canton of Underwalden. Zurich soon after revolted against the constituted authorities, and the indignation of the inhabitants was strongly excited by an ineffectual bombardment which General Andermatt, at the head of the forces of the Republic, kept up, with the view of terrifying the inhabitants into submission. But the flame now broke out on all sides: the peasants of the Oberland and Argovia assembled under their old leaders, Watteville and D'Erlach, and the approach of their united forces towards Berne compelled the Government to summon Andermatt from the siege of Zurich to defend its own ramparts. Dolder, who, by making himself useful to all parties, had contrived to place himself at the helm of the Government, now lost all hope, and seeing no means of making head against the storm, concluded a convention, by which he was allowed to retire with his troops unmolested to the Pays de Vaud. Thither he proceeded accordingly, followed by the French ambassador, who fabricated a story of a bullet having fallen in the court of his hotel, to give his Government a pretence for immediate hostilities with the insurgents. The confederates immediately published a proclamation, in which they declared, "after four years of incessant calamity, we have at length attained the object of our desires. Guided by duty, and called by fortune, we have at length re-entered into the city of Berne, our common mother, which your courage and fidelity has placed in our hands. We are penetrated with gratitude and admiration when we behold the generous and sublime burst of patriotism which has led you to brave so many dangers to recover your laws and your government. The supreme authorities have resolved to remain on terms of friendship with those who, during the preceding days of calamity, have deviated from their duty: it tenders them the hand of reconciliation. It expects not less confidently from its own and now victorious supporters, that they will forget their former injuries, and not stain the triumph of their country by acts of individual vengeance (1)."

Meanwhile Reding convoked a General Diet to be held at Schwytz; and

announced to the assembled Cantons "the necessity of renouncing for ever all political privileges, and conceding to the people subjected to their government, as to lawful brothers, the same liberties and privileges which are enjoyed by the inhabitants of towns." A resolution wise and just in itself, and which sufficiently indicated the intention not to re-establish those vexatious distinctions in political power, by which the Swiss Confederacy had

Sept. 27.
Diet assembled at
Schwyz.

been so long deformed. The Diet met on the 27th of September, and immediately adopted the resolution to raise an armed force of twenty thousand men. At the same time, the truce agreed upon

Total substitution of the Central Government.

with Dolder having expired, hostilities were renewed on the side of the Pays de Vaud; and Fribourg, after a sharp cannonade, fell into the hands of the confederates. The approaching dissolution of the Central Government was now apparent: the national guards of the Pays de Vaud, who had taken up arms in its defence, were driven back in disorder from Mora to Moudon; Payerne opened its gates; and the discomfited authorities could hardly assemble 2000 men at Lausanne for their defence. Already the Swiss troops in great force, were approaching, and the fugitive Government was preparing to retire into the neighbouring territory of France, when a new actor appeared on the stage, and the wishes of Switzerland were crushed for a long course of years, by the armed interference of the First Consul (1).

Forcible interference of the First Consul.

On the 4th October, General Rapp, aide-de-camp to Napoléon, arrived at Lausanne with the following proclamation by the French Government:—"Inhabitants of Helvetia! Swiss blood has flowed from the hands of the Swiss. For two years you have exhibited the most deplorable spectacle. Contending factions have alternately possessed themselves of power. They have signalized their ephemeral authority by a system of partiality which accused at once their weakness and incapacity. You have disputed for three years without coming to an understanding. If you are abandoned to yourselves, you will massacre each other for three years longer without interruption. Your history proves that you can never settle your intestine divisions but by the interposition of France. It is true I had intended not to intermeddle in your affairs. I had seen all your different administrations seek my advice without following it, and not unfrequently abuse my name to the purposes of their interests and their passions; but I can no longer remain an unconcerned spectator of the misfortunes which are devouring you. I revoke my resolution. I will become the mediator in your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, and such as suits the dignity of the great nation which I represent. Five days after the publication of the present proclamation the Senate shall assemble at Berne. The Government established at that place since the capitulation is dissolved. All authorities, wherever constituted by it, are at an end. The troops who have been in arms for six months shall alone be retained. All the others are hereby disbanded, and required to lay down their arms (2)."

The Swiss vainly invoke the aid of Austria.

This haughty proclamation was a severe blow to the confederate chiefs at the moment of triumph; for nearly the whole country had now arranged themselves under their banners, and, with the exception of the Pays de Vaud, Switzerland had unanimously overturned the constitution forced upon them by France. The dignity of their conduct was equal to its wisdom under this cruel reverse. Disdaining to submit to the yoke of the conqueror, and yet sensible of their inability to contend with so formidable a state without the aid of more efficient allies, they in-

(1) Join. xv. 125, 129. Dum. ix. 30, 38.

(2) Dum. x. 38, 39.

voked the support of Austria and the other powers, to assert for them the independence stipulated by the treaty of Lunéville; and finding the Imperial Cabinet deaf to their entreaties, still refused to separate, protested against the violence by which they were menaced, and declared that "they yielded only to force." They despatched a confidential agent to Paris, who addressed himself to the ambassadors of all the other states, imploring their assistance. "Scarcely," said he to the English Government, "did Switzerland find herself independent than she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes. Almost the whole of the country, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, threw off the yoke. The aristocratic Cantons renounced their exclusive privileges. The new Cantons were left at liberty to form their own constitutions. Who could have imagined that Bonaparte, in defiance of the treaty of Lunéville, would have issued such a decree as has just appeared? Is an independent nation to be thus treated? Should he persist in this determination, and the other powers not interfere, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, though without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe. Will the government of England, ever so generous, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide whether we are still to be ranked among free people? We have only men left us. The Revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means. We are without arms, ammunition stores, or money to purchase them." But though all the continental powers warmly participated in these feelings, none ventured to give expression to them. England alone Oct. 20, 1802. interfered, and, by an energetic note, protested against this subjugation of a neutral power, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville; and despatched a confidential agent to the borders of Helvetia to ascertain the real state of the country; but finding it impossible to rouse the continental powers to any interference in its behalf, they justly deemed it inexpedient to proceed farther at that moment in support of so remote and inland a state (1). All was soon accomplished. Ney entered Switzerland with twenty thousand men, and occupied, without resistance, Soleure, Zurich, and Berne; and the scene of violence commenced by the imposition of a contribution of 600,000 francs on the cities which had fallen under the power of the invaders (2).

Ney over-
runs the
country with
twenty
thousand men.

The Swiss
in despair
submit.

The subjugation of Switzerland being resolved on, the tyrannical process was, however, carried into effect with as much clemency and moderation as the circumstances would admit. Ney, to whom the painful task of completing the conquest of these gallant mountaineers was committed, executed his duty with humanity and discretion. He sent a peremptory order to the Diet to dissolve and disband its forces; and supported the mandate by the advance of masses, evidently overwhelming, to St.-Gall, Glarus, and Schwytz. Yielding to necessity, they ordered their troops to disband, and closed their sittings by a touching appeal to posterity, in which they protested against the violence by which they had been oppressed; and bequeathed to happier times the duty of restoring the liberties of their country (3). At the same time they notified to Ney, "that the Diet of Schwytz,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxvii. 1282.

(2) Journ. xv, 130, 135. Dum. ix, 34, 40. Bigu. ii. 377, 378.

Dignified
address of
the Deputies
of the Forest
Cantons on
resigning the
Govern-
ment.

(3) This memorable address, worthy of the country of Tell, was conceived in the following terms:—"The Deputies of the Cantons have come to the resolution of surrendering the powers with which they were invested into the hands of their constituents, inas-

yielding to force, had come to the resolution of separating, inserting, however, in the name of all Switzerland, the same reservation for the future which it had already made known in its public proclamation (1)."

Aloys Reding, after the disbanding of the troops, disdained either to fly or to make submission, but remained at Schwytz, ready to undertake, in his own person, all the responsibility consequent on his patriotic devotion. He was soon after arrested, along with his brother the Landamman of Baden, and some other leaders of the confederates, and sent under a strong guard to Zurich, from whence, in a short time, he was transferred to the castle of Chillon, on the lake of Geneva, a fortress rendered more interesting in the eyes of freedom by his captivity than by the sufferings of the feudal prisoner, over whose fate modern genius has thrown an imperishable lustre (2).

Speech of
the First
Consul to
the Swiss
Deputies at
Paris.

Resistance being thus rendered hopeless in Switzerland, a Diet of fifty-six Deputies of the Cantons was appointed to meet at Paris, in the December following, to deliberate on the formation of a constitution, and receive the law from the First Consul. His conduct and language on this occasion were distinguished by his usual penetration and ability, and a most unusual degree of lenity and forbearance; and if any thing could have reconciled the Swiss to the loss of their independence, it must have been the wisdom and equity on which his mediation was founded.

Dec. 10,
1802.

"The situation of your country," said he to the assembled Deputies, "is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of passion are necessary to save it. I have undertaken, in the face of Europe, the engagement to render my mediation efficacious. I will faithfully discharge all the duties which that sacred function imposes on me; but that which might be difficult without your concurrence, becomes easy by your influence and assistance. Switzerland does not resemble any other country; its geographical and topographical situation, the difference of religion, and extreme variety of manners which prevail in its various parts, render it an exception to all other states. Nature has made your country federative; to attempt to conquer it is not the part of wisdom. Circumstances, the spirit of past ages, have established among you sovereign and subject people. New circumstances, and the spirit of a different age, have introduced equality of right between all the parts of your territory. Many of your states have been governed for centuries by the most absolute democracy; others have fallen under the dominion of particular families, and subjects have grown into sovereigns. The influence of public opinion in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace, which surround you, have powerfully contributed to the formation of these institutions. The disposition of these countries is now changed, and yours must undergo a similar modification. The renunciation of all exclusive privileges is at once the wish and the interest of your people.

"What your interests require is, 1. Equality of rights among the whole eighteen Cantons.—2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation of all exclusive privileges on the part of the patrician families.—3. A federative organization,

much as the force of foreign armies opposes an irresistible bar to the accomplishment of their duties. But while they recognize the necessity of submission, the Deputies conjure their constituents not for one moment to believe that it can impair their right to choose their own form of Government; a right which they inherit from the virtues and courage of their ancestors, and is expressly guaranteed by the treaty of Landville. With this view, while they yield to force, they are resolved to do

nothing which may impair that precious bequest to future generations, or sanction in any degree that which other inhabitants of Switzerland accepting such an alleviation, may have the appearance of approving."—See JOMINI, xv. 133; and DUMAS, ix. 57.

(1) JOM. xv. 137. DUM. ix. 56. NEY'S MEM. II. 247, 260.

(2) DUM. ix. 58, 59.

where every Canton finds itself arranged according to its language, its religion, its manners, its interest and opinion. The Central Government remains to be provided for; but it is of much less consequence than the cantonal organization. It is impossible to establish uniformity, either in finances, army, or civil administration, amongst you. You have never maintained regular armies, nor had established accredited agents at the courts of the different governments. Situated on the summit of the mountains which separate France, Italy, and Germany, you participate in the disposition of all these different countries. Strict neutrality, a prosperous commerce, and family administration, can alone secure your interests, or be suited to your wishes. Every organization that could be established amongst you hostile to the wishes or interests of France, would injure you in the most essential particulars.

“After having addressed you as becomes one of your own citizens, I must now use the language befitting the Chief Magistrate of two of your most powerful neighbours; and I must at once declare, that neither France nor the Italian Republic will ever suffer a system to be established amongst you calculated to promote the interest of their enemies. The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men, your immediate neighbours, without whom you can neither exist as a state nor subsist as individuals, are also of no small weight in the balance of public justice. Let nothing, as concerns them, be hostile amongst you; let every thing, on the contrary, be conducive to their interests, and let it continue, as in times past, your first interest, your first policy, your first inclination, your first duty, to permit nothing, to leave nothing on your territory which, directly or indirectly, can prejudice the interests, the honour, or the cause of the French people. It is indispensable, not merely that there should exist no sort of disquietude for that portion of our territory which is open and which you cover, but that we should farther feel the assurance, that if your neutrality were ever to be violated, your interest, not less than your inclination, would lead you to range yourselves under the banner of France, rather than in opposition to it (1).”

Discontent
which his
principles
rooted on
both sides.

Abstracting from the determination here openly announced of subjecting Switzerland to the influence, and even government of France, which, however alarming to all the neighbouring powers, as chief magistrate of that country, the First Consul was naturally led to desire, there can be no doubt that the principles which he here set forth were those which the most profound wisdom would have suggested to terminate the dissensions of which it had so long been the prey. They gave, accordingly, almost as great umbrage to the vehement Republican as the ultra-conservative party; the former deploring the re-establishment of a federal union, and the separate constitution of different Cantons; the latter the formation of a Central Government, under the influence, and subject to the control of France. Both parties conducted the debate with much warmth, and the greatest abilities of France and Switzerland were employed in the conference, which took place in the Council of State at Paris, in presence of the First Consul (2). At length the discussion was terminated by the act of mediation pronounced by Napoléon on the 19th February, 1803, which, for the remainder of his reign, settled the condition of the Helvetic confederacy.

His final act
of mediation
for the set-
tlement of
Helvetia.

By this act Switzerland was divided into nineteen Cantons; the lesser ones were revived, and their limits, re-established as formerly. The Oberland was restored to Berne; but the estates of Vaud, Ar-

govia, Thurgovia, St.-Gall, and the Tessino, which formerly had been subjected to the other Cantons, were elevated to the rank of constituent members of the confederacy. Six of the principal Cantons, namely, Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Zurich, and Lucerne, were styled directing Cantons, and the Diet sat, year about, at their chief towns; and for that year the chief magistrate of that Canton was Landamman of Switzerland. The federal contingent was fixed at 15,203 men, and 490,507 francs, (L.20,000). All exclusive privileges were abolished, so that the citizen of any one Canton was a denizen of any part of the confederacy. All alliances of one Canton with another, or with a foreign state, were interdicted. Each Canton sent a deputy to the Diet; but Berne, Zurich, Vaud, Argovia, St.-Gall, and the Grisons, sent two. The functions of the Supreme Council were declared to be; 1. To proclaim war or peace, and conclude foreign alliances, which required the consent of three-fourths of the Diet; 2. To fix regulations for foreign commerce, capitulations in foreign services, and the recruiting of soldiers; 3. To levy the contingent, and appoint commanders of the armed force, and the foreign ambassadors; 4. To adopt measures of external utility, and settle disputes between one Canton and another. The act concluded in these terms:—"The present act, the result of long conferences with enlightened persons, appears to us the best that could be devised for the constitution and happiness of the Swiss. As soon as it is carried into execution, the French troops shall withdraw. We recognize Helvetia, as organized by this act, as an independent power, and guarantee the federal constitution, and that of each Canton in particular, against the enemies of the tranquillity of the state (1)."

The subsequent dispositions of the First Consul were all dictated by a desire to render the foreign yoke then imposed upon the Swiss as light as possible, and win the affections of a people whose situation rendered their neutrality of more value to France than their alliance. Satisfied with the erection of the Valais into a separate republic, which gave him the entire command of the Simplon road, Napoléon allowed the Swiss to retain their neutrality, rejected all idea of an alliance offensive and defensive, and modified the existing stipulated contingent of 25,000 men into a levy of sixteen regiments, who were taken into the pay of the French Republic. These lenient conditions gave universal satisfaction in Switzerland. The Deputies of the Cantons met at Fribourg in the beginning of July, under the auspices of Louis d'Affry, designated by Napoléon as the first Landamman of the confederacy, while the presence of Aloys Reding, as Deputy for Schwytz, gave testimony to the commencement of the system of fusion which it was so much his object to establish in all the countries subjected to his dominion, and proved, that if the Swiss were not reconciled to the foreign yoke, at least they had abandoned all hope of farther resisting it (2).

(1) Jom. xv. 139, 141. Dum. ix. 70, 73. App. 253, 279. Pièces Just.

(2) Jom. xv. 240, 241. Dum. ix. 73, 75.

Admirable The sagacity with which the principle of First Consul discriminated the most important features in the condition of measure in the Swiss Cantons, may be appreciated by the following extracts from the speech he delivered on the formation of the internal constitution of the confederacy:—"The re-establishment of the ancient order of things in the democratic Cantons is the best course which can be adopted both for you and me. They are the states whose peculiar form of government render them so interesting in the eyes of all Europe; but for this pure democracy, you would exhibit nothing which

is not to be found elsewhere. Beware of extinguishing so remarkable a distinction. I know well that this democratic system of administration has many inconveniences; but it is established, it has subsisted for centuries, it springs from the circumstances, situation, and primitive habits of the people, from the genius of the place, and cannot with safety be abandoned. When usage and systematic opinion find themselves in opposition, the latter must give way. You must never take away from a democratic society the practical exercise of its privileges. To give such exercise a direction consistent with the tranquillity of the state, is the part of true political wisdom. In ancient Rome the votes were counted by classes, and they threw into the last classes the whole body of indigent citizens, while the first contained

Extreme dissatisfaction
caused by this event over Europe.

The dignified conduct of the Swiss patriots, in the last extremity of their independence, and the necessity to which they reduced the First Consul of openly employing force to subdue them, was in the highest degree contrary to his wishes, and proved more prejudicial to his interests in Europe than any other event which had occurred under his government. He had hoped that all necessity for a visible conquest would be prevented by one of the factions openly invoking his assistance; and that thus Switzerland would be subjugated as other countries had been, by dividing without appearing to do violence to the people. The unanimous expression of public detestation which attended the proclamation of the French Constitution, and the instant overthrow of the Government which followed the removal of the French troops, entirely frustrated this insidious design, and compelled Napoléon to throw off the mask, and, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, openly accomplish the subjugation of the country. This violent proceeding was not less painful to the feelings of the people than it was alarming to the governments of all the neighbouring states. To see the great central fortress of Switzerland, commanding all the passes from France into Italy, placed in the hands of so ambitious a ruler, at the very time when he was rapidly extending his dominions over the whole peninsula, excited the strongest jealousy in all the European Cabinets, while the subjugation of the country of William Tell, and the overthrow of Swiss independence by republican bayonets, awakened deep feelings of commiseration among all to whom the name of liberty was dear, and did more to dispel the general fascination which had attended the government of the First Consul than any circumstance which had occurred since his elevation to power. At the same time, the indignation of the Dutch was strongly excited by the continued residence of the French troops in their territory, and the heavy load which the finding clothing, and paying so large a body of men, imposed on their almost ruined finances, in direct opposition to the treaty signed, and promises held out on occasion of the late change in their government; and the conviction became as general as it was painful, that the ambition of France was insatiable, and that the establishment of revolutionary governments in the adjoining states, only led to a prolongation of the onerous yoke of the Great Parent Republic (1).

only a few hundred of the most opulent individuals; but the populace were content, and, amused with the solicitation of their votes, did not perceive the immense difference in their relative value, and that, all put together, they did not equal the influence of a few of the great patrician families.

"Since the revolution, you have never ceased to seek your safety independent of France. Your position, your history, in fine, common sense, forbid it. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value in the eyes of other powers. The first is permanent and constant; the second depends on fortune and political combination, and can only be transient in its operation. Switzerland can never defend its plains but with the aid of France, France is open to attack on the Swiss frontier; Austria is not, for she is covered by the bulwark of the Tyrol. I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed an hundred thousand men, rather than allow it to remain in the hands of the party who were at the head of the last insurrection, so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France."

—THIERSTADT, 363, 367.

(1) Sir R. Liston's Despatch, Dec, 29, 1802. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1285.

Honourable opinion of Mr. Fox on the subject.

As a specimen of the effect which these events produced on the liberal party in Europe, it is sufficient to refer to the speeches of the leaders of the Opposition in the British Parliament—"The French Government," said Mr. Fox, "was bound by treaty, as well as by every principle of justice, to withdraw their troops from Switzerland, and to leave that country to itself, even with the miserable government which they had established in it, and to respect its independence. During their dominion in that country, they had formed a government so utterly odious to the people, that the moment their troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants, by an insurrection founded on the truest principles of justice, rose and overturned it. The French Government interfered to restore it, and bad as the system was, the manner of their interfering to restore it was, if possible, still worse. This violent act of injustice, no man can contemplate with more indignation than myself.

And on the "The conduct of France, with respect to Holland, affords a still more intolerable instance of injustice. Were I master of the use of colours, and could paint with skill, I would take the darkest to delineate the conduct of France towards that Republic. It certainly has

Tranquillity and happiness of England during this period. While the continent of Europe was agitated by these important events, and presaged, in the rapid strides of the First Consul towards universal dominion, the approaching renewal of the war, England was tasting, with unalloyed satisfaction, the blessings and the tranquillity of peace. She had given the most unequivocal proof of the sincerity of her confidence in the honour of France in permitting the vast armament of Le Clerc to proceed unmolested to the West Indies; and had beheld, with pain, indeed, but without opposition, the successive new-modelling of the Batavian, Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Valaisan Republics, under the authority of the First Consul, and the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia to his dominions or those of his subject states. On occasion only of the overthrow of Helvetic independence her ministers presented an energetic note to the French Government, complaining of that breach of the European liberties; but finding their remonstrances not supported by the other powers, they prudently desisted from any more efficacious interference in their behalf (1). Secure in her insular position and maritime strength, she beheld with uneasiness, but without apprehension for her own independence, the successive additions to the power of France; and deemed herself not called upon to interfere actively in continental affairs till the powers more immediately interested were prepared to second her efforts by efficacious aid.

Rapid improvement of the finances and trade of the country. During this brief period of national repose, the industry and finances of the country prospered in a most extraordinary degree; and Great Britain literally reaped at the same time the excitement of war with the commerce and tranquillity of peace. As her statesmen did not deem it safe to make any considerable reduction in the national establishments while the power of France was so formidable, the lassitude arising from a diminished government expenditure was hardly experienced: an extensive paper currency maintained the prices and activity of war, while the opening of the continental ports brought into her harbours the extended commerce of peace, and rendered her commercial cities the emporium of the civilized world. Her exports and imports rapidly increased; the cessation of the income tax conferred comparative affluence on the middling classes; agriculture, sustained by continued high prices, shared in the general prosperity; the sinking fund, relieved in some degree from the counteracting influence of annual loans, attracted universal attention; while the revenue, under the influence of so many favourable circumstances, steadily augmented, and the national exigencies were easily provided for, without any addition

been worse treated by her than any other country whatever. Holland has not only suffered all the unavoidable evils of war, but when peace came, to turn that country, in defiance of a positive treaty with France, into a dépôt for French troops, for the mere purpose of putting the Dutch to the expense of maintaining them, was an act no less despicable for its meanness than hateful for its atrocity."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvii. 1446, 1450.

(1) "His Majesty has received with deep regret the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, published by authority in the *Moniteur* of October 1. His Majesty most sincerely laments the convulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their ancient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but

to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers.

"The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as any other power, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has, in the present instance, been expressly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the treaty of Lunéville, by the French Government, conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret he may have perused the late proclamation of the French Government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to control that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights."—*Lord Hawkesbury's Note to M. Otto*, Oct. 10, 1802—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1281.

to the burdens of the people. So wide spread was the enthusiasm occasioned by this bright gleam of prosperity, that even sagacious practical men were carried away by the delusion; and the only apprehension expressed by the moneyed classes was, that the sinking fund would extinguish the debt too rapidly, and capital, left without any secure investment, be exposed to the risk and uncertainty of foreign adventure (1).

Under the influence of such favourable circumstances, the permanent revenue of Great Britain steadily increased, while the public expenditure was rapidly diminished. In the year 1802, indeed, the effect of the great war expenses, which the unsettled state of the negotiation prior to the signing of the definitive treaty made it impossible to reduce, rendered a considerable national expenditure necessary; but in the succeeding year the full benefit of pacific reduction was experienced. In the former year the current annual expenditure was, independent of the interest of the debt, L.29,693,000, and the receipt L.36,368,000. In the latter, the receipt had risen to L.30,609,000, and the expenditure, without the interest of debt, fallen to L.28,298,000 (2). The financial operations of both years were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude, from the extent of the floating debt which was funded, and loans contracted to meet the winding up of the war, which produced a receipt and expenditure in each of nearly eighty millions from the public treasury; but, excepting these extraneous sums, the aspect of the national resources was in the highest degree satisfactory. The sinking fund was rapidly and steadily absorbing the debt, and afforded the prospect of extinguishing the whole national encumbrances, great as they were, at no distant period (3).

And of ship- (1) It was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his place in Parliament, that the
ping real value of British produce and manufactures exported in the year 1802 was little short of L.30,000,000, being an increase of L.8,000,000 above the year preceding; and the shipping entering the port of London in the years 1801 and 1802 were as follows:

	BRITISH.			FOREIGN.		
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
1801,	1762	418,631	23,096	3385	452,667	20,388
1802,	2459	574,700	33,743	1549	217,117	10,555

This indicating that the return of peace had reduced to a half the Foreign shipping in the port of London, and added a half to the British.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1127.

(2) Porter's *Parl. Tables*, i. p. 1.

(3) The ways and means and expenditure for these two years stood as follows:

<i>Expenditure. 1802.</i>	
Ordinary	L.29,693,000
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded,	19,855,588
Exchequer Bills,	23,892,815
Sinking Fund,	6,114,033
	<hr/> L.79,555,436

The interest of the debt, funded and unfunded, was L.19,855,588; and the produce of the sinking fund L.6,114,033. [Porter's *Parl. Tables*, i. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 446. and *Ann. Reg.* 1802, 588. App. to Chron.

Ways and Means.

Ordinary Income,	L.26,368,140
Loans,	27,550,449
Exchequer Bills,	17,094,653
	<hr/> L.81,013,251

The unfunded debt funded this year amounted to L.23,892,815, which explains the difference between the supply and expenditure.

Expenditure 1803.

Current,	L.28,298,366
Interest of funded and unfunded debt,	20,099,864
Sinking fund,	6,494,694
Paid Exchequer Bills,	17,194,198
	<hr/> L.72,687,122

Ways and Means.

Revenue,	L.38,609,392
Loans,	11,960,523
Exchequer Bills,	20,481,130
	<hr/> L.71,051,045

The rapid growth and steady application of the sinking fund was the subject of deserved congratulations to the country, both by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Pitt. They calculated that it would extinguish the whole existing debt in forty-five years; and the celerity of its increase, compared with that of the interest of the debt, might be judged of by the fact, that when it was first instituted, in 1784, its produce annually was one-tenth of the interest; whereas in 1803 it had risen to a

Causes of
irritation
which gra-
dually got
up with
France.

But these flattering prospects were of short duration. Independent of the increasing jealousy with which the British Government beheld the continental encroachments of Napoléon, and which rapidly communicated itself to all classes of the English people, several causes of irritation grew up between the rival governments, which first weakened and at last destroyed their good understanding. The detail of these causes is fraught with the highest historical interest. The fate of the world has depended on the results to which they led.

Complaints
of the First
Consul at
the English
newspapers.

The first of these subjects of irritation was the asperity with which the Government and acts of the First Consul were canvassed in the English newspapers. Not only did several French journals, published in London, in particular that of Peltier and the "*Courrier Français de Londres*," comment with great severity on his proceedings, but almost all the English journals, following the bent of the public mind, discarded, in the most unmeasured terms, on his continual encroachments in Continental Europe. To Napoléon, who was accustomed only to the voice of adulation, and heard nothing in the enslaved journals of his own country but gracefully turned flattery, these diatribes were in the highest degree painful, and not the less so, probably, because the charges which they contained in regard to his foreign aggressions were more easily silenced by authority than answered by argument. He therefore caused his minister at the court of London to remonstrate warmly against these articles (1), and concluded by soliciting, "1. That the English Government should adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and writings printed in England are filled. 2. That the individuals specified in the undersigned list should be sent out of Jersey. 3. That Georges and his adherents should be transported to Canada. 4. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two Governments, it should be recommended to the princes of the House of Bourbon, at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw. 5. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient Government of France, be required to quit the territory of the British empire (2).

Of these extravagant demands, which proved that Napoléon understood as little the action of a free government as he did the relative situation of France and England treating on a footing of perfect equality, it is sufficient to observe, that it has excited the indignation even of the French historians who

third of the then existing debt. It will hereafter appear that when it was broken upon in 1813, it was producing more than half the interest of the debt; and that if it had been let alone, it would have extinguished the whole debt existing at the conclusion of the war before the year 1840.—See *POWELL'S Parl. Tables*, i. 1, and *Parl. Deb.* xxxvi. 1127-1130.

M. Otto's (1) "The greatest of all injuries," note on this said M. Otto, "is that which tends to subject, debase a foreign Government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections is that which places under the safeguard of the laws men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even, to dissolve the first bands of society. This is not a question concerning some paragraphs which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print, but a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the chief of the French Republic, but all its constituted authorities

—against the whole nation—represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. These observations are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered in England only for the purpose of the better gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace. It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to induce the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the conclusion of the concordats, that these implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities and provoke the just indignation of the French Government and people. Not a doubt can exist of these writings having been composed and circulated by Georges and the former bishops of France."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1270.

(2) M. Otto's note, Aug. 17, 1802. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1270. *Norv.* ii. 234, 236.

Indignation
excited at
this even in
France itself.

are most friendly to his cause. "It was nearly the same thing," says his eloquent apologist, Norvins, "to propose to Great Britain the sacrifice of its constitution, as to insist upon its abandoning the two pillars of its freedom, the liberty of the press, and the privilege of habeas corpus. Such a demand was in the highest degree imprudent on the part of the First Consul, as it necessarily rendered him odious to the English people. Such language might have been used to the Cisalpine or Ligurian Republics, the creations of his hands: but it was wholly unsuitable to an independent power like England: and although that language was but the expression of disunion which already existed between the two Governments, yet it was extremely imprudent to make it known in a diplomatic communication to the whole of Europe (1)."

The British Government replied to this extraordinary requisition in dignified but courteous language (2). They answered specifically each of the charges advanced by the French Government, and concluded with observing, "His Majesty is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and the security of its laws and constitution. But the French Government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and the character of its Government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded (3)."

No farther diplomatic correspondence took place on this subject, but soon after, to remove all grounds for complaint on the part of the First Consul, a prosecution was instituted by the Attorney-General against Peltier, for one of the most vehement of his articles against the French Government. This

(1) Norv. ii. 227, 238.

Answer made (2) "It cannot be denied," they to M. Otto by observed, "that some improper and the British indecent paragraphs against the Government of France have appeared,

both in the English newspapers and the French journals published in London: but they have not been published under the authority of the British Government, nor are they any ways responsible for their contents. His majesty neither can nor will, in consequence of any representation or menace from a foreign power, make any concession which may be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject; the constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description: but these exist judiciously wholly independent of the executive, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems criminal; and they may investigate and punish not only libels against the Government and magistracy of this kingdom, but those reflecting on the individuals in whose hands the administration of foreign Governments is placed. The British Government is perfectly willing to afford to the French Government all the means of punishing the authors of any writings which they may deem defamatory, which they themselves possess; but they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the French Government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, they may punish the venders or distributors of such writings as they deem defamatory in their own country, or increase, by additional penal regulations, the risk of their circulation within their own bounds.

"With respect to the removal of the persons considered obnoxious to the French Government from the British dominions, his Majesty has no desire that the princes of the House of Bourbon should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed or can be induced to quit it: but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and with his sense of justice to withdraw from them the right of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly, and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two Governments. The emigrants in Jersey, most of whom are there chiefly in consequence of the cheapness of provisions, had removed, or were removing, previous to M. Otto's note. If any of them can be shewn, by reasonable evidence, to have distributed papers on the coast of France with the view of disturbing the Government, and of inducing the people to resist the new Church Establishment, his Majesty will deem himself justified in taking measures to compel them to leave the country. Measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for removing Georges and his adherents from his Majesty's European dominions. There are few, if any, of the French emigrants who continue to wear the decorations of the ancient government: it might be more prudent if they all abstained from doing so; but the French Government cannot expect that his Majesty will commit so harsh an act as to send them out of the country on that account."—Lord Hawkesbury's Note, 17th August, 1802, *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1274, 1276.

(3) Lord Hawkesbury's Note, Aug. 17, 1802. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1277.

Trial of
Peltier for a
libel on the
First Consul.

prosecution, which, in the excited state of the public mind on the subject of France, awakened the most intense interest, gave occasion to a splendid display of eloquence on the part of the accused from Sir James Mackintosh, who then first gave public proof of those great abilities which his *Vindiciæ Gallicæ* and lectures on constitutional law had long made known to a more limited circle. Peltier was found guilty; but the subsequent breaking out of war between the two countries prevented his being brought up to receive judgment (1).

War of the
public jour-
nals on both
sides.

The war of journals continued with redoubled vehemence on both sides of the Channel, as events succeeded calculated to call forth mutual complaints; and several articles in the *Moniteur*, of the most hostile character, bore evident marks of the First Consul's composition. The French incessantly urged the execution of "the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens;" loudly complained that the British Government had not evacuated Alexandria, Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope, as stipulated in that instrument; and declared that the French people would ever remain in the attitude of Minerva, with a helmet on her head and a spear in her hand. The English answered, that the strides made by France over Continental Europe since the general pacification, and their menacing conduct towards the British possessions, were inconsistent with any intention of preserving peace, and rendered it indispensable that the securities held by them for their own independence should not be abandoned. This recriminatory warfare was continued with equal zeal and ability on the opposite sides of the Channel: loud and fierce defiance were uttered by both parties; and it soon became manifest, from the temper of the people, not less than the relations of their Governments, that the contest could be determined only by the sword (2).

In truth it was not merely from the continental acquisitions of France, great as they had been since the peace, that the British Government conceived apprehensions of the impossibility of long maintaining friendly terms with that power. Other circumstances nearer home indicated a determination in the First Consul to resume the contest at no distant period, and render the places evacuated by the treaty of Amiens, the outposts from which hostilities were to be directed against their vital interests. The continued stay of a large French force in Holland, in defiance of express treaty; the gradual accumulation of troops on the shores of the Channel and on the frontiers of Hanover, indicated any thing rather than a pacific disposition, and menaced

Expedition
of Sebastiani
to
Egypt.

England in the quarters where she was most easily assailable. At the same time, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani to Egypt and Syria, in October, 1802, for purposes evidently of a warlike character, and the minute and elaborate military report which he laid before the First Consul on his return, proved that so far from having abandoned the idea of conquest on the banks of the Nile, he was prepared to resume it on the first convenient opportunity (3). Influenced by these circumstances, and the evi-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 240.

(2) Dani ix. 98, 106. Novv. ii, 238, 241. Ann. Reg. 1803, 246.

(3) It appears from Colonel Sebastiani's Report that he embarked on the 16th September at Toulon, and after visiting Tripoli, arrived at Alexandria on the 16th October. "I communicated," says he, "to the English Commander there the order of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the treaty of Amiens. General Stuart told me that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected; and when

I insisted for a more specific answer, he declared that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he believed he should winter there." He minutely examined the fortifications of Alexandria, and all the neighbouring forts; afterwards visited Cairo, under an escort of five hundred men; traversed Upper Egypt as far as the Cataracts, and returned by St. Jean d'Acre and the Ionian Islands to France, with specific information as to the military and political state of the countries he had visited, and their respective dispositions towards France and England. The First Con.

dent demonstration of an insatiable ambition which the conduct of France to Italy and Switzerland afforded, the English Government sent orders to delay the evacuation of Malta, Alexandria, and the Cape of Good Hope, which they had not only resolved on, but in part commenced (1), and openly declared their resolution to retain these important stations till some satisfactory explanation was obtained of the French movement (2).

This resolution of the Cabinet of St.-James's immediately gave rise to an angry diplomatic correspondence between the two Governments; but instead of quoting these official documents, it is more important to give the substance of the famous interview which the First Consul had with Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador at Paris, on the 21st February, 1803, which is so descriptive of the character of that extraordinary man as to be one of the most valuable documents of history. "He placed," says that nobleman in his account of the interview transmitted the day following to his own Government, "in the very first rank our not evacuating Egypt and Malta, as we were bound by the treaty to have done. In this," said he, "no consideration on earth shall make me acquiesce. Of the two, I would rather see you in possession of the faubourg St.-Antoine than Malta. The abuse thrown out against me in the English public prints is vexatious, but not of so much consequence, not so mischievous as what appears in the French papers published in London. My irritation against England is daily increasing; because every wind which blows from England brings nothing but enmity and hatred against me. If I had felt the smallest inclination to take Egypt by force, I might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country, in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. Instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it only furnishes me with a pretence for invading it. I shall not do so, however I may wish to possess it as a colony, because I do not think it worth the chance of a war, in which I might possibly be considered as the aggressor, and by which I should lose more than I should gain; since, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.

"What have I to gain by going to war? A descent upon your coast is the only means of offence I possess; and that I am determined to attempt, and

and thought it so little necessary to disguise his designs, that he published the Report, which is very long and elaborate, in the *Moniteur*; and it was particularly observable that Sebastiani assured all the Christians from whom he received deputations in Egypt and Syria "of the friendship and protection of the First Consul." The Report concluded with a detailed statement of all the British troops in Egypt, and the respective forces of the Turks and native chiefs.—See the whole Report in *Parl. Hist.* xxxvii. 1349, 1359.

(1) British declaration. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1332, 1333.

As decisive evidence that in autumn 1802, and anterior to the manifestation of the First Consul's ambitious designs in Europe, the British Government was sincere in its intention to execute the treaty of Amiens, it is sufficient to refer to the testimony of the French historians. "England," says General Mathieu Dumas, "notwithstanding its regret at seeing the key of the Levant and the East Indies slip from its grasp, was making preparations for receiving in the fortresses of Malta the Neapolitan troops, who, by the treaty of Amiens, were to form its garrison for a year. Such, indeed,

was their sincerity, that the foreign troops were actually disembarked and well received. From the 15th to the 20th September, at the periods fixed by the treaty, orders were in like manner transmitted for the evacuation of Alexandria by the British troops, and the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch forces." General Dundas and sir Roger Curtis had received positive orders for the surrender of the Cape, with all its dependencies, to the Dutch forces. The best understanding prevailed between the troops of the two nations. The 1st January, 1803, was fixed for the final evacuation; and the English troops had actually commenced their embarkation, and were half on board, when, on the evening of the 31st of December, a vessel arrived, which had left Plymouth on the 31st October, with orders to stop the cession of the colony. The British had only fifty-nine men at that time in the town; the Dutch garrison was sixteen hundred strong; and the British troops were eight miles distant when this unexpected intelligence arrived.—DUMAS, ix. 91, 120, 121.

(2) See the documents in *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1257, 1297.

put myself at its head. But can you suppose that, after having gained the height on which I stand, I would risk my life and reputation in so hazardous an undertaking, unless compelled to it by absolute necessity. I know that the probability is that I myself and the greatest part of the expedition will go to the bottom. There are an hundred chances to one against me, but I am determined to make the attempt; and such is the disposition of the troops, that army after army will be found ready to engage in the enterprise.

“France, with an army of 480,000 men, to which amount it is to be immediately completed and ready for the most desperate enterprise, and England with a fleet which has rendered her the mistress of the seas, and which I shall not be able to rival for ten years, might, by a good understanding, govern the world, and by their strife overturn it. If I had not felt the enmity of the British Government on every occasion since the peace of Amiens, there is nothing I would not have done to prove my desire to conciliate. Participation in indemnities, as well as influence on the continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that would have testified confidence. Nothing, however, has been able to overcome the hostility of the British Government; and thence we are now come to the point—Shall we have peace or war? To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled, the abuse in the public prints suppressed or kept within due bounds, and the protection openly given to my bitterest enemies. If you desire war, it is only necessary to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. I have not chastised the Algerines, from my unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers; but I hope that the time will come when England, Russia, and France will feel that it is for their interest to destroy such a nest of robbers, and force them to live by cultivating their lands rather than plunder.

“Peace or war depends on Malta. It is in vain to talk of Piedmont and Switzerland. They are mere trifles, and must have been foreseen when the treaty was going forward. You have no right to speak of them at this time of day. I do not pretend to say this mission of Colonel Sebastiani was merely commercial. It was rendered necessary, in a military point of view, by your infraction of the treaty of Amiens (1).”

March. 8,
1803

Hostile pre-
paration on
both sides.

This energetic and highly characteristic conversation was not of a nature calculated to diminish the alarm of the British Government, or allay the hourly increasing irritation in the two countries. The result was, that the English Cabinet openly gave orders for the assembling of forces; and on the 8th March, a message from the King to both Houses of Parliament announced, that—“as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, his Majesty has judged it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government, this communication has been deemed necessary.” This message was received with the most animated feelings of patriotism by both Houses of Parliament. Mr. Fox, whose eloquence had so often been exerted in palliating the conduct of France, concurred in the address in answer, which passed both Houses without a single dissenting voice; and every thing announced a degree of unanimity in the farther prosecution of the war unknown in its earlier stages. A few days afterwards the militia was called out. Ten thousand additional men were voted for the navy; and

The press
loudly and
universally
supported the Govern-
ment.

March 10. preparations were made in the principal harbours of the kingdom for the most vigorous hostilities. These measures were immediately met by corresponding menaces on the part of France; and every thing breathed hostility and defiance in the two countries (1). Lord Nelson was intrusted with the command of the Mediterranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir Sidney Smith received orders to put to sea with a squadron of observation. A hot press took place in the Thames. Sixteen ships of the line were instantly put in commission; the public ardour rose to the highest pitch; and England resumed her arms with a degree of enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had laid them aside (2).

March 14. These hostile preparations speedily led to a second and still more violent ebullition on the part of the First Consul. In a public court at the Tuileries, held a few days after the King's message had been communicated to him, he publicly addressed Lord Whitworth in the following terms:—

“So you are determined to go to war. We have already fought for fifteen years. I suppose you want to fight for fifteen years more. The English wish for war; but if they are the first to draw the sword, I shall be the last to put it into the scabbard. They have no respect for treaties. Henceforth they must be shrouded in black crape. Wherefore these armaments? Against whom these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in the harbours of France; but if you arm, I shall arm also. If you insist upon fighting, I shall fight also. You may destroy France, but never intimidate it. If you would live on terms of good understanding with us, you must respect treaties. Wo to those who violate them; they will answer for the consequences to all Europe.” This violent harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the impassioned gestures with which it was accompanied, induced the English ambassador to suppose that the First Consul would so far forget his dignity as to strike him; and he was deliberating with himself as to what he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to the nation which he represented, when Napoléon retired, and delivered the assembled ambassadors of Europe from the pain they experienced at witnessing so extraordinary a scene (3).

This vehement exposure of hostile disposition produced an extraordinary sensation both in England and Europe. In the former, by the indignation it excited, and the ardent desire to revenge the slight thus publicly put upon the national honour, in the person of its ambassador: in the latter, by the clear evidence which it afforded of the impossibility of amicable terms being any longer preserved between the rival powers. Couriers, despatched the same night to every court in Europe, immediately made known generally the conflict that was approaching; and diplomacy was

(1) M. Talleyrand, in answer to the message of the English King, drew up the following note, which was delivered to the British Ambassador:—

1. If his Britannic Majesty, in his message, means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetals, all the world knows that it is destined for America, and was on the point of sailing; but in consequence of that message its orders are countermanded.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanations respecting these armaments in England; and if they actually take place, it is natural that the First Consul should march 20 000 men into Holland, when that country is named in the King's message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that they should form an encampment on the borders of Hanover; and that additional bodies of troops should join them.

4. It is natural that the First Consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.

6. It is also the natural consequence of all this that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1309.

(2) *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1170, 1180. *Dum.* ix. 136, 144. *Ann. Reg.* 1803.

(3) Lord Whitworth's Despatch, March 14, 1803. *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1310. *Norv.* ii. 249. *Dum.* ix. 163, 164.

soon as active in endeavouring to contract alliances as military energy in forwarding warlike preparations. General Duroc was forthwith despatched by the First Consul to Berlin, and Colonel Colbert to St.-Petersburg, to endeavour to rouse the Northern Powers to re-assert the principles of the armed neutrality, and join in the league against Great Britain; but these potentates had already concerted measures, on occasion of the meeting they had at Memel in the preceding year, to settle the matter of German indemnities, and refused to interfere in the contest. At the same time he put the army on the war footing; ordered the immediate levy of an hundred and twenty thousand men; reinforced the troops both in Holland and Italy; declared Flushing and Antwerp in a state of siege; commenced the formation of the great arsenals which were afterwards constructed in the Scheldt; hastened his naval preparations with the most incredible activity; and already directed those numerous corps to the shores of the Channel, which, under the name of the Army of England, were so seriously to menace the independence of Great Britain. The flame spread to every heart; patriotic feeling was roused to the highest pitch in France as well as in England; and never was war commenced with more cordial approbation on the part of the people of both countries (1).

Note in reply from Lord Hawkesbury, March 15, 1803.

To these intemperate sallies on the part of the First Consul the British Government contented itself with replying, through the medium of the Minister for Foreign Affairs: "His Majesty has the most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens should be executed in as complete a manner as possible; but it is impossible for him to consider that treaty as founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession or engagement was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; and that if ever there was a case in which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in a note by the French Government, namely, that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests, for the acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent. The subsequent acquisitions made by France in various quarters, particularly in Italy, have extended the power and increased the territory of France; and therefore England would have been justified, consistently with the spirit of the treaty, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, would have been willing to have overlooked these acquisitions, for the sake of not disturbing the general peace of Europe, and would have acted up to the very letter of the article regarding the evacuation of Malta, when his attention was arrested by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani on Egypt, which discloses views utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of Amiens (2)."

Distinction
of both
parties.

Notwithstanding the hostile nature of these declarations, the negotiation was kept open for two months longer, and had very nearly terminated by the English being permitted to retain Malta, on an indemnity being provided for France on the Continent. The British Government proposed that Malta should be retained by England, and the Knights indemnified: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops: Elba confirmed to France: the Italian and Ligurian Republics recognized by England, with the Kingdom of Etruria, upon a satisfactory indemnity being provided to the King of Sardinia. To this the French Cabinet would not agree; and it was next proposed by the English ministers, that "Great Britain should possess Malta for ten years; that the island of Lampedosa should be ceded in perpetuity to that power: that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated by the French troops, and the new Italian states recognized by England, on provisions in favour of Sardinia and Switzerland being contained in the treaty (1)." If these terms were not acceded to in seven days, the British Ambassador was enjoined to demand his passports. Napoléon would only consent, on the other hand, that Malta should be placed in the power of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, upon their agreeing to it and becoming parties to the treaty of Amiens; but this the British Cabinet declined, alleging that Russia, the only power deemed independent of France, had positively refused to be a party to any such arrangement (2). As a last resource, and finding the British Ambassador resolute,

War is at
length de-
clared.

Talleyrand suggested an arrangement by which Malta should be ceded in perpetuity to Great Britain, in return for a proper equivalent to France; but Lord Whitworth had no authority to enter into such an arrangement, which was one of exchange, instead of being indemnity and security; and Talleyrand positively refused to explain himself farther on the subject, or specify what equivalent France required. Lord Whitworth in consequence demanded and received his passports on May 12th; letters of marque were issued by the British Government on the 16th; General Andreosi, the French Ambassador, embarked at Dover on the 18th May; and the flames of a war were again lighted up, destined ere long to involve the whole world in conflagration (3).

May 30.

Arrival of all
the British
travellers in
France.

This declaration of war was immediately followed by an act as unnecessary as it was barbarous, and which contributed more perhaps than any other circumstance to produce that strong feeling of animosity against Napoléon which pervaded all classes of the English during the remainder of the contest. Two French vessels had been captured, under the English letters of marque, in the bay of Audierne; and the First Consul made it a pretence for ordering the arrest of all the English then travelling in France between the ages of eighteen and sixty years. Under this savage decree, unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare, above ten thousand innocent individuals, who had repaired to France in pursuit of business, science, or amusement, on the faith of the law of nations, which never extended hostilities to persons in such circumstances, were at

Decree, May
22, 1803.

(1) April 23, 1803. Lord Hawkesbury's Despatch.

(2) When this was first proposed to the Emperor Alexander, he answered that it would be ineffectual, as so inconsiderable an island could not be the real object of contest between the parties; but he afterwards signified his readiness to accept the treaty, though it was then too late, as war was declared. The communication from the Russian Ambassador, signifying the Emperor's readiness to act as me-

diator, was dated 24th May, and was not communicated to the English Government till all diplomatic relations with France had ceased, by the declaration of war on the 16th May preceding.—See *DISPOS.* iii. 73, 107, 108.

(3) *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1339, 1349. Lord Whitworth's Despatch, May 12, 1803. *Biga.* iii. 65, 75. *Norr.* ii. 250, 253. *Dunn.* ix. 160, 177.

once thrown into prison, from whence great numbers of them were never liberated till the invasion of the allies in 1814. This severity was the more unpardonable, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs had, a few days before, given the English at Paris assurances that they should be permitted to leave the kingdom without molestation; and numbers had, in consequence, declined to avail themselves of the means of evasion when in their power. No other authority than that of Napoléon itself is required to characterize this transaction. "Upon reading," says he, "the ironical and insolent answer made by the English Government to my complaints, I despatched, in the middle of the night, an order to arrest over all France, and in all the territories occupied by our armies, the whole English, of whatever description, and retain them as hostages for our vessels, so unjustly seized. The greater part of these English were wealthy or noble persons, who were travelling for their amusement. The more novel the act was, the more flagrant its injustice, the more it answered my purpose. The clamour it raised was universal, and all the English addressed themselves to me; I referred them to their own Government, telling them their fate depended on it alone (1)." In committing this unpardonable act, Napoléon hoped to bring under his power such a number of Englishmen of distinction as should compel the British Government to yield to his terms; but he mistook the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and contributed only to the formation of that inveterate spirit of hostility which mainly occasioned his overthrow (2).

Debates on
the war in
Parliament.

The renewal of the war was soon after the subject of important and animated debates in both Houses of Parliament; but in the tone

(1) Nap. in Las Cas. vi. 32, 33.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 289. Dum. ix. 178. Bign. iii. 127, 128.

General indignation justified proceeding on the part of which it ex- the First Consul was received, even cites even in France. by those of his generals who were most attached to his person and government, no better proof can be required than is furnished in the Duchess d'Abrantes' Memoirs, to whose husband's lot, as Governor of Paris, it fell to carry the painful decree into execution in that city. He was sent for by the First Consul in the middle of the night, who put letters into his hands explaining the cruel measure which was in contemplation. His eyes flashed fire, his whole figure was trembling with agitation. "Junot," said he, "you must, before an hour elapses, take measures, so that *all* the English, without one single exception, should be arrested. The Temple, the Force, the Abbaye, will hold them—they must be seized;" and with these words struck the table violently with his fist. "This measure," said Napoleon, "must be executed at seven in the evening—I am resolved that, in the obscurest theatre, or lowest restaurateur in Paris, not an Englishman shall this night be seen."—"My General," replied Junot, who though at first stunned, soon recovered from his stupor, "you know not only my attachment to your person, but my absolute devotion to every thing which concerns you. It is that devotion which induces me to hesitate at obeying your orders before imploring you to take a few hours to reflect on the measure which you have now commanded." Napoleon frowned: "Again," said he, "are we to have the scene of the other day over gain? Even Duroc, with his quiet air, will soon come here to preach to me. By God, gentlemen, I will shew you that I can make myself obeyed, Lannes has already experienced that; he will not find much to amuse himself with while eating oranges at Lisbon. Do not trust too far, Junot, to my

friendship; from the moment that I conceive doubts as to yours, mine is gone."—"My General," replied Junot, still undaunted, "it is not at the moment that I am giving you the strongest proof of my devotion, that you should thus address *me*. Demand my blood—demand my life—I will surrender them without hesitation; but to ask a thing which most cover us with—" "Go on," cried Napoleon: "what is likely to happen to me, because I fling back on a faithless Government the insults which it offered to me?"—"It is not my part," said Junot, "to decide on the conduct which you should pursue. I am sure that when you come to yourself, and are no longer fascinated by those around you who impel you to violent measures, you will be of my opinion."—"Of whom do you speak?" Junot made no answer; he knew what he would say, but his noble heart disdained to descend to the accusation of others. [D'Abr. vi. 398, 403.]

The pretence put forth by the French writers, that this unparalleled measure was justified by the capture of two French vessels in the bay of Andierne before war was formally declared, is totally groundless. These vessels were seized on the 29th May, eight days after the English Ambassador had left Paris, and two after the French had sailed from Dover; that is, after hostilities had been openly announced between the two countries, and four after the issuing of letters of marque by the British Government. To set up this, the first capture of the war, as an excuse for the severe and cruel measure adopted towards the private travellers—a class of men who universally have been allowed, in modern Europe, to retire unmolested upon hostilities breaking out—was a pretext as flimsy as the measure itself was unjustifiable and impolitic; and it was, in an especial manner, unseemly in a power which made such loud complaints of the enforcing of the ordinary rules of war in maritime affairs by the English cruisers.

which pervaded the speeches of the Opposition, it was manifest how materially the light in which the war was viewed by the Whig party had changed in the course of the contest, and how much the constant aggressions of Napoleon had alienated the minds of those who had hitherto shewn themselves the staunchest enemies of the conduct of Government in resisting the progress of the Revolution.

Arguments in favour of it by the Ministers. It was argued by Mr. Pitt, Mr. Canning, and Lord Hawkesbury, "that the first great point on which the negotiation turned was, whether there was such clear evidence of an intention, on the part of France, to resume its designs against Egypt as justified us in retaining Malta for our security? Now, on this point, the proof furnished by the conduct of the First Consul was decisive. The mission of Sebastiani to the Levant, which he himself admitted to Lord Whitworth was of a military character; the emphatic declaration which he made to that nobleman, that, sooner or later, Egypt must belong to France; and the information of the same intention, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, evidently proved that he had only suspended his designs against that country, and was resolved to renew them on the first favourable opportunity. This was a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens, which expressly provided for the integrity of the Turkish empire; and the time when he set out (Sept. 16) was important, as it entirely destroyed the pretence that he was sent to refute the statements in Sir Robert Wilson's work, which it is notorious was not published at that time. It is in vain to oppose to the inference clearly deduced from these circumstances the improbability that, if such had really been the designs of the French Government, they would have so openly avowed them; for that has been uniformly the system of all the rulers of that state since the Revolution, and seems to be now a fixed principle of their policy, instead of carefully concealing any project likely to shock the feelings of mankind till the moment of its execution, to announce it publicly for a long period before, in order that the minds of men may be familiarized to its contemplation, and have come to regard it with indifference.

"If, then, the design against Egypt is apparent, can there be the smallest doubt that we are entitled, from the moment it is discovered, to take such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we are thus exposed? And if this be admitted, the justice of our retaining Malta, the outwork both of Egypt and India, is apparent. All military authorities are agreed upon the vast importance of that island; and among them we must place, in the very first rank, the First Consul himself, who has not only declared that he would rather see us in possession of the faubourg St.-Antoine, but has evinced the sincerity of that declaration by preferring all the hazards of a war, which he was obviously anxious to avoid, to its relinquishment. England's interest in Malta is apparent, because it is a step on the road to India; whence the extraordinary anxiety of France for its acquisition, if not as a stage on the same journey for themselves? Consider, then, what would be our feelings if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or twelve months afterwards?

"The conduct of France on the continent of Europe has been equally inconsistent with the maintenance of pacific relations. What shall we say to her arrogant interference in the matter of German indemnities, and arrangement of the share of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes, without the concurrence either of the Emperor or the States interested in the maintenance of the equilibrium of the empire? What of the unprovoked and tyrannical

attack on Switzerland? What of the continued stay of French troops in Holland, in direct violation both of the treaty of Amiens and the subsequent conventions with the Batavian republic? The annexation of Piedmont, the severing of the Valais from Switzerland, the acquisition of Parma and Placentia, the new government imposed on the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, are so many steps towards supreme dominion over Italy, which may be already said to be in the hands of the French Government. And are we, with such instances of disregard of treaties and insatiable ambition before our eyes, to permit him to make the same unresisted strides towards maritime which he has already made towards continental supremacy?

“Add to this a still more glaring attack on our national independence, the clandestine sending of agents in the train of the French ambassador, with instructions to take soundings in our ports, and obtain information as to the military situation of all the provinces of the kingdom; and when the Government of England applied to the French ambassador to have them removed, the First Consul manifested an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorized emissaries, under the name of commercial agents, to prepare, in the midst of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. He has at the same time summoned us, in the most arrogant manner, to restrain the liberty of the press with reference to his government; in other words, to make an exception in favour of France of that general right to free discussion, which is the birthright of Englishmen, and daily exercised against their own Government and all the world besides. What are these acts but to require us to surrender at once our liberties and the means of national defence? And, not content with this, he requires us to banish the Bourbon princes, and transport the French emigrants to Canada,—addressing thus the King of England as if he were the President of one of his newly-created republics, and requiring him to submit to the last indignity of the conquered, the necessity of betraying the unfortunate.

“We have tried the system of connection with Europe for a century, and that of leaving the continent to shift for itself for eighteen months, and we see what has been the result. Compare the rank and station to which we raised ourselves by our former policy, with that to which we have been fast descending by the prevalence of the latter. Weigh the insults which we have borne, the aggressions to which we have been exposed during this short period against all the causes and provocations of war scattered over the face of the preceding century, and see if the former do not preponderate. We have found, then, and this, if nothing else, the experiment of the peace of Amiens has clearly proved, that a country, circumstanced as this is, cannot safely abjure a dignified policy, and abdicate its rank among nations; that with such a country to be lowly is not to be sheltered, to be unassuming is not necessarily to be safe. We may now see, by dear-bought experience, that our safety is necessarily linked with that of Continental Europe, and that a recurrence to our ancient and established policy is not only the most honourable, but the most prudent course which can be pursued.

“In these circumstances, nothing remains but to be prepared, collectively and individually, to meet with courage and resignation whatever difficulties it may be the will of Providence we should encounter; to make such vigorous naval and military preparations as may not only be adequate to repel any attempt at invasion, but diffuse the most complete sense of security throughout the whole nation; and enter at once upon such a resolute and prospective

system of finance, as may enable the people to contemplate, without apprehension, the maintenance of the war for as long a period as it has already lasted, and prevent its expenses in the end from being unnecessarily, perhaps intolerably, augmented (1)."

And on the other side by the Opposition. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox and Mr. Wilberforce, "that, however manifest it might be that the First Consul cast a longing eye to Egypt, and coveted Malta as a stepping-stone to that country, still the question of peace or war did not depend on that circumstance. Was it not evident that from the very first he had fixed his affections on that fortress? and nothing has recently occurred to strengthen the conviction of every thinking man on that subject. But still seeing that, knowing that, we made peace, and stipulated for the surrender of Malta to a neutral power; and this was all that the security of our Eastern possessions required. This is what, by the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim; this is what we should have remained contented with. Malta, indeed, is a valuable possession; but the most valuable of all possessions is good faith. By claiming the sovereignty of Malta, instead of its independence, you take a ground which is barely tenable, and give your inveterate enemy an opportunity of misstating your real views, both to France and Europe, and charging this country with those projects of rapacity and monopoly by which it has been his incessant object to represent its councils as actuated.

"The language of Bonaparte, in the latter stages of the negotiation, affords reason to believe that he would have acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not our retention of it for ten years; and this affords a reply to the argument that the surrender of Malta, on a declaration of war, was the only alternative left us. No; there was another alternative, the independence of Malta—that independence which, under the treaty of Amiens, we had a right to claim, and which would have secured Egypt and our Eastern possessions. Why were we so dilatory in availing ourselves of the proffered mediation of the Emperor of Russia? Whence the extraordinary haste, at the very close, to break off the negotiation, when it had taken a turn favourable beyond our most sanguine hopes—when the First Consul apparently was willing, rather than risk a war, to have ceded it to us in perpetuity, upon obtaining an equivalent, and the appearances of coercion being avoided?

"Undoubtedly you may interfere to prevent the aggrandizement of any continental state upon the general principles of policy, which include prudence, and upon the first principle which governs nations as well as individuals, the principle of self defence. Nay, you are authorized by the rank you hold, and I trust will ever hold in the scale of nations, to interfere and prevent injustice and oppression by a greater to a smaller power. But has the conduct of France since the peace been such as to call for the application of this principle? The system of German indemnities, indeed, was robbery, spoliation of the weaker by the stronger power; but France has had no greater share in the general iniquity than other powers against whom we have made no complaint. To say that the Emperor was injured by the arrangements made, is nothing to the purpose. Undoubtedly he was; but what else could be expected after the disasters of the war? Piedmont, at the time of the treaty of Amiens, was substantially a province of France; it was the twenty-seventh military division, and belonged to that power as effectually as Gibraltar to us. Whether it is expedient that it should belong to France, instead of being restored to the King of Sardinia, is a different question, which should have

been settled, if it was meant to have been seriously agitated, at the treaty of Amiens. The violent interference with Switzerland no one can contemplate with more indignation than myself; but it was an act not particularly directed against this country, and which, how culpable soever, we were not called on to resist, if the powers more immediately interested looked on with indifference. The disgraceful treatment of Holland, in defiance alike of treaty and former services, is, indeed, one of the most atrocious acts on record; but we have allowed the proper season for complaining to go past, and by acquiescing in their injustice at the time have precluded ourselves from making it the subject of recrimination afterwards. The mutual abuse of the press is not to be classed with these serious subjects of complaint. Great and permanent as was the evil thereby occasioned, from the irritation which it perpetuated in the minds of the people of both countries, still it is not a fit subject for war; and both nations might properly be addressed in the advice which Homer put into the mouth of the Goddess of Wisdom—‘Put up your swords, and then abuse each other as long as you please.’

“The demand to send away the French refugees, however, can never be too strongly reprobated. To deny to any man, whatever be his condition or rank, the rights of hospitality for political principles would be cowardly, cruel, and unworthy of the British character. The demand that we should send out of the country persons obnoxious to the Government of France, is made upon the most false and dangerous principles. The acquiescence of two such nations as England and France in such a system of international law would exterminate every asylum, not only to crime but misfortune, on the face of the globe. To yield to such demands would be the height of baseness. No man has, politically speaking, less respect for the house of Bourbon, nor a greater desire for peace, than I have; but yet for that family, or the very worst prince it contains, if among them there should be a bad one, I should be willing to draw my sword and go to war rather than comply with a demand to withdraw a hospitality to which he had trusted. I say this with respect to persons against whom no crime is alleged; with respect to those who are accused, whether justly or unjustly, of a crime, I think some inquiry should be made into the grounds of the accusation, and the result, whatever it is, be publicly made known. This is a duty we owe not only to France but ourselves; for the hostility of a great and generous nation gives no countenance to crimes even against its worst enemies.

“As to the commercial commissioners, as it is apparent that they were in truth military men, and in effect no better than spies, it was a shameful attempt to impose upon us for a most mischievous purpose; and therefore there was but one course to have pursued, namely, to have sent them immediately out of the country, and instantly applied to France for explanation and satisfaction for having sent them here under such colours and for such objects. But without doing either the one or the other, the question is, was it a ground for going to war?

“Is Malta essential to Egypt? Is Egypt essential to India? Both propositions are more than doubtful. Great stress is laid upon the possession of the banks of the Nile as indispensable to our Eastern possessions; but is there any rational foundation for this opinion? Is it not rather the result of an overweening interest in that country, from the glorious triumphs to our arms of which it has recently been the theatre?—feelings natural and praiseworthy if kept within due bounds, but not fit to be made the ground for determination in so momentous a question as that of peace and war. And let us beware, lest, while crying out against the aggrandizement of France

in Europe, we do not give them too good cause to recriminate upon us for our conduct in Asia (1); and consider well, whether, since the treaty of Amiens, we have not added more to our territories in the Mysore, than France has done in the whole Continent put together."

The House divided, when 398 supported the Address, approving of the war, and 67 voted against it. In the House of Lords the majority was still greater; 142 voting for the amendment and 10 against it (2).

Reflections on the altered tone of the Opposition. The altered tone of the Opposition upon the war was very remarkable, and eminently characteristic of the change which, in the estimation even of its warmest opponents, the contest had undergone. There were no longer the fierce recriminations, the vehement condemnation of Government, the loud accusations of leaguings with sovereigns in a crusade against the liberties of mankind, with which the chapel of St.-Stephen had so long resounded when the subject was brought forward. France now had little of popular sympathy in any other country. She had lost the support of the democratic party throughout Europe, and stood forth merely as a threatening and conquering military power. This change, though at the time little attended to, as all alterations which are gradual in their progress, was of the utmost moment, and deprived the contest, in its future stages, of the principal dangers with which it had at first been fraught. It was no longer a war of opinion on either side of the Channel. Democratic ambition did not now hail, in the triumphs of the French, the means of individual elevation. Aristocratic passion ceased to hope for this overthrow as paving the way to a restoration of the ancient order of things. The contest had changed its character: from being social it had become national. Not the maintenance of the constitution, the coercion of the disaffected, the overthrow of the Jacobins was the object for which we fought: the preservation of the national independence, the vindication of the national honour was felt to be at stake. The painful schism which had so long divided the country was at an end. National success was looked upon with triumph and exultation by an immense majority of the people, with the exception of a few party leaders who to the last regarded it with aversion. The war called forth the sympathies of almost all classes of citizens. The young, who had entered into life under its excitement, were unanimous in its support; and a contest which had commenced under more divided feelings than any recorded in the history of England, terminated with a degree of unanimity unprecedented in its long and glorious career.

England was obviously resolved on war. Upon coolly reviewing the circumstances under which the contest was renewed, it is impossible to deny that the British Government manifested a feverish anxiety to come to a rupture, and that, so far as the transactions between the two countries are concerned, they were the aggressors. The great stress laid on Sebastiani's mission to Egypt; the evasion of Russian mediation; the peremptory refusal to abandon Malta, even to a neutral power; the repeated demands by the English ambassador for his passports; the resolution at last not to treat, even on the footing of Malta being abandoned to England, are so many indications of a determined spirit of hostility, and a resolution, on one pretence or another, to put an end to amicable relations between the two countries.

But it was unavoidable on his acknowledged intention. On the other hand, the same impartiality requires it to be stated that the conduct of France to other states, and the language which the First Consul had begun to hold towards Great Britain herself,

indicated a settled resolution of disregarding the stipulations of treaties, and the commencement of a system of intimidation inconsistent with the existence of any independent power. The stretches made by France over Europe during a period of profound peace, in defiance alike of express agreements and the regard due by the common law of nations to the independence of weaker powers, were such as to render any long continued pacification out of the question. Pointing as the First Consul evidently did towards universal dominion, actuated as he plainly was by the principle that every thing was allowable which was conducive to the interests or the grandeur of France, it was in vain to expect that he would long continue at peace with this country, the only obstacle that stood in his way in the prosecution of these intoxicating objects. If he had not hitherto engaged in open acts of hostility against us, it was only because he was not prepared for them, because peace was requisite to restore his marine and put his naval resources on a more respectable footing; but his language already shewed his secret designs, and in his anxiety for supreme authority he spoke as if he had already acquired it. In these circumstances it is of little consequence what was the ostensible cause of the rupture; the real ground of it was a well-founded distrust of the pacific intentions of the First Consul, or his ability to remain at peace even if he had been so inclined; a conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that he was preparing, at some future period, a desperate attack upon our independence, and that all which he now acquired would ere long be returned with consummate talent against it.

He himself has told us what he meant to have done, and unfolded the matured designs he had formed for our subjugation. It was no part of his plan to have gone to war in 1803, or exposed his infant navy to the risk of being swept from the ocean or blockaded in its harbours, before his sailors had acquired the experience requisite for success in naval warfare. He intended to have remained at peace with England for six or eight years; to have built annually twenty or twenty-five ships of the line; immensely enlarged his ports and fortifications in Holland, the Scheldt, and the Channel; extended, in the interim, his dominion over all the lesser states in the Continent, and not unfurled the flag of defiance till he had from eighty to an hundred ships of the line at Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, manned by experienced seamen, to cover the embarkation of the invading army at Boulogne (1). The immense docks which he excavated out of the granite

His designs (1) "I was resolved," said Napoleon for the naval lion, "to renew at Cherbourg the subjugation wonders of Egypt. I had already raised in this country in the sea my pyramid. I would also have had my lake Mareotis. My

great object was to concentrate, at Cherbourg, all our maritime forces, and in time they would have been immense, in order to be able to deal out a grand stroke at the enemy. I was establishing my ground so as to bring the two nations, as it were, body to body. The ultimate issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium."

"The Emperor had resolved upon a strictly defensive plan till the affairs of the Continent were finally settled, and his naval resources had accumulated to such a degree as to enable him to strike a decisive stroke. He ordered canals in Brittany, by the aid of which, in spite of the enemy, he could maintain an internal communication between Bordeaux, Rochefort, Nantes, Holland, Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest. He proposed to have at Flushing or its neighbourhood, docks which were to be capa-

ble of receiving the whole fleet of Antwerp, fully armed, from whence it could put to sea in twenty-four hours. He projected near Boulogne a dike similar to that at Cherbourg; and between Cherbourg and Brest, a roadstead like that of l'île du Bois. Sailors were to be formed by exercising young conscripts in the roads, and performing gun practice and other operations in the harbours. He intended to construct twenty or twenty-five ships of the line every year. At the end of six years he would have had 200 ships of the line, at the end of ten as many as 300. The affairs of the Continent being finished, he would have entered heart and soul into that project; he would have assembled the greater part of his forces on the coast from Corunna to the mouth of the Elbe, having the bulk on the shores of the Channel. All the resources of the two nations would thus have been called forth, and then he would either, he conceived, have subjected England by his moral ascendancy, or crushed it by his physical force. The English, alarmed, would have assembled for the defence of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and the Thames. Our three corps off Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp, would have fallen on their central masses,

of Cherbourg and the slime of the Scheldt, the vast arsenal of Antwerp, the capacious basin of Boulogne, were all preparations for the great design which he had in contemplation, and which no moderation or pacific disposition on the part of Great Britain, short of absolute submission, could possibly have averted. "When by these means," said he, "England came to wrestle hand to hand with France, and the advantage which she derived from her insular situation was at an end, she must necessarily have fallen. The nation which depends on a population of seventeen millions must in the end sink before one which commands the resources of forty (1)."

In forming a judgment on the propriety of the course adopted by England on this occasion, there are two considerations not generally attended to, which require to be steadily kept in view, arising as they do out of the whole conduct of the French Government throughout the revolutionary war.

The first is, that all the great stretches of power during the whole contest were made by France in a period of peace; and that great as were her military conquests, they were yet inferior to the strides which she made, in defiance of treaty, in the middle of the forced pacifications which followed her triumphs. During the peace of Campo Formio she conquered Switzerland, revolutionized Rome, and subjugated Naples. By the treaty of Lunéville she was bound to allow the Helvetian, Ligurian, and Cisalpine Republics to choose their own constitutions; but hardly was the ink of his signature dry when she established a government in these independent states, all entirely composed of her creatures, and incorporated Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia with her dominions. The peace of Presburg and Tilsit were immediately followed by the overthrow of her own allies, Holland, Spain, and Portugal, and the seating of brothers of Napoléon on the thrones of the two first of these kingdoms. The peace of Vienna, in 1809, was but a prelude to the incorporation of the Roman States, Holland, and Hamburgh, with the French dominions; and the treaty of Vienna, in 1808, was the immediate forerunner of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the conquest of Naples for his brother Joseph; in other words, the organization of half of Germany and the whole of Italy under the direction of the Emperor.

Nor did the military strength of France, under the able direction of Napoléon, grow in a less formidable manner during every cessation of hostilities. Like blood in a plethoric patient, it accumulated fearfully during each interval of bleeding; and resistance to the malady became the more difficult the longer it was delayed. Down to 1800, Austria had maintained a protracted and doubtful contest with the Republic; but during the peace which followed, the military resources of France were so immensely increased that in the next war which ensued, in 1805, she was struck to the earth in a single campaign. The long repose of Germany which succeeded the treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was marked by such an extraordinary growth of the military strength of France as enabled it at the same time, in 1812, to maintain three hundred thousand men in Spain, and precipitate five hundred thousand on the Russian dominions. Continued hostility, however, in the end weakened this colossal power—the military resources of France rapidly declined during the fierce campaigns of 1812 and 1813; and at length the Conqueror of Europe saw

while our wings turned them in Scotland and Ireland. Every thing then would have depended on a decisive affair, and this was what Napoléon called his battle of Actium. 'We must have conquered,' said he repeatedly, 'when the two nations were op-

posed to each other, body to body, for we were forty millions, and they only fifteen.'"—See *LAS CASAS*, v. 15.

(1) Nap. in *Las Cas.* v. 8, 14.

himself reduced, in the plains of Champagne, to the command of fifty thousand men. This effect of peace to France, so different from what is generally observed in conquering states, was the result of the complete overthrow of all pacific habits and pursuits during the Revolution; the rise of a generation, educated in no other principles but the burning desire for individual and national elevation, and the organization of these immense warlike resources by a man of unexampled civil and military talent. Napoléon felt this strongly. He had no alternative but continued advance or abandonment of the throne. "My conquests," said he, "were in no respect the result of ambition or the mania of dominion; they originated in a great design, or rather in necessity (1)."

The second is, that Napoléon uniformly treated with the greatest severity the powers which had been most friendly and submissive to his will; and that acquiescence in his demands, and support of his interests, so far from being a ground to expect lenient, was the surest passport to vindictive measures; while he reserved all his favours for the rivals from whom he had experienced only the most determined hostility. Reversing the Roman maxim, his principle was,

"*Parcere superbis, et debellare subjectos.*"

The object of this policy was, that he might strengthen himself by the forces of the weaker before he hazarded an encounter with the greater powers. Its steady prosecution was an important element in his unexampled success; its ultimate consequences the principal cause of his rapid decline.

And he was uniformly most rigorous to those who had submitted the most, and been most faithful in their alliance. Holland was the first power which submitted to the republican arms. The inhabitants of its great towns hailed the soldiers of Pichegru as deliverers. Its government was rapidly revolutionized, and throughout the whole war stood faithfully by the fortunes of France; and it received in return a treatment so oppressive as to call forth the passionate censure of Mr. Fox in the British Parliament (2), and induce a brother of Napoléon to abdicate the throne of that country, that he might not be implicated in such oppressive proceedings. Piedmont next submitted to the rising fortunes of Napoléon. After a campaign of fifteen days it opened its gates to the conqueror, and placed in his hand the keys of Italy; and in a few years after the King of Sardinia was stripped of all his continental dominions, and the territories he had so early surrendered to France were annexed to the engrossing Republic. Spain was among the first of the allied powers which made a separate treaty with France; and for thirteen years afterwards its treasures, its fleets, and its armies, were at the disposal of Napoléon; and he rewarded it by the dethronement of its king, and a six years' war fraught with unexampled horrors. Portugal at the first summons drew off from the alliance with England, and admitted the French eagles within the walls of Lisbon; and it received in return an announcement in the *Moniteur* that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign. The Pope submitted without a struggle to all the rapacious demands of the French Government: the treasures, the monuments of art, one-third of the dominions of the church, were successively yielded up: the Head of the Faithful condescended to travel to Fontainebleau to crown the modern Charlemagne; and he was rewarded by a total confiscation of his dominions, and imprisonment for the remainder of his life. Venice maintained a neutrality of the utmost moment to France during the desperate struggle with Austria

in 1796, when ten thousand even of Italian troops would have cast the balance against the rising fortunes of Napoléon; and he, in return for such inestimable services, instigated a revolt in its continental dominions, which afforded him a pretence for destroying its independence and handing over its burning democrats to the hated dominion of Austria. A majority of the Swiss fraternized with the Republicans, and called in the French forces in 1798; and in 1802, Switzerland was deprived of its liberties, its government, and its independence. Prussia, by a selfish and unhappy policy, early withdrew from the alliance against France; and for ten years afterwards maintained a neutrality which enabled that enterprising power to break down the bulwark of central Europe, the Austrian monarchy; and on the very first rupture he treated it with a degree of severity almost unparalleled in the annals of European conquest.

He meditated, in the end, a resistance attack on England. While such was the conduct of Napoléon to the states which had earliest submitted and most faithfully adhered to his fortunes, his lenity towards the powers which had boldly resisted and steadily defied his ambition was not less remarkable. Austria, after a desperate warfare of five years, received as the price of its pacification the Venetian territories, more than an equivalent for all it had lost in the Low Countries; and on occasion of every subsequent rupture, obtained terms so favourable as to excite the astonishment even of its own inhabitants; until at length a Princess of the House of Hapsburg was elevated to the Revolutionary throne, and the continued hostility of twenty years rewarded by a large share of the conqueror's favour. Russia had twice engaged in fierce hostility against France; but the resentment of Napoléon did not make him forget his policy. He made the most flattering advances to Paul in 1800; and after the next struggle, the treaty of Tilsit actually gave an accession of territory to that formidable rival. With England, his most inveterate and persevering enemy, he was ever ready to treat on terms of comparative equality. He surrendered valuable colonies of his allies at the peace of Amiens; and was inclined, in the last extremity, to have abandoned Malta rather than provoke a war with so dreaded a naval power when his own maritime preparations were only in their infancy. The inference to be drawn from these circumstances is, not that Napoléon towards the greater powers was actuated by a spirit of moderation, the reverse of what he evinced towards the lesser, for such a conclusion is at variance with the whole tenor of his life; but that his ambition in every instance was subordinate to his judgment, and that he studiously offered favourable terms to the states with whom he anticipated a doubtful encounter, till his preparations had rendered him master of their destinies. His long continued favour to Prussia was but a prelude to the conquest of Jena and partition of Tilsit: his indulgence to Russia only a veil for his designs till the assembled forces of half of Europe were ready in 1812 to inundate its frontiers: his proffered amity to Great Britain, the lure which was to deceive the vigilance of its Government till the Channel was studded with hostile fleets, and a coalition of all the maritime states had prepared a Leipsic of the deep for the naval power of England. Such being the evident design of the First Consul, as it has now been developed by time, and admitted by himself, there can be but one opinion among all impartial persons as to the absolute necessity of resuming hostilities, if not in 1803, at least at no distant period, and preventing that formidable increase of his resources during the interval of peace, which with him was ever but the prelude to a more formidable future attack, and might have deprived Great Britain of all the security which she enjoyed from her insular situation and long established maritime superiority.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

MAY 1803—DECEMBER 1804.

ARGUMENT.

Great Preparations on both sides for the Renewal of the War—Conquest of Hanover by the French—A Convention is entered into by the Hanoverian Generals—Violation of Neutral Rights by the French Generals—They extend themselves through Southern Italy—Declarations against English Commerce—Immense Preparations in the Channel for the Invasion of Britain—Works and Flotilla at Boulogne—Description of the Small Craft assembled—Napoleon visits Antwerp, and orders Immense Works there—His Designs for the Invasion—And Measures to enforce Discipline in the Army on the Coast—Humiliating Treaties agreed to by Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal—Louisiana sold by France to America—Vast Forces collected on the Channel by the Money thus gained—Military Force and Finances of France—Preparations of England to repel the danger—Number and Warlike Spirit of the Volunteers—Naval Preparations—Finances and New Taxes of the year—Proposal to Fortify London—Argument in favour of it by Mr. Pitt—Napoleon's opinion on the subject—Fresh Rebellion in Ireland—Murder of the Lord Chief Justice in Dublin—Execution of the Ring-leaders—Naval Events of the year—Defeat of Linbis by the China Fleet—Supplies and Finances for the year 1804—General Despondency which ensued in Britain—Which is increased by the alarming illness of the King—All eyes are in consequence turned to Mr. Pitt—Coalition against the Ministry—Which falls, and Mr. Pitt becomes Prime Minister—Vigorous Measures of Lord Melville for the Restoration of the Navy—And his admirable Civil Regulations for that Service—Situation of Austria—Statistical details regarding that Monarchy—Its Government and State Policy—And Jealousy of Prussia and Reliance on England—Leading Statesmen at Vienna at this Period—Rapid Growth of Prussia in Wealth and Numbers—Court and Manners of Berlin—Its State Policy and Diplomacy—Foreign Policy—Russia—Its Rapid Growth and Steady System—Statistics of the Empire, and State of the Army—Character and Manners of the Emperor Alexander—His differences with France—Which lead to a Recall of the Russian Ambassador from Paris—Napoleon gains over Prussia by hinting at its obtaining Hanover—Immense sensation excited by the Death of the Duke D'Enghien—The French Government endeavours to effect a set-off, by falsifying Mr. Drake's proceedings at Stutgard—Opinions of the Diplomatic Body at Paris on the Subject—Warlike Note presented by d'Oubril, on the part of Russia, to Napoleon—Talleyrand's Answer—Farther Memorial of Russia—Pacific System of Austria—Its Conduct at the Death of the Duke d'Enghien—Recognizes Napoleon's Imperial Title—Temporizing Policy of Prussia—Accession of Hardenberg to power produces no External Change—They remonstrate against the seizure of Sir George Rumbold—Hostile Dispositions of Sweden, which are taken advantage of by Great Britain—Extension of the French Power in Italy—Internal Measures of Napoleon—Splendid Fête at Boulogne—His Vexation at the Defeat of his Flotilla in the midst of it—General Rejoicing over France on this occasion—Disgraceful Adulation with which he was surrounded—Vast Designs of the Emperor at Mayence for the Confederation of the Rhine—His Coronation at Paris—Ceremony at Notre-Dame—Result of the Appeal to the People on the Subject—Distribution of Eagles to the Army—Protest of Louis XVIII against his Assumption of the Imperial Crown—Splendour of the Imperial Court—Napoleon refuses any Accession of Territory to the Holy See—Origin of the Differences between England and Spain—Secret Measures of Hostility by the Later Power—Catastrophe which precipitated hostilities—And at once brings on a War—Spanish Manifesto—Reply by England—Argument against the Conduct of Government in Parliament—Defence of it by Mr. Pitt—Who is supported by Parliament—Reflections on the Subject—And particulars in which England appears to have been wrong.

Great preparations on both sides for the renewal of the war. The recommencement of the war was followed by hostile preparations of unparalleled magnitude on both sides of the Channel. Never did the ancient rivalry of France and England break forth with more vehemence, and never was the animosity of their respective Govern-

ments more warmly supported by the patriotism and passions of the people. The French, accustomed to a long career of conquest, and considering themselves, on land at least, as invincible, burned with anxiety to join in mortal combat with their ancient and inveterate enemies; and anticipated, in the conquest of England, the removal of the last obstacle which stood between them and universal dominion. The English hurled back with indignation the defiance they had received, warmly resented the assertion of the First Consul that Great Britain could not contend single-handed with France, and invited the descendants of the conquerors of Hastings to measure their strength with those in whose veins the blood of the victors of Cressy and Azincour was yet fresh. Ancient glories, hereditary rivalry were mingled with the recollection of recent wrongs and newly-won triumphs. The Republicans derided the military preparations of those who had fled before their arms in Holland and Flanders—anticipated in the conflagration of Portsmouth a glorious revenge for the fires of Toulon—and pointed to the career of William the Conqueror as that which was to be speedily followed by the First Consul. The English reverted to the glories of the Plantagenet reigns, and fired at the recital of ancient achievement; and referred with exultation to the sands of Egypt, as affording an earnest of the victories they were yet to obtain over the veteran arms of France. Both parties entered, heart and soul, into the contest—both anticipated a desperate and decisive struggle; but little did either foresee the disasters which were to be encountered, or the triumphs that were to be won.

Conquest of
Hanover by
the French.
May 26,
1803

The first military operation of the French ruler was attended with rapid and easy success. Ten days after the hostile message of the King of England to the House of Commons, the French army on the frontiers of Hanover received orders to put itself in motion, and accomplish the reduction of that electorate. The force intrusted to Mortier on this occasion was twenty thousand men; and the Hanoverian troops, whose valour was well known, amounted to nearly sixteen thousand; but the preponderating multitudes with which it was well known the First Consul could follow up, if necessary, this advanced guard, rendered all attempts at resistance hopeless. Some measures of defence were, however, adopted; and the Duke of Cambridge, in an energetic proclamation, enjoined the immediate assembly of the *levy en masse*, but the rapid advance of the French troops rendered all these efforts abortive. Count Walmoden made a gallant resistance at Borstell, on the shores of the Weser; but as there was no time for succours to arrive from England, and it was desirable not to involve that inconsiderable state in the horrors of a protracted and hopeless struggle, a convention was wisely entered into two days afterwards at Suhlingen, by which it was stipulated, that the Hanoverian army should retire with the honours of war, taking with them their field-artillery behind the Elbe, and not bear arms against France till exchanged during the remainder of the contest. The public stores in the arsenals, amounting to nearly 400 pieces of cannon and 30,000 muskets, fell into the hands of the French; but what they valued more, were nineteen colours and sixteen standards, the trophies of the army of Prince Ferdinand during the Seven Years' War (1).

A Convention is agreed to by the Hanoverian Generals.

The British Government, upon being informed of these transactions, refused to ratify the capitulation, and loudly complained of the invasion of the German Confederation by this irruption, in defiance alike of the privileges of the Elector of Hanover as a Prince of

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the Empire, and the neutrality of his German states, which had been observed throughout all the late war, and was expressly provided for in the treaty of Lunéville. The consequence was, that Walmoden was summoned by Mortier to resume hostilities or lay down his arms. The brave Germans declared they would rather perish than submit to such a degradation, and, on the 27th, hostilities recommenced along the whole line; but the contest was too obviously unequal to permit either party to come to extremities. The French abated somewhat from the rigour of their first terms. The Hanoverian army was dissolved; the soldiers disbanded and sent home for a year; the officers retained their side arms; those of the common men were given up to the civil authorities. The troops thus let loose afterwards proved of essential service to the common cause. They were almost all received into the English service, and, under the name of the King's German Legion, were to be seen in every subsequent field of fame from Vimeira to Waterloo (1).

Violation of neutral rights by the French Generals. In the course of this incursion the French armies set at nought the neutrality, not only of Hanover, but of all the lesser states in its vicinity. Mortier traversed without hesitation all the principalities, not merely which lay in his way on the road to Hanover, but many beyond that limit. Hamburgh and Bremen were occupied, and the mouth of the Elbe and Weser closed against British merchandise. This uncalled-for aggression is not only of importance, as demonstrating the determination of the First Consul to admit of no neutrality in the contest which was commenced, but as unfolding the first germ of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which he mainly trusted afterwards in his hostilities against Great Britain. Unaccustomed, however, as the European powers hitherto were to such instances of lordly usurpation, this violation of neutral rights excited a very great sensation. In the north especially the advance of the French standards to the Elbe, and the permanent occupation of the free cities of Hamburgh and Bremen by the troops of that nation, awakened a most extraordinary jealousy. Russia openly expressed her discontent, and Austria and Prussia made representations on the subject to the Cabinet of the Tuileries; while Denmark, more courageous, actually assembled an army of thirty thousand men in Holstein, to prevent the violation of the Danish territory. But the Emperor was too much depressed by his long continued disasters—Prussia too deeply implicated in her infatuated alliance with France, to resent openly this violation of the German confederation—and Russia too far removed to take any active steps, when the powers more immediately interested did not feel themselves called on to come forward. Thus the jealousies of the North evaporated in a mere interchange of angry notes and diplomatic remonstrances; the troops of Denmark alone appeared in the field to assert the cause of European independence; too weak to contend with the Republican legions, they were compelled to retire into their cantonments, after being treated with insulting irony in the French journals (2); and the north of Germany permanently fell under the dominion of France, from which it was only delivered, ten years after, by the disasters of the Russian campaign (3).

They extend themselves through Southern Italy. Simultaneous with the conquest of Hanover by the French was the march of an army into the south of Italy, and occupation of the port of Tarentum by the Republican forces. St.-Cyr received the command of the troops destined to this service, which were fourteen thou-

(1) Dum. ix. 217, 220. Ann. Reg. 1803, 326.

(2) "The military mania," said the Moniteur, "is a strange passion to seize little princes."—Biron, iii. 139.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1803, 326, 327. Bign. iii. 138, 139. Dum. ix. 207, 208.

sand strong; and on the 14th May he addressed a proclamation to the soldiers, which was soon after followed by the invasion of the kingdom of Naples. They advanced forthwith to Tarentum, which, with its extensive fortifications and noble roadstead, again formed the outwork of France against the Eastern possessions of Great Britain. At the same time Tuscany was invaded, Leghorn was declared in a state of siege, and all the English merchandise found in that great seaport confiscated; the First Consul thus evincing that he was resolved to admit of no neutrality in a lesser state in the great contest which was approaching, and that, by a continued violation of the usages of war at least, he was resolved to compel a change in the code of naval hostility. As usual, all these troops were to be maintained and paid by the countries where they were quartered. The formal protest by the ephemeral King of Etruria against the military occupation of his dominions was hardly even noticed by the First Consul. In vain it was represented to him that the commerce and revenue of Tuscany were ruined by the measures of severity adopted towards the English merchandise; these considerations were as nothing in his estimation, compared to the grand design which he had in contemplation of overturning the power of Great Britain. At the same time the island of Elba, intrusted to General Rucca, was put in the best state of defence; Corsica fortified at every accessible point, and ten thousand men laboured on the fortifications of Alexandria, the key, in Napoléon's estimation, to the whole peninsula. "I consider that fortress," said he, "as the possession of the whole of Italy: the rest is a matter of arms, that of political combination (1)."

Declarations against English commerce, June 23, 1803. By an *arrêt* on 23d June, the First Consul formally commenced that virulent strife which he so long maintained against the English commerce. It declared, "that no colonial produce and no merchandise coming directly from England, should be received into the ports of France; and that every such produce or merchandise should be confiscated." Neutral vessels arriving in France were subjected to new and vexatious regulations, for the purpose of discovering from whence they had come (2); and any vessel coming from, or which "had touched at a harbour of Great Britain," was declared liable to seizure.

Immense preparations in the Channel for the invasion of Britain. But all these combinations, extensive as they were, sunk into insignificance, compared to the gigantic preparation made on the shores of the Channel for the invasion of Great Britain. Every thing here conspired to rouse the First Consul to unheard-of exertion.

By accumulating the principal part of his troops on the shores of the Channel, he fixed the attention and excited the alarm of Great Britain, furnished a brilliant object of expectation to his own subjects, and obtained a pretext for maintaining an immense army on foot, without exciting the jealousy of the other European powers; while, if they conceived the design of attacking France, he had always at hand a vast force ready organized, capable of crushing them. Impelled by these different motives, he made the most extraordinary efforts to hasten the preparations for a descent on Great Britain. The official journals publicly announced his intention of putting himself at the head of the expedition, and called on all the departments to second the attempt. The public spirit of France, and the hereditary rivalry with which its inhabitants were animated against England, produced the most strenuous efforts to aid the Government. A circular from the War Office to

(1) *Dum.* x. 16, 27. *Bigo.* iii. 140, 143. *Bot.* iv. 125, 139. (2) *Dum.* x. 51, 52. *Bigo.* iii. 142, 143.

the different towns and departments called on them to furnish voluntary aids to the great undertaking. "Every vessel," said the War Minister, "shall bear the name of the town or district which has contributed the funds for its formation: the Government will accept with gratitude every thing, from a ship of the line to the smallest praeam. If by a movement as rapid as it is general, every department, every great town covers its dock-yards with vessels, soon will the French army proceed to dictate laws to Great Britain, and establish the repose of Europe, the liberty and prosperity of commerce, on the only basis which can ensure their duration." Every where the people answered the appeal with acclamations, and soon every workshop on the coast was in activity from the Texel to Bayonne. Forts and batteries, constructed on every headland and accessible point of the shore, both secured the territory of the Republic from insult, and afforded protection to the small craft proceeding from the places of their construction to the general points of rendezvous: the departments vied with each other in patriotic gifts and offerings; that of the Upper Rhine contributed 300,000 francs (L.12,000) for the construction of a vessel to bear its name; that of the Côte d'Or threw off at their own expense a hundred pieces of cannon to arm the flotilla; and Bourdeaux, albeit the first to suffer by the resumption of hostilities, manifested in an energetic address, their cordial concurrence in the war. Such was the public spirit, even of those parts of the country which had been most convulsed during the Revolution, that Napoléon ventured upon the noble design of forming a Vendéen legion, "all composed," to use his own words, "officers and soldiers, of those who have carried on war against us;" and its ranks were speedily filled by the remains of that unconquerable band (1).

The object to be gained by all these preparations was to assemble, at a single point, a flotilla capable of transporting an army of 150,000 men, with its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, and horses; and at the same time to provide so formidable a covering naval force as might ensure its safe disembarkation, notwithstanding any resistance that could be opposed by the enemy. Such a project, the most gigantic to be attempted at sea of which history makes mention, required the assembling of very great means and no small share of fortune for its success; but it was within the range of possibility, and the combinations made for its accomplishment were among the most striking monuments of the extensive views and penetrating genius of the First Consul.

Works and
flotilla at
Boulogne.

The harbour of Boulogne was taken as the central point for the assembling of the vessels destined for the conveyance of the troops. Its capacious basin, enlarged and deepened by the labour of the soldiers, was protected by an enormous tower, constructed on a coral reef, amidst incredible difficulties, from the action of the waves, and armed with heavy cannon, capable of carrying to the distance of 2,000 toises, while similar excavations extended the neighbouring ports of Etaples, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse. Every harbour, from Brest to the Texel, was rapidly filled with gunboats of different dimensions; the dockyards, the shipwrights were universally put into activity; and as fast as the vessels were finished, they were sent round, under protection of the numerous batteries with which the coast abounded, to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. The number and intrepidity of the British cruisers in the Channel rendered this a service both of difficulty and danger; but the First Consul was indefatigable, and by communicating his own incredible activity to all the persons in subordinate situations, at length

made great progress in the assembling of naval forces within sight of the shores of Britain. No sooner were the English cruisers blown off their stations by contrary winds, than the telegraph announced the favourable opportunity to the different harbours; numerous vessels were speedily seen rounding the headlands and cautiously cruising along the shore, while the artillerymen, with lighted matches in their hands, stood at the frequent batteries with which it bristled, to open upon any ships of the enemy which might come within range in attempting to impede their passage. The small draught of water which the gunboats required enabled the greater part of them to escape untouched, and concentrate in the roads of Boulogne: but a considerable number were intercepted and destroyed by the British cruisers, and innumerable deeds of daring courage were performed, in too many of which valuable blood was shed in the attainment of a comparatively trifling object (1).

Description of the small craft assembled. The small craft assembled was of four different kinds, according to the weight and species of the troops which they were intended to convey. The praams, or largest sort, carried each six four-and-twenty pounders, and were intended rather to protect the smaller vessels which conveyed the troops than to be employed in the transport themselves. The next class bore four twenty-four pounders and one howitzer; they were calculated to receive each from 150 to 200 men, and made flat-bottomed, in order to land them as near as possible to the shore. The third were armed each with two twenty-four pounders, and were capable of conveying eighty men each; while the smallest had a four-pounder at the poop and a bomb at the stern, and bore from forty to fifty men each. The artillery were intended to be embarked in the larger vessels, the cavalry in those of a medium size, the infantry in the smallest; and such was the discipline and organization of the troops destined for the expedition, that each man knew the vessel on board of which he was to embark; and experience proved that a hundred thousand men could find their places in less than half-an-hour (2).

Napoléon visits Antwerp, and orders immense works there. Upwards of thirteen hundred vessels of this description were, in the course of the year 1803, collected at Boulogne and the adjoining harbours; but immense as these preparations were, it was not on them alone that the First Consul relied for the execution of his project. Innumerable transports were at the same time assembled, which, without being armed, were destined for the reception of the stores and ammunition of the army; and Napoléon himself proceeded to the coast, to hasten by his presence the preparations which were going forward, and judge with his own eyes of the measures which should be adopted. He visited all the material points in the maritime districts; inspected at Flushing the new docks and fortifications which had been commenced; and rapidly discerned in Antwerp the central point where the chief arsenal for the naval subjugation of July 21, 1803. England should be established. An *arrêt* of the 21st July directed that a dock should be there constructed, capable of containing twenty-five ships of the line and a proportional number of frigates and smaller vessels; and those immense works were immediately commenced, which in a few years rendered this the greatest naval station on the continent (3). Not content with

(1) *Dum.* x. 38, 48. *Bign.* iii. 144, 145. *Norr.* ii. 261, 262.

In this partisan warfare, Captain Owen, in the *Immortalité*, and Sir Sidney Smith, in the *Antelope*, particularly distinguished themselves.—See *JAMES'S Naval Hist.* iii. 294, 246.

(2) *Dum.* x. 40, 45. *Bign.* iii. 145, 147.

(3) The opinion of Napoléon was repeatedly and strongly expressed as to the great importance of

Antwerp as a naval station to France. "He often declared," says Las Cases, "that all he had done for Antwerp, great as it was, was nothing compared to what he intended to have done. By sea, he meant to have made it the point from whence a mortal stroke was to be lanced against the enemy; by land, to have rendered it a certain place of refuge in case of disaster, a pivot of the national safety; he intended to have rendered it capable of re-

the realities of that marvellous period, the minds of men, as usual in times of highly-wrought excitement, were inflamed by fictitious prodigies; and the announcement that, in excavating the harbour of Boulogne, a hatchet of the Roman legions and a medal of the Norman princes had been discovered, conveyed to the vivid imaginations of the French soldiers the happy omen that they were about to tread in the footsteps of Julius Cæsar and William the Conqueror (1).

His design for the invasion. But these naval forces, great as they were, constituted but a part of those which were destined to be employed in the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of France and Holland, and, soon after of Spain, were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of Napoléon, which he himself has pronounced to have been the most profoundly conceived and nicely calculated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean in the West Indies; to have brought this combined fleet rapidly back to the Channel while the British blockading squadron were traversing the Atlantic in search of their enemies, raised the blockade of Rochefort and Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole armament, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was under cover of this irresistible force that Napoléon calculated upon crossing over to England, at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom he thought he would reach London in five days, and where he intended instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the downfall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the English republicans had at heart. Numerous as were the chances against the successful issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel how near it was succeeding, how little the English were aware of the danger which really threatened them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated the gallant officer whose important combat defeated the most profound combination that the genius of Napoléon ever formed for their destruction (2).

And measures to enforce discipline in the army on the coast. But towards the success of this attempt a very great military as well as naval force was necessary; and the attention of the First Consul was early turned to the means of restoring the strength of that arm, which the expedition to St.-Domingo and detachments into Italy and Hanover had very much diminished. The soldiers, long habituated to the excitement and plunder of war, had become weary of the monotony of a garrison or pacific life; discipline was sensibly relaxed, and desertion, especially among the old soldiers, had increased to an alarming extent. The most energetic measures were immediately taken to arrest this evil; new regula-

ceiving an army in case of defeat, and sustaining a whole year of open trenches. Already all the world admired the splendid works erected at Antwerp in so short a time, its numerous dockyards, magazines, and basins; 'but all that,' said the Emperor, 'was nothing: it was only the commercial town; the military town was to be on the opposite bank of the Scheldt, where the ground was already purchased for its construction. There three-deckers were to have reposed, with all their guns on board, during the winter months; vast sheds were to have been constructed to shelter their huge bulk from the weather in peace; every thing was determined on on the most gigantic scale. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St.-Helena; for the cession of that fortress was one of the principal reasons which induced me not to agree to peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France,

without the frontiers of the Rhine and Antwerp, is nothing.' All the difficulties attendant on the situation were nothing in the eyes of Napoléon: in his impatience to make the English feel the dangers of the Scheldt, which they had themselves often signalized as so formidable, he was indefatigable; and in less than eight years Antwerp had become a maritime arsenal of first-rate importance, and contained a considerable fleet." [Las Cas vii. 43, 44, 56, 57.] When Napoléon made these energetic remarks at St.-Helena, he was far from anticipating that, in twelve years, a British squadron was to aid a French army to wrest this magnificent fortress from the ally of England, and restore it to the son-in-law of France and the sway of the Tricolor flag!

(1) Bign. iii. 147, 149. Norv. ii. 263, 264. Dam. x. 77, 78.

(2) Nap. in Month. ii. 227. Jom. Vie de Nap. ii. 20, 21. Las Cas, ii. 277, 280.

tions introduced to ensure a rigid enforcement of the conscription, and the height requisite for the service lowered to five feet two inches,—a decisive proof that the vast expenditure of human life in the preceding wars had already begun to exhaust the robust and vigorous part of the population. Such was the rigour with which the conscription laws were now enforced, that escape became hopeless; and the price of a substitute, which rose to the enormous sum of L.500, rendered it totally impossible for the middling classes to avoid personal service. Napoléon was indefatigable on the subject. “Keep your eyes,” said he to the Minister of War, “incessantly fixed on the recruiting; let not a day pass without your attending to it; it is the greatest affair in the state.” From necessity, then, not less than inclination, the military life became the sole object of ambition; and the proportion of the number drawn to that of the youth who were liable to serve each year was so great, that, for the remainder of his reign, it practically amounted to almost a total absorption of half, sometimes the whole, of the young men, as they rose to manhood, into the ranks of war (1).

Sept. 27, 1803. Nor was Napoléon less solicitous, by means of foreign negotiations, to increase the disposable force which he could bring to bear against the common enemy. Ney, who had commanded in Switzerland, concluded a capitulation, by which sixteen thousand troops of that Government were put at the disposal of France, and soon after placed in reserve of the army of England at Compiègne, while, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded between the two states, which stipulated that the Helvetic Confederacy should in addition, if necessary, furnish eight thousand auxiliary troops to France; General Pino led an Italian division across the Alps, to form part of the same armament; while Augereau assembled a corps in the neighbourhood of Bayonne, to enforce the mandates of the Consular Government, if the Courts of Madrid and Lisbon refused to conclude treaties on the footing of the orders sent out from the Tuileries. But there was no need for the precaution; terror and French influence were already paramount at both these capitals, and the seal was put to the disgrace of the Peninsula by the treaties concluded with Spain on the 19th October, and with Portugal on the 25th December. By the first of these conventions, an annual payment of six millions of francs (L.240,000 a-month, or L.2,880,000 a-year) was stipulated in favour of France, to be either remitted to Paris or employed in repairing the French ships of war in the Spanish harbours; several officers, holding important situations in the Spanish army, were to be dismissed for alleged offences against the French Government; many stipulations in favour of the export of French manufactures, and their transit into Portugal, were agreed to; and the Spanish Government engaged to procure the payment of at least a million of francs (L.40,000) a-month by the Portuguese to the French Government, as long as the maritime war lasted. By the second, Portugal purchased an exemption from actual hostilities by an annual payment of 16,000,000 francs (L.640,000) to Napoléon. The conclusion of these treaties was a virtual declaration of war by both Spain and Portugal against great Britain, since it placed the pecuniary resources of both countries at the disposal of France during the continuance of the contest. Bitterly did the people of the Peninsula subsequently lament

(1) *Dum.* x. 60, 72.

It was calculated that 208,233 young men in the French empire annually attained the age of 20, the period when liability to serve commenced. Thus the first conscription of 1793, which required 200,000 men who had that year attained that age, absorbed

nearly the whole persons liable, and the drawing of lots became a vain formality. The conscription in 1803 was 120,000, and it was never less, generally much greater, during the remainder of the war.—*Dumas*, x. 65.

their degradation, and nobly did they then wipe off the stain on their honour (1).

No sooner also did the maritime war appear inevitable, than Napoléon concluded an arrangement with the United States of America, by which, in consideration of eighty millions of francs (L.3,200,000,) he ceded to them his whole rights, acquired by the convention with Spain, to Louisiana; anticipating thus, for a valuable consideration, the probable fate of a naval contest, and extricating from the hands of the British a valuable colonial possession, which would assuredly soon have become their prey (2).

By these different means, Napoléon was enabled to put on foot a very large army for the invasion of Great Britain. An order addressed to the Minister at War, on the 14th June, 1803, fixed the organization of the army which was divided into six corps, each of which was to occupy a separate camp, and be under a different commander. Ney, Soult, Davoust, and Victor, were to be found among the names of the generals. It extended along the whole coast, from the Texel to the Pyrenees. The first camp was in Holland, the second at Ghent, the third at St.-Omer, the fourth at Compiègne, the fifth at St.-Malo, the sixth at Bayonne. The whole troops assembled at these different points were intended to exceed 150,000 men, and their command was intrusted to the most distinguished generals of the army. Though all included under the name of the army of England, their wide dissemination renders it probable, that the First Consul had other objects in view besides the subjugation of Great Britain in their disposition; but the Continental Powers shut their eyes to the danger which awaited them from the concentration of such powerful forces, and secretly rejoiced that the vast army from which they had all suffered so much was quietly cantoned at a distance from them on the shores of the ocean, intent on a distant and hazardous enterprise (3).

Great as these preparations were, they were not beyond the resources at the disposal of the First Consul. The army of France alone, without counting the subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian states subject to its command, amounted to the enormous aggregate of above 420,000 men, independent of the national and coast guards, which were above 200,000 (4). The finances of the country were in an equally flourishing condition. The revenue exceeded that of 1802, and amounted to 570,968,000 francs, or L.25,000,000 sterling (5); while the im-

Louisiana
sold to Ame-
rica, April
30, 1803.

Vast force
collected on
the coast by
the money
thus gained.

Military
force and
finances of
France.

(1) Norv. ii. 265, 266. Bign. iii. 200, 201, and 238.

(2) Bign. iii. 169, 170.

(3) Jour. ii. 22. Dum. x. 89, 91.

(4) The army consisted of—

Infantry,	341,000
Artillery,	26,000
Cavalry,	46,350
Invalids,	14,560

427,910

—See Report of the Minister at War, June, 1803.—Dumas, ix, 117.

(5) The Budget for 1803 stood thus:—

	Francs.	
Direct contributions,	305,105,000 or	L.12,200,000
Registers, stamps, etc.	200,106,000 or	8,420,000
Customs,	36,924,000 or	1,800,000
Post Office,	11,200,000 or	600,000
Salt tax,	2,300,000 or	92,000
Lottery,	15,326,000 or	950,000

570,961,000 or L.24,062,000

—See DUKE DE GARTIA, i. 304.

The annual subsidy paid by the Italian Republic

was 25,000,000 francs, or L.1,000,000 sterling.—
Dumas, xi. 134.

mense subsidies paid by Spain and Portugal as the price of their pretended neutrality—by the Italian Republic in return for the alliance of France—and the maintenance by Hanover, Holland, Naples, and Tuscany of all the troops cantoned in their respective territories, largely contributed to the increase of the resources of the Republic (1).

Preparations
of England
to repel the
danger.

But nothing were the Government or people of England daunted by the formidable preparations which were directed against them.

Relying on the patriotism and spirit of the people, the Administration made the most vigorous efforts for the national defence, in which they were nobly seconded both by Parliament and the people. Independent of the militia, eighty thousand strong, which were called out on the 25th March, and the regular army of 130,000 already voted, the House of Commons, on June 28th, agreed to the very unusual step of raising 50,000 men additional, by drafting, in the proportion of 34,000 for England, 10,000 for Ireland, and 6000 for Scotland; which it was calculated would raise the regular troops in Great Britain to 112,000 men, besides a large surplus force for offensive

July 18. operations. In addition to this, a bill was brought in shortly afterwards, to enable the King to call on the levy *en masse* to repel the invasion of the enemy, and empowering the lord-lieutenants of the several counties to enrol all the men in the kingdom, between seventeen and fifty-five years of age, in different classes, who were to be divided into regiments according to their several ages and professions. But all persons were to be exempt from this conscription who were members of any volunteer corps approved of by his Majesty; and such was the general zeal and enthusiasm, that in a few weeks three hundred thousand men were enrolled, armed, and disciplined in the different parts of the kingdom, and the compulsory conscription fell to the ground. This immense force, which embraced all classes and professions of men, not only was of incalculable importance, by providing a powerful reserve of trained men to strengthen the ranks and supply the vacancies of the regular army, but contributed in a remarkable manner to produce a patriotic ardour and feeling of unanimity among the people, and lay the foundation of that military spirit which enabled Great Britain at length to appear as principal in the contest, and beat down the power of France, even on that element where hitherto she had obtained such unexampled success (2).

Numbers
and warlike
spirit of the
volunteers.

The spectacle now presented by the British Islands was unparalleled in their previous history, and marked decisively the arrival of a new era in the war—that in which popular sympathy was enlisted against the Revolution, and the military usurpations of France had roused an unanimous resolution to resist its aggression. In the multitudes who now thronged to the standards of their country were to be seen men of all ranks and descriptions, from the Prince of the Blood to the labourer of the soil. The merchant left his counting-house, the lawyer his briefs; the farmer paused in the labours of husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or amusement, the country gentleman was to be seen at the head of his tenantry. Everywhere were to be seen uniforms, squadrons, battalions; the clang of artillery was heard in the streets, the trampling of cavalry resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant reposing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was to be seen hurrying, with his musket on his shoulder, to his rallying point. Instead of the nobleman wasting his youth in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to

be found inhaling a nobler spirit amidst the ranks of his rural dependents. In the general tumult even the voice of faction was stilled; the heart-burnings and divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten; the Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the volunteers; from being a war of opinion, the contest had become one of nations, and, excepting in a few inveterate leaders of party in the Legislature, one feeling seemed to pervade the whole British Empire (1). Mr. Sheridan, with that independent and patriotic spirit which ever distinguished him, at the close of the Session made an eloquent speech on moving the thanks of Parliament to the volunteers and yeomanry for the zeal and alacrity with which they had come forward in

Aug. 10. defence of their country; and thunders of applause shook the House when he declared it to be the unalterable resolution, not less of the Legislature than the Government, that "no proposal for peace should be entertained while a single French soldier had footing on British ground (2)."

Nor was it at land only that preparations to resist the enemy on the most gigantic scale were made: the navy also, the peculiar arm of British strength, received the early and vigilant attention of Government. Fifty thousand seamen, including twelve thousand marines, had been in the first instance voted for the service of the year; but ten March 14, 1803. thousand additional were granted when it became probable that war would ensue, and forty thousand more when it actually broke out.

June 21. Great activity was exerted in fitting out adequate fleets for all the important naval stations the moment that hostilities were resumed, although the dilapidated state of the navy, in consequence of previous ill-judged economy, rendered it a matter of extreme difficulty. Seventy-five ships of the line, and two hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels, were put in commission. The harbours of France and Holland were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant in the Mediterranean; and, excepting when their small craft were stealing round the headlands to the general rendezvous at Boulogne, the flag of France, at least in large fleets, disappeared from the ocean (3).

June 14, 1803. No small efforts in finance were required to meet these extensive armaments by sea and land; but the resources of the country enabled Government to defray them without difficulty. A property-tax of 5 per cent, which it was calculated would produce L.4,500,000 yearly; additional customs to the amount of L.2,000,000 a-year; additional excise chiefly on malt spirits and wine, which were estimated at L.6,000,000; and a loan of L.12,000,000, were sufficient to enable Government to meet the heavy expenses attendant on the renewal of the war, even on the extended scale on which it was now undertaken. These burdens, especially the income and malt taxes, were severe, but they were universally felt to be necessary; and such was the general enthusiasm, that the imposition of war taxes in a single year to the amount of twelve millions and a half, did not excite a single dissentient voice in Parliament, or produce any dissatisfaction in the country (4).

(1) The King reviewed in Hyde Park, in October, sixty battalions of volunteers, amounting to 27,000 men, besides 1500 cavalry, all equipped at their own expense, and in a remarkable state of ef-

ficiency. The total volunteers of the metropolis were 46,000.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1694, 1697. Dum. x. 136.

(3) James, vol. iii. Table No. 12. Ann. Reg. 1803, 621. App. to Chronicle.

(4) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 1595.

The new taxes imposed were,—

1. Customs.

Twenty per cent additional on sugar, etc. imported,	L.1,300,000
Duty of one per cent on exports,	460,000
One penny a lb. on cotton wool,	250,000
Tonnage additional,	150,000
	L.2,160,000

Mr. Pitt's
speech on
fortifying
London.

A long and interesting debate took place in Parliament, upon the question whether London should be fortified. Colonel Crawford urged strongly the great danger of the capital and the principal dépôt for our military and naval stores being wholly undefended; and maintained that, as matters then stood, the loss of a single battle might draw after it the surrender of the metropolis and chief arsenals of the kingdom, the effect of which, both in a political and military point of view, would be incalculable. Mr. Pitt added the great weight of his authority on the same side, and strongly enforced the propriety, not only of strengthening the metropolis, or at least the arsenals in its vicinity, but fortifying the principal headlands of the coast, in order to render landing by the enemy more difficult. "It is in vain to say," said he, "you should not fortify London, because our ancestors did not fortify it, unless you can shew that they were in the same situation that we are. We might as well be told that, because our ancestors fought with arrows and lances, we ought to use them now, and consider shields and corslets as affording a secure defence against musketry and artillery. If the fortification of the capital can add to the security of the country, I think it ought to be done. If by the erection of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between the safety and destruction of the capital. It will not, I admit, make a difference between the conquest and independence of the country; for that will not depend upon one or upon ten battles: but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives, with misery, havoc, and desolation spread over the country on the one hand, or the confounding the efforts and chastising the insolence of the enemy on the other (4)." These arguments were little attended to at the time, and the proposed measure was not adopted: but there can be no doubt that they were well founded, and that England might have had bitter cause to regret their neglect, if Napoleon, with a hundred thousand men, had landed on the coast of Sussex. For this opinion we have now abundant grounds, in the result of the invasions

Brought over. . . . L.2,160,000

2. Excise.

Fifteen per cent on the lower, and forty-five per cent on higher teas,	L.1,300,000	}	L.6,000,000
Additional duty of ten pounds a pipe on wine,	500,000		
Fifty per cent on spirits,	1,500,000		
Two shillings additional on malt,	2,700,000		

3. Property.

Five per cent on income and property,	4,500,000
In all.	L.12,660,000

The income and expenditure of the year stood as follows:—

EXPENDITURE.		INCOME.	
Navy.	L.10,211,378	Total income from Taxes, . . .	L.38,609,392
Army,	8,935,753	Loan,	12,000,000
Militia, etc.	2,889,976	Raised by Exchequer Bills, . . .	20,481,000
Ordnance.	1,128,913		
Miscellaneous.	5,440,441		
Grant to National Debt, . . .	200,000		
Exchequer Bills,	10,150,456		
	L.38,956,917		L.71,090,392
Interest of debt, funded and unfunded,	20,699,864		
	L.59,656,781		
Sinking fund,	6,494,000		
	L.66,150,781		

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1803, 631, et seq.; *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1598; and *FOSTER'S Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 1659, 1662.

of Austria, Russia, and France, at a subsequent period, when possessed of much greater military resources than were then at the command of the British Government, and the best of all authority in the recorded opinion of Napoléon himself. Central fortifications near or around the metropolis are of incalculable importance, in order to gain time for the distant strength of the kingdom to assemble when it is suddenly assailed : if they had existed on Montmartre and Belleville, the invasion of the allies in 1814, instead of terminating in the submission of France, would probably have led to a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine; and he is a bold man who on such a subject ventures to dissent from the concurring opinion of Mr. Pitt and Napoléon (1).

French Re-
bellion in
Ireland.

This year was again distinguished by one of those unhappy attempts at rebellion, which have so frequently of late years disgraced the history and blasted the prospects of Ireland. Though the country was disturbed by the usual amount of predial violence and outrage, no insurrection of a political nature was apprehended, when suddenly, on the 14th July, the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile, unequivocal symptoms of a fermentation of a more general character were observed in the population of Dublin. It was soon discovered that a conspiracy was on foot, the object of which was to force the Castle and harbour stores of the capital, dissolve the connection with England, and establish a Republic in close alliance with France; but the means at the disposal of the conspirators were as deficient as the objects they had in view were visionary and extravagant. Eighty or a hundred persons, under the guidance of Emmett, a brother of the chief who was engaged in the former insurrection, a young man of an ardent and enthusiastic temperament, proposed, on the 23d July, to assemble in open rebellion the peasantry from the adjoining counties, who were for that purpose to flock into the metropolis, under pretence of seeking for work in hay-making, on the eve of the festival of St.-James; and with that motley array they were to march against a garrison consisting of above four thousand men. In effect, on the day appointed the country labourers did assemble in vast numbers in St.-James's street as soon as it was dark, and Emmett put himself at their head : but he soon discovered that the insurgents were rather disposed to gratify their appetite for assassination and murder, than engage in any systematic operations for the subversion of the Government. In vain he and a few other leaders, animated with sincere though deluded patriotic feeling, endeavoured to infuse some order into their ranks, and lead them against

Napoléon's (1) "Napoléon says he frequently turned in his mind the propriety of the subject. fortifying Paris and Lyon; and this in an especial manner occurred to him, on occasion of his return from the campaign of Austerlitz. Fear of exciting alarm among the inhabitants, and the events which succeeded each other with such astonishing rapidity, prevented him from carrying his designs into execution. He thought that a great capital is the country of the flower of the nation, that it is the centre of opinion, the general depot; and that it is the greatest of all contradictions, to leave a point of such importance without the means of immediate defence. At the season of great national disasters, empires frequently stand in need of soldiers, but men are never wanting for internal defence, if a place be provided where their energies can be brought into action. Fifty thousand national guards, with three thousand gunners, will defend a fortified capital against an army of 300,000 men. The same fifty thousand men in the open field, if they are not experienced soldiers, commanded by skilled officers, will be thrown into confusion by the charge

of a few thousand horse. Paris, ten times in its former history, owed its safety to its walls: if, in 1814, it had possessed a citadel capable of holding out only for eight days, the destinies of the world would have been changed. If, in 1805, Vienna had been fortified, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war: if, in 1806, Berlin had been fortified, the army beaten at Jena might have rallied there till the Russian army advanced to its relief: if, in 1808, Madrid had been fortified, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, and Somosierra, could never have ventured to march upon that capital, leaving the English army, in the neighbourhood of Salamanca, in its rear." Let not the English imagine, that their present naval superiority renders these observations inapplicable to their capital: it was after the victory of Austerlitz that the necessity of fortifying Paris occurred to the victor in that memorable fight. Who will guarantee the navy of England in all future times against a maritime crusade, and a rout of Leipzig at the mouth of the Thames?—See Napoléon, in *MONTGOMERY*, ii, 278, 280.

the Castle and other important points of the city : instead of doing so, they murdered Lord Kilwarden, the venerable Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, and Colonel Browne, a most worthy and meritorious officer, whom they met in the streets; and, equally incapable of resolute as humane conduct, were shortly after dispersed by two volleys from a subaltern and fifty men, who unexpectedly came on the rear of their savage and disorderly columns (1).

Murder of
the Lord
Chief Jus-
tice in Dub-
lin. The fate of the Lord Chief Justice was peculiarly deplorable. He arrived at the entrance of Thomas street in his carriage, accompanied by his daughter and nephew, when the chariot was stopped, the Chief Justice and his nephew dragged out and murdered by repeated stabs from the ruffians, who struggled with each other for the gratification of striking them with their pikes, while the young lady, whom they had the humanity to spare, fled in a state bordering on distraction through the streets, and arrived at the Castle in such agitation as to be hardly capable of recounting the tragic event which she had witnessed. A bystander, shocked at the savage ferocity of the murderers, exclaimed that the assassins should be executed next day; but the words recalled his recollection to the upright dying magistrate, and he raised his head for the last time to exclaim, "Murder must be punished; but let no man suffer for my death but on a fair trial, and by the laws of his country," and immediately expired. Memorable words to be uttered at such a moment by such a man, and eminently descriptive of that love of impartial justice which constitutes at once the first duty of a judge, and the noblest epitaph on his sepulchre (2).

Execution
of the ring-
leaders. Emmett and Russel, the two leaders of the insurrection, were soon after seized, brought to trial and executed. The former made no sort of defence, but when called upon to receive sentence, stood up and avowed the treason with which he was charged, glorying in his patriotic intentions, and declaring himself a martyr to the independence and liberties of his country. At his execution he evinced uncommon intrepidity and composure, received the communion of the Church of England, and died the victim of sincere but deluded patriotism. The remaining conspirators were pardoned, upon making a full disclosure of their projects and preparations, July, 25, 1803. by the judicious lenity of Government, and a bill was shortly after brought in for the better suppression of insurrection and the temporary suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland, which passed both Houses without any opposition (3).

A frantic and unsuccessful attempt at the assassination of the King was made, in the same year, by Colonel Despard, a revolutionist of the most dangerous character, who was tried, condemned and executed.

Naval events
of the year. Notwithstanding the magnitude of the preparations on both sides, the naval operations of the first year of the war were inconsiderable. The French fleets were not yet in such a state of forwardness as to be able to leave their harbours in large masses; and the closeness of the British blockade prevented any considerable number of detached vessels from escaping. As usual, the effects of the English maritime superiority speedily appeared in the successive capture of the enemy's colonies. St-Lucia and

July 17.
Sept. 2
and 23. Tobago fell into their hands in July, and Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo in September. The planters in these sugar islands willingly yielded to the British forces, anticipating from them protection from their own slaves, whom the events in St.-Domingo and Guadaloupe had

(1) Ann. Reg. 1803, 300, 312.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1803, 311, 312.

(3) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1671, 1675.

given them so much reason to dread, and a share in that lucrative commerce which, under the British flag, they could carry on with every part of the world, and which the almost total cessation of production in the French islands had thrown almost exclusively into their hands. Some angry disputes broke out in this year between the British Government and the Local Legislature in Jamaica, in consequence of the refusal of the latter to contribute the requisite supplies to the support of the large military garrison of the island (1); but they gradually gave way in the following years, in consequence of the advantageous market for their produce which the war afforded them, and the approach of real danger from the combined fleets of France and Spain.

Defeat of
Linois by
the China
fleet.

The first gleam of success came from the Eastern ocean, and what was remarkable, from the merchant ships of England. Immediately after war was declared, Admiral Linois, with one sail of the line and three frigates, escaped from the roads of Pondicherry, in consequence of the British Admiral on that station being ignorant of the commencement of hostilities; and since that time he had cruised about in the Indian Archipelago, capturing detached ships, and doing considerable damage to British commerce. Emboldened by this success, he lay in wait for the homeward bound China fleet, which he expected would prove an easy prey. On the 14th February he descried the fleet leisurely approaching, in no expectation of encountering an enemy, and anticipated little opposition: but Commodore Dance, who commanded the British vessels, by a bold and gallant manœuvre defeated his efforts, and to his infinite honour saved the valuable property under his command from destruction. Dismissing the Feb. 15, 1804. heavily laden and weaker vessels to the rear, he made the signal for the stronger and better equipped to bear down in succession upon the enemy; and so intimidated was the French Admiral by this gallant bearing and vigorous fire, that after a few broadsides he took to flight, and was pursued for above two hours by his commercial victors! This gallant action, which confounded the enemy, and saved British property to the amount of a million and a half sterling, excited the greatest satisfaction throughout the nation (2). Rewards were distributed with an unsparing hand by the East India Company to the various commanders and their brave crews; and the Commodore received the honour of knighthood from his Majesty's hands.

Various attacks were made in the course of the summer on the Boulogne flotilla and the squadrons of small craft proceeding to that destination; but although the utmost gallantry was uniformly displayed by the officers and men engaged, the success obtained was in general very trifling, and bore no proportion to the loss sustained by the assailants. The only conquest worthy of record made by the British, either at sea or land during the year 1804, was that of Surinam in the West Indies, which, in the beginning of May 3.

May, yielded, to the great joy of the inhabitants, to a military and naval force, under the command of Sir Charles Green, and Commodore, afterwards Sir Samuel Hood; on which occasion also a frigate and brig fell into the hands of the victors (3).

Supplies and
finances for
1804.

The supplies voted by Parliament for the service of the year 1804 were much greater than for the preceding year, and the military

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, p. 2. Bign. iii. 153.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1804, 138, 139.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 141. and Chron. 409. Dum.
xi. 64, 66, 69,

and naval force kept on foot far more considerable (1). The expenditure swelled, independent of the charges of the debt, to no less than L.53,000,000, of which L.42,000,000 was for the current expenditure, and L.11,000,000 for retiring of Exchequer bills. The land troops of the year amounted, including 22,000 in India, to above 300,000 men, exclusive of 340,000 volunteers—an enormous force, capable, if properly directed, not only of repelling any attempt at invasion, but interposing with decisive effect in any strife which might take place between France and the great military powers of the Continent (2). The naval forces also were very considerably augmented, there being no less than 100,000 men, including 22,000 marines, voted for the service of the year, and 83 ships of the line and 390 frigates and smaller vessels in commission.

But the magnitude of their forces, compared with the inconsiderable amount of the services rendered by them to the country, ere long revealed the secret weakness of the Administration. It was in vain to disguise from the country that the public expenditure could not long continue at the enormous height which it had now reached, and that unless some advantages commensurate to the sacrifices made were gained, the nation must in the end sink under the weight of its fruitless exertions. To the animation, excitement, and hope which generally prevailed at the commencement of the war, had succeeded the listlessness, exhaustion, and discontent which invariably, after a certain interval, follow highly wrought and disappointed feeling. The trifling nature of the success which had been gained, notwithstanding such costly efforts, during the first year of the contest, produced a very general conviction that Ministers, whatever their individual respectability or talents might be, were unequal as a body to the task of steering the vessel of the state through the shoals and quicksands with which it was surrounded; and in particular, did not possess that weight and

* (1) The receipt and expenditure of the year 1804 stood as follows:—

<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Navy,	L. 12,350,574
Army,	12,903,000
Militia, etc.	6,159,000
Ordnance,	3,737,000
Miscellaneous,	4,217,000
Extra do,	2,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	11,000,000
Civil List,	591,000
Additional do,	60,000

L.53,607,574

Interest of Debt, funded and unfunded,	20,728,772
Sinking Fund,	6,436,000

L.30,770,346

<i>Ways and Means.</i>	
War Taxes,	L.15,440,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	5,900,000
Malt Duty additional,	750,000
Duty on Pensions, etc.	2,000,000
Lottery,	250,000
Surplus of 1803,	1,370,000
Loan, England,	10,000,000
Do. Ireland,	4,500,000
Exchequer Bills,	14,000,000
Annuities Loan,	1,150,000
Permanent Revenue, minus surplus of Consolidated Fund,	25,365,000
	L.79,825,000

—See *Parl. Deb.* ii. 351, 355, and *App.* 35, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 584, *App. to Chron.*

(2) James, iii. *App.* Table 13, *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 577. *App. to Chron.* *Parl. Deb.* ii. 351, 355.

This force was distributed as follows:—

In the British Isles,	129,030
Colonies,	38,630
India,	22,897
Recruiting,	533
Militia in Great Britain,	109,947

Regulars and Militia,	301,646
Volunteers in Great Britain,	347,000

Total in Great Britain,	648,646
Irish Volunteers,	70,000
Grand Total,	718,646

—See *Parl. Deb.* i. 1678, and *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 19.

eminence in the estimation of foreign states, which was necessary to enable Great Britain to take up her appropriate station as the leader of the general confederacy, which it was now evident was alone capable of reducing the Continental power of France. This feeling was strongly increased by the complaints which generally broke out as to the reduced and inefficient state of the navy under the management of Earl St.-Vincant; and it soon became painfully evident, from a comparison of the vessels in commission at the close of the former and commencement of the present war, that this important arm of the public defence had declined to a very great degree during the interval of peace; and that, under the delusion of a wretched, and in the end most costly economy, the stores on which the public salvation depended had been sold and dissipated, to an extent in the highest degree alarming. The consequence was, that when war broke out the navy was in an unprecedented state of dilapidation; and from the absence of convoys for our merchant fleets, and the neglect to apprise Admiral Rainier and the fleets in the East of the breaking out of hostilities by an overland despatch, many severe losses, which might have been avoided, were sustained by the commercial interests (1).

Increased by
the alarming
intelligence of the
King.

The public despondency, already strongly excited by these untoward events, was increased to the highest degree by the alarming intelligence which spread abroad as to the health of the King. On the 14th February, it was publicly announced by a bulletin at St.-James's Palace that his Majesty was indisposed; and a succession of similar notices soon left no doubt in the public mind that the disease was that mental malady which had plunged the nation fifteen years before in such general consternation. On this occasion the panic was still greater, from the alarming posture of public affairs, and the general distrust which prevailed as to the stability and capacity of the Administration. But after an interval of a few weeks it was announced that the most distressing symptoms had abated. On the 29th February the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared in Parliament "that there was no necessary suspension of the Royal functions." On the 14th March the Lord Chancellor stated in the House of Lords that "he had since conversed with his Majesty, and that his mental state warranted the Lords Commissioners in expressing the royal assent to several bills which had passed through Parliament;" and on the 9th and 18th May the King drove, to the infinite joy of the inhabitants, through the principal streets of the metropolis: though it was several months afterwards before he was restored to his domestic circle, or able to go through the whole functions of royalty (2).

All eyes are
turned to
Mr. Pitt.

But during this interval of doubt and alarm the minds of the great majority of men throughout the nation became convinced of the necessity of placing the helm of the state under firmer guidance, and all

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, 129, 131.

Mr. Addington boasted during the peace that if war broke out, fifty ships of the line could be equipped in a month; but when this declaration came to be put to the test, it was discovered that the royal arsenals were almost emptied, and every thing sold requisite for the naval defence of the country. Even the men of war on the stocks, at the close of the contest, had been left imperfect, and the hands employed upon them dismissed. In the general penury which prevailed, neither vessels could be procured for the King's squadrons, nor convoys provided for the merchant service. When the royal message was delivered to Parliament on 8th March, 1803, there

was hardly a ship of war either ready or in a state of forwardness; and the greatest aversion to the public service pervaded every department of the navy. The consequence was, that notwithstanding the utmost efforts to repair the ruinous economy and dilapidations of the two preceding years, the ships in commission on the 5th January, 1804, were only 356, of which 75 were of the line; whereas in the commencement of 1801 the number was 472, of which 100 was of the line.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 130, 131, and *James's Naval Hist.* iii. Tables No. 9 and 13.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 27, 29.

eyes were naturally turned to that illustrious statesman, who had retired only to make way for a pacific administration, and could now, in strict accordance with his uniform principles, resume the direction of the second war with revolutionary France. As usual in such cases the gradual approximation of parties in the House of Commons indicated the conversion of the public mind; and it soon became evident that the Administration was approaching its dissolution. On the 15th March matters came to a crisis. Mr. Pitt made a long and elaborate speech, in the course of which he commented with great severity on the maladministration of the royal navy under the present government, and concluded with moving for returns of all the ships in commission

*Coalition
against the
Ministry.*

in 1793, 1801, and 1803. He was cordially supported by Mr. Fox and Mr. Sheridan; and it became evident that a coalition had taken place between the Whig and Tory branches of the Opposition. The motion was lost by a majority of 70; there being 130 for it, and 200 against it. But from the character and weight of the men who voted, it was evident that the Ministry were rapidly sinking, and that they only retained office till their successors could be appointed, which the unhappy condition of the King rendered a doubtful period (1). In effect, their majority went on continually declining; and on the 25th April, in a question on the army of reserve, it was only 37. It was now openly stated by Ministers that they only held office during the continuance of a delicate state of public affairs; and the Opposition, seeing their object gained, suspended all farther attacks till the King's health was

May 12, 1804.

restored; and on the 12th May, the day after he had appeared in public, it was formally announced in the House of Lords that Ministers had resigned, and their successors had been appointed (2). It was at first expected that a coalition was to be formed as the basis of the new Administration; but it was soon discovered, both that there was an irreconcilable difference between the opinions of the leaders of the different parties on the chief subjects of policy, and also that there were scruples in the royal breast against the admission of Mr. Fox, which rendered his accession to the Cabinet nearly impracticable. The new ministry, therefore, was formed exclusively of Tories; and a majority of it was composed of members of the late Cabinet. The material changes were, that Mr. Pitt was First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, in room of Mr. Addington; Lord Melville First Lord of the Admiralty, in room of Earl St.-Vincent; and Lord Harrowby Foreign Secretary, in lieu of Lord Hawkesbury (3). Lord Grenville, the able and faithful supporter of Mr. Pitt during the former war, declined to take office, assigning as a reason that it was formed on too narrow a basis, at a time when the public dangers called for a coalition of all the leading men in the state, to give vigour and unanimity to the national councils; an opinion in which he was joined by a great proportion of the men of moderate principles throughout the country.

*Lord Grenville's Letter
to Mr. Pitt,
Ann. Reg.
1804, 123,
128.*

Although Mr. Pitt probably judged rightly in constructing his Cabinet entirely of men of his own principles, as experience has proved that no individual talent, how great soever, can withstand the loss of character consequent on an abandonment of principle; and therefore that coalition administrations have seldom any long existence.

(1) Parl. Deb. i. 366, 327.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 30, 34. Parl. Deb. i. 319, 320.

(3) The new Cabinet stood thus:—
Mr. Pitt, Premier.

Duke of Portland, President of the Council.

Lord Eldon, Lord Chancellor.

Earl of Westmoreland, Privy Seal.

Earl of Chatham, Master General of the Ordnance.
Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control.

Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty.

Lord Harrowby, Foreign Affairs.

Earl of Camden, War and the Colonies.

Lord Mulgrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

The vigour and decision of Mr. Pitt's councils speedily appeared in the confederacy which he formed of the Continental States, on the greatest scale, to stem the progress of French ambition. Nor was the ability and energy of Lord Melville less conspicuous in the rapid restoration of the navy from a state of unexampled decrepitude and decay to a degree of exaltation and lustre unprecedented even in its long and glorious annals. Every thing was to be done; for such was the mutilated and shattered state of the fleet, and to such an extent had the spirit of parsimonious reform been carried, that when stores and timber were offered at comparatively moderate terms, they were refused by the late Admiralty, and suffered to be sold to the agents of the country, rather than deviate from their pernicious economy, even in the purchase of those articles which were in daily consumption. The consequence was, that Lord Melville was compelled to accept the offers of timber, stores, and masts, at whatever price the contractors chose to demand; and the savings of one naval administration entailed a quadruple expenditure upon that which succeeded it. But by strenuous exertions, and at an enormous cost, the defects were at last made up; the deficiencies were supplied by the purchase of East India vessels, and by contracting for the repairs of others; and the old practice of building prospectively for the service of future years, which had been abandoned in the fervour of ill-judged economy, was again resumed with the very best effects to the public service. The results of the admirable vigour and efficiency which the new First Lord of the Admiralty introduced into every branch of the civil department of the navy were soon conspicuous. Instead of 356 vessels, including 75 of the line, which alone were in commission in the beginning of 1804, there were 473, including 83 of the line, ready for sea in the beginning of 1805; 80 vessels of war, including 26 of the line, were in a few months far advanced on the stocks; and the navy was already afloat which was destined to carry the thunder of the British arms to the shoals of Trafalgar (1).

Nor was the conduct of Lord Melville less beneficial in the civil regulations introduced for the increase of the comfort and health of the sailors. Many admirable practical improvements were established; many experienced evils removed: the wives of absent seamen allowed to draw a certain proportion of their wages during their absence at the nearest harbour to their places of residence; many abuses in the food, clothing, and pay of the men corrected; and the foundation laid of that excellent system of management, which is ultimately, it is to be hoped, destined to wipe the stain of impressment, with all its concomitant evils, from the British Constitution. The merits of the new Admiralty on these subjects, however, were neither generally known to, nor appreciated by, the country. In hostile projects they were for the first year of their administration by no means fortunate. From unacquaintance with nautical subjects, they lent too credulous ears to the designs of visionary projectors: repeated unsuccessful attacks on the French flotilla tarnished the reputation of the navy; and the total failure of an attempt to blow it up by means of infernal machines called Catamarans exposed it to the ridicule of all Europe (2).

Before detailing the political combinations by which Mr. Pitt again resuscitated the torpid spirit of the coalition, and brought Russia, and Austria, and eventually Prussia, into the great contest of European independence, a slight

(1) James, iii, App. No. 12, 13. Ann. Reg. 1804, 137.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 144, 148. Dum. xi. 26, 51.

survey of the political situation and resources of these great military monarchies, henceforth principals in the strife, is indispensable.

Situation of Austria. Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 of florins (L.8,000,000,) had risen by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere to 106,000,000, or L.9,800,000. During the war its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes; and it sustained no diminution by the peace of Campo Formio, the Venetian States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries. At the peace of Lunéville, the income of Government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or L.10,000,000 sterling; a sum equal to at least twenty-five millions sterling in Great Britain; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled during the difficulties of former years to have recourse to a paper currency; and the bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation, convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and Government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twenty-five florins, or two pounds sterling. During the course of the war, silver and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation, and paper billets for two and three shillings were in general circulation. A considerable portion of the smaller currency was in brass, which was issued at double its intrinsic value; and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts of the Government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states. The debt, in all, was 200,000,000 florins (L.10,000,000) in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it amounted to triple that sum. The treasury had been reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own subjects (1).

Its government and state policy. The policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is neither required to uphold the influence of the crown, nor overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army and civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of Government irresistible, and enables the Archdukes and Imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of princes of the blood in other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of Government more gentle and paternal than in the Hereditary States; but in the recently acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint have long existed in the Italian and Hungarian dominions. The population of the empire, at the peace of Lunéville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable (2).

(1) *Raymond and Roth, Stat. de l'Autriche.* ii. 274, 275. *Bign.* ii. 276, 273.

(2) *Bign.* ii. 276, 274. Digitized by Google

And jealousy of Prussia. Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Lunéville, the leading principle of the Austrian Cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the Great Frederick, and had been much increased by the impolitic and ungenerous advantage which the Court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the north of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament **And reliance on England.** this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and short-sighted policy on the part of the Prussian Government, which, in their rivalry of the Emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, they never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the Cabinet of London on every occasion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the Imperial Cabinet was to lean for continental support on the Russian power; and although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg took with Prussia in arranging the matter of German indemnities, yet this temporary estrangement soon disappeared upon the arrival of more pressing dangers (1), and they were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.

Leading persons of its Cabinet at this period. The leading persons in the Administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobenzell, Vice-Chancellor of State, and Count Colloredo, a Cabinet Minister, and intimate friend of the Emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him an European reputation, was at the head of the war department, but the powers of Government were really in the hands of Cobenzell and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterwards celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian Cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe, that in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part (2).

Rapid growth of Prussia in wealth and numbers. Immense was the difference at this period between the system of government of Austria and Prussia. Though the latter monarchy in reality only dated from the reign of Frederick the Great, yet during the short period which had since elapsed it had made unexampled progress. The treasure, indeed, amassed by that great warrior and able prince, had been wholly dissipated during the succeeding reign, but both under his sway and that of his successor Frederick William, the monarchy had made important advances in territory, wealth, and population. By withdrawing from the alliance against France in 1794, the Cabinet of Berlin had succeeded in appropriating to itself a large portion of the spoils of Poland,

(1) Bign. ii. 275, 276.

(2) Bign. ii. 263, 267. Dum. xi. 23, 27.

while the open preference to French interests which they evinced for the ten years which followed the treaty of Basle was rewarded by a considerable share of the indemnities; in other words, of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire: and a most important increase of influence, by the place assigned to Prussia as the protector of the neutral leagues beyond a fixed line in the north of Germany. During this long period of pacification, the industry and population of the country had rapidly increased; a large portion of the commerce of Germany had fallen into its hands, and the whirl and expenditure of war, so desolating to other states, was felt only as increasing the demand for agricultural produce, or augmenting the profits of neutral navigation (1).

Statistical details. At the death of the Great Frederick in 1786 the population of the monarchy was 7,000,000 of souls, and its revenue 31,000,000 thalers, or about L.4,500,000 sterling. By the shares obtained of Poland, on occasion of its successive dismemberments, and the acquisition of Anspach, Bayreuth, and other districts, its population was raised to 9,000,000; and although the treasure of 70,000,000 thalers, (L.10,000,000,) left by the Great Frederick, had disappeared, and been converted into a debt of 28,000,000 of thalers, or L.4,100,000, yet this was compensated by the increase of the revenue, which had risen to 36,000,000 thalers, or L.5,000,000. Various establishments had been set on foot at Berlin, eminently calculated to promote the interests both of commerce and agriculture. In particular, a bank and society of commerce were established in that capital, and institutions formed in the provinces to lend money to the landed proprietors, on reasonable terms. By the aid of these establishments, and the effect of long continued peace and prosperity, the finances of the state were in the most flourishing condition in 1804: all the branches of the public service provided for by the current revenue, and even a considerable progress made in the reduction of the debt. The large share of the German indemnities, obtained through French and Russian influence by this aspiring power, made a considerable addition to the public resources: the acquisition of 326,000 souls raised the population to 9,500,000 souls, and the increase of 2,375,000 thalers yearly revenue swelled the income of the public treasury to 38,375,000 thalers, or L.6,000,000 sterling; a sum equivalent, from the value of money, to at least ten millions sterling in Great Britain. This revenue, as in Austria, was the net receipt of the Exchequer, and independent, not merely of the expenses of collection, but of various local charges in the different provinces. The regular army was nearly 200,000 strong, brave, and highly disciplined, but not to be compared to the French, either in the experience and skill of the officers or in the moral energy which had been developed by the events of the Revolution (2).

Manners and court at Berlin. The Prussian capital was one of the most agreeable and least expensive in Europe. No rigid etiquette, no impassable line of demarcation separated the Court from the people: the Royal Family lived on terms of friendly equality, not only with the nobility, but the leading inhabitants of Berlin. An easy demeanour, a total absence of aristocratic pride, an entire absence of extravagance or parade, distinguished all the parties given at Court, at which the King and Queen mingled on terms of perfect equality with their subjects. Many ladies of rank, both at Paris and London, spent larger sums annually on their dress than the Queen of Prussia; none

(1) *Hard. v. and vi.* 379, 247, 249. *Bign. ii.* 291, 292.

(2) *Bign. ii.* 293, 297.

equalled her in dignity and grace of manner and the elevated sentiments with which she was inspired. Admiration of her beauty and attachment to her person formed one of the strongest feelings of the Prussian monarchy; and nothing contributed more to produce that profound irritation at France, which in the latter years of the war pervaded all classes of its inhabitants, than the harshness and injustice with which Napoléon, to whom chivalrous feelings were unknown, treated, in the days of her misfortune, that captivating and high-spirited princess (1).

Its state
policy, and
diplomacy.

A spirit of economy, order, and wisdom, pervaded all the internal arrangements of the state. The Cabinet, led at that period by Haugwitz, but in which the great abilities of Hardenberg and Stein soon obtained an ascendancy, was one of the ablest in Europe. Its diplomatists, inferior to none in information, penetration, and address, had long given to Prussia a degree of influence at foreign courts beyond what could have been expected from the resources and weight of the monarchy. The army, drawn from the robust rural population, and supported by the admirable system of limited service, was in effect a military school, in which the whole inhabitants were trained to the use of arms, and could be rendered available in periods of danger to the public defence. In no other of the great powers of Europe were the expenses of Government so moderate, or the state capable, in proportion to its numbers, of bringing so great a number of men into the field; and though no restraint recognised in theory existed upon the authority of the sovereign, the wisdom and justice of the Administration in every department left few just causes of complaint to the people (2).

Foreign
policy.

The established principles of the Prussian Cabinet, under the direction of Haugwitz, ever since the peace of Basle in 1795, had been to keep aloof from the dangers of war, and take advantage, as far as possible, of the distresses of their neighbours to augment the territory and resources of the monarchy. From a mistaken idea of present interest, not less than the influence of former rivalry with Austria, they inclined to the alliance with France, and derived great temporary benefits from the union, both in the accessions of territory which they received out of the ecclesiastical estates of the empire, and the increase of importance which they acquired as the head of the defensive league of the north of Germany. Little did they imagine, however, in what a terrible catastrophe that policy was to terminate, or anticipate, as the reward of their long friendship, a severity of treatment to which Austria and England were strangers, even after years of inveterate and perilous hostility. The interview at Memel in 1802, and the open support given by Russia to the Prussian claims in the matter of the indemnities, had already laid the foundation of an intimate personal friendship between Frederick William and the Emperor Alexander; but it was as yet rather an alliance of policy than affection, and had not acquired the warmth which it afterwards received at the tomb of the Great Frederick, and on the field of Leipsic (3).

Russia, its
rapid
growth and
steady
policy.

Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before

(1) Bign. ii. 297, 299.

(2) Hard. vi. 407, 411. Bign. ii. 299, 301.

(3) Bign. ii. 300, 301. Hard. vi. 401, 407.

him, in the improvement, instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very commencement of his reign his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit : the punishment of the knout, the use of torture, had been abolished ; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens ; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code ; slavery banished from the royal domains ; and the first germ of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe ; the policy of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg was unchanged and unchangeable : domineering ascendancy over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition, and in the contests and divisions of other powers too many opportunities occurred of carrying their designs into execution. For above a century past Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded ; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory ; unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoléon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilization marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made ; its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states ; and its limits, to all human appearance, are not destined to recede till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St.-Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem (1).

*Statistics of
the Empire.
June 18,
1834.*

At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great in 1725, the population of the empire was about 20,000,000, and its revenue 13,000,000 silver rubles, or L.3,200,000 sterling : in 1787 its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000, and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or L.9,000,000 : in 1804 its inhabitants were no less than 36,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or L.12,000,000 ; a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain (2). The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation tax ; a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilization, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It amounted to five rubles for each freeman, and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors,—the object of universal desire in cold climates,—produced a large sum : the duties on the latter articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or L.3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that comparatively infant state, the expenses of Government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great that they were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory ; and experience has demonstrated, that without large foreign subsidies Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe. The army raised by conscription, at the rate of so many in each

(1) *Tooke's Russia*, ii. 124, 147. *Bign.* ii. 278, 280.

(2) The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles, but from the great omission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the

value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half-a-crown English money.—*BIGNON*, ii. 282.

And state of
the army.

hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above 300,000 men; but from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above 70,000 men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper, and the actual force which it can bring into the field; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amidst loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched; the hospital service still miserably defective; but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents on the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by Government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half-a-guinea, that of the Cossacks eight and sixpence, a-year; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Benningsen retired towards Königsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the Russian murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although 90,000 men thundered in close pursuit, that the general was compelled to soothe their dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased, and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amidst the icy lakes and drifted snow of Preussich Eylau (1).

Character
and manners
of the Em-
peror Alex-
ander.

Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of decorum, and re-

(1) Wilson's Polish Campaign, i. 31. Bigo. ii. 282, 285.

"Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment; "the enemy are already in pos-

session."—"Prince Potemkin must look to that, for he gave us the order; come on, Russians!" was the reply, and the whole marched forward, and perished the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—See ROBERT WILSON'S Polish War, p. 2.

remained throughout an attached friend to that Princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation, for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence his marked regard for the Polish nation through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there; and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzow, were his first advisers. But though attached from the outset to England, to whose influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his admiration for the First Consul, and, still directed by the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the French project of elevating Prussia at the expense of Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederick William, who had ascended the throne about the same age, and only shortly before himself; and this was soon ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a little to determine the subsequent course of events on the great theatre of Europe (1).

His difference with France. Notwithstanding, however, the high admiration which Alexander felt for Napoléon, and the open support which he had given to his policy in the matter of the German indemnities, events soon occurred which produced first a coldness, and at length a rupture between them. The first of these arose out of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulated that Malta should be placed under the guarantee of the great powers, and especially Russia, Austria, and Prussia. No sooner was the war renewed, than England made the most strenuous exertions to induce the Czar to accept the office of mediator between the contending powers in regard to this matter; and Napoléon could not refuse to accede to the proposal. After a long negotiation, however, it came to nothing. While Talleyrand was prodigal of protestations in regard to the sincere desire of the First Consul to submit to the decision of so magnanimous and just a potentate; he took care to make no concessions whatever calculated to restore the peace of Europe. The Russian monarch, by his rescript of May 24, insisted that, as a May 24, 1803. basis of the arrangement, the neutrality of the north of Germany and the Neapolitan territory should, in the event of war, be maintained inviolate, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of 11th October, 1801 (2); but hardly was this basis laid down, when Hanover was invaded by the army of Mortier, and Naples, as far as Tarentum, overrun by that of St.-Cyr.

Which led to a recall of the Russian ambassador from Paris. The consequences of this double rupture eventually were the revival of the coalition. Russia and France, indeed, easily came to an understanding on the subject of Switzerland, the Czar agreeing to leave the First Consul undisturbed in his usurpation over the Helvetic confederacy, provided he would not interfere in his arrangements concerning the Ionian Isles; but on other and more vital points it was soon discovered that their pretensions were irreconcilable. Napoléon proposed that Malta should be garrisoned by Russian troops for as many years as should be deemed necessary; Lampedosa be ceded to Britain; Switzerland and Hol- June 18, 1803. land evacuated by the French troops; and the acquisitions of France in Italy recognized by England. The British Government, on the other hand, offered to submit all their differences with France to the decision of Alexander, and insisted that the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Ger-

many should be a part of the arrangement; but to this he positively refused to accede. This matter was soon warmly taken up by the Russian Cabinet, especially after the occupation of Cuxhaven by the French troops, and the closing of the Elbe and the Weser to British vessels,—measures utterly subversive of the neutrality of Germany, and in which the Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law to the Emperor, whose territories were next threatened by Gallic invasion, was in an especial manner interested. The continued occupation of Tarentum by the French troops also irritated the Russian Cabinet, as well as the failure to provide an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for his continental dominions, as stipulated in the same treaties; and to such a height did the mutual exasperation arrive, that, before the end of 1803, M. Markoff, the Russian ambassador, was received with so much indignity, in a public audience, by the First Consul, that he was recalled, and M. D'Oubril, the chargé-d'affaires, alone left at the French capital (1).

Napoléon gains over Prussia by hinting at its getting Hanover.

Prussia at first warmly seconded Russia in its remonstrances against the occupation of the north of Germany, and especially the levying of heavy requisitions on Hamburg and the Elector of Hesse Cassel by the French troops. But Napoléon threw out a lure to the Cabinet of Berlin, which speedily caused its efforts in that direction to slacken. He directed his diplomatic agents at that capital to drop hints, that possibly the electorate of Hanover might, in the event of Prussia withdrawing her opposition to France, be incorporated with her monarchy; and though the Prussian Ministers did not venture to close at once with so scandalous an aggression, yet, actuated partly by the desire of securing so glittering a prize, partly by a wish to be freed from the disagreeable vicinity of the French troops, they proposed to Napoléon that his troops should evacuate Hanover, which should be occupied till a general peace by those of the Prussian monarchy. Napoléon declined to accede to such an arrangement, but offered, on condition of an alliance, offensive and defensive, being entered into with France, to cede in perpetuity Hanover to that power. Prussia Nov. 1803. had the virtue or the prudence to resist this insidious offer, and reverted to the proposal that the French troops should retire from the north of Germany, and the First Consul should respect the neutrality of the empire; and that, in consideration of this, Prussia should engage that, during the continuance of the war, France should neither be attacked by Germany, nor *across* Germany. This proposition, however, by no means suited the great designs which Napoléon had already formed of forcing all the neutral powers into a general confederacy against England, and, in consequence, the negotiation fell to the ground, leaving only the Prussian Cabinet, unhappily for itself, a secret desire for the possession of the Hanoverian states, which long prevented them from joining in the general league against French usurpation (2).

Matters were in this state when the arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien excited an unanimous feeling of horror through Europe, and universally overwhelmed the French partisans by the indignation which it pro-

(1) Bign. iii. 205, 225. Dum. x. 6.

(2) Bign. iii. 230, 233.

The working of this feeling may be discerned in the secret instructions sent to the Marquis Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, on 17th December, 1803. He was directed, if possible, to conclude a Convention, containing a secret article, in these terms:—"Without entering into any formal stipulation as to the fate of the electorate of Hanover, which the events of the maritime war and the

negotiations for a general peace will determine, the First Consul, considering that the geographical position of Prussia renders these arrangements of more importance to her than any other power, engages to keep chiefly in view the interests of his Prussian Majesty in all the discussions which the destination of that country may give rise to." Napoléon, however, declined to accede to any such half measures.—See BIGNON, iii. 232, 233.

Immense
sensations
excited by
the death of
the Duke
d'Enghien.
March 27,
1804.

duced in every virtuous mind. The impulse given by this deed, not less impolitic than criminal, to the fermenting elements of a coalition against France, was very great. The Court of St.-Petersburg went into deep mourning on the occasion, and sent orders to all its diplomatic ministers at foreign courts to do the same; that of Stockholm followed the example; and M. D'Oubril, on the part of his Imperial Majesty, presented an energetic remonstrance on the occasion, both to the Diet at Ratisbon and the Cabinet of the Tuileries. This produced a vigorous reply from the First Consul, written in his usual powerful manner, but with so little circumspection, that it was evidently calculated to widen instead of closing the breach already existing between the two powers. "The complaint of Russia on this matter," said he, "leads one to ask whether, when England meditated the assassination of Paul, and it was known that the proposed assassins were within a league of the frontier, the Russian Government could have had any hesitation in seizing them. A war, conducive, as any struggle between France and Russia ever must be, to no other interests but those of England, will never be voluntarily undertaken by the First Consul; but commence it who will, he would prefer it to a state of things derogatory in the slightest degree to the equality subsisting between the Great Powers. He claims no superiority over them, but he will submit to no degradation. He interferes with none of the measures of the Russian Cabinet, and he requires a corresponding forbearance on their part." Similar explosions took place between the diplomatic agents of the two powers at the Diet of Ratisbon; and resolved to have the lead in provoking a rupture, if it should arise, Napoléon sent instructions to his Ambassador, General Hédouville, to quit St.-Petersburg in forty-eight hours, and leave only a Chargé d'Affaires there. "Know," said he, "as your final instructions, that the First Consul has no desire for war, but he fears no human being (1)."

March 24,
and April
17, 1804.
The French
Government
cautiously
set off by
feigning
Mr. Drake's
proceedings
at Stuttgart.

As a sort of counterpoise to the powerful feeling excited against them by the tragic fate of the Duke d'Enghien, the French Government, shortly after that catastrophe, published, by means of Régnier the head of the police, the particulars of some steps taken towards effecting a counter-revolution in France by the British Government, in which Mr. Drake, their accredited envoy at the Court of Bavaria, and Mr. Spencer Smith, the Chargé d'Affaires at the Electoral Court of Wirtemberg, were the chief agents. They made a very great handle of that transaction, and endeavoured, by a forced and unnatural construction of the expressions employed by these gentlemen in their instructions to the leaders of the malecontent party in France, to make it appear that their object was not merely a counter-revolution, but the assassination of the First Consul; but a simple quotation of the expressions used, as given in their own report, is sufficient to demonstrate that this was not the case, and that nothing was aimed at but the subversion of the existing Government; a project in which it was never supposed diplomatic characters were forbidden to enter towards powers in hostility with their country, and in which almost all the ambassadors of France, throughout the revolutionary war, were actively engaged (2). It clearly appeared, however, that though well

(1) State Papers, 644, Ann. Reg. 1804. Bign. iii. 439, 441.

(2) Mr. Drake's instructions to his agents are thus given in the official report by the French police:—"Art. 2. The principal object in view being the overthrow of the present Government, one of the chief means of accomplishing this is by

obtaining knowledge of the plans of the enemy. For this purpose it is of the utmost consequence to begin by establishing a correspondence with the different bureaux for obtaining information as to the plans going forward, both for the exterior and the interior. 7. To gain over those employed in the powder mills, so as to be able to blow them up as

qualified to meet the French forces in the field, England was no match for their police agents in a transaction of this description; for the publications of Régnier revealed the mortifying fact, that the whole correspondence both of Drake and Spencer Smith, had been regularly transmitted, as fast as it took place, to the police of Paris; and that their principal correspondent in that city, M. Méhu de la Touche, was himself an agent of the police, employed to tempt the British envoys into this perilous enterprise (1). But that neither the British Government nor their diplomatic agents ever entertained any projects of assassination against the First Consul, or any other means of annoyance but those of open hostility, is admitted by the person in the world who had the best opportunity of information on this subject, the private secretary of Napoléon himself (2); and it is difficult to see how the First Consul could object to diplomatic characters in other countries engaging in attempts to overturn revolutionary Governments in hostility with their own, when his own brother Joseph, during his embassy at Rome, was, with his knowledge and authority, actively engaged in the conspiracy which overturned the Papal Government in 1797; and the French Ambassador at Venice, in 1796, took so active a part in the democratic conspiracy which led to the destruction, by his means, of that ancient Republic (3).

Opinions of the diplomatic body at Paris on the subject.

The publication of the details of this abortive attempt at a counter revolution in France, which were officially communicated to the whole Foreign Ambassadors at Paris, led to answers from all the members of that body, which are curious, as evincing the different degrees of subjection in which the European potentates were then kept by the French ruler. The answer of the Russian Ambassador was evasive, amounting to nothing but a declaration in favour of the rights of nations; that of the Austrian equally ambiguous; but those of Prussia and all the lesser powers

occasion may require. 8. It is necessary to gain over a certain number of printers and engravers that may be relied on, to print and execute every thing that the confederacy may stand in need of. 9. It is much to be wished that a perfect knowledge may be gained of the situation of the different parties in France, and particularly at Paris. 13. It is well understood, that every means must be taken to disorganize the armies both in and out of the Republic." The report adds, that in his intercepted correspondence Mr. Drake says, "If you see any means of extricating any of Georges' associates, do not fail to make use of them," and again, "I earnestly request you to print and distribute a short address to the army. The main object is to gain partisans among the military; for I am thoroughly persuaded that it is through the army alone that we can reasonably hope to gain the object so much desired." In a subsequent report, mention is made of a project for getting possession of the fortresses of Huningen and Strasbourg; but no where is there the slightest allusion to the commission of assassination, or any illegal or disgraceful acts.—*See Report, by Régnier, 24th March and 11th April, 1804; State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 626, 625.*

(1) Report by Régnier, April, 14, 1804. *State Papers, 624, 625. Ann. Reg. 1804.*

(2) "I can affirm," says Bourrienne, "with perfect confidence, that the British Government have constantly rejected with indignation, not indeed the projects submitted to them for overturning the Consular or Imperial Government, but all designs of assassination or personal violence against the person of the First Consul and the Emperor. Positive proof of this will be found in the subsequent part of these memoirs."—*Bourrienne, v. 12.* Again, the same author adds, "All the correspon-

dence, which scandalized every honest man, on this subject, was the work of the perfidious suggestions of the secret agents of police, of whom M^{de} la Touche was the chief, who acted in the perilous but lucrative line of double espionage. I can affirm as a positive fact, that during the six years that I spent at Hamburg, I was in a situation to know every thing; and I can with confidence affirm, that neither in my public character nor private relations have I ever discovered the smallest evidence to warrant the assertion that the English Government was ever engaged in any plots of a dishonourable character."—*Bour. vi. 207.*

(3) *Hard. Memoirs, v. 188, 192.*

"Should the Pope die," said Napoléon to his brother Joseph, when ambassador at Rome in 1794, "you must exert yourself to the utmost to prevent another being appointed, and to bring about a Revolution."—*Confidential Despatch of Napoléon to Joseph, dated Passeriano, 29th September, 1797.* "What you have to do," said Talleyrand, in his confidential despatch of 10th October following, "is to take care that the reign of the Pope shall cease; and to encourage the disposition of the people for liberty, you must proclaim at Rome a representative Government, and deliver Europe from the Papal supremacy; taking care, at the same time, to secure for us Ancona, with a suitable extent of maritime territory."—*See HARDENBERG'S Memoirs, v. 186, 192.* These were the instructions of Napoléon and the French Government to an ambassador at the court of a friendly power, for the purpose of revolutionizing that very power; whereas the acts complained of on the part of the English diplomatic agents were all directed against France, with whom their sovereign was in a state of declared hostility.

were more or less an echo of the sentiments of the French Government on the occasion, and clearly indicated the paramount ascendancy exercised over their minds by the ruler of its military force (1). Lord Hawkesbury, as the official organ of the British Government, also published a manifesto on the subject, which was followed by an answer from Talleyrand on the part of the French Cabinet; but the interest of these manifestoes was soon obliterated in the whirl of more important events, arising out of the ceaseless advance of French ambition (2).

Warlike
more pro-
posed by
D'Oubril
on the part
of Russia
in Napoleon.
July 21,
1804. This attempt on the part of the French Government to turn aside a portion of the odium which attached to them throughout Europe in consequence of the violation of the territory of Baden and murder of the Duke d'Enghien, was attended with very little success. The Russian Cabinet, now fully awakened to a sense of the imminent danger arising from the evident resolution of the First Consul to extend his power over the whole Continent, and feeling the personal slights put upon the Emperor Alexander in the correspondence of Napoléon, were resolute in demanding satisfaction; and on the 21st July a most important note was presented by M. D'Oubril, which at once announced the basis of a new coalition against France. In this able document it was stated that no Government could behold with indifference the dreadful blow given to the

(1) *State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 630, 635.*
April 30, (2) Lord Hawkesbury observed, in the British note, "That his Majesty's Government should disregard the feelings of such of the inhabitants of France as are justly discontented with the existing Government of that country; that he should refuse to listen to their designs for delivering that country from the degrading yoke of bondage under which it groans, or to give them aid and assistance, so far as those designs are fair and justifiable, would be to refuse fulfilling those duties which every wise and just Government owes to itself and to the world in general, under circumstances similar to the present. Belligerent powers have an acknowledged right to avail themselves of all discontents that may exist in countries with which they may be at war. The exercise of that right, even if in any degree doubtful, would be fully sanctioned in the present law, not only by the present state of the French nation, but by the conduct of the Government of that country, which, since the commencement of the present war, has constantly kept up communications with the disaffected in the territories of his Majesty, and has assembled at the present moment on the coast of France a corps of Irish rebels, destined to second them in their designs against that part of the United Kingdom. In the application of these principles, his Majesty has commanded me to declare, besides, that his Government have never authorized a single act which could not stand the test of the strictest principles of justice, and of usages recognized and practiced in all ages. If any Minister, accredited at a foreign Court, has kept up correspondence with persons resident in France, with a view to obtain information as to the designs of the French Government, or for any other legitimate purpose, he has done nothing more than what Ministers, under similar circumstances, have always been considered as having a right to do, and much less than the ministers and commercial agents of France have towards the disaffected in his Majesty's territories."

Sept. 3, To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, "In every country, and in every age, the ministry of diplomatic agents has been held in veneration among men; ministers of peace, organs of conciliation, their presence is an arguement of wisdom, justice, and happiness. England,

on the contrary, wishes that its diplomatic agents should be the promoters of plots, the agents of troubles, the correspondents of vile spies, and profligate emissaries: it charges them to foment seditions, to provoke and reward assassination, and pretends to cover these infamous proceedings with the respect and inviolability that belongs to the ministers of kings and the pacificators of nations. 'Diplomatic agents,' says Lord Hawkesbury, 'are not permitted to conspire in the country where they reside against the laws of that country, but they are subject to no such restriction, in regard to the states for which they are not accredited.' Admirable restriction! Europe will be covered with conspiracies, but the defenders of public right will have no cause of complaint: some distance will always intervene between the chief conspirator and his accomplices; Lord Hawkesbury's ministers will pay the crimes which they instigate; but they will have sufficient deference to appearances to avoid being at once their instigators and witnesses. Such maxims are the height of hypocrisy and audacity: never did government make so barefaced a sport of the opinion of cabinets, and the conscience of nations. The Emperor is resolved to put a stop to proceedings so fatal to humanity; and you are therefore invited to communicate to your Government, that the French Government will not recognize the English diplomacy in Europe, until the English Cabinet shall cease to charge its ministers with warlike commissions, and restrain them to their proper functions." It is curious to recollect that this tirade, which proceeds entirely upon the false assumption that the British envoys were implicated in plots for assassination, emanated from Napoléon and Talleyrand, who directed Joseph Bonaparte, in 1797, to revolutionize Rome, the very state at which he was the ambassador of the French Republic.—*See State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 602, and Dumas, x. 279-280.* A similar attempt was made by the Prince of Peace to charge Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, with having let fall in conversation some expressions favourable to the assassination of Napoléon; but this immediately drew forth a positive and indignant denial from that gentleman, and, from the degraded character of the Spanish favourite, obtained no credit in Europe.—*See Ann. Reg. 1805, 124-125.*

independence and security of nations by the recent arrest and execution of the Duke d'Enghien : that Russia, by the peace of Teschen, engaged to guarantee and mediate the German empire, and in that character was not only entitled, but bound to interfere in that matter : that, desirous to extinguish the flames of war, she had since proposed to act as mediator between France and England, but was not accepted : that since the renewal of the war the French Government had evinced a determination to disregard all the rights of neutral powers, by marching its troops to the coasts of the Adriatic, and levying contribution on, and taking military possession of the Hanse Towns, though these states had no connection whatever with the depending contest : that Portugal and Spain had been compelled to purchase their neutrality by enormous pecuniary sacrifices : that Switzerland, Holland, and great part of Italy were mere French provinces ; one part of the German empire was occupied by the French troops, and in another arrests were committed by French detachments, in open violation of the law of nations : that Russia had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of France, but neither, could she remain a passive spectator of the successive trampling under foot of all the weaker states of Europe by its armies ; nor could she overlook the insult offered to his Imperial Majesty in alluding to the death of his father, and advancing a totally groundless charge, in relation to that matter, against Great Britain, whom France never ceases to calumniate, merely because she is at war with it. The note concluded by declaring that M. D'Oubril had been ordered to state that he could not prolong his stay in Paris unless the following points were adjusted :—“ I. That conformably to the fourth and fifth articles of the secret convention of 11th October, 1804, the French troops should be ordered to evacuate the kingdom of Naples ; and having done so, its Government should engage to respect the neutrality of that power during the remainder of the war. II. That, in pursuance of the second article of the same treaty, the French Government should agree in future to act in close concert with his Imperial Majesty for the settlement of the affairs of the Italian peninsula. III. That he should engage, in conformity with the sixth article of the same convention, and the promises so often repeated to Russia, to provide without delay an indemnity to the King of Sardinia for the losses he has sustained. IV. That in virtue of the obligation implied in a common mediation and guarantee, the French Government should engage to evacuate the North of Germany, and undertake to respect strictly in future the neutrality of Germanic confederacy (1).”

Talleyrand's
answer.

How just and conformable to the letter as well as the spirit of preceding treaties these demands may have been, it was hardly to be expected that the First Consul would accede to them, or permit France openly to recede before Russia ; and it is therefore probable that in making this demand in such peremptory terms the Russian Cabinet had it in view to establish a basis on which, at some future period, they might found the resumption of hostilities. M. Talleyrand answered the note on the 29th of the same month, and declared, “ Whenever the Court of Russia shall fulfil the articles of its treaty with France, the latter will be ready to execute them with the same fidelity. If the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg is of opinion that it has claims on that of Paris, in consequence of the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the secret convention of 1804, France also claims the execution of the third article of the same treaty, which provides that the two contracting parties shall not suffer their respective subjects to maintain any correspon-

dence, direct or indirect, with the enemies of the two states; a wise provision, which has been totally neglected by the Imperial Ambassador, M. Markoff, the true author of the disunion and coldness between the two powers, and who, during his residence at Paris, has even gone so far as to lend the asylum to which he was entitled to the hired agents of England. Was the mourning assumed by the Russian Court for a man whom the French tribunals had condemned for having conspired against the safety of the First Consul, conformable to the letter or spirit of this article? The French Government demands the execution of the ninth article of the secret convention, in which the two contracting parties mutually guarantee the independence of the Republic of the Seven Isles, and that no foreign troops shall remain; a stipulation evidently violated by Russia, since she has continued to retain her troops there; reinforced them in an ostentatious manner; and changed the government of the country without any concert. Finally, France claims the execution of the eleventh article of the same treaty, which evidently requires that, instead of evincing a spirit so unduly partial to England, and rendering itself perhaps the first auxiliary of its ambition, Russia should unite with France to consolidate a general peace, and re-establish a just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, to secure the liberty of the seas (4)."

Further memorial of Russia. The same views were more fully unfolded in a subsequent memorial presented by M. D'Oubril to the French Cabinet on August 28th. The Russian minister there loudly complained that the King of Sardinia, stripped of all his continental dominions by the union of Piedmont to France, still remains without the indemnity so often promised by France: that the King of Sardinia and the North of Germany are still oppressed by the burdensome presence of the French troops: that the whole of Italy has been changed by the innovation of the French Government, without any concert with his Imperial Majesty; and replied to the charge of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, founded on the ninth article of the secret convention, "That if the Russian troops have a second time occupied the Ionian islands, it is with the consent of the Ottoman Porte, at the request of the inhabitants, and in virtue of a previous concert with France. The Emperor only awaits the intelligence of his Chargé d'Affaires' departure from Paris to intimate to the French mission to quit his capital. He beholds with regret the necessity under which he is laid of suspending his relations with a Government which refuses to perform its engagement; but he will remain in that suspensive position, which it lies on the French Government to convert if it pleases into one of open hostility." This note remained without any answer; and on the day following, M. D'Oubril received his passports, with the intimation, however, that it was expected he would not cross the frontier till he received intelligence that the French Chargé d'Affaires had left the Russian territories, and he remained accordingly at Mayence. War was not yet openly proclaimed between the two empires, but it could hardly be said that peace existed; and its open declaration was evidently postponed only for a convenient opportunity (2). And when the accession of Napoléon to the imperial throne was notified to the Court of St.-Petersburg, the Emperor refused to recognize his new title, even after it had been acceded to by the sovereign whose dignity it appeared more immediately to affect, the Emperor of Austria.

(1) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1804, 649, 650.

(2) State Papers. Ann. Reg. 1804, 951, 953. Bign. iii. 452, 454. Dum. xi. 53.

The warlike intentions of Russia during this year were not confined to diplomatic manifestoes. Independent of several lesser squadrons which were cruising in the Baltic, a fleet of nine ships of the line and several frigates passed the Sound, and sailed round by the straits of Gibraltar towards the Adriatic sea; while several expeditions from Sebastopol proceeded through the Dardanelles in the same direction, and disembarked 7000 men in the Ionian islands. The army was every where put on the most efficient footing, vacancies filled up, new levies ordered, and every thing done which could enable Russia to interpose with a weight proportioned to its strength in the great conflict which was approaching in Western Europe (1).

Russia
system of
Austria.

While the political horizon was thus overshadowed by clouds in the northern hemisphere, Austria continued faithful to her system of maintaining a strict neutrality, and repairing in silence the breaches in her army and finances which had been produced by the disasters of preceding years. An event occurred; however, in the course of the year, which proved that the spirit of the Imperial Cabinet was far from being extinguished, and that Austria might still be calculated upon to bear a prominent part in any coalition which might be formed for the independence of Europe. The Elector of Bavaria had become entangled in some very unpleasant disputes with the nobles of the equestrian order as they were called; that is, the nobles who held directly of the empire, and were subject to no other jurisdiction, wherever their territories might be locally situated, which had fallen to him on the partition of the indemnities. The Elector, considering them as to all intents and purposes his subjects, had summoned them to meet him at Bamberg, to settle the point in dispute between them; but they had refused, and applied to the Emperor, who supported their pretensions to independence from his government. Upon this the Elector appealed to the First Consul; but however well inclined he might have been in general to support any sovereign who resisted the jurisdiction and weakened the authority of the Emperor, he had no desire to see Austria added to the number of his enemies in the present threatening aspect of affairs in the North of Europe. The Elector therefore received, to his no small astonishment, a notification that he must not oppose the rights of the Emperor in this particular, Jan. 24, 1804. and also give satisfaction to Austria for the seizure of the Oberhansau, a district situated on the frontiers, near the Inn, the year before, Jan. 25, 1804. and long the subject of contention between the two powers. By a solemn decree of the Aulic Council the nobles of the equestrian order throughout the empire were confirmed in all the privileges which belonged to them before the division of the indemnities, and the execution of this decree by force of arms was committed to the Archduke of Austria, and the Electors of Saxony and Baden; a result which contributed in no small degree to restore the influence of the Emperor throughout Germany, and revive the ancient respect for the majesty of his undefined authority which preceding events had so much impaired (2).

His conduct
on the death
of the Duke
of Sutherland.

Careful, however, not to hazard the advantage thus gained by any premature or unsupported measure of hostility towards France, the Cabinet of Vienna abstained from expressing any open indignation at the violation of the territory of the empire at Ettenheim, and gave an answer rather favourable than otherwise to the circular transmitted to the diplomatic body at Paris, relative to the affair of Drake and Spencer Smith. Nay, they at once ordered the French emigrants to quit their territories,

(1) Dum. xi. 55.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1804, 180, 181. Nig. iv. 1, 2.

when the First Consul represented that their residence there gave umbrage to the Government of France. Notwithstanding these pacific steps, however, the armaments in the interior went on without intermission; magazines were formed in Styria, Carinthia, at Venice, and in the Tyrol; the army was gradually increasing in strength and reviving in spirit; and an attentive observer could discern, amidst a constant interchange of pacific assurances, appearances not a little indicative of an approaching rupture (1).

Broomfield's Napoleon's Imperial title. Matters were in this state between the Cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries, when the elevation of Napoléon to the imperial dignity opened up apparently a fresh subject of discord between the two powers. But, instead of testifying any repugnance at this step, the Austrian Cabinet had the address to make it a ground for adopting a measure which had been long in their contemplation, but for which a favourable opportunity had not yet arrived, viz, the assumption of the title of Emperors of Austria by the House of Lorraine, and rendering it hereditary in their family. After a long correspondence between the two Cabinets, this matter was adjusted to their mutual satisfaction, and on the 11th August, immediately after the Emperor, in a full council, had recognized the title of the Emperor Napoléon, he assumed for himself and his successors in the Austrian dominions the title of "Emperor of Austria." The motive for this step was declared to be, "the preservation of that degree of equality which should subsist between the great powers and the just rank of the House and State of Austria among the nations of Europe." The step was justified on "the precedent formerly afforded by the assumption of the Imperial crown by the Czars of Russia, and more recently by the ruling sovereign of France;" and though it at first excited considerable jealousy among the lesser princes of Germany, yet they soon all recognized the new and hereditary title of the Emperor; and it was ere long acquiesced in by all the potentates of Europe, those under the influence of Napoléon, not less than those who were opposed to him; by the first, because it afforded some countenance to the recent assumption of the Imperial dignity by the French ruler; by the last, because it promised to consolidate in the Austrian dominions some counterpoise to his power (2).

Emancipating policy of Prussia. Aware that the Cabinet of Vienna would endeavour, on the first favourable opportunity, to regain some of its lost possessions, and that its friendly dispositions could not with certainty be calculated upon for any length of time, Napoléon was urgent in his endeavours, during the whole of this year, to draw closer the cords which united France to Prussia. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien had awakened at Berlin, as elsewhere, the most profound feelings of indignation; and in the consternation with which it overwhelmed the friends of France might be seen, says the panegyrist of Napoléon, the clearest evidence that, "more than even a crime, that act was a fault (3)". But though the Anti-Gallican party was greatly strengthened, it was not placed in possession of power by that event. The policy of the Cabinet still continued to be guided by French influence; and accordingly the King of Prussia was among the first of the greater powers which formally recognized the French Emperor. When the menaces of Russia gave reason to apprehend an immediate rupture in the north, it became of the utmost moment for Napoléon to secure, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of Prussia, in order that a barrier might be opposed to the march of the Aus-

(1) Bign. iv. 12, 13, 19.

(2) State Papers, 695. Ann. Reg. 1804. Bign. iv. 22, 29.

(3) Bign. iv. 32.

covite troops across the north of Germany : and, on condition that the French troops in the electorate of Hanover should not be augmented, and that the burden of the war should not be laid upon the neutral states of that part of the empire, Prussia agreed to maintain a strict neutrality, and not to permit the march of Russian or any other foreign troops across her territories. In return for these concessions, which, though not so extensive as he desired, were yet of great moment to the French Emperor, Napoléon openly proclaimed, both in his diplomatic relations, and in the official columns of the *Moniteur*, his inclination to augment the strength of Prussia (1), and his intention not to let any pretensions of France upon Hanover stand in the way of the territorial aggrandizement of that power.

Accession of Hardenberg to power produces no external change. A change which occurred at this period in the Prussian Ministry was looked to by the diplomatists of Europe as likely to lead to a material alteration in its foreign policy ; but it was not attended at first with the effects which were anticipated. Count Haugwitz, who for ten years had been the chief director of its diplomatic relations, and whose leaning towards the French alliance had been conspicuous throughout the whole of his administration, retired to his estates in Silesia ; and the chief direction of affairs fell upon BARON HARDENBERG, a statesman of great ability, who was known to be decidedly hostile to the revolutionary principle, the devastating effects of which he had had ample opportunities of appreciating in the course of his diplomatic career, and whose inclination towards the English and Russian alliance, already warmly espoused by the Queen, was expected to produce important effects on the fate of northern Europe. The new minister, however, proceeded at first in the footsteps of his predecessor ; the negotiation for the occupation of Hanover, if not by Prussian, at least by Saxon or Hessian troops, instead of French, was resumed, though without success, as Napoléon shewed an invincible repugnance to quitting his hold of that important part of the German territory ; but the jealousy of Prussia was allayed by a renewed promise, that the French troops in that electorate should not exceed thirty thousand men ; on condition of which the King engaged that they should not be disquieted from the side of his dominions (2).

They re-mostrate against the seizure of Sir Geo. Rumboldt. Oct. 25, 1804. An event, however, soon occurred, which put the independence of Prussia to the test, and afforded the measure of the extent to which its Cabinet was disposed to sacrifice its pretensions to the rank of an independent power to the ascendancy of the French alliance. Sir George Rumboldt, the English Minister at Hamburgh, was seized at his country villa within the territory of that free city, on the night of the 25th October, in virtue of an order for arrest, signed by the French Minister of Police at Paris, and forwarded without delay to that capital, where he was lodged in the Temple, and all his papers submitted to the inspection of the French Government. This violent proceeding was not only a flagrant violation of the law of nations, in the person of the accredited Minister of England, in the circle of Lower Saxony, but a grave fault of policy ; as it directly brought the Emperor of France into collision with the King of Prussia, the protector of that circle of the empire, and endangered all the amicable relations which with so much care had been nursed up for ten years between the two powers. It produced a very great sensation at Berlin. The party hostile to the French alliance represented it as a grievous slight upon the honour of Prussia, and such as if unredressed would for ever

blast its influence in the north of Germany; and the opinion became universal, that the ambition of Napoléon knew no bounds, and that he was resolved to treat the independent states of Europe in the same manner as the provinces of his own empire. The conduct, both of the King and the Cabinet at this crisis, was worthy of the successors of the Great Frederick. The Prussian Ambassador at Paris received instructions to make the most energetic remonstrances on the subject to the Cabinet of the Tuileries; and the King wrote in person a confidential letter to the Emperor, expressing how deeply he had been hurt by the event. These representations had the desired effect: nothing was discovered in Sir George's papers tending to implicate either him or the British Government in any thing which could answer the purposes of Napoléon, and after a few days' confinement he was sent to Cherbourg, and delivered over with a flag of truce to the English cruisers, leaving to France the disgrace only of having violated the law of nations and the independence of Germany without any object, and receded before the remonstrances of a comparatively inferior power (1).

Hostile dispositions of Sweden.

The first decided symptom of hostility towards France came from Sweden; a country removed by its situation from the immediate dangers of French invasion, and under the government of a prince of an ardent and chivalrous character, whose animosity to the revolutionary system had been long and powerfully marked. As Duke of Pomerania, that sovereign had a voice in the Diet of the empire at Ratisbon; and his notes presented to that assembly on the subject of the Duke d'Enghien had breathed an uncommon degree of spirit and independence (2). This conduct, which was not more than might have been expected in an intrepid sovereign who was married to a princess of the House of Baden, the potentate immediately insulted on that occasion, drew forth the pointed animadversions of the French Emperor; and in a series of articles inserted in the official part of the *Moniteur*, the King of Sweden was assailed in a manner which could hardly be tolerated by any independent power (3). In one, in particular, a distinction was drawn between the Swedish nation, with whom the writer professed a desire to remain on a friendly title, and its sovereign, a rash and headstrong young man misled by extravagant ideas. "Your merchant vessels," it added, "shall ever be well received in the ports of France: your squadrons, whenever they stand in need of them, shall be victualled in her harbours. She will see on their mast-heads only the pavillons of the Gustavuses who have reigned before you." When language such as this prevails between sovereigns, the transition is easy to a state of actual hostility. On the 7th September, a note presented by the Swedish Ambassador, addressed *Monsieur Napoléon Bonaparte*, announced the termination of all confidential communication between the two Governments, and at the same time the importation of French journals and pamphlets into Sweden was prohibited. Mr. Pitt was too vigilant an observer not to perceive, in this state of mutual irritation, the foundation of a Convention favourable to the interests of Great Britain; and on the 3d December a treaty was concluded at London between England and Sweden, by which it was stipulated that a *dépôt* should be established at Stralsund in Pomerania, or in the adjoining island of Rugen, for the formation of the legion which it was intended to form of Hanoverian troops, in the pay of Great Britain; and that an *entrepôt* should be established in that town, for the disposal of British colonial produce and

Which is taken advantage of by Great Britain, Dec. 3, 1804.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1804, 183, 184. Bign. iv. 43, 40.

(2) State Papers, 697. Ann. Reg. 1804.

(3) *Moniteur*, Aug. 14, 1804. Google

manufactures. In return for these concessions, and in order to enable the Swedish Government to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence, a subsidy of L.80,000 was promised by England. If these provisions did not amount to any act of open hostility against France, they at least demonstrated that Sweden was not disposed to enter into the projects of the Emperor Napoléon for the exclusion of British commerce from the Continent of Europe (1); a disposition which amounted in his estimation to a declaration of war against the French empire.

At the time that Sweden was thus giving the first example of a decided resistance to France, the Ottoman empire also adopted a peremptory tone on the same subject. Retaining still a lively recollection of the evils they had sustained in consequence of the unprovoked attack of Napoléon on Egypt, they refused to recognize him as Emperor; and Marshal Brune, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, after six months of vain attempts at negotiation, was compelled to quit that capital, which fell entirely into the views of the Russian party (2).

Extension of French power in Italy, Oct. 20, 1804. While the northern and eastern powers were thus giving signs of approaching hostility to France, Napoléon was unceasingly extending his grasp over the Italian peninsula. By a treaty with the Ligurian Republic, of October 20, the whole resources of Genoa were placed at the disposal of France, and that magnificent harbour became a great French naval station in the Mediterranean. The Emperor engaged to procure admission on favourable terms for the Ligurian manufactures into the states of Piedmont and Parma, and to cause its pavilion to be respected by the Barbary powers; in return for which he obtained six thousand sailors, and the free use of the arsenals, fleets, and harbours of the Republic. Napoléon immediately took measures for the construction of ten ships of the line at Genoa. "This," says the French historian, "was in effect an appropriation of Genoa to France; the Act of Incorporation which soon after followed of this Republic with the French empire was but a public proclamation of what then took place (3).

Internal measures of Napoléon. While negotiations of such moment were taking place in the diplomatic body throughout Europe, and every thing conspired to indicate an approaching rupture of the most terrible kind, Napoléon was actively engaged in measures calculated to rouse the spirit and heighten the enthusiasm of his own subjects. On the 14th July, the anniversary of the July 14, 1804. taking of the Bastille, the inauguration of the Legion of Honour took place with all imaginable pomp in the splendid church of the Invalides at Paris, built by Louis XIV; and on the same day the crosses of honour of that body were distributed by the generals in all the camps and garrisons of the empire. The profound policy of Napoléon was here singularly conspicuous, in selecting the anniversary of the first victory of the Revolution for the establishment of an institution calculated to revive the distinctions which it was its chief object to abolish, and blending in the public mind the recollection of Republican triumph with the edifice and the associations which were most likely to recall the splendour of the monarchy.

July 15. At the same time that this apparent homage to Republican principles was paid at Paris, a measure of all others the most destructive to real freedom was carried into effect in the restoration of the Ministry of Police, with the crafty Fouché again at its head.

(1) Bign. iv. 57, 59. Ann. Reg. 1804, 195.

(2) Dum. xi. 56, 57.

(3) Bign. iv. 117, 119.

Shortly after the conclusion of this important ceremony in the capital, the Emperor repaired to the head-quarters of the grand army at Boulogne, and there, on the 16th August, the anniversary of the fête of his tutelary saint, a spectacle of the grandest and most imposing kind took place. Marshal Soult ^{Splendid site at Boulogne.} received orders to assemble the whole troops in the camps at Boulogne and Montreuil, nearly 80,000 strong, on the slopes of a vast natural amphitheatre, situated on the western face of the hill on which the Tower of Caesar is placed, lying immediately to the eastward of the harbour of the former of these towns. In the centre of this amphitheatre a throne was placed, elevated on a platform of turf, at the summit of a flight of steps. The immense body of soldiers were arranged in the form of the rays of a circle, emanating from the throne: the cavalry and artillery, stationed on the outer extremity, formed the exterior band of that magnificent array; beyond them, a countless multitude of spectators covered the slope to the very summit of the hill. The bands of all the regiments of the army, placed on the right and left of the throne, were ready to rend the air with the sounds of military music. At noon precisely, the Emperor ascended the throne amidst a general salute from all the batteries, and a flourish of trumpets unheard since the days of the Romans: immediately before him was the buckler of François I while the crosses and ribbons which were to be distributed were contained in the helmet of the Chevalier Bayard. His brothers, ministers, and chief functionaries, the marshals of the empire, counsellors of state and senators, the staff of the army, its whole generals and field officers, composed the splendid suite by which he was surrounded. Amidst their dazzling uniforms the standards of the regiments were to be seen; some new and waving with yet unsullied colours in the sun: many more torn by shot, stained with blood, and black with smoke; the objects of almost superstitious reverence to the warlike multitude by which they were surrounded. The Emperor took the oath first himself, and no sooner had the members of the Legion of Honour rejoined "We swear it," than raising his voice aloud, he said, "and you, soldiers, swear to defend, at the hazard of your life, the honour of the French name, your country, and your Emperor." Innumerable voices responded to the appeal, and immediately the distribution of the decorations commenced, and the ceremony was concluded by a general review of the vast army, who all drilled in the finest order before the throne, where they had just witnessed so imposing a spectacle (1).

^{His vacation at the defect of his throne in the midst of it.} The chief of such a host might be excused for deeming himself the sovereign of the earth; but an event was approaching, destined to teach the French Emperor, like his great predecessor Canute the Dane, that there were bounds to his power, and that his commands were limited to the element on which his army stood. It was part of the pageant that a naval display should take place at the same time, and the eyes of Napoleon and his Minister of Marine, M. Decrès, were anxiously turned, towards the close of the ceremony, to the headlands round which it was expected the vanguard of the flotilla would appear. In effect, they did make their appearance at four o'clock; but at the same moment a violent tempest arose, the wind blew with terrific violence, and several of the vessels, in the hands of their inexperienced mariners, were stranded on the beach. This untoward accident, though, practically speaking, of little importance, was yet in the highest degree mortifying to Napoleon, arriving as it did on such an occasion, in presence not only of his own troops, but the English cruisers, and cha-

characteristic as it was of the impassable limits which the laws of nature had placed to his power. He retired chagrined and out of humour for the rest of the day; all the magnificence of his military display could not console him for the rude manner in which he had been reminded, at the highest point of its splendour, of his weakness on the other element, which required to be subdued before his dreams of universal dominion could be realized (1).

General rejoicings over France. The fête of Napoléon was celebrated in the other harbours of France by the completion of works of more durable utility, but every where with the same enthusiastic feeling. At Cherbourg it was signalized by discharges of artillery from the battery placed on the great sea dyke intended to break the fury of the waves which roll into that harbour,—a work begun by the unfortunate Louis XVI and now completed by his illustrious successor. At Antwerp the rejoicings were equally sincere: several smaller vessels were launched on the occasion; and already its basins in a great state of forwardness, three ships of the line and a frigate almost completed, and immense preparations in the arsenals and dockyards, attested the impulse which the genius of the Emperor, in a single year, had given to the naval resources of France. Two days after the fête the English cruisers stood into the harbour of Boulogne, and a heavy cannonade took place between them and the front line of the French flotilla. Napoléon, on board a gunboat with Admiral Bruceys, was a spectator of the combat; and after an exchange of long shots Aug. 18, 1804. for two hours, the English ships stood off, not having succeeded in inflicting any serious damage on the enemy, a circumstance which afforded the French, little accustomed to indecisive combats at sea, an opportunity for boundless exultation, and the happiest augury of success in the great maritime contest which was approaching (2).

Disgraceful adulation with which he was surrounded. From Boulogne the Emperor traversed the coast of the Channel as far as Ostend, every where reviewing the troops, inspecting the harbours, stimulating the preparations, and communicating to all classes the energy of his own ardent and indefatigable mind. From thence he proceeded to Aix-la-Chapelle, endeavouring by all means to revive the recollection of the empire of Charlemagne, an era of which, with Eastern servility, he was incessantly reminded in the adulatory addresses which flowed in from the mayors and constituted authorities in all the districts through which he passed. "God," said the prefect of Arras, "created Bonaparte, and rested from his labours,"—an excess of flattery which shortly drew forth

(1) D'Abr. vii. 185, 187. Novr. ii. 338.

(2) Dum. xi. 44, 47. Bigu. iv. 124, 125.

No man knew better than Napoléon how to win the affections and excite the gratitude of his soldiers; and it was to his wonderful powers in this respect, almost as much as to his political and military capacity, that his long-continued success was owing. To increase this effect, and add to the naturally retentive powers of his memory in this respect, he inquired privately from the officers who were the veterans of Egypt or Italy in their regiments; and when he passed them in review, stopped the men designed to him, and said, "Ah! you are a veteran!—How is your old father?—I have seen you at Aboukir or the Pyramids!—You have not a cross; here is one for you,"—and threw the cord round the astonished soldier's neck. It may easily be conceived what must have been the effect of such a demeanour, impressing as it did the soldiers with the belief that they were all known to the Emperor if they had distinguished themselves, and that any one might look, under such auspices, to becoming a marshal of the empire.

It was not only in his own soldiers, however, that

this great man appreciated heroic or generous conduct. No one set a higher value upon it in his enemies. When at Boulogne, two English sailors were brought before him who had escaped from the depot at Verdun, and attempted to cross the Channel in a frail bark a few feet long, just capable of floating them, which they had constructed of wood which they found on the sea beach. The daring nature of the attempt attracted the admiration of the Emperor who said to them, "Is it really true that you have endeavoured to cross the sea in that bark?"—"Ah! Sire!" they replied, "if you doubt it, give us leave, and you will see us set out instantly." "I indeed wish it," replied he: "you are bold enterprising men, but I will not let you expose your life. You are free. Farther, I will cause you to be conducted on board an English ship: you shall return to London, and tell the English what esteem I have for the brave, even among my enemies." He dismissed them with several pieces of gold each. This incident took such a hold of his imagination, that he recounted it to his companions in exile at St. Helena.—See BOVARIAN, vi. 201, 202.

from the faubourg St.-Germain the witty addition, that he had better have reposed a little sooner (1); and is valuable as a historical record, demonstrating how rapidly revolutionary violence leads to Eastern despotism, for in no part of France was democratic cruelty more vehement ten years before than in that very town of Arras, the scene of the unparalleled atrocities of Le Bon, and the place where the guillotine had become so familiar an object, that it was employed by the little children to decapitate cats, birds, and mice, which had fallen into their hands (2).

Vast designs of the Emperor at Mayence for the Confederation of the Rhine. More important changes were destined to result from the next station at which the Emperor rested, Mayence, where he received at the same time the congratulatory addresses of all the eastern provinces of France and of all the lesser German potentates on the right bank of the Rhine, whom he was already preparing to mould into the frontier bulwark of his power. It was here that he first brought to maturity the design which he had already formed of a CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, under the protection of France, and which would practically amount to an extension of its power into the heart of Germany (3). Napoléon remained during the autumnal months at this great frontier fortress; and while to the public eye he seemed engaged only in matters of parade and magnificence, receiving the congratulations of the adjoining states on his accession to the imperial throne, he was in reality incessantly occupied with those vast designs which in the succeeding year led to such memorable results both at land and sea. It was there that he first conceived the plan of that great combination to elude the British fleets, and concentrate an overwhelming force in the Channel, which so nearly proved successful in the following year, and placed the English monarchy in greater jeopardy than it had stood since the battle of Hastings (4); and it was there too that he matured the details of that astonishing march of his land forces from the shores of the Channel to the heart of Germany, which was so soon destined to lead to the triumphs of Ulm and Austerlitz. Nor were objects of internal utility and pacific improvement neglected during these warlike designs. Numerous decrees for the encouragement of industry, as well as the encouragement of science and the protection of the frontier, are dated from the places visited during this journey.

Sept. 11. One from the camp at Boulogne established nine prizes of 10,000 francs, (L.400,) and thirteen of 5,000 each, for useful inventions in agriculture and manufactures, proceeding on the noble desire expressed in the preamble, that "not only should France maintain the superiority she had acquired in science and the arts, but that the age which was commencing should advance beyond that which was drawing to a close:" one from

Sept. 21. Mayence, on 21st September, organised the institution of twelve colleges in the principal towns of the empire for the study of law: one from

Aug. 25. Dunkirk gave a new and more effective organization to the body of
July 16. engineers for roads and bridges through the state: while another put upon a new and much improved footing the important establishment of the Polytechnic School (5).

His coronation at Paris. Immediately after his return to Paris, Napoléon commenced preparations for the important solemnity of the coronation. Although the spirit of the age was still essentially irreligious, and the forcing through

(1) *Norv.* ii. 347. *Boar.* vi. 104, 105, 205.

(2) See vol. ii. 169, and *D'Abr.* vii. 213, 214. *Boar.* vi. 221, 222.

(3) *Marquis Lucchessini's Confed. Rhenana*, i. 74. *Bign.* iv. 127, 128. *Norv.* ii. 344.

(4) Letter of Sept. 29, 1804. *Dum.* xi. 205. *Pièces Just.*

(5) *Bign.* iv. 130, 139. *Norv.* ii. 340, 344.

the concordat with the Pope had exposed his Government to a ruder shock than the abrogation of all the political privileges acquired by the people during the Revolution (1), still Napoléon was well aware that, with a large proportion at least of the rural population, the consecration of his authority by the ceremony of coronation was an essential particular, and that to all, whatever latitude of opinion, it was of great political importance to prove that his influence was so unbounded as to compel the Head of the Church himself to officiate on the occasion. The Papal benediction appeared to be the link which would unite the Revolutionary to the Legitimate régime, and cause the faithful to forget, in the sacred authority with which he was now invested, the violence and bloodshed which had paved his way to the throne (2). Napoléon, for these reasons, had long resolved, not only that he should be crowned according to the forms of the French monarchy, but that the ceremony should be performed by the Head of Christendom; and for this purpose negotiation had for some months been in dependence with the Holy See. There was no precedent, indeed, of such an honour being conferred on a crowned head excepting the Emperors of Germany, the successors of the Cæsars, since the days when Stephen III consecrated the usurpation of Pepin and poured the holy oil on the head of the founder of a new dynasty, and his son Charlemagne; but this only rendered him the more desirous to secure for himself an honour of which there had been no example for ten centuries; and his achievements certainly would not suffer by a comparison with those of the illustrious founders of the Carlovingian dynasty. Early in June accordingly, a negotiation had been opened with the Vatican for the coronation of the Emperor by the Pope in person; and although considerable difficulties were at first started by the Cardinals, in order to enhance the merit of compliance, and if possible obtain some concessions to the Church, from so great an act of condescension on the part of its Head, yet such was the ascendancy of French influence and the terror of Napoléon's arms, that at length the consent of the Consistory was obtained; and in reply to a letter of Sept. 15, 1804. Napoléon, dated from Mayence on 15th September, the Pope agreed to officiate at the consecration, and announced the speedy commencement of his journey to France. On the day following a concordat was concluded with the Italian Republic, on terms precisely similar to those already agreed on with the French Government (3).

*Ceremony
at Notre-
Dame.*

The ceremony was fixed for the 2d December, in the cathedral church of Notre-Dame at Paris. The Pope arrived on the 23d November at Fontainebleau, where the Emperor went to congratulate him on his approach. They met at a cross in the forest on the road to Lyons, about a mile to the southward of the palace, which is still shewn to travellers. Napoléon was on horseback, but they both alighted at the same time, and immediately remounted the Pope's carriage—the Emperor entering first,

(1) "At that period (in 1804) there prevailed," says the French historian, "in the Republic a complete indifference on religious subjects; and the apathy of the nation in that respect was such that it would not leave to any legislator the power of choosing for it any species of Christian worship. This state of things is well worthy of consideration; and it existed in the great majority of the nation to such a degree, that the organization of the Catholic worship by the concordat appeared to the people a more daring innovation than the overthrow of the national representation on the 19th Brumaire. Religion had no hold at that period of the affections, I had almost said none of the necessities, of the

people: the spirit of the age since the days of Louis XV had been entirely philosophical."—*Monviss.* ii. 326—7.

(2) "I will allow the generals of the Republic," said Napoléon, "to exclaim as long as they please against the mass: I know what I am about; I am working for posterity." Though indifferent as to religion himself, he saw clearly that in the end it rules the great body of mankind, and that the irreligious fanaticism of the age was probably destined to be as short-lived as its democratic fervour.—See *Bourassier*, vi. 223.

(3) *Sign.* iv. 102, 113. *Bot.* iv. 136, 142. *Dun.* xi. 75.

and placing His Holiness on his right hand. They drove together to Fontainebleau, from whence Pius VII proceeded alone to Paris (1). He was every where received with extraordinary demonstrations of respect, and lodged at the Tuileries, in magnificent rooms, in the Pavilion of Flora, where, by a deliberate attention, he found his sleeping apartment furnished exactly like that which he had recently left on the Monte Cavallo. His arrival at Paris created an extraordinary sensation; among the small remnant of the faithful, of joy at beholding the head of the church within a city so recently defiled by the argies of infidelity; among the more numerous body of the irreligious or indifferent, of curiosity and astonishment at the extraordinary changes which had so rapidly converted the cathedral where, ten years before, the Goddess of Reason was enthroned amidst crowds of revolutionary admirers, into the scene where the august ceremony of coronation was to be performed by the head of the church on the founder of a new race of sovereigns. How sceptical or indifferent soever the great bulk of the people may have been, they were universally impressed with feelings of respect for the venerable pontiff who displayed, in the trying circumstances in which he was placed, so large a portion of Christian charity and forbearance; and on some occasions on which the brutality of democratic prejudice strove to expose him to insult, his demeanour was so mild and benevolent as to excite the unanimous admiration of all who witnessed it (2).

Result of the appeal to the people on the subject. On the day before the coronation, the Senate and Tribunate presented, with great pomp, the result of the appeal made to the French people on the subject of the hereditary succession of his family. Sixty thousand registers had been opened. Out of 3,574,898 votes, only 2500 were in the negative. Such was the result, after sixteen year's experience, of the democratic fervour of 1789! In reply to a laboured harangue from François de Neufchâteau, the orator of the Legislature on this occasion, Napoléon said, "I ascend the throne where I have been placed by the unanimous voice of the people, the senate, and the army, with a heart penetrated with the splendid destinies of a people whom, in the midst of camps, I first saluted with the title of the Great. From my youth upwards my thoughts have been entirely occupied with their glory; and I now feel no pleasure nor pain but in the happiness or misfortune of my people. *My descendants will long sit on this throne.* In the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives for the defence of their country. As its first magistrates, they will never forget that contempt for the laws and the overthrow of the social edifice are never occasioned but by the weakness and vacillation of princes. You, senators, whose counsels and aid have never been wanting in the most difficult circumstances, will transmit your spirit to your successors. Remain ever as you now are, the firmest bulwarks and the chief counsellors of the throne, so necessary to the happiness of this vast empire (3)."

(1) It is a remarkable coincidence, that Fontainebleau, where Napoleon, in the pride of apparently boundless power, met the Pope coming to his coronation, was also the witness, ten years after, of his oblation and fall. But the life of the Emperor is full of such extraordinary and apparently mysterious combinations. Immediately after his accession to the Consulate, he was intent on a negotiation to obtain for France the island of Elba, the scene of his first exile; and not a month before his coronation, he dictated orders to Villeneuve for the conquest of St. Helena, the destined theatre of his sufferings and death.—See BOURAIIENNE, vi. 233.

(2) Bour. vi. 225, 227. Bigu. iv. 141, 143. D'Abr. vii. 216.

When visiting the Imperial printing office, one of the workmen was ill bred enough to keep on his hat in the presence of His Holiness. A murmur of disapprobation arose among the crowd, which the Pope observing, stepped forward and said, with the most benevolent aspect, "Uncover yourself, young man, that I may give you my benediction; no one was ever the worse of the blessing of an old man." The spectators were profoundly affected by this incident.—BOURAIENNE, vi. 227.

(3) Bour. vi. 233.

Dec. 2, 1804. The ceremony of coronation took place on the day following, with the utmost possible magnificence in the Cathedral of Notre-Dame. The day was intensely cold, but clear and bright, the procession long and gorgeous, and the whole luxury and magnificence of the empire displayed under its venerable walls. Carriages glittering with gold and purple trappings; horses proudly caparisoned; liveries, resplendent with colour, dazzled the multitude in the streets through which the cortège passed, as much as a sea of ostrich feathers; rich embroidered court dresses; and a procession of stars, ribbons, and uniforms, added to the imposing aspect of the scene within the cathedral. The bewildered Republicans who witnessed the ceremony, beheld with pain the pages in attendance on the Empress's carriage, and the swords used as part of full dress, as under the ancient régime. The multitude, though dazzled by the spectacle, was far from testifying the enthusiasm which was evinced in the fêtes of the Revolution. After taking the oath prescribed by the *Senatus Consultum* of 18th May 1804 (1), and receiving the Papal benediction, the Emperor, with his own hands, took the crown and placed it on his head; after which he himself, with perfect grace, crowned the Empress, who knelt before him. The general aspect of this interesting moment may be still seen in the admirable picture of David, whose good fortune it has been to be the means of transmitting to posterity so many of the memorable scenes of this heart-stirring epoch (2).

Distribution of eagles to the army. On the day following, a military spectacle of a still more animating kind took place in the Champ-de-Mars. Napoleon had there laid aside his imperial robes. He appeared in the uniform of a colonel of the guard, to distribute to the colonels of all the regiments in Paris, and deputations from all those absent, the EAGLES which were thenceforward to form the standards of the army. In the midst of the plain, in front of the *École Militaire*, a throne was placed, on which the Emperor and Empress were seated. The spot selected was nearly the same with that where, fifteen years before, the unfortunate Louis XVI had sat beside the President of the National Assembly. At a signal given, the troops closed their ranks, and grouped in dense masses round the throne; then the Emperor, rising from his seat, said in a loud voice, "Soldiers! there are your standards. These eagles will serve as your rallying point. They will ever be seen where your Emperor shall deem them necessary for the defence of his throne and of his people (3)."

(1) The oath was in these words: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic; to respect, and cause to be respected, the laws of the Concordat and the liberty of worship; to respect, and cause to be respected, equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the sale of the national domains; to impose no tax but by legal authority; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour; and to govern, with no other views but to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."—BIGNON, iv. 144.

(2) D'Abr. vii. 249, 259. Bour. vi. 235, 236. Bigu. iv. 145, 146.

The Duchess of Abrantes, who, as wife of the governor of Paris, was very near the Emperor on this occasion, mentions, that immediately after crowning the Empress he cast a look of almost intolerable intelligence on her. He thought doubtless of her mother, Madame Permon, and the Rue des Filles de St. Thomas, where she had refused his hand ten years before, in the humbler state of his for-

tunes. What must have been the Duchess's feeling on the fate which might have been her mother's at that moment?—D'ABRANTES, vii. 261, 263.

When Napoleon was paying his court to Joséphine shortly before their marriage, neither of them having a carriage, they walked together to the notary Raguideau, to whom the latter communicated her design of marrying the young General. "You are a great fool," replied the cautious formalist; "and you will live to repent it. You are about to marry a man who has nothing but his cloak and his sword." Napoleon, who was waiting in the antechamber unknown to Joséphine, overheard these words, but never mentioned them to her till the morning of the coronation, when he sent for Raguideau. The astounded old man was brought into the presence of the Emperor, who immediately said to him, with a good humoured smile, "What say you now, Raguideau; have I nothing but my cloak and my sword?"—BOURAIENNE, vi. 237, 238.

(3) Dum. xi. 77, 78. Bour. vi. 238, 239.

Protest of
Louis
XVIII
against his
assumption
of the impe-
rial crown.

While Napoleon was thus conferring upon his newly acquired power the sanction of Papal benediction, Louis XVIII from the shores of the Baltic, protested in the face of God and man, against this fresh invasion of his claims, in terms worthy of the illustrious house whose fortunes he bore. "On the shores of the Baltic, in the sight and under the protection of Heaven, strengthened by the presence of my brother, of the Duke d'Angoulême, and the concurrence of the other Princes of the Blood; calling to witness the royal victims, and those whom honour, fidelity, Dec. 2, 1804. patriotism, and duty, have subjected to the Revolutionary axe, or the thirst and jealousy of tyrants; invoking the manes of the young hero whom impious hands have torn from his country and future glory; offering to our people, as a pledge of reconciliation, the virtues of the angel whom Providence has snatched from fetters and death to offer an example of every Christian virtue, we swear, that never will we abandon the heritage of our fathers, or break the sacred bond which unites our destinies to yours; and we invoke, as witness to our oath, the God of St.-Louis, the judge of the rulers of men (4)." Who could have foreseen, at the date of this coronation and this protest, that the bones of Louis XVIII would repose in the royal vaults of St.-Denis, while those of Napoleon were to rest under a solitary willow on the rock of St.-Helena.

Splendour
of the impe-
rial court.

The coronation of the Emperor was followed by a series of rejoicings, assemblies, and fêtes, which lasted for upwards of two months. The vast expenditure, both of the Court and the numerous civil and military functionaries of Government; the great concourse of strangers, and unwonted splendour of the dresses and decorations, caused an unusual degree of activity among the shopkeepers and manufacturers of Paris, and contributed not a little to reconcile that important and democratic body to the Imperial régime which had now succeeded the terrors of the Revolution. Without possessing the whole elegance or finished manners of the old régime, the Imperial Court was remarkable for the lustre and beauty of its assemblies, over which the grace and affability of Joséphine threw their principal charm. But not one moment did Napoleon withdraw from state affairs for such amusements. Through the midst of the whole, he laboured eight or ten hours a-day with his Ministers, and was already deeply engaged in those great designs which led to such decisive results in the succeeding years (2).

Napoleon
refuses any
cession of
territory to
the Holy
See.

The Pope had been led to expect, in return for his condescension in travelling to Paris to crown the Emperor, some important benefits for the Holy See, and the Cabinet of the Vatican looked forward to the restoration of the three legations annexed to the Italian Republic by the treaty of Tolentino. But however much Napoleon might appreciate the importance of obtaining the Papal benediction to his throne, he was not a man to relinquish any of the substantial advantages of power and territory on that account, and he was little disposed to imitate the magnificent liberality of his predecessor Charlemagne to the Catholic Church. He accordingly replied to the petition of the Pope for the three legations—"France has dearly purchased the power which it enjoys. We cannot sever any thing from an empire which has been the fruit of ten years of bloody combats. Still less can we diminish the territory of a neighbouring potentate, which, in confiding to us the powers of government, had imposed upon us the duty of protection, and never conferred upon us the power of alienating any part of its territory (3).";

(1) Bign. iv. 150.

(2) Bign. iv. 155. D'Abr. vii. 240, 260.

(3) De l'ardt, Quatre Concordats, 173. Bign. iv. 112, 114.

The close of the year was marked by a melancholy event, on which the British historian must dwell with pain, and which led to fighting up the flames of war between England and Spain.

Origin of
the differ-
ences be-
tween Eng-
land and
Spain.

The treaty of St.-Ildefonso in 1796 has been already mentioned, by which Spain became bound to furnish France with an auxiliary force (1); and also the subsequent convention of 19th October, 1803, by which this auxiliary force was commuted into a subsidy to the amount of L.2,880,000 yearly by the Spanish to the French Government (2). The hostile character of this treaty, and great amount of this subsidy, had long been a matter of jealousy to the British Government, furnishing, as it evidently did, the sinews of war to France; and being, as it was, as directly applied to the fitting out of the armaments destined for the invasion of England, as if the gun-boats, instead of being constructed with this treasure at Boulogne, had been fitted out at Cadiz or Corunna. As it was known, however, that the Spanish Cabinet, in yielding to this tribute, was in truth constrained by necessity, the English Government, from whom its amount was studiously concealed, was not at first disposed to make it the subject of complaint; and it was intimated, soon after the convention was agreed to, that England would not consider a small and temporary advance of money as any ground for the commencement of hostilities. In the close of the year, however, when rumours as to the magnitude of the payment had got abroad, the Dec. 13, 1803. English Ambassador stated, in a formal note to the Spanish Government, that if it amounted to any thing like such a sum as three millions, Great Britain would consider it as a war-subsidy, and as in itself equivalent to a hostile aggression against herself (3). In reply, the Spanish Cabinet insisted that the amount of the subsidy was perfectly consistent with the neutrality which their Court professed towards England, and not greater than would have been required to fit out the war contingent provided for in the former treaty. Thus the matter rested for six weeks, when the English Feb. 18, 1804. Ambassador presented a fresh and energetic remonstrance, upon the ground of the evident partiality and preference shewn to French vessels over British, especially in the sale of prizes, and complaining of hostile preparations and armaments in the Spanish harbours (4). The Spanish Govern-

(1) This force was mutually stipulated at fifteen ships of the line and 24,000 men; and this aid is to be furnished on the simple demand of the requiring party, without any inquiry into the policy or justice of the hostilities in which they are to be engaged; and by Art. ii. of the same treaty, the contracting parties are to assist each other with their whole forces, in case the stipulated succours should not be sufficient.

(2) Ante, iii. 92, and v. 73.

(3) Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Madrid, stated in this note: "With respect to the subsidy, his Majesty is perfectly sensible of the difficulties of the situation in which Spain is placed, as well by reason of her ancient ties with France, as on account of the character and habitual conduct of that power and of its chief. These considerations have induced him to act with forbearance to a certain degree, and have inclined him to overlook such pecuniary sacrifices as should not be of sufficient magnitude to force attention from their political effects. But it is expressly enjoined to me to declare to your excellency, that pecuniary advances, such as are stipulated in the recent convention with France, cannot be considered by the British Government but as a war subsidy; a succour the most efficacious, the best adapted to the wants and situation of the enemy, the most prejudicial to the inte-

rests of the British subjects, and the most dangerous to the British dominions; in fine, more than equivalent for every other species of aggression. Imperious necessity compels him now to declare these sentiments, and to add that the passage of French troops through the territories of Spain would be considered as a violation of her neutrality, and that his Majesty would feel himself compelled to take the most decisive measures in consequence of that event." The Spanish Minister replied: "Although the Spanish Cabinet is penetrated with the truth, that the idea of aiding France is compatible with that of neutrality towards Great Britain, yet he has thought that he could better combine these two objects by a method which, without being disagreeable to France, strips her neutrality towards Great Britain of that hostile exterior which military succours necessarily present."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 74, 91.

(4) On the 18th February, 1804, Mr. Frere stated, in his note to the Spanish Minister at Madrid: "I am ordered to declare to you that the system of forbearance on the part of England depends entirely on the cessation of every naval armament within the ports of this kingdom, and that I am expressly forbidden to prolong my residence here, if unfortunately this condition should be rejected. It is also indispensable that the sale of prizes

ment, in reply, strongly professed their desire to give perfect satisfaction to the English Cabinet on every subject excepting the subsidy, as to which they would not draw back from existing engagements; upon which the British Ambassador stated, that his Government wished for an indefinite suspension of hostilities on the ground of the subsidy, provided no other causes of complaint were given, but that if such took place, they would forthwith commence war without any farther declaration of an intention to do so (1).

Secret measures of hostility by the latter power, Sept. 29, 1804.

Matters were in this state of jealous watching and suspended hostility, when, in the end September, intelligence was received by the British Government that several small detachments of French troops, amounting in all to 1500 men, had proceeded from Bayonne

to Ferrol, where a French naval force of four ships of the line was already lying, and that the Spanish Government had transmitted orders for the arming, without loss of time, three ships of the line, two frigates, and several smaller vessels at that port; that similar instructions had been sent to Carthagena and Cadiz; that three first-rate line of battle ships had been directed to proceed from Cadiz to Ferrol, and that orders had been given to the packets to arm as in time of war (2). This was accompanied by the alarming addition that within a month eleven ships of the line would in this way be ready for sea at the latter harbour; that numbers of soldiers were daily arriving there from France; that the ships, though said to be bound for America, were victualled for three months only; that they merely waited the arrival of the treasure on board the frigates from America to throw off the mask; and that there did not appear a doubt of the hostile intentions of Spain (3). In consequence of this intelligence, which was transmitted at the same time to Mr. Frere at Madrid, warm remonstrances were presented to the Spanish Government; and it was intimated by the British Ambassador, "that the total cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain having been the principal condition required by England, and agreed to by Spain, as the price of the forbearance of Great Britain, the present violation of this condition can be considered in no other light but as a hostile aggression on the part of Spain, and a defiance given to England. These preparations become still

Sept. 27, 1804. Mr. Frere's note.

more menacing from a squadron of the enemy being in the port where they are carrying on. In no case can England be indifferent to the armament which is preparing, and I entreat you to consider the disastrous consequences which will ensue, if the misery which presses so heavily on this

Oct. 2, 1804.

country be completed by plunging it unnecessarily into a ruinous war." To this note the Prince of Peace replied, on the part of the Spanish

D. P. Cevallos's answer.

Government, "The King of Spain has never thought of being wanting to the agreement entered into with the British Government. The cessation of all naval armaments against Great Britain shall be observed as heretofore; and whatever information to the contrary may have been received, is wholly unfounded, and derogatory to the honour of the Spanish nation (4)."

Catastrophe which precipitated hostilities.

Every thing indicated that hostilities could not be averted many weeks, when they were unhappily precipitated by the measures of the British Cabinet. No sooner was Admiral Cochrane's despatch, announcing the serious naval preparations at Cadiz, Carthagena, and Ferrol,

brought into the ports of this kingdom should cease, otherwise I am to consider all negotiations as at an end, and I am to think only of returning to my superior."—*Parl. Deb.* iii. 89, 91.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 124, 125. *Parl. Deb.* iii. 62, 62.

(2) Lord Cochrane's Despatch, Sept. 3, 1804. *Parl. Deb.* iii. 95, and 242.

(3) Admiral Cochrane's Despatches, Sept. 5 and 11, 1804. *Parl. Deb.* iii. 242, 243, and Sir A. Calder's Despatch, *Ibid.* 213.

(4) *Parl. Deb.* iii. 95, 96.

received by the English Government, than they transmitted orders to that officer to prevent the sailing of either the French or Spanish fleets from the harbour of Ferrol, and to intimate this intention to the French and Spanish admirals; and at the same time they sent instructions to Lord Nelson on the Mediterranean, Admiral Cochrane on the Ferrol, and Lord Cornwallis on the Brest station, to despatch two frigates each to cruise off Cadiz, in order to intercept the homeward-bound treasure frigates of Spain; and at the same time they directed these admirals to stop any Spanish vessels laden with naval or military stores, and keep them till the pleasure of the British Government was known, but without committing any farther act of hostility either on such vessels or the treasure frigates (1). These orders were too punctually executed. On the 5th October, a squadron of four British frigates off Cadiz, under the command of Captain Moore in the *Indefatigable*, fell in with the four Spanish frigates having the treasure on board, and the British officer immediately informed the Spanish commander that he had orders to detain his vessels, and earnestly entreated that this might be done without effusion of blood. The Spaniard, of course, declined to submit in this way to an equal force, and the consequence was, that an engagement took place, and in less than ten minutes one of the Spanish ships blew up with a terrific explosion. The three others were captured, with the valuable treasure, amounting to above L.2,000,000 sterling, on board; but England had to lament a loss on the part of Spain of 100 killed and wounded, besides 240 lost in the frigate which exploded, before any formal announcement of hostilities (2).

Which at
once brings
on a war.

It is needless to proceed farther with the details of this painful negotiation. The capture of the frigates produced the result which might have been anticipated, in an immediate declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain on the 12th December. Various attempts at explanation and apology were made by the English Government, but Spain was too completely in the arms of France to expect she should forego such an opportunity of joining in the war; nor, indeed, after such an act of violence, could it be expected that any independent state would abstain from hostilities (3).

(1) Orders, Sept. 18, 19, and 25, 1804. *Parl. Deb.* iii. 118, 121.

(2) Captain Moore's Despatch. *Ann. Reg.* 1804, 557, and 141.

(3) *Parl. Deb.* iii. 99, 115.

Spanish. The Spanish manifesto on this occasion stated: "It was very difficult for Spain and Holland, who had treated jointly with France at Amiens, and whose interests and political relations are reciprocally connected, to avoid finally taking part in the grievances and offences offered to their ally. In these circumstances his Majesty, proceeding on the principle of a wise policy, preferred pecuniary subsidies to the contingent of troops and ships with which he was bound to assist France by the treaty of alliance in 1796; and expressed, by his Minister at the Court of London, his decided and firm resolution to remain neutral during the war. But the English Government, animated with a spirit of hostility against Spain, not only listened to the reclamations of individuals addressed to it, but exacted as the precise condition on which they would consider Spain as neutral the cessation of every armament in her ports, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes brought into them. Though these conditions were urged in the most haughty manner, they were complied with, and religiously observed by the Spanish nation; when the English Government manifested its secret and perverse aims by the abominable capture of four Spanish frigates,

navigating in a state of profound peace, at the very moment when the English vessels were enjoying the full rights of hospitality in the harbours of Spain. Barbarous orders at the same time were given to detain and carry into its harbours as many Spanish ships as its fleets could meet with, to burn or destroy every Spanish ship below a hundred tons, and carry every one of larger dimensions into Malta." —*State Papers*, 700, 701. *Ann. Reg.* 1804.

Reply to England. To this it was replied in the British declaration of war: "The stipulations of military and naval succours to a great extent by the treaty of 1796, followed by an obligation to put at the disposal of France, if required, the whole resources of the Spanish Monarchy, gave to Great Britain an incontestable right to declare, that unless she decidedly renounced that treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform its conditions, she could not be considered as a neutral power; that the monthly sum which Spain was bound to pay by the present convention far exceeded the bounds of forbearance, as it might prove a greater injury than any other hostility; that in consequence it had been intimated to the Spanish Government, that England's abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that if either any French troops entered Spain, or authentic accounts were received of any naval armaments preparing in the harbours of Spain for the assistance of France, the British sh-

Arguments
against the
conduct of
Government
in Parlia-
ment.

This unhappy catastrophe produced a great and painful division of opinion among the people of Great Britain. While the Ministerial party lamented the necessity under which Government lay of adopting the steps which had led to so deplorable an effusion of human blood, they yet vindicated the measure as justifiable in itself, and unavoidable in the circumstances in which they were placed; but a large and conscientious body of their usual supporters beheld with pain what they deemed an unwarrantable invasion of the rights of nations, and loudly condemned an act derogatory to the honour of the British name. The debates in Parliament on this subject condensed as usual every thing that was or could be urged on the opposite sides, clothed in all the force of language of which the great orators who then led the different parties were masters. On the one hand it was urged by Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, "that there appeared nothing but inattention, negligence, and mystery on the part of the British Government on this occasion. The Spanish Government had been most eager to cultivate a good understanding with this country, and had made repeated applications for this purpose to the British Cabinet; but the criminal negligence or supineness of Ministers had at length forced them into the arms of France, and compelled them to permit the march of fifteen hundred French troops to Ferrol. Spain no doubt had, in 1796, entered into a treaty of alliance with France, which might well have been made the ground of hostility, but it was not done so; and when afterwards she commuted the military succours there stipulated into a fixed annual payment, to this, too, there was no serious objection stated. They told the Spanish Government, indeed, that the continuance of a suspension of hostilities would mainly depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the harbours of Spain; but was this condition violated? Ships, indeed, were fitting out at Ferrol; but when remonstrated with on the subject, the Spanish Government at once declared that their sole object was to transport troops to the coast of Biscay, where a rebellion had broken out; and at the same time the Governor of Ferrol stated, that, to remove all uneasiness, the men should be put ashore, and sent round by land, however inconvenient. Not satisfied with these explanations, not waiting to see if they were well founded, we proceeded at once to the violence of assaulting their ships on the high seas. It is in vain to assimilate this

leader had instructions forthwith to leave Madrid; that the constant report of naval armaments in the ports of Spain had induced the British Cabinet to give the Spanish Government explicit warning on the 18th February, 1804, that all farther forbearance on the part of England must depend on the cessation of all naval preparations in the ports of Spain; that notwithstanding the strongest assurances of the Spanish Government that this should be the case, information was received from the British admirals that considerable bodies of French troops had arrived at Ferrol from France; and that orders had been given for fitting out four ships of the line and two frigates in that very harbour, in which four French line-of-battle ships were already assembled, so as to threaten to outmatch the British blockading force; that these circumstances compelled the British Government explicitly to declare, by its ambassador at Madrid, that the continuance of peace required a complete and unreserved discontinuance of the Spanish relations and engagements with France, which had hitherto been withheld; and that at the same time it became necessary to issue orders to prevent the sailing of the French or Spanish squadrons from Ferrol, and to intercept and detain the treasure ships till its destination was di-

vulged, and to send back any Spanish ship of war to the harbour from which she sailed, but on no account to detain any homeward bound ships of war not having treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever."—See *Parl. Deb.* iii. 126, 130.

The statement in the Spanish manifesto as to the orders given to Lord Nelson to destroy all vessels under 100 tons and send the others to Malta, is an exaggerated and mistaken allusion to these last instructions. No such orders were given by the British Government. On the contrary, the instructions were, "not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty sailing from a port of Spain; but you are to require the commander of such ship to return directly to the port from whence he came, and only in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain him and send him to Gibraltar or England. You are not to detain any homeward bound ship of war, unless she shall have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden, on any account whatever." They are also directed "to detain any Spanish ships or vessels laden with naval or military stores."—See *Orders*, 25th September, and 25th November, 1804. *Parl. Deb.* iii. 419, 421.

to an embargo on an enemy's ships. Was there no difference between delaying merchants' ships, which might be delivered back, and assaulting them on the high seas? Take a merchant's property, it might be restored to him; imprison seamen, they might be discharged; but burn, sink, and blow up ship and crew, and who can restore the innocent blood which has been spilt? The French branded us with the name of a mercantile people, and said that we were ever thirsting after gold. They would therefore impute this violence to our eagerness for dollars. Better that all the dollars and ten times their quantity were paid, so as it could wash away the stain which had been brought on our arms.

"In considering this question, we must carefully distinguish between the causes of a rupture which might have been set forth, and those which actually were made the ground of hostilities. The treaty of St.-Ildefonso was clearly an offensive treaty, and its existence was as clearly a ground on which war might have been declared. It was even more offensive than the family compact. But the grand objection to the conduct of Ministers was, that they did not instantly take a decided line on the resumption of hostilities with France. They should then have required Spain to renounce the offensive articles of that treaty, or used every effort to cultivate a good understanding with that power, while yet her disposition was amicable. They did neither. The subsequent commutation of the warlike succours into a money payment may possibly have been considered as an additional hostile act by Ministers, but unquestionably they did nothing to evince this feeling to the Court of Spain. Mr. Frere remained, and was directed to remain, at Madrid long after the commutation was known. Spain, in truth, was acting under the dread of French conquest; and therefore it was cruel to inquire rigidly into her conduct. The armament at Ferrol was quite inconsiderable, and had been admitted by Mr. Frere himself to be destined for the conveyance of troops to Biscay. The orders for sailing had been countermanded, and the vessels ordered, on the 16th September, to be laid up in ordinary; so that all ground of complaint had been removed before the English orders to stop the treasure frigates had been given. Even the refusal to communicate the terms of the commutation treaty was no justification of the violence which had been committed, because that refusal was subsequent to the order which produced the capture (1)."

Defence of
the Govern-
ment by Mr.
Pitt.

On the other hand, it was answered by Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury: "The terms of the treaty of St.-Ildefonso, by which France and Spain mutually guarantee each other's territories, and engage to furnish reciprocally a force of fifteen ships of the line, and 24,000 men, to be given upon the mere demand of the requiring party, and the additional obligation upon each, in case of need, to assist the other with their whole forces, lie at the foundation of this question, because they constituted the ground of the whole proceedings which the British Government found themselves compelled to adopt. In whatever light this treaty be viewed, it could not be considered, on the part of Spain, but as a reluctant tribute to the overbearing dictates of its ambitious and tyrannical policy; and although conditions so plainly hostile would have justified the demand of an explicit and immediate renunciation from Spain, on pain of a declaration of war in case of refusal; yet a feeling of pity towards a gallant and high-spirited though unfortunate nation long dictated a delicate and temporizing policy. But at the same time, the interests of this country imperatively required that a pledge

should be given that this treaty should not be acted upon : and in reply to the representations of the English ambassador to that effect, the Prince of Peace evinced, in August last, a disposition if possible to elude the demands of France. The requisitions of the First Consul, however, were urgent, and nothing short of a subsidy of L.250,000 a-month, or L.3,000,000 a-year, would be accepted : although the Spaniards were so sensible of the enormity of complying with such a demand, that they strongly urged that even a subsidy of L.700,000 yearly would expose them on just grounds to a declaration of war from Great Britain. The particulars of this treaty Spain, down to the very last moment, refused to communicate : and when urged on this subject, they answered, ' You have no reason of complaint, because you do not know what we pay.' From what we have learned, however, of the commutation which was finally agreed to, it is evident that, so far from being an alleviation, it was the greatest aggravation of the original treaty. At the very highest, the rated equivalent for 15 ships of the line would be L.1,000,000 yearly : so that, as the Spanish Government has agreed to pay L.3,000,000 annually, there remains L.2,000,000 for the commutation of the land forces being at the rate of L.85 a-man ; whereas the equivalent for service of this kind usually given, and that agreed to in the treaty between this country and Holland in 1788, was L.9 for each man : a fact which clearly demonstrates that the commutation is nearly ten times as injurious to Great Britain as the original treaty would have been.

"The forbearance of Ministers, under such aggravated circumstances of provocation, was not founded upon blindness to the danger which the hostility of Spain, under French direction, might hereafter produce, but upon motives of policy adopting due preparations against that event. Their forbearance was expressly said to be conditional, and to depend as a *sine qua non* on a total abstinence from naval preparations in all the harbours of Spain, and the prohibition of the sale of prizes in Spanish ports. When it is recollected that the total revenue of Spain does not exceed L.8,000,000, and that they had consented to give L.3,000,000, or not much less than a half of this sum, annually to France, these conditions cannot be deemed exorbitant. It is in vain to say that this enormous subsidy was subsequently acquiesced in. In all his notes to the Spanish Government on this subject, Mr. Frere accurately distinguishes between temporary connivance and permanent acquiescence ; and reserved the right of making the subsidy the ground of hostility at some future period, even by itself : and much more, if any additional ground for complaint were given.

"Such was the state of affairs, when information was received from Admiral Cochrane that the condition on which alone the neutrality of Spain, under existing circumstances, had been connived at, had been violated by the Spanish Government. That Government were called upon to act upon that information, cannot be denied. The existence of formidable preparations in the ports of Ferrol, at the very time when a French squadron was lying blockaded there, and French troops were pouring in through the Spanish territory, and the packets were armed as in time of war, were such indications of approaching hostility as would have rendered the British Government to the last degree culpable if they had not instantly adopted measures of precaution. What would have been said, if, through their negligence in doing so, the Ferrol, in conjunction with the Cadiz and Carthagena squadron, had struck a blow at our interests, or co-operated with the French in any part of the great naval designs which they have in contemplation ? The excuse that they were wanted to convey troops to quell an insurrection in Biscay is a

pretence so flimsy, as to be seen through the moment it is stated. If such was really the object, why not transport the troops in small craft, or in ships of war armed *en flûte*? and why, for such a domestic transaction, range her line-of-battle ships alongside of the French and Dutch in the harbour of Ferrol? Why arm the packets, if land operations in Biscay alone were in contemplation? The only question, in truth, is, not whether we have done too much, but whether we have done enough? It was clearly stated by us, long before hostilities commenced, that if the conditions of neutrality were violated by Spain, we would consider it as a declaration of war: they were so violated, and we acted upon them as such. We would, in such circumstances, have been clearly justified in preventing the junction of the French, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, and intercepting the treasures destined for the coffers, not of Spain, but of France; but we adopted the milder expedient of stopping and detaining them only; and if they have subsequently been rendered good prize, it is entirely owing to the conduct of Spain herself, in refusing to communicate any particulars in regard to the commutation convention, and following that up by a declaration of war against this country (1)."

Who is supported by Parliament.
Feb. 12.
1805.

Upon a division, the conduct of Ministers in this affair was approved of by a majority 207 in the Lower House; there being 313 in their favour, and 106 on the other side. In the House of Lords a similar decision was given by a majority of 78; the number being 114 to 36 (2).

Reflections on the subject.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this question, so vital to the national honour and public character of England, was thus fiercely debated in Parliament and the nation: almost all the actors on the stage are dead, or have retired into the privacy of domestic life, and the rapid succession of other events has drawn public interest into a different direction, and enabled us now to look back upon it with the calm feelings of retrospective justice. Impartiality compels the admission that the conduct of England in this transaction cannot be reviewed without feelings of regret. Substantially, the proceedings of the English Cabinet were justifiable, and warranted by the circumstances in which they were placed: but formally, they were reprehensible, and forms enter into the essence of justice in the transactions of nations. It is true the treaty of St.-Ildefonso was a just ground for declaring war: the commutation treaty was a still juster; and even the armaments at Ferrol, if not explained, might have warranted the withdrawing of the ambassador at Madrid, and commencement of hostilities. Spain was in the most delicate of all situations in relation to Great Britain, after agreeing to the enormous war subsidy stipulated by that treaty; and this the French historians cannot dispute, since they represent the accepting of a subsidy of L.80,000 a year from England by the Convention of the 3d December of that very year (3), as an overt act of hostility on the part of Sweden against France. She was bound, therefore, in return for the forbearance which overlooked such excessive provocation, to have been studiously careful not to give offence in any other particular; and could not have complained if the crossing of the Bidassoa by one French company, or the arming of one frigate at Ferrol, had been followed by an immediate declaration of war on the part of Great Britain. But admitting all this, conceding that ample ground for declaring war existed, the question remains, could the existence of these grounds warrant the commencement of hostilities without such a declaration, while the

And particular in which England appears to have been wrong.

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 366, 386.
(2) Parl. iii. 354, 468.

British ambassador was still at Madrid, and negotiations for the explaining or removal of the grounds of complaint were still in dependence? That is the material question; and it is a question on which no defence can be maintained for the conduct of England. True, the declaration of war would, in such circumstances, have been a piece of form merely: true, it would not have averted one shot from the treasure frigates, and, on the contrary, led to their immediate capture instead of conditional detention: but it was a step which the usages of war imperatively required, and the want of which distinguishes legitimate hostility from unauthorized piracy. A line apparently as unsubstantial frequently separates the duellist from the assassin, or the legitimate acquirer of property from the highway robber: and they have much to answer for who, in the transactions of nations which acknowledge no superior, depart from one formality which usage has sanctioned, or one security against spoliation which a sense of justice has introduced. It is with painful feelings, therefore, that the British historian must recount the circumstances of this melancholy transaction: but it is a subject of congratulation, that this injustice was committed to a nation which was afterwards overwhelmed by such a load of obligation; that, like the Protestant martyr at the stake, England held her right hand in the flames till her offence was expiated by suffering; and that if Spain was the scene of the darkest blot on her character which the annals of the revolutionary war can exhibit, it was the theatre also of the most generous devotion, and the brightest glories which her history has to record.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR TO THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Necessity to which Napoléon was exposed of constant war—To disguise it, he proposes Peace to Great Britain—Answer of the British Government—Great influence of the French Press in his favour—Speech of Napoléon to the Senate—Commencement of indirect Taxation in France, and flattering state of the Finances—Public announcement of the Alliance with Russia in the King of England's opening Speech to Parliament—Important negotiations with the Russian Ambassador in London—Memorable State Paper, 11th January, 1805, the basis of the whole Anti-revolutionary Alliance—Continued jealousy of Austria on the part of Prussia—Supplies for 1805—Financial details of Great Britain for 1805—Other Parliamentary Measures—Charges against Lord Melville—His impeachment and acquittal—Commencement of the Debates on the Catholic Question—Argument of Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville for the Repeal of the Catholic Disabilities—Answer of Lords Hawkesbury, Sidmouth, and Eldon, for their continuance—The Bill is rejected by a large majority—Reflections on this subject—Total failure of Catholic Emancipation to pacify the Country—Causes of this apparent anomaly—The immense confiscation of land in former times—The vesting of the Forfeited Estates in Absentees—Total unfitness of the Irish at present for a Free Constitution—And peculiar character and dangers of the Catholic Religion—Measures of Napoléon at this period—Change of Government in Holland—And assumption of the Iron Crown of Lombardy by the French Emperor—His journey into Italy—Splendid pageant in the field of Marengo—He enters Milan—Is crowned with the Iron Crown of Charlemagne—Adulatory Addresses from Naples and Genoa—Napoléon's reply to the latter body—Incorporation of Genoa with France—His secret designs in that step—Popularity of Napoléon's Government in Italy, and great works which it undertook—His progress through the Italian Cities—Magnificent Fête at Genoa—Extinction of Lueca, and incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France—Increasing jealousy of Austria, and change of its Ministry—Treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and England—Objects of the Alliance—They disclaim all intention to control the French in the choice of their Government—At length the accession of Austria is obtained to the Alliance—Sweden also is included—Prussia in vain endeavours to mediate—Manifesto of France in the *Moniteur*—Prussia persists in her neutrality, from the hope of getting Hanover—And agrees explicitly to accept of that Electorate—Napoléon repairs to Boulogne to superintend the English Expedition—Immense force collected on the coasts of the Channel for that object—Its admirable organization and equipment—Nature of the Camps in which the Soldiers were lodged—Ample powers vested in the Marshals of Corps and Generals of Division—And vigilant watching to which they were subjected—Vast extent of his correspondence with his Generals—Organization of the Flotilla—His secret project for effecting the passage—Autograph note which he has himself left on the subject—Various actions with the British Cruizers off Boulogne—Operations of the combined Fleets of France and Spain to second the Enterprize—Measures of Defence by the British Government—The Toulon and Rochefort Squadrons put to sea—Alarm they excite in Great Britain—The combined Fleet steer for the West Indies—Uncertainty of Nelson—He at length follows to that quarter—Searches in vain for the enemy there—Simultaneous anxiety of Napoléon as to Nelson's destination—Combined Fleet had returned to Europe—Its secret orders—Entire success hitherto of Napoléon's design—But Nelson penetrates it, and warns the British Government of their danger—Energetic measures of the Admiralty when they receive his Despatches—The combined Fleet is outstripped by the British brig which brought them—Extraordinary penetration of Collingwood as to the enemies' design—Sir R. Calder's action with the combined Fleet—The two Fleets separate without decisive success—Vast importance of this action—Napoléon's conduct on receiving the intelligence—It totally defeats his well-laid projects—Cruel injustice to which Sir R. Calder was meanwhile subjected—Nelson returns to England—Napoléon orders the combined Fleet again to put to sea—But it makes for Cadiz instead of Brest—Ganteaume in vain leaves Brest to meet them—Napoléon's designs are in consequence entirely ruined—He sets off for Paris, September 1—Extraordinary dexterity to which the troops had arrived in embarking—Austria had been making hostile pre-

parations—Angry note of Talleyrand to the Cabinet of Vienna—Their reply—Both parties warmly assail the Court of Munich—It finally joins France—The Austrians cross the Inn—Forces on both sides—The Army of England marches from Boulogne for the Rhine—his Address to the Senate—Entire dislocation of the Armament at Boulogne—The combined Fleet is ordered nevertheless to sail from Cadiz—Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar—Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz—Enthusiastic reception of Nelson by the Fleet—His stratagem to induce the enemy to leave the harbour—They accordingly set sail—Disposition on both sides—Magnificent aspect of the Fleets as they approached each other—Order in which the English Fleet bore down upon the enemy—Battle of Trafalgar—Heroic conduct of Collingwood—Nelson next breaks the line—Details of the action in other quarters—Last moments and death of Nelson—Vast magnitude of this victory—Violent tempest, and disasters to the prizes after it terminated—Interchange of courteous deeds with the Spaniards at Cadiz—Mingled joy and grief in England on the occasion—Honours granted to the family of Nelson—Character of that naval hero—Victory of Sir R. Strachan—Reflections on the decisive nature of these successes—On the manœuvre of breaking the line—And on the introduction of Steam into naval warfare—What if Napoléon had succeeded in effecting a landing?—His designs, if he had succeeded in that object—Democratic changes which he would instantly have proclaimed—Their probable result.

“THE world,” said Napoléon, “believe me the enemy of peace; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them whoever ceases to advance is lost (1).” Continual progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that

Necessity to which Napoléon was exposed of constant war.

the moment these failed, his authority would begin to decline. With him constant wars and evident advances towards universal dominion, therefore, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose inevitably from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation when heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or individuals, the principles of its own destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to the evil spirit of his times; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition, converted by his genius into that of military conquest; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him at last upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

But to disguise it he proposed peace to Great Britain.

But although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, that he held the throne, no man knew better than Napoléon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled on every occasion to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made

pacific overtures to the English Government. His letter on this subject, addressed, according to custom, to the King of England in person, was of Jan. 2, 1805. the following tenour :—" Sir, my brother,—Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the Senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity : they may continue their strife for ages ; but will their Governments in so doing fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people ? And how will they answer to their conscience for so much blood innocently shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects ? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have sufficiently proved, I flatter myself, to the world that I fear none of the chances of war. It presents nothing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart ; but war has never been adverse to my glory. I conjure your Majesty therefore not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate ? Your Majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory : your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity : what can you expect from a war ? To form a coalition of the Continental powers ? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French empire. To renew our intestine divisions ? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances ? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies ? They are to her only a secondary consideration ; and your Majesty has already enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion, that the war is maintained without an object ; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting ! The world is surely large enough for our two nations to live in it ; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not wanting. I have now at least discharged a duty dear to my heart. May your Majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it (1)."

The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person ; but Answer of the British Government. Lord Mulgrave, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 14th Jan. 14, 1805. January, addressed the following answer to M. Talleyrand :—" His Britannic Majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the Chief of the French Government. There is nothing which his Majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that that object cannot be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received, until he has had time to communicate with the Continental Powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has

given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of sentiments with which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe (1)."

Great influence of the French press in his favour.

This reply, which in a manner disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoléon. It both revealed to the subjects of his empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the Emperor with the projects of ambition which were formed by the coalesced Sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular (2), had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war, the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland, were forgotten; and public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the Ruler of France, in the firm belief that in so doing they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence (3).

Dec. 25, 1804.

This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoléon addressed himself to the Legislative Body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804:—"Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens," said he, "we have all but one object in our several departments, the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier or First Consul, I have but one thought: Emperor, I have no other object,—the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe; but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our empire;* but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us, to other states." Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event will shew, for the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the ecclesiastical states and the whole Italian peninsula. No man ever knew so well as Napoléon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; and none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection and exclusive attention to present objects which have ever characterized that volatile people (4).

This session of the Legislative Body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect* taxation, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amidst all the declamations of the revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people.

It has been already mentioned (3), that the territorial burdens of France during the progress of the Revolution had become enormous; the land-

(1) Dum., xi. 86. Ann. Reg. 1805. State Papers, 277.

(2) De Staël, ii. 282. Sur la Rév. Franç.

(3) Dum., xi. 89. Digitized by Google

(4) Bigu., iv. 163, 164.

(5) Ante, iv, 857.

Commence-
ment of in-
direct taxa-
tion in
France, and
flattering
state of the
finances.

tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, fifty, and even eighty per cent on their incomes (1). The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the Emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a particular class of society. Under his auspices, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organized under the name of *Droits réunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue. In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled the Government to diminish the territorial impost by 10,200,000 francs, or L.408,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the Emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year (2). On the 31st December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the empire was laid before the Chambers by M. Champagny, the Minister of the Interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Bavarian Republics, similar to that recently completed in the French empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoléon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time. "The first place was vacant: the most worthy was called to fill it: he has only dethroned anarchy (3)."

Public an-
nouncement
of the alli-
ance with
Russia in
the King of
England's
opening
speech to
Parliament.
Jan. 15,
1805.

Events of still more importance were announced to the British Parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the grounds then taken, Great Britain, through all the subsequent vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the speech from the throne, the King of England observed, "I have received pacific overtures from the Chief of the French Government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connection with a view to that im-

(1) Duc de Gaeta, i. 196, 197.

(2) Duc de Gaeta, i. 215. Bign. iv. 158, 159.

The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions higher than in 1803, and was as follows:—

	Francs.	
Direct Taxes, . .	313,749,000, or	L. 12,500,000
Registers, . . .	198,584,000, or	7,900,000
Customs, . . .	41,485,000, or	1,700,000
Excise, first year,	3,895,000, or	138,000
Post-office, . . .	10,471,000, or	442,000
Lottery, . . .	16,658,000, or	640,000
Salt Tax, . . .	3,220,000, or	122,000

588,062,000, or L. 23,342,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 304.

(3) State Papers, 1804. Ann. Reg. 284. Bign. iv. 68.

portant object, and especially to the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe (4)."

Important negotiations with the Russian Ambassador at London. It was not without foundation that Mr. Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connections which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success, the Cabinet of Vienna. Assured at length of the friendly disposition of the Austrian Government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situation, they were compelled to adopt, Mr. Pitt, four days after the meeting of Parliament, presented a confidential communication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed,—1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as, while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future, and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia. 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont. 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. "The first of these objects," continues the note, "is certainly the one which the views of his Majesty and of the Emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document; for it goes on to state, "His Majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your Excellency has transmitted, that the views of the Court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even extended with advantage to the common cause (2). But it is worthy of especial notice, that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France, or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants; an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely under the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr. Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years afterwards, effected the deliverance of Europe; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his suc-

cessors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and in severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of their enemy's elevation (1).

Memorable (1) This state paper, the most remarkable in the whole revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the abridged narrative of the text:—

"From the Report of Prince Czartoriski, and the confidential communications received from the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg, his Majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the Emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The King, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the Emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability to take a part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependent.

"With this design the first point is, to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coaligned powers.

"It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the Emperor, with which those of the King are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads:—
1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution; and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandizement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

"The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the Emperor and King would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to unite to Great Britain and Russia the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

"The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish, as much as possible, their ancient rights, and to secure the well-being of

their inhabitants; but in pursuing that object, the most not lose sight of the general security of Europe on which, indeed, that well-being is mainly dependent.

"It follows from this principle, that if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed, that they cannot be re-established; or because they are so situated, that their independence could only be nominal, an equally incompatible with their own security, as that of Europe in general. Happily the great number stand in the first predicament. If the arm of the allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Duke of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Piacenza, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated, that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France, the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family; and the last measures of Genoa and of some of the other Italian states, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyze the force, which as much as possible should be concentrated in the hands of the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the House of Austria: it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the States on the left bank of the Rhine: they have been detached from the empire, and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, a way repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality, to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident, that after all the blood which has been shed, there exists no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause

Jan. 14.
1805.

About the same time a treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian Cabinet; and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St.-Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Winzingerode was in consequence despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian Cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but notwithstanding the leaning of Baron Hardenberg, its chief Minister, and the influence of the Queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit (1).

Continued
jealousy of
Austria on
the part of
Prussia.

Supplies for
1805.

The supplies voted in the British Parliament for the service of the year, amounted to no less than L.44,559,521 for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, exclusive of L.4,554,000, as separate charges for England, besides L.28,032,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of L.77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of L.20,000,000, amounted to L.45,992,000 for England, and L.3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of L.32,381,000; in all L.79,873,000 (2). The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the

unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his Majesty is clearly of opinion, that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Prussia in a similar situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those the Ligurian Republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France, than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the Euro-

pean powers should mutually guarantee each others' possessions; such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as seems possible to repress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandizement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution." [Schoell, vii. 59. *Jom. Vie de Nap.* i. 471, 478.]

In all these varied projects, there is not a syllable, either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation, which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes only a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable, and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interests of the people in the territories to be disposed of, and the general safety of Europe, required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

(1) *Ibid.* iv. 194, 196, 197.

(2) INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary.

Financial details of Great Britain for 1805.	Malt and personal estate duties,	L. 2,750,000
	War taxes,	8,300,000
	New war do.	1,150,000
	Property tax,	6,300,000
	Surplus consolidated fund,	4,000,000
	Lottery,	300,000
	Surplus, 1801,	1,192,000
	Loans, England,	20,000,000

Carried forward. L.45,992,000

loan amounted to L.1,860,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations (1).

Other parliamentary measures. The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both Houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a conviction which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilization requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants, and desolate its surface. In this session of Parliament also, the report of the select committee upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the management of Lord Melville; proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory (2).

Charges against Lord Melville. The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st, That he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express Act of Parliament; and, 2d, That he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a

Brought forward,	L.43,992,000
<i>Permanent.</i>	
Customs,	L. 8,357,000
Excise,	20,604,000
Stamps,	3,354,000
Land and assessed taxes,	5,309,000
Post office,	924,000
Pensions and salaries,	49,000
Do.	61,000
Smaller taxes,	32,000
	<hr/>
	L.38,690,000
Deduct war customs and excise,	8,300,000
	<hr/>
	30,390,000
Total extraordinary and permanent income,	<hr/> L.74 382 000 <hr/>

EXPENDITURE, GREAT BRITAIN.

<i>Extraordinary Charges.</i>	
Navy,	L.15,035,000
Army,	18,616,000
Ordnance,	4,846,000
Miscellanies,	6,450,000
	<hr/>
<i>Permanent Charges.</i>	
Interest of debt,	L.19,193,000
Sinking fund,	6,835,000
Civil List, etc.	1,337,000
Other payments,	727,000
	<hr/>
	28,092,000

Total extraordinary and permanent charges, exclusive of Ireland, . . L.73,639,000
[Parl. Deb. iii. 546, 550. V. App. 220. Ann. Reg. 1805, 592. App. to Chron.]

(1) Parl. Deb. iii. 551, 546, and v. 23.

(2) Suttie's Reports. Parl. Deb. v. 1, 210. App. iii, 509.

time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses; in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. They were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr. Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterwards assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the House to the real import of what was established in evidence, viz. that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of the bankers; and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of patrimonial advantage from that irregularity (1). After an animated debate, Mr. Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting vote of the Speaker, the numbers being 216 on each side (2).

His impeachment and acquittal.
 This was too important a blow against the Administration of Mr. Pitt not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party. It led to various subsequent proceedings, and so vehement did the opinion of the public become in consequence of the incessant efforts made to keep it in a state of agitation, that on the 6th May, Mr. Pitt

May 6.
 announced in Parliament, that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of Privy Counsellors; and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the Commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble Lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons June 12, 1805. were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the house of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality; and in the interim, the nation, from whose services he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as first Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar (3).

Commencement of the debates on the Catholic question.
 This session of Parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the Legislature for five-and-twenty years. It was argued with the utmost ability in both Houses of Parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then considered, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age.

On the one hand, it was argued by Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Grattan, "That in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that

(1) "I never," said Mr. Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb. iv. 671.*

(2) *Parl. Deb. iv. 255, 326. Ann. Reg. 1806. 67, 72.*

(3) *Ann. Reg. 1806, 86, 88, 127. Parl. Deb. iv. 602, 606.*

Argument
of Mr. Fox
and Lord
Grenville
for the re-
peal of the
Catholic
disabilities.

they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three-fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions, of its inhabitants. It would indeed be a happy thing, if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions; but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for, and the question is, what is to be done under existing circumstances? That Parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain; but in justice to the memory of King William, it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with its measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent that the Roman Catholics were the irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant Establishment of Ireland, and the Protestant Government of England; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the next step was to exclude them from all share in the constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

“Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present Majesty : and under his Government the measures pursued have indeed been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of gradual amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system. You have given them full toleration, and the benefits of education ; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunions of families ; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, excepting the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, commerce, and general civilization : the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent Government; and at length, in 1792, they were admitted to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced ; and here for a time a stand was made : not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any farther concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish Parliament. That Parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the precise object of making the legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three-fourths of the population. In these circumstances it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that legislature, founded as it would have been on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connection with this country. But that obstacle is now removed ; the Irish members no longer form a separate assembly, but are merged in the general Parliament of the empire ; and the same prudential considerations which forbade the admission of Catholics into the Irish Parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the British, where they can never exceed a small minority.

“It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes, that by the operation of the Union they would be relieved of their disabili-

ties. No authorized assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them that such a measure would result from that step : but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within doors and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic Emancipation would be more favourably considered than it had hitherto been ; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand, that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the United Parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem : you are required not to concede Catholic Emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

“ Every Government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects : but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities ? We are not now to go back in the nineteenth century to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted : it lies upon the opponents of emancipation to make out their exception from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result, that you must undo all that you have done, recall every concession you have made, and begin a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character ? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected ? And have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the Popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war ? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion : from the heartburnings consequent on the unhappy system of middlemen, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state : and the tranquil condition of three-fourths of the Catholic population for years past may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents can militate against them.

“ The period has now arrived when one of two things must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics, by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force : too little to be won by affection. They have got every thing, excepting the right to seats in Parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions : to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude ; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heartburnings than serious patrimonial injuries. If they came into this House, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the Hierarchy of the country ? What could five or six, or indeed fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object, in the midst of a Protestant Legislature tenfold more numerous ? Similar arguments were urged against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility against

the English Establishment? and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr. Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment, under circumstances which left little, if any, hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted (1).

Answers
of Lords
Hawkes-
bury, Sid-
mouth, and
Eldon.

On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British empire can boast; but their present claims do not relate to their condition as subjects, but their title to political power. No law, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must every where exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state, according as circumstances may render necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed, *non tangenda non movenda*, except on the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question, whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the Crown were the greater; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now, is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the Crown to persons of the Protestant faith, that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the Crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than in a Government, where the law is above the Crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the Ministers, the Chancellor, the Judges of the land, to be of the religion the most hostile to the establishment?"

"What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the Constitution? There are many classes of Dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital point is that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is, in a peculiar manner, of importance to consider in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio*, only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis,

which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood interfere in a great part of the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not whether Catholics may be loyal subjects—whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty,—for all that they already have,—but whether they are to obtain political power of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

“The practical effect of the extension of the elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of Parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants; and thus the influence of property would be operating on one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it must operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests.

“The present condition of the Continent renders it, in an especial manner, inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the present extension of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman see is substantially under the power of Napoléon. The Pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard of for ten centuries, to place a revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return to so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence in which he is placed to the French Government? and would it not be the height of madness in us, knowing his inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control?

“Mr. Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, ‘that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation; neither did they care for parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.’ It is evident, therefore, from their authority, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is unfortunately contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has been invariably found that yielding leads to disturbance and anarchy; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century, and that

since its relaxation it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and constantly been, more or less, the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands : kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay ; but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our destruction, and recollect that it is only by a steady adherence to that system which we have received from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour (1)."

It is rejected by a large majority. The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both houses : in the Peers by 178 to 49 : in the Commons by 336 to 124 (2).

Reflections on the subject. Total failure of Catholic Emancipation to pacify the country. In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquency alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has hitherto, at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried : but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realized many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands ; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change ; and melancholy experience has taught us that Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland never has been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted : the total suspension of the constitution has in consequence been forced as a measure of absolute necessity upon Government : and without stilling the waves of discontent in the Emerald Isle, that long debated change has fixed the firebrand of discord in the British empire (3). Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of toleration : many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose : others have settled into the

(1) Parl. Deb. iv. 674, 691, 695, 700, 783, 803.

(2) Parl. Deb. iv. 843, 1059.

(3) The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed.

	Committed.	Convicted.
1828, Catholic disabilities in force,	14,683	9,260
1829, Relief Bill passed in March,	18,271	9,449
1830,	18,794	9,902
1831, Reform agitation,	16,192	9,605
1832, Ditto,	16,036	9,759
1833, Tithe agitation begun,	17,819	11,444
1834, Coercion act in force,	21,381	14,523

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or

trial, it may safely be concluded, from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—See *Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

belief that, however well founded in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles; and that, in the attempt to draw a tainted beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.

Causes of this apparent anomaly. In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote: and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution, of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction; it shows that nations who commit injustice cannot escape punishment: and in its present wretchedness may be discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, which constitute the great moral of the present times.

The immense confiscation of land in former times. I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it in the whole British Empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without referring to historical details, it is sufficient to observe that at least three-fourths of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of injustice, because it extends to distant generations the punishment of one, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed: between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France, a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries Restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created: therefore, by both countries Retribution must be endured.

The vesting of the forfeited estates in absentees. II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of middle-men and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland: and they soon found that, without middle-men interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realize any thing whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed in close and rapid succession the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a long tract of years, between the landlords and the peasantry; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining out of the produce of their labour such a multitude of

superiors; and the ruinous right of the landlord to distrain the effects of the sub-tenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal,—a privilege which, in its application to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realizing any rents out of their tenantry: a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of any thing like general freedom in their country; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with infatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of government and national representation for the two countries, has contributed still farther to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent peasantry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom, and an extensive distribution of property, alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement, or disregarding the passions consequent on a popular constitution. The state of civilization to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial: the passions consequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions (1). Could the wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is a wise and humane, but despotic Government, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every opening to employment, should, at the same time, close every avenue to democratic ambition, and extinguish every hope of revolutionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation be laid in the growth of an opulent middling class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr. Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who attribute to themselves

(1) The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a-year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act they were, over the whole country, reduced three-fifths; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from 1561 to \$30 a-year. See *Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. "The disturbances of Ireland," said Marquis Wellesley, while Viceroy of that country in 1834, "have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solicitude that his Majesty's Government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connection, marked by the strongest characters in all

these transactions, between the system of agitation and its inevitable consequence, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect; nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connexion." So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr. Littleton, the Irish Secretary under Earl Grey's administration, stated in Parliament, that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wish for its removal." *Mirror of Parliament*, 19th July, 1834.

any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority (1). The distinction which he draws between toleration to those who merely differ from Government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire to regain the lost possessions or ascendancy of the Catholic Church, is in the highest degree important, and throws a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastic ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its mitre, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom. Unlimited toleration the Irish Papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted, on their shores, an armed and fortified settlement of Romans: or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoléon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number, at first, of such an organized band of aliens, any reason for despising its ultimate dangers: for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malecontents in its bosom, can almost always in the end attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

(1) Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows:—"Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is, when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be de throne by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awake all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is, forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these

have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government, and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects, and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

"Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own Government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it them on the pain of eternal fire."—*First Letter on Toleration*, Works, vi. 36, 47.

Measures of
Napoleon at
this period.

While the British Parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, and the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoleon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up in the tenth report of the Naval Commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated Republics his newly acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the first of these objects, and disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the last, he introduced a change into the government of all the states dependent upon France; placed on his head the Iron Crown of Lombardy, and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration: but during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel; and the minutest movements of the navy of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to co-operate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command, were regulated by his indefatigable activity, while to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress (1).

Change of
Government
in Holland.

Holland was the first of the dependent Republics which underwent the change consequent on the assumption of the Crown by Napoleon. The continuance of the Republican régime in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states subjected to his control: but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the Emperor. The whole powers of the constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new constitution, forged at Paris, the grand manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French Government, with the aid of M. Schemmelpennick, the Dutch ambassador at that capital, a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the Emperor, and was rewarded by the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this as they had done to all the preceding changes. The Democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a curb imposed on their revolutionary antagonists; and augured better things of this constitution than any which had before been forced upon their country. The new constitution, accepted on the 22d March by the Legislative Body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants (2).

March 22.
April 30.

And as-
sumption of
the iron
crown of
Lombardy
by the
French
Emperor.

More important changes soon after ensued in the Italian states. The original design of Napoleon was to have erected the Italian Republic into a separate kingdom, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne; and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines: but that upright Prince declared he would not accept it, unless the Emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist, a tract of sea coast and a harbour in the Mediterranean, and relieve it from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (L.1,000,000) yearly paid to the French Government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoleon, and therefore he changed his design, and

(1) *Norr.* ii. 365, 367. *Dum.* xi. 140, 141.

(2) *Bign.* iv. 199, 200.

resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugène Beauharnais, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in quality of Viceroy (1).

This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation of the Italian Republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoléon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French Senate, called upon Napoléon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting

March 18, 1805.

the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the Act of Settlement, by which Napoléon, Emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs. On the following day the Emperor appeared in great pomp in the Senate, and conferred on his sister Eliza the Principality of Piombino. The act of settlement of the Italian Crown was then read; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new Sovereign, and he declared, "That he accepted, and would defend, the Iron Crown; and that even during his lifetime he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the 31st of March,

March 31.

when Eugène Beauharnais, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as Viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities. On the same day the new constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom; but in every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French empire (2).

His journey
into Italy.

The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bringing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces in the invasion of Great Britain, Napoléon resolved to proceed to Italy, and dazzle the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the Iron Crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose he set out

April 2.

for Turin, by the route of Fontainebleau and Lyon, corresponding daily with the Minister of Marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from the Texel to Cadiz, and from Brest to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing gives so strong an impression of the vast ability and indefatigable activity of his mind as the study of the numerous minute and lucid orders

(1) Dum. xi. 133, 134. Bign. 190, 202.

(2) Bot. iv. 154, 156. Dum. xi. 137, 138.

Napoléon on this occasion made the following speech in the Senate:—"Powerful and great is the French Empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany; but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest

of India, and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain something, but we keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory, if we had united to them the Italian Republic; but we gave it independence at Lyon; and now we proceed a step farther, and solemnly recognize its ultimate separation from the Crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."

—Botta, iv. 157.

which he addressed during every day of this journey to the Minister of Marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for his all-seeing intellect (1). But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which to external appearance he was engaged. At Lyon he inspected the rising manufactures of the city, upon which the five pacific years of his government had already diffused an extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mount Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the Pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stupinigi, a country residence of the Kings of Savoy, which had been splendidly fitted up for his reception. He then received accounts of the successful passage of the straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and its junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given. Overjoyed at this intelligence, he moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alexandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest fortresses in the world. A splendid pageant had for some time been in preparation at the field of Marengo. Thirty-four battalions and seven squadrons were assembled on that memorable plain, to imitate the manœuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the emperor and Empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes of which it had once been the theatre. The day was bright and clear; the soldiers, who from daybreak had been on their ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero; and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the Empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manœuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers, in an especial manner, distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialists in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the Emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amidst the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour. The splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the mind of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoléon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching (2).

On the day following the Emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mezzona Costa amidst the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which

(1) This correspondence is to be found entire in General Matthieu Dumas's work, having been put into his hands by the Duchess Decrès, widow of the Minister of Marine, to whom it was addressed.—See DUMAS, xi. 195.—*Piccas Just.* It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoléon's designs for

the invasion of this country, and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented it from being carried into effect.

(2) Bot. iv. 157, 164. Dum. xi. 141, 147. Eigh. iv. 217, 218.

May 8, 1805.
By orders
Milan.

the earned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amidst the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues, pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue of heaven: the chaste design of the arch of the Simplon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoléon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among whom were, in an especial manner, noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia, two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great contest which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the Emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent to him on the occasion by Frederick William (1).

Is crowned
with the
Iron crown
of Charle-
magne.
May 28.

After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the Iron Crown of Charlemagne was brought forth to encircle the brows of Napoléon. On the 28th May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted with the utmost magnificence, in the cathedral of Milan.

The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, how splendid soever, at Paris. First came forth, from a side entrance, the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, and dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations; but the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the Emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the Pope on the occasion; Napoléon placed the Iron Crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the Historical words, *Dio me la diade: guai a chi la tocca* (2). He afterwards, as at Paris, himself crowned Joséphine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. The magnificence of the dresses, the matchless beauty of the women, the inimitable strains of the music, and the admirable decorations of the cathedral, in all of which the refined taste of the Italians shone forth in the most conspicuous manner, combined to form a scene surpassing even the far-famed coronation in the preceding year at Notre-Dame. Te Deum was afterwards sung according to the ancient custom of the Kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramoniane authority ceased for ever (3).

Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the Emperor, not the least remarkable was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms of flattery and adulation. At that very time, however, he had intercepted a secret corres-

(1) Bign. iv. 219, 220. Bot. iv. 160, 165. Personal observation.

(2) "God has given it me: beware of touching it."

(3) Bot. iv. 165, 167. Dum. xi. 149, 151. Bign. iv. 220.

pondence of Queen Caroline with the Imperial Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France, and he in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the Senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the Doge addressed the Emperor left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place, "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your Majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy: but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your Majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for an union with that France which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your Majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation (1)."

Napoléon's reply to the latter. Napoléon replied in words memorable, as containing the death warrant of one of the oldest and most distinguished republics of modern Europe. "Circumstances have frequently compelled me within the last ten years to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your Government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish by yourselves any thing worthy of your ancient renown. Every thing has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognize; the right which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which in effect is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary: all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation (2)." The secret motive of Napoléon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.

June 9,
1805.
Incorporation of Genoa with France.

A few days afterwards a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian Republic with the French empire, and dividing its territory into three departments; those of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. Two days afterwards the ancient standard of the Republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. Thus was the French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of sea-coast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Apennines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan states; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sunk unheeded into the arms of death (3).

(1) Dum. xi. 151, 153. Bign. iv. 221, 222.
(2) Dum. xi. 154, 155. Bign. iv. 230.

(3) Dum. xi. 155, 156. Google
Napoléon's secret motive for this act of rapacity,

Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoléon presided at the opening of its Legislative Assembly, and laid the foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory empire of its author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000; the military establishment cost 30,000,000, the civil only six; and a very considerable portion of the public revenue was allotted to the departments, to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoléon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, notwithstanding the change of Government, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law: the order of the Iron Crown instituted, and the authority and powers of the Viceroy, Eugène Beauharnais, defined by an express statute. Napoléon, after having received as King the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as Viceroy, pronounced a discourse which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so desirous of giving to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to accomplish, by every means in my power, the happiness of the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy the place which they have already obtained in my mind; and they will never do so till they are persuaded that force in arms is the chief bulwark of nations. It is at length time that the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war (1)."

Popularity of Napoléon's Government in Italy, and great work which he undertook.

Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the Government of Napoléon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration, and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence.

Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the Vice-regal Court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoléon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more was owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugène's internal administration, and the admirable principles of Government which he received from the sagacity and

His secret design in that step. Aug. 12, 1805.

Thus distinctly appeared from his letter to the Arch Chancellor of that Republic, on the advantages to be derived from this acquisition. "I had no other reason for uniting Genoa to the empire but to obtain the command of its naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port contains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that in matters of state, *justice means force* as well as *virtue*? Do you think I am so sunk in decrepitude as to entertain any fears of the murmurs of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnish-

ing sailors is expressed with sufficient force."—Biox. v. 78.

Sept. 16. So tenacious was Napoléon on this subject, and so provident was that St.-Cloud, great conqueror of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly after to the same minister when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine: "To secure victories we must think only of defeats. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alexandria, nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenal, the magazines, be there in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strasbourg, on 1st Oct. 1, from October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least 300,000 quintals of wheat. My war projects are vast; but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly on all occasions that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the hosts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of the coalition when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany."—Biox. v. 79. 80.

(1) Dum. xi. 157, 159. Bign. iv. 223, 224.

experience of Napoléon. In the management of the kingdom of Italy he followed the maxims which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all were reserved for Italians: hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Every where great and useful undertakings were set on foot; splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields; if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of them was reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which a temporary revival, even of the military spirit, can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilization (1).

His progress
through the
Italian
cities.

Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his Minister of Marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoléon visited the other towns of the north of Italy; Verona, Mantua, Parma, successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation from the Republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion of the oligarchy, under whose influence they had fallen; and to whom he promised a government, in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in northern Italy; veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of regard for the public welfare; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence either in the election of their Government or the administration of affairs. At length, on the 30th June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of the most unparalleled magnificence. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates, with the keys. "Genoa, named the superb from its situation," said they, "is now still more so from its destination: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero; jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory: and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amidst the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and vessels in the harbour; and then commenced the fêtes, which, in splendour and variety, exceeded any thing seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied; all that poetic genius has ascribed to fairy power, was realized on that memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city; its blue sea and cloudless skies; its streets of marble and gorgeous domes; its embattled shores and

Magnificent
fête at Genoa.

overhanging forts; its proud palaces, surmounting one another in gay theatric pride, and lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night; spreading from the Lantern on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amidst the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amidst the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination that this venerable republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism (1)!

Extinction of Lucca, and incorporation of Parma and Placentia with France. The same period witnessed the extinction of the Republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoléon were accomplished. It was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Thus was fulfilled the saying of Napoléon nine years before, that the days were passed in which Republics could be swallowed up by Monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organization at this time of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendancy in Italy was now complete: Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of King, and in Lucca and Tuscany by the ephemeral Governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria (2).

Increasing jealousy of Austria, and change in its Ministry. These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but the temporizing policy of the Cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The rapid advances of Napoléon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the Cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the Cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of Government. The illustrious President of the Council, M. Cobenzell, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, June. 1805. resigned, and was succeeded by Count Baillet-Latour; and Prince Schwartzemberg received the situation of Vice-President of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive (3): the war party were now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.

Treaty of peace and defensive alliance between Russia and England, April 11, 1805. Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th April a treaty was signed at St.-Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands speedy

(1) *Bot. iv. 172, 176.*(2) *Bot. iv. 176. Bign. iv. 226, 227.*(3) *Dum. xi. 160, 164.* digitized by Google

remedy, their Majesties have mutually agreed to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French Government. They have agreed in consequence to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at 500,000 men; and the objects of the league are declared to be. 1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of Germany. 2. The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland. 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit. 4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces. 5. The establishment of an order of things in Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. To enable the different powers who may accede to the coalition to bring forward the forces respectively required of them, England engages to furnish a subsidy, in the proportion of £1,250,000 sterling for every 100,000 of regular troops brought into the field (1)."

Objects of the alliance: By separate articles, signed between England and Russia only, it was agreed that the objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as 400,000 men could be ready for active service; of which Austria was expected to furnish 250,000, Russia 115,000 and the remaining 35,000 by Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples. By another separate article, Russia engaged to march forthwith an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, and 80,000 to those of Prussia, "to be able to co-operate with the said courts in the proportions established by the treaty, and to support them respectively, in case they should be attacked by France;" and that, independently of the 115,000 men to be engaged in active operations, the Emperor of Russia should keep bodies of reserve and of observation upon his frontiers. The advantages of the treaty, so far as subsidies were concerned, were to be communicated to Austria and Sweden, if in the course of the year 1805 they brought their forces into action; the Emperor of Russia agreed, if necessary, to bring 180,000 men into the field, on the same condition as to supplies as the original 115,000; and the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against any power which should unite with France in the contest which was approaching. Finally, a separate article of great importance settled the ultimate objects of the coalition (2), and the intentions of the allies in regard to the states which they might rescue from the dominion of France, in a manner alike consistent with good faith, justice, and moderation (3).

(1) *Parl. Deb. vi. App. p. 2 to 5.*

(2) *Parl. Deb. vi. App. 5 to 10. Separate articles.*

They dis- (3) "The Emperor and King being claim all in- disposed to form an energetic concert, tention to with the sole view of ensuring to Eu- control the rope a solid and lasting peace, found- French in ed upon the principles of justice, the choice equity, and the law of nations, are of their Go- aware of the necessity of a mutual vernment. understanding at this time of those principles which they will evince as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. These principles are in no degree to control the public opinion in France, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on their operations, with respect to the form of

Government which it may be proper to adopt; nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties; and to take possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the common enemy, in the name of the country or state to which they of right belong; and in all other cases in the name of all the members of the league; and finally, to assemble at the termination of the war a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more determined basis than has been possible heretofore, and to ensure their observance by a federative system calculated upon the situation of the different states of Europe."—*Parl. Deb. vi. App. 6, 7.*

At length
the accession
of Austria
is obtained to the
alliance.

Notwithstanding the definite terms of this treaty, considerable difficulty existed, and delay was incurred, in arranging the terms of the Austrian co-operation. Not that the Cabinet of Vienna was backward in its disposition to forward the objects of the coalition, but that the deplorable state of their finances rendered it impossible for them to bring any considerable forces into the field till they had received large subsidies from Great Britain, and that it was highly inexpedient to commence hostilities till they had arrived, as the exposed situation of their territories rendered it certain that they would be the first objects of attack. At length, however, by the indefatigable efforts of Mr. Pitt, on the part of England and M. Novosiltzoff, on the part of Russia, these difficulties were overcome, and the cordial co-operation of Austria to the alliance was obtained. The Austrian Minister at St.-Petersburg, Count Stadion, forcibly represented the dilapidated state of the Imperial finances, and insisted on a subsidy of L.3,000,000, one-half to be immediately paid, in order to bring the troops into the field, and the other by monthly instalments after the campaign had commenced (1). These terms were at length agreed to by the British ambassador, it being stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should forthwith embody a force of not less than 320,000 men, and that the advance to be made by Great Britain, under the name of *Première mise en campagne*, or preliminary payment, should be made on this calculation (2). On the same day a treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria; and active negotiations ensued between the Aulic Council and the Russian war Minister relative to the measures to be pursued in the prosecution of their joint hostilities (3).

Sweden also
is included.

Much less difficulty was experienced in arranging the terms of an alliance; offensive and defensive, with Sweden, which had already, by the treaty of 3d December, 1804, evinced a desire to range itself under the banners of England. By a convention, concluded at Helsingborg on the 31st August, 1805, it was provided that England should pay monthly L. 1800 for every 1000 men who co-operated in the common cause; and as the garrison of Stralsund was taken at 4000 men, who were not included in the subsidy, this periodical payment amounted to L.7200. By a subsequent, signed at Bekcagsog, 3d October, 1805, the number of Swedish troops to be employed in Pomerania was fixed at 12,000 men, for whom England was to pay at the rate of L.12, 10s. per annum for each man, besides five months' subsidy in advance, as outfit for the campaign, and L.50,000 to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence (4). Thus, by the effects of the incessant advances of Napoléon towards universal dominion, and the genius and influence of Mr. Pitt, were the discordant elements of European strength again arrayed, notwithstanding the terror of former defeats, in a firm coalition against France, and a force assembled amply sufficient, as the event has proved, to have accomplished the deliverance of Europe, if ignorance or infatuation had not directed them when in the field. Diplomacy had done its part; war was now required to complete the undertaking. Mr. Pitt might then have said with Wallace, when he had assembled the Scottish Peers on the field of Falkirk, "Now, gallants, I have brought you to the ring; dance as you may."

Prussia in
vain endeavours
to mediate.
July 10,
1806.

It was still, however, a great object, if possible, to engage Prussia in the alliance; and, for this purpose, M. Novosiltzoff was despatched to Berlin, and the successive annexations of Genoa, Parma, and Placentia to France gave him great advantages in the repre-

(1) Count Stadion's note, Aug. 9, 1806.

(2) Lord G. L. Gordon's answer, Aug. 9, 1805.

(3) Parl. Deb. vi. 11, 17.

(4) Parl. Deb. vi. App. 18, 24.

sentations which he made as to the necessity of opposing a barrier to its future progress. Fearful of the strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and for this purpose the Cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zostrow, aide-de-camp to the King, to St.-Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the Courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India; and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason, that recent events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers, a fact, of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence (1).

Notwithstanding all the efforts of England and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France in the Cabinet of Berlin, or its able director, Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize which her Ministers had long coveted in the electorate of Hanover. The Prussian Government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving her interposition for the decisive moment, she might without danger add that important acquisition to her dominions. In effect, Napoléon, well aware of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, 12,000 men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian Ministers then dropped hints as to "the revival of the King's wishes as to Hanover," and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, "as the union of the Continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acquisition, provided it can be done without compromising the character of his Majesty."

(1) *Esq.* iv. 259, 260. *Dum.* xii. 92, 93.

Manifesto of France in the Monitor. The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the *Monitor* at this period, than the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. "What have France and Russia to embroil each other? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a great influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the Cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland; it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you

wish a General Congress in Europe? Let every power begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Marhatta states to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian states, the states of Holland and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Salza and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoléon in these able remarks.—*Monitor*, 19th July, 1805, and *Dumas*, xii. 96, 97.

There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power at the very moment when it was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe. The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The King at length put the question to his Ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests

Aug. 12. between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian Cabinet intimated to the French Minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French Government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions; and Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris by Napoléon to

Sept. 1. conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act of cupidity and insatiation; but in the mean while the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French Emperor. By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoléon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all its powers long abandoned, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress (1)!

Napoléon
wishes to
induce, to
supervise
the English
expedition.

Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoléon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; being well aware that if England was destroyed, the Continental Coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either

Aug. 2, 1805. in the basin of the Danube or the shores of the Vistula. For this purpose, shortly after his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets by

(1) Hign. iv. 268, 273.

And agrees
explicitly to
accept of
that election.
See.
to Baron Hardenberg:—"The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say, that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the Emperor engages to support it with 20,000 men against the Russians; when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the Emperor engaging to obtain for the King the possession of Hanover, while his allies will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The Emperor offers Hanover, absolutely

and without any condition; and the King may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian Minister replied: "It is with the most lively gratitude that the King has received the proposition made by the intervention of the French Minister. We experience the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made to exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy, in order to avert a war on the Continent, and lead towards peace with England. His Majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland, and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. Upon these subjects his Imperial Majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the King will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."—See *ibidem*, iv. 271, 272.

which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking it within a few days' march of London (1).

The army which Napoléon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organization, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions. It amounted to 114,000 combatants, 482 pieces of cannon, and 14,654 horses, assembled in the camps at St.-Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 12,000 at the Texel and Helvoetsluys, and 10,000 on board the combined fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark on the squadron of Admiral Gantheaume; in all, 155,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the Emperor had in view. Each cannon had two hundred rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 14,000,000; the flints, 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5,000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected; the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2293 vessels, capable of transporting 160,000 men and 9000 horses, of which 1359 were armed with above 3000 pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited in the harbours of Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleteuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea (2).

During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organized in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe. It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoléon, aided by all the experience of the revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organization, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution, the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to ensure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoléon adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which

(1) Bign. iv. 277.

(2) Dum. xii. 33, 37, and Tables opposite p. 304.
Jom. ii. 66, 68.

The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: It is one of the most curious monuments of the age of Napoléon,—

Infantry,	76,798
Cavalry,	11,640
Cannoniers,	8,780
Waggoners,	3,780
Non-combatants,	17,476

Total, 118,474

Gun-boats,	1,339
Transport vessels,	954

Which could carry,	161,215 men
and horses,	9,050
Guns mounted on armed vessels,	2,500
Horses,	7,394
Fusils (spare),	32,437
Cartridges,	18,000,000
Flints,	1,200,000
Biscuits (rations),	1,434,000
Bottles brandy,	226,230
Tools,	30,375
Saddles,	10,500
Field-pieces,	482
Rounds of ammunition,	26,400
Loads of hay,	70,370
Do. oats,	70,370
Sheep,	4,924

—See Dumas, xii; Tables, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

was intrusted to a marshal of the empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general. The organization of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only—that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the Emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying from five to seven thousand men, each commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only among the members of the same regiment, but those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care (1).

Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fights, or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting any thing defective in the discipline of the men; and the soldiers, from constant exercises and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced every thing that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick (2).

No man knew better than Napoléon, from his own experience, as well as the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had in-

(1) Dum. xii. 401, 411. Join. ii. 58.

The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were distinguished by the same admirable system of organization. They were

laid out, according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on an uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were formed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Vimieux, of sharp stakes cut in the forest of Guenis, supported by moss work. These field barracks were extremely healthy; the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the

true secret both of their good health and docile habits; neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle; when not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or levelling down eminences, draining marshes, or filling up hollows, to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations, and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions vied with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornaments; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of Nature was sensibly improved.—See Dumas, xii. 25, 26.

(2) Dum. xii. 29, 32. Digitized by Google

Ample powers intrusted to the Marshals of corps and Generals of divisions.

sifted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief especially, if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received general instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed; but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained; and although Napoléon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances; and a commander in his estimation would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom a certain discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted; a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of those officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoléon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état-major*, or general staff, by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be abolished; an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and converted what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers (1).

And vigilant watching to which they were subjected.

But though Napoléon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active survey of every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders: nothing escaped his vigilance; continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted; and if any thing was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier instantly informed the person in fault that the attention of the Emperor had been attracted to his delinquency. Continual and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all, the attention of the Emperor was habitually turned to the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops; a branch of service which, from the prodigious extension of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the Emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had any thing of importance to perform imagined that the Imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself: while, in fact, it was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament. By this unexampled vigi-

lance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organization, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions (1).

Organization of the flotilla. The organization of the flotilla was as extraordinary and perfect as that of the land forces. It was divided into as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery were already on board; so that nothing was wanting but the embarkation of the men. The French genius, able beyond that of any other people in Europe in the organization of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment and company had a section of the flotilla allotted to it; and the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array. Every man in the army, down to the lowest drummer, knew where he was to embark, on board what vessel, and where he was to station himself while on board; and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes (2).

His secret projects for effecting the passage. The object of Napoléon, in this immense accumulation of gun-boats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter from whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent, and no man knew better than Napoléon that to engage in such an enterprise while the English were masters of the sea was a vain attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English Government from adopting the means by which they might have been frustrated; and for this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing fifteen hundred warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil; the real covering force was assembled at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched

(1) *Dum.* xii. 411, 412.

Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the Emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the appendixes to General Matthieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain on the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon contained in Napier's *Account of the Peninsular war*, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of a man

who, amidst all the cares of empire, and all the distraction of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely printed volumes; and his letters to his generals during that time must have been at least twice as voluminous.

(2) *Ney's Mem.* ii. 256, 260. *Dum.* xii. 35, 37.

to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably conceived, was completely successful; not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design; the French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks sail in the rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne, in August, 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force (1).

Various
actions with
the British
cruisers off
Boulogne.

In the prosecution of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prosecution of this object many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast, which answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. Numerous actions in consequence took place with the English cruisers, whose vigour and boldness knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries with which the coast was guarded; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counter-balanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels, under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, and Captain Owen in the *Immortalité* frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their broadsides with great effect upon the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs by Marshal Davoust that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore

(1) *Jom. ii. 70. Napoléon in Mouth. ii. 20, 21. Las Cases, ii. 277, 280.*

The following precious note, written by Napoléon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September, 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project:—

“What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne?”

“I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadix, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have 150,000 men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment that the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering into the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.

“To succeed in this object, it was necessary to assemble 150,000 men at Boulogne; to have there

four thousand transports, and immense matériel, to embark all that, and nevertheless to prevent the enemy from divining my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I have succeeded, it was by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gun-boats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand unarmed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage; but by constructing praams and gun-boats, I appeared to be opposing cannons to cannons; and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the *trajet* by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadrons, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the Councils of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin.”—*See the original in Dumas, xii. 315, 316, and in Napoléon in Mouth, iii. App. 284.*

and the English cruisers; and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France (4).

Aug. 1805. While the Emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in reviewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two

Jan. 1. 1805. Operations of the combined Armies of France and Spain to invade the British Isles.

countries. Early in the year, Napoléon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with Napoléon long before the capture of the treasure frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated a junction of the Spanish forces already calculated on by Napoléon for the execution of his great design. By this convention, it was stipulated that the Emperor should provide at the Texel an army of 30,000 men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, 120,000 men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, 21 ships of the line, with the frigates and smaller vessels capable of embarking 30,000 men; at Rochefort, 6 ships of the line and 4 frigates, with 4000 men; at Toulon, 11 ships of the line, and 8 frigates, having 9000 land troops on board: and Spain, in return, bound herself to have 30 ships of the line and 3000 men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena,—in all 38 French ships of the line and 30 Spanish, and 170,000 men, all to be employed in the invasion of England. But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided “that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his Majesty reserves the explanation for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect.” When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoléon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right (2).

Measures of defence by the British Government.

The English Government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures for the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz; Carthagena also was watched; and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy's force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile squadron which might approach; and thus, if one squadron got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined fleets for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what, in effect, soon happened (3).

(1) Dum. xii. 42, 48. James, iii. 424, 440.

(2) Dum. xi. 97, 98.

Jan. 22. Napoléon, anxious for the execution of his designs, sent orders for the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons to put to sea. On the 14th January the former of these fleets, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squadron put to sea about the same time, but having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon considerably shattered in four days after its departure (4). The Rochefort fleet was more fortunate; it arrived at Martinique on the 5th February, and after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the Admiral landed 4000 men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only 500 regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, having no leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St.-Kitt's and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any farther stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santa Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochefort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons (2).

Alarm they excite in Great Britain. The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoléon, who had prescribed to Missiessy a much more extensive set of operations, viz: to throw succours into Martinique and Guadaloupe, take possession of Ste.-Lucie and Dominica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St.-Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St.-Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the Emperor from Strasburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St.-Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for Life (3)!

The combined fleet sent for the West Indies. More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th March, from Toulon. On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the gulf of Palma, and made straight for Carthage, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour; but finding them not

(1) "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyon gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried

away a spar."—*SOUTHEY'S Life of Nelson*, ii. 214.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 219, 221. *Jom.* ii. 71. *Dum.* xi. 110, 113, 123.

(3) *Dum.* xiii. 205. *Pièces Just.*

ready for sea, the French fleet passed the straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish squadron in that harbour, and one French ship of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to the amount of eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail on the following day for the West Indies. About the same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Ganteaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line, put to sea, and remained three days off the isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen (1).

Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was ^{April 4. Uncertainty of Nelson.} bearing up from the gulf of Palma for his old position off Toulon, when on the 4th April he met the *Phœbe* brig with the long wished for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but feeling assured by the 11th, from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds, to Gibraltar; devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest before he could reach them the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion he could not reach the Straits till the 30th April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and was compelled to anchor in Mazari bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days (2).

^{He at length follows to the West Indies.} At length, on the 5th May, he received certain information that the combined fleet had made for the West Indies, and amounted to eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind, that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England as indispensable to its recovery. In these circumstances this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman a piece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then (3)."

The combined fleet had above thirty days the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact Villeneuve reached Marti-

(1) South. Nelson, ii. 217, 218. Dum. xi. 124, 125.

(2) South. ii. 216, 217. Ann. Reg. 1805, 225.

On this occasion Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta,—"My good fortune, my dear to hell, is blown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill luck will go far to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel."—SOURDIS, ii. 217.

(3) South. ii. 219, 220.

Some- The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoleon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the great events now

in progress, with the utmost disquietude. On the 9th June, 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the Minister of Marine: "We cannot discover what has become of Nelson; it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica; but I am of opinion that he is still in the European seas. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to recruit, and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—Dumas, xi. 169.

nique on the 14th May, while Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th June: but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing excepting the capture of the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant resistance by the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet had gone to attempt the reduction of that colony; and so far was he misled by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th June, hoping to render the mouths of the Orinoco on the following day as famous in history as those of the Nile: but when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Grasse five-and-twenty years before; but as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas (1).

May 28.
Combined
fleet had re-
turned to
Europe.
Its secret
orders.

In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 28th May, and instantly made sail for the north: having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line of battle ships. This reinforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoléon, dated Pavia, 8th May, 1805, which were, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line and ten Spanish which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochefort, join the five ships of the line under Missiessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. With this great fleet, which would greatly overmatch any force the British Government could muster in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle unless it was unavoidable, and if so, to bring it on as near as possible to Brest, in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in it. "The grand object of the whole operation," said Napoléon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne—masters of the Channel for a few days, 150,000 men will embark in the 2000 vessels which are there assembled, and the expedition is concluded." Every contingency was provided for: the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen; and stores of provisions were provided both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours (2).

Entire suc-
cess hitherto
of Napo-
léon's de-
sign.

Hitherto every thing had not only fully answered, but even exceeded Napoléon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British Government: on the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French Admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent, while the English squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and

(1) South. ii. 222, 223. Dum. xii. 1, 6.

(2) See the orders in Dum. xi. 247, 254. *Pièces Just.*

Rochefort were totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours. Villeneuve had sailed on the

May 26. 28th May from Martinique; and on the 13th June, Nelson, on arriving at Antigua for the first time, received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth in order to warn the British Government of the probable return of the whole fleets of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing his sailors a moment's rest,

June 12. set sail the very same day for Europe, and on the 18th July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the Leeward Islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days (1); an instance of vigour and rapidity of naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world (2).

Great was the despondency in the British islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found; and the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering every man and ship that could be got in readiness to sea, and despatched Admiral Collingwood with a squadron of five ships of the line to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoléon; and on the 21st July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoléon, at that time in the possession of Villeneuve (3).

Meanwhile, Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d June he had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoléon, who by this time had returned to St.-Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochefort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined

(1) From April 30th, to July 18th.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1805, 228, 229, South. ii. 224, 225, *Ibid.* xii. 6, 7.

On the day following, Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

(3) South. ii. 224, 225. Collingwood, i. 145.

Extradit. His words are—"July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen to the coast. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and taking the Rochefort people with them, ap-

pear off Ushant perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined with twenty more. This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe Bonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French Government never aims at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."—Collingwood's *Memoirs*, i. 145, 146.—The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from the West Indies; the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The *Curieux* brig, sent on this important

errand, arrived at London on the 9th July having made the passages from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the Admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochefort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest.

These orders reached Admiral Stirling on the 13th July. On the 18th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station in search of the enemy (1).

The event soon shewed of what vital importance it was that the *Curieux* had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the Admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information communicated by Lord Nelson. Hardly had Sir Robert Calder reached the place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and Spain hove in sight, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty gun ship, and seven frigates (2). The weather was so hazy, that the two fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity; but as soon as the British Admiral descried the enemy he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy, which, combined with the foggy state of the weather, brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the *St-Raphael* and *Firme*, were so much da-

(1) *Dum.* xii. 16, 19. *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 229. *James*, iv. 1, 2.

(2) Yet strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital importance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochefort and Ferrol. Mr. James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which at the time were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in search of. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the squadron did not, like the Rochefort one, take advantage of this circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders. [*James*, iv. 2.] Is it not evident, that unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?"

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th July, 1805, he wrote in these terms to the Minister of Marine.—"The English squadron before Rochefort has disappeared on the 12th July. It was only on the 9th July that the brig

Curieux arrived in England. The Admiralty could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before Rochefort in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised therefore by orders received before the arrival of the *Curieux*. On the 15th July that squadron effected its junction with that before Ferrol; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of Nelson, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet: and that it is these fourteen vessels before Ferrol which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look out, or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long hidden designs of the French Emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets before Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the Admiralty, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—See *Dumas*, xii. 19—20.

maged that they were compelled to strike their colours, while the Windsor Castle, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the Dragon. Darkness separated the combatants; and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day. The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to 39 killed, and 139 wounded: that of the French and Spaniards to 476 (1); and no ship except the Windsor Castle was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet shewed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day: at noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and

The two
sides appear
drawn out
without
decisive suc-
cess.

a-half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle, but

Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as

the British; that is, to decline the engagement for the present, as

soon as he saw that the English fleet stood firm; and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the Rochefort and Ferrol squadrons, the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or that of Lord Nelson; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d August (2).

For impor-
tance of
this action,
Napoleon's
conduct on
receiving the
intelligence.
Aug. 21.
1805.

Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action

ever fought by the navy of England, no farther proof is required

than is furnished by the conduct of Napoléon, narrated by the

unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and

the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in

which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival

of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the Emperor into his Cabinet. The

scene which followed must be given in his own words.—“Daru found him

transported with rage; walking up and down the room with hurried steps,

and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. ‘What a navy—

what sacrifices for nothing—what an admiral! All hope is gone. That Ville-

neuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol! It is all

over: he will be blockaded there—Daru, sit down and write.’ The fact

was, that on that morning the Emperor had received intelligence of the ar-

ival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour; he at once saw that the English

expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for a

long time, perhaps for ever! Then, in the transports of a fury which would

have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of

the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable

achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a moment’s hesi-

tation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once the plan of the cam-

paign of Austerlitz; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover

and Holland to the south and the west of France, their order of march, dura-

tion, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous; the surprises and

hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers movements of the

enemy, every thing was foreseen: victory rendered secure on every supposi-

tion. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of

departure two hundred leagues in extent, and lines of operations three hun-

dred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this

(1) James, iv. 7, 8. Dum. xii. 51, 52.

(2) James iv. 17. Vict. et Cong. xiv. 143. Dum. xii. 53.

original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital, the periods only underwent a slight alteration, but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan as originally conceived carried into complete execution (1)."

It totally
defeats his
well-laid
designs.

Nothing can portray the character of Napoléon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage.

He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming; and that unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be felt on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria, on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals before he was assailed in his own. Finding this great project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line, adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first; and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

Cruel injustice
to which
Sir Robert
Calder was
meanwhile
subjected.

While such immense consequences were resulting from the action of the 22d July, the gallant officer who, with a force so inferior, had achieved so decisive a success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation wound up to the very highest pitch by an expression in the Admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement every where made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place (2). When, therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met, that the British Admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an encounter, and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoléon, in the official accounts published in the Admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms (3). The consequence was, that after hav-

(1) Dupin *Force Navale de l'Angleterre*, i. 244. Dum. xii. 119, 120. Bign. iv. 296-7.

(2) The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was in a great degree owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the accounts published by the Admiralty. The passage published was in these words:—"The enemy are now in sight to windward; and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any further opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this:—"At the same time, it will behave me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron." [James, iv. 17.] Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British Admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of

eighteen hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British Admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when its character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

(3) The accounts published by Napoléon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the action, were entirely fabricated by the Emperor himself. In his despatch to the Minister of Marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers, which claimed the victory, Napoléon said, "The arrival of Villeneuve at Corunna will overturn all

ing continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th December, "severely reprimanded him for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th July;" though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection (1). Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the Admiralty the statesman whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best arranged project ever conceived by Napoléon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fit, is public opinion! History would indeed be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees (2).

Meanwhile Nelson having taken in water and other necessary supplies at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th July; and having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St.-Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland; and finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Corn-

wallis off Ushant on the 13th August. No news had been obtained of the enemy; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at

length heard of the action of 22d July, and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England; the public having followed with intense anxiety his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements (3).

Napoléon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly he resumed his designs of invasion; on the 12th August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the Minister of Marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, were Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning (4); and in two days afterwards

their reconnoitres, and in the eyes of Europe will give to the victory; that is no small matter. I instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. Here is my idea of what it should be;" and then follows the fabricated account.—*Dumas*, xii. 348; *Pièces Just.*

(1) *James*, iv. 18. *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 230, 231.

(2) Let us hear what the French writers say of this proceeding:—"Admiral Calder," says Dupin, "with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour?"—*Dumas's Voyages dans la Campée D'Espagne*, li. 17.

(3) *Smith*, ii. 225, 230. *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 230.

(4) "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoléon, on the 12th August, to M. Decrès, "a messenger to

Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the Imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects—that the enemy's squadron has suffered much—and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th August—"With thirty vessels, my admirals should learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hopes of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces; had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of-battle ships before him—I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—*Dumas*, xii. 32, 37.

he wrote a second letter, in still more pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet. Sir Robert Calder had at this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th August, however, he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off cape Finistère. On the 14th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a north-westerly direction; but having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder) was approaching, Villeneuve tacked about and made sail Aug. 21. for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Collingwood, with four sail of the line, who lay before that port, was obliged to retire on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had they entered than he resumed his station, and with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled (1).

Aug. 21. Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Gantheaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron, after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets; but the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed off without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of descrying the long-wished-for reinforcement—in vain Gantheaume counted the hours for the arrival of Villeneuve with thirty ships of the line, chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed; the action of the 22d July had saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour; the combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour (2).

Napoleon's designs are in consequence entirely ruined. The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoléon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of 22d July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterwards steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest (3). But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be disguised, preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time when the Emperor was directing the contemplated movements across France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 25d August and 1st September the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in that difficult operation (4). The cavalry

He sets off for Paris, Sept. 1.

(1) James, iv. 23, 27. Dum. xii. 63, 71.
(2) Dum. xii. 69, 70.

(3) Dum. xii. 64.

(4) The following passage (from Marshal Ney's

and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the Emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board; when suddenly, on the 1st September, the Emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to defile by different routes towards the Rhine (1).

The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution, were not merely the destruction of all the projects for the naval campaign by the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz: matters had also come to a crisis on the Continent of Europe; and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube (2).

From the moment that Napoléon put on his head the Iron Crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine Republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end: and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the Emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces, having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength of the empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists to commence operations. General Chastelar, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered the Tyrol, and began to organize the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venetian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the Cabinet of the Tuileries and that of Vienna; and in several articles in the *Moniteur*, evidently flowing from the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible in the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence (3).

Extremist-
ary de-
votion-
to which
the troops
had arrived
to embark-
ing.

Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject:—"The instructions of the Emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out exactly. To ascertain the time required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, muzzles, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he directed that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company received the boats destined for its use; every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprised of the boat, and the place in the boat where he was to sit himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery, were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field officers dismounted, and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of

command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers in perfect order hastened on board, each to his appointed place: in ten minutes and a half 25,000 men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds; they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The relanding was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in thirteen minutes from the time the soldiers were on board, they were drawn up in battle array on shore."—*Mem.* ii. 266, 264.

(1) *Jom.* ii. 101. *Dum.* xii. 127. *Ney.* ii. 249, 265.

(2) *Sign.* iv. 303.

(3) *Sign.* iv. 310, 319. *Dum.* xii. 104, 111.

"The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two Cabinets:—

Both parties warmly as-
sail the
court of
Munich.

At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the Imperial dominions, left no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoléon were, unknown to Austria, converging from the Elbe to the Pyrenees towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would in all probability be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich accordingly was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest, and the Elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connections with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours, and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria—that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory, and there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the Elector had therefore every thing to hope from an alliance with Napoléon, and as much to fear from falling into the jaws of the Emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party, that all these advantages were merely elusory; that the alliance with France was a connection with a revolutionary state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society, and that when menaced by such a catastrophe the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would always be opposed to such innovations. It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the Elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoléon; the fate of

Angry note
of Talley-
rand to the
Cabinet of
Vienna.

"Let us come at once," said Talleyrand, "to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different question that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria united will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilization itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she is fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not experience the rudest strokes of fortune.

"What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The Emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it; and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great design, and to enter into no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two

empires." [Note, Aug. 5, 1805. Talleyrand to Cobenzel.]

Their reply. It was replied on the part of Austria on the 3d September, "That the Cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put a period to the dangers which threatened Europe, by a sincere and anxious mediation; but that to do that with any prospect of success it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Lunéville anxiously stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian Republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it; no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French Government which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its invasion. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the Courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect in the internal affairs of France; to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany; and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French empire." [Note by Austria, Sept. 3, 1805. *Dum.* xii. 109, 110.]

the Duke d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French Emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such opposite dangers, the Elector agreed to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France on the 24th August, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d September at Wurtzburg. Meanwhile the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the Elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the Elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the Emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Wurtzburg, and the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn (1).

The preparations of Napoléon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the allies were preparing to deploy against him. Mr. Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability: every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened: Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained that if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in support of the freedom of Europe. In Italy and Germany no less than 330,000 men were preparing to act against France, among whom were 116,000 Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at least two months to come: and in the mean time the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, 80,000 strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoléon. 30,000 Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were already assembled in the Tyrol: and the Archduke Charles, at the head of 53,000 of the best troops of the empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains. It could not be concealed, that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior; and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. Every thing, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and celerity of movement; and in both these qualities Napoléon was unrivalled (2).

To meet this immense force, and destroy part, before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoléon, and in its prosecu-

(1) Big. iv. 320, 323. Dum. xii. 210, 211.

(2) Dum. xii. 131, 138. Jon. ii. 97.

The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn:—

In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand,	90,000
Reserve under Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna,	30,000
First Russian army crossing Poland,	56,000
Second Russian army, under Emperor Alexander,	60,000
Austrians in Tyrol,	30,000
Austrians in Italy, under Archduke Charles,	55,000
Russians and Swedes in Pomerania,	30,000
	351,000

The army
of England
marches
from Brn-
lagny to the
Rhine.

tion he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of so many marshals of the empire : their united numbers amounted to 190,000 men ; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if they could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to their support. The army of Italy was 33,000, besides 15,000 in the Neapolitan territories ; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to 24,000, so that France could open the campaign with 270,000 men (1).

Immense
preparations
of Napoleon

But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but a part of the preparations of the Emperor. On the 23d September, he repaired to the Senate, and submitted two propositions to the Legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of 80,000 conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806 ; a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating the military resources of the empire ; the second, the re-organization of the national Guard, throughout its whole extent. But in thus reviving this Republican institution the Emperor was careful to organize it on a different footing from what it had been during the days of democratic equality. " It is important," said he " that the officers of the National Guard should be *named by the Emperor* : every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme authority : all our institutions should be in harmony ; and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens." Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this re-organization ; every man in good health was required to serve from the age of twenty-one to sixty ; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Sept. 23, 1805. Lefebvre, Marshal Kellermann, and General d'Aboville. The Emperor adjourned the meeting of the Senate, by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent aspect in which he viewed public affairs, and left him no alternative but to conquer or die.—" The eternal ob-
His address to the Senate. jects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished ; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany ; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago, I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed : menaces and umbrages alike found me immovable ; but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn ; Munich is invaded ; the Elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital ; all my hopes have vanished. Senators, when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the Imperial Crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up

(1) Dum. xii. 136.

The French forces were thus disposed :—

Grand Army, divided into seven corps under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes,

Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and guard under Mortier,

Army of Italy,

— of Naples,

Electoral troops,

196,471

34,674

15,000

23,815

of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people : they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen ! your emperor will do his duty ; the soldiers will do theirs ; you will do yours (1).

Entire dislocation of the armament at Boulogne. Previous to setting out from Boulogne, Napoléon issued several decrees for the disarmament of the flotilla, and the laying up what was kept in ordinary for future and distant operations. The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports ; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion, and soon of all that vast assemblage of vessels hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport 30,000 men. A reserve of 20,000 men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, destined at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances, and the intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than any inadequacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view (2).

The combined fleet is ordered nevertheless to sail from Cadiz. Determined, however, not to lose entirely the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoléon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosilly to the command of the combined fleet in lieu of Villeneuve, who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival, a measure which led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising expeditions, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St.-Helena ! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death (3) !

Restoration of the Gregorian Calendar.
July 3, 1805. An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilized life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian Calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France, a change prescribed by the Emperor in a decree shortly before setting out for Strasbourg (4).

Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz. Meanwhile the British Government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independently of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis and

(1) Bign. iv. 330, 331. Dum. xii. 237, 238.

(2) Dum. xii. 127, 129, 142, 143, Jom. ii. 37, 39.

(3) Dum. xii. 145, 149.

(4) Ibid. xii. 151.

the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth, and Nelson, who had retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Portsmouth, and hoisted his flag on board the *Victory* of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea, that they were destined to receive their death-blow from his hand. In these generous sentiments he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty (1). He was vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching, and before he left London called at the upholsterer's, where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the *l'Orient*, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, at it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which formed the leading features of his character (2). With difficulty he tore himself, on the beach at Portsmouth on the following morning, from the crowd who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land, which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes on his vessel till it vanished from their sight (3).

Enthusiastic
reception of
Nelson by
the fleet.

Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England: the yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the yards when he was seen on the quarterdeck of the *Victory* shaking hands with his old captains, who in transports of joy hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name, that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, Villeneuve hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival: and in a council of war it was resolved not to venture out unless they were at least one-third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents; stationed his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St.-Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy, while, at the same

(1) When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety became so excessive, that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will

gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes—"Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons."—*SOUTHWELL*, iii. 232.

(2) "Friday night, Sept. 13, half-past ten.—I drove from dear, dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country! and if it is his good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of his mercy. If it is his good providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that he will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—*SOUTHWELL*, ii. 235.

(3) *South*, ii. 234, 237.

time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that ere long they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoléon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had made no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochefort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt. Still, however, the council of war which Villeneuve had summoned to his assistance declined to undertake the responsibility of an engagement, and Nelson, to overcome their irresolution, had recourse to a stratagem, which was

His stratagem to induce the enemy to leave the harbour.

crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and

water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly equipped and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Cartagena or Rochefort squadrons should join the enemy and increase their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own ninety-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately the promised reinforcements arrived, and in single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line (1).

They accordingly set sail. Oct. 19.

Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy—aware that Napoléon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean, and apprehensive, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosilly might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the south-east. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in the same direction; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest upon seeing the number of his vessels they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at daybreak on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semicircle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles ahead; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet, made signal to bear down in two lines perpendicular upon the enemy. He had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates; they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, of which four were three-deckers; and 4000 marksmen were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed (2).

(1) South. ii. 237, 242. Ann. Reg. 1805, 233, 234. Dum. xiii. 174, 177.

(2) James, iv. 39. South, ii. 240, 246. Ann. Reg. 1805, 234, 235. Dum. xii. 175, 177.

Dispositions
on both
sides.

Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in double columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was likely that each ship would be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the English lay to windward, were to lie in close order and await the attack. The fleet was divided into two lines, so arranged, that at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line, the broadside of one in the second presented itself: a combination as well imagined as can be figured, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Collingwood, in the Royal Sovereign, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the Belleisle and Mars: Nelson himself, in the Victory, headed the second, immediately after whom came the Temeraire and the Neptune (1). When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer—"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to him that made me, and may his blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To him I resign myself and the just cause which is intrusted me to defend (2)." Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power!

Oct. 21, 1805.

Magnificent
a-pot of the
fluvias as they
approached
each other.

Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st October, a few leagues to the north-west of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvass, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the south-west. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amidst the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded. The British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other, "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarter-deck, wore his admiral's frock coat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested; the officers

In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote,—"I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll, have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old

friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "that knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action, would supply any deficiency of signals; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—*Scotsman*, ii. 243, 244.

(1) Collingwood's Memoirs, i. 182. James, ii. 41, 49. South, ii. 246, 247. *Dum.* xiii. 183.

(2) South, ii. 247.

on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen: it was evident that he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory? That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day; and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting? and after musing awhile he fixed what it should be, and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the Victory, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the great Disposer of all events and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty (1)."

Order in which the English fleet bore down. Nelson led thirteen ships of the line in the Victory; Collingwood fourteen in the Royal Sovereign: but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood in order to cut off the enemy's retreat from Cadiz, the other column was first engaged (2). Far a-head of all the rest of the fleet was the Royal Sovereign, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still more than two miles in the rear. "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action;" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed, "What would Nelson give to be here!" When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hostile fleet was bearing down upon his line, he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the Santa Anna, the Royal Sovereign gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down and killing and wounding four hundred of her men (3): then wheeling rapidly round, she lay beside her so close, that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other. The Spanish Admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of the Royal Sovereign to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the Royal Sovereign heel two streaks

(1) James, iv. 45, 47. South, ii. 252, 253. Dum. xiii. 165, 166.

(2) Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their masts, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly £200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of its early success was owing.

(3) Collingwood's guns on this occasion were all double shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought his men to such perfection that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a-half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now gentlemen," said he, "let us do something to-day which the world may talk of hereafter."—Collingwood, ii. 168, 169.

Battle of Tra- out of the water. A furious combat now engaged between the two
falgar. first-rates; but such was the rapidity and precision of the Royal Sovereign's fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. The disgrace, however, was prevented by the *St.-Just*, *Indomptable*, *Fougueux*, and *S.-Leandro*, which grouped round the Royal Sovereign when they saw their Admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring his broadsides into his first-rate antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other, though, with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character, the Admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet, and they watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length shewed the British flag, waving unconquered in the midst of the numerous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded (4).

*Nelson next
 breaks the
 line.*

Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger, and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the *Victory's* main-top-gallant-sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the *Victory* continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this awful moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the *Victory* advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands, stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment Nelson's Secretary, Mr. Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amidst the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the *Santissima Trinidad*, which he imagined bore the French Admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted: but as the *Victory* approached, the enemy closed up and presented so compact a front that it was impossible to find an entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the *Téméraire* and *Bucentaure*, and at one o'clock the *Victory*, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble-shotted, into the *Bucentaure*, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the *Victory's* port-holes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbled wood-works of the *Bucentaure's* stern. In advancing, the *Victory* received a dreadful broadside from the French

Neptune, but passed on to the Redoutable, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while on the other side she engaged the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidad. Captain Harvey, in the *Téméraire*, fell on board the Redoutable on the other side, so that these four ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants on the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge lest the shot should pass through and injure the *Téméraire* (1); and as every shot from the Victory set the Redoutable on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

After the first discharge, the Redoutable closed her lower-deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. Seeing this, and thinking they had struck, Nelson twice ordered the firing into her to cease: but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops; and to this humanity he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's forecastle, each loaded with 500 muskets balls, soon cleared the Redoutable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and main-tops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarterdeck he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards distant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied, "my back-bone is shot through." He was immediately carried below, but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been shot away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should leave him, and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. As the action continued, however, several ships of the enemy began to strike; and as the crew of the Victory cheered as each successive flag was lowered, at every hurra a gleam of joy illuminated the countenance of the dying hero (2).

Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the Santa Anna struck to the Royal

Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her vanquished opponent. During the latter part of the action Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarter-deck, he visited the men, enjoining them not to fire a shot in waste; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commending particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite port-hole of the Santa Anna. Captain Harvey of the *Téméraire*, when engaged in close combat with the Redoutable, perceived the Fougueux of 74 guns preparing to board her on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within an hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance,

(1) Ann. Reg. 1805, 235, 236. James, iv. 54, 59.
South, ii. 259, 262, Dum. xiii. 39, 406, 298.

(2) South, ii. 263, 264. Ann. Reg. 1805, 237.
James, iv. 61, 63.

by boarding. The other British vessels, as they successively came into action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the columns had reduced the great odds against which the leading line-of-battle ships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent. Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. The fire on the poop of the Victory from the tops of the Redoutable was so tremendous, that for a time it was almost deserted, upon which the French made a vigorous attempt to board; but they were quickly repulsed by the crew of the English vessel rushing up from below and engaging them at the muzzles of the muskets: and shortly after, the Temeraire, having wafted nearer, poured in her whole broadside upon her crowded decks, with such effect, that two hundred men were swept a way by the discharge. By degrees, however, the marksmen in the tops of the Redoutable were picked off by the Victory's marines, and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the Temeraire's bows, which, forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Never had a ship been more gallantly defended: out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, only five-and-thirty reached the English shores (1). Shortly after the Bucentaur, which had never recovered the first broadside of the Victory, struck her colours, with Villeneuve on board, and the masts of the Santissima Trinidad, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the Victory, Neptune, Leviathan, and Conqueror, fell with a tremendous crash, and she was taken possession of when wholly disabled by a boat from the Prince (2).

Last moments and death of Nelson.

While victory was thus every where declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed: he is surely dead." At length he came down: they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?"—"Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing."—"I hope," said Nelson, "none of our ships have struck?"—"There is no fear of that," replied Hardy.—"I am a dead man," then said Nelson; "I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon." Hardy then went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were taken. "That's well," replied Nelson; "but I bargained for twenty;" and then, in a stronger voice, added, "Anchor, Hardy, anchor. Do you make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy," said he. Hardy knelt down, and kissed his cheek. "Now I am satisfied," said Nelson, "thank God I have done my duty." His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, "Thank God I have done my duty," and

(1) The marksman who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after he fell, the storm of balls was so severe that an old quartermaster, who had seen him fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the Victory's poop. The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired

the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock. He received a ball in the mouth and instantly expired.—*SCOTT*, ii. 269, 270.

(2) *James*, iv. 76, 89. *South*, ii. 270, 271. *Ann. Reg.* 1805, 236, 237. *Dum.* xiii. 208, 209. *Vict. et Conq.* xvi, 170, 175. *Colledge*, i. 174.

expired at half past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled, even in the glorious annals of the English navy (1).

Van magni-
tude of the
victory. The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only floating wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides; and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. Twenty ships of the line had struck, with Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish Admirals, Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the *Achille*, of 74 guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of 150 guns, and *Santa Anna*, of 112, were in the hands of the British, and lay in mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz; and Admiral Dumanoir, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides, as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours; a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, however, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour (2).

Violent tem-
pest, and
disorders to
the crews
after the ter-
mination. It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well for that great and good man had this advice been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead (3).

As it was he deemed it an unnecessary precaution till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous (4). Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides, to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was, that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the *Algesirax* rose upon the slender British guard which had her

Oct. 22. in possession and escaped with them into Cadiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English who had her in possession to return on their parole to the English fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance,

Oct. 22. Captain Kirgulien, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismantled hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly

(1) *Scottie's Narrat.* 46, 49. *South* ii. 267, 270.

(2) *Jones*, iv. 99, 102. *South*, ii. 273, 274. *Dum.* xiii. 222, 229. *Vict. et Conq.* xvi. 186, 192.

(3) A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes from attending to Nelson's dying instructions was afforded by the *Ulclocco*. This vessel, with its prize the *San Uldonso*, anchored, and rode out the gale in safety. The *Switzerland* and *Bahama* prizes also anchored and were saved.—*JAMES*, iv. 130.

(4) In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated that many high naval authorities are of opinion that if he had anchored immediately after the battle the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night many vessels, including the *Victory* itself, were incapable of obeying.—*Collingwood*, i. 191, 192, *Notes*.

formed a line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the *Santa Anna* and *Neptune*, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many melancholy catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest the *Indomitable* was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the *Bucentaur's* crew, and above 1000 persons perished. Many of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Admirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides 20,000 prisoners, including the land forces on board; and the combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only 1690 men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Matthieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal (1), were compelled to strike their colours." It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which, two months before, had filled England with alarm (2).

Courteous
intercourse
with the
Spaniards at
Cadiz. An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded and the numerous prizes in their hands. In return, the Marquis of Solana, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies; and it was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse (3).

Mingled joy
and grief in
Britain on
the occasion. No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoleon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these

(1) The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan.

(2) Dum. xiii. 230, 239. James, iv. 123, 137. Coll. i. 183, 184.

In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle the following general order was issued to the fleet:—"The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his Majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and

that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are nought."—Collingwood, i. 179.

(3) Collingwood, i. 185, 190. South. ii. 275, 276.

blessings were, they yet seemed inadequately purchased by the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson?

His brother was made an earl, with a grant of L.6000 a-year: L.10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and L.100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St.-Paul's Cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of L.3000 a-year, a grant which first raised that noble officer from that of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St.-Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of weeping spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr: the most awful, that of the martyred patriot: the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory: and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory (1).

Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the skilful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him always blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the licence of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and a manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted

his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius in the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds of Naples, his public character might be deemed perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness. (1).

Victory of
Sir R. Strachan.

The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the ene-

my visible, until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near, that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours, when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships; but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of 750 killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only 24 killed and 111 wounded. (2).

Reflections
on the de-
cisive nature
of these suc-
cesses.

It is observed by Mr. Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land: a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II; but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalizing from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect farther, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea: that the battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion, that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world, that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan invasion in the south of Europe, and that of La Hogue checked, for nearly a century, the maritime efforts of the House of Bourbon. Equally important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the

(1) Dupin's Voyages, iv. 66. Bretton, iii. 463.

(2) Dum. xiii. 228, 223. James, iv. 154, 168.

battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England and destroyed all Napoléon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months: even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost obliterated by the host which was marshalled round the Imperial eagles at Waterloo; but from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the the utmost efforts of Napoléon, no considerable fleet with the tricolor flag was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

It is stated by Napoléon, that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of 120,000 men at land (1). Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which destroyed fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where 90,000 men out of 120,000 were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoléon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above 40,000 men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased on the side of the British alone, was 9,999: on that of the allies, above 20,000: whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only 1690 men; a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain (2). This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea than land: and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of proportion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands (3);" while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoléon.

And on the
subject of
the breaking
the line. The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary success of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors is alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or if attempted succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and full a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot: and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained (4). So far from the French and Spanish fleets

(1) Napoléon, ii. 124.

(2) The loss at Talavera, out of 19,000 British, was 5,000; that at Albuera, 4,500 out of 7,500; and out of 18,000 who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4,000 lay on the benches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress!

(3) Coll. i. 183. 184.

(4) "The total loss was 1690; of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."

—JAMES, iv. 111.

being doubled up and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was doubled up; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior to their antagonists, they must have been taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but a superior enemy have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the *Santa Anna* and the *Bucentaur*, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the *Royal Sovereign* and the *Victory*, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, when three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support? In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force, before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if from accidental causes their arrival, as at *Trafalgar*, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard by breaking the line at *Trafalgar*, *Camperdown*, and *Martinique*—quite the reverse; they did perfectly right: but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skilful party, and never can prove successful but in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force before the centre or rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being made prisoner, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an antagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did with British troops; and accordingly Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoléon's system of bringing an overwhelming force to one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms, or retired, the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops, among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with 7000 men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him, that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

And on the introduction of steam into naval warfare.

It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance; and that, if the naval officers to whom Napoléon remitted to report on M. Fulton's pro-

posal for the navigation of the vessels by steam had given a different opinion, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end, to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so to outstrip the march of time as to give to one generation that general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle; the mighty engine would have yielded its powers equally to both sides, and their relative situation would have remained the same as before. If steamers would have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel, they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into their crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steam-ship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, brought flames and explosion into its forests of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not more decisive than that of Edward III at Sluys; the countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action, and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoléon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days, and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the confiscation of the property of the church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the Revolutionary party in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterwards, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy; and that if he could once have roused the multitude against their rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France (1). "I would not," said he, "have attempted to subject England

Democratic changes which he would have instantly proclaimed, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing: I would have proclaimed a

Republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution of the property of such of the latter as opposed me among my partisans; liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform. I would have published a proclamation, declaring

to France : I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of Republicanism in their morale. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform (1)

His designs if he had succeeded in that object; That the French Emperor would have been defeated in his attempt if England had remained true to herself, can be doubtful to one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, without exception, from Vimiera to Waterloo, and that Napoléon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained doubt till within these few years; but the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior stimulants since 1830 and the strong partiality to French alliance which has recently grown up with the spread of democratic principles, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoléon did not know us better than we knew ourselves and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which have proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people. The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented animated the British people : but, strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people. No man can say how he would keep his sense under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth suddenly open beneath his feet; and even the warmest friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounced upon the stability of the English mind under the influence of the

Their probable result.

that we came as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy; all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been joined by a formidable body; and I would at the same time have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have hurried your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruins of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully amongst the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen every thing, which would have made a great impression on their minds.

The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an obnoxious and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families with the blood of the people, together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and its division amongst the partisans of the Revolution, with a general equalisation of property, would have gained me the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and the disaffected in the kingdom." Thus for the Emperor Napoléon; to which it may be added, that, amidst the divisions and democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and smiled at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, farther than supplying some of the higher orders, and if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the chapel of St. Stephen.—See O'Meara, i. 346, 352.

(1) O'Meara, i. 350, 480.

prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoléon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage indeed would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger; thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory; at Trafalgar, for existence.

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

SEPTEMBER—DECEMBER, 1805.

ARGUMENT.

Austria, deceived by Napoléon's measures, crosses the Inn—Her forces advance across Bavaria to the Black Forest—Efforts of Napoléon to gain Prussia—Negotiations between the two Powers—Russians refused a passage across the Prussian Territories—March of French Troops from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine—Composition and direction of these forces—Violation of the Prussian Territory by Bernadotte's Corps—Great indignation excited by this at Berlin—Measures concerted between Russia, Sweden, and England in the North of Germany—Neutrality of Naples—Napoléon's arrival on the Rhine, and Proclamations to his Troops—Mutual Manifestoes by the belligerent Powers—Movements of the French Troops to surround the Austrians—Mack's defensive arrangements—Four thousand Imperial Grenadiers are cut to pieces by Murat—Recompenses bestowed by Napoléon on the Soldiers engaged in the Combat—Measures of Mack to extricate himself—Bloody Combat at Hasslach—Surrender of four thousand Austrians at Memmingen—Completion of the Investment of Ulm—Napoléon's address to his Soldiers at the Bridge of the Lech—Mack resolves to detach the Archduke Ferdinand to Bohemia, and himself remain at Ulm—Combat at Elchingen—Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand, with great loss—Surrender of Wernneck with eight thousand men—The Heights around Ulm are carried by Napoléon—Negotiations for the surrender of Mack—He capitulates at first conditionally—and then unconditionally—The Army of Mack defiles before Napoléon—Napoléon's Message to the Senate at Paris—His Proclamation to his Soldiers—The blame of these Disasters is divided between Mack and the Aulic Council—Errors of the Cabinet of Vienna in the general plan of the Campaign—The Archduke Charles is kept on the defensive in Italy—The Frigate at Verona is forced by Masséna—The Archduke resolves to retreat, in order to cover Vienna—And falls back by the *Tagliamento* to Laybach in Carinthia—Advance of Napoléon's Army through Bavaria—Defensive Measures of the Austrian Government—Increasing Irritation of Prussia—Arrival of the Emperor Alexander at Berlin, and conclusion of a Secret Convention with the Prussian Government—Nocturnal Visit to the Tomb of the Great Frederick—Landing of the Allies in Hanover—Operations in the Tyrol—Surrender of Jellachich and the Prince de Rohan, and abandonment of that Province—Napoléon advances into Upper Austria—Austrians' proposals of Peace, which come to nothing—Kutusoff withdraws to the left bank of the Danube—Continued advance of the French towards Vienna—Destruction of part of Mortier's Corps by Kutusoff—Desperate Action at Dierstein—Mortier recrosses the Danube—Napoléon advances rapidly to Vienna—Description of that City—Surprise of the Bridge over the Danube—Napoléon passes through the Capital, and establishes himself at Schornbrunn—Subsequent Movements of the Armies—Finesse of Kutusoff in parrying the attempts of the French to circumvent him—Heroic action of Ragnathion, who at length makes good his retreat—Junction of the Russian Armies—Measures of Napoléon—Conduct of the French at Vienna—Forces on both sides—Napoléon reconnoitres the Field of Austerlitz—Dangers of his situation—Simulate Negotiations on both sides to gain time—Haukwitz arrives from Berlin—The Allies advance to Wischaw—Preparatory Movements on both sides—Allied Order of Battle—Description of the Field of Battle—Dispositions of the French Troops—Nocturnal Illumination of the French Lines—Movements on both sides in the morning—Battle of Austerlitz—Its results—Dangers of Napoléon's situation, notwithstanding his success—The Austrians sue for an Armistice—Interview of the Emperor Francis with Napoléon—Armistice concluded with Russia—And with Austria—Dissimulation of Prussia, and accommodation with that Power—Treaty of Alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin, which gains Hanover—Affairs of Naples—And of the North of Germany—Peace of Presburg—Dethronement of the King of Naples—Reflections on this step—Napoléon returns to Vienna—Munich, the Rhine, and Paris—Reflections on the Campaign—Importance of the Valley of the Danube as the theatre of contest between France and Austria—Vast growth of the Military Power of France since the last Peace—A similar increase during Peace characterized all the reign of Napoléon—Great Abilities displayed by Napoléon in the arrangements for this Campaign—Errors of the Allies—Ruinous effects of

the Indecision of Prussia—Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the formation of the Confederacy—His last Illness and Death—His Character and mighty Achievements—Principles of his Domestic Administration—Progressive and steady growth of his Fame—Erroneous Views of Foreign Writers on his Designs—His Errors—Opinion of the Democratic Party in England on him—Funeral Honours paid to his Memory.

Austria, deceived by Napoleon's measures, crosses the Inn. In proportion as the time approached when his great projects against Austria were to be carried into execution, Napoléon redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that Admiral to Cadiz, had been received, completely produced the desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of the Emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment come when she could safely commence hostilities, even before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn, and invading the Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard, and appear before their arrival, with the whole forces of the empire, on the banks of the Rhine. But she grievously miscalculated in so doing the activity and resources of the French Emperor, and soon found to her cost that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played his game as effectually as if she had intentionally prostrated before his ambition the resources of the monarchy (1).

They advance through Bavaria to the Black Forest. The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were 80,000 men; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the Elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite side of the scale. The army of the Imperialists was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience. What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standard of Napoléon (2)? In vain the British Government transmitted to the Cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement, obtained from the Imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march, and asked whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act. With inflated self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied

(1) *Dum.* xiii. 1. 11. *Jom.* ii. 99, 100.

(2) Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility, in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign: and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr. Pitt, that he wrote to the Cabinet of Vienna,

recommending that officer to the command of the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr. Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations, and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoléon.—*See Napoléon in Month.* ii. 432.

with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine (1).

Efforts of
Napoleon
to gain
Prussia.

From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoléon was indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his Envoy at Berlin, were to represent to the Prussian Government, "that there was not a moment to lose: that it was indispensable that an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that during the negotiations for a conclusion of the treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an expenditure against Austria, or at least a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the Emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might have their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the Emperor offered them the aid of 80,000, amply provided with every thing necessary for a campaign (2)." The answer of the Prussian Cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable. They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone

Negotia-
tions be-
tween the
two powers.

provide against the rest of the Continent such a barrier as would ensure the maintenance of general tranquillity." The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended, immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian Government, their temporizing policy reappeared; they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amidst all their anxiety for the acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoléon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his account, and that the empire of France and kingdom of Italy shall receive no acquisition (3)." But the terrors of the Prussian Cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities.

Sept. 21.
Russians
denied a
passage
through the
Prussian
territories.

Matters were in this doubtful state when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor of Russia, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian Majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for his troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederick William instantly took fire; and he replied by a positive negative against the passage of the Moscovites through any part of his dominions; but expressed his willingness to meet his august neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war: a proposition to which Napoléon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit (4)."

While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French troops were in full march from the shores of

(1) Dum. xiii. 12.

(2) Instructions to Duroc, 24th August, 1805.—*Monon*, iv. 334.—These instructions, written the very day on which Napoléon received accounts of the entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol, and when he dictated to Dava the march of the grand army from

Boulogne across Germany, (*ante*, v. 156,) are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

(3) *Bign.* iv. 333, 341.

(4) *Bign.* iv. 343, 346.

March of
the French
troops to-
wards Na-
varre.

the Channel to the banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoléon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combination of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment, were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck (4). The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope: the exercises and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years in their camps on the shores of the ocean having enabled them to overcome fatigues with ease which would have been deemed impossible at that period by any other soldiers of Europe (2).

Composi-
tion and di-
vision of
these forces.

The army which Napoléon thus directed against the Imperialists was the most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. Divided into eight corps under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the empire, it consisted of 180,000 men; and had been brought by long exercise, both in camps and in the field, to an unrivalled pitch of discipline and splendour (3). The plan of Napoléon was to direct the corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guards and the cavalry under Murat, to Donaworth and Dettingen: Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neubourg; and Bernadotte joined to the Bavarians upon Ingolstadt; while Augereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest, received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of Tyrol and the Grisons. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to shew that these movements were calculated to envelope altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm: for while the bulk of the French, under Napoléon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donaworth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Augereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible,

(1) See the orders, addressed by Napoléon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in Dumas, xiii. 302, 340 *Pièces Just.*—Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven, at night, or midnight; but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

(2) Dumas, xiii. 13, 14. Bign. iv. 300, Jom. ii. 103, 104. Bour. vii. 10.

The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

(3) The composition of this army was as follows:

- | | |
|-----|----------------------------------|
| 1. | corps commanded by Bernadotte. |
| 2. | by Marmont. |
| 3. | by Davoust. |
| 4. | by Soult. |
| 5. | by Lannes. |
| 6. | by Ney. |
| 7. | by Augereau. |
| 8. | by Murat (cavalry). |
| 9. | Guards by Mortier and Bessières. |
| 10. | Bavarians, by Wrede. |

—See Jom. ii. 104; Dumas, xiii.

be concealed : and the despotic power of the French Emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately laid on in all parts of the empire; the post was every-where stopped; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the Cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne (1).

Violation of
the Prussian
territory by
Bernadotte's
corps.

The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march : but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoléon was not a man to be restrained by such an obstacle; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. "You will traverse its territories," said he, "avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions were punctually obeyed : and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory, and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced guard on the Oct. 8. Danube, between Neubourg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The master stroke was delivered : the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm (2):

Great indignation
excited by this
at Berlin.

Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage to their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian Cabinet; that the alliance with France neither was based on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage; that it had been contracted only for purposes of ambition by Napoléon; that he neither respected nor feared their power, and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning the independence of their own. The weight of these considerations was much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation whom, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in their power; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories, had been sufficient to avert the march of the Russian troops, although the Cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance to the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian Cabinet; while the more generous and warlike part of the capital, at the head of which were the Queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation, and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circumstance which had at length opened the eyes of Government to the ruinous consequences of the temporizing policy which they had so long

Oct. 24. pursued. All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian Monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoléon; the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded; and three powerful armies of observation formed, one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower Saxony, of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick, and one in Westphalia, of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse (1). This impolitic step of Napoléon is linked with many important consequences. It produced that burst of angry feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806. It is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which, in their ultimate results, produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French empire.

Resources
concentrated
between
Prussia,
Sweden, and
England, in
the north of
Germany. While the precipitance of Napoléon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of 12,000 men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of double the amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be farther reinforced by the German Legion in the service of England; an addition which would raise it to nearly forty thousand men; an army it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in an united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders (2). Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities would have been spared to itself and to Europe!

Sept. 12.
Neutrality
of Naples. More fortunate in the south than the north of Europe, Napoléon at this period concluded a convention with the Court of Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona; but the Pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession; and both parties protracted the discussions, with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations (3).

These negotiations at either extremity of the line of military operations might have been attended with important effects upon the final issue of the war, if affairs had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoléon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combinations formed by the English and Russian Cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.

Sept. 27.
Napoléon's
proclamations
to his
troops. The Emperor arrived at Strasburg on the 27th September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military

(1) Egu. iv. 346, 347. Dum. xiii. 28, 31. Hard. viii. 476, 480.

(2) Dum. xiii. 31, 33.

(3) Egu. iv. 356, 357. Bot. iv. 287.

genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced, Austria has passed the Inn, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced guard of the great people: you may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure; but whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself—"Bavarian Soldiers! I come to put myself at your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The House of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour: and feel assured that after the first battle I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people, you are worthy to combat in the ranks of the grand army (1)."

Movements of the French troops to surround the Austrians. The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually in a defensive position, around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in the former war. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoléon in turning his flank with his left wing, and interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by a whole French corps, diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Bavarians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed that river at Donaworth, Neubourg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the communications of the Austrian army with Vienna, and by the middle of October, Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsburg, directly on the road from the Imperial headquarters to the Hereditary States; while Napoléon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon them from the westward both on the right and left banks of the Danube (2).

Mack's defensive arrangements. Struck, as by a thunderbolt, by this formidable apparition in his rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian General had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, hastily throw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and grouping his masses

(1) Bign. iv. 302. Nov. ii. 286.

(2) Damm. xiii. 25, 26. Jour. ii. 100, 109. Nov. ii. 288.

round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffenberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Innspruck, to join him by forced marches, and as soon as he arrived despatched him to support the corps of Reinmayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donaworth (1).

Four thousand Imperialists are cut to pieces by Murat. The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Vertingen, four leagues from Donaworth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffenberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly awaited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the Imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mont Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate: in vain Nansouty with the heavy dragoons charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down rank after rank of the assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square; the Austrians worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffenberg succeeded in forming a smaller square which effected its retreat into some marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse; but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery remained in the hands of the enemy (2).

On 9. Brumaire the Imperialists were broken by Napoleon on the soldiers' appeal. Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion appeared to the reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French, as it was depressing to the Imperial soldiers. Napoléon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action, he repaired in person to Zurmurhausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand he distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving, and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Excelmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer, who at the head only of two dragoons had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists

(1) *Dum.* xiii. 44, 45. *Jom.* ii. 193, 199.

(2) *Dum.* xiii. 43, 45. *Jom.* ii. 199. *Nap.* iv. 364.

the night after the action, as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the Imperial Guard. Never did sovereign in modern times understand so completely the art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers, by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in whatever rank of the army; and it was as much owing to this circumstance, as the greatness of his military genius, that the superior successes of the grand army, which he commanded in person, to those at a distance, under the orders of his lieutenants, was owing (1).

While the powerful advanced guards of the grand army, viz. the corps of Ney on the left bank of the Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus engaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg: the Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the same place: Davoust, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived at Aicha, all directly in the rear of the Imperialists, while the corps of Kienmayer, almost enveloped in

8th and 9th
October.

such immense masses, deemed itself fortunate in being able to effect its retreat by the bridge of Neubourg into Baravia, and the city of Munich. Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital, while the corps of Marmont and Davoust were moved in the same direction, in the view of forming a powerful army of observation, which might repel any attempt on the part of the Russians or Imperial reserves from the Hereditary States to disengage the army of Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces. But information soon arrived that the Russians were at such a distance, as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and, therefore, Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced guards on the right bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him, and regain Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army (2).

Mack, instead of falling back to the Tyrol, which was the only retreat which now really remained to him, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the north-east, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsburg, while the defence of Ulm was intrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants in the vicinity, at strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed; it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Gunzbouurg. The latter post

(1) Bign. iv. 365, 366. Dum. xiii. 45, 46.

Generosity as well as excellence of military conduct attracted the notice of the Emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer at the point of perishing in the waves of the river. For-

getting his injury, the brave man plunged in and saved him. The Emperor caused him to be brought into his presence, and after publicly eulogising his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of honour.—BIGNON, iv. 365, 366.

(2) Dum. xiii. 49, 52. Join. ii. 110, 111.

being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They were there attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces, and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of the town, with the loss of above two thousand men. Disconcerted by this check, and despairing, from the vast accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm, and Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle on the north and east, which enveloped the Austrians in that city (1).

Bloody combat at Hasslach October 11. In their advance towards Ulm; the vanguard of Ney encountered a body of Austrians, 20,000 strong, posted in an admirable situation at Hasslach, and supported by a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far advanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy, which was more than double their own, that retreat was impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these circumstances, their commander, General Dupont, took the most audacious, often in such situations the most prudent course,—he vigorously assailed the enemy, and in the evening, the arrival of successive reinforcements in some degree restored the equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and retaken six times during the course of the day: but although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired, leaving, indeed, a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him as a set off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners taken, during the terrible strife in the village, from the Imperial infantry (2).

October 13. Capitulation of four thousand Austrians in Memmingen. The honour of the Austrian arms was in some degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmingen. On the 11th October, Soult was detached by Napoléon, with his whole corps, from Augsbourg against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combat which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons, and then began that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large bodies, which, during this campaign, more even than their numerous disasters, tarnished the lustre of the Imperial annals. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper Swabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while the fourth took post on the south-east before the ramparts of Ulm, where they were shortly after joined by the corps of Marmont and Lannes. On the same day, Napoléon, with the Imperial Guard, advanced

(1) *Dan. xiii. 53; 56. Nov. ii. 389, 390.*(2) *Jom. ii. 114. Dan. xlii. 57, 62. Bign. iv. 376.*

from Augsburg to Burgau, and established his headquarters there for the night, while Ney, on the north, completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed—a hundred thousand French were grouped round the ramparts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep dejection, were accumulated together (1).

Napoléon's
address to
his soldiers
at the
Bridge of
the Lech.

In advancing towards Ulm on the following morning, at the head of his guards, Napoléon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful; the snow already fell in heavy flakes; the cold was intense; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furrowed its surface. Insensible to the severity of the elements, Napoléon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight, as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory, if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which resemble as much the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions, as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the peculiar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention; but no sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides, and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them (2).

October 13.
Mack re-
solves to
detach the
Archduke
Ferdinand
to Bohemia,
and himself
remain at
Ulm.

While the formidable legions of Napoléon were thus closing round the Imperial array, the most stormy debates took place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which yet remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only chance of safety which was left was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage either towards Bohemia or the Tyrol; on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted; but the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the Imperial House, overpowered every other consideration, and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the Archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains (3).

(1) *Jom. ii. 115, 116. Dum. xlii. 67, 68. Bign. iv. 368.*

(2) *Dum. xlii. 68, 69. Bign. iv. 369, 370.*

(3) *Jom. ii. 112. ^{Digitized by Google} Norv. ii. 392, 393.*

At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoléon was preparing for a general attack on the following day on the position which they occupied. His army formed a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were every where in presence of each other.

October 4.
Combat at
Erlangen. Early on the following morning Napoléon himself ascended to the chateau of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who at the head of 16,000 men, was commencing an attack on the Bridge and Abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, 15,000 strong, with forty pieces of cannon under Laudon, had there established themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a vast convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the retiring Austrians on the preceding day, but the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered; and they still had a strong advanced guard on the northern bank of the river. Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. Dressed in full uniform, he was every where to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the Imperial outposts on the north bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements, while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on their right, from whence they enfiladed the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery made good their ground, and though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable. The French, now in full possession of the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over. Already their cavalry was sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of 1500 killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners (1).

The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of them-

(1) *Denn.* xiii. 72. 74. *Jom.* ii. 118. 119. *Norv.* ii. 303. 304. *Ney*, ii.

It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen was taken. He exposed

his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death; but fate reserved him for greater and more melancholy destinies.—*Jom.* ii. 118.

selves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the House of Hapsbourg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at

October 15.

Elchingen, the Archduke disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which he made a feint of advancing towards Biberach, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed on the road it was following, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach, and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously enjoyed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before

nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred of their wearied columns prisoners; but having been joined by the Archduke, who had now returned from his feint towards Biberach, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy. With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose existence depended on the celerity of its movements, with five hundred waggons, heavily laden. They were speedily charged by the French horse and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied. Despairing, after these disasters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the Archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donaworth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a-day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers the Archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmuhl, and by Reidenberg and Ratisbon gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers.

October 16.

But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety (1), were surrounded at Trochtelfingen by the cavalry of Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.

Surrender of Werneck with 8000 men.

While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoléon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and les Tuileries, which on the other side of the Danube command it in every part (2). These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the

The heights around Ulm are carried by Napoléon.

October 18.

(1) Dum. xiii. 92, 97. Jom. ii. 124, 126. Novv. ii. 397, 398. Rapp. 39, 44.

(2) Personal Observation.

provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the capitulation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign : but the ramparts were incomplete; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the Emperor, who had established his headquarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amidst torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack (1). Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of les Tuileries; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and consternation into every part of the city.

Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoléon beheld Ulm, crowded with troops, stretched out within half cannon-shot at his feet, while the positions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little more than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Werneck, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to surrender, and returning himself to his head-quarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by the Russians. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were at Dauchaw, within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, if you do not grant them eight days. I can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume, before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place."—"Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur, "Ah, Marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource." Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoléon's headquarters to give an account of his unsuccessful mission (2).

Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoléon sent back Ségur, on the following day, with a written ultimatum, granting the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days, or, death!" replied the Austrian general, and, at the same time, he published a proclamation, in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who should mention the word "surrender (3)!" Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was

(1) Dum. xiii. 80, 84. Jom. ii. 120, 122.

(2) Meur. vii. 25, 27. Dum. xiii. 84, 86. Rapp. Mém. 26, 31.

(3) The proclamation was in these terms—"In the name of his Majesty I render responsible, on their honour and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word 'surrender,' or who should think of any thing but the most obstinate

defence: a defence which cannot be required for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced guards of an Imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days: and as to trying an

They capitulate at first conditionally.

despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme, when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the Emperor and his brilliant staff. The Emperor began the conversation, by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the example of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would lead the Imperial army to the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not yet reached the Bavarian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen (1). The Prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack falling suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender, and on the following day the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up, and the whole army lay down its arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian armies (2).

And then unconditionally.

These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms; but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation: Napoléon, to whom every hour was precious, and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters at Elchingen, and there so completely bewildered him by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians, or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops employed in the blockade, amounting to nearly 70,000 men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations (3).

October 20. In consequence of this new article in the capitulation, a spectacle took place on the following day unparalleled in modern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, 30,000 strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoléon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence, forming part of the heights on the north of the city; for five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay,

The army of Mack defiles before Napoléon.

assault, it could only be done by little detachments: our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; nothing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time"—Dum., xliii. 87.

(1) "You expect the Russians?" said Napoléon: "Do you really, then, not know that they have not reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not fully informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers at least will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have so often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war; after the conduct of your Government, I have no mea-

sures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me: I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand was here, I could trust him; but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube, but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your General, I will grant him no other; the officers alone can be allowed to return into Austria: the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer he delays, the worse will be his ultimate fate."—Bour. vii. 31, 33.

(2) Rapp, 35, 36. Jom. ii. 124. Dum. xlii. 61, 68. Bour. vii. 35. See the capitulation in Dum. xlii. 396.

(3) Jom. ii. 127. Dum. xlii. 97, 98. Rapp. 36.

Gottesheim, Lichtenstein, were there—names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones which followed. Napoléon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: "Gentlemen," said he, "war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother the Emperor of Germany,—let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember, *that there are limits to all empires, however powerful*. The idea that the House of Lorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is *ships, colonies, and commerce, which I desire*; and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me." Thus spoke Napoléon on the 20th October, 1805: on the day following, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France on the field of Leipsic (4).

Little anticipating these calamities, the Emperor enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him. The Imperial soldiers, amidst all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been overcome: as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero, who filled the world with his renown; but when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them, and without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen: never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never the devotion to the Emperor so unbounded; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets (2)."

Napoléon's
message to
the Senate.

Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital,

(1) Bige. iv. 374, 375. Dum. xiii. 99, 100.

As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoléon said to the Austrian General,—"It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane Cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war: but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Such an alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed." At this mo-

ment, a general officer recounted aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. "You must have little respect for yourself," said Napoléon, with an air of marked displeasure, "to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune."—Savart, i. 101, 102.

(2) Dum. xiii. 101. Rapp, 37.

During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the Emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he had hardly ever off his clothes, incessantly on horseback; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsburg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception: he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants.—Dum. iv. 376.

Napoléon sent to the Conservative Senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he said, "Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the grand army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without farther effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the Emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say, 'the people have done theirs.'" Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Wirtemberg, and 25,000 muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies (1).

The blame of these disasters divided between Mack and the Aulic Council.

The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian Government, on General Mack; he was subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years in consequence, upon the conclusion of the war. Napoléon interceded for him, but in vain. Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoléon, and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful abridgment of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the Imperial Government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the army; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the Imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed (2). It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoléon's legions were closing

(1) *Jom.* ii. 130. *Dum.* xiii. 103, 104:

His procla. "Soldiers of the grand army! In fifteen days we have concluded a campaign. We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. That army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and his subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of 100,000 men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; from that whole army, not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers, I announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained these great advantages without incurring any risk; and what is unexampled in the history of nations,

this great result has not weakened us by the loss of 1500 men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your Emperor—to your patience in undergoing fatigues—to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that it is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little an effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amidst his customary exaggeration there was much truth in this proclamation. —*Rapp.* 47, 48.

(2) *Rapp.* 36. *Jom.* ii. 130.

around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in afterwards capitulating without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian Government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoleon; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared with an assembly of officers; and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the discreditable custom of laying down their arms on the first reverse in large bodies.

Errors of the Cabinet of Vienna in the general plan of the campaign. While these stupendous events were paralyzing the Imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and already fiercely contested on the Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two great armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men, with no enemy whatever to combat, on the Tyrol, which might at different times have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and the south of its mountains. While Mack with 80,000 men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the grand army, of double its own strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above 90,000, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige, in presence of Masséna, who had only 80,000 (1); and 20,000 men were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front than the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.

Archduke Charles kept on the defensive in Italy. No sooner was the Cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoleon's troops across Germany, and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Swabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince accordingly restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions on the Adige; retained his forces on the left

On 15. bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Masséna in his front; to depress the spirits of his soldiers by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes; and all this for no good purpose, as, before his reinforcements could emerge from the gorges of Tyrol, the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had defiled as captives before the French Emperor (2).

Forcing of the bridge of Verona by Masséna. The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps, to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself: the town properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs on the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river; and the Archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Swabia to a

(1) *Jom. ii. 139. Düm. xiii. 108, 109.*(2) *Jom. ii. 139. Düm. ii. 109. Sigal. iv. 380, 381.*

melancholy defensive, was strengthening with field works the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt in former campaigns, when Masséna, stimulated by the orders of the Emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations. He denounced, accordingly, the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th October, and in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire command of the river at that point. At midnight, on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, they attached a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists; but this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers; some threw themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced; and under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street, and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *tête-de-pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution on the part of the French general: it cost the Austrians 2000 men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number (1).

Bloody but
indecisive
actions at
Caldiero.

Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the Archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts, intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy an attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoléon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the farther advance of the French troops. Masséna remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th October, but having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoléon in the plains of Swabia, he resolved to resume the offensive; but how to assail 70,000 men, strongly intrenched, with a force not 50,000, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless he resolved upon making the attempt. The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he made his dispositions, for an attack.

To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived, that by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it: Masséna himself, with two divisions, was to

engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn his left, and Molitor, with the left wing, was to gain the mountains, and threaten his right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Masséna, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona, while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige. On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre, issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the Imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all his endeavours were unsuccessful; and though his active efforts and threatening aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the Lower Adige, the contest fell exclusively on the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the Imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery; while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Masséna and the Archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit, but they were instantly there cut to pieces by the point blank discharge of the Imperial cannon rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage; for if the French had broken several columns of Imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners, they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists (1).

On the following morning, Masséna renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river; but at daybreak they were reinforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dykes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Soon a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chivvecco del Christo, which in this quarter formed the key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General

Nordman, who commanded the Austrians, saw all his cannoneers killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterwards one of the most distinguished of the Imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the Archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige (1).

The
Archduke
resolves to
retreat to
cover
Vienna.

But notwithstanding this success, the Archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the disasters in Germany, which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the empire was laid open, and it was necessary to fly to the protection of the menaced capital. The better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward in the mountains towards the French left, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the

lake of Garda. Alarmed at this movement, Masséna stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the Archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to defile towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments which had been so obstinately contested, they found them, stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rear-guard. Masséna's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rear-guard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of his troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, he resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bachiglione, whose stream was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rear-guard in battle array the whole of the 3d November, and on

the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rear-guard, with heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Masséna, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river, having afforded by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march on the other troops, and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in the presence of a victorious enemy, commanded by such an officer as Masséna,

(1) Duménil, xlii. 143, 149. — Jom. ii. 144, 145. Austrian Official Report.

We have the best possible evidence, that of Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated upon the whole to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had

gained considerable advantages over Marmont at Caldiero; in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The Archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches. — See *Napoléon in Monte*, ii. 108, and 116, and *HARD*, viii. 499.

secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth (1).

Archduke
continues
his retreat
to Laybach
by Carinthia.
Nov. 12.

From Vicenza the Archduke retired, by forced marches, through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave, towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Saltzbouurg, or proceed by the direct route through Laybach to Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skilfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen torrents of that stream as well as the Piave and the Isonzo could afford, he conducted his march with such ability, that though it lay through narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor the spirits of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams which make their way to the great basin of the Danube (2).

Advance of
Napoleon's
army
through
Bavaria.

Meanwhile Napoléon, whose genius never appeared more strongly than in the vigour with which, by separate columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian troops. On the 24th of October he arrived at Munich, where he was received with every imaginable demonstration of joy, and a general illumination gave vent to the universal transports. Augsburg was made the grand depôt of the army, while the leading corps, under Bernadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in ceaseless march towards the Hereditary States. Speedily the Iser was passed: the French eagles were borne in exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Brannau. At the same time Marshal Ney, who had remained at Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th October, received orders to move with his whole corps upon the Tyrol, in order to clear the vast fortress which its mountains composed, of the enemy's forces, while Augereau's corps, which, having broken up from Brest, had latest come into the scene of action (3), and had recently crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was moved forward by forced marches to menace the western frontier of that romantic province.

Defensive
measures
of the
Austrians.

While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides upon the Austrian monarchy, the Cabinet of Vienna did their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacuate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower

(1) Dum. xlii. 150, 161. Jom. ii. 143.

(2) Jom. ii. 143, 144. Dum. xlii. 165, 171.

(3) Dum. xlii. 241, 248. Savary, &c. 103. 2d Part. Jom. ii. 144.

Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the Emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna (1), set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at his headquarters at Wells; the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Kienmayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such inconsiderable forces, to withstand Napoléon at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across their line of march (2), as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching, under Bennigsen and the Archduke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.

Increasing
Irritation of
Prussia.

But while every thing seemed thus to smile upon Napoléon in the south of Germany, a storm was arising in the north which menaced him with destruction. The Cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of a French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation; it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that by keeping aloof she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Germany; and hitherto success had in a surprising manner attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already

(1) "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms. To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a Conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to unite in his own hands all the ties upon which depends the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace, which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new constitution which Germany received after the peace of Lunéville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our councils. But the Sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, whilst his secret ally, the Elector Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the King of Prussia at the

very moment that he had given the most solemn promises to respect it; and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy arose from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undiminished. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare every thing to save what must be saved,—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From this spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, every thing that is great and good; but above all things unanimity, and a quick firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered, to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe and the security of thrones and of nations."

—*Ann. Reg.* 1805, 713.

(2) *Danz.* xiii, 248, 250. *Jom.* ii. 144.

been discreditable. So far from having increased the respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the great Frederick, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers; they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submissions; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the Cabinet was violently shaken; the King openly inclined to hostile measures, but the indignation of the nation knew no bounds; Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehement and generous character, could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the Queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the author of the temporizing system, rapidly sunk and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs (1).

Oct. 25.
Arrival of
Alexander
at Berlin,
and confer-
ence of a
Treaty with
Russia.

Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the King to embrace a more manly and courageous policy.

Under the influence of so many concurring causes, the French influence rapidly declined; Duroc left the capital on the 2d November, without having been able to obtain an audience for some days previously, either from

the King or Emperor; and on the day following, a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier against the ambition of the French Emperor. By this convention it was stipulated, that the treaty of Lunéville was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all the acquisitions which France had since made were to be wrested from it: Switzerland and Holland were to be restored to their independence, and without overturning the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely stipulated that they were never to centre in the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted with the notification of this convention to Napoléon, with authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation, but in case of refusal, to declare war, with an intimation, that hostilities would commence on the 15th December (2).

The conclusion of this convention was followed by a scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was ultimately attended by consequences of the highest importance upon the destinies of Europe. When they signed it, both were fully aware of the perilous nature

of the enterprise on which they were adventuring; as the Archduke Antony had arrived two days before with detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats around Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the Queen conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a bond more likely to be durable, than the mere alliances of Cabinets with each other. This was to

Recurrent
Visit to the
bank of the
Great
Frederick.

Nov. 4.

(1) Hard. viii. 479, 481. Dum. xiii. 250, 251.
Rep. in Lee Cas. iv. 229.

(2) Hard. viii. 481, 482. Martens, vii. Dum. xiii.
253, 254.

bring them together at the tomb of the great Frederick, where it was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The Emperor, who was desirous of visiting the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torch-light to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the Emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were engaged. A few hours after Alexander departed for Galicia to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune, and deeply checkered with disaster, was yet destined to be brought to so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe (1).

It would have been well for the common cause if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her Cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But after the departure of the Emperor, the old habit of temporizing returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to elapse without any operation being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from Potsdam till the 14th; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoléon was permitted to continue without interruption his advance to Vienna, while 80,000 disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank, amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr. Pitt, could not prevail on the Government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently the Cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities; forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken; that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the Emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoléon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction (2).

Landing of
the allies in
Hanover.

But though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoléon was not without very serious subject of anxiety in the north of Germany. A com-

(1) Hard. viii. 482. Dum. xiii. 254, 255.

(2) Dum. xiii. 255, 256. Hard. viii. 488, 489. Savary, i. 104.

There were not wanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from any longer adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tempelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are in presence of each other," said he; "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoléon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is

secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the allies, and that a strong body should threaten their communications with the Rhine, in order to compel them to divide their forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Rochet, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council without having come to any determination. —HARD, viii, 489.

bined force of English, Russians, and Swedes, 30,000 strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover; and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance; a sure proof of a secret understanding between the Cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the English Government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the House of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoléon contrived to paralyze the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the *Moniteur* of the formation of a powerful army of the north, of which Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the Emperor himself (1).

Operations in the Tyrol. On his right flank Marshal Ney was more successful, in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him from all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterwards the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered (2). The imperious necessity to which the Austrian Government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from Tyrol for the protection of the capital, prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the Imperial troops, Napoléon ordered Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn, right upon Innspruck, while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzbourg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenhall to the same capital, and menaced Kuffstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Deroz, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzbourg from that of Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amidst a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kuffstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the Imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolesc levies were shut up under the cannon of Kuffstein, which was soon blockaded. Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia*, a celebrated mountain intrenchment which commands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innspruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could to all appearance be assailed. An attack in front, though

(1) *Jom. ii. 145. Dum, xiii. 249.*

(2) See post Chap. L.

supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was repulsed with very heavy loss : success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions, he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in making himself master of the fort of Leitasch, in the rear of the intrenchments : from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful : securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders : in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once : as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable ; a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which they had no defence, rendered it impossible either to man the works or stand to the guns (1). A panic seized the garrison ; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides a mountain barrier, hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of 1500 prisoners (2).

Surrender of
Jellachich
and the
Prince de
Rohan.

The immediate trophy of this victory was the capture of Innspruck, with sixteen thousand stand of arms. The whole northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned ; General Jellachich, who commanded in the western part of the Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch, while the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the valley of the Inn and took post upon the Brenner, in the hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the Hereditary States. It was too late, however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with 5000 men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumphs of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Clagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince of Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with 6000 men near Nauders and Finstermung, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surrounded, and joining the garrison left in Venice. Surprising success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he sur-

(1) Bign iv. 390, 391. Jom. ii. 167, 168. Dum. xiii. 280, 283.

(2) An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had in the campaign of 1799 lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal at Innspruck one of its officers beheld them

among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolans. Instantly the intelligence spread that their lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans hastening in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the companions of their former glory.—BIGNON, iv. 394.

prised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared; Bassado was passed; and the wearied troops were joyfully winding their way across the level fields to the shores of the Laguna, when they were met by St.-Cyr, who commanded the force stationed in observation of that town, and completely defeated at Castel Franco. Di-

Nov. 24. spirited by such a succession of disasters, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still 3000 strong, was obliged to lay down

Nov. 25. its arms. At the same time the fortress of Kuffstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to march back to the Hereditary States, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, though garrisoned by 25,000 regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than the half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzbουργ to co-operate with Masséna, who was approaching the same quarter against the Archduke Charles, while Augereau withdrew to Ulm (1), to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.

Repetition
advances
into Upper
Austria.

It was not inability to defend the Tyrol which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the House of Austria had long been conspicuous; it was the pressing danger of the heart of the empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoléon's progress down the valley of the Danube was every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up: forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line

October 31. against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Muhl-dorf, the ramparts of Brannau, armed as they were with artillery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn crossed by innumerable battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable that the French Emperor gave immediate order for its conversion into the grand

Nov. 2. dépôt of the army. Meanwhile, Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the advanced guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the

Nov. 4. enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach; a more stubborn resis-

Nov. 6. tance near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the new enemy with whom they had now to contend, barely retarded the march of the invaders an hour; the determined opposition of the Austrians near the foot of the mountains (2), at the bridge of Seyer over the Ens, only delayed Marshal Davoust with the right wing of the army a day; and at length the Imperial headquarters were established at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.

The Emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops occasioned, to give a new organization to his army, with a view to the

(1) Dum. xiii. 220, 203. Jom. ii. 168, 170.

(2) Sav. ii. 102, 103. Dum. xiii. 204, 277. Jom. ii. 133, 134.

surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Lannes, which moved next to them on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube; and such directions given to the numerous corps on its right bank as were best calculated to ensure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that the Emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the north, under the command of his brother Louis, composed of six divisions; a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany; while at the same time a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times (1), the Marquis LA ROMANA, which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow in the same direction.

Austrian proposals of peace, which come to nothing.

At Lintz the Emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice with a view to a general peace. The ruined condition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, and the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian Cabinet over their long continued jealousy of France. Napoléon received the envoy courteously, but after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that propositions should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the Emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions. If these terms were not agreed to, he declared he would continue, without an hour's intermission, his march towards Vienna (2).

Kutusoff withdraws to the left bank of the Danube.

These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of their reserves, while a strong rearguard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rearguard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat; in which, although the allies were ultimately forced to retreat from the increasing multitude of the enemy (3), they long stood their

(1) Dum. xiii. 294, 298. Jom. ii. 145. Sav. ii. 103.

(2) Sav. ii. 104. Dum. xiii. 298, 300. Jom. ii. 146.

(3) A remarkable instance of courage occurred

ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St.-Polten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed, through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right, while the Emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the Imperial guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to withstand such formidable forces; either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality.

Nov. 9.
Continued
advance of
the French
towards
Vienna.

Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Lintz and

Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded for some days at least in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St.-Polten the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced: no force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry eagerly pushing

Nov. 10.

forward, on the following day reached Burkendorf, within four leagues of the capital. About the same time, Davoust, while toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and wooded Alpine ridges which formed the romantic southern barrier of the valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rearguard of Meerfelt, which, unsuspecting of evil, was pursuing its course in a southern direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of

Nov. 8.

Marmont. Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through the centre and thrown into such confusion, that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring woods and mountains, leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces of cannon in the hands of the enemy (1).

Destruction
of part of
Marmont's
corps by
Kutusoff.

But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoléon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befel them on the left.

here on the part of a French cannoner. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high-road, had seized a battery of horse artillery which was firing grape at them within half musket shot, and secured most of the gunners. One of them, however, though wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and putting the match to the touch-hole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen with such decisive effect that the whole squadron turned and fled.—*Dumas*, xiii. 303, 304.

(1) *Dum.* xiii. 307, 309. *Jum.* ii. 148, 149.

When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chassours, which he commonly wore, Napoléon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped, and inquired into the cause of her lamenta-

tations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the Emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged, and my gardener killed, by his soldiers."—"Your name?" replied he.—"De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marboeuf, formerly governor of Corsica."—"I am charmed," rejoined Napoléon. "to have the means of serving you. I am the Emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chassours of the guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with. *Rare*, 54, 55.

Murat, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French Emperor; who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger would attend those on the left bank, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which he had received

Nov. 11. to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind the columns on the right bank, and intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia, was eagerly emerging from the defiles of Diernstein, beneath the Danube and the rocky hills beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur de Lion was once immured, when he came upon the Russian rearguard under Milaradovitch, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery. He instantly commenced the attack at break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm: fresh troops arrived on both sides: the grenadiers fought man to man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff, ably conducted by the Austrian General Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had by a circuitous march through the hills reached his rear, and already occupied Diernstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal had the bulk of Kutusoff's force on his hands in front, his retreat was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army (1).

Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten their march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant cannonade from the farther extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. In truth it was the division of Dupont, which, fully aware of the imminent danger of their general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them. This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants, in the

dark or by the light of the moon, continued the strife: the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of fire-arms; while the ancient Gothic towers which once held in chains the crusading hero were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upwards of two-thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded his sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to step on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave Marshal refused to leave his comrades (1). This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with heroic courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, but who now in his turn found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grape-shot, at the moment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's division. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amidst the cries of "France! France! you have saved us," the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades (2).

Mortier re-
crosses the
Danube.

This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoléon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men, which in so mighty a host was of little consequence,—that of the allies had amounted to two-thirds of that number,—and it could easily be repaired, it was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source

Nov. 11.

of annoyance. Mortier on the day after the battle esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutusoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been clearly demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated but out-generalled; and the Moscovites, in their first serious engagement of the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle of Marengo. He paused therefore a day at St.-Polten; and abandoning all thoughts of harassing any farther the retreat of Kutusoff, turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would render totally impossible the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces (3).

Napoléon
advances
rapidly on
Vienna.

Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition upon Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges

(1) "No. 1" said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to command such brave soldiers should esteem himself too happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grape-shot; we

are almost at Diernstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—Dumas, xiv. 14.

(2) Bign. iv. 402, 403. Dum. xiv. 9, 13. Jom. ii. 151, 152. Sav. ii. 105.

(3) Jom. ii. 153. Dum. xiv. 17, 18. Sav. ii. 105.

over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not (1). Meanwhile the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it at this eventful crisis to Count Wurbna, the grand chamberlain, who executed with great fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when they found themselves deserted by Government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts; but it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoléon's headquarters to treat of a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to the terms on which an armistice could be granted; but the French Emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded, and the Tyrol, with the Duchy of Venice, be immediately ceded to France (2).

Description Built in the superb basin formed on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. Anciently the frontier station of the Roman empire against the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the frontier of civilization has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century; but the inhabitants hardly regarded as conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to an innumerable army of Turks in 1688 gave time for Sobiesky to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe from barbarian yoke. The old city is surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions; but it contains only 100,000 souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glacis, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments; but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decoration, though the church of St.-Stephens, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, possesses the greatest interest; and the Imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. But in a military point of view its capture was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only bridge below Lintz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon, and above a hundred thousand stand of arms (3).

(1) "As soon as ten o'clock on the 12th has arrived you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Giulay, before ten o'clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but, notwithstanding, use all

your efforts to secure the passage of the river."—*Orders to Murat, 12th November, 1805, in Dumas, xiv. 20.*

(2) *Jom. ii. 153, 154. Dumas. xiv. 17, 25. Sav. ii. 105.*

(3) Personal observation. *Jom. ii. 155, 156. Dumas. xiv. 23, 25.* Digitized by Google

Seizure of the bridge of Vienna.

The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he stimulated the armament of the Hungarian insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the farther prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, the French forces in great strength approached Vienna; and Napoléon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge which led across the river to the northern provinces of the empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the outposts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfeld, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridges over the Danube to Prince Auersberg, who, with a strong rearguard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the Imperial dominions. At daybreak on the 13th November, General Sébastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely followed by Murat, Lannes, and General Bertrand, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Léopold on its opposite side, and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thabor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced guard of the Austrians. Every thing was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge was wrapt in flames, and all communication with the left bank was cut off. The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops; every thing bore a friendly appearance; the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers as in time of profound peace: so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances: General Belliard advanced, with Lannes and Murat, with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter: they called out to the Imperial officers "not to fire, as the armistice was concluded;" and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French Generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge: for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French grenadiers were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible: the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grape shot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying, with a loud voice, "What are you about? do you not see?" At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward: the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that the armistice was signed: while the column advanced with a rapid step along the bridge, covering by its mass a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillery-men on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forbore to fire: the critical moment was passed; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge,

and suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoneers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by a stratagem, conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would be worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can either palliate or excuse (1).

Napoléon passes through Vienna, and establishes headquarters at Schoenbrunn. This surprise of the bridge of Vienna gave the highest satisfaction to Napoléon, and it was in truth one of the most important events of the campaign. It was now in his power, from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force either against the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased; the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. Impatient to profit by such extraordinary good fortune, the Emperor, at daybreak the following morning, crossed the bridge and established his headquarters at Schoenbrunn, from which the young Archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to regain his communications with the allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna; the hospital train were established there; the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been ordered up from Metz and Strasbourg; while one-half of the army, passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kuffstein in Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles (2).

Subsequent movements of the armies. The unexpected surprise of the bridge of Vienna contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his mastery movement across the Danube were now lost; the river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoléon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit in different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Noslitz, on the 15th November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rearguard of the Imperialists was soon overtaken, encumbered as it was with great loads of artillery and stores, which had been taken from the arsenal of Vienna: one hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, and equipments to an immense amount, fell almost without a combat into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of

(1) Bour. vii. 49, 50. Rapp. 56, 60. Sav. ii. 105, 106. Dum. xiv. 27, 31. Jour. ii. 157, 159.

(2) Sav. ii. 107, 108. Dum. xiv. 31, 33. Bour. vii. 50, 51.

the whole cavalry and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaim before the enemy, which, if done, would have prevented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. Meanwhile, Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian General, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable (1).

Picture of Kutusoff in parrying the attempts of the French to circumvent him. Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaim, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of an armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns; but he soon found that he had a very different antagonist to deal with in such an attempt from the unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shewn themselves superior in address to all the diplomatists of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia; while, in the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied (2). Murat fell into the snare: Bagration, who was in presence of the French videttes with 8000 men, indeed remained stationary: but meanwhile, the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaim, which opened up their communication with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves which were approaching. The Emperor Napoléon was highly indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but before his answer could be received, twenty hours had been gained, Znaim was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagration and his division in presence of the enemy (3).

Heroic action of Bagration, who at length makes good his retreat. At noon on the 16th despatches arrived from Napoléon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagration to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army: nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to the last man to their country. He was soon assailed at once in front and both flanks, by Lannes, Oudinot, and Murat; to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian

of the French Emperor, and meanwhile caused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagration to almost certain ruin: but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps."

—Dumas, xiv. 48.

(3) *Jom. ii.* 160, 161. *Dum. xiv.* 44, 51. *Bign. iv.* 432, 434.

(1) *Jom. ii.* 159, 160. *Dum. xiv.* 33, 36, 45. *Rev. ii.* 108.

(2) "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in my view nothing but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The Adjutant-General, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that

position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Muscovites made good their ground : in vain column after column bravely advanced to the attack : the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however; the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed : the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved by a constant feeling towards the centre; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle : man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of fire-arms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night; and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife 3000 Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagration effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly 3000, unbroken from amidst 40,000 enemies : a glorious achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino (1).

Nothing now could prevent the junction of the allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau in Moravia, without farther molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoléon. It was no longer a dispirited band of 40,000 men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own, but a vast army, 75,000 strong, animated by the presence of the Emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoléon was in consequence daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army : the Archduke Charles, with 70,000 tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south : the Hungarian insurrection was organizing in the east : 75,000 Russians were in his front : while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with 80,000 men on his communications. The measures of Napoléon were calculated with his wonted ability to ward off so many concurring dangers. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies with whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expand forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained and a moral impression produced, and concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to disseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria : Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria to observe the Archduke Charles : Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians : Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, were removed towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with the 40,000 men who had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the upper Danube; while Mortier with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The corps of Soult

and Lannes, with the imperial guard and the cavalry under Murat, advanced on the road to Brunn to make head against the now united Russian armies (1).

Conduct of the French at Vienna. Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the gates were open, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in the occupation of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government was organized throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and then next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and even considerable payments made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments, —admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendant of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under authority of Napoléon himself, and the coercion of private plunder had not been all turned to the account of the great Imperial robber (2). At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the war were, as usual, ascribed to the English and the corrupting influence of their gold, while, with a rudeness unworthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne, the character and influence of the Empress herself (3).

Forces on the two sides. Meanwhile the allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau; 104 battalions, including 20 Austrian, and 159 squadrons, of which 50 were of same nation, presented a total of 75,000 effective men. A division of the Imperial guard, under the Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly 90,000. The forces which the French Emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great array were much less considerable, and hardly amounted at that moment to 70,000 combatants; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmutz before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their Sovereign, whose presence amongst them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers; but in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but

(1) Dum. xiv. 55, 58. Jom. ii. 162, 163. Biga. iv. 435.

(2) The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000 sterling, a sum fully equivalent to L.8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest at Vienna, were immense; 2000 pieces of artillery, of

which 500 were heavy for siege: 100,000 muskets; 600,000 quintals of powder; 600,000 balls; and 160,000 bombs. 15,000 muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—See Bioron, iv. 412.

(3) Biga. iv. 412, 417. Jom. ii. 167. Dum. xiv. 37, 40.

the indomitable firmness of northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground against them (1).

Nov. 20. The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoléon reconnoitres advanced his headquarters to Brunn, a fortified place, containing the fields of considerable magazines recently abandoned by the allies, and which Austerlitz. afforded him the immense advantage of a secure dépôt for his stores, sick, and

Nov. 25. wounded, in the immediate vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, when out on horseback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood, with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a strategical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. The two chief roads of that part of Moravia, that from Nikolsbourg to Olmutz, and from Brunn towards Hungary by Holitsch, cross at that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here : within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this intersection of the roads led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced guard of the French, in presence of Napoléon himself, and the rear guard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the enemy compelled the allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced guard of Masséna had entered into communication with Marmont's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the grand army, so that Napoléon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany (2).

Dangers of his situation. But all this notwithstanding, the French Emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Masséna and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archdukes Charles and John, nearly 90,000 strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their arms. The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Archduke Constantine at headquarters had already raised their efficient force to 80,000 men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmutz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by 20,000 of the soldiers of the Great Frederick (3). Every thing depended upon striking a decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties.

Nov. 25. The more to inspire the allies with the false confidence which Simulate negotiations might lead to such a result, Napoléon despatched Savary with a on both sides letter to the Emperor Alexander to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his arrival with his army, and propose terms of accommodation to gain time. (4). About the same time Counts Giulay and Stadion arrived at the

(1) Dum. xiv. 61, 63. Journ. ii. 165, 166. Bign. iv. 435.

(2) Bign. iv. 436. Dum. xiv. 104, 105, 118.

(3) Dum. xiv. 120, 121. Bign. iv. 438, 439. Journ. ii. 171, 172.

Nov. 25. (1) "Sire," said Napoléon, "I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty,

to offer you my compliments on your arrival at the headquarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your Majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your Majesty will receive him with that consideration for which you are so eminently distinguished,

headquarters of the French Emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoléon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgorucki, whom Napoléon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoléon, when the aide-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Emperor Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease betwixt us." The Russian represented that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his Cabinet, and that the Emperor had only taken up arms to succour Austria, and obtain for the Continent a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter or animosity against France, which he desired to see powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast that its extension was no object of ambition; and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects. Napoléon replied, that the allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgoroucki denied; and he denied also that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia;

and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you." I pray God to keep your Imperial Majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmutz, on the 27th, in these terms:—"I have received, sir, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments: I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you: receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declaiming against the ambition of the French Government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The Emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him; it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The Emperor said, when I put the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. It is long since he has been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only Grand Duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters and met with nothing but obloquy from the other Cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian Cabinet to take the lead, to induce the other powers of Europe, to recognize the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence. I have been called on by them to concur with them in establishing an order of things which may tranquillize all parties; and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted; but I will never desert an ally

in distress, or separate my cause from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but not beyond the reach of remedy. I command brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandisement? Since the peace of Lunéville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposition."

"Genoa has been acquired by us," answered Savary, "in spite of ourselves. Its political power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has regained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with Republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The Emperor, in sending me to your Majesty, was far from doubting that the war took its origin in these questions; if so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility." It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission; but effectually gained its real design in making the French Emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the allied headquarters.—SAVARY, li. 112, 128.

but admitted that they insisted on the independence of Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. "Let the Emperor of Russia imitate my conduct," said Napoléon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation."—"He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgorucki.—"Then we must fight," rejoined Napoléon. "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But though it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the allies as to the real state of affairs. The Emperor met him at the advanced posts, as if solicitous, to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward, field works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army, and Dolgorucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French Emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed (1).

Haugwitz arrives from Berlin. On the same day, Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in the treaty of November 3. Since that time the measures of the Cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover; a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade; and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia, and all the former authorities reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia; while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia to bring immediate succour to the allied army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian Müller had wrought up the public mind to a perfect frenzy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoléon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He therefore resolved to temporize, and if possible dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. He therefore refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amidst the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily obeyed his directions (2).

The allies advance to Wissemb. When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the north and south, it was the obvious policy of the allies to remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmutz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had descended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The Russian troops, miserably provided at that period with com-

(1) Sav. ii. 115, 128. Bign. iv. 437, 442.

When Dolgorucki had retired, Napoléon said to the officers around him, "The allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre, before they make such propositions;" a remarkable expression,

which subsequent events rendered prophetic.—Bova. vii. 87.

(2) Hard. viii. 497, 498. Bign. iv. 437, 438. Jom. ii. 171. Digitized by Google

miseries, and totally destitute of magazines in that part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions; while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply supplied with provisions of all sorts. The allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brunn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in echelon in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the left flank of the French army, cut them off from their communication with Vienna and the reserve under Masséna, and at the same time establish their own connection with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. The movement commenced on the 27th at day-

Nov. 27. break, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy. The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an assailant; a detachment

Nov. 28. was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Rausnitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagration. Encouraged by this success of its advanced guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischau, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz (1).

Preparatory movements on both sides. This sudden irruption produced an immediate concentration of the French army. Murat, Lannes, and Soult received orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brunn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians alone at Iglau, and advance by forced marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsbourg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brunn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. In this way Napoléon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than 50,000 strong, would be raised in a few days to 90,000 men; but before these distant succours could arrive, great successes might be obtained, and the Emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were reassembled. Fortunately for him, their movements were

Nov. 29. slow and vacillating. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force towards the French left: but on the day

Nov. 30. following they retraced their footsteps, and, advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hoqueditz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching across their position towards the right of the army. Napoléon spent the whole of both days on horseback, at the advanced posts, watching their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right towards Brunn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design, the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy (2). Austerlitz was evacuated, and

(1) *Dum.* xiv. 150, 152. *Hard.* viii. 506, 506.
Jom. ii. 172.

(2) *Norv.* ii. 407, 408. *Jom.* ii. 174, 175. *Dum.* xiv. 133, 134. *Bign.* iv. 439, 440.

the French army concentrated round Brunn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries.

At length, on the morning of the 1st December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifested. Napoléon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched, with intense anxiety, their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops who had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Hohenlinden had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous operations in war—a flank march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that too when that enemy was Napoléon at the head of 75,000 men (1).

Allied order
of battle.

Meanwhile the allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut them off from Vienna, and throw them back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which it was hoped would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. Their first column under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Aujezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Pratzen, directly before their right wing; the third, under Prybyszeweki, crowned the eminences immediately behind that elevated point; the fourth and fifth, under Milaradowitch and Lichtenstein, followed in order, shewing their flank to the enemy, and stretching along the whole front of his position: while the reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz. In all, 114 battalions and 172 squadrons, amounting to full eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition (2).

Description
of the field
of battle.

The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position, in advance of the fortress of Brunn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. The Emperor's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brunn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues and a-half from the former place, a little in front of Bollowitz, between the two streams which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Punlowitz (3). From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fish-ponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the lake Moenitz, formed by the confluence, in that undulated country, of the two rivulets above mentioned; their left on the Bosenitzberg—an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain

(1) Hard. viii. 506, 507. Dum. xiv. 133, 135. Nov. ii. 408. Jom. ii. 175, 176. Sav. ii. 130.

(2) Dum. xiv. 134, 135. Nap. ii. 176.

(3) These names will convey no idea to readers

in this country; but they will be of value to the traveller who explores in that distant region the theatre of this memorable conflict.

which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the March, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which on either side bordered the streams, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brunn to Olmutz, and by various country roads, from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence. Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, by the line of waving heights, gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge, sought, to conceal the general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoleon (1).

Disposition of the French troops. By great exertions, the French Emperor had succeeded in assembling an immense force for the decisive battle which was approaching. The left wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advance guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Rosenitzberg. Next to these were placed the corps of Bernadotte, who by forced marches had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high-road, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the Imperial guard, under Bessières, in second line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, who by incredible efforts had come up from Hungary, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the abbey of Raygern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the lake Moenitz. Before the night of the 1st December, above ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues; all veterans hured to war, and burning with impatience to signalize themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow (2).

Personal observation of the French Emperor. Napoléon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, speaking to the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a decisive blow;" and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs, animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which, so often on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won (3). Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires

fire if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first strokes, for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manoeuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious; while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the

(1) Personal observation. *Ann. riv.* 126, 143. *Jour. N.* 125, 126.

(2) *Ann. riv.* 142, 147. *Sav. H.* 131, 134. *Jour. N.* 177.

(3) "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Ausau at Olm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hohenlinden, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blow. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the

were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled with the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved Emperor, celebrated thus, by the spontaneous combustion of the wood of their huts and straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation (1).

Movements
on both
sides in the
morning.

The night was cold but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly enabled the sentinels to discern each other at ten yard's distance.

At four in the morning the Emperor mounted on horseback. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the south eastern parts of the horizon; and all the reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, their orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Tilnitz, the outermost village in their possession on that side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoléon hear the sound of distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced; every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared. Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the summit of the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day; and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun rose in unclouded brilliancy—that “Sun of Austerlitz” which he so often afterwards apostrophized as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life. As the mist sunk and the upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent: the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted; it was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Tilnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoléon saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour, and turning to Soult, said, “How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?”—“Less than twenty minutes,” replied the Marshal; “for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs; the enemy cannot see them.”—“In that case,” said Napoléon, “let us wait twenty

clearer indication of the mutual confidence, which long service together had established between them.
—See Dumas, xiv. 148, 149.

(1) Dum. xiv. 148, 149. Sav. ii. 132, 133. Jon. ii. 176, 177.

minutes; when the enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right, towards Tilnitz, and an aide-de-camp arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoléon; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time the Emperor mounted his horse, and riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers," said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder (1)."

Battle of
Austerlitz. The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the allies were sailing in a wide semi-circle round their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action; but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their superiority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Tilnitz, and Buxhowden was advancing through the defile which leads from thence to Sokelnitz, beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoléon ordered Davoust, who with his reserve was concealed behind the abbey of Bayern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up Sokelnitz also was carried, amidst loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokelnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of cannon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution (2).

Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth Russian column, under Kollowrath, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, which preceded it, when its outpost perceived the immense dark mass of French infantry emerging out in the mist of the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been committed, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was wanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Pratzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Milaradowitch rapidly wheeled into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult had ascended the heights: its attack was so impetuous, that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Pratzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' dura-

(1) *Dum.* xiv. 160, 161. *Jom.* ii. 179, 180. *Sav.* ii. 132, 134. *Bign.* iv. 444.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 183. *Dum.* xiv. 160, 165. *Norv.* ii. 410.

tion, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the allied army, surprised in their line of march, were pierced through the centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army (1).

While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte and Lannes, were also warmly engaged with the enemy. They too surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoléon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. They advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in order of battle, the second in columns, with the artillery between them, and Murat in reserve with the cavalry behind the second line: a disposition every where attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, when moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunder-struck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist in the low grounds; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand Duke Constantine was one of the first to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, however, were speedily made: the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, were wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellermann were assailing even the imperial Russian guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Austrian cuirassiers, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoléon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain (2).

This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive success to either party: but it had long the desired effect of preventing any succours being sent from that quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult. At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make head against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: they joined the horse of Ouvaroff, and formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the allies. Meanwhile the Grand Duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were

(1) Dum. xiv. 170, 172. Jom. ii. 185, 186. Bign. iv. 445.

(2) Dum. xiv. 176, 181. Jom. ii. 186. Bign. iv. 445, 446.

The combat of Lannes and Bernadotte, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops, arranged in the order prescribed by Napoléon, baffled all the efforts of the allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array; the second in squares of battalions—the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arrayed in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse,

which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares in the rear, from whose front and flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to bring them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition to baffle the most terrific charges of the finest cavalry in the world.—See Dumas, xiv. 183.

making on his own side, brought forward the Russian Imperial guard, and descending from the heights, advanced midway into the low grounds to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by the Russian cuirassiers of the guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the French column was broken: three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th regiment lost its eagle. Napoléon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder; and immediately ordered up Marshal Bessières with the cavalry of the guard to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and, preceded by four pieces of horse-artillery, set off at the gallop to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there; they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to re-form their squadrons after their glorious success when this fierce enemy was upon them: they were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, they returned to the charge: both imperial guards met in full career: the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. The infantry on both sides advanced to support their comrades; the resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, company to company, man to man, they fought with invincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewn with the dead and the dying. At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their guard gave way, and after losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz (1); while from a neighbouring eminence the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army (2).

This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing, between Aujezd and Sokelnitz to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoléon caused his reserves and imperial guard to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokelnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of 6000 men, who were retracing their steps, too late to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated and half of its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate: and the survivors from his divisions, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central column of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouche from Aujezd with a

(1) Rapp, 61, 62. Dum. xiv. 191, 195. Jom. ii. 197, 198. Sev. ii. 136, 136.

(2) It is the moment when Rapp returned with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive

success, that Gerard has selected for the admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz. —Rapp, 62.

view to regain, by a road between the margin of the lakes in his rear and the high grounds which adjoin them to the south, the remains of the army at Austerlitz. But before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle, and separating Buxhowden with a few battalions in advance from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear, by the imperial guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance they were at length overwhelmed: 7000 were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, a frozen lake or morass which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shells from the French batteries bursting below the surface caused it to crack with a loud explosion: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above 2000 brave men were swallowed up in the waves (1).

While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight of their battalions on the heights which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes, Bérnadotte, and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat continued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse; but at noon the allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Krüh, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagration, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass, and dislodging it from the road of Olmutz, where almost the whole of the baggage of the allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution Bagration succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army (2).

Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoléon; that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; and the stroke which at once reestablished his affairs and prostrated Europe was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners (3); a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards remained the trophies of the victor's triumph; and the disorganisation of the combined forces was complete. It is true these advantages had been dearly purchased; twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the allies were cut off from the road to Olmutz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank, while Napoléon's victorious legions thundered in their rear. Such was the

(1) Dum. xiv. 195, 203. Jom. ii. 189, 190. Sav. ii. 137.

(2) Jom. ii. 190, 191. Dum. xiv. 182, 189. Sav. ii. 136. Bign. iv. 449.

(3) The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a large proportion of them were wounded.

consternation produced by this disaster that; at a council held at midnight at the Emperors' lodgings, it was resolved by a great majority that the farther prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoléon to propose an armistice (1).

Emperor of Napoleon's situation notwithstanding his success. There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoléon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war; and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses; but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Moscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of 80,000 men, in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent, Masséna, was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising *en masse* at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Iglau. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmutz; while Prussia, with 100,000 men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to advance farther into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat without commencing a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power (2)?

The Austrian and his ambition. Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoléon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without farther danger, but the utmost possible éclat. As on the Carinthian mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were within his grasp. The better to increase the terror of his arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and, appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders in the mean time for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour (3).

Meanwhile the allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the

(1) *Jom.* ii. 190, 193. *Dum.* xiv. 207, 209. *Sav.* ii. 137. *Bign.* iv. 450, 451.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 191. *Dum.* xiv. 208, 210. *Hard.* iv. 2, 4. *Sav.* ii. 134.

(3) *Bign.* iv. 452. *Jom.* ii. 191, 192. *Dum.* xiv. 209, 210.

Dec. 4.
Interview
of Emperor
Francis
with Napo-
léon.

attacks made on its rearguard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the chateau of Hollitch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitch, in order to be ready for the conference which Napoléon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the road side near Sarutchitz, still shewn to travellers, where the fire of a bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoléon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months."—"You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two Emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoléon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the Allies. Every thing, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amidst universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilized world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissension on the Continent, and, secure from attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoléon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins (1).

Armistice
with Russia.

The conference lasted two hours, after which the two Emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of mutual esteem. The conditions had been verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Presburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference, but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without farther molestation, to their own country (2). Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which was immediately agreed to; and, without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoléon immediately stopped the advance of his columns (3). In truth, after the secession of Austria, the

(1) See this admitted in *Dum.* xiv. 214, 216. *Bign.* iv. 453.

(2) Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it, in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Marche was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeld. Davoust had already commanded his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the

Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the Emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful, as, independent of the Austrians, 20,000 Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—See *SAVARY*, ii. 144, 145.

(3) Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's head

war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate in being able to extricate his army without farther danger, from its perilous situation. Anxious to conciliate the good will of so powerful an adversary, Napoléon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, without exchange; and Alexander set out two days after by post, for St.-Petersburg (1).

Armistice of Austerlitz. On the 6th December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated, that, until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was levelled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the Cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered on so untoward an occasion. Napoléon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the wounded and widows of those who had fallen in the battle (2). At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners, above sixteen thousand in number, in the most ostentatious manner through the streets of Vienna on their road to France (3), and returned himself to Schoenbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Presburg (4).

Dissolution of Prussia, and accommodation with that power. Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the great Frederick, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the toils of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand Duke Constantine and Prince Dolgoroucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposition of the Prussian Cabinet if they would vigorously prosecute the war; but the veteran diplomatist to whom

quarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed; and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manœuvres has never given me time to succour the menaced points: every where you were at least double the number of our forces."—"Sire," replied Savary, "your Majesty has been misinformed. Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less than yours; and even of that the whole was not very warmly engaged; but we manœuvred much, and these same divisions combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the Emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your Majesty, by accepting the armistice, does not dispose it otherwise."—"What guarantee does your master require?" replied Alexander, "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?"—"He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust."—"I give it with pleasure," rejoined the Emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St.-Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—SAVARY, ii. 112, 113.

(1) Sav. ii. 140, 141. Dum. xiv. 216, 218. Bigu. iv. 454.

(2) In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy, "Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory: peace cannot now be far removed. When every thing necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy: and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'There is a brave man.'" Liberal gratifications at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 3000 francs each; and the common soldiers a Napoléon each: the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or L.240; of the colonels, 2400, or L.96; of the common men, 200, or L.8 sterling yearly.—See SAVARY, ii. 148, and BIGNON, iv. 460.

(3) Bigu. iv. 460. Dum. xiv. 214, 222. Sav. ii. 148.

(4) On his road there, Napoléon met a large convey of wounded Austrians on their rout for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the waggons passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune." So well did this great man know how to win the affections and command the admiration of the very soldiers who had, lavished their best blood in combating his power.

the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Haugwitz as already mentioned, had come to Vienna to declare war against Napoléon, and the 15th December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French Emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing could be more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his view of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessory, it was now likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part. But not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a step farther. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to secure a part of the spoils of his former allies; and if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least wrest from England those

Dec. 7. continental possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery he changed the whole object of his mission; and when admitted into the presence of Napoléon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions until the conclusion of a peace between France and England (1).

Although Napoléon had not received full accounts of the treaty of 3d November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, 30,000 strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslaw. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into a vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet; informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations; and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole forces against them; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovisioned, were in no condition to make any defence; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their matchless perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best founded causes of animosity: on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England; but this could be only on one condition—that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into the French alliance. On these terms he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with their dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria. Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations: and it was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Bareuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as well as all the other continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neufchatels and Cleves to France; and accede to all

Treaty of
alliance
with Prussia,
who gains
Hanover.

the conditions of the general peace of Presburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed by Haugwitz on December 13, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. Thus the Prussian Minister extricated himself, not only without loss, but with apparent advantage, from his perilous situation. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous: it excited a just indignation in the Government of Great Britain (1), without really propitiating that of France (2); and by inducing a false security in the Cabinet of Berlin; rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved (3).

To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Presburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the North of Germany, which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria.

The Court of Naples had entered somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France. Notwithstanding the treaty of 1st September, already mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated, a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three thousand English troops, cast anchor in the bay of Naples, and

Affairs of Naples. (1) As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the Cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say that it was signed by Haugwitz, of his own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the Government at home: and that of far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the prejudice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that four days after the treaty

Dec. 19th was signed, a long and official note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English Ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Berlin as a declaration of war, and various arrangements were proposed for the farther continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterwards, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that Minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French Ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoleon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his habitual disregard of truth, some months afterwards, published, in the *Moniteur*, an article, in which he declared, that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the Cabinet; and that he had for "base bribes prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent." [See 24th bulletin, and *Moniteur*, No. 106.] This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoleon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled: "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the Treaty of 3d November Napoleon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair; but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach."—See BIGNON, v. 246, and HANDELSBERG, ix. 30, 42.

Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were well known. The war party, in particular, with

the Queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment a friendly and allied power. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the Cabinet: national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed that the treaty was ratified only under the following reservations:—That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only; a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction.—See HANDELSBERG, ix. 50, 59; BIGNON, v. 241, 242.

(2) "The conduct of Prussia," said Mr. Fox, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Parliament, "was a union of every thing that was contemptible in servility with every thing that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces; but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, that of being compelled to become the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master."—23d April, 1806, *Parl. Deb.* vi. 691.

(3) Hard. ix. 47, 49. Bign. v. 17, 19. Sav. ii. 149, 150.

"You have come," said Napoleon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory; but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoleon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on; but he prudently determined in the mean time to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by unbroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unfixed, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—See BIGNON, v. 14.

Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were well known. The war party, in particular, with

soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the allies, what in effect happened, that this armament would have the effect of embroiling the Court with the French Emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality and inability to resist the allied forces; and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France; but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The Queen did every thing in her power to engage the Cabinet in the war, and the French ambassador disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the Court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the Government, seeing a war inevitable, was taking measures for organizing a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, like a flash of lightning, to deliver them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor (1).

And of the
north of
Germany.

It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British Government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the King's German legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to 18,000 men, which arrived, in October, in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of 12,000 men, and a Russian force, under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of 10,000; and it was the intention of the Allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and after freeing the United States from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscarriage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the Cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the Allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order to accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was to dissolve this ill combined armament; the Russians retired to Mecklenberg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund (2).

Peace of
Presburg,
27th Dec.
1805.

The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoléon, were not long of being brought to a close. By the peace of Presburg she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Inviertel;

(1) Bot. iv. 198, 409. Ann. Reg. 1805, 192. Jan. ii. 198, 199. Eign. v. 25, 37.

(2) Jan. ii. 196, 197. Ann. Reg. 1805, 197, 198.

to the kingdom of Italy, the whole continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognized. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were elevated to the throne of their respective dominions, with large accessions of territory to each : to the former, besides the Tyrol and Voralberg, the principality of Echstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany ; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzbourg and the possessions of the Teutonic order, which, from their dispersion in different states, were almost a nominal acquisition. But what was of still greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage " to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the Kings of Wirtemberg or Baden might think proper to adopt,"—a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic empire. The counter-stipulations were entirely illusory : Napoléon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic Confederacy, which he held in chains ; and that of the Batavian Republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis (1).

Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided, that Austria was to pay a contribution of 40,000,000 francs, or £1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered provinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for their behoof (2). But her Government judged wisely that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire ; and therefore they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large portion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior

(1) Martens, iv. Sup. vi. 212, 229. Journ. H. 1795. Decr. xiv. 236, and 300, 351.

(2) The losses of Austria by this treaty were,—

	Population.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
She received	2,975,620	1,417	17,075,000
	271,600	80	2,900,000
Clear loss	2,704,020	1,331	14,175,000
Bavaria gained	681,600	528	3,400,000
Wirtemberg gained	132,400	52	691,000
Baden gained	143,620	54	508,000
Kingdom of Italy gained	1,856,000	711	10,000,000

And thus, the sums drawn from Austrian contributions and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or £3,500,000.—MARTENS, iv. 472, and BEAUCON, v. 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly elected states stood as follows :—

	Population.	Army.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
Bavaria	3,259,000	60,000	1,760	22,000,000
Wirtemberg	1,154,000	20,000	346	8,000,000
Baden	569,000	10,000	290	6,000,000
Net Amalg retained	24,900,000	230,000	10,936	110,000,000

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederick.—MARTENS, iv. 472, 474. App. and 29, 24, and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens, par le Baron Lianzoni*.

to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through a war of twenty years' duration, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people—a memorable example of the vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion (1).

Dethronement of the King of Naples.

This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in European history—the pronouncing a sentence of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French Emperor. On the 26th December a menacing proclamation proceeded from Presburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evidently bore marks of Napoléon's composition, against the House of Naples. The conqueror announced, that Marshal St.-Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal Queen, and precipitate her from the throne. We have pardoned that infatuated King, who thrice has done every thing to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? shall we a fourth time trust a Court without faith, without honour, without reason?—No! *the dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign*—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown." St.-Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which Napoléon afterwards pronounced against the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own (2).

Reflections on this step.

This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only meditating hostilities against the French Emperor, had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and at the same time descriptive of that mixture of caution and prudence by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The Ambassador and Cabinet of Naples, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the Court, under the like menaces, on the 8th October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the Bay of Naples six weeks afterwards liberated them from their apprehensions, and the Cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude; but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity: How often,

(1) Harl. ix. 17, 19, 25. Dum. xiv. 426, 428.

It is evident; from the statistical details given in the preceding note, that Napoléon had no intention, by the peace of Presburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependent on France, between his empire and the Hereditary States, the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Wirtemberg to the north of those mountains: Talleyrand, improving

upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danubé, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a perpetual bone of contention between the Cabinets of Vienna and St.-Petersburg; but Napoléon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with whom he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty, with a view to turning his undivided force against England. — See BROWNE, v. 67.

(2) Sign. v. 24. Harl. ix. 20.

on this principle, has Napoléon himself deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry? And what excuse is to be made for the Revolutionary Government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and every where rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom! But this has in every age been the system of the Revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoléon had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated Republics, but of subsidiary Crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwarlike, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and Prussia: and without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

Napoléon's return to Vienna, Munich, the Rhine, and Paris. The remaining career of Napoléon during this memorable year was a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers (1) and at the same time complimented the burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous: the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. At Munich he arrived on the 31st December, and on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the Elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Joséphine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugène Beauharnais, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stéphanie Beauharnais, adopted daughter of the French Emperor. On this occasion Napoléon, in de-

(1) "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have, in the last autumn, made two campaigns—you have seen your Emperor share your dangers and your fatigues—I wish also that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first people in the universe. You shall all be there—we shall celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns in the field of

honour—the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, or resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies on the continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoléon was contemplating a Prussian war.—*Bioxo*, v. 41.

fault of his own lawful issue, called Eugène Beauharnais to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the Senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise*, between all the states in alliance with the French empire, which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strasbourg, the Emperor recrossed the same river at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amidst applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th January. A hundred days! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumph of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar (1): but destined to be eclipsed by another hundred days, in future times, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which shall endure till time itself shall be no more (2).

Reflections
on the cam-
paign.

The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of August the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the coalesced powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in four months! In the first division of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against the Republic: in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and yielded only, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoléon, and the scientific combinations of Moreau: but in the third she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with France! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than its celerity; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoléon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Directory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var? Blunders undoubtedly were committed; misfortunes occurred; but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign; and in the long catalogue of Imperial fatuity parallels are not wanting to the advance to Ulm or the flank march of Austerlitz. What was it then which made those false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable, and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but the overthrow of empires, and the dissolution of confederacies?

This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French Emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the Hereditary States, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, but a great navi-

(1) Bign. v. 39, 53. Dum. xiv. 237, 239.

(2) The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoléon; but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by

any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the Senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, li. 209.

importance of the valley of the Danube as the theatre of contest between France and Austria. gable river constantly furnished the means of transport and supplies to his army. In former wars, the contest lay in corners of the empire; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat: but in the present all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation, with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commanders, to the Italian plains, on which side the empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoléon in person, to an inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced commander. The ruinous effects of this error were perceived, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. Like a skilful player at chess, Napoléon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities: and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rhaetian Alps.

Dangers of Napoléon's position before the battle. This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk; and it was evident even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the Allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated him from the most perilous situation in which he had stood since the commencement of his career. At Marengo Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was open by the St.-Gothard and the St.-Bernard: at Campo Formio the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau with a vast force was preparing to advance to his support through southern Germany; but before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived: the Archduke Charles, with 80,000 men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and already nearly equal to his own. Delay in such circumstances was ruin: advance with such force in his rear was impossible: retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe: great as the talents of Napoléon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous moral retribution.

Vast growth of the military power of France since the peace.

But though this rapid advance to the heart of the empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French Emperor, yet it was by no means the principal: and though perhaps his triumphs might not have been so rapid, the result would

probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoléon poured down the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Masséna held the Archduke Charles in check in Italy with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast never had before been brought into action at any period of the war : nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort : it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men (1) that France maintained the contest, and she was capable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period. It was at once evident, upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace, than nine years of previous warfare : and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them.

Similar growth during peace characterized all the reign of Napoléon.

This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandisement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoléon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Lunéville, moderation and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions ; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded ; every interval of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces or the annexation of some minor state to his dominions ; and he never appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances and been longest on terms of the most apparent cordiality. Five years of continental peace followed the treaty of Lunéville ; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprung up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoléon on its termination : ten years of neutrality or alliance with the Cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Basle : but at one stroke he felled the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when she at last took up arms : for twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet ; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions : he proposed eternal friendship to

(1) Strength of the French army in August, 1805.

Troops of the line,	341,000 men.
Light infantry,	100,130
Light horse,	60,554
Heavy horse, or of the line,	18,944
Artillery,	46,469
Engineers,	900
Gendarmerie,	15,691
Imperial guard,	3,500

Besides Coast guard, 100,000 strong, 590,208

Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterwards led to the Kremlin. It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms the true and unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British Cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first signalized England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing time in warfare, even on that element where his power was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities, —an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted, in 1800, that before five years had elapsed, Napoléon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit than if he had foretold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign. Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of turning to such account every interval of war: and the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views; for while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

Great abilities displayed by Napoléon in the arrangements for this campaign. Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoléon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the Hereditary States, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army; the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coasts of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and the banks of the Elbe, were made to arrive each at the hour appointed around the ramparts of Ulm; the swift advance on Vienna; the subsequent fanlike dispersion of the army to overawe the Hereditary States; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross march of the Allied Sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French Emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organization which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which was the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Rivoli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the fierce tempest of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of the general: the previous preparations of the Emperor, the deeply matured combinations of the statesman, produced their natural results: he did not now take the field with a force which left any thing to chance; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate; and the fruit

of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few month's duration.

Errors of
the allies.

Great, however, as were the abilities, unbounded the resources of the French Emperor in this memorable campaign, it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the Allied Cabinets, had their full share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field, and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, they exposed Mack, with an inferior force, to the shock of Napoléon in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralyzed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated, thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops and giving the invader time to envelope with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the preceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to and stopping the advance of the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horse-flesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy. When the rapid advance of Napoléon towards Vienna threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and every thing depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into his hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the Allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when every thing counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumulating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undiscouraged veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with a hundred thousand men, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his rear, the allies must inevitably have led him to destruction or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence impelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction (1).

(1) In a memoir presented to the British Government by the Cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Presburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed—1. To the failure, on the part of the Allied powers, to realize in the north of Germany those promised diversions which might have prevented him from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover on the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2. To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back upon the Inn, or see itself cut off from

its base of operations. 3. To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutsoff in the Hereditary States, remained immovable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, in consequence of the armaments of Prussia, which, until its intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5. To the negligence of Prince Anserberg in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at

Unknown effects of the intervention of Prussia. But most of all is Prussia answerable for the disasters of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: Mr Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror, that he contemned her menaces, despised her power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part—then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillations of ten years, and, by a cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that if she had done so such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for his army to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoléon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearance, have prevented to Europe are considered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporizing policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia more than any other power these misfortunes had been owing; so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them.

Ability displayed by Mr. Pitt in the formation of this coalition. In fact, the forces which Mr. Pitt had now arrayed for this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished: the continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armies fully adequate to the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom; the presence of a common danger had at that moment at least extinguished their jealousies. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and 500,000 veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense; and the powers who had suffered so much from

Vienna, which at once gave them the command of both banks, and exposed Kutusoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Razhdowens.—See HAAS, viii. 511.

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the enormous calamities of the campaign. But without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted, that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillations of the former power from the first paralyzed both Russia and England: the former by detaining those forces long in Poland, which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoleon

on the Danube. Hanover was the ill-gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophes of Jena and Tilsit. England must take her share also of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command, [Hard, viii. 512.] but also by obtaining from all continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her sea-girt citadel, had then 500,000 men in arms. Had she despatched 80,000 of this vast force early in the campaign to a decisive point: had her troops marched to the shores of Kent when the legions of Napoleon broke up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of the troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

French ambition were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor interfere in the internal frame of its government (1). Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggression in future, alone were to be insisted on. To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justice of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr. Pitt necessarily intrusted the execution of its details to the allied sovereigns or their generals; and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross-march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make, and he spared none, were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr. Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its construction; and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its calamitous result, as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoléon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his last conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz or striking down the Prussian Monarchy on the field of Jena.

His last illness and death. The dissolution of this great confederacy, which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr. Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sunk at length under the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain he tried the waters of Bath; in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office: his constitution was worn out by the labours, the anxiety, and the excitement which have proved fatal to so many Parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with accumulating force. From the time the disastrous news were received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. A devouring fever seized his blood—delirium quenched the fire of his genius. In the intervals of rest his thoughts, however, still were riveted to the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century:" so little could the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce. At the close of a lingering illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house in London on the 23d January, 1806, exclaiming with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle (2).

Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still at the zenith of his in-

(1) See note, 11th January, 1805, Mr. Pitt to Russian Ambassador.—*Ante*, v. 124.

(2) Gifford's Pitt, iii. 347, 360. Ann. Reg. 1806, 13, 14.

His character and mighty achievements. intellectual powers; William Pitt. Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely, of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom and modern democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved; if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he rose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sunk under the struggle. If the calamities which befel Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm he had seen not merely its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch, by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every period of his career; in the midst of a desperate strife in Europe he extended the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoléon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere, strike down the throne of Tippoo Sah in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide extent of the Indian Peninsula. Under his administration the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies and political strength quadrupled; and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

Principles of his domestic administration. But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting benefits of Mr. Pitt's government. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness; there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom: early imbued with liberal principles, the strenuous supporter of a relaxation of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals or danger to the state, he was at the same time as fully alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on such vital subjects, or permitting democratic ambition, under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel the institutions of society. No sooner therefore did the French Revolution break out, and it had become evident that a social convulsion was designed, than he threw his weight into the opposite scale: and though the advocate for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the King had thrown down the gauntlet to every established government, when once fairly drawn into the contest he espoused it with the whole ardour and perseverance of his character, and became the soul of all the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life, were framed to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady friend of freedom, he was on that very account the resolute opponent of democracy: the deadly, because the unsuspected enemy by whose triumphs in every age

its principles have been subverted, and its blessings destroyed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling under the shock, when the ardent and philanthropic were every where rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity, which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening, when Mr. Fox was pronouncing the Revolutionary Constitution of France "the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public virtue in any age or country," his superior sagacity, like that of Burke, beheld amidst the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the universe with darkness. Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses; and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood, and ravaging Europe with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions. With admirable foresight he there established a system of finances adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition (1); with indomitable perseverance he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, out of the discordant and selfish Cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Alone of all the statesmen of his age, he from the outset appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of democratic principles; and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles; for while liberty perished in a few months in France, amidst the fervour of revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished in the British empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to democratic ambition, were not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

Progressive
and steady
growth of
his fame.

Chateaubriand has said, "that while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoléon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr. Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this magnificent eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoléon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the Barricades, and the military Government of Louis-Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete in foreign transactions; without the passing of the Reform Bill, and the subsequent ascendant of democratic ambition in Great Britain, his worth would never have been appreciated in domestic government. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady asserter of general freedom: his doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and the affluent: they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of

(1) See Chap. XL. "On the British Finances,"

historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warnings of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history; it is experience which brings conviction to the cold lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr. Pitt's memory: but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's Administration.

Erroneous views of foreign writers on his designs. Foreign writers of every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent him as governed by an ardent desire to elevate his own country—the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation—and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr. Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by a commercial jealousy of that country, he had embraced the generous maxim of Mr. Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependent on the prosperity of those which surround it (1). Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792; but before the revolutionary levies were completed, have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its Government in the American war. It was not against France, but *Republican* France, that his hostility was directed, it was not French warfare, but French propagandism which he dreaded; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if these insidious principles had emanated from their states.

His errors. If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr. Pitt's Government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion. Unequalled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies, and awakened the activity of Cabinets, he was by no means equally felicitous in

(1) In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr. Fox said, "France is the natural enemy of Great Britain; and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility, all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France; the true situation is the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr. Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours; on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependent on each other, and as a British subject, no less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably

the enemy of another nation is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposing the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man." [Parl. Hist. xxvi. 392, 402.] Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate; they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure; and this statesman, whom the Continental writers represent as the eternal inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses any thing ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe." The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal; their brandy on paying a duty of 7s. a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron work on a duty *ad valorem* of 10 per cent! So wide is the common opinion of the principles of this great statesman from the truth!—See the treaty in Parl. Hist. xxvi. 234-240.

the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoléon has observed, that he had no turn for military combinations (1), and a retrospect of the campaigns which he had a share in directing, must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the Continental armies put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt; whereas, by the vigorous application of a comparatively inconsiderable English force to the heart of the enemy's power at the outset, or when their resources were failing, before the arrival of Napoléon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and at the same time liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In warlike combinations, he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land, which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

Opinion of the democratic party in England of him. "It is needless," say the Republicans, "to raise statues to Mr. Pitt's memory, he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people." If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoléon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as the salvage paid for the safety of the empire, and are no more chargeable on his memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore protracted system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different, and, ultimately, less burdensome form. And probably the warmest of his partisans will find it difficult to defend the frequent practice which he adopted, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced—a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

Funeral
honours
paid to his
memory.

Mr. Pitt's eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of oratory, unequalled in modern times. Many of his speeches, delivered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with the most finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. In private life his conduct was irreproachable; concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune; and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote, Mr. Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred, but he resisted the motion for a monument at the public expense to his memory, upon the ground that, however splendid his abilities, or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of “an excellent statesman (1).” The monument which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of too many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British empire at the close of the contest, which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependent on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, “Si monumentum quaeris circumspice.”

(1) *Parl. Deb.* vi. 42, 62, 71, 138.

“When I see a minister,” said Mr. Fox, “who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integ-

grity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr. Pitt as an ‘excellent statesman.’ Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not in such cases yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty.”
— *Parl. Deb.* vi. 61, 62.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR. PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

ARGUMENT.

Importance of the subject—Astonishing Financial Efforts of England during the war—Historical Sketch—Public Income of the State before the Commonwealth—Great Increase of the Public Burdens during the usurpation—Permanent addition to them on the accession of William III—Reasons which led to the introduction of the National Debt—Corresponding Increase of the Expenditure of France on the accession of Louis-Philippe—Progressive growth of the Public Debt during the succeeding century—Table illustrating its increase—Alarming Financial Aspect of the country at Mr. Pitt's accession to power in 1784—Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing evils—His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in Parliament—And his simultaneous adoption of Measures for National Defence—Establishment of the Sinking Fund, and Mr. Pitt's speech introducing it—Mr. Fox gives the plan his cordial support—It is passed by the Legislature, and made applicable to all future loans—Modification introduced on the system in 1802—Immense results with which it was attended—Table showing the Progressive Growth of the Sinking Fund—Obloquy to which it began to be exposed—General diffusion of this delusion—Which is the more dangerous, as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error—Ultimate extinction of the Sinking Fund in 1832—Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction—Comparison of the Arguments for and against its continuance—He saw clearly the objections since urged against the System—Proof of the justice of Mr. Pitt's principles, which has been afforded by the result during the last twenty years—It is clearly the only way of effecting a reduction of the debt—Durable and far-seeing system which he had established—Had it been adhered to the whole debt would have been discharged in 1843—Tables showing the progressive growth of a Sinking Fund kept up at fifteen or ten millions, from 1816 to 1836—Causes which have led to the decay of this system—Table showing the amount of indirect taxes repealed since 1816—Great error in not repealing at once all the Direct Taxes on the peace—Imprudent remission of Indirect Taxes since that time—Little good has been derived from their repeal—Immense burdens under which the nation prospered during the war—Argument on this subject—Temporary advantages which would have attended the keeping up the Sinking Fund—Ample Funds which existed for its maintenance, even when providing largely for the public relief—Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects—Lord Castlereagh's error in 1816 regarding the Income Tax—Advantages of the Funding System—Its dangers—Mr. Pitt's views on the subject—Modification which they received from the first Continental peace in 1797—He proposed to augment largely the Supplies raised within the year—Trebling of the Assessed Taxes, which were intended to be a war-burden only—First introduction of the Income Tax—Details of Mr. Pitt's plan on the subject—Objections urged against it—It is adopted by Parliament—Advantages of the new system—Mr. Pitt's permanent Taxes were all in the indirect form—Their advantage—Arguments in favour of indirect Taxation—Reply to the objections against them—Cases in which Indirect Taxes, being excessive, become direct burdens on production—General character of Mr. Pitt's Financial Measures: their grandeur and foresight—Their errors—Undue extent to which he carried the Funding System—Niggardly use of the military forces of England—Injudicious system of borrowing in the three per cents—Its effect in preventing the reduction of interest by Government on the return of peace—Temporary diminution of interest with which it was attended was no adequate compensation for these evils—In Mr. Pitt's view, however, the Sinking Fund was speedily to obviate all these ruinous consequences—Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department during the war—Vast effects of the Suspension of Cash Payments in 1797—Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state—Table showing the Paper and Coin issued, with the Exports, Imports, Shipping, and Revenue of every year during the war—Great temporary advantages also of the Funding System—Undue ascendancy of Popular Power was the real cause which undid Mr. Pitt's durable System for the Reduction of the Debt—And it must ultimately ruin the British Empire—But will still more impel the British race to the New World.

Importance
of the sub-
ject.

It would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French Revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the main spring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It

was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay, in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other nations; when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, on her citadel amidst the waves, the return of a right spirit in the surrounding nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain; and the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the contest they so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of Government, the means of permanently continuing it. Vain even would have been the re-action produced by suffering against the French Revolution: vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if England had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis, if she had been unable to alimient the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts, if the wealth of England had not at last arrayed them in dense and disciplined battalions, on the banks of the Rhine.

*Anticipating
financial
efforts of
England
during the
war.*

How then did it happen, that this inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years; to keep on foot a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land forces of Napoléon, and equipped all the armies of the north for the liberation of Germany? The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe: but the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organized and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seemed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

*Financial
details.
Public in-
come before
the Com-
monwealth.*

The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth, it amounted only to L.400,000 a-year; and that of James I to L.450,000: and even including all the subsidies received from Parliament during his reign, L.480,000 a-year, sums certainly not equivalent to more than L.800,000, or L.1,000,000 of our money (1). That enjoyed by Charles I amounted on an average to L.895,000 annually; a sum perhaps equal to L.1,500,000 in these times (2).

*Great
increase of
the public
burdens
during the
Usurpation.*

It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people of England; affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when relieved from all control on the part of the other powers in the state. The sums levied in Eng-

land during the Commonwealth, that is, from 3d November, 1640, to 5th November, 1659, amounted to the enormous, and if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of L.83,000,000, being at the rate of nearly L.3,000,000 a-year: or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had preceded it (1). The permanent revenue of Cromwell was raised from the three kingdoms to L.1,868,000: or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I (2). The total public income at the death of Charles II was L.1,800,000, of James II L.2,000,000; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was not then materially different from what it is at the present moment (3).

These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of William III. of the House of Brunswick to the throne. The intimate connection of the princes of that family with continental politics, and the long wars in which in consequence the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled: being raised from L.2,000,000 a-year, to L.3,893,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and Government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity (4).

Reasons which led to the introduction of the national debt.

Various motives combined to induce the Government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-

(1) "It is seldom," says Hume, "that the people gain any thing by revolutions in government, because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old; but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money and the tyranny of the Star Chamber had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the Crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of administration." [Hume, vii. 115.]

The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of L. 83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth,—a striking proof

of the despotic character of the executive during that period:—

Land-tax,	L. 32,000,000
Excise,	3,000,000
Tonnage and poundage,	7,000,000
Sale of church lands,	10,035,000
Sequestrations of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years,	3,528,000
Sequestration of private estates in England,	4,564,000
Fee-farm rents for five years,	2,963,000
Compositions with delinquents in Ireland,	1,000,000
Sales of estates in Ireland,	3,567,000
Other lesser,	10,074,000

Total, L. 83,331,000

—PARSONS, 139, 140.

(2) Of this sum, there was drawn from England, L. 1,517,274
from Scotland, 143,632
from Ireland, 207,790

L. 1,868,716

—*Ibid.* 140.

(3) Febrer, 139, 143.

The quarter of wheat, from 1636 to 1701, was on an average 51s. 11½d.

From 1700 to 1765. 40s. 8d.

From 1764 to 1794. 44s. 7d.

In 1835 the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 38s. 8d. and the average of the last five years was only 48s.—*SARRA'S Wealth of Nations*, i, 358. and *Corn Average, 1835*, by Google

(4) Febrer, 59, 60.

burnings and divisions had succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of Government over a nation thus divided : foreign wars were deemed requisite to maintain the ascendant of the Protestant principles, to which the King owed his accession to the throne ; and the continental connections of the House of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles by which the very existence of the commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same which led to the duplication of the public burdens of France by Louis-Philippe, after the Revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and engendered the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessments of future years (1). It was justly thought, that the present influence of Government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself ; and that, by the distribution of the debt among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty ; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power of attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand ; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed ; but, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages ; and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.

Progressive growth of the public debt during the succeeding century.

It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain, were increased after this period. Suffice it to say, that both were largely augmented during the glorious war of the succession ; that the long and pacific administration which followed, effected no sensible reduction in their amount ; that the checkered contest of 1739, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' War, contributed equally to their increase ;

Corresponding increase of the expenditure of France on the accession of Louis-Philippe.

(1) The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions as France and England were at the accession of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar :

	France.	
1824	951,000,000, or about	L. 38,100,000
1825	946,000,000, or . .	37,800,000
1826	942,000,000, or . .	37,600,000
1827	986,000,000, or . .	38,730,000
1828	939,000,000, or . .	37,300,000
1829	975,000,000, or . .	38,840,000
1830 Revol. in July. .	981,000,000, or . .	38,930,000
1831 Louis-Philippe. .	1,511,000,000, or . .	60,000,000
1832 Ditto.	1,100,000,000, or . .	44,000,000
1833	1,120,000,000, or . .	44,500,000

and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1735, in the opinion both of Mr. Hume and Adam Smith, they must inevitably prove fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was L.12,000,000, and the debt L.240,000,000 (1), the interest of which absorbed no less than L.9,319,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during that last unfortunate contest having been no less than one hundred millions (2).

Alarming financial aspect of the country on Mr Pitt's accession to power in 1746.

It was at this period that Mr. Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr. Fox and the coalition Ministry. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inextricable, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the previous years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed

(1) *Pebrer*, 245.

Table illustrating its increase.

(2) The following table exhibits, in a clear and condensed form, the increase of the public revenue, and progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present times.

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue
National debt at the Revolution,	L.664,263	39,865	2,001,325
Increase during the reign of William,	15,739,439	1,271,087	
Debt at the accession of Queen Anne,	16,394,702	1,310,952	3,395,265
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne,	37,750,661	2,040,416	
Debt at the accession of George I,	54,145,363	3,351,368	5,691,803
Decrease during the reign of George I,	2,053,129	133,807	
Debt at the accession of George II,	52,092,235	3,217,561	6,762,463
Decrease during the peace,	5,137,612	253,526	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1739,	46,954,623	2,964,035	6,874,000
Increase during the war,	31,338,689	1,096,979	
Debt at the end of the war, 1748,	78,293,312	4,061,014	6,923,000
Decrease during the peace,	3,721,472	664,287	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1756,	74,571,840	3,396,737	7,127,164
Increase during the war,	72,111,004	2,444,104	
Debt at the end of the war in 1763,	146,682,844	5,840,841	8,523,440
Decrease during the peace,	10,739,793	364,000	
Debt at the opening of the American war, 1776,	135,943,051	5,476,841	10,265,405
Increase during the war,	102,541,819	3,843,084	
Debt at the peace of 1783,	238,484,870	9,319,925	11,962,000
Decrease during the peace,	4,751,261	143,569	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1793,	233,733,609	9,176,356	16,658,814
Increase during the war,	295,105,668	10,232,152	
Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February, 1801,	528,839,277	19,428,508	34,113,146
Increase during the second war,	335,983,164	12,796,796	
Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st February, 1816,	864,822,441	32,225,304	72,210,512
Decrease since the peace,	82,155,207	3,883,841	
Debt on 5th January, 1832,	L.782,667,234	L.28,341,463	L.50,990,000

—MORAU and PERRER's *Tables*, 70, 89, 153, 245, and PERRER's *Part. Tables*, i. 1.

now more than two-thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening at no distant period to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. It was easy to foresee, that, in the course of events, wars and changes would arise, which would render it indispensable for the Government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities; but how could any Administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralyzing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

Principle on which he proposed to remedy the existing evils.

These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr. Pitt; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his understanding with the greater vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of money at compound interest; and Dr. Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great (1). Mr. Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might, without difficulty, be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed in producing great effects, because they were directed to the *annual* discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation: they advanced therefore by addition, not multiplication, in an arithmetical, not a geometrical progression. Mr. Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy: he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in Parliament.

Mr. Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject, one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the constitution sunk into insignificance. From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted to the subject, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on the subject on 29th March, 1786, "the people of

(1) A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would, in the year 1776, have

amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions on which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this House, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it—to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which on many accounts we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties of my situation; but the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity, that which we ourselves have felt the want of, an efficient sinking fund for the national debt. To accomplish this is the first wish of my heart; and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt (1).

In pursuance of these designs, Mr. Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of L.900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of L.100,000—should be granted to his Majesty, to be vested in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sum thus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the farther purchase of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan was secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the people, but the dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested

(1) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1295, 1313, 1109.

And his simultaneous adoption of measures for national defence. It is worthy of especial notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr. Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired, and on the contrary, at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," said he, "by the plausible and popular name of economy, he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy, to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few

hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the sinking fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies, without which the nation must be endangered." [Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1109.] Every measure of this great man was directed to great and lasting national objects: he was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

in the public trustees. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the side of the creditor to that of the debtor—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would, to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction (1). “If this million,” said Mr. Pitt, “to be so applied, is to be laid out, with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation; and this will diminish the debt of this country so much, as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the bane of this country; for if the original sinking fund had been properly preserved, it can easily be proved, that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome; but this, hitherto, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his convenience, gotten hold of this sum, which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long and very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House, and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law—of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt; it must for ever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war. To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan (2).

(1) The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of 5 per cent, is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that £.20,000,000 is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for £1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of £1,000,000 to be annually applied in the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners, for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased, being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progressive growth in ten years will stand as follows:

First year's surplus.	£. 200,000
Second.	210,000
Third.	220,500
Fourth.	231,250
Fifth.	242,562
Sixth.	253,078
Seventh.	265,054
Eighth.	278,286
Ninth.	292,114
Tenth.	306,661
<hr/>	
	£. 2,506,105

The wonderful rate, at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1309, 1322.

The speech delivered by Mr. Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one of the most luminous of his whole Parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded, “That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was prepared. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up; but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine with him at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far extended speech, as Mr. Fox called it, without one omission or error.” See No. V. WILLIAM PITT. *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxxvi. 852; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

Mr. Fox gives this plan his cordial support.

Nor was Mr. Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments; but he pointed out with too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amidst the necessities or weakness of future administrations. "No man," said he, "in existence was, or ever had been, a greater friend to the principle of a sinking fund than I have been, from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman, in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking fund, for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals, to whom the faith of Parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions, at stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when Parliament, stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking fund, or enabling Government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents (1)". Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in its composition, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and, on the May 26, 1786. 26th May, the King gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

It is passed by the legislature, and made applicable to all future loans. 1792.

The sinking fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate period; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to Parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which followed, soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy March 30, 1792. of Mr. Pitt is to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never on any pretence whatever to be departed from, that when any additional loan was contracted for, provision should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr. Pitt, "not to confine our views to the

sinking fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter; we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should of course be issued out of the consolidated fund (1), to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, an additional sum, sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking fund, after reaching its largest amount, will discharge what will then remain of the present debt. To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, L.100,000 should be raised in addition to the existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose that L.200,000 a-year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking fund." Mr. Fox stated, "that he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt (2), and that as strongly when on the Ministerial as the Opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr. Pitt, but he wished it as warmly." In pursuance of the united opinion of these great men, it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "that whenever in future any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one *per cent* on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be placed to the account of the commissioners (3)." Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty in little more than forty years be expected.

Modification introduced upon the system in 1802. Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking fund was managed till 1802; and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not indeed by Mr. Pitt, but by Mr. Addington, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now L.488,000,000; its interest, including the charges of the sinking fund, L.23,000,000: it is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other, without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking fund should be removed; and that both that original fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to: it being enacted, "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking fund of L.1,000,000, with the L.200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent

(1) The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which were amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue

above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated during war among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

(2) Parl. Hist. xxix. 1050, 1056.

(3) 32 Geo. iii. c. 69.

on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund, to be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years(1)."

Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr. Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr. Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking fund which he established down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

Immense
results of
the sinking
fund.

From the accounts laid before Parliament, it appears that the sinking fund of a million which Mr. Pitt established in 1786, had increased, by accumulation at compound interest, and the vast additions drawn from the one per cent on all subsequent loans, to the enormous sum of *fifteen millions and a-half yearly* in 1813, while the debts which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than L.238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years; whereas Mr. Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years; the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of five per cent. The subsequent L.200,000 a-year granted certainly accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the vast accumulation which the one per cent on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the table compiled below, showing the sums paid off by the sinking fund in every year from 1786 to 1813 the loans contracted during that period—the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking fund rose, with the immense sums borrowed at different periods during the war : and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were L.585,000,000, it will not appear surprising, that even the small sum of one per cent on each, regularly issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked for accumulation (2).

Obloquy to
which it be-
came ex-
posed.

It is this subsequent addition of one per cent on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking fund which has been at once the cause of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr. Pitt's financial statements, and, delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply of loans, or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely during war, for its permanent character, loudly proclaimed that it was founded entirely on a delusion : that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans : that, at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed, had been annually borrowed since the commencement of the war : that it was impossible that a nation, any

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 890, 892.

(2) Table showing the sums paid to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in

every year, from 1786 to 1816; the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those Commis-

more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations, and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income (1).

These doctrines soon spread among a considerable part of the thinking portion of the nation: but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into different channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoléon; and democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal; attacks on the sinking fund were rapidly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr. Pitt's system—the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth; the meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days; and a system on which the greatest and best of men in the last age had been united, in commendation of which Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke, was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

Had these doctrines been confined to the declamation of the hustings, or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent,

since in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time.—*Parl. Pap.* 1822, etc. 145; *POWELL'S Parl. Tables*, i. 1; *COLQUHOUN*, 292, 294; *POWELL'S Progress of the House's Tables*; *PERAZZA'S Tables*, 153, 154, 246; *Nation*, ii. 296.

(Table showing the progressive growth of the sinking fund.)

Years.	Sinking Fund.	Stock Redeemed by Sinking Fund.	Loans contracted.	Proportion of Loan paid to Sinking Fund.	Expenditure, including Interest of Debt, Funded and Unfunded, and Sinking Fund.	Total charge of Debt, including Sinking Fund.	Revenue.
	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1792	1,458,504	1,507,100			16,179,347	9,437,862	16,382,435
1793	1,534,976	1,962,650	4,500,000		17,434,767	9,890,904	17,674,395
1794	1,630,615	2,174,405	12,907,451	1,630,615	22,754,366	10,715,941	17,440,809
1795	1,672,000	2,804,945	42,090,646	1,872,200	29,305,477	11,081,159	17,374,890
1796	2,143,596	3,083,455	42,736,199	2,143,595	39,751,091	12,345,987	18,243,876
1797	2,639,724	4,390,670	14,620,000	2,639,724	40,791,533	13,683,129	18,668,925
1798	3,369,218	6,716,153	18,000,000	3,361,752	50,739,857	16,405,402	20,518,780
1799	4,294,325	7,858,109	12,500,000	3,984,252	51,241,798	20,108,885	23,607,945
1800	4,649,871	7,221,338	18,500,000	4,288,208	59,296,081	21,572,867	29,604,008
1801	4,767,992	7,315,002	34,410,000	4,620,479	61,617,988	21,661,029	28,085,829
1802	5,310,511	8,091,454	23,000,000	5,117,723	73,072,468	23,808,895	28,221,183
1803	5,922,979	7,733,421	10,000,000	5,685,542	62,373,480	25,436,894	38,401,738
1804	6,287,940	10,527,243	10,000,000	6,018,179	54,912,890	25,066,212	49,335,978
1805	6,851,200	11,395,692	21,526,699	6,521,394	67,619,475	26,669,646	49,652,471
1806	7,615,167	12,234,064	18,000,000	7,181,482	76,056,796	28,963,702	53,698,124
1807	8,323,329	12,907,070	12,500,000	7,829,588	75,154,548	30,336,859	58,902,291
1808	9,479,165	14,171,407	12,000,000	8,908,673	78,369,689	32,052,537	61,524,113
1809	10,188,607	13,965,824	19,532,000	9,555,853	76,566,013	32,781,592	63,042,746
1810	10,904,451	14,352,771	16,311,000	10,170,104	76,865,549	33,986,233	66,029,349
1811	11,660,601	15,659,194	24,000,000	10,813,016	89,735,223	35,248,833	64,427,371
1812	12,502,860	18,147,245	27,871,325	11,543,881	88,757,324	36,388,790	63,327,432
1813	13,488,160	21,108,442	58,763,100	12,439,631	105,943,727	38,443,147	63,211,422
1814	15,379,262	24,120,867	18,500,000	14,181,006	106,832,260	41,755,235	70,926,215
1815	14,120,963	19,149,684	45,135,589	12,748,231	92,280,180	42,902,430	72,131,214
1816	13,452,696	20,260,098	3,000,000	11,902,051	65,169,771	43,902,999	62,264,546

(1) Hamilton on the sinking fund, and others.

Which is the more dangerous as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error.

and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed as an engine for the purpose of faction or ambition. But unhappily the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion: the prevailing ideas spread to the legislature, and the statesmen who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens, without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking fund till it was totally extinguished during the great convulsion of 1832; and the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The principle acted upon since that time has been to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the present democratic system, can never be expected to be considerable, Mr. Pitt's sinking fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed (1).

In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form the important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history.

(1) The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the Sinking Fund from the time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken

upon by Mr. Vansittart in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1832.

(Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction.)

Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.	Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.
	L.	L.	L.		L.	L.	L.
1786	662,000	500,000	239,693,900	1812	24,246,059	14,078,577	635,583,468
1787	1,503,000	1,000,000	239,200,719	1813		16,064,067	661,466,666
1788	1,506,000	1,000,000	237,697,665	1814	27,552,230	14,830,957	740,621,535
1789	1,558,000	1,155,000	236,191,315	1815	22,599,853	14,241,397	752,837,236
1790	1,587,500	1,230,000	234,632,465	1816	24,001,083	13,945,117	816,311,940
1791	1,507,100	1,371,000	233,044,965	1817	23,117,541	14,514,457	796,200,192
1792	1,962,650	1,458,504	231,537,865	1818	19,460,982	16,339,483	776,742,403
1793	2,174,405	1,634,972	209,614,446	1819	19,648,469	16,305,500	791,867,314
1794	2,804,945	1,872,957	234,034,718	1820	31,191,702	17,499,773	794,986,480
1795	3,083,455	2,143,697	247,877,237	1821	24,618,885	17,219,957	801,565,316
1796	4,390,670	2,639,956	301,861,306	1822	23,605,931	18,889,319	795,312,707
1797	6,790,023	3,393,214	355,323,774	1823	17,966,680	7,482,325	796,530,114
1798	8,102,875	4,093,164	381,525,836	1824	4,828,536	10,652,069	791,701,612
1799	9,550,094	4,528,568	414,936,334	1825	10,582,732	6,093,475	781,123,222
1800	10,713,168	4,908,379	423,367,547	1826	3,313,834	5,621,231	776,128,365
1801	10,491,325	5,528,215	447,147,164	1827	2,866,528	5,704,706	783,801,139
1802	9,436,389	6,114,033	497,043,489	1828	7,281,414	4,667,965	777,476,890
1803	13,181,667	6,494,694	522,231,786	1829	6,035,414	4,569,485	772,322,540
1804	12,880,629	7,436,929	528,260,642	1830	6,425,465	4,545,465	771,251,932
1805	13,759,607	9,402,658	545,803,318	1831	3,304,729	1,663,093	757,486,997
1806	15,341,799	10,625,419	573,529,932	1832	9,079	5,696	
1807	16,064,962	10,185,579	593,694,287	1833	1,321,749	1,023,784	
1808	16,181,689	10,584,672	601,733,073	1834	2,461,927	1,776,378	
1809	16,656,643	11,359,579	604,287,474	1835	1,846,791	1,270,050	
1810	17,884,234	12,093,691	614,789,091	1836	2,169,700	1,590,727	
1811	20,733,354	13,075,977	624,301,936				

—FOSTER'S *Part. Tables*, i. and ii. 6, 8; PERRAZ'S *Tables*, 247; MORRIS'S *Tables*; FOSTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 260.

N. B.—This table exhibits the progress of the

Sinking Fund and Stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table applicable to Great Britain alone.

But it is only by attending to the dissolution of Mr. Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned which, so far as human wisdom could, had guarded against the evils which must, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British empire.

It is perfectly true, as Mr. Hamilton and the opponents of the sinking fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial operations, by borrowing with one hand, while you pay off with another; and unquestionably Mr. Pitt never imagined that if the nation was paying off ten millions a-year, and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking fund; because, as long as larger sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no *present* benefit to the state; nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But all that notwithstanding Mr. Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt, was not only founded on consummate wisdom, but a thorough knowledge of human nature. He never looked to the sinking fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year (1); he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt in time of peace. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance; indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr. Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation of mankind in general, and the especial desire always felt, that when the excitement of war ceased, its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to get the popular representatives at the conclusion of a war to lay on new taxes, and provide for a sinking fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so

He clearly
now the ob-
jections
since urged
against the
system.
looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased by the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy—we shall have to go far before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the

(1) Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget, in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking fund during war; but always

war. Yet there are means by which I am confident it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise and not less practicable to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year; and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. I cannot indeed take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation; but if the means I have pointed out are adopted and resolutely adhered to, it will leave us at least stationary.—*Parl. Hist.* xxxiii. 1053, 1054.

that it might be at once brought forward into full and efficient operation, upon the conclusion of hostilities, without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

Proof of
these prin-
ciples afford-
ed by the re-
sult during
the last
twenty
years.

The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt : amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In sixteen years, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of five per cent granted to the holders of the five per cents, who were reduced to four : that it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions (1). It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

It is clearly
the only way
of effecting
a reduction
of the debt.

Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr. Pitt's unbending self-poised system was introduced ; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has to all practical purposes swallowed it entirely up. The sinking fund, when thus broken upon, has proved, like the chastity of a woman, when once lost, the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the conclusion of hostilities with a view to effect a diminution of its public debt ; and how completely dependent therefore the sinking fund was for its very existence upon Mr. Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view without any application to the legislature, by the mere cessation of borrowing on the return of peace (2).

(1) Funded debt on January 5, 1816,	L.316,311,040
Unfunded ditto,	48,510,501
Total,	L.364,822,441
Total debt on 5th January, 1833. viz. Funded,	L.751,100,549
Unfunded,	27,752,650
	<hr/>
	781,853,199

Paid off in sixteen years,

— *Annual Finance Statement*, 1833, and *PARSONS*, 246, and *POWELL'S Parliamentary Tables*, ii. 6.
Durable and (2) In Mr. Pitt's Financial Resolutions, far-seeing in the year 1799, which embrace a system vast variety of important financial which he had details, there is the clearest indication established, of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was—“ That, supposing the price of 3 per cent stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, L.90 in time of peace, and L.75 in time

Had it been adhered to the whole debt would have been discharged in 1843.

Not a shadow of a doubt can now remain that Mr. Pitt's and Mr. Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1843. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected, had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the Commissioners the whole sinking fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its Government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836, would, at five per cent, have been nearly six hundred millions, and the sinking fund would now have been paying off above forty millions a-year. Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent, which, on an average, is probably not far from the truth, the fund applicable to the reduction of debt would now have been above twenty millions annually, and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of funded property would not probably have been consistent either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury (1).

of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about L.85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about 40 years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793, will be redeemed in about 47 years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable) taxes would be set free in each year of peace, to the amount of L.133,000, and of war to that of L.168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would in the course of the same period gradually rise from L.5,000,000 to L.10,000,000; and that, on the suppositions before

stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of L.10,500,000, and about 1846, farther taxes to the amount of L.4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793: making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of L.19,000,000 yearly." [Parl. Hist. xxiv. 1155] Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and experience has now proved, that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repealed, these anticipations would have been more than realized, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.

(1) Table I. showing what the Sinking Fund, accumulating at five per cent, if maintained at L.15,000,000 a-year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

(Tables showing the progressive growth of a sinking fund of fifteen or ten millions, since 1816 to 1836)

1816.	L.15,000,000	Brought forward,	L.212,660,625
1817.	15,750,000	1827.	25,530,240
1818.	16,537,500	1828.	26,839,360
1819.	17,368,870	1829.	28,181,423
1820.	18,231,973	1830.	29,560,464
1821.	19,143,566	1831.	31,579,590
1822.	20,100,774	1832.	33,158,577
1823.	21,005,038	1833.	34,816,000
1824.	22,055,284	1834.	35,524,625
1825.	23,157,618	1835.	37,238,312
1826.	24,315,572	1836.	39,099,214
Carry forward.	L.212,660,625	Total in 20 years,	L.534,127,430

Table II. showing what the Sinking Fund, if maintained from the taxes at L.10,000,000 sterling, and if accumulating at four per cent only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.

1816.	L.10,000,000	Brought forward,	L.31,216,000
1817.	10,400,000	1819.	11,264,000
1818.	10,816,000	1820.	11,715,500
Carry forward,	L.31,216,000	Carry forward,	L.54,195,560

Every thing, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr. Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but an accurate knowledge of human nature, and a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind, that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the war with the French Revolution might have been discharged in nearly the same time that it was contracted.

Causes
which have
led to the
decay of this
system.

What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to under the severest trials, with unshaken fidelity? The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen; in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the advent of times, when Government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain. When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "for," said he, "if you had spoken wisely these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest disasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual amongst them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage; the learned fiercely assailed the sinking fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile imposture, unfit to stand the test of reason or experience; the Opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the Government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; tax after tax was repealed, amidst the general applause of the nation (1); the

Brought forward;	L. 54,195,560
1821.	12,671,544
1822.	13,178,404
1823.	13,705,510
1824.	14,253,760
1825.	14,822,948
1826.	15,415,944
1827.	16,032,580
1828.	16,673,880
Carry forward,.	L. 170,950,160

Brought forward,	L. 170,950,160
1829.	17,340,832
1830.	18,034,464
1831.	18,754,840
1832.	19,505,032
1833.	20,285,232
1834.	21,096,540
1835.	21,930,504
1836.	23,107,724
Total in 20 years,	L. 331,005,428

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the L. 534,027,464 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or L. 587,000,000 of the stock. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at

an average at 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the L. 342,000,000 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or L. 385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment.

(1) Taxes repealed since the peace of 1814 :

general concurrence in the work of destruction for a time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amidst mutual compliments from the Opposition to the Ministerial benches, the deep foundations of British greatness were loosened, the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue to the amount of forty-two millions a-year surrendered without any equivalent, and the nation, when it wakened from its trance, found itself saddled for ever with eight-and-twenty millions as the interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and a democratic constitution, which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxation upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when its excitement and expenditure was over. The income tax could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid any thing to Government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr. Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to Government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitements and understood necessities of war can render it bearable. His system was therefore to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of Government, those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple object was gained: the nation during the continuance of war was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties, while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to Government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in

(Table showing the amount of direct taxes repealed since 1816.)

1814.	War duties on goods, etc.	L. 932,000	L. 948,861
1815.	Ditto,	222,000	222,749
1816.	Property tax and war malt,	17,547,000	17,886,666
1817.	Sweet wines,	37,000	37,812
1818.	Vinegar, etc.	9,500	9,524
1819.	Plate glass, etc.	269,900	273,573
1820.	Beer in Scotland,	4,000	4,000
1821.	Wool,	471,000	490,113
1822.	Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000	2,164,037
1823.	Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000	4,286,389
1824.	Thrown silk and salt,	1,801,000	1,805,467
1825.	Wine, salt, etc.	3,676,000	3,771,019
1826.	Rem and British spirits,	1,967,000	1,973,915
1827.	Stamps,	84,000	84,038
1828.	Rice, etc.	51,000	52,227
1829.	Silk, etc.	126,000	126,406
1830.	Beer, hides, and sugars,	4,070,000	4,264,425
1831.	Printed cottons and coals,	1,588,000	3,189,312
1832.	Candles, almonds, raisins, etc.	747,000	754,996
1833.	Soap, tiles, etc.	1,000,000	1,100,000
1834.	House duty,	1,200,000	1,400,000
		L.42,125,000	L.44,845,529
Laid on in the same time,		5,813,000	
Net taxation reduced,		L.36,312,500	
Of which was direct,		L.18,690,000	
Indirect,		17,490,000	
		L.36,180,000	

those direct duties which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of, from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr. Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state, in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amidst the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

Imprudent
remission of
indirect
taxes since
1816.

Following out these principles, the income tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt tax, and in general all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated: but on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking fund, and none of them repealed till, from the growth of a surplus, after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population, and the constant efforts of general industry, would progressively had enabled Government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the salt tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since the peace amount to L.42,000,000 and consequently after the repeal of the income tax, assessed taxes, and these oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking fund, even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a-year, would have remained (1). Thus Mr. Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.

If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable; and therefore that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be

(Ample funds which existed for its maintenance, even when providing largely for the public relief.)

(1) Total taxes repealed since the peace,	L.42,115,000
Might have been repealed, viz.	
Property tax and war malt,	L.17,547,000
War duties on goods,	1,154,000
Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000
Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000
Candles,	600,000
Soap tax,	800,000
House tax,	1,200,000

Leaving to support the sinking-fund,
L. 27,025,000
14,490,000

Beside, L.5,813,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period,

Little good
has been de-
rived from
the repeal of
indirect
taxes.

reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But unfortunately this is by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as future prospects, from the change.

In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect, that during the war the nation not only existed, but throve under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than *half* of what they have since become. During the four last years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five millions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty; although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from twenty-five to thirty; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five; and in the last year had swelled to the enormous amount of one hundred and five millions for the former, and sixty for the latter (1). Without doubt, the prosperity of the latter years of the war was in a great degree fictitious—most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear, that if this had gone on for some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation; it is like making a man who has for years drank two bottles of port a-day suddenly take to toast and water. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but unquestionably the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

Argument
on this sub-
ject.

It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step farther, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no

(1)	Raised by taxes.	Official value.	Official value.
		Exports, Great Britain and Ireland.	Imports, Great Britain and Ireland.
1818.	L. 63,211,000	L. 38,226,283	L. 25,163,411
1814.	70,926,000	Records destroyed by fire.	
1816.	72,210,000	52,573,034	33,755,264
1816.	62,264,000	58,624,600	32,967,896
1830.	L. 55,824,802	L. 69,691,302	L. 46,245,241
1831.	54,810,190	71,429,004	49,713,889
1832.	50,990,315	76,071,572	44,686,241
1836.	L. 48,591,180	L. 97,621,549	L. 57,230,968
1837.	47,030,000	85,781,669	54,737,301
1838.	47,978,753	105,170,549	61,268,320

—*Peacock's Tables*, 150, 341; *Peacock's Tables*, i. 46, and ii. 49; *Finance Accounts*, 27th March, 1839; *Peacock's Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking fund? That was the ruinous measure! The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a-year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would to all appearance have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long run diminishing the national burdens, would at the same time have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the effects of which, for eighteen years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to labour.

Temporary advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking fund. No one branch of the Government expenditure would have gone farther to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a-year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty or thirty millions, annually applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum, during the war, in loans occasioned. The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that since 1820 they would have been constantly kept from 90 to 100. The effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the Government expenditure in other departments, must have been very great. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in size, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking fund must have operated like a great forcing pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work must have been drawn from the nation, or the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry; but experience has abundantly proved that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income to such a productive investment, is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if from an undue regard to popular clamour it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner, not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilizing of his fields and the draining of his morasses. Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and growing purchases of the commissioners would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but would have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out, in order to realize the great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt would have altogether

counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going farther than either reason or experience will justify; but this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively a tolerable burden—that the nation would to all appearance have been much more prosperous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two-thirds of the national debt. This prosperity, doubtless, would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital; but whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only for its discharge—and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

Public errors which led to its abandonment, and their distressing effects.

Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking fund and Mr. Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that if the demands of Government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, their demands on Government must instantly undergo a similar diminution: that if the Exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a-year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it was not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers; whereas, in truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real, as, though a diminution of those burdens was effected, it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when it could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace, was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes and consequent abandonment of the sinking fund necessarily occasioned; and which the maintenance of its machinery, till it had fulfilled its destined purpose, would, to a very great degree, have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr. Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious expedience for its recommendation; but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr. Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain that heavy impost as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities; and its weight was so excessive, that it

Lord Castlereagh's error regarding the income tax.

was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit Government to a contest with the people on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above five-and-twenty millions a year, when they were not complained of, and the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr. Pitt's principles. The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result. It is not unlikely, that from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the Government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and posterity will not acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous, popular weakness; and if they could not prevail on the House of Commons to adhere to Mr. Pitt's financial system, at least laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment.

It was impossible to explain Mr. Pitt's system for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's apology for the anachronism; and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

Advantages of the funding system. It is evident that, in some cases, the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, the interest of which is alone laid as burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and if possible would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contests, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so it is always advisable to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income, so that, at the conclusion of hostilities, no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure: nor is it reasonable in such cases to lay upon those who for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalization of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amidst all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation; or to resist the conclusion deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application at

the close of the war, that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed (1).

Its dangers. But this system, like every thing good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity and conducted with prudence; unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing is to nations, not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leave the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause which has drowned almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages: the existence of the means of relieving present difficulties, by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by Government, that by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

Mr. Pitt's views on the subject. Mr. Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and ultimate dangers of the fundingsystem. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue, which present appearances appeared to afford. During its earlier years, when the continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish Revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war supplies of the year were raised by that means; provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and the sinking fund for its extinction, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged (2). It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of L. 116,000,000 was contracted before the continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the con-

(1) Loans contracted by the British Government in the later years of the war.

1812, L. 24,000,000	1814, L. 58,763,000
1813, 27,371,000	1815, 18,500,000

Of these great loans upwards of L. 12,000,000 was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to foreign powers; in consequence of which, the whole services of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 60,000 men,

was maintained on the southern frontier of France. —MORREAU'S Tables; PERRIN, 246.

(2) 1793, Loan contracted,	L. 4,500,000
1794,	12,907,451
1795,	42,090,646
1796,	42,736,196
1797,	14,620,000

L. 116,854,293

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test, it might speedily be brought to a successful issue. That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, threw away the means of triumph when within their grasp. The financial measures of the British Minister, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent : the real error consisted in the misapplication or undue husbanding of its land forces, for which it is not so easy to find an apology.

Modification
which they
received
from the
first conti-
nental peace
in 1797.

But after the peace of Campo Formio the system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle. Her Continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle; and the utmost that she could now expect was to continue a defensive warfare, till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr. Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798 :—
 “Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth, and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the embarrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, on such a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever, is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause and to the supply of our own exigencies, by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick

redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

He proposes to augment the supplies raised within the year. "To guard against the undue accumulation of the public debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed any thing which has been raised at any former period at one time; but I trust that whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle, by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations; and that while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view; if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert, great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance.

"The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the manners, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the portion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into execution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardship in every individual instance; but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting the large deficiency, which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year (1).

Trebbling of the assessed taxes. In pursuance of these admirable principles, Mr. Pitt proposed to treble the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages; and that the house and window tax, which in a great measure are borne by the middling ranks, should only be doubled; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the Committee of the House of Commons; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of Government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never cleared four millions and a half; a deficiency which rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year (2).

Were to be a temporary war burden only. The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr. Pitt's plan, to be continued only for a limited time, and kept up only as a war burden. "I propose," said he, "that the increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest, of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven

millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exoneration of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope, that by stopping short of this effort, you will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability; the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware, it will be said it would be fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated: but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sums by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it: but if, on the other hand you fund its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest, which, in forty years, will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language fit for men legislating for a country, that from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow circumscribed sphere of shortsighted selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity, a sum of between forty and fifty millions sterling?' And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve every thing dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity (1)." Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge the whole principal sums themselves. An admirable plan, and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance, that of making the supplies raised within the year equal or nearly equal to the expenditure: but which was soon departed from amidst the necessities or profusion of future years; and which from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and from its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it added to the public, was necessarily attended both with greatly more suffering, and far less counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

First introduction of the income tax.

The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr. Pitt's administration. But in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiii. 1054, 1055.

circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a niggardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort, it appeared possible to obtain, during the absence of Napoléon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr. Pitt proposed the income tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and if considered as a war impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive and expedient that could be adopted. The grounds on which this great addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr. Pitt: "The principles of finance which the House adopted last year, were, first to reduce the total amount to be at present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount, and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded, shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion: but I trust that all who value the national safety will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts (1).

Details
of Mr. Pitt's
plan on that
subject.

In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under L.60 a-year should pay any thing: that, from that up to L.200 a-year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for L.200 a-year and upwards, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to disclose to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was, if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as any other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three-fourths of the rackrent of their lands. The total taxable income of Great Britain he estimated at L.102,000,000 a-year; and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to L.9,500,000, for which the income tax was to be mortgaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged (2).

Objections
urged
against it.

In opposition to this bill, it was urged by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downwards, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window tax was a burden on luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but income: that is, of imposing a burden which, by no possibility, can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the Government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third,

(1) Parl. Hist. xxxiv, 5, 6.

(2) Ibid. xxxiv. 6, 18, 22.

or even a half: that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution. The great danger of this tax, therefore, is that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middling orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middling class, and do it soon: it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great source of general prosperity, and then we should have only two classes in the community, and a miserable community it would be, of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means, is doubtless just: but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary—it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income might spend what portion of it he chose, without injury to his heirs: but income resulting from personal industry, or from profession, stood in a very different situation; for it was necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed: and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who, in all probability, will be the more extravagant; and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the farspread injustice should be inflicted, which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration (1)."

It is adopted
by Parlia-
ment.

The income tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799; the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, L.18,500,000 besides L.3,000,000 of exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary, if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr. Pitt that no less than L.120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account; a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and providing them in great part by the funding system (2).

The regulation of Mr. Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy; and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required beyond one or two years; and in consequence it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it came to violate the principle that these direct taxes, being a painful impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1798 to 1804 the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct

(1) *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 134, 147.

(2) *Ibid.* xxxiv. 1153.

war taxes was no less than fifty-six millions. The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr. Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking fund required for their redemption; and in 1802, when Mr. Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this L.36,000,000, as well as L.40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war; and for the whole of this immense sum of L.96,000,000, he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr. Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but the sinking fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt that this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle, which is, that the whole sums required for the interest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and direct burdens reserved only for the extraordinary efforts intended during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure (1).

Advantages
of the new
system.

The changes which have now been mentioned embraced all the leading principles of Mr. Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of Chancellor of the Exchequer:—"In the year 1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, "the proportions of the sinking fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being L.5,833,000, and the latter L.480,572,000. But in the year ending 1st February, 1806, the sinking fund amounted to L.7,566,000; and the unredeemed debt was then L.547,280,000, making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking fund, or to detain the House with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the House to cling to it as their sheet anchor for the future, they were pledged to support it, having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact, that during the first ten years of the war the increase of the debt was L.253,000,000, being at the rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a-year (2); whereas during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downwards, the total sum borrowed has been L.36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a-year only."

Mr. Pitt's
permanent
taxes were
all in the
indirect
form. Their
advantages.

With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr. Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans an-

nually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and for the immediate redemption of the principles of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr. Hume:—"The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed; and being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the other. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting an universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenue of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans (1)." It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr. Pitt's financial measures, that he not only provided in permanent imposts, for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially set apart for those years only when the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

Arguments for indirect taxation. In addition to these forcible reasons for ever, except in cases of obvious necessity, and when its resources are exhausted, preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish Pachas or the Indian Rajahs have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason is obvious: it consists in the difference upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below after it has fertilized innumerable plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, before it is withdrawn, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the Government may be the same in both cases: but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the tax collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all

(1) Hume's Essays, i. 365, 366.

the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax, a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form, that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future existence.

Reply to the
objections
against
this.

Nor is there any foundation for the obvious reply to this argument, based on the observation, that if the productions of industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralyzed as if the impost were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind has everywhere rejected its authority. No complaint was made during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain; but so burdensome was the income tax, producing only fourteen millions a year, felt to be, that all the efforts of Government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals opened by the Reform Bill, upon the legislature, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a-half extracted directly by the assessed taxes, which was made the subject of such loud complaint that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are most oppressive upon them at the moment. Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse never it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not in reality fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery of its production, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguishes the burden. The proof of this is decisive: the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war; many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during its continuance, were sold at half the price at its termination which they were at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr. Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the *permanent* expenses of the nation in the indirect taxes; of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention of direct, and the lavish relinquishment of indirect taxes (1).

(1) It results from these principles, that when an indirect tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material,

General character of Mr. Pitt's financial measures. Their grandeur and foresight.

Such were the general features of Mr. Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately succeeded; stigmatized by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amidst the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the Governments by whom he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing, the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages: inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understanding, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements; it required for its successful development, patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of

Cases in which indirect taxes, by being excessive, become direct burdens on production. or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption; it becomes a direct burden on production, and if unduly heavy may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in regard to the heavy impost duties on sugar. The burden formerly of 30s. then 27s. and now of 24s. the hundred weight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead, (from L.6 to L.6, 10s. the cwt.;) but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to L.12 or L.15 the hogshead, (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt.) including duty, it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent on the rude material; the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production; the cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery; and the stoppage of the slave trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties, and defray the interest of their mortgages, by raising more extensive crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive; the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per cwt. was, in Great Bri-

tain, 23s. 8d. excluding duty; while in America it was 36s. per cwt. in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to 100 per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which has fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.—See *Common's Report*, 1832, on *West India*, p. 7.

In all fiscal measures on this subject, there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than any thing else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilized states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, it is always much greater of producing agricultural produce. Great Britain can underwrite the world in manufactures, but her farmers would be ruined without a corn law; a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.—See *Barnard's Theory of the Constitution*, 386, 388; a work which, amidst much exaggeration and declamation, contains many just and profound observations on the changes the country has undergone during the last half century, and is deserving of much more attention than it has received.

England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the revolutionary war, we feel that we are conversing with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and calculated for eternal duration to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs, who dwell amidst their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

Their errors. While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, it is indispensable not to draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray.

Under extension of the funding system. 1. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Mr. Pitt, is having carried too far, and continued too long the funding system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterwards so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broke through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugène, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was passed; after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Pichegru; after Spain had retired from the struggle, and the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napoléon, the career of conquest in Italy, it had become evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one half. Those loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time, on account of the loans of those years, would have been above L.420,000,000! So prodigious is the difference in the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the energetic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more acceptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

Proportion of the military force of England. II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale and in a way calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the immense burdens thus imposed on posterity; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the history of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear

that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly accepted a temporary respite from the victorious arms of Clairfait: after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura with the terrible armies of Suwarrow and the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at that period at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been subverted by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies! Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr. Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote, that while the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most niggardly exertion of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish dissipation of its present funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportional efforts in the field had at the same time been made; and it was evident that nothing had been omitted which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war: but our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only 208,000 men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a sea-girt and inaccessible citadel, never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, and that only in the two first years of the war, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand. Mr. Pitt's plans for military operations were all based on the action of continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking up pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence, in a great measure, the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

Injudicious
system of
borrowing
in the 3 per
cents.

III. But the greatest of all Mr. Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which he carried the ruinous system, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, inscribing the public creditor for L.100 in the books of the bank of England, in consideration of only sixty advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true, but what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable; the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions has been contracted in the three per cents; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to

pay in all two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking fund at 80, on an average, which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr. Pitt's estimate in 1799, the surplus to be paid above what was received, would still be two hundred millions.

In effect in preventing the reduction of interest on peace. Nor have the evils of this most improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the 5 per cents; that is, if a bond for L.100 had been given for each L.100 only paid into the treasury. But as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with funds so contracted, of lowering the interest in time of peace? It is impossible to lower the interest of the 3 per cents till interest generally falls below 3 per cent; because if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and Government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, 4 per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the 5 per cents, it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the 5 per cents, and which, on L.157,000,000 only of the debt, the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time L.1,700,000 a-year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to 3½; which, after taking into view the dissentients, has saved the nation, *for ever*, L.2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the L.600,000,000 in the 3 per cents (L.360,000,000 sterling) at L.18,000,000 a-year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent, would have been L.3,600,000, and by the second of ½ per cent, L.1,800,000 more; in all, L.5,400,000 for ever. The sum already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years in future the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions a-year!

Temporary diminution of interest was no adequate compensation for these evils. The temporary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses with which the system was ultimately attended. It appears, from the curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the 3 per cents and the 5 per cents was seldom above half a per cent, generally not more than a quarter (1). What is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled Government to have effected on the return of peace? Even supposing the difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent, what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest *for ever* to four or three and a half per cent? This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument; and if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an

(1) Take, for example, the following loans contracted in the 3 and 5 per cents, at different periods during the war:—

additional loan every year while the disability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, disabled posterity for ever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts. So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that by a solemn resolution in 1824, Parliament pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the 5 per cents; a resolution worthy of the British legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget, but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praiseworthy determinations, amidst the warlike profusion or democratic pressure of subsequent times (1).

	Sums borrowed, actually paid into Treasury.	Interest.	Rate per cent.
	L.	L.	
1794. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,907,451	96,326	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	10,806,000	502,791	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1795. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,490,646	80,494	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	17,777,163	841,374	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1796. Loan in 5 per cents,	2,084,889	101,744	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	8,500,000	493,145	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1797. Loan in 5 per cents,	17,815,918	1,006,242	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	13,000,000	825,500	5 per cent.
1801. Loan in 5 per cents,	2,227,012	111,380	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1806. Loan in 3 per cents,	27,519,544	1,344,487	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1807. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,293,200	64,660	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	10,800,000	512,400	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. but L. 140 stock created for each. L. 60 paid.
1809. Loan in 5 per cents,	7,932,100	408,878	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,600,000	588,482	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1811. Loan in 5 per cents,	4,909,350	258,315	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,925,243	569,500	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1814. Loan in 5 per cents,	5,549,400	277,470	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	12,345,076	574,362	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1815. Loan in 5 per cents,	10,813,000	603,310	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	27,000,000	1,517,400	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

—See PERRAZ's Tables, 246, from MONROU.

It clearly appears, from this most instructive table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the 3 and the 5 per cents, from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears; for the public creditors were frequently, in the three per cents, inscribed for much more than L. 100 in consideration of L. 60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than L. 140 of stock for each L. 60 paid.

(1) The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents, but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject in a company consisting of the most eminent and intel-

ligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended, that if Mr. Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a little loan to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that the money could not have been obtained on other terms; and the "little loan" became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr. Anderson of Moreland, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes and Co. of Edinburgh, he will recall, perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

In Mr. Pitt's view the sinking fund was to remedy all these evils. It is true, as Mr. Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking fund, and had provided means which, if steadily adhered to, would unquestionably have produced that result even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the 3 per cents could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated, was the purchase of stock by the sinking fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they do by no means exculpate Mr. Pitt in these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 83 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr. Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking fund which he himself had established, and that the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effects of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements (1).

Vast effects of suspension of cash payments in 1797. To Mr. Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are even yet far from being exhausted. The SUSPENSION OF CASH PAYMENTS in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century, and, when taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the Spanish mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, opened the way to a series of changes in prices, and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico, and to which the future historian will perhaps point as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate fall of the British empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its development, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency from the

(1) It is a common opinion that the great expenses of Mr. Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to

foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during

rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is at the same time made the subject of discussion.

At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed to Mr. Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor like subsequent changes in this country, of theoretical or abstract opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national bankruptcy stared him in the face if the momentous step were any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at a subsequent period, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all its resources.

the whole war only amounted to L.52,528,470; of which no less than L.33,000,000 were advanced during the three last years. At Mr. Pitt's death the sum was only L.6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with

the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war were as follow.
—(MOOREAU,) (POISSON,)

(Table of the whole expenses of every year, in every department, during the war.)

	Subsidies to Foreign Powers.	ARMY.		Civil List	Ordnance.	Navy Total.	Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded.	Total Expenditure.
		Ordinary.	Extraordi- nary.					
	L.	L.		L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1793	2,198,200	4,167,312		1,021,536	843,603	2,464,307	10,715,941	22,754,300
1794	4,000	9,209,236		1,027,761	1,500,767	4,219,156	11,081,156	29,305,471
1795	810,500	14,562,737		1,026,842	1,968,008	8,135,140	12,345,987	39,751,001
1796	99,500	13,738,350		1,125,053	2,590,000	7,780,868	13,683,129	40,761,581
1797	—	16,208,690		1,081,046	2,121,552	11,984,031	16,405,402	50,739,851
1798	120,012	7,986,297	3,165,854	1,111,376	1,715,358	12,591,728	20,108,885	51,241,791
1799	325,000	9,898,716	4,241,433	1,208,067	2,221,516	13,036,490	21,572,867	59,296,601
1800	2,613,178	9,971,889	3,906,000	1,247,420	1,918,967	14,809,488	21,661,029	61,617,901
1801	200,114	8,838,208	5,347,174	1,290,136	2,165,909	17,303,370	23,808,895	73,072,461
1802	—	6,951,193	2,635,063	1,338,766	1,500,733	11,704,400	25,436,894	62,373,480
1803	—	8,134,315	3,165,092	1,425,545	1,827,150	7,979,878	25,066,212	54,912,891
1804	—	12,183,891	3,560,804	1,417,517	3,350,142	11,759,352	26,609,646	67,619,471
1805	—	10,758,343	6,261,387	1,914,104	4,782,289	14,466,998	28,683,702	76,056,791
1806	—	9,282,492	5,829,000	1,676,323	5,511,064	16,084,028	30,336,859	75,154,541
1807	—	9,956,684	5,431,807	1,680,061	4,190,748	16,775,762	32,052,531	78,300,691
1808	1,400,000	11,353,390	5,847,762	1,724,147	5,108,900	17,467,891	32,781,592	76,506,811
1809	2,050,000	12,591,041	5,872,034	1,696,994	4,374,184	19,238,037	33,986,223	76,865,541
1810	2,660,103	11,357,623	7,178,677	1,651,297	4,652,333	20,054,412	35,248,933	83,735,221
1811	2,977,747	13,753,163	10,116,196	1,582,097	4,557,509	19,540,679	36,388,790	83,757,321
1812	5,315,828	15,382,050	9,605,313	1,748,349	4,252,416	20,500,339	38,443,147	105,943,721
1813	11,294,416	18,500,985	10,968,535	1,708,526	3,404,582	21,906,624	41,756,235	106,832,261
1814	10,024,624	16,532,945	17,662,610	1,675,152	4,480,729	21,961,567	42,912,440	92,286,111
1815	11,035,248	23,172,137		1,682,021	2,963,692	16,373,870	43,902,989	65,169,771
Totals.	53,128,470	384,787,438		32,036,1257	1,082,262	328,236,415	619,830,178	1,539,176,61

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of seventeen hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirty-third, the latter hardly a fifteenth of the total expenditure. The vast sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted; for it

gave England the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to almost a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; coinciding thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the miserably use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficacy, which was the real reproach to Mr. Pitt's administration.

In powerful
operation
in increasing
the present
resources of
the state.

No doubt, however, can remain that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place, that the perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amidst this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependents. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every additional demand, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the alterations on the currency, as productive of present strength as they were conducive to future weakness. No financial embarrassments of any moment were experienced subsequent to 1797; in vain Napoléon waited for the blowing up of the funding system, and the stoppage of England's financial resources; year after year the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained, and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle. No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an annual creation of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that one great cause is to be found of the neverfailing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, whose quickened and extended circulation spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports, and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if not sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency (1).

Great
temporary
advantage
of the fund-
ing system.

It is evident also that the funding system, with all its dangers and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassment with which it was to be attended, but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management. The contracting and immediately spending loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a-year, in addition to a revenue raised by taxation of equal amount, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would

have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was indeed withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry : but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence in that respect was still more powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals ; it was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter ; but still that circumstance, how fatal soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression : exports and imports doubled, the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were to a certain extent delusive ; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state

paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the Gold and Silver annually coined at the Bank, with the Exports, Imports, and Revenue for the same period.

(Table showing the paper and coin issued, with the exports, and revenue of every year during the war.)

Years.	L5 Notes in Circulation	Under L5.	Commercial Paper discounted at Bank.	Bullion coined.	Total of Notes.	Official Va- lue Imports from Great Britain.	Official Va- lue Exports from Great Britain.	Revenue.	British Vessels Tonnage.
1792	11,307,380	—	—	1,171,863	11,307,380	19,650,358	24,904,850	17,864,464	1,540,143
1793	11,388,910	—	—	2,747,430	11,388,910	19,650,357	20,390,179	17,707,983	—
1794	10,744,020	—	—	2,558,895	10,744,020	22,294,893	26,748,082	17,809,294	—
1795	14,017,510	—	2,946,500	493,416	14,017,510	23,736,889	27,123,338	18,456,298	—
1796	10,729,520	—	3,505,000	464,680	16,729,520	23,187,319	30,518,918	18,456,628	—
1797	9,674,780	867,585	5,350,000	2,600,297	11,114,120	21,013,956	28,917,010	19,852,646	—
1798	11,647,610	1,448,220	4,490,600	2,967,565	13,095,830	25,122,203	27,317,087	30,492,995	—
1799	11,494,150	1,465,650	5,403,900	449,962	12,959,610	24,066,700	29,556,637	35,311,018	—
1800	15,372,980	1,471,540	6,401,900	189,937	16,854,800	28,257,781	33,381,617	34,069,457	1,905,430
1801	15,578,520	2,634,760	7,905,100	450,242	16,203,280	30,435,268	34,838,564	35,516,351	1,725,944
1802	12,574,860	2,612,020	7,523,300	437,019	15,186,880	28,308,373	37,873,324	37,111,620	2,147,623
1803	12,359,970	2,968,960	10,747,600	596,445	15,849,980	25,104,541	28,075,239	38,203,937	2,167,861
1804	12,546,560	4,531,270	9,982,400	718,397	17,077,830	26,454,281	31,071,108	45,515,152	2,268,577
1805	13,011,010	4,860,160	11,365,500	54,068	17,871,170	27,344,720	30,540,491	50,555,190	2,283,445
1806	13,271,529	4,458,600	12,380,100	405,106	17,730,120	25,504,478	32,984,101	54,071,908	2,263,714
1807	12,840,790	4,109,890	13,484,600	None	16,950,680	23,326,845	30,588,084	59,406,773	2,281,621
1808	14,093,690	4,695,170	12,950,100	371,714	14,183,860	25,660,953	29,956,623	62,147,661	2,324,811
1809	14,241,360	4,301,500	15,475,700	298,946	18,542,860	30,170,292	43,667,216	63,879,802	2,368,460
1810	15,159,180	5,860,420	20,070,600	316,936	21,019,600	37,613,294	42,656,841	67,825,597	2,426,044
1811	16,246,130	7,114,090	14,355,400	312,263	23,360,220	25,240,704	72,837,252	65,309,160	2,474,777
1812	15,951,290	7,457,030	14,991,600	None	23,408,320	24,923,922	37,982,977	65,752,425	2,474,799
1813	15,407,320	7,713,610	12,330,200	519,722	23,210,930	Records destroyed by fire	—	68,302,800	—
1814	16,455,540	8,345,540	13,285,800	None	24,801,080	32,622,771	51,358,398	70,240,313	2,616,966
1815	18,226,400	9,035,250	14,917,000	None	27,261,650	31,822,053	57,490,437	72,203,142	2,681,277
1816	18,021,220	9,001,400	11,416,400	None	27,013,620	26,374,921	48,216,186	62,640,711	2,648,599

Parl. Deb. vii. xiv xv *App. Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563, Colquhoun, 99.—*MORHAU'S Tables*, and *PARSONS*, 279.—*MARSHALL'S Digest*, pp 99, 147, 236.

Thus, in the twenty-four years, from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled : the revenue tripled, and the exports more than doubled ; the imports increased a-half. The increase of commercial paper from 1792 to 1810 was sevenfold : indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emergencies; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow this feverish and unnatural tract of excitement, is indeed certain: but still the effect at the moment was the same, and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created, were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state in future times, it might have been, to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict: and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept for ever from the book of existence.

Conte
mocracy
of popular
power led
to the
undoing of
Mr. Pitt's
durable ap-
proach for redem-
tion of debt.

Had Mr. Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience: and there can be no question that, if it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1840; that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation, a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals: the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent Governments. Without exculpating the members of the administration who did not manfully resist, and if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may safely be affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for its redemption, they have to blame not Mr. Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind democratic spirit which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge.

And it must
ultimately
ruin the
British
empire.

"All nations," says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American Democracy, "which have made a great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable

of durable achievements (1)." The abandonment of a system, fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the constitution had become overloaded in reality before it was so in form on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an ignorant impatience of taxation was to bring about that disregard of every thing but present objects, which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. With the prevalence of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired amidst the general influence of the unthinking multitude; and at length, upon its subversion by the great change of 1832, it finally, to all practical purposes, was destroyed. Irretrievable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state: for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected.

But will
still more
impel the
British race
to the New
World.

But if the sun of British greatness is setting in the Old, it is from the same cause rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the democratic spirit, both in the British isles and on the shores of the Atlantic: the energy it develops, the insatiable desires it creates, the national burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the west, and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilization into the primeval recesses of the forest. In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown: but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality; but in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing operation of those principles at once of corruption and resurrection which are combined in humanity, and which, universal in communities as in single men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

(1) Tocqueville, ii. 237.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

ARGUMENT.

Immense results of the Campaign of Austerlitz—The office of Premier is offered to Lord Hawkesbury, and declined—General opinion on the necessity of a Coalition of Parties—Mr. Fox is sent for—State of Parties in the Country—Composition of the new Cabinet—Their first Measures—The Budget—Return of Napoléon to Paris—Financial crisis there—Its ostensible causes—Immediate origin of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war—Measures of Napoléon to remedy the evil—Real causes of the catastrophe—Financial changes in consequence introduced in France—And imposition of its Armies as a burden on Foreign States—French Budget for 1805, and Exposition of the Minister of the Interior—Erection of the Column in the Place Vendôme—Advance of the French against Naples—Successful Invasion of Calabria—Joseph Bonaparte created King of the Two Sicilies—Naples threatened by Sir Sidney Smith—General Stuart lands in the Bay of St. Euphemia—Regnier resolves to attack him—Battle of Maida—Great moral effect of this victory—But its immediate results are less considerable—Surrender of Gaeta—Retreat of the English, and Suppression of the Insurrection—Domestic Reforms of Joseph in Naples—Louis Bonaparte is created King of Holland—Creation of Military Fiefs in the kingdom of Italy—Napoléon's secret views in these measures—Audience given to the Turkish Ambassador—Naval operations—Sailing of a Division of the Brest Fleet—Defeat of the first squadron at St. Domingo—Disasters of the second division under Villameux—Capture of Linois, and lesser Naval Operations—Reflections on these last Naval Disasters of France—Greatness of the French Navy under Louis XVI—Napoléon's change of system in regard to Naval War—Reflections on the growth of the English Maritime Power—Its probable influence on the future destinies of the world—Reduction of the Cape of Good Hope—Sir Home Popham resolves to attack Buenos Ayres—Which falls—Embarrassment of Government at this success—It is retaken by the South Americans—Differences with America in regard to Neutral Rights—Violent measures of Congress—The Commissioners appointed on both sides adjust the differences—Continental Affairs—Growing Coldness between France and Prussia—Jealousy of the two Cabinets—The Prussian Cabinet seizes on Hanover—Measures of Retaliation adopted by Great Britain—Mr. Fox's speech on the subject—Napoléon's opinion of Prussia in this transaction—His farther measures of aggression on Germany—Universal indignation which they excite in the North of Germany—Gentz's Pamphlet on the subject—Formation on the Confederacy of the Rhine—Powers admitted to the Confederation—The Emperor Francis renounces the Crown of Germany—Addresses of Napoléon and the Emperor Francis to the German States—Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin—Warlike preparations of Prussia—Renewed causes of irritation between France and Russia—Difference about the mouths of the Cattaro, which is occupied by the Russians—The French in return seize Ragusa—Actions in its neighbourhood—D'Oubril concludes a Treaty between France and Russia—Which is disavowed by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg—Opening of the Negotiations between France and England—Latter power insists on Russia being a party to the negotiation—Basis of *Uti-possidetis*—Which France departs from—Continuance of the Negotiation, and gradual estrangement of the parties—Its farther progress—The demands of France become more extravagant, and the Negotiation is broken off—Real views of the Parties in this proceeding—State of Affairs at Berlin—Prussian ultimatum, and preparations for War on both sides—Murder of Palm—Great sensation which it occasioned—Proceedings of the Military Commission by which he was condemned—Influence which it had in producing the Rupture of the Negotiation—Last instructions of Mr. Fox to Lord Lauderdale—His eyes were at length opened to the real nature of the War—His Illness and Death—And Character—Extraordinary Talents in Debate—But his fame is on the decline as a just thinker—Reasons of this change.

Immense
results of
the cam-
paign of
Austerlitz.

THE peace of Presburg appeared to have finally subjected the continent to the empire of France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes

was dissolved; the military strength of Austria had received to all appearance an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern Autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his triumph. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they too had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was silent; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the continental armies, and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible object; while the death of the great statesman who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolution, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of Government might be anticipated in his successors.

Premiership
offered to
Lord
Hawkes-
bury, and
declined.

The hopes entertained by Napoléon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon to all appearance likely to be realized. The death of Mr. Pitt dissolved the Administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none—friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from Government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unreserved confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his Cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sunk into the grave, the Ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The King, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the middle of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India bill introduced by the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the Government in the same hands, and immediately after Mr. Pitt's death commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new Administration on the same basis; but that experienced and cautious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his short-lived power was to accept the wardenship of the Cinq Ports, which had been held by Mr. Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift of the Crown—an appointment which gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussion in both Houses of Parliament under the succeeding Administration (1).

Public
opinion on
the necessity
of a coalition
of parties.

Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the Ministry after Mr. Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new Administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties, and an union of all the principal statesmen of

the time to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its terrors might not be disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of Government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a very great degree; the Opposition journals had increased in number and vehemence of declamation; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of Government in that point where Mr. Pitt's Administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, are exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when these absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true friends to their country, on which ever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended Administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish accordingly was felt for the formation of a Government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction—a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England, and never can do so, except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy in the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened (1).

Mr. Fox is
sent for. Yielding at length, though unwillingly, and with sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the King, on the 26th January, sent a message to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr. Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham house, to confer with his Majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr. Fox as the person he should consult on the subject. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the King; and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men (2).

State of
parties in
the country. The anxious wish expressed both by the Sovereign and the nation that the Government should be formed on the broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties, which, although it gave great apparent stability at the outset, was little calculated in the end to ensure the permanence of the administration. Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr. Pitt's Cabinet, then divided the legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to democratic principles, were represented by Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of republican institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the test acts, the abolition of slavery, peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 17, 25.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 21.

in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had receded with Mr. Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr. Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in Parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr. Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold of the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stauncher brethren. In hostility to France and fierce opposition to revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr. Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the popular side, and might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more democratic portion of the Government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of these great parties, the adherents of Mr. Addington's administration, who had remained in Opposition ever since they were displaced from power were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr. Addington) was the leader of his portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalesce, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists, and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the Cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.

The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new Cabinet: but the preponderance of Mr. Fox's adherents was so great as to render the Ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig Administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most inconsiderable, under Government. Mr. Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the Crown, contented himself with the important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was likely to be experienced, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made First Lord of the Treasury; Mr. Erskine, Lord Chancellor; Lord Howick (formerly Mr. Grey) First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Windham, Secretary at War; Earl Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home Department (1) The Cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked forward to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But amidst the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent Government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily excluded the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs, while the admission of the Lord Chief Justice into the Cabinet was

(1) The Cabinet was composed of the following members:—

Lord Erskine—Lord Chancellor.
 Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council.
 Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.
 Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Earl Moira—Master-General of the Ordnance.

Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.

Mr. Fox—Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Windham—Secretary at War.

Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Lord Ellenborough—Chief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet.

—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 26.

justly regarded by all as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties (1), which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.

Notwithstanding the essential and total change which the Ministry had undergone, and the accession of a party to power who had so long denounced the measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the measures of Government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterized the war as unjust and impolitic preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors,—a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr. Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of Mr. Pitt, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late Government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, it was proposed to carry the war taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions and a half,—an increase which was effected by raising the income tax from six and a half to ten per cent, and an addition of 3s. a hundred weight on sugar (2). The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still L.18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and a sinking fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing L.500,000 a-year, and an additional duty laid on pig iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount in all of L.1,136,000 (3).

The great addition to the income tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden and total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by Ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue; and there can be no doubt that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesman like part.

The return of Napoléon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, was very necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to involve the Government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from poli-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 26, 28.

(2) Parl. Deb. vi. 566, 574. Ann. Reg. 1806, 71.

(3) The budget of this year stood as follows:—

	Charges, Great Britain.
Navy,	L.15,281,000
Army,	18,500,000
Ordnance,	4,718,000
Miscellaneous,	2,170,000
Arrears of Subsidies,	1,000,000
Vote of Credit,	2,000,000
	<hr/> L.43,669,000

	Supplies, Great Britain.
Malt and Personal Estate Duties, . . .	L. 2,750,000
Grants from Captured Ships, . . .	1,000,000
Lotteries,	380,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund, . . .	3,500,000
War Taxes,	19,500,000
Deduct as outstanding at end of year,	18,000,000
Loan,	1,500,000
	<hr/> L.43,630,000

Exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being L.23,000,000, and the total sum

raised by taxes and other sources of revenue, L.55,706,000, while the total expenditure was L.72,750,000.—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 566, 569.—*POWELL'S Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

tical, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the Emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the Council of Finance was assembled: it sat nine hours: and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed Minister of Finances, and M. de Marbois, the former Minister, dismissed (1).

^{its ostensible} This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, ^{causes.} and might, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the empire, and urged on by the constant demand for discounts on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, from the expenditure of Government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progressively enlarging its discounts: before the Emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoléon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amidst all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the Minister of Finances on the subject, and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in extensive transactions or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the Royal privilege of coining money (2). The immense discounts which occasioned the peril, were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who being obliged to make good their payments to Government by a certain day, and embarrassed by this remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were frequently driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and whose credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration. A few rich companies also had shared in the liberality of the Bank, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to the Bank, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these, was that of which M. Ouvrard was the leading partner; and its engagements with the Bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the

(1) Bign. v. 96. Bour. vii. 111.

From Bour- (2) His words are, in a letter to the
logue, Sept. Minister of Finances, "The evil origi-
24, 1805. nates in the Bank having transgressed
the law. What has the law done? It has given the
privilege of coining money in the form of paper to
a particular company; but what did it intend by so
doing? Assuredly that the circulation thus created
should be based on solid credit. The Bank appears
to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which
is to discount to individuals, not in proportion to
their real capital, but the number of shares of its
capital stock which they possess. That, however, is
no real test of solvency. How many persons may be
possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and
yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them
a single farthing? The paper of the Bank is thus issued
in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on
real credit but a delusive supposition of wealth. In

one word, in discounting after this manner the
Bank is coining false money. So clearly do I see the
dangers of such a course that, if necessary, I would
stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in
it. I am distressed beyond measure at the neces-
sities of my situation, which, by compelling me to
live in camps and engaging me in distant expedi-
tions, withdraw my attention from what would
otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first
wish of my heart, a good and solid organization of
all which concerns the interest of banks, manufac-
tures, and commerce." What admirable wisdom in
this great man, conceived at the camp of Boulogne,
in the midst of the boundless arrangements which
the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced,
must have required, and of which his correspon-
dence furnishes such ample proof!—See BIGNON,
v. 85, 86.

Spanish fleet, and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service : and before the middle of 1806, nearly seventy millions (L.2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the Government, occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market : but so implicated was Government in these transactions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course, and thus increase the depreciation, which had already become sufficiently alarming. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sunk so much in value that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100 : an universal disquietude prevailed (1), and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.

Immediate
cause of the
explosion was the
absorption
of gold for
the German
war. Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states, both on the part of Government and individuals. Napoléon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (L.2,000,000) from the Bank of France. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the Minister of Finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanderbergh, and Seguin, who advanced 102,000,000 (L.4,080,000) to the Public Treasury, and received, in return, long dated bills for 150,000,000. To meet this advance Ouvrard hastened to Madrid, to obtain a supply of piastres from the Spanish Government, and such was the ascendancy which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an exclusive right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company : the treasures of the whole world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining, before a year expired, from America 272,000,000 francs (L.11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of Europe, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Desprez and several of the greatest capitalists in Paris failed : this immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the Bank and the Treasury; paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanderbergh, one of the greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing, solely by an advance to a great amount from the Public Treasury. The consequences would have been fatal to the empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany, for the Government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service; but the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg operated as a charm in dispelling the panic : with the cessation of continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased; and the crisis was in fact over when the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public con-

fidence. But the danger had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it : and by merely protracting the contest in Moravia for a few months, the allies would infallibly have brought the French Government to a national bankruptcy (1).

Measures of Napoléon in consequence. Napoléon was highly indignant at these embarrassments, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate victory of Austerlitz (2). Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders; the imprudent facility of the Minister of Finances became the general object of reprobation and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration (3). The emperor minutely scrutinized the embarrassments of the Bank and the Treasury: it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the Government amounted to 141,000,000 francs (L.5,600,000) of which Ouvrard and Vanderbergh owed nearly two-thirds, and measures of severity were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, who were thrown into prison without distinction. The gigantic company of M. Ouvrard and his partners was in consequence reduced to bankruptcy: but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned: but a few years after the Government was under the necessity of resuming it: and Napoléon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by appointing him President of the Chamber of Accounts (4).

Real cause of the catastrophe. In fact, though it suited the interests of the Emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the Minister of Finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the Bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper, and the crisis was, in fact, occasioned by the vicious system to which the extravagant expenditure of the Imperial Government had driven the Finance Ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoléon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the labouring condition of the finances. The actual receipts of the Treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions below the annual expenses (5). In addition to this, the payments of the Finance Minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year; while the period of its receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Thence there arose an indispensable necessity for a recourse to money-lenders, who instantly advanced cash to the Treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realized. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure, as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the Chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted by the Treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it. Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances: and this system

(1) Bign. v. 89, 94. Bour. vii. 100, 111. Sav. ii. 157, 162.

(2) "Beaten," says Savary, "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii. 161.

(3) The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Staël, "He!" said she, "he is nothing but a willow wand painted to look like bronze."—Bour. vii. 111.

(4) Bour. vii. 111. Bign. v. 96, 97.

(5) Bign. v. 193.

succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804; but the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the Austrian war, rendered their resources totally unavailing; and it became necessary to apply to greater capitalists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by Government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, which was already the contractor for the supplies to almost all the forces, both by land and sea; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on Exchequer bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of Government; and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone Government derived the fund requisite for its immense engagement. The monetary embarrassments of 1803, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure: but they arose not on the part of individuals but of Government; the crisis was not commercial but political. Thence the singular and instructive fact that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoléon so loudly complained, were made not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service: the root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the Emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of Government. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest: it indicated the arrival of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the Convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution (4).

Financial changes in consequence introduced in France.

Napoléon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. M. Marbois had, long before, represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoléon was so sensible of this, that he had long before expressed his resolution, in military fashion, of having M. Ouvrard arrested, and made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence (2). The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he, "be-

(1) Bign. v. 87, 88.

(2) "Bourricone," said he, in 1800, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested."—"General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?"—"Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? at the public

expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the Government.—Bova. vii. 24, 25.

tween the Bank and the Treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign an *arrêt* for the emancipation of the Treasury." The difficulty was, that the Treasury had to pay every twelve months an hundred and twenty millions (L.5,000,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the Exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (L.2,500,000) was funded in the five per cents; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit banks, under the name of "*caisses de service*," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as ever they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly (1).

But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by Government greatly beyond its income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz solved the difficulty. From the moment that the grand army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany (2). On the 18th November, an edict of the Emperor directed the transmission of all funds to the army of the north to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the army of Italy. Thus the three principal armies of the empire ceased to be any longer a charge to its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoléon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were, in consequence, as the Duke de Gaeta, their principal author, himself confesses, no true statement of the Imperial expenses (3). They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; but, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the conquered states, totally fallacious (4).

The budget of France for 1806, presented to the Chambers in February, 1806, accordingly exhibited no true picture of the national finances; but even as it was, it shewed an expenditure of 700,000,000 (L.28,000,000), and an income of only 588,000,000 (L.23,600,000), the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states (3). But although Napoléon knew as well as any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the Government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a splendid exposition of the state of the empire. The

(1) Bign. v. 89, 189, and 195.

(2) From the castle of Louisberg in Wirtemberg, Napoléon wrote, so early as 4th October, 1805, to the Minister of Finances at Paris—"The army maintains the most exact discipline: the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: I have no need of money from you."

(3) The income was exhibited as follows:—

These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French Government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—*Bignon*, v. 100.

(4) Gaeta, i. 272, 434.

(5) Bign. v. 99, 100.

report drawn up by Champagny, Minister of the Interior, contained a picture of the state of the empire, which, from the magnitude of the victories which it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings which it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Saône as essentially improved; Alexandria surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Apennines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mont-Cenis, the Comiché, and the Mont-Genèvre opening to loaded chariots a path amidst heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Saône and the Rhône; harbours and wet docks in a rapid state of construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; the works of Antwerp and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England. The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence. "The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the Republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The House of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions: Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded: the Italian Peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great empire: the Emperor has guaranteed, as chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects for exultation, Napoléon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers:—"The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion by an hour. I shall always

Receipts.	Francs.	
Direct taxes,	311,649,196	
Registration and stamps,	172,763,591	
Customs,	52,725,918	
Lottery,	13,860,000	
Post Office,	10,000,000	
Excise,	25,000,000	
Salt,	3,000,000	
Total from France	588,998,705	francs, or L. 23,600,000
— from Italy,	30,000,000	or 1,200,000
— from Germany and Holland,	100,000,000	or 4,000,000
Total,	718,998,705	francs, or L. 28,820,000
<i>Expenditure.</i>		
Army,	271,500,000	francs
Navy,	140,000,000	
Church,	25,000,000	
Interest of debt,	60,140,000	
Civil list,	27,000,000	
Minister of Finance,	43,349,800	
— of Justice,	21,200,000	
— of Interior,	29,500,000	
— of Treasury,	8,000,000	
— of Police,	700,000	
Miscellaneous,	30,765,339	
	666,155,139	francs, or L. 26,600,000

be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality, a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak and temporize till the proper time arrived with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoléon's policy (1).

Erection of
the Column
in the Place
Vendôme.

The return of Napoléon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the Emperor and the grand army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of the Emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect; five hundred imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to the summit of the structure, 120 feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoléon, since carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St.-Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis-Philippe it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his gray riding coat, which has become canonized in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. Magnificent fêtes were projected by the Emperor to signalize the return of the grand army to the capital; but they were adjourned, first on account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign (2).

Advance of
the French
against
Naples.

The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Masséna was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month 50,000 men, under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, had crossed the Pontifical states and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible; the small Russian and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily; the Court, thunderstruck by the menacing proclamation of 27th December, speedily followed their example; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hastened to appease the conqueror by submission; a vain attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St.-Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops; in vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage; she was seconded by none; Capua opened its gates; Gaeta was invested; the Campagna filled with the invaders; she, vanquished but not subdued, was compelled to yield to necessity, and followed her timid consort to Sicily; and, on the 15th February, Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Bonaparte, enter its walls (3).

Successful
invasion of
Calabria.

But although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the sea-girt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The

(1) Bign. v. 104, 110. Hard. ix. 91.

(2) Bign. v. 112, 113.

(3) Dum. xv. 95, 99. Bign. v. 114, 116. Hard. ix. 56, 58.

Prince of Hesse-Philippsthal had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own gallant resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied, that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity; and the long resistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian Cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion, the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their Government and its allies, submitted to the enemy; and General Regnier, with a considerable corps, at first experienced little resistance in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Masséna with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to despair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position; but they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campo-Tenese their tumultuary levies, though 15,000 strong, were entirely dispersed. The victorious Regnier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoléon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily (1).

Joseph
Bonaparte
created King
of the Two
Sicilies.
March 20.

When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in person to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district.

He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Scigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoléon created him King of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time the Venetian states were definitively annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand Duke of Berg, with a considerable territory; and the Emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army (2). Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the military

(1) Rot. iv. Hard. ix. 88, 90. Dum. xv. 107, 116.

(2) Sign. v. 131. Hard. ix. 93, 94. Colletta, ii. 14, 15.

"The interests of our crown," said Napoléon, "and the tranquillity of the continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and forming part of the great empire—we therefore declare our well-beloved brother Joseph King of the Two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier

was created Prince of Neufchatel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the Pontifical States; Bernadotte became Prince of Pontecorvo; Cambacérès and Le Brun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the Crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories; a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues to be distributed among the French soldiers.—Hard. ix. 94, 95; Bion. v. 131.

hero of the Revolution already gave indications of his secret design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, to overturn its principles.

Naples is threatened by Sir Sidney Smith. General Stuart lands in the bay of St. Euphemia.

Events, however, soon occurred which shewed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects on his elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the Bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment, and nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sidney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment, amidst the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions, attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffections which prevailed in Calabria, the English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the ca-

July 1. pital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than 5000 men, which landed in the Gulf of St. Euphemia: and the commander, Sir John Stuart, issued a proclamation calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none, however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received; and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Régnier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at MAIDA, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces accordingly in quest of the enemy. On the 5th July the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning, the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive that it would be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers (1).

Regular resolves to attack them.

When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Régnier, consisting of 8000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet towards the sea, while the British, bivouacking in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential gales of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Régnier, inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the errors of General Menou, and encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to 7,500 men (2), resolved to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, and march

(1) Bot. iv. 210, 211. Colletta, ii. 19. Ann. Reg., 1800, 142, Dum. xv. 142, 145.

(2) Bot. iv. 211.

at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy (1).

Surprised, but nothing dismayed at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current fell into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled with light troops which kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached; but notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge; the 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward; and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity; their battalions broke and fled; but were instantly overtaken amidst deafening shouts, with such slaughter, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a thousand, including General Compere, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Ragnier made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the left: a rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left, and this movement might have yet retrieved the day, when the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, were assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 28th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew their shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers (2).

Great moral effect of this victory. The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation amidst the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, never was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling: but of what avail was all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had fallen in the conflict. At last the rival states had come into collision on terms approaching to equality, and without the paralyzing effect of lukewarm or dubious allies, and the result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoleon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable

(1) *Ibid.* iv. 211. *Dum.* xv. 144. *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 142.

(2) *Sir J. Stuart's Despatch*, *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 391, 598. *Est. iv.* 311, 312. *Colletta*, ii. 99. *Dum.* xv. 146, 148.

The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded. The *Duchess of Abrantes* states the loss of the French at 5,000 men. (*D'Abrantes*, ix. 136; and *Sir J. Stuart's Despatch*, *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 594.)

was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or ascribed to their true cause, general inexperience in the military art : confidence, the surest presage of victory when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service ; and reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy, and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy (1) : the people no longer hesitated to speak of Crécy and Azincourt. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war (2). Napoléon was well aware of its importance : he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal. “ Sive tanta, sive minor victoria fuit, ingens eo dic res, ac nescio, an maxima illo bello, gesta sit ; non vinci enim ab Hannibal, vincentibus, tunc difficilius fuit, quam postea vincere (3).”

Its immediate results are less considerable.

But though productive in the end of the most important consequences from the moral feelings which it inspired, the victory of Maida was not attended at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily, were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wildfire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after the town of Crotona, containing 1000 men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. Their detachments were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilized warfare. So general was the disaster, that Régnier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the intrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of 8000 men, at length to make head against the enemy (4).

Surrender of Gaeta.

These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Masséna, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on

(1) In particular, Captain Pasley's able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England ; a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

(2) D'Abr. ix. 136.

(3) Liv. xxlii. 16.

(4) Dum. xv. 148, 155. Ann. Reg. 1806, 595. Bot. iv. 213. Jom. ii. 238. Bign. v. 126.

board an English vessel to Sicily. His successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit; proposals of capitulation were made; and Masséna, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions. The garrison, still seven thousand strong, marched out with the honours of war; and on the 18th July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements (1).

Revert of the English. Suppression of the insurrection. The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Masséna, eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible. Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving, of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain too often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Masséna, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents kept their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria, but were at length turned by the Monte Galdo and defeated with

Aug. 5. great slaughter. A guerilla warfare ensued, attended with savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the Nov. 10. slain. But after several months of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English; and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost by sickness and the sword little short of 15,000 men (2).

Domestic reforms of Joseph in Naples. No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the administration of the finances, the general police of the country, stood equally in need of amendment. Hence the remarkable fact, that the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education, while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses consequent in its train, were to be found among the rabble of cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Bonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found

(1) Bign. v. 127, 128. Dum. xv. 155, 170. Bot. iv. 244.

The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened

on the 10th July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent. Gaeta, named after the nurse of Æneas (1), underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marshal Dam. Thirty years afterwards, it was besieged and taken when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—See Dumas, xv. 155, 170.

(2) Dum. xv. 171, 179. Jom. ii. 239, 246. Bot. iv. 214, 217. Ann. Reg. 1806, 143, 148.

(1) Tu quoque litoribus nostris, Æneia nutrit, Eternam moriens famam, Gaeta, dedisti.

ample room for, and soon effected the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restrained; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the public debt; part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national institute, and various other useful institutions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals were undertaken or projected, and a general spirit of activity diffused by the energy of the Government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits produced by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution (1).

Louis Bonaparte created King of Holland.

The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the Two Sicilies by the brother of Napoléon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Presburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious Emperor; while the republic of Venice, incorporated by the decree of 30th March with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the Grand Pensionary in 1808, had almost rendered it a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were to all appearance indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a halfway house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepôt of the commercial riches of Holland, in the Eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean, and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotic rule of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others was equalled only by their base adulation of the foreign rulers of the commonwealth. The people, desperate of relief, and worn out by obscure tyrants, in the election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things. Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoléon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that in the existing state of Europe a hereditary government could alone guarantee the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious of the state," declared Louis the King of Holland. A few days after, the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the Emperor; but the elusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which

May 26.

June 6.

Napoléon made to his brother on the occasion. "Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of constable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge towards me, and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states (4)."

Cession of military duty to the kingdom of Italy. At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy afforded the Emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne. Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoléon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers; while a fifteenth of the revenue which they yielded to the treasury at Milan, was set apart to form appanages suitable to those dignities. A revenue of 1,200,000 francs (L.48,000) was at the same time destined, from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund, out of which he was to recompense his soldiers: and soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoléon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree (2).

Napoléon's secret views in these measures. The system upon which Napoléon now openly entered of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of dependent dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere abolition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances, both which had elevated him to the throne, and surrounded him when there. He clearly perceived that it was revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both dreaded, from dear bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship—his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him; and this being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance on which he could depend was that which united him to his own family, and cemented with his own the interests of inferior royalties, dependent on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own relations? could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoléon, and that, *situated as he was*, they were founded on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite in the highest degree the jealousy and hostility of the other continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is indeed equally certain: but these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They shew only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played; and afford another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal

(1) *Mem.* ix. 98, 100. *Bign.* v. 141, 142.

(2) *Bign.* v. 139, 140.

truth, that those who owe their elevation to revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by, than those who resist its fury (1).

Audience
given to the
Turkish
ambassador.

On the same day on which a king was given by the French Emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the Grand Signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the Imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoléon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his subsequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Every thing," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect, that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from me: united to my throne, he need fear nothing from his enemies." Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoléon signed on the Niemur, a treaty with Russia, for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe (2).

Naval
operations.

But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoléon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations, and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies.

Sailing and
division of
the Brest
fleet.

The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievements of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which, under Villeneuve, had issued from Cadix: but the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoléon had so fondly calculated, still existed; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their resources. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations with smaller squadrons, against their remote colonies or merchant vessels. Half the Brest fleet, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, were victualled for six months; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons: the first, under Admiral Leisseigues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, were destined to carry out succours to St.-Domingo; while the second, under Villaumez, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward bound merchant fleets. But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which annihilated the enemy's remaining naval forces, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war (3).

Defeat of
the first
squadron
at St.-Do-
mingo.

Admiral Leisseigues arrived without any accident at St.-Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated

(1) Bign. v. 132, 241. Las Cas. vii. 127.
"The truth is," said Napoléon, "that I was never master of my own movements—I was never alto-

gether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—LAS CAS, vii. 124, 125.

(2) Bign. v. 145

(3) Dum. xv. 84, 86; Ann. Reg. 1806, 229.

that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the Imperial, a splendid vessel of 130 guns, which bore the Admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action: a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb Imperial, driven ashore and burnt. The frigates stood to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all the ships stood to their guns; on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760; while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed and 294 wounded. The Imperial, before it ran ashore, had seen 500 of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels (1).

Division of Villeneuve's division. Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a disaster, the cruise of Admiral Villameuz, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in with the homeward bound Jamaica fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th July Sir John Borlase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the

June 4. 4th June: Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance
July 8. with a second fleet in the same latitude; while a third, under ad-
July 12. miral Louis, put to sea in the end of August to intercept their re-
August 28. turn. As it was now evident that the attention of the English Government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St.-Domingo: and under the influence of these feelings the Veteran, of 74 guns, commanded by Jerome Bonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders
July 30. stood away in the night of the 30th July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Villameuz saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet: the Foudroyant, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havannah, pursued by the English frigate Anson under the very guns of the Moro Castle; the Impetueux was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burnt, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the Cassant alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Bonaparte, in the Veteran, made

a rich prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by some English vessels when he reached the Bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where the hulk was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety (1).

Capture of
Linois, and
other naval
operations.
Sept. 18,
1805.

The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmolested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given, made an attack on the *Centurion*, 74 guns, and a few English merchantmen in the Bay of Vesigabatam; but though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove another on shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that March 13, 1806. the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois at length bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell in the night into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and after a short action was taken, with the *Marengo* of 80 and the March 14. *Belle Poule* of 40 guns. Next day five large frigates, with troops on board, bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were made prisoners. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the *Rechefort* squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made 800 prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British Government, Lallemand's was called by the Eng-

Dec. 15, 1804. lish sailors the invisible squadron. He had the luck to meet and capture the *Calcutta* of 86 guns, which, unsuspecting danger, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French (2), who in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.

Reflections
on these last
naval dis-
asters of
France.

These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish navies were re-
TALLY DESTROYED, and the English fleet, by general consent, had attained to UNIVERSAL DOMINION. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary ascendancy acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire. Napoleon afterwards acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the impotent rage of Denmark, were put at his disposal: but he never again ventured on naval enterprises; and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the *Brest* fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, conveying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours; all apprehensions of invasion disappeared, and England, relieved from all danger

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 230, 231. Bign. v. 157, 158.
Dum. xv. 90, 94.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 220. Bign. v. 153, 154.

of domestic warfare or colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and launch forth her invincible legions in that career of glory which has immortalized the name of Wellington.

Gravamen of the French navy under Louis XVI. It was not thus at the commencement of the struggle, nor had it been thus in the preceding war. The mild and pacific Louis XVI had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of power. The French and Spanish fleets had rode triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been revictualled in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the Convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St.-Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can hardly produce a naval power. The transports of Brissot and the society of Les Amis des Noirs cut off the right arm of their maritime strength by the destruction of St.-Domingo; the confiscations of the Convention utterly ruined their commercial wealth: the blockade of their harbours deprived them of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only their own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralyzed that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily invaded him in his harbours.

Napoleon's change of system in regard to the naval war. This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoléon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivalling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe. Abandoning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, every where set on foot for the formation of a navy, were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the continental powers, which could every where be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its Governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for if any considerable state was left out, the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to the separate interests of England, but the commencement of that important change in the system of continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoléon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illus-

Reflections
on the
growth of
the English
maritime
power.

trious men who, during a series of ages, reared up this astonishing power. It was not, like the empires of Napoléon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime; nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France: 30,000 of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the victory of Sluys equalled in magnitude and importance, though from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs it has not attained equal celebrity with, that of Cressy or Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake—the fire of Essex—the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric; it grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow: the power of Louis XIV—the genius of Napoléon, were alike shattered against its strength: the victories of La Hogue and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the revolutionary war: dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the northern ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen serenity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amidst the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amidst the solitudes of the waves, the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced. But amidst all our admiration for the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities perhaps still more worthy of admiration. Theirs was the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoléon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs; but had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that as self-confidence is its soul, so despondence is its ruin; and that in reality the admirals who encountered not only danger but disgrace in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land forces to certain victory at Jena or Austerlitz.

As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal domi-

<sup>its probable
future
influence on
the world.</sup> nion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion, that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert, that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created, is already conspicuous. The Roman legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind the still more glorious inheritance of Transatlantic greatness. A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilization follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will arise to greatness in the east of Europe: the Cross is inscribed on its banners: as to the Crescent is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoléon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, alike irresistible by sea and land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

<sup>Reduction
of the Cape
of Good
Hope.
Jan. 8.</sup> The destruction of the French naval squadrons were not the only maritime operations of this year. Before Mr. Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, consisting of 3000 men; the naval armament being under the direction of Sir Home Popham. On the 4th January, 1806, the expedition reached Table Bay, but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking in that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th, they came up with the Dutch forces, 5000 strong, chiefly cavalry, in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders withstood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet, than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle; while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; General Jansens, who had retired with three thousand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for his safe return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the English dominions (1).

<sup>Sir Home
Popham re-
turns to at-
tach British
Agree.</sup> This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth: but the facility with which it was conducted, inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr. Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda against South America, and had even been appointed in December, 1804, to the Diadem of 64 guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the continent of South America favourable

to the trade of this country (4)." But this intention had been afterwards abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces; and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope: and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the Governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay; taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops. With these, and two companies which he had the address to procure from St.-Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio della Plata (2).

Which falls 25th June. The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th June, and was immediately disembarked. General Beresford, who commanded the land forces, immediately proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy by threatening Monte Video, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders; and a capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property—a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat in the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to Government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors (3).

Embarrassments of Government on this success. Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked for success reached the British islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpediency and unhappy tendency of the enterprise; for on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing; which unhappily arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people perhaps of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though fortunately not very lasting fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports: boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered; and those fabled regions which formed the Eldorado of Sir Walter Raleigh, appeared about to pour their inexhaustible treasures into the British islands. Under the influence of these extravagant feelings every principle of reason, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience was swept away: speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained (4): and Government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.

(1) Lord Melville's evidence in Sir H. Popham's trial, March 9, 1807.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 234, 235. Dum, xv. 73, 75.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1806, 235, 236. Dum, xv. 73, 75.

(4) Ann. Reg. 1806, 237, 238.

*It is re-
taken by
the South
Americans,
Aug. 4.*

But long before the Cabinet of St. James were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the boundless consignments which were in preparation could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the Government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unwanted occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders. An insurrection was secretly organized in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward : the militia of the surrounding districts were assembled : Colonel Linières, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Monte Video at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection in the interior of the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible : a des-

Aug. 12. perate conflict ensued in the town; and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal conflict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender were afterwards violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till reinforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended in the end with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American Governments, set sail from New York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after undergoing many hardships and landing on the Spanish Main, was obliged to re-embark and make the best of his way back to Trinidad (4).

*Differences
with Amer-
ica in
regard to
neutral
rights.*

Differences at this period arose which threatened to involve the British Government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service. The next the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a necessary consequence from the right of search which the American Government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had recognized, and which constituted the basis of the whole mari-

time laws of Europe. It was impossible to expect that when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to their service, they should not reclaim them for their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether (1). The second arose from the decisions of the English Admiralty Courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country (2), contrary to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo (3). The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that to bring the neutral within the exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done; but, on the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unlading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognize such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state; but it was equally natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity, and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognizing as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then, after extensive capital had, on the faith of that

(1) On the part of the Americans it was contended, "that the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that, while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British born subjects; and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such intolerable abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to abstract right, or the practice of other states; the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their than it could be in any other case. The American Government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships; but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which he owed to the Government of his nativity; and that provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them: that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its merchant vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if in the

course of that search her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time vindicate its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary from the right of search; it is in truth the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment: if the Americans can show that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released: but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which has never yet been done."—See *Am. Reg.* 1806, 244, 245.

(2) The *Essex*, May, 1805, per Sir W. Scott.

(3) Case of *Polly*, July 5, 1800. *Edm.* ii. 264.

recognition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize (1).

Violent measures of Congress. To these serious and lasting subjects of discord was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship *Leander*, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so violent a commotion, that Mr. Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, April 10. and, after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect the 15th November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights (2), and every thing announced the commencement of a fresh Transatlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.

The commissioners on both sides adjust the differences. But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the vehement populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of Great Britain. The instructions of their respective Governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their important duties in a correspondent spirit. Under such auspices, the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever, could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such difficulties, that the American commissioners; in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to consent, in the meantime, to a pledge by the British Government, that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and to afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by them, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity; but on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade by the enemy to their colonies, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent on European and two per cent on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, to five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the northern coalition (3).

(1) *Robinson's Reports*, lii. 241, 249. *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 248, 249.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 247, 249.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 248, 250. Art. 11 and 12, Treaty.

Continental
affairs.
Coldness
between
France and
Prussia.

While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoléon was rapidly advancing in his career of universal terrestrial empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th December, whereby he substituted for the intended warlike defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral England. Great was the embarrassment of the Cabinet of Berlin when this unexpected intelligence arrived. On the one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be bounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls; on the other hand, some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoléon prevailed over the King's better principles, and it was determined not simply to ratify the treaty, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications; and as a colour to the transaction, and also perhaps as a salve to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margraviates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the meantime be obtained;" while it was represented to the English Minister at Berlin that arrangements had been con-
Jan. 26, 1806. cluded with France for insuring the tranquillity of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Russian troops and to the administration of the King until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitively annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the meantime the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army disbanded, and a proclamation to the same effect issued by the King in taking possession of that territory (1).

Increasing
jealousies
between
the two
Cabinets.
They seize
on Hanover.

But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs of Napoléon to admit any modification, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St.-Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoléon the question was decided; all sincere friendship was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian Government, the Emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect; Prussia had not resolu-
Feb. 15. tion enough to resist; and on the 15th February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ra-
March 28. tified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. Count

(1) Hardenberg's Letter, Jan. 26, 1806, to Mr. Jackson. Ann. Reg. 1806, 158. Hard. ix. 33. 14 Bign. v. 223, 226.

Schulenberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian Monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation, closing its harbours against English vessels; and on the 1st April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoleon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France (4).

Measures of
retaliation
by Great
Britain.

This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater potentates, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoleon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to manifest their resentment; but Prussia was egregiously

Feb. 2. mistaken when she applied it to Great Britain. So early as the 3d February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more

March 17. than take possession of it for a temporary purpose; and the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr. Fox at a subsequent period, when the intentions of the Cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to shew that perfidious Government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British Ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours declared in a state of blockade; an embargo laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours;

April 12. while a message from the King to both houses of Parliament announced his resolution to assert the dignity of his crown, and his anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened

May 24. policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power with whom his Majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts (2).” An order of council was soon after issued, authorizing the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was instantly swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.

Mr. Fox's
speech on
the subject.

In the speech which he made shortly after in the House of Commons, Mr. Fox drew in vivid colours, and depicted with all the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. “The Emperor of Russia,” said he, “after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French Emperor. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 159. Mign. v. 233, 234. Hard. ix. 107.

(2) Hard. ix. 207, 210. Mign. v. 233. Ann. Reg. 1806, 159, 161. Parl. Deb. vi. 890, 896.

could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer; but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoléon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country—and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of a military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of every thing that is contemptible in servility, with every thing that is odious in rapacity. Other nations have yielded to the ascendant of military power: Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master (1)."

Napoléon's
opinion of
Prussia in
this trans-
action.

In consenting to this infamous transaction, the Cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French Emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed, by that dreaded conqueror. "From the moment," says Bignon, "that the treaty of 15th February was signed, Napoléon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France (2): he would not permit the delay of a single day." Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoléon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian Cabinet before they were finally consummated (3).

His farther
measures of
aggression
on Germany.

The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared, in a series of measures, which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic empire, and ultimately brought that power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French empire. On March 15, Murat, without any previous concert with the Cabinet of Berlin, was invested with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of 15th February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune the brother-in-law of Napoléon, in the very heart of his Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now awakened jealousy of Prussia; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Werden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. 890, 892. Ann. Reg. 1806, 161.

(2) Bign. v. 232.

(3) Hard. ix. 107.

of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of 4,000,000 florins (L.200,000) from the city of Frankfort; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburg to a still larger amount; while, in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English was seized without distinction, and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (L.240,000) was the price at which the Imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound peace, to tender to the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian Government now began to fall; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies (1).

No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation, which burst forth in all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they had made so many sacrifices; but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The Queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporizing policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall; one universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks: it was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat: the elder spoke of the glories of Frederick and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence, issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved, and that universal fervour ensued which is the invariable forerunner of great events for good or for evil. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters (2).

(1) *Bign. v.* 247, 370. 1806. *Reg. Ann.* 164. *Hard. ix.* 136, 224, 225. *Bour. vii.* 137, 138.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 165. *Hard. ix.* 117, 119.

Genz's One of the most remarkable of these pamphlets was a pamphlet published by the celebrated Genz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard every thing as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But how is our salvation to be obtained? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, reanimating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes, they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource; that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations, and peace to the world. You, then, who amidst the uni-

versal shipwreck have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts; who have hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down, but not destroyed; in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is to Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved. It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more: we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe." —*Genz, Europe en 1806*; and *Hard. ix.* 122, 123. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time!—a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

Formation
of the Con-
federacy of
the Rhine.

Strong as were the patriotic feelings which the conquest and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate feelings of many of their people, Napoléon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the Emperor at Mayence; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states of Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which they had elevated their sovereigns. France on this occasion played off with fatal effect the policy so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution, that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoléon felt daily more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to convert their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance,* under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on the allied states (1).

Powers
admitted to
the Confe-
deracy.

Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty were not long of being brought to a termination. The plenipotentiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July; and on the 12th of that month, the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand Duke

July 12.

of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau Weilberg, Nassau Usingen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, and Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm, and Salm-Kerboung, Isenberg-Birchstein Prince Lichtenstein d'Arenberg, and Count de la Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, acceded to the confederacy a short time after-

Sept. 30.

wards. By the act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be severed for ever from the Germanic empire; rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, placed under the protection of the Emperor of the French; and any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole (2). Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories encircled in their dominions (3). Lastly, a separate ar-

(1) Hard. ix. 153, 155. Bign. v. 300, 303. Lucches. i. 124, 131.

(2) Arts. 4, 7, 12, and 35.
(3) Arts. 24, 25.

side provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection; which were, for France, 200,000 (1), and for the German states, 88,000 men: but subsequent experience soon proved that Napoleon received military aid to double the amount of these numbers from them all (2).

The Emperor re-
stores the
crown of
Germany.

This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoleon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic empire had been pierced to the heart, her fairest provinces had been reft from the empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great: sixteen millions of men were by a single stroke transferred from the Cæsars to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the Emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened by what immediately followed.

§ 1. On the 1st August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced Princes. The former deemed it unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the empire, the inconsistency between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amidst the weakness of their former chief, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess force adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish Princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterwards to expiate in tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Scarcely still held the battlements of Brannau: on one pretext or another the evacuation of the German States, which by the treaty of Presburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed: the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn, the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored, while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the Imperial Cabinet dissembled their feelings; and justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, renounced the throne of the Cæsars, and declared himself the first of a new series of the Emperors of Austria (3).

(1) See Treaty, Ann. Reg. 1806, 818. Marten's Treaties, iv. 313, 329.

(2) The contingents were settled as follows:—

France,	200,000
Bavaria,	30,000
Wirttemberg,	12,000
Raden,	3,000
Berg,	5,000
Darmstadt,	4,000
Namur, Hohenlohi, and others,	4,000

258,000

(3) Jom. ii. 240, 243. Bign. v. 317, 319. Hard. ix. 157.

Addresses of Napoleon and the Emperor Francis to the German States. Napoleon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon announcing the Confederation of the Rhine—"The Germanic constitution is no longer but a shadow; the Diet has ceased to have any will of its own, His Majesty the Emperor and King can, therefore, no longer recognize its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. In his pacific views he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his pro-

Great
sensation
which these
events pro-
duce at
Berlin.

Though in appearance levelled at the emperor Francis as chief of the empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded : all classes, from the Cabinet of the King to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet : they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. The increasing aggressions of Napoléon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. Murat advanced claims to the principality of Emden, and the three Abbacies which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the House of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the King, tributary to the vassal of Napoléon ; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with

Sept. 27. the Court of Berlin, they were given to understand by the French Emperor that if they were desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to Prussia in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation. But they were informed shortly after, that the *Hanse*

October 2. Towns, which Napoléon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy : that Saxony could not be allowed to form part of it against its will ; while the Elector of Hesse was invited to join the confederacy of the Rhine, and on his refusing to comply, struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions. But all these causes of complaint, serious as they were, sunk into insignificance compared to that which arose when it was discovered by M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign ; that, while continually urging the Cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoléon had engaged to Russia, in the treaty signed with d'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions (1) ; and that while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederic William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand Duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the

mises." The confederated Princes declared—"The results of the three last wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the Princes of the West and South have deemed it expedient to renounce all connection with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory as well as those of his empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity"—"With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the empire : "Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the imperial throne imposed

upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the Princes Electors of the empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the Electors, Princes, and States, members of the Supreme Tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chief."—See *HAUS*. ii. 159, 162.

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 187. *Bigu.* v. 369, 390. *Hard.* ix. 167, 176.

Aug. 9.
Warlike
preparations
of Prussia.

King of Prussia put his armies on the war footing, despatched M. Krusemark to St.-Petersburg, and M. Lacobi to London, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers; opened the navigation of the Elbe; concluded his differences with Sweden; assembled his generals; and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible; the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne; Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederic, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able, single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amidst thunders of applause, at the theatres, and the Queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch, by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps (1).

While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of southern Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England.

Reverted
causes of
discord be-
tween
Prussia and
Russia.

The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz, had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France.

Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Presburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations toward his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still farther removed the possibility of a rupture, while the withdrawing of Austria from the continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. But notwithstanding all these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again threw them into collision, and the quarter where the difference arose indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.

Differences
about the
mouths of
the Cattaro.

Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in its naval transactions. By the treaty of Presburg it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorized to take possession had not arrived, and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who are almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pur-

(1) *Hard. ix. 176, 181. Bign. v. 409, 415. Ann. Reg. 1806, 167.*

Which is
occupied by
the Rus-
sians.

suance of these instigations, the people, who are styled Montenegrius, and ardently desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict blockade, in which they were soon supported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived March 4. from Corfu. After a short blockade, he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately transferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force; but the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious, that the Austrian subaltern officers, in the fortress protested against its surrender, and the governor was afterwards brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Trahsylvanian fortress for life (1).

The French
in return
sue Ra-
guza.
Actions in
its neigh-
bourhood.

Nothing that has since transpired authorizes the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoléon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than Napoléon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Brannau, on the Austrian frontier; and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German States. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrius from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him, he was at liberty to look for an indemnity

May 27.

wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with whom they had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians, both by land and sea; but before any thing of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian Cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the

July 9.

exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. But, in consequence of that ambassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune ar-

July 6.

rival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrius; but these troops having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued (2).

M. d'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he appears,

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 149, 150. Bign. v. 258, 262. Hard. ix. 195, 196.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 150, 151. Bign. v. 258, 265. Hard. ix. 210, 221.

D'Oubril concludes a treaty at Paris between France and Russia.

when he arrived at Paris, to have misunderstood, in an unaccountable manner, his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with that power was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands of the Emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and Russia from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoléon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was

contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord, to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the Court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-Royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of King—the harbours of those islands being shut against the British flag during the continuance of the present war; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his Queen; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties—a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concluded in within a year afterwards at Tilsit. Thus did Napoléon and d'Oubril concur in spoliating the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands to his son; gift away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the Court of Palermo or the Cabinet of London; dispose of the Balearic Islands, without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden, at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover (1).

Which is disavowed by the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg.
M. d'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions, for no sooner was it concluded, than he set off in person to render an account of it at St.-Petersburg, observing, at the same time—"I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my Imperial master." In effect before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A change of Ministry had ensued: Prince Adam Czartorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the Imperial Government, as "entirely in opposition to the instructions which d'Oubril had received," though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been com-

municated to the Cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian Government was saved the dishonour which must for ever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one Ministry, with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the Imperial Cabinet, not any deviation from instructions on the part of its ambassador; and all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states (1).

The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and England, which had been long in dependence at Paris; and the turn which it was now taking left little hope that hostilities in every quarter could be brought to a termination.

Opening of
negotiations
between
France and
England.

This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private audience with Mr. Fox in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoléon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English Minister, after having at first dismissed him from his

Feb. 10. presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply from that minister, in which after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a Cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr. Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated the passage, in the exposition of the state of the empire by the Minister of the Interior, wherein Napoléon declared that he would always be ready to renew con-
March 26. ferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr. Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments; and thus commenced a negotiation under the most favourable of all auspices, mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it (2).

The basis proposed by Mr. Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their
April 1. respective allies.—"Our interests," said Talleyrand, "are easily

(1) Bign. v. 330, 344. Hard. ix. 221, 222.

The powers conferred on M. d'Oubril bore—"We authorize, by these presents, M. d'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorized on the part of the French Government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to admit to it our imperial ratification in the terms that shall be specified." On the other hand the act of disavowal bore—"The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. d'Oubril

has been submitted to a council specially summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions transmitted to him from Vienna before his departure from that town; and they found that M. d'Oubril, in signing that treaty, has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however, that of mere banishment to his estates, did not look like any very serious deviation from instructions.—See MARTIN'S *Sep. ii.* 508, 312, and HARD. ix. 222.

(2) Bign. v. 266, 269. Hard. ix. 184, 187. Parl. Deb. viii. 92, 94.

England in-
side on
Russia being
a party to
the negotia-
tion.

reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kings of the earth put together. We are a great continental power; but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English Minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr. Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty (1), independent of that power? No." Finding the English Minister immovable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation; and it was agreed that the intervention of the continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.

Basis of uti-possidetis fact. The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and honour of England and France themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoléon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoléon was brought to agree to, and the restitution of Sicily by England or its allies (2); the recognition of the Emperor of France by England, and of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France (3). These terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti-possidetis*, and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr. Fox on the subject.

Which France de- parts from. June 12. At the time when the proposals were made by the French Government, no accommodation had been effected with Russia; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Oubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace on behalf of Russia, and Napoléon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British Government. When pressed, therefore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti-possidetis*; and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied, that though the sentiments of the Emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that *some changes had taken place*, the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and farther mentioned that the Emperor had received reports from his brother and the

(1) *Parl. Deb.* viii. 102. 108. *Bign.* v. 267, 274.

(2) "I inquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said. 'Vous l'avez,' he replied, 'nous ne vous la demandons pas; si vous la possédiez, elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make further questions. We ask nothing of you (*nous ne vous demandons rien*), amounting to an admission

of *uti-possidetis*, as applicable to his Majesty's conquests. Talleyrand concluded with these words:—'Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changés; l'aigreur qui caractérisait le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus. Et ce que nous désirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande-Bretagne.'—*Lord Yarmouth's Communication*, No. 12. *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

(3) Lord Yarmouth's *Commun.* *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily*, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown; the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the Cabinet of St. James's to enter into the negotiation; that if a confidential communication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the Emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the Emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication."

June 26. Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr. Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was on the faith of this basis,

more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences alone were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct the negotiation; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine qua non*,

July 1. without which it was useless to continue the conferences. Talley-

July 9. rand upon this offered the *Hanse Towns* as an equivalent for the King of Naples; and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian Majesty: looking out thus, according to the usual system of Napoléon, in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions (1).

This clear departure on the side of France from the basis of the negotiations, negotiation originally laid down by its own minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be spoliated, in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents, augured but ill for its ultimate success; and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr. Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily should

July 9. be retained by the King, and enjoined Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this were not acceded to. The changes in Germany consequent on the Confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be concealed, if peace with Great Britain were concluded. Mr. Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ragusa, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the pro-

July 19. posed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoléon would by no means consent. Advices were received at Paris that an army of 30,000 men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in Paris belonging to corps

July 20. in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments, and the signature of a separate treaty between France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles taken from Spain was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British Plenipotentiary (2).

(1) Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, June 19, July 1, 5, and 12. Parl. Deb. viii. 110, 115.

(2) Mr. Fox's and Lord Yarmouth's Despatches, July 9, 18, 19, and 20. Parl. Deb. viii. 112, 125.

Progress
of the ne-
gotiation.
July 21.

The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the Cabinet of St. Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacification. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover: full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clarke, and specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoléon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia as a compensation for Hanover, or by his

July 30.

Sicilian Majesty; and held out the menace, that by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views in regard to the Spanish Peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as they had been in Holland and Naples. But regardless of these threats Mr. Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti possidetis*, as the only one which could be admitted, and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British Government (1).

The de-
mands of
France be-
come more
exaggerated,
and the
negotiation
is broken off.

Under the auspices of Lord Lauderdale the negotiation was protracted two months longer without leading to any satisfactory result. The English Minister continued incessantly to demand for a return to the principle of *uti possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation; and the French Cabinet as uniformly eluded, or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain.

Lord Lauderdale in consequence repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril. This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, farther than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia: but it considerably lowered those of France, and Talleyrand announced that France

Sept. 12.

Sept. 20.

"would make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterwards explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain, the confirmation of its possession of Malta, the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire, and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity from Spain, in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English Cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoléon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia (2).

Real views
of the par-
ties in this
negotiation.

Thus this negotiation, begun under such favourable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro.

(1) Lord Yarmouth's and Mr. Fox's Despatches, July 28, August 3, 1806. Parl. Deb. viii. 125, 138.

(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 173, 203. Bign. v. 343, 359. Lord Lauderdale's Desp. 26th Sept. 1806.

Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the South and North of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but in reality the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view were more considerable in contending for these distant possessions than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the Crown of Naples that Napoléon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother; it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire; it was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the colossal empires of France and Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties; and the negotiation broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France, the empire of the seas and the dominion of continental Europe (1).

State of
affairs at
Berlin.

The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify d'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when shortly after it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible; a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the Queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin (2). The enthusiasm was universal, but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to frenzy: in proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even

Aug. 26.

the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital (3). Lucchesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his Government full of acrimonious complaints of the Cabinet of the Tuileries, which either by accident or design fell into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoléon. He in-

Sept. 2.

stantly demanded the recal of the obnoxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission

Sept. 7.

Prussian
ultimatum,
and prepara-
tions for war
on both
sides.

was mainly to protract matters, that the Cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and if possible gain time for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoléon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly defiling from Brannau, the Inn, and the Neckar towards the banks of the Elbe, and 100,000 men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at

(1) Bign. v. 363, 365.

(2) Bign. v. 403.

(3) He repeated with emphasis the lines of the

poet Gleims, in allusion to the warlike birds of Berlin.

"Sie singen, laut im hohen Chor,
Vom Tod, fürs Vaterland uns vor,
Doch kommt ein einziger Hahn.
So lauft die ganze Barmen-Schar."

Sept. 26.

their head on the night of the 26th September, conveyed the guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by

Oct. 1.

M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were: 1st, That the French troops should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the Emperor, and continue it without interruption. 2d, That Wesel should be detached from the French empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter league in the North of Germany. No stronger proof of the infatuation which had seized the Cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of Napoléon and the grand army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rosbach than the eve of the battle of Jena (1).

Murder of
Palm.
Great excite-
ment which it
occasioned.

The public mind was violently excited at this period in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder committed by orders of Napo-

leon on a citizen of one of the free cities of the empire, who had sold a work hostile to their interests. Palm, a tradesman in Nuremberg, had been instrumental with many other booksellers in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gentz, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others

Aug. 12.

were fortunate enough to make their escape: but Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers, assembled by the Emperor's orders at Brannau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution,

Aug. 25.

without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence (2). This atrocious proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany: men compared the loud declama-

(1) *Jom. ii. 274. Bign. v. 443. Hard. ix. 266.*

Proceedings of the Military Commission convicting Palm and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble:—"Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservation; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination, menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the progress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of nations and the respect due to crowned heads; injurious to the people committed to their Governments; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination, declares unanimously, That the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty of high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the frenzy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm

had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination or any private crime. If they had, they were published not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its Emperor, but in the free city of Nuremberg, in the heart of the German empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoléon, but the Germans, aliens to his authority and enemies of his Government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Presburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that *Russia*, a separate power at war with France, had, in the usual course of hostility, conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Even applying Napoléon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Swiss, to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British empire to throw off the rule of their sovereign and parliament, establish annual parliaments and universal suffrage? —See *Biox. v. 337, 338.*

tions of the republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with this savage violation of it by their military chief; and concluded, that the only freedom which they really had at heart was licence for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendancy, that of military force. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the senate of Frankfort, after recounting the enormous

contributions which they had paid to the republican armies in 1796, 1799, 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Augereau replied to this proclamation by a stern requisition to have the

authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the last magistrates of the state, but after they had been arrested, Napoléon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop farther proceedings (1).

Influence which it had on the rupture of the negotiation.

The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevengeed, either upon Napoléon or the French people. It fell deep and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr. Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general freedom by the spread of republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoléon for the negotiations which ultimately led to its abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the rock of St.-Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly in every part of Europe, that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France: that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolor flag. Napoléon has frequently said, that if Mr. Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted: but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to deprive one of the brightest ornaments of his country of the honour of having at last been awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and possessed the magnanimity instantly to act upon the conviction. In the last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow out the path thus clearly chalked out (2).

(1) *Hard.* ix. 246, 250. *Bign.* v. 337, 339.

(2) "In the Instructions," says Mr. Fox in his last important official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French Government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his Lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded: in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct: the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of

powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to sign them till the French Government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand upon this made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany; and stated; 'that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place.' That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of those assurances, the German confederation treaties were

In several of the speeches which he had made after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration (1). Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic duty: the two lights of the age came finally to concur in the same policy: if Mr. Pitt struggled for fifteen years, amidst difficulty and disaster, to carry on the war, it was Mr. Fox who bequeathed the flood of glory in which it terminated to his successors; and after having spent the best part of his life in recommending less honourable and enlightened measures of concession to his country, in his last moments "nailed her colours to the mast (2)."

The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining; and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in Parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th September he sunk into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery (3).

Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings, and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his

both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French Government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr. Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoleon's assertion that if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. His last stages, down to his death on 17th September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—See Mr. Fox's Despatches, August 2d and 14th, 1806, *Parl. Deb. viii.* 138, 164.

(1) In the debate on Mr. Windham's military system, on April 2, 1806, Mr. Fox said, with admirable candour: "Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that I have been moved from the opinions which I formerly held with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of careful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying it on, we must be reduced to that state which for me cannot contemplate without apprehension, — two divisions of the Britanno, and be left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or indeed under any system which we may set upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb. vi.* 715, 716.

(2) This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox, on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties.

Ten years before, the two champions of the constitution and of revolution, Mr. Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the *Vindiciae Gallicae*, had in like manner come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm," said Mackintosh, in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter: You are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitutions of my country." Burke answered from the bed of death: "You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shows how much your own sagacity, operating on your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the shew of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end." What words between such men!—See Mackintosh's *Memoirs*, i. 87, 88.

(3) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 258.

character communicated confidence; the ardour of his eloquence roused enthusiasm: the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship."—"I admired," says Gibbon, "the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood." Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr. Fox's character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between them had ceased: "To be sure, he is a man made to be loved (1)."

A man of pleasure in every sense of the word; dissipated and irregular in private life; having ruined his private fortune at the gaming table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in Parliament, he yet never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments, and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration, not only of his partisans, but his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British Parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic every where turned as to those of the gifted spirit intrusted with their cause. To his support the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he triumphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gratuitous exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

Extraordi-
nary talents
in debate,

Mr. Fox was the greatest debater that the English Parliament ever produced. Without the admirable arrangement and lucid order which enabled Mr. Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under a hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate; but his habits were too desultory—his indolence too great—his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge (2). Respectable as an historian, the fragment on the annals of the Revolution which he composed is justly admired, from the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the Parliamentary orator. It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from studying the vehement declamation—the powerful and fervent reasoning by which his great speeches are here distinguished.

But all this notwithstanding, the fame of Mr. Fox is on the decline. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts

(1) Mackintosh's Mem. i. 324.

(2) No man more frequently quoted or referred

to Adam Smith; but he had never read the Wealth of Nations.

—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected in legislation the freedom of the press, and stopped the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind; but in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of democratic power—in so far as he supported the wild prospects of the French revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same destructive doctrines, and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition,—he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

Reason of this change. The doctrines that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands—that the extension of political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil—that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction—and that the growth of democratic ascendancy is the commencement of social regeneration,—are sometimes amiable, from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular, from the agreeable flattery they convey to the multitude. They are liable to only one objection—that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a democratic regime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, are kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated (1). It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional monarchy :

(1) "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes."—"In turbis atque seditionibus," says the Roman annalist, "persuaso cuique plurima vis; pax et quies bonis artibus aluntur."—"Enfin je vois," said the French demagogue, when going to the scaffold, "que dans les révolutions l'autorité toujours vaine aux plus scélérats."—"A democratic republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few; with this difference, that the few who are thus elevated to power are the most profli-

gate and worthless of the community."—"Democracy," says the author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and to control; and consequently the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large." What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr. Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—THUCYDIDES, l. iii. c. 39; SALLUST *de Bello Cat.*; ROMEYRE, 67; *Parl. Hist.* xxx. 902; MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 92.

no hope remains of its outliving the spring flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when these antagonist forces are brought for any length of time to draw in the same direction. The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr. Pitt opposed to revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps for ever, under the triumph in which Mr. Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by this great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr. Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration; on the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr. Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr. Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave; and award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise rather of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, than either a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart—it will indulge the pleasing hope, that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many of his earlier delusions; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors, by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA—FALL OF PRUSSIA.

ARGUMENT.

Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England—And of Austria—But the Cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neutral—Instructions to Mr. Adair, at the Austrian capital, on the subject—Spain indicates a hostile disposition against France—The lesser German Powers incline to France—Preparations of Prussia—Forces on both sides—Her want of foresight, and neglect of Defensive Measures—Imprudent conduct of the Prussian Generals—Proclamation of Napoléon to his soldiers—Reply of Prussia—Reflections on these Proclamations—Preparatory Movements of the Prussians—Counter-movement of Napoléon—The Duke of Brunswick abandons the offensive—Commencement of Hostilities, and Defeat of Detached Bodies of the Prussians—Death of Prince Louis—Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French—Movements on both sides preparatory to a general action—Result of these Manœuvres—The Prussian Army is again divided—The King marches to Auerstadt—Napoléon's dispositions for the approaching Action—Positions of the Army on both sides—Battle of Jena—Defensive measures of the Prussians—The Prussians are defeated—Arrival of Ruchel on the Field, who is also overwhelmed—Preparatory movements which led to the Battle of the King's Army—Battle of Auerstadt—Desperate struggle which there ensued—Additional Forces come up on both sides—Dreadful Fight on the Sonnenberg, on the right—The Prussian Reserve advances and is overthrown—Disastrous Retreat of the Prussians from both fields of battle—Loss on both sides in these actions—Unparalleled disasters of the Retreat—Capture of Erfurth with thirteen thousand men—The King of Prussia confers the chief command on Prince Hohenlohe, and retires to Magdebourg—Measures of Napoléon to follow up his Victory—Soult defeats Kalkreuth—The Duke of Wirtemberg is overthrown by Bernadotte at Halle—Saxony is overrun by the French—Investment of Magdebourg, which is abandoned by Hohenlohe—Who is pursued, assailed, and made prisoner—March and escape of the Duke of Saxe Weimar—Disgraceful surrender of Stettin and Custrin—Blucher's corps is pursued to Lubeck—And is there defeated, after a desperate conflict—He retires to Rat-Kau, and is there made prisoner—Fall of Magdebourg—And of Hameln and Nienbourg on the Weser—Napoléon detaches Saxony from the Coalition—But refuses to treat with Prussia—Napoléon visits Potsdam and the Tomb of the Great Frederick—Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg are occupied by the French—Affair of Prince Hatzfeld, and his pardon by Napoléon—His Proclamation and Addresses to his Soldiers—And unpardonable severity to the Queen, the Duke of Brunswick, and Elector of Hesse Cassel—Cruel expressions regarding both in the Bulletins—Enormous Contributions levied on Prussia and the North of Germany—Napoléon's unworthy expressions on Gentz, and Sir James Mackintosh's opinion of him—Military organization of the country, from the Rhine to the Vistula, under Napoléon—Negotiation with Prussia—Armistice concluded, which the King refuses to ratify—Advance of Jerome Bonaparte into Silesia, and of the French troops to the Vistula—Siege and Surrender of Glogau—Treaty between France and Saxony—Berlin Decree against English Commerce—Occupation of Hamburg—Immense results of the Campaign—General dependency which it occasioned in Europe—Talents and rashness displayed by Napoléon during its progress—Reflections on the sudden fall of Prussia—Blucher's opinion on its probable Resurrection.

Efforts of Prussia to obtain the aid of Russia and England.

NOTWITHSTANDING the inconsiderate haste with which Prussia had taken up arms, the Cabinet of Berlin made some attempts to induce the other powers of Europe to share with them the dangers of the conflict. With England it was no difficult matter to effect a reconciliation. At the first authentic accounts of the change in the policy of Frederick William, an order in council was issued, raising the blockade of the Prussian harbours. M. Jacobi, the Prussian Minister in London, returned to that capital immediately after he had left it; and the British Ministry had the generosity to resume its amicable relations with the Cabinet of Berlin before an explanation had been given on the subject of Hanover.

Aug. 17. With Sweden an accommodation was also without difficulty effected, on the footing of the troops of that power taking possession of Lauenberg, which they did in the name of the King of Great Britain. It was not so easy a matter to convince the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg of this unlooked-for change in the Prussian councils; and, taught by the long vacillation of its policy, they were for some time unwilling to yield to the general joy which was diffused through the Russian capital on the intelligence that war was resolved

Sept. 18. on. But no sooner was Alexander informed by confidential letters brought by General Krusemark from the King of Prussia, that he had embarked seriously in the contest, than he instantly wrote, promising an immediate succour of 70,000 men, and announcing his intention of himself marching at the head of a chosen army to aid in the support of his faithful ally (1).

And of Austria. Important as the announcement of the intentions of Russia were, the accession of Austria would have been of still more value to the common cause, from its closer proximity to the scene of action, and the strong positions which the Bohemian mountains afforded on the flank of the probable theatre of war. The Prussian ambassador accordingly was indefatigable in his endeavours to rouse the Cabinet of Vienna to a sense of the vital importance of joining heart and hand in the approaching conflict for the liberties of Europe. He represented to Count Stadion, then Prime Minister at Vienna, "that the losses inflicted on Austria by the treaty of Presburg were so immense, that the Emperor, of necessity, must at some future period look out for the means of repairing them. The loss of the Tyrol is of such irreparable importance to Austria that no doubt can be entertained that she will take advantage of the first opportunity to resume it from Bavaria, by rousing the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that important province to their ancient masters. Napoléon has justly conceived the most serious apprehensions for the faithful observance of that treaty which he himself has been the first to violate. Does he not, in defiance of his engagements, still hold the fortress of Brannau and the line of the Inn six months after he was bound by a solemn treaty to have evacuated Germany with all his forces? The recent establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and dissolution of the Germanic empire, too clearly demonstrate with what ulterior views the French Government is actuated in regard to the countries beyond the Rhine. Honour, necessity, the existence of its people, have forced the King of Prussia to take up arms alone; but a powerful Russian army, and the well-known generosity of England, diminish its perilous chances. Now, therefore, is the time for Austria and Prussia to lay aside their jealousies springing from the conquest of Silesia, and unite their forces against the common enemy, who is about to make the Confederation of the Rhine an outwork from whence to enslave all the other states of Germanic origin (2)."

But the Cabinet of Vienna resolves to remain neutral. Forcible as these considerations were, and strongly as the Cabinet of Vienna felt their justice, there were yet many circumstances which forbade them to yield on this occasion to their inclinations. The conduct of Prussia for the last ten years had been so dubious and vacillating; her hostility to Austria, especially on the division of the indemnities, so evident; her partiality for the French alliance so conspicuous; her changes of policy during the last year so extraordinary, that no reliance could be placed on her maintaining a decided line of conduct for any length of time together, and, least of all, continuing steadfast in that sudden and perilous hostility in which she had now engaged, and the vehemence of which was

(1) Hard. ix. 272, 275. Bign. v. 413, 415. Dum. xv. 285, 287.

(2) Hard. ix. 277, 281.

the worst possible guarantee for its endurance. Who could ensure that she would not desert this alliance as she had done the first coalition against France, or change her policy as suddenly as she had done her recent hostility against England, and leave to Austria, irrevocably embarked, the whole weight and dangers of the contest? The Archduke Charles, on being consulted as to the state of the army, reported that the infantry, which had not yet been rejoined by the prisoners taken during the campaign, was hardly a half of its full complement; the cavalry but recently remounted, and for the most part unskilled in military exercises; the artillery numerous, but the majority of the gunners without any experience. The treasury was empty; great part of the most valuable provinces of the monarchy had been torn away, and those which remained were exhausted by enormous war contributions, wrung from them by the enemy. Influenced by these considerations, the Cabinet of Vienna resolved to preserve a strict neutrality, and issued a proclamation to that effect; and however much the historian may lament that determination, from a knowledge of the boundless calamities which an opposite course might have saved to both monarchies, it is impossible to deny that, situated as Austria was at that time, it was the most prudent resolution which its Government could have adopted, and that if Prussia was left single-handed to maintain the cause of European independence, it was no more than what she was bound to expect from the selfish and temporizing policy which she had so long followed (1).

Spain hostile.
extra hostile.
Dispositions
against
France. Hopes were not wanting to the Cabinet of Berlin of efficacious aid in another quarter where it was least expected, and of a kind to paralyze a considerable part of the French forces. Spain, bereft of her navy by the battle of Trafalgar, blockaded in her harbours, destitute of commerce, cut off from all intercourse with her colonies, had felt all the burdens of war without any of its glories. The public indignation was hourly accumulating against the Prince of Peace, whose ignoble birth, exorbitant power, and immense wealth, rendered him as much an object of jealousy to the Castilian noblesse, as the uniform disasters which had attended his administration made him detested by the people. Still, however, that ruling favourite persevered, against the almost unanimous wishes of the kingdom, in the French alliance, till his pride was offended at the haughty conduct of Napoleon, who excluded the Spanish ambassador from any share in the negotiations for a general peace at Paris, and it was revealed to him, that in these conferences he had seriously proposed to take the Balearic islands from the Spanish crown, and confer them as an indemnity for Sicily, together with a revenue drawn from Spain, on the King of Naples; while the assembling of a powerful army at Bayonne, ostensibly directed against Portugal, sufficiently indicated a design to overawe both states of the Peninsula. The light now suddenly flashed upon the Spanish rulers. They perceived, as Prussia had done during the same negotiation, that the French Emperor made use of the powers with whom he was in alliance as mere dependencies, excluding them from

(1) *Hand.* ix. 279, 281. *Bign.* v. 418, 419. *Lucchesini*, ii. 106, 112.

Instructions
to Mr. Adair
on the sub-
ject. The instructions of Mr. Adair, the British Ambassador at Vienna at that period, were, not to stimulate the Austrian Government to hurry into a war, of which the consequences, if unsuccessful, might be fatal to that country, but to offer its Government, if they deemed the opportunity favourable for engaging in hostilities, or if the necessities of their situation compelled them to such a course, the whole pecuniary aid which Great Bri-

tain, was capable of affording. Of the wisdom of this course of proceeding, no one who considers the precarious situation of Austria at that crisis can entertain a doubt; and it affords another proof of the clear insight which Mr. Fox at that period had obtained into the insatiable ambition of Napoleon, and of the magnanimity with which that upright statesman instantly acted upon his conviction. "A man," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "unjustly styled by Napoleon and his adherents, the last prop of the pacific dispositions of the Cabinet of St. James's." *Vide Lucchesini*, ii. 96, 97, *note*; and *Bign.* v. 417.

any participation in treaties in which they were deeply interested, and disposing of their provinces to others without condescending even to ask their consent to the transfer. No sooner, therefore, did they receive intelligence of the rupture of the conferences between Great Britain and France at Paris, and the resolution of Prussia to take up arms, than they resolved to detach themselves from the French alliance, and join their forces to those of European independence. Despatches from the Prussian envoy at Paris to the Prince of Peace on this subject were secretly intercepted and deciphered by the French Government, which from that moment resolved on the overthrow of the Spanish branch of the House of Bourbon at the first convenient opportunity; while the Prince of Peace, deeming concealment of his designs no Oct. 14 and 15. longer necessary, issued two proclamations, in the middle of October, in which he enjoined the immediate completion of the ranks of the army, and the formation of the national militia, under their constitutional leaders, in all the provinces of the monarchy. Thus was the ambition and reckless disregard of national rights by Napoléon again reviving, on a surer basis, because that of experience and common danger, the great original European coalition against France; and on the eve of the battle of Jena were the first sparkles of that terrible conflagration visible, which afterwards burst with such fury in Russia, Germany, and the Spanish Peninsula (1).

The lesser German powers incline to France. But although the greater and distant powers, with the exception of Austria, were thus arming in favour of the coalition, the lesser states nearer the scene of action were overawed by the influence and the authority of France. Napoléon was daily receiving accessions of strength from the states which bordered on the Confederation of the Rhine. The Archduke Ferdinand, though brother to the Emperor of Austria, gave Sept. 25. the first example of defection by joining his states of Wurtzburg to that alliance; the Elector of Hesse, whom interest as well as family connections strongly inclined to the cause of Prussia, was nevertheless so overcome by his apprehensions, as to persist, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the Cabinet of Berlin, in a forced neutrality; the Elector of Cassel, summoned to each of the hostile camps, and sorely perplexed between his inclinations and his apprehensions, put his troops on the war footing of twenty thousand men, and contrived to protract his ultimate decision till the battle of Jena rendered submission to France a matter of necessity. Saxony alone, continuous along its northern frontier with Prussia, and capable from its strength of adopting a more generous resolution, openly joined the Cabinet of Berlin, but twenty thousand men were all that it brought to the standards of the Great Frederick (2).

Preparations of Prussia. Forces on both sides. The whole weight of the contest, therefore, fell on Prussia; for although great and efficacious aid might be expected to be derived in time from Russia, and succours were hoped for from England, both in men and money, yet these auxiliaries were as yet far distant. The Moscovite battalions were still cantoned on the Niemen; those of England had not yet left the Thames; while Napoléon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops, was rapidly approaching the Thuringian Forest. Nothing daunted, however, by this formidable prospect, Frederick William gallantly took the field, and directed all the disposable troops of the monarchy towards Saxony and Erfurth. The total military strength of the kingdom was 240,000 men, of whom 120,000 were assembled on the frontier, and 12,000 in observation in Westphalia, for the approaching campaign; the re-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 221. Lucches. ii. 100, 101. Hard. ix. 285, 286.

(2) Bign. v. 435, 442. Dum. xv. 227, 228.

mainder being dispersed in garrison depôts, or not yet put in a state for active operations. Such was the general enthusiasm, and so little did they anticipate the terrible reverse which awaited them, that the Prussian guards marched out of Berlin, singing triumphant airs, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, almost in a state of sedition from the tumultuous joy they experienced on at length being about to measure their strength with the enemy (1).

Her grievous want of foresight and defensive measures.

The memorable military operations of the year 1813, and the tenacious hold which Napoléon then kept of the fortresses on the Elbe, when assailed by the greatly superior forces of the coalition, have demonstrated that no position in Europe is more susceptible of defence than the course of that river; and that, supported by the ramparts of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, Dresden, and Torgau, an inferior force can there for a considerable time prolong its defence against an enemy possessing an overwhelming superiority in the field. Had these fortresses been properly armed and provisioned, and the Prussians been commanded by a general capable of turning to the best advantage the means of defence which they afforded, it is probable that as protracted a contest might have been maintained as Napoléon supported in 1796 on the Adige, or Kray in 1800 around the bastions of Ulm, and time gained for the arrival of the Russians before a decisive blow was struck in the centre of Germany. But not only had no preparations for such a defensive system been made, but the nation, as well as its rulers, were in such a state of exultation as to despise them. None of these important bulwarks were provisioned; hardly were guns mounted on their ramparts. The interior fortified towns on the Oder and in Silesia were for the most part in the most deplorable state. No depôts were formed; no provision for recruiting the army in case of disaster made. They had not even a rallying point assigned in the event of defeat, though the strong fortresses of Magdebourg, Wittenberg, and Torgau lay immediately in the rear of the theatre of war, and the Elbe spread its ample stream to arrest the victor. Careless of the future, chanting songs of victory, and enjoying its triumphant march through the villages, the army bent its steps towards Erfurth; strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, stronger still in the anticipation of the overthrow of Napoléon, and dreaming rather of the banks of the Rhine or the plains of Champagne, than of the shores of the Vistula or the fields of Poland (2).

But if the infatuation of the army was great, greater still was the delusion

(1) Lacches. ii. 117, 118. Dum. xv. 289. Jom. ii. 275, 276. Hard. ix. 299, 300.

Napoléon's army was divided into nine corps, and stationed as follows, on the 3d October, when he arrived at Wurtzburg—

First corps—Bernadotte—at Lichtenfelds.

Second do.—Marmont—Illiria.

Third do.—Davoust—Bamberg.

Fourth do.—Soult—between Amberg and Bamberg.

Fifth do.—Lefebvre, succeeded by Lannes—in front of Schweinfurth.

Sixth do.—Ney—Nuremberg.

Seventh do.—Augereau—Wurtzburg.

Cavalry do.—Marat—between Wurtzburg and Cronach.

Imperial Guard—Bessières and Lefebvre, after Lannes got the 5th corps—Wartburg.

The bulk of the army was grouped round Cobourg and Bamberg. The whole bearing on the Prussians, exclusive of Marmont in Illiria, was 150,000 men.

The Prussians, when the campaign opened, were divided into three armies: the right wing under General Ruel, of 30,000 men, was stationed on the frontiers of the Hessian territories; the centre, 55,000 strong, commanded by the King in person, with his lieutenant-general, the Duke of Brunswick, under his orders, was behind the Elbe around Magdebourg, with its advanced guard on the Saale; the left wing, composed of 40,000 men, including the Saxons, was commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the King's brother, under him. It assembled in Saxony; its extreme left rested on the Bohemian mountains, and its advanced posts were pushed as far as Hof and the Kirchberg. A detached corps of 12,000 men, in Westphalia, was under the orders of a general destined for future celebrity—Blücher.—See Dum., xv. 290, 314; and Jom. ii. 275, 276, and the *Official Report of the Russian strength to the Duke of Brunswick*, HAMB. ix. 484, App. G.

(2) Hard. ix. 297, 300. Lacches. ii. 117, 120.

Imprudent
conduct of
the Prussian
Generals.

of its commanders. The Duke of Brunswick, though an able man of the last century, and enjoying a great reputation, was altogether behind the age, and totally ignorant of the perilous chances of a war with the veteran legions and numerous columns of Napoleon. The disasters of the late campaigns were by him ascribed entirely to timidity or want of skill in the Austrians; the true way to combat the French, he constantly maintained, was to assume a vigorous offensive, and paralyse their military enthusiasm by compelling them to defend their own positions. That there was some truth in this opinion, no one acquainted with the character and history of the French army could deny: but unfortunately it required, for its successful application, both a general and an army very different from the Prussian at this period. The former did not possess the energy and rapidity, the latter the strength or experience requisite for so perilous a system. Bold even to rashness in the original conception of the campaign, the Duke of Brunswick was vacillating and irresolute when he came to carry it into execution; and while his opponent was counting hours and minutes in the march of his indefatigable legions, frequently lost whole days in deliberation or councils of war, and sometimes changed the destination of the forces when their movements were half completed. The troops indeed were numerous and perfectly disciplined: the artillery admirable; the cavalry magnificent; the staff skilful and highly educated, but in matters of theory and detail, rather than the practical disposal of large masses in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy. But what the whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer, were alike ignorant of, was the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoleon had introduced into modern war, by the union of consummate skill at headquarters with enormous masses and a vast application of physical force: combining thus the talent of Cæsar or Turenne with the fierce tempest of Scythian warfare. Applying then to the present the experience of the past age, the usual error of second-rate men, they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them; and advanced as against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in presence of Napoleon and 150,000 men (1).

Proclamation
of Napoleon to his
soldiers, 7th
Oct. 1806.

As usual in such cases, the contending parties prefaced the war of arms by mutual manifestoes calculated to rouse the spirit of their respective forces, or vindicate their hostility in the eyes of Europe. That of Napoleon, which bore intrinsic evidence of his composition, was, as usual, admirably calculated to dazzle and stimulate his followers. "Soldiers! the order for your return to France was already issued: you had already approached it by several marches: triumphal fêtes awaited you; preparations for your reception were already made in the capital: but whilst we were surrendering ourselves to a too confident security, new conspiracies were formed under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war have been heard from Berlin: for two months provocations have daily been offered to us; the same insane spirit which, taking the advantage of our dissensions fourteen years ago, conducted the Prussians into the plains of Champagne, still prevails in their councils. If it is no longer Paris which they propose to raze to its foundation, it is now their standards which they announce their intention of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony which they wish to compel to renounce, by a shameful transaction, its independence, and range itself by their side; it is your laurels which they wish to tear from your brows: they insist upon our evacuating Germany at the mere

(1) Hard. ix. 301, 303. Jour. ii. 279.

sight of their army! The fools! Let them learn that it is a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to wither the honours of a great people and its allies. Their projects were then confounded: they found in the plains of Champagne defeat, shame, and death: but the lessons of experience are forgotten; and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy are never extinguished. Soldiers! there is not one among you who would return to France by any other path but that of honour. We should never re-enter there but under arches of triumph. What then! shall we have braved the seasons, the seas, the deserts—vanquished Europe, repeatedly coalesced against us—extended our glory from the east to the west,—to return at last to our country like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French Eagle fled at the mere sight of the Prussian standards? But they have already arrived at our advanced posts. Let us then march, since moderation has not been able to awaken them from this astonishing trance: let the Prussian army experience the same fate which it did fourteen years ago: let them learn that if it is easy, by means of the friendship of a great people, to acquire power and dominions, its enmity, though capable of being roused only by an abandonment of every principle of wisdom and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean (1).”

Reply of
Prussia.

Less fitted to rouse the military passions and warlike enthusiasm of its subjects than this masterpiece of Napoléon, the Prussian manifesto, drawn by Gentz, was yet a model of dignified reason, and concluded with a sentiment as to the ultimate issue of the contest, which subsequent events have rendered prophetic. “All our efforts, and those of our allies, to preserve peace have proved unsuccessful; and if we are not willing to abandon to the despotism of an implacable enemy, and to deliver over to his devouring armies the whole North of Germany, and perhaps of Europe, a war is inevitable. His majesty has resolved upon it, because the honour and security of the state are in danger: he would have deemed himself happy could he have attained the same end by pacific means; but it is with the firmest confidence that he takes the command of the army which is about to combat for its country and national honour, because the cause in which it is engaged is just. His majesty is well aware that for long the army desired war; and even when circumstances prevented him from yielding to its wishes, they commanded his respect because they took their origin in those feelings of honour and patriotism which have ever distinguished the Prussian forces. The nation, in a body, has manifested the warm interest which it takes in this war; and that strong expression of enthusiasm has confirmed his Majesty in the opinion that now it is not only unavoidable, but in unison with the wishes of every people. His Majesty is convinced that the desire to preserve the national honour unchanged, and the glory which the Great Frederick has shed over our arms, will suffice to excite the army to combat with its accustomed valour, and to support with constancy all its fatigues.

“But this war possesses even a more general interest. We have to deal with an enemy who all around us has beaten the most numerous armies, humbled their most powerful states, annihilated their most venerable constitutions; ravished from several nations their honour, from others their independence. A similar fate awaited the Prussian monarchy: numerous armies menaced your frontiers; they were daily augmenting; it had become your turn to fall into the gulf, to bow beneath a stranger yoke; and already his pride and rapacity coveted the spoils of the North of Germany. Thus we

combat for our independence, for our hearths, for all that is dear to us; and if God gives victory to the just side, to our arms, to the courage which burns in the heart of every Prussian, we shall be the liberators of oppressed millions. Every warrior who shall fall on the field of battle will have sacrificed his life in the cause of humanity: every one who survives will acquire, besides immortal glory, a just title to the gratitude, the triumph, the tears of joy of a liberated country. Who amongst us could endure the thoughts of becoming the prey of a stranger? While we combat for our own safety, to avert from us the deepest humiliation to which a nation can be subjected, we are the saviours of all our German brethren; the eyes of all nations are fixed on us as the last bulwark of liberty, security, or social order in Europe (1)."

Reflections
on these
proclama-
tions.

The opposite style of these two eloquent proclamations is very remarkable. Both are addressed to some of the strongest passions of the human breast; both are masterpieces of manly oratory; but the language which they severally employ is strikingly characteristic of the different situations in which their authors respectively stood. Napoléon speaks to his soldiers only of an insult offered to their arms; of glory and triumphs, and victories to be won; Frederick William, equally firm, but less sanguine as to the result, disguises not the dangers and chances of the struggle, but reminds them of the duty they owed to themselves, their country, the cause of the human race. The former invokes the Eagles of France, and calls on the soldiers to follow their glorious career: the latter appeals to the God of battles, and anticipates from his aid a final triumph to the arms of freedom. The battle of Jena and chains of Tilsit, seemed for long to have announced an abandonment of this cause by the care of Providence: but let these words be borne in mind, and compared with the final issue of the contest (2).

Preparatory
movements
of the
Prussians.

Animated by those heart-stirring addresses, the forces on both sides rapidly approached each other; and their advanced posts were in presence on the 8th October. Then began the terrible contest of the North with the South of Europe; never destined to be extinguished till the domes of the Kremlin were reddened with flames, and the towers of Notre-Dame were shaken by the discharge of the Russian batteries. The first plan discussed at Berlin was for the whole army to debouche in two columns by the two great roads, those of Saalfeld and Adorf, and Gotha and Eisenach, and commence the offensive towards the valley of the Maine, on the east and west of the Thuringian Forest, the intermediate passes of which were to be occupied by a central corps; but this plan was soon abandoned, as exposing the army to a perilous division of force in presence of so powerful and enter-

(1) Dum. xvi. 8, 10.

(2) Napoléon had no gallantry or chivalrous feeling in his breast. The Prussian Minister had, with the ultimatum of the Cabinet of Berlin, given a pressing request for an answer to the Prussian headquarters by the 8th October. "Marshal," said he to Berthier, "they have given us a rendezvous for the 8th: never did a Frenchman refuse such an appeal: we are told that a beautiful Queen is to be a spectator of the combat: let us then be courteous, and march without resting for Saxony." Francis I. might have used the same language; but what followed is the first bulletin of the campaign, dictated by Napoléon himself? The Emperor was right when he spoke thus: for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an Amazon, bearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters-a-day to spread the conflagration in

all directions. We seem to behold Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace. After her follows Prince Louis of Prussia, a young prince full of bravery and courage, hurried on by the spirit of party, who flatters himself he shall find a great renown in the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of these illustrious persons, all the Comd cries 'to arms;' but when our shall have reached them with all its horrors, all will seek to exempt themselves from having been instrumental in bringing its thunder to the peaceful plains of the North. Such was the language in which Napoléon spoke of the most beautiful princes in Europe, rousing her subjects to patriotic resistance! How singularly prophetic is the concluding part of the sentence of what he himself experienced just six years afterwards in the frozen fields of Russia!—*First Bulletin of 1806.*—*Bull. Nap. ii. 11, 12.*

Sept. 27. prising an enemy. The design ultimately adopted was to advance with the right in front, which was pushed on to Eisenach : next in echelon followed the centre commanded by the King in person, which, united with the corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, was to advance upon Saalfeld and JENA, while each wing was covered by a detached corps of observation, the right by Blücher, on the confines of Hesse, the left by Tauenzien, on the side of Bayreuth. The object of this movement was to determine the hesitations of the Electors of Hesse and Cassel, and effect the junction of their contingents to the Prussian army, and at the same time pierce the centre of the valley of the Maine, which was the base of the enemy's operations, and cut them off from their communication with France. Both objects were important, and the design well conceived, had the Duke of Brunswick possessed a force adequate to its execution ; but it necessarily involved his army in great hazard in presence of a numerous and skilful enemy ; and by leaving open to his advance the great roads to Dresden and Leipsic, exposed the Prussians, to the very hazard of being themselves turned and cut off from their communications and magazines when endeavouring to inflict that injury upon their opponents (1).

*Counter-
movement
of Napo-
leon.* Napoléon was not a man to let slip the opportunity which this hazardous attempt of the Prussians to pass his position afforded, of not merely defeating, but destroying their army. Confident in the numbers and experience of his troops, which rendered a situation comparatively safe to them which was to the last degree perilous to their opponents, he instantly resolved to retort upon the enemy the measure they were preparing to play off upon him ; and by throwing forward his army with the right in front, turn the Prussian left, and cut them off from their

Oct. 2. magazines on the Elbe, and the heart of the monarchy. On the 8th October, the French army was concentrated around Bamberg : at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Napoléon put himself in motion, and his columns marched towards Saxony on three great roads : on the right Soult and Ney with a Bavarian division moved from Bayreuth by Hof, on Plauen : in the centre, Murat with the cavalry, with Bernadotte and Davoust, marched from Bamberg by Cronach, on Saalbourg : on the left, Lannes and Angereau, breaking up from Schweinfurt (2), advanced by Cobourg and Graffenhau, upon Saalfeld. The effect of these movements was to bring the centre and right of the French directly upon the Prussian magazines and reserves, while they were stretching forward on the left, to interpose between their antagonists and the Rhine.

*Duke of
Brunswick
renounces
the offensive.* The Prussians were in the midst of their perilous advance to the French left, when intelligence of this rapid accumulation of forces on their centre and left reached the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters. It was indispensable to renounce forthwith the hazardous enterprise ; and orders were instantly despatched to countermand the advance, and direct the concentration of the army in the neighbourhood of Weimar : the principal column, commanded by the King, at Erfurth ; Ruchel at Gotha ; Hohenlohe at Hochdorf ; the reserve, under the Duke of Wirtemberg, at Hall. Thus the Prussians, in presence of the greatest general and most powerful army of modern times, were thrown into a change of position, and a complicated series of cross movements, with their flank exposed to the enemy, the situation of all others the most perilous in war, and which, not a year before,

(1) Pruss. plan of operations. *Dum.* xvi. 19.
Jom. ii. 279, 280.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 280, 281. *Dum.* xvi. 19, 26. *Bign.*
v. 465, 466. *Norv.* ii. 456, 457.

had proved fatal to the combined army, when attempting a similar movement in front of Austerlitz. To complete their danger, the concentration, from the orders which they received, took place on the centre and right; whereas it was on the left, towards Hof, that it should have been made, to resist the rapid march of the invaders upon their magazines and resources (1).

But before the junction of the Prussian forces, even in this false direction, could be effected, the formidable legions of Napoléon were already upon them. As might have been expected, when surprised in this manner in the middle of a lateral movement, they were attacked at the same time in different quarters, and in all by greatly superior columns of the enemy. The French masses, dense and strong, marching on the great chaussées, fell perpendicularly upon the flank of their opponents when endeavouring, by cross and often deplorable roads, to reach the points of rendezvous assigned to them. The consequences might easily have been anticipated; they were defeated in every quarter, and lost, in the very outset of the campaign, the moral influence of an advance. On the

October 9. 9th Tauenzein, who was at the moment in front of Schleitz with 6000 Prussians and 3000 Saxons, was attacked by Bernadotte, at the head of greatly superior forces, and, after a gallant resistance, dislodged from his position with the loss of several hundred men. The day following,

October 10. Murat marched on Gera, and on the road fell in with and captured a convoy of 500 carriages and a pontoon train,—an extraordinary proof of the advance the French had already gained, when, on the third day after hostilities had commenced, they had fallen in with and captured a large part of the baggage of the enemy! Nor was the French left, under Lannes and Augereau, less successful. On the 10th, the former of these generals arrived on the heights of Saalfeld, and animated his troops to the highest degree by reading to them the proclamation of Napoléon on the opening of hostilities; and on the same day, in continuing his advance, fell in with Prince Louis, who commanded the rear-guard of the Prussian right, and had been stationed at Rudolstadt and Blankenberg by Prince Hohenlohe to cover the cross march of his columns, who were then endeavouring to reach the points of rendezvous assigned them by their commander-in-chief. This gallant prince, in common with his immediate superior, Prince Hohenlohe, had long expressed the opinion, which they had in vain endeavoured to impress upon the Duke of Brunswick, that Napoléon meditated an attack on the Prussian left, and that a concentration of their troops in that direction should have been made some days before (2). Unable to prevent the disastrous resolution to assemble on the right, he now set himself with heroic bravery to mitigate its effects. The forces under his command were only eleven battalions and eighteen squadrons of hussars, with eighteen pieces of cannon; and with these he had

October 9. to withstand the shock of Lannes, with 25,000 men. Notwithstanding

(1) Jom. li. 280. Dum. xvi. 26, 31. Bign. v. 466, 467. Hard. ix. 303.

(2) In the great council of war, held on the 5th October at Erfurth, when the Duke of Brunswick's project of continuing the march across the Thuringian Forest was discussed, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Louis, and Colonel Massenbach, his chief of the staff, strongly represented that by continuing the march in that direction, the army would be exposed to certain ruin: that they would soon arrive at a country where the ground was entirely favourable to the operations of the enemy, and adverse to their own method of fighting; and that if the French were inclined, as seemed more than probable, to turn

either of the wings of the army, nothing could favour his design so much as the plunging the Prussian host by columns in the Forest. These sage observations made no sort of impression on the Duke of Brunswick; and all the modification of his plan which these generals could effect, was that the troops should halt for a day on the 8th October, and on the following morning throw out strong reconnoitring parties, and receive bread for eight days before engaging in the defiles of Thuringia. It may safely be affirmed that that council, by continuing this fatal advance, determined the result of the campaign.—See Dum. xvi. 25, 26, and *Saalfeld Allgemeine Geschichte*, iii. 299.

ing this fearful preponderance of force, he resolved to hold firm during the remainder of the day, to gain time for the evacuation of the considerable magazines which were collected close in his rear at Saalfeld. In this gallant but unhappy determination he was confirmed from an opinion that it was only by resuming the old Prussian system of a vigorous offensive, that the spirits of the soldiers, which had been much sunk by the general order to retreat on the preceding day, could be revived. The sensible increase of the enemy all around him on the following day—even the turning of his right flank by Suchet with a powerful body of light troops, which rendered his position no longer tenable, could not induce him to abandon his ground; and, when the attack commenced, the Prussians were surrounded on all sides. Notwithstanding this they made a gallant resistance, and enabled the artillery and chariots to leave Saalfeld in safety. Returning from the town to his gallant comrades, who still made good their ground in its front, Prince Louis found them dropping fast under the murderous fire of the French *tirailleurs*. Soon their retreat was converted into a route by the ravages of the hostile artillery; and the Prince himself, while combating bravely with the rearguard, and striving to restore order among the fugitives, was surrounded by the enemy's hussars—“Surrender, colonel,” said their chief not knowing the rank of his opponent, “or you are a dead man.” The Prince answered only by a blow with his sabre, which wounded without disabling his adversary, who replied with a mortal stroke, which laid the heroic Prince dead at his feet.

Discouragement of the Prussians, who are completely turned by the French. In this disastrous encounter the Prussians lost twelve hundred prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded, and thirty pieces of cannon; but this was the least part of their misfortunes. The heroic Prince Louis was no more; he had fallen, it is true, while bravely combating on the field of honour; but his body had remained the trophy of the victors, and the continued advance of the enemy too surely indicated that defeat had attended the first serious exploit of the Prussian arms (1). Their army was now broken in upon in several points; its concentration interrupted; its magazines in part seized; its line of march intercepted; and the dejected columns, without any fixed rallying points, were wandering about in every direction, while the terrible French legions, in dense masses, were falling perpendicularly on their flank. These disasters rapidly communicated themselves to the minds of the soldiers. The death of Prince Louis, above all, equally dear to the officers and private men, diffused an universal gloom. So grievous a calamity in the outset of the campaign was taken as the worst augury of its future fortunes; and as is usual with great bodies in a violent state of excitement, the transition was immediate from the preceding exaltation to an extraordinary degree of depression (2).

Preparatory movements on both sides to a general action. Meanwhile the movements preparatory to a decisive battle continued, though in a very different spirit, on both sides. In deep dejection, and with infinite difficulty, the Prussians at length concentrated their forces in two great masses under the King in the neighbourhood of Weimar, and under Hohenlohe near Jena. It was in

(1) No sooner was the rank of the slain prisoner known than Marshal Lannes, with deserved courtesy, showed it all the honours due to so illustrious a character. He was interred with military honours in the cemetery of the Princes of Cobourg, at Saalfeld: and Berthier wrote on the 12th to the chief of the Prussian staff, announcing that the Emperor had

ordered it to be restored, if it was desired that he should rest in the tomb of his ancestors: an offer which the disasters immediately ensuing rendered it impossible for the royal family at that time to comply with.—BIGNON, v. 469.

(2) Lucches. ii. 137, 140. Bign. v. 468, 470. Dam. xvi. 51, 56.

the highest exultation, on the other hand, and in the full anticipation of victory, that the French made a sweep which brought them completely round the Prussian army. The early triumphs with which the campaign had opened had given Napoléon hopes of rapid and decisive success. He no longer feared that he would be obliged to have recourse to the mattock (1). The confusion of the enemy's columns had dissipated the prestige of the

October 12. Great Frederick. Encouraged by these events, he now hesitated not to follow out the brilliant career which had opened to his arms. A complete conversion, turning on the pivot of the left, took place in the direction of his columns, who wheeled round so as to face the Northern Ocean.

October 13. Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat, marched upon Naumberg, where on the next day, they made themselves masters of considerable magazines. Soult was advancing on Jena, where Lannes was already established, while Ney and Augereau were at Roda and Kohla, in its immediate neighbourhood. Such was the confusion of the Prussian movements and the bad understanding which already prevailed between them and the Saxons, that when the French took up the ground which the allies had just quitted in the environs of Jena, they found the fields and roads covered with arms, cuirasses, and chariots, like the scene of a defeat. The Saxons had pillaged the Prussians, the Prussians the Saxons. Baggage and ammunition waggons had been abandoned by their drivers, and lay scattered in confusion, while some guns even had been spiked to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy (2).

Result of
these man-
œuvres.

The result of these different marches was in the highest degree favourable to the Imperial arms. By the advance on Naumberg they had cut the enemy off from the line of their retreat to Leipsic, and thrown their left back in such a manner that the French on the banks of the Saale had their back to the Elbe, and faced the Rhine; while the Prussians had their back to the Rhine, and could only hope to regain their country by cutting their way through the enemy. Finding affairs in a situation so much more favourable than he could possibly have anticipated, Napoléon, to gain additional time to complete the encircling of his antago-

October 12. nists, despatched, on the 12th, an officer of his household with proposals of peace to Frederick William, taking care mean time not to suspend for one instant the march of his columns; but the letter did not reach that monarch till after the battle was over. In the evening of the 12th the army of Hohenlohe, which, with all the additions it had received from Ruchel, did not exceed forty thousand men, was grouped in dense masses on a ridge of heights to the north on the road from Jena to Weimar, between the Ilm and the Saale. Its advanced posts were on the Landgrafenberg, a steep hill between its position and the town of Jena, from the summit of which the whole lines of the Prussians could be descried, and over which the only road to the attack of their position in front lay. The army of the King of Prussia, under the immediate command of the Duke of Brunswick, on the other hand, sixty five thousand strong was concentrated at the distance of somewhat more than a league in the rear of Hohenlohe, near Weimar. Thus the whole Prussian army, consisting of above a hundred thousand men, of which eighteen thousand were superb cavalry, with three

(1) In setting out for the Prussian campaign, Napoléon expected to experience a more formidable resistance than he had yet met with in Europe. The exploits of the Seven Years' War had filled him with the highest idea of the troops trained in the school

of its illustrious hero, and he frequently said to his assembled officers at Mayence, "We shall have earth to move in this war."—See *Journal*, ii. 257.

(2) *Dumas*, xvi. 58, 64. *Journal*, ii. 222, 253. *Lectures*, ii. 140, 141.

hundred pieces of cannon, were at length concentrated in a field of battle, where their far-famed tactics had a fair theatre for development; and notwithstanding the early disasters of the campaign, an opportunity was afforded them of reinstating affairs at the sword's point. Each army had passed its opponent, and mutually intercepted the other's communications; but there was this extreme difference between the two, that the army of the Duke of Brunswick, cut off from all its magazines, had no resource but in victory; whereas that of Napoléon, though severed from the Rhine, had a clear line of retreat, in case of disaster, to the Maine and the Danube (1).

The Prussian army is again divided. The King marches to Auerstadt. It would have been well for the Prussians had they continued and given battle in this concentrated position; but the intelligence of the advance of Davoust and Murat upon Naumberg, which arrived at headquarters on the night of the 12th, led to a renewed separation, attended in the end with the most frightful disasters. Conceiving that the French Emperor had no intention of immediate combat, and being anxious for the safety of that town where the principal magazines of the army were placed, the Duke of Brunswick came to the ruinous resolution of again dividing his forces; and while Hohenlohe was left in position near Jena, as a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the army, the principal body, with the King at its head, moved at daylight for Sulza, and at night October 12. arrived on the heights of AUERSTADT. Thus at the very moment when Napoléon with above a hundred thousand men, was making his dispositions for a general battle on the day following, and surmounting the difficulties of the approach to the enemy's position on the heights in his vicinity, the Prussian general dislocated the imposing mass of his soldiers, and diverging to the left with two-thirds of his forces, engaged in a hazardous flank march of ten leagues in presence of his antagonists, leaving a comparatively inconsiderable rear-guard to be crushed by more than double its force in its position in the rear. Such was the dearth of provisions which already prevailed in the allied camp from the capture of their magazines by the enemy, that no regular supply of bread was dealt out to the men after the long and fatiguing march; but great numbers lay down, wearied and supererious, to sleep on the ground which was to cover their grave on the morrow (2).

Napoléon's dispositions for the battle. Meanwhile Napoléon, never suspecting this division of the enemy's force, and supposing they were to follow the principles of the Great Frederick, which were to combat in concentrated masses and on as confined a field of battle as possible, was endeavouring, with his wonted energy, to overcome the all but insurmountable difficulties of the passage of the Landgrafenberg, by which access was to be afforded to his columns for the attack of the Prussian position. No sooner had the French light troops dislodged the enemy's patrols from these important heights than the Emperor repaired to them in person, from whence he distinctly beheld the Prussian army still reposing at leisure on its formidable position on the opposite ridge. Not doubting that he would have to deal with their whole army on the following day, he pressed without intermission the march of his columns; and soon arranged the forces of Lannes, who first arrived with his infantry above by the steep and rugged ascent to its summit, in such formidable masses around its declivities on the other side, that the enemy, who were now sensible of their error in abandoning so important

(1) *Dum.* xiv. 72, 76. *Jom.* ii. 234, 235. *Bign.* v. 471, 472. *Lauch.* ii. 141, 151.

(2) *Lauch.* ii. 141, 144. *Jom.* ii. 234, 235. *Bign.* v. 472. *Dum.* xvi. 79, 83.

a point, and were making preparations to retake it, were obliged to desist from the attempt. This valuable height, therefore, from which the whole of the Prussian position and all the movements of their troops were distinctly visible, remained in the hands of the French; and its elevation not only gave them that advantage, but entirely concealed from their observation the rapid concentration of troops on the Jena side of the mountain, which would at once have revealed the intention of a decisive attack on the following day. Still the difficulty of surmounting the ascent was very great, and for artillery and waggons it was as yet totally impassable. Nothing, however, could long withstand the vigour of Napoléon and his followers. He stood on the spot till the most rugged parts of the ascent were widened by blasting the solid rock, or smoothed by pioneers, and when the men were exhausted, revived their spirits by himself working with the tools, and exhibiting his old experience as a gunner, in surmounting the difficulty of dragging the cannon up the pass. Animated by such an example, and the vigorous exertions of the successive multitudes who engaged in the task, the difficulties which the Prussian generals deemed altogether insurmountable were rapidly overcome; before eight in the evening the ascent was passable for cavalry and artillery; and at midnight the whole corps of Lannes, with all its guns and equipage, reposed in crowded array on the ridges and flanks of the mountain; the imperial guard, under Lefebvre, bivouacked on its summit; Augereau on its left; Soult and Ney received orders to march all night to the right, in order to turn the enemy after the combat was engaged by his left; Murat was in reserve at Jena; while Davoust and Bernadotte were directed, the first to fall back to Naumberg, in order to threaten the enemy's rear, the second to advance to Dornberg and cut off his retreat to the Prussian dominions. The two armies were now so near that their fires were within cannon shot, and the sentinels touched each other: the lights of the Prussians, dispersed over a space of six leagues, threw a prodigious glow over the whole heavens to the northwest: those of the French, concentrated in a small space illuminated the heights in the middle of their position. Surrounded by his faithful guards, the Emperor, after having despatched his last orders to his marshals, wrapped himself in his cloak, and shared the frigid bivouack of the soldiers on the summit of the Landgrafenberg (1).

Situation of
the armies
on both
sides.

At four in the morning of the 14th he was already on horseback, and, surrounded by his generals, rode along the front of the line of Suchet and Gazan's divisions, which were first to be engaged, and were already under arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the Prussian army is turned, as the Austrian was a year ago at Ulm; it no longer combats but to find the means of retreat. The corps which should permit itself to be broken would be dishonoured. Fear not its renowned cavalry; oppose to their charges firm squares and the bayonet." Loud acclamations rent the air at these words, but the morning was still dark: the first streaks of dawn were only beginning to appear, and a thick cold fog obscured every object around. Burning with impatience, the soldiers awaited the signal of attack, but for two long hours they were kept shivering in their lines. At length at six, when the day, though still misty, was light, and the Emperor judged that his marching columns would be so far advanced on their respective routes as to justify the commencement of the action in front, he gave the signal for

(1) Jom. ii. 285, 286. Bign. v. 473, 474. Dum. xvi. 83, 84. Sealf. iii. 301, 305. Camp. de Saxe i. 260.

the attack. Meanwhile the Prussians, little suspecting the tempest which awaited them, were securely reposing in their position, and, anticipating a day of complete repose on the 14th, had made no provision either for marching or battle. This fatal security had been increased by the opinion generally received at Hohenlohe's head-quarters, that the flag of truce who had appeared at their advanced posts on the preceding day, and been forwarded with his despatches to the King, bore proposals of peace, and that nothing serious would be attempted till his answer was received. Their position was strong, and admirably chosen : secure from attack on either flank, and approachable in front only by narrow and steep defiles, in which, if the heads of the enemy's columns were vigorously resisted and hindered from deploying, horse, foot, and cannon would be jammed up together, and the disaster of Hohenlinden might have been repaid with interest to the French army. But the departure of the King with two-thirds of the army, and the total absence of any preparations for an attack on the part of those who remained, deprived them of this advantage, and relieved Napoleon from a risk in the outset of the campaign, greater perhaps than he underwent even during the perilous changes which signalized its later stages (1).

Battle of
Jena, 14th
October. Great was the astonishment of the Prussian outposts, when, through the grey mist of the morning, they beheld the French battalions close upon them, and advancing swiftly in the finest order to the attack. They made a gallant resistance, and did their utmost to prevent the French from debouching from the defiles at the mouth of which they were stationed ; but being altogether unprepared for the attack, and completely surprised, they were not long able to make good their post, and fell back, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, to the main body of the army. The ground thus gained by Suchet was of the utmost importance, for it enabled the heads of the French columns, after emerging from the defiles, to extend themselves to the right and left, and gain room for the successive corps as they came up to deploy. Roused by the first discharge of fire-arms in front, Prince Hohenlohe rode through the mist from his headquarters in the rear at Cappellendorf towards the front ; but still confident that it would only prove a skirmish, said to General Muffling, " that his troops should remain quiet in their camp till the fog had risen ; and that if circumstances demanded it, he would move forward the division of Grawert, as he did not wish the Saxons to combat at all that day." Soon, however, messengers arrived in breathless haste from the outposts with urgent demands for assistance, and Grawert was rapidly advanced towards Vierzehn-Heiligen to support Tauenzien, who there with difficulty kept his ground against the impetuous attacks of Suchet. Meanwhile the whole army of the Prussians, alarmed by the sharp and incessant fire of musketry in their front, stood to their arms, and reinforcements were sent to the points in advance which were menaced ; but in spite of all their exertions the enemy gained ground, the villages of Closswitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which the lines of Hohenlohe were posted, were successively carried ; and all the low grounds in front of his position were filled with troops. Still the mist was so thick as to be almost impenetrable ; the contending bodies could not see each other till they were within a few yards' distance ; and under cover of this veil, and in the midst of the confusion arising from an unexpected attack, the movements of the assailants were completed, the defiles past, and the precious moments, when the heads of his columns might have been driven back

into the gorges by a vigorous attack, as those of the Imperialists were at Hohenlinden, for ever lost (1).

Defensive
measures
of the
Prussians.

At length, at nine o'clock, the increasing rays of the sun dispersed the fog, and his light shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. Then, and not till then, the Prussians perceived the full magnitude of the danger. On every side they were beset by assailants, no longer struggling through steep and narrow gorges, but deployed, with all their cavalry and artillery, on the open expanse to which they led. Directly in their front, the whole corps of Lannes, having made itself master of the villages at the foot of the Prussian position, was preparing to ascend the slope on which they stood : immediately to its right, Ney, and beyond him Soult, had already cleared the defiles, and were drawn up in line or column on the open ground ; while Augereau on the left was pressing forward to turn their flank ; and the imperial guard, with Murat's cavalry, were stationed in reserve on the slopes of the Landgrafenberg. Above ninety thousand men had out-flanked on either side, and were preparing to crush forty thousand, in a strong position, indeed, but totally inadequate to so desperate an encounter. Surprised, but not panic-struck, the Prussians drew up their lines in admirable order in the form of an obtuse triangle, with the apex in front, to avoid the danger of being turned on their flanks, and instructions were despatched to Ruchel, who with the reserve, twenty thousand strong, was at a short distance on their right, to hasten his march to the scene of action. Before he could arrive, however, the battle had commenced : the preparatory movements were made on either side in the finest style, the French columns advancing, and the Prussian retiring to their chosen ground with all the precision of a field day. But though they stood their ground bravely, and received the assailants with a close and well-directed fire, the odds were too great to give any hopes of success. Ney, indeed, whose impetuous courage led him to begin the attack before his columns were properly supported, and who had, by a charge of cuirassiers, carried a battery of thirteen pieces on an eminence which severely galled his soldiers, was for a few minutes in imminent danger : the Prussian cavalry broke the French horse, and enveloped the infantry in such numbers as would inevitably have proved fatal to less experienced troops : but the brave Marshal instantly formed his men in square, threw himself into one of them, and there maintained the combat by a rolling fire on all sides, till Napoléon, who saw his danger, sent several regiments of horse, under Bertrand, who disengaged him from his perilous situation. But on all other points the French obtained early and decisive success. Ney, extricated from his difficulties, with an intrepid step ascended the hill, and after a sharp conflict carried the important village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, in the centre of the Prussian position : in vain Hohenlohe formed the flower of his troops to regain the post : in vain these brave men advanced in parade order and with unshrinking firmness, through a storm of musketry and grape ; the troops of Lannes came up to his support, and the French established themselves in such strength in the village as to render all subsequent attempts for its recapture abortive. Imboldened by this success, Ney next attacked the right of the Prussian line towards Isserstaedt, which Augereau with the French left had already carried : a devouring fire ran along the whole right wing, and the French were for some time arrested by the intrepid resistance of their adversaries ; but the odds were too great, and despite of all their efforts, the allies were compelled to give ground in that quarter.

(1) Lucches. ii. 154, 155. Jom. ii. 286, 287. Dum. xvi. 94, 97.

But on the left of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the Prussians had obtained some advantage: their numerous and magnificent cavalry had made several successful charges on the French infantry when advancing on the open ground beyond its enclosures; several cannon had been taken, and Hohenlohe for a short time flattered himself with the hope of obtaining decisive success (1).

The Prussians are defeated. Matters were in this state when the approach of Ruchel with his corps, 20,000 strong, to the field of battle from the right, confirmed the Prussian General in these flattering anticipations; and he despatched a pressing request to him to direct the bulk of his forces to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, already the theatre of such desperate strife (2). Thither, accordingly, the brave Prussian directed his steps; but before he could arrive at the decisive point, matters had essentially changed for the worse, and he came up only in time to share and augment the general ruin. The lapse of time had now enabled the French to bring their immense superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at all points: Soult, by a heavy and well-directed fire, had driven the cavalry from the field on their left, while Lannes and Agercau, pressing them at once in front and flank on their right, had forced back their infantry above half-a-mile. Emerging from the villages which had been the theatre of such obstinate conflict, the French forces advanced with loud shouts and in irresistible strength towards the Prussians, who, weakened and dispirited, and in some places almost mown down by the terrible fire of their adversaries, were now yielding on all sides, though hitherto their retreat was conducted in the most orderly manner. Napoléon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and from his station on the heights in the rear, sent orders to Murat with the whole cavalry to advance and complete the victory. This terrible mass was irresistible. Twelve thousand horse, fresh, unwearied, in the finest array, animated by the shouts of triumph which they heard on all sides, bore down with loud cheers on the retreating lines of the Prussians. In an instant the change was visible; in vain their cavalry, so brilliant and effective in the early part of the day, strove to make head against the assailants, and cover the retreat of the infantry and cannon: their horses, wearied by eight hours of fighting or fatigue, were unable to withstand the fresh squadrons and ponderous cuirassiers of Murat, and by their overthrow contributed to the disorder of the foot soldiers. After a gallant resistance, the lines were broken: horse, foot, and cannon pressed tumultuously together to the rear, closely followed by the bloody sabres of Murat; in the general confusion all order was lost: the infantry and cavalry were blended together, the guns and caissons abandoned to the victors (3).

Arrival of Ruchel, who is overwhelmed. In the midst of this appalling scene, the columns of Ruchel, still in battle array, emerged through the cloud of fugitives to stem the torrent (4). It was a movement extremely similar to the arrival of Desaix on the field of Marengo: but he had to meet Napoléon, not Melas. The fresh troops, though advancing in good order, and with an undaunted

(1) Dum. xvi. 97, 445. Jom. ii. 286, 287. Bign. v. 475, 476. Saalf. iii. 306. Lucchesi ii. 156.

(2) At this crisis, Hohenlohe wrote to Ruchel—"It is highly gratifying to me to hear at this moment that your Excellency has arrived to my support. Send all the force you can to the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, the chief point of attack. You are a brave man and sincere friend. At this moment we beat the enemy at all points; my cavalry has captured some of his cannon."—Dum. xvi. 114.

(3) Dum. xvi. 97, 120. Bign. v. 476. Jom. ii. 287. Saalf. iii. 307, 308. Camp. de Saxe, i. 262, 263.

(4) The rapid change for the worse in the prospects of the Prussians since he first approached the field, may be discerned in the altered tone of the next letter despatched to him by Prince Hohenlohe. "Lose not a moment in advancing with your as yet unbroken troops. Arrange your columns so that through their openings there may pass the broken bands of the battle: be ready to receive the charges of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitive, and has driven into one confused mass the infantry, cavalry, and artillery."—Lucchesi, ii. 167.

countenance, were speedily assailed on all sides : an ephemeral advantage gained by their cavalry was speedily, in the disorder of success, turned into disaster ; in front they were charged with the bayonet by the French grenadiers, in flank assailed by an endless succession of Murat's dragoons ; the villages of Romstedt and Cappellendorf were strewed with their dead, and Ruchel himself, while bravely animating his men, was wounded in the breast by a musket ball, and carried off the field. After a terrible combat of an hour's duration, this powerful reserve, which in any other circumstances would have changed the fortune of the day, was broken, dispersed, and almost totally annihilated. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre. In frightful disorder the whole army rushed like an impetuous torrent from the field : but nearly the whole right wing was cut off by the rapidity of Soult's advance, and made prisoners. Almost all the artillery of the allies was taken, and the victors entered Weimar pell mell with the fugitives, at the distance of six leagues from the field of battle. Behind that town, on the road to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe, at six o'clock, collected twenty squadrons, whose firm countenance till nightfall gave some respite to the wearied foot soldiers, who were now dispersed through the fields in every direction ; while Napoléon, according to his usual custom, rode over the bloody theatre of death, distributing prizes to those who had most distinguished themselves, and giving directions for the care and consolation of the wounded (1).

*Preparatory
movements
which led to
the battle of
the King's
army.*

While this terrible disaster was befalling the united corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the King of Prussia was combating under very different circumstances, but with little better success, on the plateau of AUERSTADT. Little expecting any engagement on the morrow, this fine army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick in person, had bivouacked in close array around the village of that name : the Queen was only prevailed on by the most pressing entreaties late in the evening to retire with a slender guard to Weimar. Informed of the occupation of Naumberg by a considerable force, the Duke directed the division of Schmettau to occupy the heights of Koessen, and present themselves in battle array before the enemy, whom he supposed to be at the utmost a few thousands strong, while under their cover the remainder of the army leisurely continued its march towards the Elbe. These orders were obeyed, but Schmettau's division, contenting themselves with occupying the heights in the neighbourhood, neglected to send forward detachments to seize the defile of Koessen ; an omission which was speedily taken advantage of by Davoust on the morning of the 14th, who falling back to Naumberg according to his directions, early seized upon the important pass. At six on that morning, the French marshal had received an order from Napoléon, dated three o'clock *a. m.* from his bivouac on the Landgrafenberg, in which he announced his intention to attack in a few hours the Prussian army, which he imagined to be concentrated in his front, and ordered Davoust to march without loss of time upon Apolda, in order to fall upon their rear, leaving him the choice of his route, provided he took a part in the action. The despatch added : " If the Prince of Ponte Corvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together ; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned to him at Dornberg." Davoust instantly repaired to the headquarters of Bernadotte, who at that moment was in communication with his corps in the neighbourhood of Naumberg, and shewed him this order, proposing that they

(1) *Dnm.* xvi. 120, 133. *Bign.* v. 475, 476. *Lucches.* i. 157, 158. *Hard.* ix. 305, 306. *Sesil.* iii. 307, 308.

should march together to Apolda; but that officer, relying on the ambiguous expression in the despatch, which indicated that the Emperor "hoped he would be in the position assigned to him at Dornberg," did not conceive himself entitled to deviate from his previous instructions, and set out with his whole corps in the direction of that town (1).

Battle of
Auerstedt. Left then to his own resources, Marshal Davoust, notwithstanding, set himself to march in the direction which Napoléon had assigned. His forces were considerable, amounting to twenty-six thousand infantry and four thousand horse; a body perfectly adequate to its destined task of falling on the rear of the allied army, when defeated in front by Napoléon, but little calculated to withstand the shock of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, whom the King was leading in person to the encounter. The Prussians, on their side, were as little prepared for an action, and deeming their flank march sufficiently secured by Schmettau's division on the heights of Koessen, were in open column and straggling, advancing on their march towards the Elbe, when suddenly, at eight o'clock, on the plateau, they were met by the vanguard of Davoust, which had emerged from the long and steep ascent so well known to travellers who visit that memorable field, and were already in battle array on either side of its summit. The thick mist which here, as at Jena, concealed the movements of the opposing armies, prevented the troops seeing each other till they were only a few yards distant; and both parties deeming their adversaries only an inconsiderable detachment, fell back to collect forces to clear their advance—the Prussians, to drive the enemy back again down the defile, and secure the flank of the army from insult; the French, to clear their front, and pursue their rout by the cross road they were on to Apolda. Speedily reinforced, both sides returned to the charge. Davoust supported the advanced guard by the whole division of Gudin, with instruction to maintain themselves to the last extremity on the level space at the upper end of the defile, in order to gain time for the remainder of the corps to debouche; while the King of Prussia, impatient at the check given to the march of his army, ordered Blucher, with 2500 hussars, to ride over the Sonnenberg and clear the plateau of the enemy. Little anticipating the formidable resistance which awaited them, the Prussian cavalry were thrown into disorder by the close and steady fire of the French infantry, which speedily formed themselves into squares. Their cavalry were, indeed, overthrown by the overwhelming mass of the Prussian horse (2); but all the efforts of that gallant body, even when guided by the impetuosity of Blucher, were shattered against the compact mass of Gudin's infantry, and the terrible discharges of grape which issued from his artillery.

Desperate
struggle
which re-
sulted. Surprised at the obstinacy of the resistance, the King, adopting the opinion of Marshal Moellendorf, who insisted that it was only a detached column which occasioned the delay, and disregarding the advice of the Duke of Brunswick, who strongly counselled a general halt, and the formation of the army in order of battle till the mist cleared away and the enemy's force could be ascertained, continued the attack by means merely of successive divisions as they came up to the ground. The divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange were ordered to pass the defile of Auerstadt, where the road runs through a winding hollow skirted with copsewood or rough slopes, and advance to the support of the discomfited cavalry. The former, who first emerged from the defile, was directed to assail the flank of

(1) Dum. xvi. 137, 141. Bign. v. 480. Jom. ii.

(2) Jom. ii. 290, 291. Dum. xvi. 139, 147. Bign. v. 480, 481. Salf. iii. 306.

Gudin's division, which had advanced on the plateau beyond the village of Hassen-Hausen; at this moment the mist was dissipated, and the sun shone in full brilliancy on the splendid squadrons and regular lines of the Prussians. The Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of the infantry, and led them gallantly to the attack, while Schmettau and Blucher pressed them with their respective divisions of foot and horse on the other flank. But the brave troops of Gudin, forming themselves into squares, resisted all the charges with unconquerable resolution; and the nature of the ground, which permitted the successive divisions to come up to the support of either side only by degrees, the one by the long and winding defile of Auerstadt, the other up the steep ascent of Koessen, rendered it impossible for the Prussians to bring all their overwhelming force to bear at once upon the enemy. The conflict, therefore, was most severe. The French troops, stationed behind the hedges, enclosures, and garden walls of Hassen-Hausen, kept up an uninterrupted and murderous fire upon the enemy. The Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded by a ball in the breast while leading on a charge. Schmettau experienced the same fate. Wartensleben had his horse shot under him; and the Prussians, discouraged by the loss of their leaders, wavered in the attack, which being made in line, and not in column, was not pressed with the requisite vigour. Still the terrible discharge of artillery and fire-arms continued. Gudin's division had lost nearly half their numbers, and it was evident they could not long maintain their ground against their redoubtable and hourly increasing adversaries (1).

Additional
forces
come up on
both sides.

From this peril, however, they were at length relieved by the arrival of the other divisions of Davoust's army. Morand was the first who got up the defile; his troops, as they successively arrived on the summit, drew up on the left of Gudin, towards the Sonnenberg; and shortly after, Friant, with his division, debouched upon the right, and extended to the foot of the Speilberg. The combat was now equal, or rather the advantage was on the side of the French, for their three divisions were superior in strength to those of Schmettau, the Prince of Orange, and Wartensleben, to which they were opposed. Prince William of Prussia, at the head of a powerful body of cavalry, which had surmounted the Sonnenberg and arrived on the French left, furiously assailed Morand's division immediately after it formed, but those veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into squares, and with rapid discharges received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. In vain those gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds to the very muzzles of the French muskets. In vain they rode round and enveloped their squares; ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls; impenetrable the hedge of bayonets which the front rank, kneeling, presented to their advances. The heroic devotion of Prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge; still the fire continued, still the bayonets stood firm. At length, he himself was wounded, half his followers stretched on the field, and the remainder sought refuge in disorder, partly on the heights of the Sonnenberg, partly in the enclosures of Neuzalza (2).

Desperate
struggle
around the
Sonnenberg
on the right.

While this desperate conflict was going on on the left of Hassen-Hausen, the division of Friant had debouched from the defile, extended itself on the ground to its right, and chased the enemy who assailed it back to the village and heights of Speilberg, which were speedily

(1) Jom. ii. 292, 293. Dum. xvi. 159, 156. Bign. v. 482. Saalf. iii. 306. Personal observation.

(2) Jom. ii. 192, 193. Dum. xvi. 156, 161. Bign. v. 483, Saalf. iii. 306.

carried. The left of the Prussians was thus threatened; but it was not there that the principal danger lay. The progress of Morand on their right was much more alarming. On that side, not content with repulsing the furious attacks directed against them, the French had now assumed the offensive, and were rapidly pressing forward to the heights of Sonnenberg, from whence their guns would command the whole field of battle, and render untenable the position of the Prussian reserves, which had hitherto taken no part in the action. Sensible that the battle was lost without resource if these important heights fell into the hands of the enemy, the King put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and bravely led them to the charge. But if the attack was gallant, the defence was not less obstinate; Morand himself was to be seen at the head of his regiments, and for some minutes the balance quivered, but insensibly the French gained ground, and at length their artillery, dragged up to the summit of the heights, was placed in battery, and opened such a tremendous fire of grape upon the enemy's columns, as completed their discomfiture in that quarter, and with the bloodstained Sonnenberg and the village of Rehansen, the whole left of the field of battle fell into the hands of the invaders (1).

The Prussian reserve advanced, and is overthrown.

The experienced eye of Marshal Davoust now told him that the moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived. The heights of Eckartsberg commanded the line of the enemy's retreat, as those of Sonnenberg did the field of battle: by moving forward his centre and seizing that important point, their defeat would be rendered complete, and all possibility of their rallying prevented. Thither accordingly Gudin's division advanced, driving before them the broken remains of Schmettau's and Wartensleben's divisions, which had lost nearly half their numbers during the sanguinary strife in which they had been engaged. But the Prussians made one effort more to regain the day. Their broken battalions, which had retired from the field, were rallied under cover of the powerful reserve commanded by Kalkreuth, who assumed the direction upon Moellendorf being wounded, consisting of two divisions which had hitherto taken no part in the action, and placed in front; while the whole cavalry, re-formed under Blücher's orders, was posted in a second line immediately behind the infantry to take advantage of any hesitation which might appear in the enemy's columns. Wearied by a morning's march and four hours' hard fighting, the French soldiers had now to withstand the shock of fifteen thousand fresh troops, to whom they had no corresponding reserve to oppose. Had the quality of the troops on the opposite side been equal, this powerful addition to the enemy's forces, at such a moment, must have proved decisive: but nevertheless they were totally defeated; and this last success put the keystone to the arch of Marshal Davoust's fame. Though strongly posted on an eminence, and protected by the fire of a powerful battery, they were charged with such intrepidity by Gudin's division, supported by a part of Friant's, that they were driven from their position with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. At the same time, Morand repulsed an attack against the troops which he had stationed on the heights of Sonnenberg: the artillery, from that commanding position, carried death through all the ranks of the enemy; and at length his gallant troops descended from the eminence, and carrying all before them, drove the reserves opposed to their advance through the defile of Auerstadt. Thither Blücher's cavalry followed the retreating columns: the guards still kept their ranks, and retired in good order in open square, and by their firm

countenance enabled the broken infantry to rally at a distance from the field of battle, where Davoust reposed amidst his heroic followers (1).

Disastrous
retreat of the
Prussians during
the night
from both
fields of
battle.

The King of Prussia, who, during this disastrous day, had manifested the most signal coolness and intrepidity, and, during the repeated charges which he made at the head of his troops, had lost two horses killed under him, gave directions for the army to retreat in the direction of Weimar, intending to fall back on the corps of Prince Hohenlohe, of whose disaster he was still ignorant. But as the troops were in extreme dejection, and with little order following the great road which leads to that place, they were suddenly startled in the twilight by the sight of an extensive line of bivouac fires on the heights of Apolda. These lights were made by the corps of Bernadotte, who, adhering to his original instructions to march to Dornberg, had arrived in this position, after passing that town, late in the evening, and, ignorant of the combats which had taken place, was preparing to fall on the rear of the Prussian army on the following day. His too strict adherence to the letter of the orders he had received, deprived him of the glory of sharing in either battle, endangered Davoust's corps, and had wellnigh cost him his own life, from the indignation of the Emperor; but, nevertheless, this sudden apparition of a fresh corps of unknown strength upon the flank of their line of retreat at that untimely hour, compelled the Prussians to change their direction and abandon the great road (2). About the same time, obscure rumours began to circulate through the ranks of a disaster experienced on the same day at Jena; and soon the appearance of fugitives from Hohenlohe and Ruchel's corps, flying in the utmost haste across the line which the troops retiring with the King were following, announced but too certainly the magnitude of the defeat sustained in that quarter. A general consternation now seized the men—despair took possession of the firmest hearts, as the cross tide of the battalions flying from Jena mingled in greater proportions with the wreck which had survived the fight of Auerstadt—the confusion became inextricable, the panic universal—infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and leaving their guns, horses, and ammunition waggons, fled in mingled disorder across the fields, without either direction, command, or rallying point. The King himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner during the tumult and horrors of the night; and it was not till five in the morning that, by a long circuit, he arrived at Sommerda, where he received the official news of the melancholy disaster at Jena, accompanied by the letter, offering an accommodation, so insidiously despatched by Napoléon the day before that great victory (3).

(1) Dum. xvi. 164, 171. *Jom.* ii. 294. *Lucches.* ii. 146, 148. *Bign.* v. 485, 486.

(2) Napoléon's anger at Bernadotte, on account of his not supporting Davoust, and taking a share in the battle of Auerstadt, knew no bounds. "If I should send him to a council of war," said he, "nothing could save him from being shot. I will not speak to him on the subject; but I will let him see what I think of his conduct. He has too much honour not to be aware himself that he has committed a disgraceful action." In truth, however, Napoléon had no sufficient grounds for this ebullition. If Bernadotte did not take a part in the action, it was because his own latest instructions expressed a hope that he should go to Dornberg rather than march toward Auerstadt with Davoust. Had he violated these instructions, and, in consequence, the Prussian army had escaped by Dornberg, its natural and most probable line of retreat, what defence could Bernadotte have offered for his conduct? "I

was piqued," said that Marshal, "to be addressed in the language of authority by Davoust, but I did my duty. Let the Emperor accuse me if he pleases, I will answer him. I am a Gascon, but he is still more so."—*BOUAPART*, vii. 161, 162.

(3) Dum. xvi. 171, 178. *Jom.* ii. 295, 298. *Eiga.* v. 486, 487. *Hard.* ix. 307. *Lucches.* ii. 148.

Napoléon's official account of the battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign, is characterized by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and uncessant jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a weakness in an especial manner reprehensible. Davoust was the real hero of the day, since, with thirty thousand men, he had defeated the King of Prussia in person, at the head of sixty thousand. His own achievement in overthrowing forty thousand, or, including Ruchel, sixty thousand, with ninety thousand veteran troops,

Such were the astonishing battles of Jena and Auerstadt, which, in a single day, prostrated the strength of the Prussian monarchy; and did that in a few hours which all the might of Austria, Russia, and France, in the Seven Years' War, had been unable to effect. The subsequent disasters of the campaign were but the completion of this great calamity—the decisive strokes were given on the banks of the Saale. The loss of the Prussians was prodigious: in the two fields there fell nearly twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides nearly as many prisoners; and two hundred pieces of cannon, with twenty-five standards, were taken. Ten thousand of the killed and wounded fell at Auerstadt—an honourable proof, that if infatuation led them into field, valour inspired them when there. Nor was that victory bloodless to the conquerors: their total loss was fourteen thousand men; of whom seven thousand five hundred belonged to Davoust's corps—a striking indication of the dauntless intrepidity with which they had fought. (1) Napoléon, with his usual disregard of truth, called his whole loss in both battles 4000, little more than a fourth part of its real amount.

Unparal-
leled disas-
ters of the
present.

Great as were these results, however, they were but a part of the effects which ultimately flowed from these memorable battles. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians exceeded any thing hitherto recorded in modern history, equalled only by the still greater calamities which followed the flight from Waterloo. Nothing had been provided for such a contingency; no rallying point assigned; no line of march prescribed; no magazines collected. The extraordinary circumstance of four generals of the army—the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Moellendorf, General Schmettau, and General Ruchel—being killed or mortally wounded, left the confused mass of fugitives without a head: the unparalleled calamity of the survivors from two different defeats, experienced on the same day, crossing each other, and becoming intermingled during the horrors of a nocturnal retreat, rendered it impossible for them to know whose orders were to be obeyed. Thus, when morning dawned on the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenlohe, and the Duke of Brunswick, collected as chance threw them together, in disorderly groups, and inspired only with a common panic, fled in different directions, as accident or intelligence guided their steps. Vast numbers of stragglers wandered at large through the fields, or hurried, with so little knowledge of the country, from the scene of danger, that instead of avoiding, they fell headlong into the jaws

including the whole cavalry of Murat, is nothing in comparison. Nevertheless he represents the action as all fought in one field; speaks of the enemy, eighty thousand strong, as being commanded by the King and the Duke of Brunswick in person, and other dilating fully on his own achievements, dismising the wonderful exploits of Davoust in the following words. "On our right, the corps of Marshal Davoust performed prodigies. Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues, with the bulk of the enemy's troops, who were seeking to debouche on the side of Kossau. That Marshal has displayed alike the distinguished bravery and firmness of character which are the first qualities of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Dautanme, chief of the staff, and by the rare intrepidity of his brave corps." Why could I imagine that it was the glorious battle of Austerlitz which was here narrated? The injustice to Davoust is so manifest, that it is admitted even by the eulogists of Napoléon.—See BUGH. v. 467, 468; and Fourth Bulletin, 1806, in *Camp de la Saxe*, i. 265.

(1) DUM. xvi. 177. *Camp de Saxe*, i. 265. DUM. xvi. 180.

Davoust's loss at Auerstadt was 270 officers and 7200 privates, killed and wounded. Of these 134 officers and 3500 privates belonged to Gudin's division of 7000 men: in other words, more than a half of that band of heroes had fallen. This was the bravest action fought by the French troops during the whole contest: but the valour both of the corps and the division was inferior to that displayed by the English in more than one action of the Peninsular war, if the number of killed and wounded, a fair test with armies both of which have been victorious, is taken as the criterion. At Talavera, out of 19,500 English soldiers, 5000 were killed and wounded; nearly the same proportion as fell of the victors at Austerlitz: but at Albuera, out of 7000 English troops, only 1500 were unwounded at the close of the fight; and 9999 redcoats fell at Waterloo, out of a force of native English not exceeding 36,000 men.—See DUMAS, xvi. 177; NAPOLÉON'S *Peninsular War*, iii. 451; and WALLINGTON'S *Official Account of the Battle of Waterloo*, Ann. Reg. 1815, App. to Chron.

of the enemy. It is in the extraordinary confusion arising from this disastrous retreat, and the terror which seized the minds of both officers and men at finding themselves thus huddled together with soldiers to whom they were perfect strangers, that the true cause of the unparalleled disasters which followed the battle of Jena is to be found (1).

Capture of
Erfurth
with 13,000
men, Oct. 15.

The effect of the general consternation which prevailed speedily appeared in the fate which befel the fragments of the mighty army. Six thousand fugitives, almost without leaders, had taken refuge the day after the battle in Erfurth, whose embattled walls and almost inaccessible citadels promised the means of at least a temporary defence. It contained also the grand park and reserve artillery stores of the army, with the greatest part of its camp equipage. Thither also the Prince of Orange, Marshal Moellendorf, and a great number of the wounded of distinction, besides seven thousand private soldiers, in the same mutilated state, had been conveyed. Such, however, was the terror of the governor at finding himself thus suddenly overwhelmed by a mass of wounded and stragglers, incapable of aiding in the defence, but who would speedily consume its slender stock of provisions, that he thought the best thing he could do was to negotiate a capitulation, on condition that the officers should retire on their parole into Prussia, and the private men remain prisoners of war. On these terms the place surrendered (2), and with it fourteen thousand men, including Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange; a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and immense military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy.

Hohenlohe, who had retired, covering the retreat of the fugitives beyond Weimar with a considerable body of cavalry, in good order, at nightfall on the 14th found himself so completely overwhelmed by the crowd of stragglers who attached themselves during the night to his squadrons, that by degrees his array melted away; and it was only by making frequent circuits, and repeatedly crossing the fields, that he was enabled to reach Bernstedt at seven on the following morning, at the head of sixty horsemen. On the day following, the King, who had arrived at Sonders-Hausen, accompanied only by his aides-de-camp, conferred the command of all the troops which had combated at Jena and Auerstadt upon Prince Hohenlohe, with the exception of the two divisions under the orders of Kalkreuth, the reserve at the latter battle, which it was thought would still be in some sort of order; but in the general confusion this corps had dispersed like the rest, and there remained only eight battalions around his standard. Magdebourg was assigned as the rallying point to the army, within the almost impregnable walls of which fortress it was hoped the wreck of its mighty array could be re-organized, and a defensive struggle maintained till the arrival of the Russians from the Vistula, and the reinforcements which were collecting in the interior of the kingdom. Thither accordingly the King repaired, attended only by a few horsemen, to make preparations for the reception of the army; and there he was quitted by the British envoy, Lord Morpeth (3), who, seeing no chance of diplomatic concerns being attended to amidst the general confusion, returned to London to render an account to his bewildered Cabinet of the extraordinary events which he had witnessed in the outset of his mission.

But if there was any one thing more than another in which the genius of

(1) *Dam.* xvi. 178, 182. *Bign.* vi. 3, 5. *Jom.* ii. 297. *Hard.* ix. 807.

(2) *Dam.* xvi. 200, 202. *Jom.* ii. 298. *Lucches.* ii. 159.

(3) *Dam.* xvi. 184, 192. *Bign.* vi. 7, 8. *Hard.* ix. 307.

Measures of Napoleon to follow up the victory. **Napoléon** shone prominent, it was in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. The present was not an opportunity to be lost of displaying this essential quality of a great general. Without an instant's delay, therefore, he prepared to pursue the extraordinary advantages he had gained. From all parts of Germany his troops had been assembled to one point, in order to strike the decisive blow. That done, the next object was to disperse them like a fan over the conquered territory, to carry every where the impression of their victory, and the terrors of their arms. On the night after the battle, Napoléon, instead of retiring to rest, sat up dictating orders to all the corps of his army for the directions they were to follow in pursuing the enemy. On the extreme right, Bernadotte, whose numerous corps was still untouched, received orders to advance from Apolda to Neustadt, to cut off the line of retreat from Weimar to Naumburg, and so shut out the army from the great road to Magdebourg. Davoust was to return to Naumburg to hold that important post, and keep himself in readiness to debouch on the Elbe before the enemy could arrive there; Soult was to move on Buttelsstadt, the point in rear of the fields of battle, where the greatest number of fugitives had assembled; Murat and Ney were to march direct upon Erfurth (1), and reduce that important place; while Lannes and Augereau were directed to take a position in advance of Weimar; and the Imperial guard and Napoléon's headquarters were transferred to that town.

Soult defeats Kalkreuth. **Soult** was the first who came up with the enemy. At Greussen his cavalry reached the retiring squadrons of Kalkreuth's division, which alone preserved any semblance of an army. That general proposed a suspension of arms, in order to gain time, declaring that he knew an armistice had been concluded, and for the purpose of arranging its conditions repaired to the advanced posts in order to a conference with the French General. The terms, as might be expected, could not be agreed on. The statement was made in perfect good faith, under the impression founded on the letter from Napoléon offering an accommodation, written the day before, but not received till the night after the battle; and it gave the Prussian commander leisure to cause a considerable part of his forces to defile in safety to the rear. Enraged at finding himself thus overreached, Soult, the moment the conferences were broken off, attacked the Prussian rear-guard posted in front of Greussen; which, after a short resistance, was cut to pieces, and the victors entered that town pell-mell with the vanquished. Following up his success, the French Marshal, early the following morning, resumed the pursuit, and again came up with the enemy at Nordhausen, where they were again defeated with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, and 3000 men. Unable, from want of provisions, to keep his men together, and having no other means of escape to any part of his forces, the Prussian general divided his troops into two bodies, with instructions to follow different routes to Magdebourg. An almost total dispersion immediately followed this order. The stragglers came into that fortress by companies, squadrons, and groups of single men in hardly any array; and thus was the disorganization of the only divisions of the army which still preserved their ranks rendered complete within three days after the battle. Collecting prisoners at every step, Soult continued rapidly to advance, and on the 21st his vanguard reached the Elbe, and planted their victorious standards around the walls of Magdebourg (2).

(1) See the orders in *Dum.* xvi. 192, 193.

(2) *Dum.* xvi. 194, 200. *Jom.* ii. 298. *Narr.* ii. 465, 466. *Lucches.* ii. 161.

The Duke of Wirtemberg is defeated by Bernadotte at Halle, October 17.

A more important action awaited the arms of Bernadotte. This able chief, whose too literal adherence to the letter of his instructions had deprived him of all the laurels of Auerstadt, was burning with anxiety to achieve some exploit worthy of the deeds of his comrades and his own renown, when fortune threw the wished-for opportunity in his way. The Duke of Wirtemberg, who commanded the Prussian reserve, 14,000 strong, stunned by the intelligence of the disasters of the army at Jena, was making the best of his way back to Magdebourg and the Elbe, when he was beset on all sides at Halle by the corps of Bernadotte. The Prussians, who were brought into action, had not shared in the preceding defeats: notwithstanding the great superiority of force on the part of the French, they made a brave resistance; and there might be seen what elements of success existed in their army had they been opposed by less, or guided by greater ability. Assailed with the utmost impetuosity by the vanguard of the French, under Dupont, at Passendorf, they were driven in haste back to the islands in the Saale, over which the road passes; but in that defile they stood firm, and supported by a cloud of light troops who lined the dykes on either hand along the margin of the stream, long withstood their assailants and debarred all access to the gates. After an obstinate resistance, however, a column of grenadiers, headed by Dupont himself, rushed across the bridges, carried the guns which enfiladed them; and rapidly pursuing their success, pushed on and made themselves masters of the town. The Prussians had now no alternative to gain time for the retreat of their main body to Magdebourg but to prevent as long as possible the French troops from debouching from the gates on its opposite side; and the gallant efforts of the Duke of Wirtemberg long delayed them at that important point; but at length the increasing numbers of the French, and the murderous fire of the artillery which they brought up and planted on the ramparts, drove the Prussians from their strongholds in the gardens and walls of the suburbs, and enabled the columns to issue from the gates. Charged while retreating in open square along the level plain, the Prussians, during a running fight of four leagues, sustained severe loss from the enemy, and lost nearly their whole artillery; but they combated with heroic resolution; and still kept their ranks, when the pursuit ceased on the approach of night. Then the combat terminated on the right bank of the river, but on the left bank a greater disaster awaited the allied arms. Three thousand Prussians had broken up from their quarters near Magdebourg, in order to join the main body of the reserve at Halle, and ignorant of the occupation of that town by the French, fell into the midst of such superior forces that they were almost all either killed or made prisoners. Honourable as this affair was to the Prussians, it augmented, in an alarming degree the dangers of the army by dissipating its last regular corps: four thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed twelve hundred men; while the broken remains of the vanquished crossed the Elbe in such haste that they were unable completely to burn the bridge behind them, which was speedily restored by the French, who established themselves in force on the right bank, and drew their posts round Magdebourg (1).

Saxony is overcome by the French, October 18.

Meanwhile the other corps of the army continued their triumphant progress, with hardly any opposition, through Saxony. Four days after the battle of Auerstadt Marshal Davoust took possession of

Leipzig : strange coincidence, that the French army should for the first time enter that city on the very day on which, seven years afterwards, they were there to experience so terrible an overthrow (1)! Napoléon gave testimony of the rigorous warfare which he was about to commence on English commerce, by there issuing an edict of extraordinary severity against British merchandise (2). Rapidly following up his success, Davoust, two days afterwards, reached Wittenberg, at the very time that the retiring Prussians were preparing to blow up its great bridge over the Elbe; the French grenadiers rushed so rapidly over the arches that the enemy had not time to set fire to the train, and thus that important passage was secured. On the same day Lannes made himself master of the passage at Dessau. Thither Napoléon followed with his guards three days afterwards; and regarding the capture of Berlin as certain and a secondary object, he already began to give directions for the march of his troops from the Elbe to the Oder. Davoust's corps was pushed on towards that capital, Napoléon having permitted, as a reward for his transcendent heroism at Auerstadt, that his corps should be the first to enter the capital of the fallen monarch (3).

Such was the rapidity of the French advance, that they arrived around Magdebourg before a large portion of the broken Prussians had taken refuge within its walls. Napoléon saw clearly the importance of accumulating as large a number as possible of the enemy in a situation where he foresaw they would, ere long, become his prisoners, and therefore he gave orders to leave the entrance to the place open, and dispersed his cavalry in all directions to drive the stragglers into that devoted fortress (4). Murat's horsemen inundated the plain; and the garrison of the town, ill provided with subsistence, already began to feel the pangs of hunger from the multitude of useless soldiers who were driven to its shelter. Summoned to surrender by Marshal Soult, the Governor replied, that he hoped to gain the esteem of the besiegers by an honourable defence; but the confusion of the garrison, and the evident discouragement of the multitudes of insulated men who thronged around the gates, rendered it more than probable that his means of defence could not be prolonged for a very long period. Hohenlohe, despairing of preventing the investment of the place with so disorganized a wreck as was collected within its walls, and aware that the want of provisions would in the end compel its surrender, resolved to depart with all the forces which still maintained the appearance of

(1) On Oct. 18, 1813.

(2) "Your city," said Napoléon, "is known throughout Europe as the principal dépôt of English merchandise, and on that account the enemy most dangerous to France. The Emperor and King commands, 1. In the four-and-twenty hours immediately following this notification, every banker, merchant, or manufacturer having in his possession any funds the produce of English manufactures, whether they belong to a British subject or the foreign owner, shall declare their amount in a register appointed for that special purpose. 2. As soon as these returns are authentically received, domiciliary visits shall be made to all, whether they have declared or not, to compare the registers with the stock in hand to ascertain its exactness, and punish by military execution any attempt at fraud or concealment." Well may the honest General Mathieu Dumas exclaim, "What a deplorable abuse of victory!" — DUMAS, xvi, 225.

(3) *Sigs.* vi. 3, 9. *Jom. II.* 302. *Dum.* xvi. 223, 227. *Lacches*, li, 162.

Bernadotte was unavoidably detained a day longer than he was ordered in marching to the

Elbe, and in consequence did not cross that river till the 23d and 24th, instead of the 21st and 22d, before which time the corps of the Duke of Wittenberg had defiled through Magdebourg, and was in full march for the Oder. This escape of a considerable part of the best organized corps of the Prussians excited to the highest degree the indignation of Napoléon, who took occasion bitterly to reproach him with this delay, as well as his conduct in not marching with Davoust to Auerstadt. Already were to be seen the germs of that mutual discontent which seven years afterwards, on those very plains, brought Bernadotte in arms against the French Emperor on the field of Leipsic. — *Brazor*, vi. 9; *Dumas*, xvi. 230.

(4) "Magdebourg," said Napoléon, "is a spot where all the isolated men who have wandered about since the battle may be taken. We must, therefore, invert our manoeuvres, and beat all the country for fifteen leagues around; we shall thus collect numbers of prisoners, and also gain accounts of the direction taken by the strong columns of the enemy, of whose route we have as yet no certain intelligence." — *Dumas*, xvi. 232.

order, and make for the great line of fortresses on the Oder; but such was the universal confusion which prevailed, that he could only collect fifty battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons in a state to keep the field. With those he departed on the day following, leaving fifty skeleton battalions, hardly amounting to twelve thousand combatants, within the walls (1).

Who is pursued, assailed, and made prisoner at Prenzlau, October 25.

Upon leaving Magdebourg, Hohenlohe, abandoning Berlin to its fate, made for Stettin, situated near the mouth of the Oder, by the route of Spandau. But when he drew near to that place, he received intelligence that on that very day it had capitulated to the first summons of the advanced posts of the cavalry, under Murat, and that Devoust on the same day was to make his entrance into the capital. Driven thus to a circuit to avoid the taken towns, he moved by Grandsee to Zeydenick, in order to reach, if possible, before the enemy, the defile of Lochnitz, near Stettin, which would have secured his retreat to that important fortress. Aware of the importance of anticipating the Prussian General in these movements, Napoléon sent Murat forward with the cavalry to get before him to the defile, while Lannes advanced as rapidly as possible in pursuit of his steps with his indefatigable infantry. By forced marches, Murat got the start even of the horsemen who formed the advanced guard of Hohenlohe's corps; and

October 26.

on leaving Zeydenick, they were assailed by that active officer himself, at the head of Lassalles' dragoons. Confounded at being thus anticipated in a quarter where they expected a leisurely retreat, the Prussian horse made but a feeble resistance: even the famous regiment of the Queen's dragoons was driven back after a gallant effort, surrounded and almost cut to pieces; and the Prussian cavalry were compelled to fall back on their infantry, with the loss of 300 slain, and renounce all hope of pursuing the direct road to Stettin. Driven thus from his line of retreat, and his right flank being exposed to the attack of Marshal Lannes, Hohenlohe, after waiting three hours in the vain hope of being joined by Blücher, who had retreated to the same quarter, changed his direction, and moved upon Boitzenberg, where he arrived on

October 27.

the 27th, hoping to reach Stettin by the circuitous route of Prenzlau: but in attempting to do so, the unhappy Prince found himself again beset by his indefatigable pursuers. No sooner was Murat informed of his change of direction, than he marched across the country all night, from the one road to the other, again got before him, and assailed the Prussian horse at once in front and flank with his terrible dragoons, on the following morning, as they were continuing their march two leagues beyond Prenzlau. To troops

October 28.

wearied by incessant marching for a fortnight together, and discouraged by such a succession of disasters, the shock of his victorious squadrons was irresistible, the Prussian cavalry were speedily broken, and fell back in disorder to the suburbs of Prenzlau, already encumbered with infantry and artillery. To complete their misfortunes, Marshal Lannes appeared at this critical moment on their right flank, having, with indefatigable perseverance, marched all night from Templin on the direct road. Murat now summoned Hohenlohe to surrender, which the latter refused, and brought up a powerful battery of cannon to answer the fire of the French artillery, which was severely galling his troops as they attempted to debouche from the town. This battery was immediately attacked and carried; a regiment of infantry and cavalry which advanced to support it broken and made prisoners. Prince Augustus of Prussia, at the head of his regiment, which was still two leagues in the rear of Prenzlau, was surrounded, and after

heroically resisting the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers, during a march in hollow square of four miles, was at length made prisoner, with almost all his men, while bravely resisting to the last. Overwhelmed by such a multitude of calamities, and seeing no chance of escape, while every hour increased the forces against him by permitting the formidable battalions of Lannes to arrive on his rear and flank, Prince Hohenlohe, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a capitulation, was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition that the officers should be dismissed on their parole. With him were taken fourteen thousand men, including the flower of the Prussian army; the guards, six chosen regiments of cavalry, forty standards, and fifty pieces of field artillery. Notwithstanding their many defeats and disastrous circumstances, this grievous surrender did not take place without the most profound grief by the Prussian troops; the officers retired from the circle where it had been agreed to in stern silence, or shedding tears; many of them fiercely and indignantly accused their commanders of treachery, and invited their comrades to cut their way through the enemy, sword in hand; the private soldiers, by loud sobs and lamentations, gave vent to their grief, and flinging their muskets on the ground, slowly and mournfully pursued their way into the town; while a loud flourish of trumpets, the quick rattle of drums, and the triumphant shouts of the soldiers, announced the successive arrival of the French regiments at the scene of their triumph (1).

March and
escape of
the Duke of
Saxe-Wei-
mar.

Of the army, late so splendid and numerous, there remained only for the field the corps of the Duke of Weimar and General Blücher.

The former of these, which formed the advanced guard of the host which advanced to the Saale, and had been pushed on through the Thuringian Forest to Verra, in the view of threatening the rear of the French army, had become entirely detached by subsequent events from the principal body, and thus escaped the catastrophes of both defeats. Almost forgotten in the rapid succession of succeeding triumphs, the Duke was left to his own direction, and no sooner received accounts of the ruin of the main army, than he took steps for making the best of his way back to the Elbe. He had much difficulty in steering his way through the numerous corps of enemies which traversed the intervening country in every direction: but by great exertions he contrived to escape, and rallying to his standard a considerable detachment of Rüchel's corps, which had been separated from the remainder, reached the Elbe in safety at Stendal, with 14,000 men, by Seesen, Schladen, and Lutter. He was there superseded in the command by the King of Prussia, and his corps passed into the hands of General Winning, who gave them a day's rest at Kigritz. As the approach of the French corps rendered those quarters dangerous, he broke up and retired towards the Oder, and by good fortune, and no small share of skill, he succeeded in reaching the banks of that river in safety in the first week of October, where he joined Blücher with the cavalry which had escaped from Auerstadt. Their united forces now amounted to 24,000 men (2).

Disgraceful
surrender of
Stettin and
Cottin.

Meanwhile, the fortresses on the Oder fell in the most disgraceful manner. The day after the capitulation of Hohenlohe, a brigade which had escaped from the wreck of his corps presented itself at the gates of Stettin; the governor sternly refused them admittance, upon the pretence that his provisions were only adequate to the support of his own garrison. Next day, however, he capitulated, on the first summons,

October 21.

(1) Dum. xvi. 275, 299. Jom. ii. 308, 312. Bigu. vi. 19, 21. Scall. iii. 349, 310. Hard. ix. 313.

(2) Dum. xvi. 260, 272, 303, 306. Bigu. vi. 23.

to the advanced guard of Marshal Lannes; and the French, without firing a shot, became masters of a fortress of the first order, armed with 150 pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by 6000 men. The brigade of Prussians, shut out

October 29. from its walls, was soon after surrounded at Anclam and made prisoners. Encouraged by these repeated successes, the French soldiers deemed nothing beyond the reach of their arms; and the advanced guard of Davoust's corps, which had traversed the district between the Elbe and the Oder without meeting with any enemies, presented itself before Custrin, and threatened the garrison with a severe bombardment if they did not instantly capitulate. This menacing outpost consisted merely of a regiment of foot, and had only two pieces of artillery at its command. On the other hand, the governor of the town had ninety pieces of cannon mounted on the ramparts, and four hundred in the arsenal; four thousand brave men for a garrison, and every requisite for a prolonged defence. Nevertheless, such was the terror produced by Napoléon's arms, and such the skill with which the French officer, General Gauthier, concealed the real amount and description of his force,

October 31. that the Prussians capitulated almost on the first summons; and one of the strongest places in the kingdom, amply garrisoned, situated in an island of the Oder, and invested only on one side, had the disgrace of surrendering to a regiment of foot with only two pieces of cannon. The besiegers could not approach it to take possession till the garrison furnished them with boats! These disgraceful capitulations, at which the brave troops involved in them were so much exasperated that it was with difficulty they could be induced to yield obedience to their officers in carrying them into execution, demonstrated that the Prussian generals were so overwhelmed by the magnitude of their misfortunes, that they deemed the monarchy irrevocably ruined, and that *saue qui peut* had become the only remaining principle of their conduct. Astonished at his good fortune in effecting the reduction of such a

October 1. fortress without firing a shot, Marshal Davoust inspected the fortifications on the day following, which he found in the best condition, and

October 3. deeming his base on the Oder now sufficiently secured, pushed on his light troops to Posen, in Prussian Poland; while six thousand Bavarians formed the investment of Glogau, the only remaining stronghold on its banks which was still in the hands of the enemy; and Augereau established himself at Frankfort, the well-known emporium of eastern Prussia (1).

The only corps of the Prussian army which had hitherto escaped destruction was that formed by the union of Blücher's cavalry with the Duke of Saxe Weimar's infantry, and commanded by the former of these generals (2). Though its resistance, however, was more honourable,

Blücher's
corps is
pursued to
Lubeck.

(1) Dum. xvii. 13, 20. Bign. vi. 23. Jom. ii. 314.

(2) Before this junction was effected, Blücher's cavalry had been hard pressed by a brigade of horse under the French General Klein, and escaped in consequence of his affirming that an armistice had been concluded on the propositions for an accommodation sent to Napoléon after the battle by the King of Prussia. Whether the Prussian General really believed the report to that effect, which unquestionably prevailed through the whole army at that time, [Hard ix. 320.] or whether he made use of this very questionable military stratagem as a device to extricate his troops from present danger, does not appear; and therefore neither praise nor blame can in this uncertainty be awarded on the subject. But this much is clear, that if he knowingly affirmed a falsehood, as they assert, no necessity, how pressing soever, no advantage, how great soever, can afford it any apology. But when the

French historians inveigh with such severity against Blücher's conduct on this occasion, [See Bign. vi. 7. and Novr. ii. 466.] and affirm, "In the campaigns of the Revolution, the Austrian Generals have frequently had recourse to that strange *non de guerre*, the *French never*," they forget or wilfully conceal immediately preceding events, on which they bestow no sort of censure. What is to be said to General Lecourbe, who, in November, 1799, escaped destruction at the hands of the Austrian General Staray solely by falsely affirming that a negotiation for peace was commenced; [Aust. iv. 88.] to Lannes and Murat, in the campaign of Austerlitz, who won the bridge of Vienna, by the fallacious declaration that an armistice had been concluded, which they well knew was not the case; or to the latter of these Marshals, who a few days after tried a similar piece of deceit with Kutusoff, and was only foiled by the superior finesse of that astute commander. Both these French historians

its ultimate fate was not less calamitous. No sooner was he informed of the junction of these two corps in the north of Prussia, than Napoléon ordered their pursuit by forces so considerable, that escape became impossible. Bernadotte was instructed to follow closely on its footsteps; while Murat was despatched by a circuit to cut it off, on the right, from Stralsund and Rostock, under the cannon of which it might have found shelter; and Soult threw

October 28. himself on the left, to bar the communication with the lower Elbe. Blücher arrived at Boitzenberg the day after the ill-fated Hohenlohe had left that town; and having there learned the catastrophe which had befallen that brilliant portion of the army, he renounced all hope of retiring before the enemy, and retraced his steps in order to unite with General Winning and the Duke of Saxe Weimar's corps, which took place at Kratzemburg on the

October 29. day following; and finding himself now at the head of eighteen thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, he resolved to move to the right, recross the Elbe, raise the siege of Magdebourg, and, supported by that fortress and Hameln, maintain himself as long as possible in the rear of the Emperor's army. The project was boldly conceived and intrepidly executed; but the three corps now directed against him, numbering nearly sixty thousand combatants, rendered its execution im-

Nov. 1. possible. A sharp conflict took place with his rear-guard at Nossentin, in which five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the French; but the next day the junction of Bernadotte with Soult rendered it necessary for the gallant Prussian to be more circumspect. An opportunity, however, soon

Nov. 2. occurred of taking his revenge. Next day the French hussars were charged and put to the route by the Prussian light dragoons, at the entrance of a defile. Colonel Gerard and three hundred horsemen were made prisoners;

Nov. 3. but the cavalry having fallen back on the support of their infantry, headed by Bernadotte in person, the Prussians were in their turn repulsed, with severe loss. Finding the enemy's forces so considerable, that all chance of making good his way to the lower Elbe was out of the question,

Nov. 4. Blücher resolved to fall back by Gadebush on Lubeck, where he hoped to find resources to recruit his wearied troops, and whose decayed bastions he flattered himself he would soon be able to put in a respectable

Nov. 5. state of defence. Before arriving at that city, he was summoned by Bernadotte to surrender, and informed that he was beset by forces triple his own. "I will never capitulate," was the brief and characteristic reply of the Prussian general; and continuing his march, he entered Lubeck on the evening of the 5th, closely followed by his indefatigable pursuers (1).

Unfortunately for Lubeck, it was still surrounded by a ruined wall and deep ditches filled with water; and this gave Blücher an excuse

for representing it as a military post, and disregarding all the remonstrances of the magistrates, who loudly protested against this violation of their neutrality. Hastily planting the few heavy cannon which he still retained to defend the principal gates, Blücher caused the greater part of his

mention these unworthy stratagems, not only without censure, but with the highest admiration. [Rapp. 57. 58. 59. Bign. iv. 406. Ante, v. 217, 218.] It would be well, if, in making such random assertions, they would calculate less confidently on the want of information or recollection in their readers; and if, in the survey of the conduct of their own officers, they would display a little of that warm anxiety for the great principles of public morality, to which they so loudly appeal when any violation of it occurs to their disadvantage on the part of their enemies.

(1) Dum. xvi. 308, 321. Bign. vi. 23, 24. Jom. ii. 317. Saalf. iii. 311, 312.

In the course of the pursuit, a convey of twelve hundred Swedes fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who treated them with unusual courtesy and kindness. From the gratitude of the Swedes for this treatment arose the interchange of good deeds which terminated in his elevation to the throne of Gustavus Adolphus. At that period events, in appearance the most trivial, were big with the fate of nations.—See SAALFELD, iii. 313, and BIGNON, vi. 24.

forces to desile through the town, and take post on the low marshy ground on the opposite side, on the confines of the Danish territory. At day break on the following morning the French columns were at the gates, and every preparation made for an instant assault. In spite of a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the old walls, the French advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the assault. The corps of Bernadotte advanced against the Burg-Thor, or gate which looked to the north; that of Soult approached the Huxter-Thor and Mahlen-Thor, or gates of Hanover. After sustaining a terrible discharge from the bastions, which were armed with the Prussian field-pieces, the French advanced guard, under Generals Merle and Frere, succeeded in breaking through with their hatches the exterior palisades of the Burg-Thor, and rapidly following the Prussian regiments which held that outwork, entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of the adjoining bastions. At the same moment Soult's divisions threatened the gates opposed to their attack; but so murderous was the fire which the Prussians kept up from the walls which flanked their approaches that the assailants were unable to make any progress till Bernadotte's divisions, having penetrated into the town, threatened to take the defenders in rear. Even then, however, the brave Prussians, at this gate, to the number of two thousand, faced both ways, and besieged in their turn, sustained the double attack within and without. Posted on the roofs of houses, and on the summits of the ramparts, they kept up an incessant fire till their cartridges were exhausted, when they were all either killed or made prisoners. So rapid was the advance of the French through the Burg-Thor that Blucher, who had retired to his lodgings, after having made his dispositions, to dictate orders, had barely time to mount his horse with his son and a single aid-de-camp and ride off; all the rest of his staff were made prisoners. Having joined the remaining troops in the town, that brave general, with his gallant followers, prolonged the defence. He himself repeatedly charged down the Koning-Strasse at the head of a body of cavalry, but was unable to clear it of the French soldiers, who had now broken into the houses near the gate, and from thence kept up a fire of such severity upon the street as rendered it impossible for the dragoons to advance to its farther extremity. Presently the besiegers brought up their field-pieces, the guns on the ramparts were turned upon the town, and repeated discharges of grape from both sides swept the pavement, and occasioned a terrific slaughter. With invincible resolution, however, the Prussians maintained the combat. From street to street, from church to church, from house to house, the conflict continued. Blood flowed on all sides. The incessant rattle of the musketry was almost drowned in some quarters by the cries of the wounded and the shrieks of the inhabitants, who in that day of wo underwent all the horrors consequent on a town carried by assault. By degrees, however, the superior numbers of the French, who were soon reinforced by part of Murat's corps, prevailed over the heroic resolution of the Prussians. With difficulty Blucher succeeded, towards evening, in collecting five thousand men, with whom he forced his way through by the gate of Holstein, and rejoined his cavalry, which lay at Schwertau on the opposite side of the town, near the Danish frontier (1); while the remainder of his corps, in the town, consisting of eight thousand men, were slain before nightfall in that terrific fight, or fell into the hands of the enemy (2).

(1) Dum. xvi. 322, 333. Jom. ii. 317, 318. Bign. vi. 24, 25. Saalf. iii. 313. Hard. ix. 322.

(2) The French writers make it a just reproach to the English army that its soldiers committed

such disgraceful excesses at St. Sebastian, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, when these fortresses fell by assault. It is the duty of the historian to condemn equally such outrages, by whomsoever committed;

He returns
to Rat Kau,
and is there
made prisoner.

The situation of Blücher, with his cavalry and this slender body of infantry, was now altogether desperate. He was driven up to Rat Kau, in the extremity of Germany, on the very edge of the the Danish territory, where a powerful body of troops was collected to prevent his entrance. In the night he received intelligence that Travemünde, a fortified town on the sea-coast, to which he proposed to have retired, had been taken by Murat with a battalion which he had sent forward to garrison that important post, where he hoped to have embarked; and to complete his misfortunes, information arrived in the morning that the salt marshes between Schwertau and that town were not passable by the army. At the same time a flag of truce arrived from Murat, while his numerous squadrons had already driven the Prussian infantry out of Schwertau, and were closing in, in all directions, on his last position. Overcome by stern necessity, the hardy veteran, with tears in his eyes, agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which all his troops laid down their arms (1). On this occasion were taken ten battalions and fifty-three squadrons, amounting to four thousand foot soldiers, and three thousand seven hundred cavalry, with forty pieces of cannon, the remainder of his fine train of artillery having been left on the ramparts of Lübeck.

Fall of Mag-
debourg.

To complete the disasters of the Prussian monarchy nothing was wanting but the surrender of Magdebourg; and that important bulwark was not long of falling into the hands of Marshal Ney. Although its garrison was in great part composed of fugitives of all regiments, who had made their escape into that asylum from the disasters of Jena and Auerstadt, yet such was the strength of its works, and the ample store of provisions and magazines of all sorts which existed within its walls, that a prolonged defence might confidently have been anticipated. Nevertheless, if its fall was not quite so disgraceful as that of Stettin and Custrin, it was such as to affix a lasting stigma on the Prussian arms. After fifteen days of a blockade, Marshal Ney commenced operations in form; but before having recourse to the tedious method of regular approaches, he resolved to try the effect of a bombardment. Furnaces for this purpose were heated to throw four-and-twenty pound shot, red hot, into every part of the town, while a copious shower of bombs were ready to bring terror and conflagration upon the inhabitants. It was not necessary, however, to proceed to these extremities. The citizens of Magdebourg preserved a vivid traditional recollection of the horrors which their forefathers underwent after the memorable storm by Count Tilly in 1631, when the whole town was reduced to ashes. No sooner, therefore, did the first flaming projectiles begin to descend upon their houses than they besieged General Kleist, the governor, with entreaties for a capitulation. That officer, deeming the Prussian monarchy destroyed, and seeing no use in singly prolonging a contest now become hopeless, agreed to a capitulation on the same terms as Stettin, in virtue of which this important frontier town, the bulwark of the monarchy, with its redoubtable ramparts still untouched, and not even an outwork lost, containing sixteen thousand troops in arms, and four thousand in hospital, six hundred pieces of cannon, eight hundred thousand pounds of powder, a pontoon train complete, and immense magazines of all

and certainly in this work no veil shall be thrown over these atrocities when they come to be recounted. But it would be well if they would reserve a little of their humane indignation for the sufferers under their own soldiery on similar catastrophes. On this occasion, though they pass it lightly over, the cruelties and devastation committed by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps for two days after the town

was taken, notwithstanding all the efforts of those marshals, were equal to the very worst deeds that ever stained the British arms.—See the frightful details, drawn with a graphic hand, in *Lettre de F. à la Comtesse Fanny Beauharnais*, Amst. 1808.

(1) Dum. xvi. 333, 339. Jom. ii. 317, 319. Harl. ix. 321, 322. Scalf. iii. 313.

sorts, fell into the hands of the enemy, who hardly mustered a greater force without its walls (1).

Fall of
Hameln and
Nieubourg
on the
Weser.

After these stunning calamities, it was not to be expected that the fortresses on the Weser, which were now left far in the rear of the storm of war, should long continue to hold out. A host of fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt had taken refuge in those strongholds, particularly Hameln and Nieubourg; into the former of which General Lecoq, who had been separated in the confusion of the disastrous night which followed those battles, had thrown himself with four thousand men who still preserved a military array. There he speedily found himself blockaded by the forces of the King of Holland, who had advanced by Wurtzbourg and Paderborn to the banks of the Weser. The disastrous state of the monarchy gave him too plausible a ground for assailing the fidelity of the besieged. "You are insulated," said he, "without hope of succour. Abandoned, and more than a hundred leagues in the rear of the victorious invaders, what can your efforts do to avert the fall of the Prussian monarchy?" These arguments, supported by the official intelligence of the fall of Magdebourg and the surrender of almost all the fragments of the army, produced the desired impression, and it was speedily agreed that the fortress should be evacuated, the private soldiers made prisoners, and the officers return on their parole to Prussia. A mutiny

Nov. 20.

broke out among the soldiers upon learning the terms of this disgraceful capitulation; but it was speedily suppressed by Savary's dragoons, the men disarmed, and the fortress, in admirable condition, delivered over, with five thousand prisoners, to the French. Nieubourg speedily followed the same example, and, with its untouched fortifications and garrison of three thousand men, capitulated to the victors; and with it all the elements of resistance expired between the Elbe and the Weser (2).

Nov. 25.

Napoléon
detaches
Saxony
from the
coalition.

While the arms of Napoléon, guided by his penetrating eye, were reaping in this astonishing series of successes the fruits of the victories of Jena and Auerstadt, the Emperor himself, occupied alike with military and diplomatic objects, was preparing the means of farther triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of the power which fortune and genius had thus combined to place at his disposal. His first care was to detach Saxony from the coalition; and after the defeat of its army in those disastrous days, and occupation of its territory by the conquerors, this was easily accomplished. The Saxons have a hereditary jealousy of the Prussians, by whom they have a presentiment they are one day to be swallowed up. Necessity, not inclination, had brought them into the field with their ambitious neighbours; and they gladly availed themselves of the first opportunity to range their forces on the side to which their secret inclinations had long pointed, and which seemed to be recommended alike by prudence and necessity. Early in the campaign, Napoléon had addressed them, in a proclamation, in which he called on them to assert their national independence, and throw off that withering alliance with Prussia from which nothing but ultimate ruin was to be anticipated (3). This address had already produced

(1) Dum. xvi. 343, 347. Jom. ii. 319. Bign. vi. 26. Saalf. iii. 313.

(2) Dum. xvi. 347, 351. Bign. vi. 27.

(3) "Saxons! the Prussians have invaded your territory. I have come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops and incorporated them with their own ranks. You must forsooth shed your blood, not merely for interests foreign but adverse to those of your country! Saxons! your fate is now in your own hands.

Will you float in uncertainty between those who impose and those who seek to liberate you from the yoke? My success will secure the independence of your country and your prince. The triumph of the Prussians would rivet on you eternal chains. Tomorrow they will demand Lusatia; the day after, the right bank of the Elbe. But what do I say? Have they not already done so? Have they not long endeavoured to force your sovereign to recognize a feudal supremacy which would soon sweep

a great impression on the Saxon troops, when the victory of Jena seemed to dissolve at once the bonds which held the two nations together. Improving on these dispositions, Napoléon assembled the Saxon officers, three hundred in number, who had been made prisoners at Weimar, and strongly represented to them the impolicy of any longer uniting their arms to those of their

Oct. 17. natural enemies the Prussians; and offered, upon their subscribing the oath tendered to them of fidelity to its fortunes, to admit them into the Confederation of the Rhine. Gladly the officers, for themselves and the troops under their command, subscribed the conditions; and immediately they were all, with the private soldiers, six thousand in number, sent back to Dresden. The Elector shortly after recalled the remainder of his forces from the Prussian standard; he accepted first neutrality, then an alliance with the conqueror; and before the war in Poland was concluded, his troops were to be seen actively engaged under the French eagles. Such was the origin of that intimate union which, down to the close of the war, subsisted between Napoléon and the Saxon Government, and which, though in the end fraught with numberless calamities to that electorate, must ever command respect, from the fidelity with which its engagements were adhered to under adverse fortune (1).

Refers to treaty with Prussia. It was shortly after having detached Saxony from the Prussian, and united it to his own alliance, that Napoléon received an answer from the King of Prussia to the elusory proposals of accommodation made by him before the battle of Jena, and which that unhappy monarch eagerly caught at after that disaster as the only light that seemed to break upon his sinking fortunes. The times, however, were not the same: there was no longer any need of dissembling; the Prussian army was routed, and he was not the man to let slip the opportunity of completing its destruction. He Oct. 18. therefore coldly replied, that it was premature to speak of peace when the campaign could hardly be said to have commenced, and that, having resolved to try the fate of arms, the King must abide by its issue (2).

Napoléon visits Potsdam and the tomb of Frederick, Oct. 23. Following the march of his victorious armies, Napoléon continued his progress, by Weimar, Naumberg, Wittenberg, and Potsdam, towards Berlin. On the march he passed the field of Rosbach, the well-known theatre of the Prussian victory over the French, and ordered the column erected in commemoration of that triumph, which had been thrown down by the soldiers of his army, to be preserved, and transported as a trophy to Paris. At Potsdam he visited, with eager haste, the palace of Sans Souci and the tomb of the Great Frederick. Every thing in the apartments of the illustrious monarch remained as when he breathed his last: the book which he read shortly before his death remained on the table; the furniture was untouched; the writing materials still there: their simplicity surprised the conqueror, who was accustomed to the magnificence of St.-Cloud. By a singular coincidence, but one of the many with which the Oct. 24. history of Napoléon is full, he visited the sepulchre on the anniversary of the day on which Alexander, just a year before, on the same spot, had sworn fidelity to Frederick William. Such had been the confusion of the Prussian flight, that on the tomb there still remained the cordon of the black

you from the rank of independent nations? Your independence, your constitution, your liberty, would exist only in recollection, and the spirits of your ancestors, of the brave Saxons, would feel impatient at seeing you reduced, without resistance, by your rivals to a slavery long prepared by their councils, and your country reduced to the

rank of a Prussian province." None could descend more fluently than Napoléon on the withering effect to inconsiderable states of an alliance with a greater power; for none put it in force so invariably towards his own tributary states.—*Dumas*, xvi. 205.

(1) *Dum.* xvi. 204, 207. *Bign.* vi. 3, 4.
(2) *Dum.* xvi. 236, 239. *Jom.* ii. 301.

eagle, the scarf and sword of the hero, which he had worn in the Seven Years' War, as well as the standards of his guard. With generous emotion Napoléon approached the awful monument; but even at that solemn moment unworthy feelings gained the ascendancy. He himself seized the venerable relics, and sent them with indecent haste off to Paris. "I will make them a present," said he, "to the Hôtel-des-Invalides: the old veterans of that Hanoverian war will receive with religious respect all that once belonged to one of the greatest captains of whom history has made mention." Such an act could not injure the dead; his glory was enshrined in imperishable lustre in the page of history; but it lowered the living, and sullied the triumph of Jena by an unbecoming act of rapacity. Little did Napoléon at the moment anticipate the advent of times so soon approaching, when the Prussians, now so humbled, were to have the mastery of his proudest trophies, and nought was to remain but veneration for the remains of the dead to protect his own ashes in a foreign and far distant land from the rude hand of the spoiler (1)!

Berlin, Spandau, and Charlottenberg occupied by the French. Oct. 25.

This interesting episode did not interrupt for a moment the military movements of the corps immediately around the person of the Emperor. The same weakness and infatuation appeared there as elsewhere to have seized the Prussian authorities. On the same day Marshal Davoust, agreeably to the promise of Napoléon, headed the splendid vanguard which, with all the pomp of war, entered Berlin. No words can describe the mingled feelings of rage, astonishment, and despair, which animated the inhabitants at this heart-rending spectacle, occurring in less than a fortnight after hostilities had commenced. With speechless grief they gazed on the proud array which defiled through their gates, and drank deep, in the agony of that dreadful moment, of the punishment for the political sins of their Government during the last ten years. On the same day the strong fortress of Spandau, with its impregnable citadel and a garrison of twelve hundred men, surrendered, without firing a shot, to

Oct. 26.

Oct. 27.

Marshal Lannes (2); and Napoléon, after inspecting that stronghold on the day following, made his triumphal entry into the capital. He had not the same delicacy towards the feelings of its inhabitants which he had previously evinced towards those of Vienna: the palace of Charlottenberg would have answered his purpose of a residence as well as that of Schoenbrunn had done; but he was anxious to lacerate the feelings of the Prussians as much as he had been to spare those of the Austrians, and punish ten years of subservience and ten days of warfare more than he had done the inveterate hostility of twelve years. Surrounded, therefore, by all the splendour of the

(1) Bignon. vi. 11, 12. Jom. ii. 302, 303. Baum. xvi. 249, 250.

How much more honourable as well as magnanimous was the conduct of the Russian officer who, instead of destroying the monument erected at Cologne to commemorate the battle of Austerlitz, simply engraved below the inscription the words, "Seen and approved by the Russian governor of Cologne, May 8th, 1814." It is for the interest of all nations to preserve the trophies of their enemy's victory and the remains of the dead from insult; for it is impossible to foresee how soon they may themselves suffer from an opposite system. Nor is such forbearance without its reward. It obliterates the disgrace of defeat in the magnanimity of subsequent victory. The Pillar of Austerlitz, in the Place Vendôme, is now a monument not less to German generosity than French valour. It would be well for the memory of Napoléon if more instances of

moderation in victory and regard for the vanquished were mingled with his military triumphs.

(2) Napoléon spoke thus of this fortress: "The citadel of Spandau, situated on the Spree, fully vantageable for two months, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of open trenches. But such was the general confusion that the batteries were not even armed."—18th Bulletin. It is evident that treachery, or selfishness equivalent to treachery, occasioned the sudden fall of so many of the Prussian fortresses at this period; and Bignon tells us that he became convinced of that when, on being sent by the Emperor to superintend the capitulation of Spandau, he found the governor, Benckendorf, occupied with no other consideration but disputes with the French commander as to some wretched culinary articles which he alleged the capitulation authorized him to remove.—Baerov. vi. 11.

empire, in the midst of a brilliant staff, and preceded by his dragoon guards, he made his triumphal entry under the arch erected to the honour of the Great Frederick, and surrounded by an innumerable crowd, in whom passion, admiration, and wonder were mingled in some cases with joy (1), he proceeded through the streets, and alighted at the gates of the old palace.

Prince Hatzfeld, one of the leaders of the war party, in the total absence of any authority flowing from the King, had been besought by the principal inhabitants to take an interim direction of affairs, and assume the command of the burgher guard. In doing so he had issued a proclamation, in which he said, "Nothing remains for us now but to assume a pacific attitude: our cares should not extend beyond what is within our own walls: that constitutes our sole interest, and as it is of the highest importance, we should bestow our exclusive attention upon it." This prince, as the chief of the pacific authorities, presented himself at the head of the magistrates before Napoléon at Potsdam, and was well received. He again waited on him when he arrived at the palace; but the conqueror received him with a severe air, and averting his head said, "Do not present yourself before me; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates." Shortly after the astonished noblemen withdrew he was ordered to be arrested by orders of Napoléon, who had commanded him to be seized *and executed before six o'clock* that evening. In fact he had transmitted to Prince Hohenlohe a letter, containing military details in regard to what he had seen at Potsdam when waiting on Napoléon, which had been intercepted by Davoust and brought to the Emperor. The imperious commands of the conqueror left his subordinate authorities no alternative but submission; although Berthier, shocked at the deed of violence which was in contemplation, did his utmost to avert the storm, and even refused to write out the warrant, which Rapp was called in to do. He could not, however, prevent Napoléon from ordering another murder as atrocious as that of the Duke d'Enghien, and the death-warrant was signed, and ordered to be sent by Rapp to Davoust for immediate execution. That brave and generous man, at his own imminent hazard, took upon himself to delay its transmission; and in the meantime the Princess of Hatzfeld, having arrived in the antechamber of the palace, was informed of the danger of her husband, and sunk in a swoon on the floor. Rapp advised her, after she recovered, to endeavour to throw herself in Napoléon's way at the hotel of Prince Ferdinand, where he was going in a short time; she did so, and fell at his feet in the extremity of despair. Her grief and beauty touched Napoléon, who, though subject to violent fits of passion, was not insensible to generous emotions. Rapp warmly seconded the return to feelings of humanity, and orders were despatched to Davoust to suspend the execution till farther directions. Meanwhile the Princess was enjoined to repair to the palace, whither Napoléon soon after returned. He ordered her to be brought into the room which he occupied. "Your husband," said he, with a benign air, "has brought himself into a distressing situation; according to our laws he has incurred the penalty of death. General Rapp, give me the letter: take it, read it, madam. Is it your husband's writing?" She did so, trembling. "I cannot deny his subscription," she replied, almost fainting with emotion. Napoléon then took it from her, tore it, and threw it into the fire. "I have no longer any proof; your husband is pardoned." He then desired Rapp to bring him back immediately from Davoust's headquarters: that officer ventured to admit that he had not even sent him there: the

(1) *Dan.* xvi. 250, 252. *Bign.* vi. 42. *Herod.* ix. 312.

Emperor manifested no displeasure (1), but on the contrary seemed gratified at the delay which had taken place in the execution of the order (2).

Napoleon's
proclama-
tion and
addresses to
his soldiers.
Oct. 30.

Shortly after his arrival at Berlin, Napoléon paid a visit of condolence to Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great King of Prussia, and father of Prince Louis who fell at Saalfeld, and manifested the most delicate attentions to the widow of Prince Henry, as well as the Princess Electoral of Hesse Cassel. At the same time he addressed an animated proclamation to his troops, in which he recounted with just pride their astonishing exploits, and promised to lead them against the Russians, who, he foretold, would find another Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia (3). Next day he reviewed the corps of Marshal Davoust on the road to Frankfort, and assembling the officers in a circle, assured them of the admiration which he felt for their achievements, and the grief which he had experienced at the numerous losses which had thinned their ranks. "Sire," answered the Marshal, "the soldiers of the third corps will ever be to you what the tenth legion was to Cæsar." Already, in the emulation of the different corps, and the mutual knowledge and attachment of the officers and men, were to be found the happy effects of that permanent organization into separate armies and divisions which, first of the moderns, Napoléon had imitated from the ancient conquerors of the world (4).

(1) Rapp. 109, 110. Bign. vi. 14. Hard. ix. 315.

(2) It is always pleasing to record a generous action, and doubly so when it occurs in an enemy; but justice compels the admission, that by delaying the transmission of this order Rapp conferred a greater favour on Napoléon than on the intended victim of his passion; for the one he saved only from death, the other from the guilt of murder. Rapp informs us that the Prince of Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam on the 25th, and it was for the account transmitted to Hohenlohe on that day of what he there saw that he was about to be condemned. The 25th was the day on which Davoust entered Berlin. The information objected to was collected, and the letter written, therefore, before the Prince had come under the military government of the French Emperor. There is no law against a private citizen, or a civic authority of one nation, transmitting to its military officers details which have come to his knowledge regarding an enemy, when not yet subject to their authority—Napoléon himself called on the French prefects and magistrates to do so a hundred times. If the circumstance of Hatzfeld having collected and transmitted this information, while on a civil mission to the Emperor at Potsdam, exposed him to the penalty of death, what is to be said to Savary the year before, who, by orders of Napoléon, when conferring with the Emperor Alexander on the proposed terms of accommodation, obtained and brought to him military details of inestimable importance in regard to the temper and strength of the allied army on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz; [Sav. ii. 112, 113. Ante, v.] or to Napoléon himself, who, in 1797, transmitted orders to his brother Joseph, when holding the sacred office of ambassador at Rome, to do all in his power to revolutionize the Eternal City, and overturn the Papal authority? [Ante, iii. 291, and Corresp. Confid. de Napoléon, iv. 199, 201.] What the Prince of Hatzfeld did was no more than all ambassadors do, and which Napoléon invariably required from all his diplomatic agents. The character of the intended transaction may be judged of by what Berthier, with generous warmth, said on the occasion—"Your majesty will surely not shoot a man connected with the first families of Berlin for so trifling a thing: the supposition is impossible—

you will not do so;" and from his positive refusal to write out the order, as well as Rapp's delay in its transmission. Had the Prince been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Angles and the bookseller Palm—an act of deliberate murder. History, therefore, cannot award to Napoléon the praise of having pardoned, on this occasion, a criminal who had forfeited his life, either by the laws of war or the principles of justice; but it must not refuse the meed due to a conqueror who returns to generous feelings, after having been led, in a moment of irritation, to the command of an atrocious deed; and joyfully seizes on this incident as illustrative of that ascendancy which, in his cooler moments, humane feelings obtained over ruthless passion in the mind of this extraordinary man.—RAPP. 109.

(3) "Soldiers! you are worthy defenders of my crown, and of the great people. As long as you are animated with your present spirit nothing can resist you. Behold the result of your labours! One of the first powers in Europe, which recently had the audacity to propose to us a shameful capitulation, is annihilated. The forests and desiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers would not have traversed in seven years, we have surmounted in seven days, besides, during the same period, fighting four combats and a great battle. We have arrived at Potsdam and Berlin sooner than the renown of our victories! We have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, including those of the royal guard, six hundred pieces of cannon, three fortresses, twenty generals, while half the army regret their not having had an opportunity of firing a shot. All the Prussian provinces, from the Elbe to the Oder, are in our hands.

"Soldiers, the Russians boast that they are advancing to meet us; let us march to encounter them; we will spare them the half of their journey; they will find an Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. A nation which has so speedily forgot the generosity which we manifested towards it after the battle, when its Emperor, its Court, the wreck of its army, owed its safety entirely to the capitulation which we granted to it, is a nation that will never be able to contend with us."—Dumas, xvi. 250, 260.

(4) Dumas, xvi. 259, 261.

Unpar-
donable
severity
of Napoleon
to the Queen,
and the
Duke of
Brunswick,
and Elector
of Hesse
Cassel.

While Napoleon and his followers were thus indulging in an excusable pride at the retrospect of their wonderful achievements, the Prussian officers who had traversed the country, or reached the capital in virtue of the several capitulations which had been granted, were exposed to the most grievous humiliation. The officers of the guard, especially, who had escaped from the wreck of Hohenlohe's corps, were ostentatiously marched by the Emperor through Berlin to Spandau. Words cannot describe the mortification of these high-spirited young men, at the unparalleled calamities in which their inconsiderate passions had involved their country; wherever they went crowds beset their steps, some lamenting their sufferings, others reproaching them as the authors of all the public misfortunes. Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of Jéna, recommending his states to his generosity; was in an especial manner the object of invective; his states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that this wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died (1). The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms, and a heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an excess of patriotic ardour, compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy (2). The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jéna, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his posses-

Crud ex-
pressions
regarding
both in the
bulletins.

of the latter, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war; of the former, who complain of his manoeuvres and military conduct. The false calculations of the young may be pardoned, but the conduct of that old Prince, aged 72, is an excess of impenitence, and his catastrophe can excite no regret. What can there be respectable in gray hairs, when to the faults of age it unites the inconsiderateness and folly of youth? For these extravagances he has justly incurred the forfeiture of all his dominions."—23 and 27 *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe*, ii. 216, 293.

Napoleon's unworthy expressions regarding Gentz. Sir James Mackintosh's opinion of him.

(2) "All the world accuses the Queen as the author of all the calamities which have befallen the Prussian nation. The public indignation is at its height against the authors of the war, especially Gentz, a miserable scribbler who sells himself for money. After her ridiculous journey to Erfurt and Weimar, the Queen entered Berlin a fugitive and alone. Among the standards we have taken are those embroidered by the hands of this princess, whose beauty has been as fatal to her people as that of Helen was to the citizens of Troy.—27 and

23 *Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe*, ii. 215. It is worthy of observation that M. Gentz, who is here stigmatised as a miserable hireling sold to England, was one of the most distinguished writers of the age, and with whom Sir James Mackintosh, the eloquent apologist of the French Revolution, maintained a constant and valued correspondence down to the time of his death. That distinguished author thus speaks of Gentz's pamphlet, to which Napoleon alluded in a letter to the author:—"I received by the mail your two precious fragments. I assent to all you say, sympathize with all you feel, and admire equally your reason and your eloquence throughout your masterly fragment. I have read your letter fifty times since I received it, with the same sentiment which a Roman in the extremity of Mauritania would have felt, if he had received an account of the ruin of his country after the battle of Pharsalia, written the morning after that calamity, with the unconquerable spirit of Cato, and the terrible energy of Tacitus. He would have exulted that there was something which Caesar could not subdue, and from which a deliverer and avenger might yet spring."—Mackintosh's *Memoirs*, i. 304. Certainly, of all the unaccountable peculiarities in the mind of Napoleon, the most extraordinary is his total insensibility to the ultimate ascendancy of truth over falsehood, and the extent to which he calculated on palming off falsehood and defamation on the credulity or ignorance of mankind.

sions. Animosity to England was the secret motive for all those acts of robbery. So strongly was Napoléon influenced by these feelings that he made no attempt to disguise that it was the ruling principle which governed all his measures towards the vanquished (1). The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, in favour of whom the Prussian plenipotentiaries then at Berlin made the strongest representations, shared the same fate : while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs,—“I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their bread.” When a conqueror, in the midst of his greatest triumphs, uses such insulting language to the vanquished, and makes such an atrocious use of his victory, it is impossible to sympathize with his fall, and Waterloo and St.-Helena are felt to be a just measure of moral retribution (2).

Enormous contributions levied on Prussia and the north of Germany.

Meanwhile the French armies, without any farther resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoléon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of 159,000,000 francs (L.6,200,000) on the countries at war with France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian states on the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector of Saxony, and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden, equivalent to at least 12,000,000 sterling, if the difference between the value of money in England and Germany is taken into account, was levied with unrelenting severity; and the rapacity and exactions of the French agents employed in its collection aggravated to a very great degree the weight and odious nature of the imposition. Saxony, in the scourging contributions with which she was overwhelmed, had soon abundant cause to regret the French alliance; while Berlin, as well as the Hanoverian and Prussian states which had been occupied, experienced, in the rapacity of General Clarke and his subordinate agents, all the bitterness as well as the humiliation of conquest. Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor (3),—an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation, while General Clarke, governor of Berlin, acting towards the magistrates as if they were already its subjects, barbarously shot a burgomaster of the town of Kiritz, whose only fault was that he had, when destitute of any armed force, been unable to resist the

(1) M. Bignon, who was present on the occasion, gives the following curious account of the conversation which led to the dethronement of the Elector of Hesse Cassel :—“Duroc and I said every thing we could during breakfast in favour of the Elector. He only petitioned to be allowed to resume possession of his estates; his fortresses were all to be ceded to the French arms; his troops, twelve thousand strong, were to be joined to their forces, and a heavy contribution paid. These offers appeared to make a considerable impression on the Emperor, especially the offer of so many troops; but after musing a while, he said abruptly ‘Bah! Brunswick, Nassau, Cassel : all these princes are essentially English; they will never be our friends;’—and in-

stantly set out for a review. Two days afterwards appeared the 27th bulletin, containing the announcement of their dethronement.”—See BROUGH, vi. 35.

(2) Bign. vi. 15, 33, 34. 23 and 27 Bulletins, Camp. de Saxe, ii. 155, 295, 214.

(3) The oath was in these terms :—“I swear to exercise with fidelity the authority which is committed to me by the Emperor of the French, and to act only for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to concur with all my power in the execution of all the measures which may be ordered for the French army, and to maintain no correspondence with its enemies.”—BROUGH, vi. 51.

abstraction of the arms of the burgher guard and local militia by Colonel Schill, who commanded a flying detachment that still, in the open country, preserved its fidelity to the colours of the monarchy (1). Even the highest authorities gave way to the indiscriminate passion for pillage; "the name of General Clarke," says Bourrienne, "became justly odious from every species of exaction, and a servile execution of all the orders of Napoléon," while the great reputation of the conqueror of Auerstadt was disgraced by the pillage of the noble library at Tempelberg, the country seat of Baron Hardenberg (2), minister of state, which took place, by his authority, while he was in person occupying the edifice.

Military organization of the country from the Rhine to the Vistula. These evils, great as they were, and disgraceful to the arms and generals of France, were, however, in the ordinary case, only transitory; but it soon appeared that in the case of Prussia and the adjoining states they were to be permanent, and that the iron grasp of the conqueror was to be not only laid but retained on the north of Germany. Early in November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organization and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments, those of Berlin, of Magdebourg, of Stettin, and Custrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders of provinces into which it was divided. Receivers-general were appointed in each province, charged with collecting its whole revenue and all the war contributions imposed on it, and their transmission to the French governors. Magistrates, police, gendarmes, all were nominated by the authorities of Napoléon; the whole civil and military government of the country was concentrated in his hands. Clarke was governor-general, aided in the details of government by Count Daru, whose great capacity soon appeared in the admirable order which he introduced into every branch of the administration, and which would have been worthy of the highest admiration if it had not been rendered instrumental to the most cruel and universal system of public extortion. The same system of government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenberg, and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburg, which were speedily oppressed by grievous contributions, in exacting which the Dutch generals and troops were peculiarly conspicuous. The Emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. Careful, at the same time, to mingle with these important civil changes such deeds as might captivate the imaginations of his subjects, he paraded before the deputation which came to Berlin from the senate of Paris to congratulate him on his victories, three hundred and forty grenadiers of his imperial guard, each bearing a standard taken from the enemy in this short campaign,—the most splendid display of military trophies seen in Europe since the triumphs of the Roman generals (3).

Negotiations with Prussia, and the misfortune concluded. Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed; the misfortunes of the King rendered it almost indispensable that a respite should be

(1) At a dinner given by Louis XVIII. in 1815, to the King of Prussia, this massacre became the subject of conversation. "Sire," said Clarke, then Duke of Feltre, "it was an unhappy error."—"Sey, rather, an unworthy crime," replied the indignant monarch.—HARD. ix. 318.

(2) HARD. ix. 317. BIGN. vi. 51, 53. DUM. xvii. 40, 49. BOAR. vii. 219.

(3) DUM. xvii. 54, 61. BIGN. vi. 72. BOAR. vii. 217, 219.

obtained on any terms, while it was not less advantageous for Napoléon to reap at once the fruits of his triumphs without undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a winter campaign in the frozen plains of Poland. Plenipotentiaries accordingly were appointed on both sides : on that of France, Duroc; on that of Prussia, M. Luchesini and Rastrow. There was no need of lengthened conferences; the situation of the parties gave to the one the power of demanding whatever he pleased, to the other the power of withholding nothing which was required. Napoléon insisted that Prussia should renounce all the provinces she possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, pay a contribution of a hundred millions of francs for the expenses of the war, cease to take any concern in the affairs of Germany, and recognize in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine whatever titles the conqueror chose to confer upon them. Not daring to refuse these conditions, and yet unwilling to take upon themselves the responsibility of making so great a

Oct. 27. sacrifice, the Prussian envoys referred the matter to the King or his Cabinet. They returned an answer agreeing to all the exactions which were required; but in the interval matters had essentially changed for the worse, the wreck of the Prussian armies had been almost totally destroyed, and the demands of Napoléon rose in proportion. Perpetually haunted by the idea that it was the influence of England which he required to combat, and that the northern powers were brought into the field only to maintain her cause (1), he now insisted that the Prussian troops should retire entirely to Königsberg and the small portion of the monarchy which lies to the east of the Vistula; that Colberg, Dantzic, Graudentz, Thorn, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Nieuburg should be placed in the hands of the French; and that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter any part of the Prussian territory. In agreeing to terms so ruinous to the monarchy, the Prussian plenipotentiaries could hardly expect that the King would ratify them; but so desperate had its affairs now become, that it was of importance to obtain a delay even of a few days, in the departure of Napoléon for Posen, in order

Nov. 16. to gain time for the arrival of the Russian troops on the Vistula. They signed the convention at Charlottenberg accordingly, stipulating only for its ratification by the King of Prussia. In fact, however, no hope remained to either side that it would lead to a permanent accommodation; for, a few days before the truce was concluded, Talleyrand openly announced to the Prussian plenipotentiaries that they must look for no restitution of his conquests by the Emperor Napoléon, and that the vast territory from the Rhine to the Vistula would be retained until a general peace, as a means of compelling England to surrender its maritime acquisitions, and Russia to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had recently been invaded by its arms. Thus the unhappy Prussian monarchy was made responsible for the ambition or successes of other powers over whose measures it had no sort of control; and the negotiations at Berlin, diverging from their original object, were degenerating into a mere manifesto of implacable hostility against the Cabinets of London and St.-Petersburg (2).

The severity of the terms demanded, as well as their express assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead to a separate accommo-

(1) "He was persuaded," says the Marquis Luchesini, "that it was the intrigues of England which had arrayed the northern courts against France, which had brought about the refusal of the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of Paris, and pushed forward Prussia into the field of battle. It was England, therefore, which it had become necessary to strike in Prussia; and it was on the

conduct of the Cabinet of London, in regard to the restitution of conquests, that the Emperor announced he would measure his own steps for the future fate of the Prussian monarchy"—LUCCHESINI, ii. 176, 177; BIGN. vi. 44.

(2) DUMA. xvii. 66, 67. BIGN. vi. 48, 49. LUCCHESINI, ii. 182, 185, 186. MARTENS, xi. 390.

Which the King of Prussia refuses to ratify.

dation, as Napoléon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, what was to be gained by the cession of three-fourths of its dominions, and its fortresses still unsubdued on the Vistula, to the French? Reft as he was of his kingdom and his army, the King still preserved his honour, and nobly resolved to continue faithful to his engagements. He declined, therefore, to

Nov. 26. ratify the armistice, which was presented to him at Osterode for signature, on the part of France, by Duroc, and at the same time published a melancholy but noble proclamation, in which, without attempting to disguise his hopes or conceal the deplorable state of his affairs, he rose superior to the storms of fortune, and declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia (4). This refusal was anticipated by Napoléon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree of the 21st November, against the commerce of Great Britain. But that subject is too vast to be adequately touched on in the close of a chapter embracing such a variety of objects as the present; and it will be fully enlarged on in a subsequent one, which will include also the Milan decree which followed, in 1807, the continental system, and orders of council adopted as a measure of retaliation by the British Government.

Prussia Berlin decree against English commerce.

Napoléon set out from Berlin for the Vistula soon after he had fulminated this anathema against English commerce, and at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the re-

mains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hopes which his subsequent conduct never realized: "France," said he, "has never recognized the partitions of Poland; but, nevertheless, I cannot proclaim your independence until you are resolved to defend your rights as a nation at every sacrifice, even that of life itself. The world reproaches

Nov. 29. you with having in your continual civil dissensions lost sight of the true interests and safety of your country. Taught by your misfortunes, now unite, and prove to the world that the same spirit animates the whole Polish nation." Universal acclamations attended his arrival at Posen; all the population advanced to meet his carriage; four magnificent triumphal arches were erected to the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Count Palatine Radzerminski, at the head of the deputation from Great Poland, addressed him in terms of Eastern adulation, mingled with strange expressions which proved prophetic: "The universe knows your exploits and your triumphs; the West beheld the first development of your genius;

(4) Dum. xvii. 69, 71. Lucches. ii. 223, 225. Hüb. vi. 48, 49.

Matters, said the proclamation, had arrived at that pass, that Prussia could no longer hope to obtain peace, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices. It was not in his power to make the Russian forces retrograde, since already their own frontiers were menaced. The Emperor of France has shown a determination, even when he acceded to the basis of a negotiation, not to suspend for one moment his military operations; and he has protracted the considerations till his successes enabled him to declare that the conquest of Prussia should afford him the means of dictating peace to England and Russia. Compelled thus to resume hostilities, the King is not without hopes of yet bringing them to successful issue. He hopes that the governors of the

fortresses on the Vistula will not imitate the weakness of those on the Oder and Elbe, and all the disposable forces of the monarchy will hasten to unite their colours on the Vistula and the Warta to the brave Russian battalions. Such a proof of courage and constancy is not new to the Prussian nation. In the Seven Years' War the capital and provinces were also occupied by the enemy; but the firmness and intrepidity of the nation brought it safe through all its perils, and excited alike the admiration and astonishment of posterity. Then Prussia combated alone the greatest powers of Europe; now the powerful and magnanimous Alexander is about to take his place by her side with all the forces of his vast empire. Their cause is the same. they will stand or fall together.—Dum. vii. 70, 71.

the South was the recompense of your labours; the East became to you an object of admiration; *the North will be the term of your victories*. The Polish race, yet groaning under the yoke of the Germanic nations, humbly implores your august highness to raise up its remnant from the dust."—Napoleon replied, "That which has been destroyed by force cannot be restored but by force. I would with pleasure behold the independence of Poland restored, and a barrier formed by its strength against the unbounded ambition of Russia; but petitions and discourses will not achieve this work; and unless the whole nation, including nobles, priests, and burghers, does unite and embrace the firm resolution to conquer or die, success is hopeless. With such a determination it is certain; and you may always rely on my powerful protection (1)."

Advance of Jérôme into Silesia, and of the French army to the Vistula. While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the flanks of the invading force. To Jérôme Bonaparte, who commanded the ninth corps, consisting of twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Wirtembergers, and who had Vandamme for his adviser, was intrusted the difficult task of reducing the six fortresses of Silesia, Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Neisse, Schweidnitz, and Glatz, containing in all a force nearly equal to his own. Glogau, however, with its garrison of three thousand men, made but a show of resistance, and, early in December, fell into the hands of the French. The other bulwarks of the province exhibited more determination, and operations in form were commenced against them (2).

Mortier occupies Hamburg. Mortier, on the extreme left, was intrusted with the subjugation of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, and the occupation of Hamburg, which was accomplished with hardly any resistance. Having done this, he advanced to observe Stralsund and the Swedes, while a fresh reserve was collecting on the Elbe, under the command of Louis, King of Holland. Thus, though the grand army was advancing by rapid strides to the shores of the Vistula, its flanks on either side were protected by subordinate corps; and fresh forces, stationed in echelon in their rear, overawed the intermediate states, and kept up the communication with the Rhine. The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while a hundred thousand were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such prodigious efforts over so great an extent of surface, rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The Senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor, eighty thousand were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. "In what more triumphant circumstances," said the Emperor, "can we call on the youth of France to flock to our standards? They will have to traverse, in joining their comrades, the capitals of their enemies, and fields of battle illustrated by immortal victories." It may easily be conceived with what transports this appeal was received by a nation so passionately attached to military glory as the French, and the Emperor resolved to turn it to the best account. Not content with this great addition to his prospective resources, he instituted corps of volunteers to receive the numerous and enthusiastic youth, whom even the conscription could not drain off in sufficient numbers; additional battalions were added to the imperial guard; the troops of Hesse taken

(1) Dum. xvii. 60, 64.

(2) Dum. iii. 324, 325. Dum. xvii. 20.

in a body into French pay, and the most energetic measures adopted to augment as much as possible the military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine. Detailed instructions were at the same time transmitted to Mar-mont in Illyria, and the Viceroy Eugène Beauharnais, to have their forces disposed on the Austrian monarchy in the most advantageous position; the King of Bavaria was informed by the Emperor himself of all that he should do for the defence of his dominions, and the activity displayed in the fortresses on the Adige, the Isonzo, and the Inn, looked as if he was making preparations rather for a defensive struggle in the plains of Bavaria, or the fields of Italy, than for a stroke at the vitals of Russia on the shores of the Vistula (1).

Treaty
between
France and
Saxony.

A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France was the natural result of these successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at twenty thousand men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign: a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation—while by a subsidiary
Dec. 13. treaty, signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the Confederacy (2).

Immense
results of
the cam-
paign.

Such was the astonishing campaign of Jena, the most marvellous of all the achievements of Napoléon; that in which success the most unheard of attended his steps, and his force appeared most irresistible to the bewildered nations. Europe had hardly recovered the shock arising from the fall of Austria in three months, during the campaign of Austerlitz, when she beheld Prussia overthrown in as many weeks by the shock of Jena. Without halting one day before the forces of the enemy, without ever once pausing in the career of conquest, the French troops had marched from the Rhine to the Vistula; the fabric reared with so much care by the wisdom and valour of Frederick the Great, had fallen by a single blow; and one of the chief powers of Christendom had disappeared at once from the theatre of Europe. Three hundred and fifty standards, four thousand pieces of cannon, six first-rate fortresses, eighty thousand prisoners, had been taken in less than seven weeks; of a noble array of a hundred and twenty thousand men, who had so lately crowded on the banks of the Saale, not more than fifteen thousand now followed the standards of the King to the shores of the Vistula (3). Results so astonishing were altogether unprecedented in modern Europe: they recalled rather the classic exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, or the fierce inroads of Timour or Gengiskhan, than any thing yet experienced in Christendom; but they possessed this superiority above the achievements of antiquity or the sanguinary conquest of modern barbarism, that it was not over inexperienced tribes or enervated nations that the triumphs had been won, but the most warlike nation of the civilized world that had been overthrown, and the army which had recently withstood the banded strength of Europe which had been dissolved.

The talents displayed by Napoléon in this campaign, though of a very high order, were not equal to the transcendent abilities evinced at Ulm and Austerlitz. Doubtless the celerity with which the hazardous advance of the

(1) Bign. vi. 69, 71. Dum. xvii. 50, 55. See the orders in Dum. xvii. Pièces Just.

(2) Dum. xvii. 88, 89. Martens, Sup. iv. 384, 387.

(3) Join. ii. 325.

Talents and
rashness
displayed by
Napoleon
during the
campaign.

Duke of Brunswick across the Thuringian Forest to turn the French left and interpose between the Rhine and their army, was turned to the best account, and the Prussians cut off from their magazines and communications at the very moment they were endeavouring to inflict that injury on the enemy, the vigour of the fight at Jena, and the incomparable energy with which the mighty host which there conquered was dispersed like a fan in pursuit of the broken remains of the enemy, and incessantly pressed on till they were totally destroyed, were worthy of the highest admiration. But in the very outset of the campaign he exposed himself to unnecessary hazard, and but for a change of position on the part of the bulk of the Prussian army, of which he was ignorant, might have been involved in as great a catastrophe as the route on the banks of the Inn had been to the Imperialists. To advance and attack the Prussian army, strongly posted at Jena, through the narrow and rugged defiles of the Landgrafenberg, was a greater error in military conduct than it was in the Archduke John to advance against Moreau through the pines of Hohenlinden. Napoléon has told us this himself,—“The first principle of the military art,” says he, “is never to fight with a defile in your rear; for if defeated in such a station, total ruin is hardly avoidable (1).” Had the whole Prussian army, a hundred thousand strong, been posted at the opening of the defiles instead of a rear-guard of forty thousand only, the French would probably have never been able to debouche, and a disastrous retreat have been experienced. There was little of the usual calculation of means to end in this great commander, when he himself, with eighty thousand men, was opposed only to Hohenlohe with forty thousand, while Davoust, with thirty thousand, was left to struggle with the King in person, at the head of sixty thousand. No man knew better than Napoléon that such combinations were against the first principles, not merely of the military art, but of common sense applied to such subjects; but the truth is, that the campaign of Austerlitz had given him an undue confidence in his destiny; he deemed himself invincible, because he had always hitherto proved so; and already were to be seen the signs of that fatal rashness which was to lead him to the Moscow retreat and the disasters of Leipsic.

Reflections
on the sud-
den fall of
Prussia.

After making every allowance for the magnitude of the defeat sustained by the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, and the extraordinary circumstance of the fugitives from these two fields getting intermingled during their nocturnal flight, there is something extraordinary and almost unaccountable in the sudden prostration of the monarchy. Had the people been lukewarm or disaffected in the cause, it would have admitted of easy solution; but this was very far indeed from being the case; public spirit ran high, and unanimity unprecedented against Gallic aggression existed among all classes. Yet in the midst of this ardent and enthusiastic feeling, pusillanimity the most disgraceful was generally evinced, and fortresses all but impregnable surrendered at the first summons of a contemptible enemy! Where were the soldiers of the Great Frederick, where the constancy of the Seven Years War, when Magdebourg, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau lowered their colours without firing a shot, and the weakness of these garrisons permitted the army on the Vistula to be reinforced at the decisive moment by forty thousand men, who otherwise would have been chained round their walls? These unprecedented capitulations demonstrate that, however high was the spirit of part of the nation, the same feelings were not universal, and that the kingdom of Prussia, newly cemented by the genius of Frederick, had

(1) Nap. Mem. Book ix. 124, 125, on Waterloo.

not yet acquired that general patriotic spirit which can withstand the severer shocks of adversity, and constitutes the only secure basis of national independence. And the English historian who recollects how a similar catastrophe prostrated the energies of his own ancestors after the battle of Hastings, will probably feel charitably towards an infant nation placed in such trying circumstances; and feel a deeper thankfulness for that long career of national independence, that unbroken line of national glory, which has formed the indomitable public spirit of his own country, and constitutes the unseen chain which has so long held together the immense fabric of the British dominions.

General
despondency
which it
arouses
in Europe.

In proportion to the unbounded enthusiasm which these wondrous events excited in France, was the despondency which they diffused through the other states of Europe. Alarm now seized the most sanguine, despair took possession of the most resolute. The power which had risen up in Europe to vanquish and destroy seemed beyond the reach of attack. Every effort made against it, every coalition formed for its overthrow, had led only to fresh triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of its strength. The utmost efforts of Austria, supported by all the wealth of England and all the military strength of Russia, had sunk in the conflict; and now a few weeks had sufficed to dissipate that admirable army which the Great Frederick had bequeathed as the phalanx of independence to his country. The thoughtful and philanthropic, more even than the multitude, were penetrated with apprehensions at these portentous events. They looked back to ancient times, and read in the long degradation of Greece and the Byzantine empire, the consequences of their subjugation from the military force of Rome, and could anticipate no brighter prospect for futurity than the ultimate resurrection of Europe after many ages of slavery and decline (4). So little can the greatest intellects anticipate the future course of events in a society so perpetually influenced by new moving powers as that of modern Europe; and so necessary is it, in forming a judgment on the ultimate consequences of existing changes, not merely to look back to the lessons of history, but take into account also the hitherto inexperienced influence of fresh causes rising into action in the ever varying scene of human affairs.

Blücher's
opinion of
its probable
resurrection.

That bright dawn, however, which philanthropy looked for in vain, and philosophy was unable to anticipate in the dark gloom of the political horizon, the ardent mind of a hero had already begun to descry; and what is very remarkable, he fixed on the precise circumstances in the temper of the times which were destined to make it ultimately expand to all the lustre of day. "I reckon much," said Blücher to Bourrienne at Hamburgh, whither he had retired on his parole from Lubeck, "on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral; but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honour and a passion for national glory. Be assured, when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination, they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a Landwehr such as the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. England will yield us its subsidies; we will renew our alliances with Russia and Austria. I know well the principles of the coalition. The sole object which the allied sovereigns have in

(4) See, in particular, Sir James Mackintosh's letter to Gentz on this subject, *Memoirs*, i. 384. It is curious, but not unnatural, to observe the earliest and warmest advocates of the French Revolution most gloomy in their anticipations of its ultimate

effects. Ardour of imagination, the habit of looking before the multitude into the ultimate consequences of passing events, a sincere desire for the good of mankind, naturally in the same minds, in 1790 and 1806, produced these opposite results.

view is to put a limit to the system of aggression which Napoléon has adopted, and which he pursues with the most alarming rapidity. In our first wars against France, at the commencement of its Revolution, we fought for the rights of kings, in which, for my part, I felt very little interest; but now the case is totally changed, the population of Prussia makes common cause with its Government, the safety of our hearths is at stake; and reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation. I look forward without anxiety to the future, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your Emperor. The time may come when Europe in a body, humiliated by his exactions, exhausted by his depredations, will rise up in arms against him. The more he enchains different nations, the more terrible will be the explosion when they burst their fetters. Who can now dispute the insatiable passion for aggrandizement with which he is animated? No sooner is Austria subjugated than Prussia is destroyed; and though we have fallen, Russia remains to continue the strife. I cannot foresee the issue of this struggle; but supposing it to be favourable to France, it will come to an end. You will speedily see new wars arise, and if we hold firm, France, worn out with conquests, will at length succumb (1)."

Blucher was right in these anticipations. It is not in the suffering but the prosperity of nations that the seeds of ruin are in general to be found: the anguish and humiliation which are the consequences of weakness, disunion, or corruption, are often the severe school of ultimate improvement. If we would discern the true cause of the fall of Prussia, we must go back to the vacillation and selfishness which characterized its national councils during the ten prosperous years which succeeded the treaty of Basle in 1795: which caused it to temporize when the moment for action had arrived, and brought it in heedless security to the very edge of perdition; which lowered the national feeling by sacrificing the national honour, and paralyzed the arms of its natural allies by inspiring distrust in the good faith of its Government. In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations any more than individuals; it is the flow of unbroken prosperity which, by promoting the growth of the selfish passions, is the real source, in most cases, of irremediable ruin. Those twin curses of humanity, despotism and democracy, act in precisely the same way on the sources of public welfare, by poisoning the fountains of individual exertion, and inducing in the active members of society a slavish submission to the authority of the irresistible executive, or a selfish prosecution of their own interest, instead of a generous devotion to the public good. Till this last stage of national degradation has arrived, there is always a hope of revival to its fortunes; no misfortunes are irremediable as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken; no calamities irreparable but those which undermine their virtue.

(1) Bour. vii. 205, 206.



HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint hæc scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gesserit. Nam neque validiores opibus ullis inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virtutum aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. lib. 21.

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Advance of the French and Russians to the Vistula.

THE campaign of Jena had destroyed the power of Prussia : incon- siderate valour had yielded to overwhelming force and skilful combination ; with more justice the King than the people could say with François I at Pavia, *Tout est perdu fors l'honneur*. But Russia was still untouched ; and while her formidable legions remained unsubdued, the war, so far from being completed, could hardly be said to be seriously commenced. —Napoleon felt this : on the Trebbia, at Novî, at Diernstein, and Austerlitz, the French had experienced the stern valour of these northern warriors ; and he counted the hours, as the mortal conflict approached, which was to bring either universal empire or irreparable ruin in its train. Nor were the Russians less desirous to commence the struggle. Confident in the prowess of their arms —proud of the steady growth of an empire whose frontiers have never yet re- ceded, and which its meanest peasant believes is one day to subdue the world—they anticipated a glorious result from their exertions ; and, without underrating the forces of their opponents, indulged a sanguine hope that the North would prove the limits of their power, and that, while they repelled them from their own frontiers, they would afford the means of liberation to oppressed Europe. The severity of a Polish winter could not deter these un- daunted combatants : eager for the conflict, both their mighty hosts ap- proached the Vistula ; and, at a period of the year when some respite is usu- ally given in ordinary war to suffering humanity, commenced a new cam- paign, and advanced through a snowy wilderness to the bloody fields of Preussich-Eylau.

Military preparations of Russia.

Alexander had displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses which his army had sustained in the campaign of Austerlitz. Thirty fresh squadrons and fifty-one battalions had been added to its amount, all the chasms occasioned by the casualties of war supplied, and the new French organization into divisions universally adopted (1). Nor was this all :

(1) The Russian army was divided into eighteen divisions, each of which was composed of six regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of heavy cavalry, ten of light, two batteries of heavy cannon, three of

light, or horse artillery, and a company of pioneers : in all for each, eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and seventy-two pieces of cannon ; about 12,000 men. The army was thus divided :—

1. Guard under Grand Duke Constantine,
2. Polish army—Eight divisions under Ostermann, Sacken, Gallitzin, Toutschoff, Barclay de Tolly, Doestoroff, Essen, Gortschakoff, afterwards Kamenskoi,
3. Army of Moldavia, five divisions under Michelson as General-in-Chief, commanded by Wolkonsky, Zaczomilsky, Miloradowitch, Meindorf, and the Duke of Richelieu,
4. Intermediate corps under the Count Appenzin, consisted of the divisions of General Ritschhoff, Prince Labanoff, and Gortschakoff.

Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cannon.
33	35	64
143	430	504
90	100	308
54	30	244

Total,

Besides the local corps in Georgia, Finland, and garrison battalions. The whole regular force was

anxious to rouse the religious enthusiasm of his subjects, and deeply impressed with the magnitude of the struggle which was approaching, he had called out a defensive militia of six hundred thousand men, and excited their devout loyalty to the highest degree by a proclamation, in which Napoléon was represented as the relentless enemy of the Christian religion, and they were called on to shed their best blood in defence of the faith of their fathers (1). This proclamation excited the ridicule of a large part of Europe, still tainted by infidel fanaticism, and not then awakened to the impossibility of combating revolutionary energy with any other weapons but those of religious fervour; but it was admirably calculated for the simple-minded people to whom it was addressed, and excited such an enthusiasm, that not only was this immense armament without difficulty raised, but, contrary to usual custom, the peasants drawn for the regular army joyfully left their homes, and marched with songs of triumph, amidst the blessings of their countrymen, towards the frontier, the anticipated scene of their glory or their martyrdom (2).

Composition
and character
of her
armies.

The troops who were now pressing forward to defend the western frontiers of the empire, were very different from those with whom the French had hitherto, for the most part, contended, in the fields of Germany or the Italian plains. The forces of civilisation, the resources of art, were exhausted; the legions of Napoléon had reached the old frontier of Europe; the energy of the desert, the hosts of Asia were before them; passions hitherto, save in la Vendée, inexperienced in the contest, were now brought into action. Religious enthusiasm, patriotic ardour, the fervour of youthful civilisation, were arrayed against the power of knowledge, the discipline of art, and the resources of ancient opulence. There was to be seen the serf but recently emancipated from the servitude of his fathers, whose mother and sisters had checked the lamentations of nature when he assumed the military habit, and bade him go forth, the champion of Christendom, to present glory or future paradise; there the peasant, inured from infancy to hardy exercise, ignorant alike of the enjoyments and corruptions of urban society, long accustomed to rural labour, and habituated equally to the glow of a Russian bath or the severity of a Scythian winter; there the Cossack, whose steed, nourished on the steppes of the Don, had never yet felt the curb, while his master, following his beloved Attaman to the theatre of action, bore his formidable lance in his hand, his pistols and sword by his side, and his whole effects, the fruit of years of warfare, in the folds of his saddle. Careless of the future, the children of the Desert joyfully took their way to the animating fields of plunder and triumph; mounted on small but swift and indefatigable horses, they were peculiarly adapted for a country where provisions were scanty, forage exhausted, and hardships universal; the heat of summer,

about 300,000 men; but in no country is the difference between the numbers on paper and in the field so great as in Russia, and the troops in the campaign of Poland never exceeded 30,000 men.—See JONES, ii. 235, and WILSON, 4.

(1) "Bonaparte," said this proclamation, which was read in all the Russian churches, "after having by open force, or secret intrigue, extended his power over the countries which he oppresses, menaces Russia, which Heaven protects. It is for you to prevent the destroyer of peace, of the faith, and of the happiness of mankind, from seducing the orthodox Christians. He has trampled under foot every principle of truth; in Egypt he preached the Koran of Mahomet, in France manifested his contempt for the religion of Jesus-Christ by convoking

Jewish synagogues. Do you love your fellow-creatures, fly the persecutor of Christians; do you desire to be saved, oppose an invincible barrier to his advances. He has dared to the combat God and Russia; prove that you are the defenders of the Most High and of your country. Chase far from your frontiers that monster; punish his barbarity to so many innocents, whose blood cries aloud to Heaven for vengeance; God will hear the prayer of the faithful; he will shield you with his power, he will cover you with his grace, your exploits will be celebrated by the church and by your country; immortal crowns or abodes of eternal felicity await you."—HARDENBERG, ix. 376.

(2) Jom. ii. 335. Hard. ix. 375, 376. Dum. xvii. 99. Wilson, Polish War, 10, 11

the frost of winter, were alike unable to check the vigour of their desultory operations; but when the hosts on either side were arrayed in battle, and the charge of regular forces was requisite, they often appeared with decisive effect at the critical moment, and urging their blood horses to full speed, bore down, by the length of their spears and the vehemence of their onset, the most powerful cavalry of Western Europe (1).

Impro-
vident divi-
sion of their
force by the
invasion of
Moldavia.

If the whole disposable Russian forces had been united upon the Vistula, they would have presented an imposing mass of a hundred and fifty thousand warriors, against which all the efforts of Napoléon would, in all probability, have been exerted in vain. But, by a strange and unaccountable infatuation, at the very moment when this formidable contest awaited them on the Polish plains, a large portion of their disposable force was drawn off to the shores of the Danube, and a Turkish superadded to the already overwhelming weight of the French war. Of the causes which led to this unhappy diversion, and the grounds which the cabinet of St.-Petersburg set forth in vindication of their aggression on the Ottoman dominions, a full account will be given in the sequel of this work (2); but, in the mean time, its effect in causing a most calamitous division of the Russian force, is too obvious to require illustration. At Eylau the hostile forces on either side were nearly equal, and both retired without any decisive advantage from that scene of blood; ten thousand additional troops would there have overthrown Napoléon, and driven him to a disastrous retreat, while fifty thousand of the best troops of the empire were uselessly employed on the banks of the Danube. At the same time, it is evident that the war in Moldavia was resolved on, and the necessary orders transmitted, before the disasters in Prussia were known, or the pressing necessity for succour on the Vistula could have been anticipated; the battle of Jena was fought Nov. 22. on the 14th October, and on the 23d November General Michelson entered Moldavia and commenced the Turkish campaign. But though the Russian cabinet is thus not answerable for having given orders to commence an additional war unnecessarily in the midst of the desperate struggle in the north of Germany, yet it cannot be relieved of the responsibility of having, without any adequate cause, provoked hostilities in the southern provinces of its empire, at the time when the contest in Saxony, if not commenced, might at least have been easily foreseen, when the resolution to annul the treaty, signed by d'Oubril at Paris, had been already taken, and all the strength of Europe was required to meet the encounter with the Conqueror of Austerlitz on the banks of the Elbe (3).

(1) Wilson, viii. 23. Personal observation.

"Mounted," says Sir Robert Wilson, "on a little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk with ease at the rate of five miles an hour, or dispute in his speed the race with the swiftest, with a short whip on his wrist, as he wears no spur, armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, the Cossack never fears a competitor in single combat; but in the Polish war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge; and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arms and skill of the Cossack; but in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, when the cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and, in a few moments, five hundred and thirty Cossacks reap-

peared in the field, equipped with the spoils of the slain. But they did not permanently wear them; the steel trophies were conveyed by subscription to the Don and the Volga, where they are inspected as trophies of their prowess and respect for the pride of their kindred and glory of their nation."—Wilson, 27, 28. When the author saw the Cossacks of the Don and the guard at Paris in May 1814, this description was still precisely applicable.

(2) See chap. li., on the Turkish war.

(3) Journ. ii. 336, 337. Ann. Reg. 1806, 209. Egu. vi. 57.

The determination to refuse the ratification of the treaty, signed at Paris by d'Oubril, was taken at St Petersburg on the 25th August—the Decree was passed on the 23d November. The resolution to provoke a Turkish war, therefore, was taken after it was known that a continued struggle with the enemy, whose strength they had felt at Austerlitz, had become inevitable.—*Ibid.*, v. 336.

Embarrassment of Napoleon on the Polish question.

While Russia, distracted by the varied interests of her mighty dominions, was thus running the hazard of destruction by the imprudent division of her forces in presence of the enemy, Napoléon was extremely perplexed at Posen by the consideration of the Polish question. The destiny of this people, which enters so deeply into the consideration of every political combination of the nineteenth century, here stood in the very foremost rank, and called for immediate decision. The advance of the French armies through Prussian Poland towards Warsaw, the ambiguous, but still encouraging words of the Emperor to the numerous deputations which had approached him, had awakened to the highest degree the hopes and expectations of that unfortunate, but impassioned race. A solemn deputation from Great Poland, headed by Count Dzadiniki, waited upon Napoléon, and announced an immediate insurrection of the Polish nation, headed by their nobles, palatines, and chiefs; a great ferment prevailed in Lithuania, and symptoms of alarming effervescence were visible even in Galicia. The crisis was of the most violent kind; an immediate decision was called for by imperious necessity; Napoléon was much at a loss how to act; and the question was warmly debated by the Council assembled at his headquarters (1).

On the one hand, it was urged by the friends of Poland, "that the only ally in the east of Europe, on whom France could really and permanently depend, was now prepared to range itself by her side, and enter into a contest of life or death for her support. The alliances of cabinets may be dissolved, the friendships of kings may be extinguished, but the union of nations, founded on identity of interest and community of feeling, may be calculated upon as of more lasting endurance. But what people was ever impelled towards another by such powerful motives, or animated in the alliance by such vehement passions as Poland now is toward France? Alone of all great nations, in ancient or modern times, she has been partitioned by her powerful and ambitious neighbours, struck down to the earth by hostile armies, and swept by repeated spoliations, from the book of existence. Her nationality is destroyed, her people scattered, her glories at an end. Is it possible that these injuries can be forgotten, that such unparalleled calamities leave no traces behind them, in the breasts of the descendants of the Sarmatian race? Is it not certain, on the contrary, that they have left there profound impressions, ineradicable passions, which are ready, on the first favourable opportunity, to raise throughout the whole scattered provinces of the old Republic an inextinguishable flame? Where has the Emperor found such faithful followers, such devoted fidelity, as in the Polish legions of the Italian army, whom Muscovite barbarity drove to seek an asylum in foreign lands? Is it expedient to refuse the proffered aid of a hundred thousand such warriors, who are ready to fly to his standards from the whole wide-spread fields of Sarmatia? True, they are undisciplined—without arms, fortresses, magazines, or resources—but what does all that signify? Napoléon is in the midst of them; his invincible legions will precede them in the fight; from their enemies and their spoilers his victorious sword will wrest the implements of war; in their example, they will see the model of military discipline. The Poles are by nature warriors; little discipline or organization is requisite to bring them into the field. When the regular forces of Germany had sunk in the conflict, their tumultuary array chased the infidels from the heart of Austria, and delivered Vienna from Mussulman bondage. Nor is it

merely a temporary succour which may be anticipated from their exertions; lasting aid, a durable alliance, may with confidence be expected from their necessities. Surrounded by the partitioning powers, they have no chance of independence but in the French alliance; the moment they desert it, they will be again crushed by their ambition. Not only the nationality of Poland, but the individual safety of its whole inhabitants, must for ever bind them to their deliverers; they well know what cruel punishments and confiscations await them, if they again fall under the Muscovite yoke. In restoring the oldest of European commonwealths, therefore, not only will a memorable act of justice be done—a memorable punishment of iniquity inflicted, but a durable alliance on the frontier of civilisation will be formed, and a barrier erected against the inroads of barbarism in the people, who, in every age, have devoted their blood to combating its advances (1)."

Arguments
on the other
side, against
interfering
with the
Poles.

Specious as these arguments were, and powerfully as they appealed to the generous feelings of our nature, it may be doubted whether they were not opposed by others of greater solidity. "It is in vain," it was urged, "to dwell on the misfortunes of Poland, or represent her partition as an unavoidable calamity for which her inhabitants are noways answerable. Such a misfortune may doubtless sometimes occur to a small state surrounded by larger ones; but was that the case in the present instance? On the contrary, Poland was originally the most powerful nation in the north: her dominions extended from the Euxine to the Baltic, and from Swabia to Smolensko. All Prussia, great part of the Austrian dominions, and a large portion of Russia, have at different times been carved out of her wide-spread territories. So far from being weaker than Russia, she was originally much stronger; and the standards of the Jagellons and the Piasts have more than once been planted in triumph on the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, her history for the last five hundred years has been nothing but a succession of disasters, illuminated at intervals by transient gleams of heroic achievement; and, notwithstanding the valour of her inhabitants, her frontiers have, from the earliest times, been constantly receding, until at length she became the prey of potentates who had risen to importance by acquisitions reft from herself. So uniform and undeviating a course of misfortune, in a nation so brave, so enthusiastic, and so numerous, as even, at the moment of its partition, to contain sixteen millions of inhabitants, argues some incurable vice in its domestic institutions. It is not difficult to see what this vice was, when we contemplate the uniform and fatal weakness of the executive, the disorders consequent on an elective monarchy, the inveterate and deadly animosity of faction, and the insane democratic spirit of a plebeian noblesse, which made John Sobieski, a century before its final destruction, prophesy the approaching ruin of the commonwealth.

"Such being the character of Polish institutions, as they have been ascertained by experience and proved by the ruin of the commonwealth, it becomes a most serious question whether it is for the interest of France, for the aid of such an ally, to incur the certain and inveterate hostility of the three northern powers. That Russia, Prussia, and Austria will thenceforth be combined in an indissoluble alliance against France, if Poland is restored, and the rich provinces now enjoyed by them from its partition wrested from their vast dominions, is evident; and, whatever may be thought of the strength of the Sarmatian levies, there can be but one opinion as to the military resources which they enjoy. What aid can Polish enthusiasm bring to the French

standards to counterbalance this strong combination of the greatest military powers of Europe? A hundred thousand horsemen, brave, doubtless, and enthusiastic, but destitute of fortresses, magazines, and resources, and inhabiting a level plain, unprotected by mountains, rivers, or any natural frontier, and open on all sides to the incursions of their well-organized opponents—Supposing that, by the aid of the vast army and still vaster reputation of Napoléon, they shall succeed at this time in bearing back the Russian hosts, and wresting Lithuania from their grasp, what may not be apprehended from the appearance of Austria on the theatre of conflict, and the debouching of a hundred and fifty thousand men in the rear of the grand army, when far advanced in the deserts of Muscovy? That the cabinet of Vienna is preparing for the conflict is evident; that she is arming is well known; fear and uncertainty as to the future alone restrain her forces; but the stroke which, by restoring Poland, severs Galicia from her empire, will at once determine her policy, and bring the imperial legions in formidable strength to the banks of the Elbe. Even supposing that, by an unprecedented series of victories, these dangers are averted for the moment, and the French battalions, loaded with honours, regain the Rhine; how is Poland, still torn by intestine faction, and destitute of any solid institutions, to withstand her formidable military neighbours; and how is France, at the distance of four hundred leagues, to protect a power whose internal weakness has always been such that it has never been able to protect itself against its own provinces? If a barrier is to be erected against Russian ambition, and a state formed dependent on the French alliance for its existence, far better to look for it in Prussia, whose history exhibits as remarkable a rise as that of Poland does a decline, and the solidity of whose institutions, not less than the firmness of its national character, has been decisively exhibited in contending with all the military forces of Europe during the Seven Years' War (1)".

Napoléon adopts a middle course, and renews only Prussian Poland. Pressed by so many difficulties, and struck in an especial manner by the danger of bringing the forces of Austria upon his rear, while engaged in the hardships of a winter campaign in Poland, Napoléon resolved upon a middle course (2). Irrevocably fixed upon humbling Prussia to the dust, and entirely indifferent to the irritation which he excited among its people, he resolved to rouse to the uttermost the inhabitants of Prussian Poland; but at the same time sedulously abstain from any invitations to Galicia to revolt, and even held out no encouragement to the Russian provinces of Lithuania to join the standard of Polish independence. Kosciuszko, who, since his heroic achievements in 1794, had lived in retirement near Fontainebleau, was invited by Napoléon to join his countrymen, and a proclamation, drawn in his name, was even published in the French papers, in which he promised speedily to put himself at their head (3); but the course of time soon dispelled the illusion, and it became painfully

(1) *Jen. M.* 329.

(2) "I love the Poles," said he to Rapp, after having received one of their deputations; "their ardour pleases me. I could wish to render them an independent people, but it is no easy undertaking. Too many nations are interested in their spoils—Austria, Russia, Prussia. If the match is once lighted, there is no saying where it would stop. My first duty is towards France, and it is no part of it to sacrifice its interests to Poland—that would lead us too far. We must leave its destinies, in the hands of the Supreme Disposer of all things, to Time. It will possibly teach us hereafter what course we ought to pursue."—*Bona.* vii. 250.

(3) "Kosciuszko," said this fabricated epistle, dated 1st November, "is about to place himself in the midst of you. He sees in your deliverers no ambitious conquerors; the great nation is before you; Napoléon expects you; Kosciuszko calls you. Fly to your succour; never more to leave your side. Worthy of the great man whose arm is stretched forth for your deliverance, I attach myself to your cause never again to leave. The bright days of Poland have returned; we are under theegis of a monarch accustomed to overcome difficulties by miracles."—*HARDENBERG*, ix. 329.

evident to the Poles that their illustrious hero, despairing of success, or having no confidence in their pretended allies, was resolved to bear the responsibility of no future insurrections under such auspices. In fact, he had been profoundly affected by the indifference manifested by all the European powers to the fate of Poland on occasion of the last partition, and thoroughly impressed with the idea that no efficacious co-operation could be expected from any of them; and, while he rendered full justice to the military talents of Napoléon, despaired of seeing the deliverance of Sarmatia in good faith attempted by his despotic arms (1). The task of rousing the Poles in the Prussian dominions was therefore committed to Dombrowski and Wybicki; the former of whom had acquired a deserved celebrity at the head of the Polish Legion in Italy, while the latter possessed such influence with his countrymen as to promise great advantage to the cause of Napoléon.

At the same time, every care was taken to excite the feelings and diminish the apprehensions of the Poles of Prussia; heart-stirring proclamations in Kosciusko's name were addressed to them by the generals of their nation in the Italian army, but that brave man himself, faithful to the oath he had taken to the Emperor of Russia, and aware of the delusive nature of Napoléon's support, refused to take any part in these proceedings; resisted all the brilliant offers which he made to induce him to engage in his service, and even had the boldness, in foreign journals, to disavow the letter which the French government had published in his name. Notwithstanding this reserve, however, the advance of the French armies to Warsaw, and the sedulous care which they took to save the inhabitants from every species of insult or contribution, produced an extraordinary ferment in the Polish provinces—universally they were hailed as deliverers—the substantial benefits, the real protection, the fostering tranquillity of the Prussian administration, were forgotten in the recollection of ancient achievements, and, incited by the heart-stirring prospect of coming independence, the nation was fast running into its ancient and ruinous anarchy. The public exultation was at its height when Napoléon arrived at Posen: several regiments were already formed in Prussian Poland; and the arrival of the French troops in Warsaw, which the Russians evacuated at their approach, was universally hailed as the first day of Polish Restoration (2).

Napoléon's
dubious bul-
letin on the
subject.

Napoléon was not insensible to the important effects of this national enthusiasm, both in augmenting the resources of his own army and intercepting those of his opponents; but at the same time he felt the necessity of not rousing all Poland in a similar manner, or incurring the immediate hostility of Austria, by threatening the tenure by which she held her Polish acquisitions. He resolved, therefore, to moderate the general fervour, and confine it to the provinces of Prussia, where it was intended to excite a conflagration; and this was done by the bulletin which appeared on the 1st December:—"The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and the sentiment of nationality, is not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but it has become more profound from misfortune. Their first passion, the universal wish, is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their chateaux to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the nation, and to offer their children, their fortune, their influence, in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have every where resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs: is then the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is the nation destined to resume its exis-

(1) Oginski, ii. 337.

(2) Oginski, ii. 337, 338. Urd. ix. 344. Mf. Bign. vi. 79, 81.

to peace and independence? From the depth of the tomb, is it destined to start into life? God alone, who holds in his hand the combination of great events, is the arbiter of that great political problem, but certainly never was an event more memorable or worthy of interest." Situated as Napoléon was, the reserve of this language was an act of humanity as well as justice to the unhappy race whose destiny it still held in suspense; but it contributed powerfully to allay the rising enthusiasm of the Russian and Austrian provinces of the ancient commonwealth; and the prudent, despairing of any national resurrection from such an ally, began to ask, "if the restoration of the Republic of Poland, could, in good faith, be expected from the man who had extinguished the liberty of his own country (1)."

Napoléon proposes to Austria to exchange Galicia for Silesia, which is refused.

One chance, and only one, remained to Napoléon of smoothing away the difficulties which surrounded the restoration of Poland, and that consisted in the proposal, which at this time he made to Austria, to exchange its share of Poland for its old province of Silesia. During the negotiation with Prussia for a separate peace, he only held out the prospect of this exchange in a doubtful manner to the cabinets of Vienna; but no sooner had the King of Prussia refused to ratify the armistice of Charlottenberg, than General Andreossy was authorized to propose it formally to that power. Count Stadion replied, that the good faith of the Imperial government would not permit them to accept a possession which was not assented to by Prussia; and it would indeed have been an extraordinary fault in policy, as well as breach of morality, to have thus despoiled a friendly power and reopened an ancient wound, at the very moment when a concentration of all energies was required to resist the enemy who threatened to destroy all the European states. In consequence of this refusal, the conduct of Napoléon, in regard to Poland, became still more guarded; and although a provisional government and local administration were formed at Warsaw, yet none but natives of Prussian Poland were admitted to any share in the direction of affairs (2).

His proclamation to his soldiers on the anniversary of Austria's

While this great political question was under discussion, during the fortnight that the Emperor's stay continued at Posen, the army in great force approached the Vistula; but the severity of the weather, and the incessant fatigue of the troops, in the long and dreary marches through that monotonous country at so inclement a season, produced a general feeling of despondency among the soldiers, and gave rise to a fermentation which even Napoléon deemed alarming. To the intoxication consequent on the victory of Jena had succeeded a mortal inquietude, when,

(1) Oginski, ii. 380. Bign. vi. 80, 81. Lucches, ii. 236.

(2) Bign. vi. 90, 91. Hard. ix. 349, 350.

Napoléon's strong declaration in the strongest professions of his resolution to support the Turks against the invasion of the Russians. To the

Prussian plenipotentiaries at Charlottenberg he declared, "that the greatest of all the evils which France has occasioned to France by the late war, is the shock they have given to the independence of the Ottoman Porte; as the imperious commands of the Emperor of Russia have brought back to the government of Wallachia and Moldavia the hospodars justly banished from their administration; which, in effect, reduces their principalities to the rank of Russian provinces. But the full and complete independence of the Ottoman Empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor, as it is indispensable for the security of France and

Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence. In conformity with these principles, the Emperor is determined that, until the Sultan shall have recovered the full and entire command both of Moldavia and Wallachia, and is completely secured in his own independence, the French troops will not evacuate any part of the countries they have conquered, or which may hereafter fall into their power;" [Lucches, ii. 186, 187.] The same resolution was publicly announced in the bulletins, when intelligence of the ill-judged invasion of the principalities arrived; and yet, within six months afterwards, Napoléon, though Turkey had faithfully and gallantly stood to the French alliance, under circumstances of extreme peril, as will shortly appear, signed a treaty at Tilsit, by which not only were Wallachia and Moldavia ceded to Russia, but provision was made for the partition of the whole Turkish dominions in Europe!

immediately after such glorious successes, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged on in the depth of winter to begin a new campaign, amidst pathless snows and gloomy forests. In order to dispel these sinister presentiments, Napoléon took advantage of the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz to address an animating proclamation to his army:—"Soldiers! This day year, at this very hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalions fled in terror before you, or, surrounded on all sides, laid down their arms to their conquerors. On the day following they read the words of peace; but they were deceitful. Hardly had they escaped, by the effects of a generosity, perhaps blamable, from the disasters of the third coalition, than they set on foot a fourth; but the new ally, on whose skilful tactics they placed all their hopes, is already destroyed. His strongholds, his capital, his magazines, two hundred and eighty standards, seven hundred field-pieces, five first-rate fortresses are in our power. The Oder, the Warta, the deserts of Poland, have been alike unable to restrain your steps. Even the storms of winter have not arrested you an instant—you have braved all—surmounted all. Every thing has flown at your approach. In vain have the Russians endeavoured to defend the capital of the ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula—the brave and unfortunate Poles, when they behold you, imagine that they see the soldiers of Sobieski returning from his mémorable expedition. Soldiers! we shall not again lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce liberty and its colonies. We have conquered, on the Elbe and the Oder, Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish Colonies. Who has given the Russians right to hope that they can balance the weight of destiny? Who has authorized them to overturn such great designs? Are not they and we the soldiers of Austerlitz (1)?" Even in the forests of Poland, and amidst ice and snow, the thoughts of Napoléon were incessantly fixed on England and the East; and it was to overthrow her maritime power on the banks of the Ganges, that a campaign was undertaken in the depth of winter on the shores of the Vistula.

Its great effect.
Formation of the Temple of Glory at Paris.

This proclamation, dictated by a profound knowledge of the French character, produced an extraordinary effect upon the soldiers. It was distributed with profusion over all Germany, and none but an eyewitness could credit the influence which it had in restoring the spirit of the men. The veterans in the front line forgot their fatigues and privations, and thought only of soon terminating the war by a second Austerlitz on the banks of the Vistula; those who were approaching by forced marches in the rear, redoubled their exertions to join their comrades in the more forward stations, and counted the days till they gained sight of the eagles which appeared to be advancing to immortal renown. The

better to improve upon these dispositions, and at the same time establish a durable record of the glorious achievements of his troops, Napoléon, by a decree published on the same day, gave orders for the erection of a splendid edifice on the site of the convent of the Madeleine, at the end of the Boulevards des Italiens at Paris, with the inscription—"The Emperor Napoléon to the soldiers of the Grand Army." In the interior were to be inscribed, on tablets of marble, the names of all those who had been present in the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; on tablets of massy gold, the

(1) Bign. vi. 75, 76. Bour. vii. 251, 252.

names of all those who had fallen in those memorable conflicts. There also were to be deposited the arms, statues, standards, colours, and monuments of every description taken during the two campaigns by the grand army. Every year a great solemnity was to commemorate the glory of these memorable days; but, in the discourses or odes made on the occasion, no mention was ever to be made of the Emperor: like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, his exploits, it was well known, would only be the more present to the mind from being withdrawn from the sight. This project took a strong hold of the imagination of Napoléon; he gave immediate orders for the formation of plans for the edifice, and the purchase of all the buildings in the vicinity, in order to form a vast circular place of uniform buildings around it; and, as a previous decree had directed the construction of the Bourse or public exchange on that situation, he shortly after directed the Minister of the Interior to look out for another isolated situation for that structure, "worthy of the grandeur of the capital, and the greatness of the business which will one day be transacted within its walls." Such was the origin of those beautiful edifices, the Church of the Madeleine and the Exchange at Paris; and which, carried on through other reigns and completed under another dynasty, with that grandeur of conception and perseverance in execution by which all their public edifices are distinguished, will for centuries attract the world to Paris, as the centre of modern architectural beauty. To the world at that time Napoléon revealed no other design in the structure of the Madeleine than that of a monument to the grand army; but, penetrated with the magnitude of the mission with which he was persuaded he was intrusted of closing the wounds of the Revolution, he in his secret heart destined for it another and a greater object. He intended to have made it an expiatory monument to Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution; a design which he did not purpose to declare for ten years, when the fever of revolutionary ideas was in a great measure exhausted; and therefore it was, that he directed its front to face the centre of the Place Louis XV, where those august martyrs had perished, and constructed it on the site of the Madeleine, where their uncoffined remains still lay in an undistinguished grave (1).

The commencement of a winter campaign which would obviously be attended with no ordinary bloodshed, required unusual precautions for the protection of the long line of communication of the grand army, and the efforts of Napoléon were incessant to effect this object. The march of troops through Germany was urged forward with

(1) Bourr. vii. 284, 285. Rign. vi. 77, 78. Las Cas. i. 370, 371.

"No one but myself," said he, "could restore the memory of Louis XVI, and wash from the nation the crimes with which a few galley slaves and an unhappy fatality had stained it. The Bourbons being at his family, and resting on external succour, in striving to do so, would have been considered as only avenging their own cause, and increasing the public animosity. I, on the contrary, sprung from the people, would have purified their glory, by expelling from their ranks those who had disgraced them; and such was my intention; but it was necessary to proceed with caution; the three expiatory altars at St.-Denis were only the commencement; the Temple of Glory, on the foundation of the Madeleine, was destined to be consecrated to this purpose with a far greater éclat. It was there, that near their tomb, above their very bones, the monu-

ments of men, and the ceremonies of religion would have raised a memorial to the memory of the political victims of the Revolution. This was a secret which was not communicated to above ten persons; but it was necessary to allow it to transpire in some degree to those who were intrusted with the preparation of the design for the edifice. I would not have revealed the design for ten years, and even then I would have employed every imaginable precaution, and taken care to avoid every possibility of offence. All would have applauded it; and no one could have suffered from its effects. Every thing in such cases depends on the mode and time of execution. Carnot would never have ventured under my government to write an apology for the death of the King, but he did so under the Bourbons. The difference lay here, that I would have marched with public opinion to punish it, whilst public opinion marched with him, so as to render him unassailable."—Las Cas. i. 370-371.

all possible rapidity; some attempts at insurrection in Hesse were crushed with great severity; the conscripts, as they arrived from the Rhine or Italy at the different stations in the Prussian states, organized and sent into the field almost before they had acquired the rudiments of the military art; and the subsidiary contingent of Saxony, Hesse Cassel, and the states of the Rhenish confederacy, raised to double their fixed amount. By these means not only were the rear and communications of the grand army preserved from danger, but successive additions to its active force constantly obtained; while at the same time Austria was overawed, whose formidable armaments on the Bohemian frontier already excited the attention of the Emperor (1), and had given rise to pointed and acrimonious remonstrances from his military envoy, General Andreossy, to the cabinet of Vienna (2).

Enormous contributions levied on all the conquered states.

How to maintain these vast and hourly increasing armaments was a more difficult question; but here, too, the indefatigable activity of the Emperor, and his grinding system of making war support war, contrived to find resources. Requisitions of enormous magnitude were made from all the cities in his rear, especially those which had been enriched by the commerce of England: Napoléon seemed resolved that their ill-gotten wealth should, in the first instance, be devoted to the necessities of his troops. The decrees against English commerce were every where made a pretext for subjecting the mercantile cities to contributions of astounding amount. Fifty millions of francs (L.2,000,000) was in the first instance demanded from Hamburg as a ransom for its English merchandize, seized in virtue of the decree of 21st November; and it only escaped by the immediate payment of sixteen millions. In addition to this, that unhappy city, which had taken no part in hostilities against France, was ordered to furnish at once fifty thousand great-coats for the use of the troops, while Lubeck, which had been successively pillaged by the troops of Blucher and Bernadotte, was compelled to yield up four hundred thousand lasts of corn (3), and wood to the value of sixty thousand pounds; Leipsic redeemed its English merchandise, seized for ten millions of francs (L.400,000), while all the other Hanse towns were subjected to equally severe requisitions; and the great impost of one hundred and sixty-nine millions of francs (L.6,100,000), imposed after the battle of Jena, was every where collected from the Prussian territories with a rigour which greatly added to its nominal amount. Under pretext of executing the decree against English commerce, pillage was exercised in so undisguised a manner by the French inferior agents, that it attracted in many places the severe animadversion of the chiefs of the army. Thus, while the decrees of the Emperor professed to be grounded on the great principle of compelling the English government, by the pressure of mercantile embarrassment, to accede to the liberty of the seas, in their execution they had already departed from their ostensible object; and, while the merchandize seized was allowed to remain in the emporium of British commerce, its confiscation was made a pretext for subject-

(1) Jom. ii. 332, 333. Bign. vi. 94, 95.

(2) In an audience of the Emperor of Austria, which a general obtained, he said, with more of military frankness than diplomatic ambiguity.—“The Emperor Napoleon fears neither his avowed nor his secret enemies. Judging of intentions by public acts, he is too clear-sighted not to dive into hidden dispositions; and in this view, he would infinitely regret if he were compelled to arrive at the conclusion, that the considerable armaments which your Majesty has had on foot since the commencement of hostilities, were intended to be directed, in

certain events, against himself. Your Majesty appears to have assembled on the flank of the French army all your disposable forces, with magazines beyond all proportion to their amount. The Emperor asks what is the intention of this army while he is engaged with Russia on the banks of the Vistula. Ostensibly intended for the preservation of neutrality, how can such an object be its real destination, when there is not the slightest chance of its being threatened?”—BIGNON, vi. 88.

(3) Each last weighs 2000 kilogrammes, or about half a ton.—BOVA, vii. 249.

ing their neutral inhabitants to inordinate requisitions for the support of the grand army (1).

Positions and force of the French on the Vistula. By these different means Napoléon was enabled, before the middle of December, not only to bring a very great force to bear upon the

Vistula, but to have the magazines and equipments necessary for qualifying it to undergo and keep the field during the rigours of a Polish winter in a complete state of preparation. Davoust and Murat had entered Warsaw at the end of November, which was abandoned by the Prussians at their approach, and two days afterwards they crossed the Vistula, and occu-

Nov. 30. Dec. 2. pied the important *tête-de-pont* of Prague on its right bank, which was in like manner evacuated without a struggle; on the right

Lannes supported them and spread himself as far as the Bug; while on the left, Ney had already made himself master of Thorn, and marched out of that fortress, supported by the cavalry of Bessières and followed by the corps of Bernadotte; in the centre, Soult and Angereau were preparing with the utmost activity to surmount the difficulties of the passage of the Vistula between Modlin and Wysogrod; thus, eight corps were assembled ready for active service on the Vistula, which, even after taking into view all the losses of the campaign, and the numerous detachments requisite to keep up the communications in the rear, could in all bring a hundred thousand men into the field, while the powerful reinforcements on their march through Prussia and Poland, promised to enable the Emperor to keep up the active force in front at that great numerical amount (2).

And of the Russians. Their dispositions, and evacuation of Warsaw. The Emperor Alexander was far from having an equal force at his disposal. The first army, under Benningsen, consisting of sixty-eight battalions, and one hundred and twenty-five squadrons, could muster forty-five thousand men, divided into four divisions, under Osterman Tolstoy, Sacken, Prince Gallitzin, and Sidmaratzki. It arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November; the second, consisting also of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred squadrons, arranged in the divisions of Tutschakoff, Doctoroff, Essen, and Aurepp, was about thirty thousand strong, its regiments having not yet recovered the chasms made by the rout of Austerlitz. The wreck of the Prussian forces, re-organized and directed under the able management of General Lestocq, was not more than fifteen thousand men, when the numerous garrisons of Dantzic and Graudentz were completed from its shattered ranks: thus the total Allied force was not above ninety thousand strong, and for the actual shock of war in the field not more than seventy-five thousand men could be relied on. This imposing array was under the command of Field-Marshal Kamenskoi, a veteran of the school of Suwarrow, nearly eighty years of age, and little qualified to measure swords with the Conqueror of Western Europe; but the known abilities of Benningesen and Buxhowden, the two next in command, would, it was hoped, compensate for his want of experience in the novel art of warfare which Napoléon had introduced. Headquarters had been established at Pultusk since

Nov. 12. the 12th November: Warsaw, all the bridges of the Vistula were in the hands of the Allies, and the firmness of their countenance gave rise to a

(1) Bour. vii. 247, 248. Bign. vi. 98, 99. Hard. ii. 371, 372.

As an example at once of the enormous magnitude of these contributions, and the provident care of the Emperor for the health and comfort of his troops, reference may be made to his letter to the French governor of Stettin, from whom contributions to the amount of twenty millions (L.600,000) was demanded, though the city only contained

32,000 inhabitants. "You must seize goods to the amount of twenty millions, but do it by rule, and give receipts. Take payment as much as possible in kind; the great stores of wine which its cellars contain, would be of inestimable importance: it is wine which in winter can alone give the victory."

—BIGNON, vi. 99.

(2) Dum. xvii. 106, 116. Jom. ii. 337, 338.

belief that they were disposed to dispute the passage of that river with the invaders. Until the arrival of the second army, under Buxhowden, however, which was advancing by forced marches from the Niemen, they were in no condition to keep their ground against the French; and it was deemed better to give them the moral advantage arising from the occupation of the Polish capital, than hazard a general engagement with so decided an inferiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishes, therefore, the Russians fell back at all points, their advanced posts were all withdrawn across the Vistula, and Warsaw, evacuated on the 28th, was occupied by Davoust on the 30th November (1).

Application for assistance in men and money to England. Its impolitic refusal.

Sensible of the inferiority of its forces to those which Napoleon had assembled on the Vistula from all the states of Western Europe, the Russian cabinet made an application to the British government for a portion of those subsidies which she had so liberally granted on all former occasions to the powers who combated the common enemy of European independence; and considering that the whole weight of the contest had now fallen on Russia, and the danger had now approached her own frontiers, they demanded, not without reason, a loan of six millions sterling, of which one was to be paid down immediately for the indispensable expenses connected with the opening of the campaign. It was easy to see, from the answer to this demand now, however, that the spirit of Pitt no longer directed the British councils—the request was refused by the Ministry on the part of government, but it was proposed that a loan should be contracted for in England for the service of Russia, and that, for the security of the lenders, the duties on English merchandise, at present levied in the Russian harbours, should be repealed, and in lieu thereof, the same duties should be levied at once in the British harbours, and applied to the payment of the interest of the loan to the British capitalists. This strange proposition, which amounted to a declaration of want of confidence, both in the integrity of the Russian government and the solvency of the Russian finances, was of course rejected, and the result was, that no assistance, either in men or money, was afforded by England to her gallant ally in this vital struggle; an instance of parsimony beyond all example calamitous and discreditable, when it is considered that Russia was at that moment bearing the whole weight of France on the Vistula, and that England had at her disposal twenty millions in subsidies, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers in Europe (2).

The Russians resume the offensive.

No sooner had the heads of Buxhowden's column begun to arrive in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, than Kamenskoi, whose great age had by no means extinguished the vigour by which he was formerly distinguished, made a forward movement: head-quarters were ad-

(1) Dum. xvii. 99, 110. Jom. ii. 338, 339. Bign. vi. 109, 110.

Proclama. Previous to the opening of the winter campaign, Alexander addressed the order to the following proclamation to his soldiers:—"Prussia formerly was the barrier between France and Russia, when Napoleon's tyranny extended over all Germany. But now the flame of war has burst out also in the Prussian states, and after great misfortunes, that monarchy has been struck down, and the conflagration now menaces the frontiers of our territory. It would be useless to prove to the Russians, who love the glory of their country, and are ready to undergo every sacrifice to maintain it, how such events have contributed to render our present efforts inevitable. If honour alone compelled us to draw our sword for

the protection of our Allies, how much more are we now called upon to combat for our own safety? We have in consequence taken all the measures which the national security requires—our army has received orders to advance beyond the frontier—Field-Marshal Kamenskoi has been appointed to the command, with instructions to march vigorously against the enemy—all our faithful subjects will unite their prayers to ours to the Most High, who disposes of the fate of empires and battles, that he will protect our just cause, and that his victorious arm and blessing may direct the Russian army employed in the defence of European freedom."—DUMAS, xvii. 94.

(2) Hard. ix. 399, 400. Bign. vi. 107, 108. Letter to the Marquis of Douglas, Jan. 13, 1807.

vanced to Nasielsk, and the four divisions of Benningsen's army cantoned between the Ukra, the Bug, and the Narew; while Buxhowden's divisions, as they successively arrived, were stationed between Golymin and Makow; and Leszcz, on the extreme right of the Allies, encamped on the banks of the Drewentz, on the great road leading to Thorn, was advanced almost up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this general advance was to circumscribe the French quarters on the right bank of the Vistula; and as it was known that Napoléon with his Guard was still at Posen, hopes were entertained that his troops would be entirely drawn from the right bank before his arrival, and the river interposed between the winter quarters of the two armies (1).

Dec. 16. No sooner did Napoléon hear of this forward movement of the Russians, than he broke up from his quarters at Posen, and arrived at Warsaw two days afterwards. No words can do justice to the warlike and patriotic enthusiasm which burst forth in that capital when they beheld the hero whom they hailed as their deliverer, actually within their walls, and saw the ancient arms of Poland affixed to the door of the hotel where the provisional government of Prussian Poland was established. The nobility flocked into the capital from all quarters; the peasantry every where assembled in the cities, demanding arms; the national dress was generally resumed; national airs universally heard; several regiments of horse were speedily raised, and before the conclusion of the campaign, thirty thousand men were enrolled in disciplined regiments from the Prussian provinces alone of the ancient monarchy. Still the general enthusiasm did not make Napoléon forget his policy; the provisional government was established by a decree of the Emperor, only "until the fate of Prussian Poland was determined by a general peace;" and the prudent began to entertain melancholy presages in regard to the future destiny of a monarchy thus agitated by the passion of independence and the generous sentiments of patriotic ardour, with only a quarter of its former inhabitants to maintain the struggle against its numerous and formidable enemies (2).

And resumed the offensive against the Russians. Having taken the precaution to establish strong *têtes-de-pont* at Prague, Modlin, Thorn, and all the bridges which he held over the Vistula, Napoléon lost not an instant in resuming the offensive, in order to repel this dangerous incursion of the enemy. Davoust, who formed the advanced guard of the army, was pushed forward from Prague on the roads towards Pultusk, and soon arrived on the Bug; and after having reconnoitred the whole left bank of that river, from its confluence with the Narew to its junction with the Vistula, made preparations for effecting the passage Dec. 17, 1806. at Okernin, a little below the junction with the Ukra. The Cossacks and Russian outposts lined the opposite bank, and the difficulties of the passage were considerable; but the Russians were not in sufficient force to dispute it in a serious manner; and after some sharp skirmishing, the experienced talents of General Gauthier, who was intrusted with the enterprise, established the French on the right bank, where they soon after sustained a severe action with the Russian advanced guard at Czarnowo. The Russians, however, returned in greater force; and the result was, that all the French advanced guards which had been passed over were cut off, and their detachment fell back to the *tête-de-pont* established at the river. Mean-

(1) *Dem.* xvii. 121, 126. *Jom.* ii. 339. *Bign.* vi. 110.

(2) *Bign.* vi. 92. *Camp. de Saxe*, iii. 178, 179.

Dec. 21. while Soult advanced on the left to Ploussk, and Ney and Bernadotte, with a portion of Murat's cavalry, moved forward to Soldan and Biezun from Thorn, in such a manner as to threaten to interpose between the detached corps under Lestocq, and Benningsen's main body, which was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Pultusk (1).

Dec. 22. Forcing of the passage of the Ukra by the French. This partisan warfare continued for ten days without any decisive result on either side; but the arrival of Napoléon at Warsaw was the signal for the commencement of more important operations. On the 23d December, at daybreak, he set out from that capital for the army, with the guards and Lannes' corps, and no sooner arrived at the advanced posts of Davoust, than he dictated on the spot directions for the forcing the passage of the Ukra, which had hitherto bounded all their incursions (2). The operation was carried into effect with the happiest success at Czarnowa, and that ardour with which the presence of the Emperor never failed to animate the troops. After a severe action of fourteen hours, the passage was forced, and Count Osterman, who commanded the Russian rearguard, retreated upon Nasielsk. In this well-contested affair each party had to lament the loss of about a thousand men. Kamenskoi, finding the barrier which covered the front of his position forced, gave orders for concentrating his forces towards Pultusk; and the Allies accordingly fell back at all points. They were vigorously pursued by the French, and another desperate conflict took place in front of Nasielsk, between General Rapp and the Russians under Count Osterman Tolstoy, in which the latter were worsted, but not without a severe loss to the enemy; and the opposite bodies had become so intermingled, that Colonel Ouwaroff, an aide-de-camp of Alexander, was made prisoner by the French, while Count Philippe de Ségur, destined for future celebrity as the historian of the still more memorable campaign of 1812, and attached to Napoléon's household, fell into the hands of the Russians. On the same day Augereau fought from daybreak till sunset at Lochoczyn with the divisions opposed to him, which, at length, began to retire. Thus the Russians, pierced in the centre by the passage of the Ukra at Czarnowa and the combat at Nasielsk, were every where in full retreat. No decisive advantage had been gained; but the initiative had been taken from the enemy, and his divisions, separated from each other, were thrown into eccentric lines of retreat, which promised every moment to separate them more widely from each other (3).

Kamenskoi loses his presence of mind, and orders the sacrifice of the artillery. Kamenskoi, though a gallant veteran, was altogether unequal to the perilous crisis which had now arrived. The army, separated into two parts, of which one was moving upon Golymin, the other falling back towards Pultusk, was traversing a continual forest, through roads almost impassable from the mud occasioned by a long-continued thaw, and the passage of innumerable carriages, which had broken it up in all parts. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, he issued orders to sacrifice the artillery, which impeded the retreat—gave directions to stop the sup-

(1) *Jom. i. 339. Dum. xvii. 126, 122. Wilson, 73, 74.*

(2) Napoléon, says Rapp, no sooner arrived in sight of Okernin, than he reconnoitred the position of the Russians, and the plain which it was necessary to pass before arriving at the river. Covered with woods, intersected by marshes, it was almost as difficult to traverse as the field works, which were bristling with Cosacks, were to carry on the opposite bank. The Emperor surveyed them long and with close attention; but as the thickets of

wood in some places intercepted his view, he caused a ladder to be brought and ascended to the roof of a cottage where he completed his observations. He then said, "It will do—send an officer," and when he arrived, dictated on the spot the minute directions for the movement of all the corps during the operation, which are preserved in *Dumas, xvii. 137. —Vide Rapp, 125.*

(3) *Wilson, 75, 76. Jom. ii. 340. Dum. xvii. 140, 153.* Digitized by Google

plies, destined for the army at Grodno, and himself took the road of Lomza. Deeming such an order wholly unnecessary, and the result of that approaching insanity which soon after entirely overset the mind of the veteran marshal, Benningsen took upon himself the bold step of disobeying it; and in order to gain time for the artillery and equipages to defile in his rear, resolved to hold fast in the position of Pultusk, with all the troops which he had at his disposal. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Russians, to whom the fatigues and privations of a retreat, at a season when sixteen hours out of the twenty-four were involved in total darkness, and the roads, bad at all times, were in many places several feet deep of mud, had been the severest trial of discipline and courage. No sooner, however, was it known that they were marching towards a chosen field of battle, than their hardships and difficulties were all forgotten, and the troops which, from midday on the 23th, successively arrived at Pultusk, took up their ground in parade order, full of enthusiasm for the battle on the morrow. Before it was dark, sixty battalions and fifty-five squadrons, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, in all about forty thousand men, were here assembled, while the divisions of Doctoroff, Sacken, and Gallitzin were opposed at Golymin to Augereau's corps, two divisions of Davoust's, and part of Murat's cavalry. Three Russian divisions, viz. those of Essen, Aurepp, and Tutschakoff, were at such a distance in the rear both of Pultusk and Golymin, that they could not be expected to take any part in the actions which were approaching (1).

Object of
Napoleon
in these
movements.

The object of Napoléon, in these complicated operations, was in the highest degree important; and the vigour of Benningsen and Prince Gallitzin, joined to the extreme shortness of the days and the horrible state of the roads, alone saved the Allies from a repetition of the disasters of Auerstadt and Jena. His right wing, under Lannes, was intended to cut Benningsen's army off from the great road through Pultusk: his centre, under Davoust, Augereau, Soult, and Murat, was destined to penetrate by Golymin and Makow to Ostrolenka, directly in the rear of that town, and two marches between Benningsen and the Russian frontier; while the left wing, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessières, interposed between Lestocq and the Russian centre, and threw him back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven up to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blucher, to surrender. A more masterly project never was conceived: it was precisely a repetition of the semicircular route of his left wing under Bernadotte, round Mack at Ulm; and the hesitation of Kamenskoi between an advance and a retrograde movement served to offer every facility for the success of the enterprise. The celerity of the Russian retreat, the sacrifice of seventy pieces of their heavy artillery, and the dreadful state of the roads, which impeded the French advance, and the impervious intervening country, which separated their numerous corps from each other, alone defeated this profound combination, and brought their corps to Pultusk and Golymin a few hours before the enemy, who were there destined to fall upon their retreating columns, or bar the road to the frontiers of Russia (2).

Description
of the field
at Pultusk,
and of the
positions of
the two hostile
bodies.

The position of Pultusk is the only one in that country where the ground is so far cleared of wood as to permit of any considerable armies combating each other in a proper field of battle—an open and cultivated plain on this side of the river Narew, there stretches out to the south and east of that town, which lies on the banks of its mean-

(1) Wilson, 77, 80. Jom. ii. 341. Dum. xvii. 159, 162.

(2) Jom. ii. 340, 341. Dum. xvii. 162, 164.

dering stream—a succession of thickets surround this open space in all directions, excepting that on which the town lies; and on the inside of them the ground rises to a semi-circular ridge, from whence it gradually slopes down towards the town on one side, and the forest on the other; so that it is impossible, till this barrier is surmounted, to get a glimpse even of the buildings. There the Russians were drawn up in admirable order, in two lines; their left resting on the town of Pultusk, their right on the wood of Moszyn, which skirted the little plain, the artillery in advance; but a cloud of Cossacks swarmed in front of the array, and prevented either the force or composition of the enemy from being seen by the French as they advanced to the attack. Sacken had the command of the left; Count Osterman Tolstoy of the right; Barclay de Tolly, with twelve battalions and ten squadrons, occupied a copse-wood in front of the right; Benningsen was stationed in the centre—names destined to immortal celebrity in future wars, and which, even at this distant period, the historian can hardly enumerate without a feeling of exultation and the thrilling interest of former days (1).

Battle of Pultusk. Lannes, with his own corps, and the division Gudin from that of Davoust—in all about thirty-five thousand men—resolved to force the enemy in this position; and for this purpose he, early on the morning of Dec. 26. the 26th, advanced to the attack. The woods which skirted the little plain occupied by the Russian light troops in front of their position, were forced by the French *voltigeurs* after an obstinate resistance, and a battery which galled their advance, and which could not be withdrawn, carried by assault; but no sooner had Lannes, encouraged by this success, surmounted the crest of the ridge, and advanced into the open plain, than the cloud of Cossacks dispersed to the right and left, and exposed to view the Russian army in two lines, in admirable order, with a hundred and twenty guns disposed along its front. Astonished, but not panic-struck by so formidable an opposition, Lannes still continued to press forward, and as his divisions successively cleared the thickets and advanced to the crest of the hill, they deployed into line. This operation, performed under the fire of all the Russian cannon, to which the French had as yet none of equal number to oppose, was executed with admirable discipline, but attended with a very heavy loss, and the ground was already strewn with dead bodies when the line was so far formed as to enable a general charge to take place. It was attended, however, with very little success: the soil, cut up by the passage of so many horses and carriages, was in many places knee-deep of mud; heavy snow showers at intervals obscured the heavens and deprived the French gunners of the sight of the enemy, while the Russian batteries, in position and served with admirable skill, alike in light and darkness sent their fatal storm of grape and round-shot through the ranks of the assailants. Notwithstanding these obstacles, however, the French advanced with their wonted intrepidity to the attack, and gradually the arrival of their successive batteries rendered the fire of cannon on the opposite sides more equal. Suchet, who commanded the first line, insensibly gained ground, especially on the right, where the division of Barclay was stationed; but Benningsen, seeing the danger, reinforced that gallant officer with fresh troops; a battalion of the French infantry was broken and cut to pieces by the Russian horse, and the rout in that quarter became so serious, that Lannes was compelled to advance in person with his reserve to repair the disorder. By these efforts the forward movement of the Russians in that direction was arrested, and their victorious columns, charged

(1) Wilson, 77, 78. Jom. ii. 341. Dum. xvii. 162, 165.

in flank while disordered by the rapidity of their advance, were forced to give ground, and resume their former position in front of Pultusk (1).

Which turns out to the disadvantage of the French. Meanwhile Suchet, on the left of the French, had commenced a furious attack on the advanced post in the wood on the right of the Russians, occupied by Barclay de Tolly. After a violent struggle the Russians were driven back; reinforced from the town, they again regained their ground, and drove the French out of the wood in disorder. Lannes, at the head of the 34th regiment, flew to the menaced point, and again in some degree restored the combat; but Barclay had regained his lost position, and menaced the French extreme left. Osterman Tolstoy brought up the Russian reserve, and after a murderous conflict, which lasted long after it was dark, a frightful storm separated the combatants. Neither party could boast of decisive success; but the Russians remained masters of the field of battle till midnight, when they crossed the Narew by the bridge of Pultusk, and resumed their retreat in the most orderly manner, while the French also retreated to such a distance, that next day the Cossacks, who patrolled eight miles from the field of battle towards Warsaw, could discover no traces of the enemy. The losses were severe on both sides—on that of the French they amounted to six thousand men; on that of the Russians nearly five thousand; and the twelve guns which they lost in the morning were never regained (2).

Combat of Golymin. On the same day on which this bloody battle took place at Pultusk, a serious conflict also occurred at Golymin, about thirty miles from the former field of battle. Davoust and Angereau, supported by a large party of Murat's cavalry, there attacked Prince Gallitzin, who, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, had taken post at the entrance of the town, to gain time for his artillery and carriages to defile through the forest in his rear. His force was successively augmented, however, in the course of the day, by the arrival of other troops from Sacken and Doctoroff's corps, and before nightfall twenty-eight battalions and forty squadrons were assembled in line.

Dec. 24. Operations in that quarter began at daylight on the 24th, which in that inclement season was at eight in the morning; the bridge of Kollosump, over the Ukra, was carried by a brilliant charge by Colonel Savary; but that of Choczym resisted all their efforts, and it was only when it became no longer tenable, from the number who had crossed at Kollosump, that orders for the evacuation of the post were given. Continuing his march all the succeed-

Dec. 25. ing day, Angereau found himself, on the morning of the 26th, in presence of Prince Gallitzin, who was advantageously posted on the right of Golymin. As the French battalions and squadrons successively arrived on the ground, and deployed to the right or left, they were severely galled by the Russian artillery stationed in front of their positions; but they bravely formed line, and advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the attack, though few of their guns could as yet be brought up to reply to the enemy. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the assault was impetuous, and, despite all their efforts, the French, after several hours' hard fighting, had not gained any ground from the enemy. But while this severe conflict was going on in front, a division of Murat's cavalry, advancing on the road from Czarnowo, was discerned driving before it a body of Cossacks who had been stationed in that village; while a powerful mass of Davoust's infantry, which had broken up that morning from Stretzegoczyn, joined the horse in front of Czarnowo, and their united mass, above fifteen thousand strong, bore down upon the

(1) *Dum.* xvii. 164, 165. *Jom.* ii. 342. *Wilson*,
76, 80. *Rapp.* 127.

(2) *Wilson*, 79, 80. *Jom.* ii. 341, 342. *Dum.*
xvii. 166, 174.

troops of Gallitzin, already wearied by a severe combat of several hours' duration (1).

Its doubtful
issue.

This great addition to the attacking force must have proved altogether fatal to the Russian troops, had they not shortly after received considerable reinforcements from the corps of Doctoroff and Tutschakoff, which, in some degree, restored the equality of the combat. Davoust, with the divisions Morand and Friant, so well known from their heroic conduct on the plateau of Auerstadt, charged vehemently through the woods which skirted the open space in front of Golymin; throwing off their haversacks, the Russian infantry met them with the bayonet; but, after repulsing the French advance, they were themselves arrested by the murderous fire of the tirailleurs in the wood. Nearly encircled, however, by hourly increasing enemies, Prince Gallitzin withdrew his troops, towards evening, into the village; but there maintained himself with heroic constancy till nightfall, vigorously repulsing the repeated attacks of the conquerors of Jena and Auerstadt. Davoust, after occupying all the woods round the town, detached a brigade of horse to cut off the communication by the great road with Pultusk; and they succeeded in clearing the causey of the Cossacks and light horse who were posted on it. But the French dragoons, following up their success, were assailed by so murderous a fire from the Russian voltigeurs, stationed in the marshes on either side of the road, that half their number was slain; General Rapp, while bravely heading the column, had his left arm broken, and the discomfited remnant sought refuge behind the ranks of their infantry. When night closed on this scene of blood, neither party had gained any decisive advantage; for if the French had taken twenty-six pieces of cannon and a large train of carriages which had stuck fast in the mud, the Russians still held the town of Golymin, and had inflicted upon them a loss of above four thousand men (2), while they had not to lament the destruction of more than half the number, in consequence chiefly of their great superiority in artillery to their assailants. As the order for retreat still held good, Prince Gallitzin, at midnight, resumed his march for Ostrolenka (3).

Napoleon
stops his ad-
vance, and
puts his
army into
winter
quarters.

Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance thus experienced by his lieutenants on both the roads on which his corps were advancing, and the unsatisfactory issue of the combats in which they had been engaged, Napoleon was still not without hopes of effecting the grand object of his designs, the isolating and surrounding the enemy's centre or left wing. On the extreme left of the French, Bernadette and Ney had succeeded, after several severe actions, particularly one at Soldan, which was taken and retaken several times, and where the Prussians behaved with the most heroic resolution, in interposing between Lestocq and the Russian forces on the Ukra, and throwing the Prussian general back towards Königsberg; and if Soult could have effected the movement on Makow which was prescribed to him, he would have been directly in the rear of the troops who had combated at Pultusk and Golymin, who must have been reduced to the necessity of laying down their arms, or cutting their way through against great odds. But the frightful state of the roads, which in many places were three feet deep of mud, and the rudeness of the season, which alternately deluged the marching columns with drenching rain, driving sleet, and melt-

(1) Dum. xvii. 176, 182. Jam. ii. 342. Rapp, 127.

(2) The 47th Bulletin admits a loss of 800 killed and 2000 wounded on the part of the French at Golymin and Pultusk; and as their usual practice was to allow only a loss of a third to a fourth of its

real amount, this would seem to imply that they lost on these occasions at least 10,000 or 12,000 men.—See 40th Bulletin in *Camp. en Prusse*, iii. 222.

(3) Rapp, 127, 128. Dum. xvii. 183, 185.

ing snow, rendered it totally impossible for that enterprising officer to effect the forced marches necessary to outstrip and get into the rear of the enemy; and the Russians, retiring to Ostrolenka and Hohenstein, still found the line of their retreat open. On the 28th, Napoléon advanced his headquarters to Golymin; but having received there certain intelligence that the Russians must arrive at Makow before Soult could possibly get there, he saw the object of the campaign was frustrated, and resolved to put his troops into winter quarters; on that day, accordingly, he issued orders to stop the advance of the troops at all points; they were put into cantonments between the Narew and the Ukra, and the Emperor himself returned with the guards to Warsaw (1).

On the side of the Russians repose had become nearly as necessary: the weather was as unfavourable to them as to the French; their infantry, equally with the enemy's, had shivered up to the knees in mud at Pultusk; their cavalry, equally with his, sunk in the marshes of Golymin; the breaking up of the roads was more fatal to them than their opponents, as the guns or chariots, which were left, necessarily fell into hostile hands, and experience had already begun to evince (2), what more extended observation has since abundantly confirmed, that exposure to an inclement season was more fatal to the troops of the north than the south of Europe. In these circumstances it was with the most lively satisfaction that they perceived that Napoléon was disposed to discontinue the contest during the remainder of the rigorous season; and their troops, retiring from the theatre of this bloody strife, were put into cantonments on the left bank of the Narew, after having evacuated the town and burned the bridge of Ostrolenka (3).

This desperate struggle in the forests of Poland in the depth of winter, made the most lively impression in Europe. Independent of the interest excited by the extraordinary spectacle of two vast armies, numbering between them a hundred and fifty thousand combatants, prolonging their hostility in the most inclement season, and engaging in desperate conflicts amidst storms of snow, and when the soldiers on both sides were often sunk up to the middle in morasses, bivouacking for sixteen hours together without covering on the cold damp ground, or plunging fearlessly into streams swollen by the rains and charged with the ice of a Polish winter, there was something singularly calculated to awaken the passions in the result of this fearful contest. Both parties loudly claimed the victory; *Te Deum* was sung at St.-Petersburg; the cannon of the Invalides roared at Paris; and Benningsen, imitating in his official despatches the exaggerated accounts of the bulletins, asserted a complete victory at Pultusk, under circumstances where a more faithful chronicler would only have laid claim to the honour of a divided combat. The French indignantly repelled the aspersion on their arms, and pointed with decisive effect to the cantonments of their troops, for evidence that the general result of the struggle had been favourable to them. But though there was no denying this, when the Russian troops, instead of having their advanced posts between the Bug and the Vistula, had now retired behind the Narew at Ostrolenka, still enough was apparent on the face of the campaign to excite the most vivid hopes on the one side, and serious apprehensions on the other, throughout Europe. It was not to win merely eighty miles of forest, interspersed with the wretched

(1) Dom. xvii. 185, 191. Jom. ii. 342, 343.
Wilson, 82, 83.

(2) Larrey's surgical campaign.
(3) Dom. xvii. 191, 194. Jom. ii. 344.

hamlets or squalid towns of Poland, that the Emperor had left Warsaw at the dead of winter, and put so vast an army in motion over a line thirty leagues in length; there was no claiming of the victory on both sides at Austerlitz or Jena; the divided trophies of the late engagement indicated a struggle of a very different character from those which had preceded them; it was evident that the torrent of French conquest, if not averted, had been at least stemmed. The interest excited by these events accordingly was intense over all Europe, but especially in England and Germany, and hopes began to be entertained that the obstinate valour of the North would at length put a stop to the calamities which had so long desolated Europe. Happy would it have been if the cabinet either of Vienna or St.-James's had improved on these dispositions, and taken advantage of the pause in the career of universal conquest, to render effectual aid to the powers who now threw the last die for the independence of Europe on the shores of the Vistula (1).

Positions of the French army in winter quarters.

The French army, which was now put into winter quarters, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, and was accompanied by forty thousand horse: so wonderfully had the levies in France and the allied states compensated the prodigious consumption of human life during the bloody battles and wasteful marches which had occurred since they arrived on the banks of the Saale. The cantonments, from the extreme right to left, extended over a space of fifty leagues, forming beyond the Vistula the chord of the arc which that river describes in its course from Warsaw to Dantzic. The left wing, under Bernadotte, was, from its position, most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; but no apprehensions were entertained of its being disquieted, as that marshal had fifty-five thousand men under his command, and could speedily receive succour, in case of need, from Marshal Ney, whose rallying point was Osterode, and who lay next to his right. The centre and right wing, nearly a hundred thousand strong, were almost detached from the left wing, and lay more closely together on either side of Warsaw (2).

Napoleon's measures to provide food and secure his cantonments.

How to provide subsistence for so great a multitude amidst the forests and marshes of Poland, was no easy matter; for its fertile plains, though the granary of Western Europe, raise their admirable wheat crops only for exportation, and present, in proportion to their extent of level surface, fewer resources for an army than any country in Europe. But it was in such subordinate, though necessary cares, that the admirable organization and indefatigable activity of the Emperor shone most conspicuous. Innumerable orders, which for a long time back had periodically issued from headquarters, had brought all the resources of Germany to the supply of the army in Poland. Convoys from all quarters were incessantly converging towards the Vistula, and supplies of every sort, not only for the maintenance of the soldiers, but for the sick and the wounded, as well as the munitions of war, transported in many thousand carriages, were, from the Rhine and the Danube, to be had in abundance. So great was the activity in the rear of the army, that the roads through Prussia bore rather the appearance of a country enriched by the extended commerce of profound peace, than of a district lately ravaged by the scourge of war. Great hospitals were established at Thorn, Posen, and Warsaw; thirty thousand tents taken from the Prussians, cut down into bandages for the use of the wounded; immense magazines formed all along the Vistula, and formidable entrenchments erected to protect the *têtes-de-pont* of Prague, Thorn and Modlin

on the Vistula, and Sierock on the Narew. Though the blockade of Dantzic was not yet formally commenced, yet it was necessary to neutralize the advantages which the enemy derived from the possession of so important a fortress on the right of their line; and for this purpose a French division, united to the contingent of Baden and the Polish levies, was formed into the tenth corps, and placed under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. It soon amounted to twenty-seven thousand men, and began to observe the fortresses of Dantzic and Colberg (1); while Napoléon evinced his sense of the dubious nature of the struggle in which he was engaged, by sending for his experienced lieutenant Masséna, from the scene of his easy triumphs amidst the sunny hills of Calabria, to a sterner conflict on the frozen fields of Poland.

Successive reduction of the fortresses in Silesia. The repose of the army at Warsaw was no period of rest to the Emperor. Great care was taken to keep alive the spirits of the Poles, and conceal from them the dubious issue of the late conflict; and for this purpose it was announced that almost all the prisoners taken from the Russians had either been marched off for France, or already entered the ranks of the grand army, while the eighty pieces of cannon, which they had been forced to leave behind them in their retreat, were ostentatiously placed before the Palace of the Republic. Orders were at the same time sent to Jerome to press the siege of the fortresses in Silesia which still remained in the hands of the Prussians. The pusillanimous and unaccountable surrender of Stettin, Custring, and Glogau, have already been mentioned (2); and in the

Dec. 2. consequences which immediately flowed from those disgraceful derelictions of duty, was soon made manifest of what vast importance it is, that all officers, even in commands apparently not very considerable, should under all circumstances adhere to the simple line of duty, instead of entering into capitulations from the supposed pressure of political considerations. The transport of artillery and a siege equipage from the Rhine or the Elbe to the Oder, would have taken a very long period, and prolonged the reduction of the interior line of the Prussian fortresses; but the surrender of Custring to the summons of a regiment of infantry and two pieces of cannon, enabled Vandamme speedily to surround Glogau with a formidable battering train, which, before the first parallel was completed, induced its feeble governor to lower his colours. From the vast military stores captured in that town, a battering-train for the reduction of Breslaw was immediately obtained, and

Dec. 15. forwarded along the Oder with such rapidity, that on the 15th December, the trenches before that place, the capital of Silesia, *à cheval* on the Oder, and a fortress of the first order, were opened, and a heavy bombardment kept up upon the town. The defence, however, was much more creditable to the Prussian character, and proved of what inestimable importance it would have been to the monarchy had the French arms been in like manner delayed before the walls of the other fortresses. Twice during its continuance Prince Anhalt, who, with a few battalions and a levy of peasants, still maintained himself in Upper Silesia, approached the besiegers' lines and endeavoured to throw succours into the town; but on the first occasion his efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the French and Bavarians, who formed the covering force; and in the last attack he was totally defeated,

Dec. 31. with the loss of two thousand men. Soon after, a severe frost deprived him of the protection of the wet ditches; and the governor, despairing of being relieved, and seeing the besieger's succours rapidly and hourly

(1) *Jom. ii. 345. Duss. xvii. 205, 208. Ann. Reg. 1807, 3.*

(2) *Ante, V., 390.*

augmenting by the arrival of military stores from Glogau, surrendered, with the garrison of six thousand men; the private men being prisoners of war, the officers dismissed on their parole not to serve against France till exchanged. By this acquisition, 300 pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of all sorts fell into the hands of the conquerors (1).

Capture of
Brieg and
Schweid-
nitz, and
total con-
quest of
Silesia.

This great achievement made the reduction of the other fortresses in Silesia a matter of comparative ease, by furnishing, close at hand, all the resources necessary for their reduction. They were almost forgotten accordingly, and fell, without being observed, into the hands of the invaders. Brieg surrendered almost as soon as it was

Jan. 17.

invested. Kosel fell in silence, after a siege of a few days! Napoléon, delighted with these acquisitions, which entirely secured the right flank of his army, and were of the greater importance from the menacing aspect of the force which Austria was collecting on the Bohemian frontier, named Jerome Bonaparte governor of the province of Silesia; and, after having drawn all the resources out of its rich cities and powerful fortresses which they were capable of yielding, for the prosecution of operations against Dantzic and the strongholds on the Lower Vistula, dispatched Vandamme, with twelve thousand men, to besiege Schweidnitz, Neiss, and Glatz, the only remaining towns in the upper province which still hoisted the Prussian colours. The reduction of these strong fortresses, which had been the object of several campaigns to the Great Frederick, did not take place for some months afterwards, and was hardly noticed by Europe amidst the whirl of more important events on the Lower Vistula (2).

Operations
on the left
towards Po-
merania and
Dantzic.

The task of reducing the fortified towns on the Lower Oder, and between that and the Vistula, was allotted to Marshal Mortier. He took a position, in the middle of December, at Anclam; and, upon his approach, the Swedish forces retired to Stralsund. While in this station, he drew his posts round Colberg, and several skirmishes occurred with the Prussian garrisons of that place. Matters remained in that situation till the end of January, when the blockade of Stralsund was more closely established, which continued till the conclusion of the campaign. More important operations took place at Dantzic and Graudentz, the siege of both which places was much facilitated by the great military stores taken in the towns of Silesia. They were brought down the Oder to near its mouth, and thence transported by land to the neighbourhood of these fortresses; and with such vigour did Marshal Lefebvre push forward the operations, especially against the former of these towns, that, before the end of January, considerable progress had been made in the works (3).

Operations
of Marmont
in Illyria.

On the return of Napoléon to Warsaw, he received detailed accounts of the operations of Marmont in Illyria since the commencement of hostilities in October. For a long period, and during the time when it was understood that a negotiation was on foot between the two governments, a sort of tacit suspension of arms existed between the French marshal and

(1) Dum. xvii. 214, 223. Jom. ii. 250. Ann. Reg. 1807, 22.

(2) Dum. xvii. 95, 101. Jom. ii. 251.

As fast as these fortresses in Silesia fell into the hands of Napoléon, they were, by his orders, totally dismantled and their fortifications razed to the ground. Their inhabitants were seized with consternation when they beheld these rigorous orders carried into full execution, and anticipated a total separation from the Prussian Monarchy, to which they were much attached, from so complete a de-

struction of the barrier raised with so much care both against Austria and Russia. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the determination of the French Emperor to reduce Prussia to the rank of a third-rate power; but the policy, with reference to the future interests, both of France and Germany, of destroying the chief barrier of both against Moscow aggression, was extremely doubtful.—See MONTVALLON, *Hist. Const. de la Sibirie de l'Anglo-terre en 1816*, 147, and Dum. xvii. 99, 100.

(3) Dum. xvii. 223, 237. Jom. ii. 387.

the Russians; but when it was distinctly ascertained that hostilities had been resumed, the flames of war extended to the smiling shores of the Adriatic sea. The Russians, strengthened by the arrival of Admiral Siniavin with a powerful squadron, resumed the offensive, and compelled Marmont to abandon the point of Ostro, and fall back on Old Ragusa, where he fortified himself in a strong position in front of the town, and resolved to await the arrival of his
 Sept. 29. *flotilla and reinforcements.* Encouraged by this retrograde movement, the Russians, six thousand strong, supported by some thousand Montenegrins, advanced to the attack; but they were anticipated by the
 Sept. 30. French general; and after a sharp action, the new levies were dispersed, and the regular troops compelled to take refuge within the walls of Castel Nuovo, after sustaining a loss of six hundred men (4).

Napoleon's efforts to stimulate the Turks to vigorous resistance. At the same period, a courier from Constantinople brought intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia. This was an event of the very highest importance, promising, as it did, to effect so powerful a diversion in the Russian forces; and Napoleon therefore resolved to improve to the uttermost so auspicious a change, by contracting the closest alliance with the Turkish government. Though General Michelson had early gained considerable advantage, and was advancing towards Belgrade, which had fallen into the hands of Czerny George and the insurgent Georgians, yet the disasters of the Prussian war had opened the eyes of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg, when it was too late, to the imprudence of which they had been guilty in engaging at once in two such formidable contests; and thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons (about twenty-five thousand men) were ordered to advance with all possible rapidity from the plains of Moldavia to the banks of the Bug. Desirous to derive every possible advantage from this great diversion, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople, General Sebastiani, to use the greatest efforts to induce the Turkish government to enter vigorously into the contest; while to Marshal Marmont he gave orders to send French officers into all the Ottoman provinces, with orders to do their utmost every where to rouse the Mussulman population against the Muscovite invaders (2); while the relations of France with Persia and Turkey were considered of such paramount importance, that

(1) *Dum.* xvii. 240, 256.

(2) These instructions to Marmont are well worthy of attention, both as evincing the views Napoleon already entertained in regard to the Ottoman empire, and setting in a clear light his subsequent perfidious conduct in abandoning that power to the ambition of Russia, by the treaty of Tilsit. Jan. 2, 1807. "A courier, just arrived from Constantinople, has announced that war against Russia is declared: great enthusiasm prevails at that capital; twenty regiments of Janissaries have just set out from its walls for the Danube, and twenty more will speedily follow from Asia. Sixty thousand men are at Herova, Puswan Oglou has assembled twenty thousand at Widdin. Send immediately five engineer officers and as many of artillery to Constantinople—aid the pachas in every possible way with counsel, provision, and ammunition. It is not unlikely that I may send you with 25,000 men to Widdin, and there you will enter into the system of the grand army, of which you would form the extreme right. Twenty-five thousand French, supported by sixty thousand Turks, would soon force the Russians not to leave thirty thousand men on the Danube, as they have done, but to forward twice that number to defend their own frontiers in that quarter. Send twenty or thirty officers to the pachas, if they demand so many; but the period for the employment of troops

is not yet arrived. The Turks may be relied on as faithful allies, because they hate the Russians; therefore be not sparing in your supplies of all sorts to them. An ambassador from Persia as well as Turkey has just been at Warsaw; the court of Isfahan also, as the sworn enemy of Russia, may be relied on as our friend. Our relations with the Eastern powers are now such that we may look forward shortly to transporting forty thousand men to the gates of Isfahan, and from thence to the shores of the Indus,—projects which formerly appeared chimerical are now no longer so, when I receive ambassadors from the Sultan, testifying a serious alarm at the progress of Russia, and the strongest confidence in the protection of France. In these circumstances, send your officers over all the Turkish provinces; they will make known my disposition towards the Grand Seigneur, and that will exalt the general enthusiasm, while at the same time you will be able to acquire for me information which may prove in the highest degree useful. In a word, General, I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and wish to do it all the good in my power; let that principle regulate all your actions. I consider the Turkish declaration of war against Russia as the most fortunate circumstance which could possibly have occurred in my present situation."—*Fontenay, ii.* 347-349.

they were made the subject of a special message to the Senate, which declared, "the Emperor of Persia, tormented, as Poland was for sixty years, by the intrigues of Russia, is animated by the same sentiments as the Turks. He has resolved to march upon the Caucasus to defend his dominions. Who could number the duration of the wars, the number of campaigns, which would be required one day to repair the calamities consequent upon the Russians, obtaining possession of Constantinople? Were the tiara of the Greek faith raised again, and extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should see in our own days our provinces attacked by clouds of barbarians; and if, in that tardy struggle, civilized Europe should happen to fall, our culpable indifference would justly excite the reproaches of posterity, and would become a subject of opprobrium in history." Memorable words! when the events which subsequent times have brought about, and the objects of political apprehensions in our own time, are taken into view (1).

Delightful
residence of
the French
at Warsaw.

The residence of the French generals and officers at Warsaw appeared a perfect Elysium, after the fatigues and privations to which they had been exposed. The society of that capital is well known to be one of the most agreeable in Europe, from the extraordinary talents and accomplishments of the women of rank of which it is composed. No person can have mingled in those delightful circles without perceiving that the Polish women are the most fascinating in Europe. Endowed by nature with an ardent temperament, an affectionate disposition, and an exalted imagination, they have, at the same time, all the grace and coquetry which constitute the charm of Parisian beauty, and yet retain, in most cases, the domestic virtues and simplicity of manner which nurse in infancy the national character of the English people (2). Speaking every language in Europe with incomparable facility,—conversing alternately in French, German, Italian, Russian, and sometimes English, with the accent of a native,—versed in the literature and history of all these countries, and yet preferring to them all, the ruins of their own wasted land,—enthusiastic in their patriotism, and yet extended in their views,—with hearts formed in the simplicity of domestic life, minds cultivated during the solitude of rural habitation, and manners polished by the elegance of metropolitan society,—they approach as near as imagination can figure to that imaginary standard of perfection which constitutes the object of chivalrous devotion. Melancholy reflection! that the greatest charms of society should be co-existent with the most vicious and destructive national institutions; and that its principal excellencies should have been called forth by the miserable and distracted customs which had brought the Polish nation to a premature dissolution (3)!

If such are the attractions of Warsaw, even to a passing traveller, it may easily be believed what it appeared to the French officers after the storms of Pultusk and Golymin. From all parts of Prussian Poland the great fami-

(1) *Jom.* ii 345, 349. *Bign.* vi. 121.

(2) This observation applies to the character of the female part of the Polish rural nobility. Those who have made Warsaw or other great capitals their habitual residence, have too often contracted the vices incident to a polished and corrupted society.

(3) Personal observation. *Savary*, iii. 17.

"It may with truth be said," says Savary, "that the Polish women are fitted to inspire jealousy to the most accomplished ladies in the civilized world: they unite, for the most part, to the manners of the great world, a depth of information which is rarely to be seen even among the French women, and which is infinitely superior to what is usually to

be met with in the most accomplished urban society. It would appear, that being obliged to pass more than half the year on their estates, they devote themselves to reading and mental cultivation; and thence in the capitals, where they go to pass the winter, they so frequently appear superior to all their rivals."—*SAVARY*, iii. 17.

"I did not require to learn," says Duroc, "that the Polish women are the most agreeable in Europe; but it was not till I arrived in Poland that I became acquainted with the full extent of their charms.—The attractions of Warsaw are indescribable. It contains several agreeable circles—one charming."—*Letter of Duroc to Junot*, Dec. 17, 1806; *D'A.* *BRANTES*, ix. 380.

*Enthusias-
tic reception
of the
French by
the Polish
women.*

lies flocked to her capital, and soon formed a society in the midst of the horrors of war, which rivalled any in Europe in splendour and attractions. Abandoning themselves without reserve to the delightful prospects which seemed to be opening on their country, the Polish women saw in the French officers the deliverers of Sarmatia, the invincible allies who were to restore the glories of the Piasts and the Jagellons. An universal enthusiasm prevailed; fêtes and theatrical amusements succeeded each other in varying magnificence; and, following the general bent, even the intellectual breast of Napoléon caught the flame, and did homage to charms which, attractive at all times, were in that moment of exultation irresistible. But these fairy scenes were of short duration; and war, in its most terrible form, was destined soon to rouse them from this transient period of enchantment (1).

Kamenskoi goes mad, and Benningsen assumes the command. He advances against Bernadotte.

When the French were put into cantonments on the right bank of the Vistula, the situation of the Russian army was such, that it could hardly be said to have a commander. Kamenskoi retired far to the rear to Grodno, where he went out in his shirt to the streets, and gave unequivocal proofs of mental derangement. Buxhowden commanded his own corps, while Benningsen did the same with his; and the jealousy of each of these officers for a time prevented the one from obeying the commands of the other: but at length the appointment of the latter to the supreme command restored unity to the operations of the army. Fortunately for the Russians, the suspension of hostilities, and the interval of fifteen leagues, which separated them from the enemy, prevented them from suffering under this division of council; and when Benningsen assumed the command, he resolved to continue the design of Buxhowden, and, instead of allowing the army to repose in its cantonments, commence an offensive movement with the whole army against the French left under Bernadotte and Ney, which had extended itself so far as to menace Königsberg, the second city of the Prussian dominions, and the capital of the old part of the monarchy. Many reasons recommended this course. It was evident that Napoléon would turn to the best account the breathing-time afforded him in winter-quarters. His army would be recruited and strengthened, his cavalry remounted, his magazines replenished on the Vistula; the fortresses at its mouth were already observed; and when the mild season returned in May, there was every reason to fear that it would be as solidly established on the line of that river by the capture of Colberg, Graudentz, and Dantzic, as it was now on the Oder and in Silesia by the reduction of the fortresses of that province. And the situation of Bernadotte and Ney, who had extended their cantonments beyond what was either necessary or prudent, and such as almost to indicate an offensive intention, suggested a hope, that by a rapid movement their corps might be isolated and destroyed before the bulk of the grand army, grouped round Warsaw, could advance to their relief (2).

Rapid advance of Benningsen towards Königsberg.

Impressed with these ideas, the Russian army, seventy-five thousand strong, with five hundred pieces of cannon, was every where put in motion, crossed the Narew, and marched upon the Bobr. The corps of Benningsen and Buxhowden, so long separated, effected a junction at Biala on the 14th January: and on the 15th, headquarters were established at that place. Essen was left with one division on the Narew to mark this forward movement; and there he was soon after joined by

(1) Savary, iii. 17.

(2) Wilson, 83, 84. Dum. xvii. 295, 297. Join. ii. 351. Sav. iii. 26, 27.

the divisions from Moldavia. This great assemblage of force was the more formidable that it was entirely unknown to the enemy, being completely concealed by the great Forest of Johansberg and the numerous chain of lakes, intersected by woods, which lie between Arys, in East Prussia, and the shores of the Vistula. Rapidly advancing after its columns were united, the Russian army moved forward between the lakes of Sperding and Lowenthin; and on

Jan. 17. the 17th, headquarters were established at Rhein in East Prussia. Meanwhile, the cavalry, consisting of forty squadrons under Prince Gallitzin, pushed on for the Alle, on the roads leading to Königsberg and Bischofstein; and on the other side of that river, surprised and defeated the light-horse of

Jan. 19. Marshal Ney, which had advanced in pursuit of Lestocq to Schippenhal, within ten leagues of Königsberg. Thus, on the 20th January, the Russian army, perfectly concentrated, and in admirable order, was grouped in the middle of East Prussia, and was within six marches of the Lower Vistula, where it might either raise the blockade of Dantzic and Graudentz, or fall with a vast superiority of force upon Bernadotte or Ney, still slumbering in undisturbed security in their cantonments (1).

Jan. 20. Had Benningsen been aware of the scattered condition of Marshal Ney's corps, he might, by the admission of the French military historians, have destroyed the whole before it could by possibility have been united and put in a condition to give battle. As it was, great numbers of his detached bodies were made prisoners; and the conduct of the Marshal, in first, by his senseless incursions attracting the enemy, and then, by his undue dispersion, exposing himself to their attacks, drew down a severe reproof from Napoléon (2). But a glance at the map must be sufficient to show that great and decisive success was at this moment within the grasp of the Russian General; and that if, instead of making a long circuit to reach the head of Marshal Ney's corps, scattered over a space of eighteen leagues, and drive it back upon its line of retreat towards Warsaw, he had boldly thrown himself, three days earlier, upon its flank, he would have separated it from the centre of the army, and driven both it and Bernadotte to a disastrous retreat into the angle formed by the Vistula and the Baltic Sea. The movement of Benningsen to the head of Ney's column, however, having prevented this, he turned his attention to Bernadotte, who had received intelligence of his approach, and had rapidly concentrated his corps from the neighbourhood of Elbing at Mohrungen. Meanwhile, the Russian army continued its advance; on the 22d, headquarters were established at Bischofstein, and the Cossacks pushed on to Heilsberg; and on the same day, a severe action took place at Lecberg, from whence the French cavalry, under Colbert, were driven in the direction of Allenstein. Ney, now seriously alarmed, dispatched couriers in all directions to collect his scattered divisions, and on the 23d resumed his headquarters at Neidenberg, extending his troops by the left towards Gilgenberg to lend assistance to Bernadotte (3).

Jan. 22. Bernadotte, informed by despatches from all quarters of this formidable irruption into his cantonments, was rapidly concentrating his troops at Mohrungen, when Benningsen, with greatly superior forces, fell upon him. The French troops, eighteen thousand strong, were posted in rugged ground

quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair, the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—Dum. xvii. 303.

(3) Dum. xvii. 297, 307. Join. ii. 353. Wilson, 84, 85. Digitized by Google

(1) Wilson, 83, 85. Dum. xvii. 295, 302. Join. ii. 352.

(2) He severely blamed the Marshal "for having, by an inconsiderate movement, attracted the enemy, and even endeavoured to engage Marshal Soult, who declined to follow him, in the same expedition. You will immediately resume the winter-

quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair, the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—Dum. xvii. 303.

(3) Dum. xvii. 297, 307. Join. ii. 353. Wilson, 84, 85.

Bernadotte, attacked near Mohrungen, recaptured with difficulty. at Georgenthal, two miles in front of that town. General Makow attacked them with the advanced guard of the Russians, before sufficient forces had come up, and after a sanguinary conflict, in which the eagle of the 9th French regiment was taken and retaken several times, and finally remained in the hands of the Russians, suffered the penalty of his rashness by being repulsed towards Liebstadt. In this bloody affair both parties had to lament the loss of two thousand men, and the Russian General Aurepp was killed. It was the more to be regretted that this premature attack had been made, as Lestocq was at the moment at Wormditt, or five leagues distant on the right; Gallitzin, with five thousand horse, at All-Reichau, at the same distance on the left; Osterman Tolstoy at Heilighenthal, and Sacken at Elditten, all in the immediate neighbourhood; so that, by a concentration of these forces, the whole French corps might with ease have been made prisoners. As it was, Prince Michael Dolgoroucki, who had been detached by Prince Gallitzin towards Mohrungen in consequence of the violent fire heard in that direction, fell upon the rear of Bernadotte's corps, penetrated into the town, made several hundred prisoners, and captured all his private baggage, among which, to his eternal disgrace, were found, as in the den of a common freebooter, silver plate, bearing the arms of almost all the states in Germany, 10,000 ducats, recently levied for his own private use, and 3500 for that of his staff, from the town of Elbing (1).

The narrow escape, both of Ney and Bernadotte, from total destruction in consequence of this bold and vigorous enterprise, excited the utmost alarm in the French army. The latter fell back rapidly towards Thorn on the Lower Vistula, by Deutsch-Eylau, severely pressed by the Cossacks, who almost totally destroyed his rear-guard, and made many thousand prisoners. Headquarters were advanced by Benningsen on the 26th to Mohrungen, where they remained, from the exhaustion of the troops, till the 2d February. Taking advantage of the aid thus obtained, the brave and active Lestocq succeeded in raising the blockade of Graudentz, the key to the Lower Vistula, and throwing in supplies of ammunition and provisions, which enabled that important fortress to hold out through all the succeeding campaign. The whole French left wing raised their cantonments, and fell back in haste, and with great loss, towards the Lower Vistula; and the alarm, spread as far as Warsaw, gave the most effectual refutation of the false accounts published in the bulletins of the successive defeats of the Russian army (2). At the same time, intelligence was received of the arrival of the Russian divisions from the army of Moldavia, on the Narew and the Bug, where they formed a junction with General Essen, and raised the enemy's force in that quarter to thirty thousand men (3).

These untoward events made a great impression on the mind of Napoléon, who had never contemplated a renewal of active operations till his reinforcements from the Rhine had arrived at headquarters, and the return of the mild season had enabled him to resume hostilities without the excessive hardships to which his troops, dur-

Extraordi-
nary entry
of Napoleon
in recon-
quering his
army.

(1) Bign. vi. 115. Wilson, 85. Dum. xvii. 307, 319. Jom. ii. 353.

(2) "In Bernadotte's baggage, taken at Mohrungen, were found curious proofs of the arrangements for stage effect and false intelligence, made by all the officers of the French army, from the Emperor downwards. An order was there found, giving the most minute directions for the reception of Napoléon at Warsaw, with all the stations and crossings where 'Vive l'Empereur!' was to be

shouted; and official despatches of all the actions of the campaign in which Bernadotte had been engaged, for publication, and private despatches, giving the facts as they really occurred, for the Emperor's secret perusal. These papers are still in the possession of General Benningsen's family."—Wilson's *Polish Campaign*, 86.—Note.

(3) Wilson, 86, 87. Dum. xvii. 307, 322. Bign. vi. 115, 116.

ing the later stages of the campaign, had been exposed. The cold was still extreme: the Vistula and the Narew were charged with enormous blocks of floating ice, which daily threatened to break down the bridges over them; the earth was covered with snow, the heavens exhibited that serene deep-blue aspect which indicated a long continuance of intense frost: magazines there were none in the country which was likely to become the theatre of war; and, though the highly cultivated territory of Old Prussia offered as great resources as any of its extent in Europe (1) for an invading army, yet it was impossible to expect that it could maintain, for any length of time, the enormous masses who would speedily be assembled on its surface. But there was no time for deliberation; matters were pressing, the right of Benningsen was now approaching the Lower Vistula, and in a few days the Russian army would raise the blockade of Dantzic, and, resting on that fortress as a base from whence inexhaustible supplies of all sorts might be obtained by sea, would bid defiance to all his efforts. It was in such a crisis that the extraordinary activity and, indefatigable perseverance of Napoléon appeared most conspicuous. Instantly perceiving that active operations must be resumed even at that rude season, he Jan. 23. despatched orders from the 23d to the 27th January, for the assembling of all his army; and as, with the exception of Bernadotte and Ney, they all lay in cantonments not extending over more than twenty leagues, this was neither a tedious nor a difficult operation. Bernadotte was enjoined to assemble around Osterode, Lefebvre at Thorn to observe Dantzic, Soult at Pragnitz, Davoust at Pultusk, Ney at Nudenberg, Bessières and Murat at Warsaw with the imperial guard and cavalry: though breathing only victory in his proclamations to his troops, he in reality was making every preparation for defeat; Lefebvre received orders to collect all the forces at his disposal, without any regard to the blockade of Dantzic, in order to secure the fortress and bridge of Thorn, the direct line of retreat across the Vistula from the theatre of war, while Lannes was disposed as a reserve on the right, and Augereau on the left bank of that river. On the 27th, orders were given to all the columns to march, and early on the morning of the 30th the Emperor set out from Warsaw (2).

Napoléon marches for the rear of Benningsen, who discovers his design and falls back.

Following his usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in the rear of the enemy during his advance, Napoléon marched towards Allenstein, where he arrived on the 2d February with the corps of Soult, Augereau, and Ney, while Davoust was, at a short distance still farther on his right, at Wartenberg. Already he had interposed between Benningsen and Russia; the only line of retreat which lay open to that officer was to the north-east, in the direction of Königsberg and the Niemen. The Russian army was stationed between the Passarge and the Alle, from Guttstadt and Heilsberg on the latter river, to Liebstadt and Wormditt in the neighbourhood of the former; but these movements of Napoléon induced Benningsen to concentrate his divisions and move them

(1) The territory of Old Prussia is not naturally more fertile than the adjoining provinces of Poland, but nevertheless it is as rich and cultivated as they are sterile and neglected. On one side of the frontier line is to be seen numerous and opulent cities, smiling well-cultivated fields, comfortable hamlets, and an industrious and contented population; on the other, endless forests of pine, wretched villages, a deplorable agriculture, squalid huts beside a few gorgeous palaces. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the vicious and ruinous political institutions which have prevailed amidst the mingled anarchy, tyranny, and democracy of Old Poland. This difference, so well known to travellers, repeatedly

attracted the attention even of the military followers of the French army.—See *Saeva, Camp de Russie*, i. 127, and *Jomini*, ii. 354.

(2) *Dum.* xvii. 322, 325. *Jom.* ii. 354, 355.

“The orders given by Napoléon to all the marshals and chief officers of his army on this trying emergency, may be considered as a master-piece of military skill and foresight, and deserve especial attention from all who desire to make themselves acquainted either with his extraordinary activity and resources, or the multiplied cares which, on such an occasion, devolve on a commander-in-chief.—See the whole in *Dumas*, xvii. 330-374; *Picott Just*.

to the eastward, in the direction of Spiegelberg and the Alle, on the 1st and Feb. 1 and 2. 2d of February, in order to preserve his communications with the Russian frontier. The whole army assembled in order of battle on the follow-

Feb. 2. ing day, in a strong position on the heights of Junkowo, covering the great road from Allenstein to Liebstadt, its right resting on the village of Moudtken. Napoléon instantly directed Davoust to march from Wartenberg to Spiegelberg with his whole corps, in order to get entirely round the left flank of the Russians in this position and attack them in rear, while Soult received orders to force the bridge of Bergfried, by which their retreat and communications lay across the Alle. It was all over with the Russians if these orders had been carried into full execution without their being aware how completely they were in course of being encircled; but by a fortunate accident the despatches to Bernadotte, announcing the design, and enjoining him to draw Benningsen on towards the Lower Vistula, had previously fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, and made that general aware of his danger; he immediately dispatched orders to the officer at Bergfried to hold the bridge to the last extremity, which was so gallantly obeyed, that, though Soult assisted it with all his corps, and it was taken and retaken several times, yet it Feb. 2. finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The situation of Benningsen, however, was now very critical; he was compelled to fall back to avoid being turned in presence of very superior forces, and by his lateral movement from Mohrungen he had become entirely separated from Lestocq, who saw the most imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed by the superior forces of Bernadotte. Fortunately, however, from the despatches being intercepted, that Marshal remained entirely ignorant, both of what was expected from him, and of the great advantages which remained in his power; and Lestocq, without being disquieted, was enabled to check his advance and make preparations for a retreat, which was presented to him from Freystadt, where he had been covering the revictualling of Graudentz, by Deutch-Eylau, Osterode, Mohrungen to Liebstadt, while Benningsen himself on the night of the 3d, broke up from Junkowo, and retired in the same direction (1).

By daybreak the French army, headed by Murat, with his numerous and terrible dragoons, were in motion to pursue the enemy; and as the Russians had been much retarded during the night by the passage of so many pieces of cannon and waggons through the narrow streets of Junkowo, they soon came up with their rear-guard. By Feb. 3. the French pursued the Russians, who resolve to give battle.

Feb. 4. overwhelming numbers, the Russians were forced from the bridge of Bergfried; but they rallied in the village, and forming barricades with timbers, waggons, and chariots, effectually checked the advance of the enemy, until the carriages in the rear had got clear through, when they retired, obstinately contesting every inch of ground, which they did with such effect that the French lost fifteen hundred men in the pursuit, without inflicting a greater loss on their adversaries. Nor were any cannon or chariots taken—a striking proof of the orderly nature of the retreat, and the heroism with which the rearguard performed its duty, when it is recollected that Napoléon, with eighty thousand men, thundered in close pursuit; and that, from the state of the roads, the march which had been ordered upon three lines, could take place on two only. Soult and Davoust continued to manœuvre, in order to turn the Russian left, while Murat and Ney pressed their rearguard. On the Feb. 5. night of the 4th, the Russians retired to Frauendorf, where they stood firm next day. But this continued retreat in presence of the enemy

was now beginning to be attended with bad effects, both upon the health and spirits of the soldiers. The Russian commissariat was then wretched; magazines there were none in the country which was now the theatre of war; and the soldiers, when worn out with a night march over frozen snow, had no means of obtaining subsistence but by prowling about to discover and dig up the little stores which the peasants had buried for the use of their families. The men every where lay on the bare ground in intense frost, with no other bed but the snow, and no covering but their greatcoats, which were now little better than rags. They were not as yet inured to retire before the enemy; and the murmur against any further retreat was so loud, that Benning-sen resolved to fall back only to a chosen field of battle; and, upon examining the map, that of PREUSSICH-EYLAU was selected for this purpose. No sooner was this announced to the troops than their discontents were appeased, the hardships of the night marches were forgotten, and, from the joyful looks of the men, it would rather have been supposed they were marching to tranquil winter quarters, than the most desperate struggle which had occurred in modern times (1).

Severe actions, however, awaited these brave men ere they reached the theatre of final conflict. On the night of the 5th, the army moved to Landsberg, where the troops from Heilsberg joined them, notwithstanding a bloody combat with Marshal Davoust. On the following day, the rearguard, under Bagration, posted between Hoff and that town, was assailed with the utmost vehemence by Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the principal part of the corps of Soult and Augereau. The approach of these formidable masses, and the imposing appearance of their cavalry, as well as the balls which began to fall from the French batteries, occasioned great confusion among the cannon and carriages in the streets of the town. But with such resolution did the rearguard maintain their position, that though they sustained a heavy loss, the enemy were kept at bay till night closed the carnage, and relieved the Russian general from the anxieties consequent on so critical a situation in presence of such enormous forces of the enemy. Two battalions of Russians were trampled under foot in the course of the day, or cut down chiefly by one of their own regiments of horse dashing over them, when broken and flying from Murat's dragoons. Benningsen, upon this, supported the rearguard by several brigades of fresh troops, and the combat continued with various success till night, when both armies bivouacked in presence of each other; that of the French on the heights of Hoff, that of the Russians on those which lie in front of Landsberg, and the little stream of the Stein separating their outposts from each other. In this untoward affair the Russians sustained a loss of 2500 men, among whom was Prince Gallitzin, whose chivalrous courage had already endeared him to the army; but the French were weakened by nearly as great a number. During the night the whole army again broke up, and, without farther molestation, reached Preussich-Eylau at seven the next morning, when they passed through the town, and moved quietly to the appointed ground for the battle on the other side, where it arrived by noonday (2).

This rapid concentration and retreat of the Russians isolated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and gave too much reason to fear that it might be cut off by the superior forces of Bernadotte or Ney,

(1) Wilson, 92, 94. Jom. ii. 356. Dum. xvii. 349, 352.

(2) Dum. xvii. 354, 365. Wilson, 94, 95. Jom. ii. 356.

who were now pressing on it on all sides. But the skilful movements of the Prussian general extricated him from a most perilous situation. On the Feb. 5.

5th, he set out from Mohrungen, and his horse encountered the cavalry of Murat near Dippen, while the head of the column of infantry was at the same time charged by Ney, who had crossed the Passarge to intercept his progress near Waltersdorf. The heroic resistance of the advanced guard, only three thousand strong, gave time for the main body to change the line of its march, and escape in the direction of Schloditten; but it proved fatal to itself, as almost the whole were slain or made prisoners, with twelve pieces of cannon. The firm countenance of the cavalry, however, defeated all the efforts of Murat, who in vain charged them repeatedly with six thousand horse: and, after baffling all his attacks, they retired leisurely and in the best order, covering the march of the infantry all the way; crossed the Feb. 7.

Passarge at Spandau; and arrived, on the 7th, in safety at Hussehn in the neighbourhood of Preussich-Eylau (1).

Thus, after sustaining incredible hardships, and undergoing serious dangers, the whole Russian army was at length concentrated in one field of battle, and about to measure its strength with the enemy. It was reduced, by the fatigues and losses of this winter campaign, to sixty-five thousand men, assembled around Eylau, to which if ten thousand be added as Lestocq's division, which might be expected to co-operate in the approaching action, the whole amount that could be relied on for the shock was seventy-five thousand, with 460 pieces of cannon. The French, after deducting the losses of this dreadful warfare, exclusive of Bernadotte, who did not arrive on the ground for two days after, could still bring eighty-five thousand men into the field, including nearly sixteen thousand horse; but they had not above three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery (2). Thus the two armies were nearly equal—the French superiority in numbers, and especially in cavalry, being counterbalanced by the advantage which the Russians had in that important arm, the artillery. Their spirit and courage were at the same level; for if the French could recall with deserved pride the glorious achievements of the campaign, and a long course of almost unbroken victories, the Russians on their side, had the triumphs of Suwarrow in Turkey, Poland, and the Italian plains, to commemorate: and if the former was impelled by the ardour of a revolution converted by consummate genius

(1) *Journ. ii.* 356, 357. *Dum. xvii.* 352, 356.

(2) The following is the account given by Dumas

of the troops present under arms, in January 1807, under Napoleon on the Vistula:—

	Infantry and Artillery.	Cavalry.
Imperial Guard under Bessières,	9,199	3,829
Oudinot,	6,046	
First Corps, Bernadotte,	18,073	950
Third do. Davoust,	19,000	757
Fourth do. Soult,	26,329	1,495
Fifth do. Lannes,	16,720	1,399
Sixth do. Ney,	15,158	861
Cavalry do. Murat,	753	14,868
Total on the Vistula,	109,238	20,350
Detached, viz. Mortier in Pomerania,	15,868	1,254
Jerome and Vandamme, in Silesia,	18,232	2,207
Lefebvre, Dantzic,	23,248	547
Hanover, Dumonceau,	6,898	689
Total,	173,464	25,047

If from this mass of 109,238 infantry, and 20,000 cavalry, there be deducted 18,000 absent, under Bernadotte, 16,000 under Lannes, and 10,000 lost or left behind during the march from Warsaw, there

will remain, on their own showing, 85,000 in line at Eylau, and that agrees nearly with Sir Robert Wilson's estimate. — *Dumas*, vol. xviii. 502; *Wilson*, 99.

into that of military conquest, the latter were buoyant with the rising energy of an empire whose frontiers had never yet receded before the standards of an enemy (1).

Bloody combats around Eylau the day before the battle. The Russian rearguard, ten thousand strong, under Bagrathion, was leisurely retiring towards Eylau, and at the distance of about two miles from that village, when it was attacked by the French infantry. The Russians were at first compelled to give way, but the St.-Petersburg dragoons, whose rout had occasioned such damage to their own comrades on the preceding day, emulous to wipe away their disgrace, assailed the enemy so opportunely in flank, when emerging from the tumult of the charge, that they instantly cut to pieces two battalions, and made prize of their eagles. Disconcerted by this check, the French gave no further molestation to the Russian rearguard, which retired into Eylau. By Feb. 7. a mistake, however, the division destined to occupy that important station evacuated it, along with the rest of the army; and though Benningsen instantly ordered it to be re-occupied by fresh troops, the French had, meanwhile entered in great numbers, and the assailing division, under Barclay de Tolly, had a rude contest to encounter in endeavouring to regain the lost ground. By vast exertions, however, they at length succeeded in expelling the enemy: the French again returned in greater force; the combat continued with the utmost fury till long after sunset; fresh reinforcements came up to the Russians; twice Barclay carried the village after dark, by the light of the burning houses; and when at length driven out of the town, which, from lying in a hollow and being commanded on all sides, was no longer tenable after the enemy had brought up their heavy artillery, that gallant commander, with this heroic rearguard, entrenched himself in the church and churchyard, which stands on an eminence by the road, on issuing from the town on the other side, and there maintained a sanguinary resistance till past ten at night, when he was severely wounded. Then the object of the strife having been gained by the heavy artillery having all arrived by the road of Schloditten, and taken up its position on the field of battle behind the village, the unconquered Russians were withdrawn from the churchyard, which, with its blood-stained graves, and corpse-cased slopes; remained in the hands of Napoléon (2).

Anxious situation of both armies in their night's bivouac. Never in the history of war did two armies pass a night under more awful and impressive circumstances, than the rival hosts who now lay, without tent or covering, on the snowy expanse of the field of Eylau. The close vicinity of the two armies, the vast multitude assembled in so narrow a space, intent only on mutual destruction; the vital interests to the lives and fortunes of all, which were at stake; the wintry wildness of the scene, cheered only by the watchfires, which threw a partial glow on the snow-clad heights around; the shivering groups who in either army lay round the blazing fires, chilled by girdles of impenetrable ice; the stern resolution of the soldiers in the one array, and the enthusiastic ardour of those in the other; the liberty of Europe now brought to the issue of one dread combat; the glory of Russia and France dependent on the efforts of the mightiest armament that either had yet sent forth, all contributed to impress a feeling of extraordinary solemnity, which reached the most inconsiderate breast, oppressed the mind with a feeling of anxious thought, and kept unclosed many a wearied eyelid in both camps, notwithstanding the extraor-

(1) Dum. xviii. 1, 10. Wilson, 98, 99.

(2) Wilson, 97, 98, 100. Dum. ii. 357, 358. Dum. xviii. 6, 8. Bign. vi. 126.

dinary fatigues of the preceding days. But no sooner did the dawn break, and the quick rattle of musketry from the outposts commence, than these gloomy presentiments were dispelled, and all arose from their icy beds with no other feelings but those of joyous confidence and military ardour (1).

Description of the field of battle and the positions of either army. The evacuation of Eylau, on the preceding night, had led Napoléon to suppose that the enemy were not to give battle on the succeeding day; and, overwhelmed with the extraordinary fatigues he had undergone since leaving Warsaw, during which time he had been occupied in business or marching twenty hours out of the twenty-four, he retired to a house in the town, and there, amidst all the horrors of a place carried by assault, fell into a profound sleep. The two armies were within half cannon-shot of each other, and their immense masses disposed in close array on a space not exceeding a league in breadth. The field of battle was an open expanse of unenclosed ground, rising into swells, or small hills, interspersed with many lakes; but as the whole surface was covered with snow, and the lakes so thoroughly frozen as to bear any weight either of cavalry or artillery, the whole surface was accessible to military operations. The Russian right, under Tutschakoff, lay on either side of Schloditten; the centre, under Sacken, occupied a cluster of little open hills, intercepted by lakes, in front of Kuschnitten; the left under Osterman Tolstoy, rested on Klein-Saussgarten; the advanced guard, ten thousand strong, with its outposts extending almost to the houses of Eylau, was under the command of Bagration; the reserve, in two divisions, was led by Doctoroff. The whole army in front was drawn up in two lines with admirable precision; the reserve, in two close columns behind the centre; the foot artillery, consisting of 400 pieces, was disposed along the front of the lines; the horse artillery, carrying sixty guns; cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, in reserve behind the centre and wings, in order to support any point which might appear to require assistance. Lestocq, with his division, was not yet in line, but he had lain at Husehnen the preceding night, which was only three leagues off, and might be expected to join before the battle was far advanced (2).

Distribution of the French forces. The French position, generally speaking, was more elevated than that of the Russians, with the exception of the right, where it was commanded by the heights of Klein-Saussgarten. The town of Eylau, however, occupied in force by their troops, was situated in a hollow, so low that the roofs of the houses were below the range of the cannon-shot, and the summit of the church steeple, which stands on an eminence, alone was exposed to the destructive storm. Davoust was on the right, and received orders to attack the villages of Klein-Saussgarten and Serpallen, occupied by the enemy. Soult in the centre, was destined to advance against the Russian main body and the strong batteries placed opposite to Eylau; Angereau was on the left, to support his attack; the Imperial Guard and cavalry of Murat, in reserve behind the centre, ready to support any attack which might appear likely to prove unsuccessful. Orders had been despatched to Ney to attack the Russian right as soon as the action was warmly engaged; and it was hoped he would arrive on the field, at least as soon as Lestocq on the other side, upon whose traces he had so long been following. Lannes had been detained by sickness at Pultusk, and his corps, placed under the orders of Savary, afterwards Duke of Rovigo, was observing the Russian forces left on the Bug and the Narew (3).

(1) Wilson, 101. *Jom.* ii. 358.(3) Wilson, 101. *Jom.* ii. 360, 361. *Dum.* xviii.(2) *Dum.* xviii. 12, 13. *Jom.* ii. 359, 360. *Wil.* 9, 15.

see, 101.

Battle of
Eylau.
Defeat of
Augereau.

Napoléon's design, when he saw that the Russians stood firm, and were resolved to give battle, was to turn their left by the corps of Marshal Davoust, and throw it back, as at Austerlitz, on the middle of the army; but the better to conceal this object he commenced the

Feb. 8. action soon after daylight by a violent attack on their right and centre. The Russian cannon played heavily, but rather at hazard, on the hostile masses in front of Eylau, while the French guns replied with fatal effect from their elevated position down upon the enemy, whose lines were exposed from head to foot to the range of their shot. Presently the left, under Augereau, advanced in massy columns towards Schloditten; while Soult's corps, preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, marched with an intrepid step against the Russian centre, and forty guns of the Imperial Guard posted on an eminence near the church of Eylau, opened a heavy fire on the great central Russian battery. These troops had not advanced above three hundred yards, driving the Russian tirailleurs before them, when the Russian cannon-shot, from two hundred pieces, admirably directed, ploughed through the mass, and so shattered it, that the whole body inclined to the left, to get under the shelter of a detached house which stood in the way. A snow-storm at the same time set in and darkened the atmosphere, so that neither army could see its opponent, but nevertheless the deadly storm of bullets continued to tear the massy columns of Augereau; and the fire was so violent as to prevent Soult from rendering him any effectual support. Augereau's divisions were already severely shaken by this murderous fire, when they were suddenly assailed on one side by the right wing of the Russians, under Tutschakoff, and on the other by their reserve and a powerful cavalry, under Doctoroff. So thick was the snow-storm, so unexpected the onset, that the assailants were only a few yards distant, and the long lances of the Cossacks, almost touching the French infantry when they were first discerned. The combat was not of more than a few minutes' duration; the corps, charged at once by foot and horse with the utmost vigour, broke and fled in the wildest disorder back into Eylau, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, who made such havoc, that the whole, above sixteen thousand strong, were, with the exception of fifteen hundred men, taken or destroyed; and Augereau himself, with his two generals of divisions, Desgardens and Heudelet, desperately wounded (1).

Imminent
danger of
Napoléon.

Napoléon was apprised of this disaster by the torrent of fugitives which rushed into Eylau; and the snow-storm clearing away at the same time, showed him the Russian right and centre far advanced, with their light troops almost at the edge of the town. He himself was stationed at the churchyard on its eastern side, which had been the scene of such a sanguinary conflict on the preceding night; and already the crash of the enemy's balls on the steeple and walls of the church showed how nearly danger was approaching. Presently one of the Russian divisions, following rapidly after the fugitives, entered Eylau by the western street, and charged, with loud hurrahs, to the foot of the mount where the Emperor was placed with a battery of the Imperial Guard and his personal escort of a hundred men. Had a regiment of horse been at hand to support the attack, Napoléon must have been made prisoner; for though the last reserve, consisting of six battalions of the old guard, were at a short distance, he might have been enveloped before they could get up to his rescue. The fate of Europe then hung by a thread, but in that terrible moment the Emperor's presence of

(1) Wilson, 101, 102. Jour ii. 361. Dum. xviii. 17, 18. Bign. 129, 130.

mind did not forsake him ; he instantly ordered his little body-guard, hardly more than a company, to form line, in order to check the enemy's advance, and dispatched orders to the old guard to attack the column on one flank, while a brigade of Murat's horse charged it on the other. The Russians, disordered by success, and ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within their grasp, were arrested by the firm countenance of the little band of heroes who formed Napoléon's last resource ; and before they could reform their ranks for a regular conflict, the enemy were upon them on either flank, and almost the whole division was cut to pieces on the spot (1).

Grand charge by the cavalry and Imperial Guard on the Russian centre. The disorder produced by the repulse of Soult and the almost total destruction of Augereau's corps, however, was such, that the French Emperor was compelled to strain every nerve to repair it. For this purpose he prepared a grand charge by the whole cavalry and Imperial Guard, supported by the divisions of Soult, which were again formed and led back to the attack. The onset of this enormous mass, consisting of fourteen thousand cavalry, and twenty-five thousand foot soldiers, supported by two hundred pieces of cannon, was the more formidable, that the thick storm of snow prevented them from being perceived till they were close upon the first line. The shock was irresistible ; the front line of the Russians was forced to give ground, and in some places thrown into disorder ; their cavalry crushed by the enormous weight of the seventy squadrons which followed the white plume of Murat ; and a desperate *mêlée* ensued, in which prodigious losses were sustained on both sides ; for the Russian battalions, though broken, did not lay down their arms or fly, but falling back on such as yet stood firm, or uniting in little knots together, still maintained the combat with the most dogged resolution. Instantly perceiving the extent of the danger, Benningsen, with his whole staff, galloped forward from his station in the rear to the front, and at the same time dispatched orders to the whole infantry of the reserve to close their ranks, and advance to the support of their comrades engaged. These brave men inclining inwards, pressed eagerly on, regardless of the shower of grape and musketry which fell in their advancing ranks, and uniting with the first line, charged home with loud hurrahs upon the enemy. In the shock Essen's Russian division was broken, and the French horse, pursuing their advantage, swept through several openings, and got as far as the reserve cavalry of Benningsen ; but no sooner did Platoff see them approaching with loud cries, and in all the tumult of victory, than he gave orders to the Cossacks of the Don to advance. Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge ; their long lances are in rest, their blood horses are at speed ; in an instant the French cuirassiers are broken, pierced through, and scattered. Retreat was impossible through the again closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit, while five hundred and thirty Cossacks returned, each cased in the shining armour which they had stripped from the dead bodies of their opponents. At all other points the enemy were, after a desperate struggle, driven back ;

(1) Bign. vi. 430. Dum. xviii. 19, 20. Jom. ii. 362, 363. Wilson, 101, 102.

"I never was so much struck with any thing in my life," said General Bertrand at St.-Helena, "as by the Emperor at Eylau at the moment when, alone with some officers of his staff, he was almost trodden under foot by a column of four or five thousand Russians. The Emperor was on foot ; and Berthier gave orders instantly for the horses to be brought forward : the Emperor gave him a reproachful look,

and instead ordered a battalion of his guard, which was at a little distance, to advance. He himself kept his ground as the Russians approached, repeating frequently the words, 'What boldness ! what boldness !' At the sight of the grenadiers of his guard, the Russians made a dead pause ; the Emperor did not stir, but all around him trembled."—*Las Cases*, ii. 151. See also *Relation de la Bataille d'Eylau, par un Témoin oculaire. Camp. en Prusse et Pol.* iv. 45.

and several eagles, with fourteen pieces of cannon, remained in the hands of the victors (1).

Great success of Davoust on the French right.

The battle appeared gained; the French left and centre had been defeated with extraordinary loss; their last reserves, with the exception of part of the Guard, had been engaged without success; to the cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, and the shouts of enthusiasm with which they commenced the combat, had succeeded a sullen silence along the whole line in front of Eylau; the Russians were several hundred paces in advance of the ground which they occupied in the morning; and a distant cannonade on both sides evinced the exhaustion and fatigue which was mutually felt. Lestocq had not yet arrived, but he was hourly and anxiously expected, and the addition of his fresh and gallant corps would, it was hoped, enable Benningsen to complete the victory. But while all eyes were eagerly turned to the right, where it was expected his standards would first appear, a terrible disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, took place on the left. Davoust, who was intrusted with the attack which was intended to be the decisive one in that quarter, had long been delayed by the firm countenance of Bagavout and Osterman Tolstoy; but at length the increasing numbers and vigorous attacks of the French prevailed, and the village of Klein-Sausgarten fell into their hands. It was again reconquered by the Russians, but finally remained in the possession of their antagonists. Nor was the action less warmly contested at Serpallen. Supported by a battery of thirty pieces of artillery, Bagavout there, for three hours, made head against the superior forces of St.-Hilaire and Morand; at length the two lines advanced to within pistol-shot, when the Russians gave way; the cannoniers bravely resisting, were bayoneted at their guns, and the pieces were on the point of being taken, when they were reinforced by two regiments which Benningsen sent to their support, and the French, in their turn, were charged in flank by cavalry, broken and driven back upwards of three hundred yards. But notwithstanding this success at Serpallen, the progress of the enemy at Klein-Sausgarten was so alarming, that the Russians were unable to maintain themselves on the ground they had so gallantly regained. Friant debouched in their rear in great strength, and, rapidly continuing his advance from left to right of the Russian position, he had soon passed, driving every thing before him, the whole ground occupied by their left wing; and continuing his triumphant course in their rear, carried by assault the hamlet of Anklappen, and was making dispositions for the attack of Kuschnitten, which had been the headquarters of Benningsen during the preceding night, and lay directly behind the Russian centre. Never was change more sudden; the victorious centre, turned and attacked both in flank and rear, seemed on the point of being driven off the field of battle; already the shouts of victory were heard from Davoust's divisions, and vast volumes of black smoke, blown along the whole Russian centre and right from the flames of Serpallen, evinced in frightful colours the progress of the enemy on their left (2).

Benningsen throws back his left to arrest the evil.

The firmness of Benningsen, however, was equal to the emergency. Orders were dispatched to the whole left wing to fall back, so as to come nearly at right angles to the centre and right; and although this retrograde movement, performed in presence of a victorious enemy, was necessarily attended with some disorder, yet it was successfully accomplished; and, after sustaining considerable loss, the Russian left wing was

(1) *Dum.* xviii. 19, 20. *Join.* ii. 362. *Wilson*, 103, 104.

(2) *Wilson*, 104, 105. *Dum.* xviii. 21, 22. *Join.* ii. 363, 364.

drawn up, facing outwards, nearly at right angles to the centre, which still retained its advanced position, midway between the ground occupied by the two armies where the fight began in the morning. As the Russian left fell back to the neighbourhood of the centre, it received the support of the reserves, while Benningsen wheeled about to the assistance of the discomfited wing (1); and although St.-Hilaire carried Kuschnitten, this was the last of his advantages in that quarter, and the victorious Davoust was at length arrested.

Lestocq at length appears on the Russian right, and restores the battle. The battle was in this critical state, with the French victorious on one wing and the Russians on the centre and the other, but without any decisive advantage to either side, when the corps of Lestocq, so long expected, at length appeared on the extreme Russian right, driving before him the French battalions which were stationed near the village of Althof. Orders were immediately dispatched to him to defile as quickly as possible in the rear of the Russian right, so as to assist in the recapture of Kuschnitten behind their centre, where St.-Hilaire had established himself in so threatening a manner. These directions were rapidly and ably performed; moving swiftly over the open ground in the rear of the Russian right in three columns, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Kuschnitten an hour before it was dark, with seven thousand men, having left two thousand to occupy Althof, and lost nearly a thousand in the course of the march that morning, which had been a constant fight with Marshal Ney's corps. Dispositions for attacking the village and cutting off the retreat of the enemy were instantly made; a terrible cannonade was kept up on its houses, and the Prussians, under cover of the guns, charging in three columns, carried it with irresistible force, destroying or making prisoners the 51st and one battalion of the 108th regiments stationed there, with an eagle, and recovering the Russian guns which had been abandoned on the retreat from Serpallen. Not content with this great success, Lestocq immediately re-formed his divisions in line, with the cavalry and Cossacks in rear, and advanced against the hamlet of Anklappen and the wood adjoining. The division of Friant, wearied by eight hours' fighting, was little in a condition to withstand these fresh troops, flushed by so important an advantage. The combat, however, was terrible; Davoust was there, and his troops, though exhausted, were more than double the numbers of the enemy, and he made the utmost efforts to maintain his ground.—“Here,” said the Marshal, “is the place where the brave should find a glorious death; the cowards will perish in the deserts of Siberia.” Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, Friant was driven out of the wood, after an hour's combat, with the loss of three thousand men; the Russians, by a bold attack of cavalry regained the smoking walls of Anklappen, and the whole allied line was pressing on in proud array, driving the enemy before them over the open ground between that ruin and Saussgarten, when night drew her sable mantle over this scene of blood (2).

Schloditten, is carried by Ney, and retaken by Benningsen. The battle was over on the centre and left, and already the French lines were illuminated by the fire of innumerable bivouacs, when both armies were startled by a sharp fire succeeded by loud shouts on the extreme right of the Russians towards Schloditten; it was occasioned by Marshal Ney's corps, which, following fast on the traces of Lestocq, had, at night-fall entered Althof, driving the Prussian detachment which occupied it before him, and had now carried Schloditten, so as to interrupt the Russian

(1) Wilson, 194, 195. *Jom.* ii. 363, 364. *Dum.* xviii. 21, 29.

(2) *Dum.* xviii. 30, 35. *Wilson*, 195, 196. *Jom.* ii. 364, 365.

communication with Königsberg. Benningsen immediately ordered the Russian division of Kamenskoi which had suffered least in the preceding action, to storm the village, which was executed at ten at night in the most gallant style. The loud cheers of their victorious troops were heard at Preussich-Eylau; and Napoléon, supposing that a general attack was commencing for which he was little prepared, gave orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to the position which he had occupied in front of the wood when the action commenced in the morning, and this terminated the changes of this eventful day (1).

Benningsen, contrary to the wishes of his officers, resolves to retreat.

From the mortification, however, of retiring for the first time in his life from before an enemy in an open field, Napoléon was relieved by the measures adopted by the Russian General. At eleven at night, a council of war was held by the Generals on horseback, as to the course which the army should pursue. It was strongly represented by Osterman Tolstoy, the second in command, and Generals Knoring and Lestocq, that at last Bonaparte had now been defeated in a pitched battle, and that it would be to the last degree impolitic to destroy the moral effect of such an advantage by retreating before him, and thus giving him a fair pretext for representing it as a victory; that they were ready instantly or next day to follow up their success, and attack the enemy wherever they could find him; and that at all events, they would pledge their heads, that if he would only stand firm, Napoléon would be driven to a disastrous retreat. Strong as these considerations were, they were overbalanced, in Benningsen's estimation, by still stronger. He knew that his own loss was not less than twenty thousand men, and though he had every reason to believe that the enemy's was still heavier, yet the means of repairing the chasm existed to a greater degree in the hands of Napoléon than his own: Ney, whose corps had comparatively suffered little, had just joined him: Bernadotte, it was to be presumed, would instantly be summoned to headquarters, and these fresh troops might give the enemy the means of cutting them off from Königsberg, in which case, in the total destitution for provisions which prevailed, the most dreadful calamities might be apprehended. Influenced by these considerations, Benningsen, who was ignorant of the enormous magnitude of the losses which the French had sustained, and who, though a gallant veteran, had lost somewhat of the vigour of youth, and had been thirty-six hours on horseback with hardly any nourishment, persevered in his opinion, and directed the order of march, which began at midnight, through Schloditten towards Königsberg, without any molestation from the enemy. They took post at Wottenberg, three leagues in front of that town, where the wearied soldiers, after a struggle of unexampled severity, were at length enabled to taste a few hours of repose (2).

Results of the battle, and losses on both sides.

Such was the terrible battle of Eylau, fought in the depth of winter, amidst ice and snow, under circumstances of unexampled horror; the most bloody and obstinately-contested that had yet occurred during the war; and in which, if Napoléon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had wellnigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never, in modern times, had a field of battle been strewed with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians twenty-five thousand had fallen, of whom above seven thousand were already no more: on that of the French, upwards of thirty thousand

(1) Wilson, 106, 107. Dum. xviii. 35, 37. Jon. ii. 365. Bign. vi. 133, 131.

(2) Wilson, 108, 109. Jon. ii. 365, 366. Dum. xviii. 37, 39.

were killed or wounded, and nearly ten thousand had left their colours, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterwards. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced: the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of twelve eagles taken from their antagonists; while they had made spoil of sixteen of the Russian guns, and fourteen standards. Hardly any prisoners were made on either side during the action; but six thousand of the wounded, most of them in a hopeless state, were left on the field of battle, and fell into the hands of the French (1).

Aspect of the field of battle on the following day. Never was spectacle so dreadful as the field of battle presented on the following morning. Above fifty thousand men lay in the space of two leagues, weltering in blood. The wounds were, for the most part, of the severest kind, from the extraordinary quantity of cannon-balls which had been discharged during the action, and the close proximity of the contending masses to the deadly batteries which spread grape at half-musket shot through their ranks. Though stretched on the cold snow, and exposed to the severity of an arctic winter, they were burning with thirst; and piteous cries were heard on all sides for water, or assistance to extricate the wounded men from beneath the heaps of slain, or load of horses by which they were crushed. Six thousand of these noble animals encumbered the field, or, maddened with pain, were shrieking aloud amidst the stifled groans of the wounded. Subdued by loss of blood, tamed by cold, exhausted by hunger, the foemen lay side by side amidst the general wreck. The Cossack was to be seen beside the Italian; the gay vinedresser, from the smiling banks of the Garonne, lay athwart the stern peasant from the plains of the Ukraine. The extremity of suffering had extinguished alike the fiercest and the most generous passions. After his usual custom, Napoléon in the afternoon rode through this dreadful field, accompanied by his generals and staff, while the still burning piles of Serpallen and Saussgarten sent volumes of black smoke over the scene of death: but the men exhibited none of their wonted enthusiasm; no cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard; the bloody surface echoed only with the cries of suffering, or the groans of woe. It is this moment which the genius of Le Gros has selected for the finest and most inspired painting that exists of the Emperor, in that immortal work, which, amidst the false taste and artificial sentiment of Parisian society, has revived the severe simplicity and chastened feeling of ancient art (2).

For nine days after the battle, the French remained at Eylau, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and apparently awaiting some pacific overture

(1) Jom. ii. 365. Dum. xviii. 39, 40. Wilson, 108, 109, 111.

The official accounts of this great battle on both sides are so much interwoven with falsehood, as to furnish no clue whatever to the truth. That of Napoleon is distinguished by more than his usual misrepresentation. He states his loss at 1900 killed, and 5700 wounded, in all 7600. [58th Bulletin.] Judging by his usual practice, which was to avow a loss about a fourth of its real amount, this would imply a loss of 30,000 men. At St. Helena he admitted that he lost 18,000; (Monte, *Mélanges*, 268.) and, considering that the Russians admit a loss of above 20,000, that their artillery throughout the day was greatly superior to that of the French, and that they sustained no loss in any quarter comparable to that of Augereau's corps, which was so completely destroyed that its remains were immediately incorporated with the other corps, and the corps itself disappeared entirely from the Grand Army, it may safely be concluded that this estimate is not exaggerated.

"Our loss," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "at Eylau, was enormous—why conceal the truth? The Emperor avowing the truth at Eylau would have appeared to me more truly great than putting forth an official falsehood which no child could believe, more especially if he was nephew or son of Col. Semelé of the 24th regiment of the line, one of the finest in the army, and itself equal almost to a brigade, which was to a man destroyed."—D'ANNALES, ix. 367.

(2) Dum. xviii. 40, 41. Wilson, 109. Ann. Reg. 1807, 14, 15.

This admirable painting, the masterpiece of modern French art, is to be seen in the Luxembourg at Paris, standing forth in dark simplicity amidst its unreticent compeers: it is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun or Tempesta; and in grandeur of thought and of effect, greatly excels any British work of art since the days of Reynolds.

Inactivity
and losses of
the French
after the
battle.
Feb. 14.

from the enemy. The only movement of any consequence which was attempted was by Murat, with twelve regiments of cuirassiers, who approached the Russian position in front of Königsberg; but they were defeated by the Allied horse, with the loss of four hundred killed and three hundred prisoners. Elated with this success, the Cossacks became daily more enterprising in their excursions: night and day they gave the enemy no rest in their position; their foraging parties were all cut off; and to such a length was this partisan warfare carried, and so completely did the superiority of the Cossacks in its conduct appear, that during the ten days the French remained at Eylau, upwards of fifteen hundred of their cavalry were made prisoners, and brought into Königsberg. Meanwhile, the relative situation of the two armies was rapidly changing: the Russians, with the great seaport of Königsberg in their rear, were amply supplied with every thing, and their wounded carefully nursed in the great hospitals of that city; while the French, still starving on the snows of Eylau, and unable, from the superiority of the Russian horse, to levy requisitions in the surrounding country, were daily reduced to greater straits from want of provisions, and totally destitute of all the accommodations requisite to withstand the rigour of the season (1).

Napoléon
calls in all
his rein-
forcements,
and propo-
ses peace.

Meanwhile Napoléon, however, was not idle. The day after the battle he issued orders for all the troops in his rear to advance by forced marches to the scene of action. The cuirassiers of Nanseut, which had not been engaged, arrived in consequence two days after. Lefebvre received orders to suspend the blockade of Dantzic, and concentrate his corps at Osterode, in order to form a reserve to the army, and co-operate with Savary, who had the command of Lannes' corps on the Narew. All the bridges on the Lower Vistula were put in a posture of defence, and Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau. Such, however, had been the havoc in the army, that the Emperor, notwithstanding these great reinforcements, did not venture to renew hostilities, or advance against Königsberg, the prize of victory, where he would have found the best possible winter quarters, and the steeples of which were visible from the heights occupied by his army (2). Even the critical position of the Russian army, with its back to the sea and the river Pregel, where defeat would necessarily prove ruin, could not induce Napoléon to hazard another encounter; and finding that the Russians were not disposed to propose an armistice, he de-

Feb. 15.

termined himself to take that step. For this purpose, General Bertram was sent to Benningsen's outposts with proposals of peace both to the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. The Russian general sent him on to Memel, where the latter was, with a letter strongly advising him not to treat, and representing that the fact of Napoléon proposing an armistice after so doubtful a battle, was the best evidence that it was not for the in-

Feb. 17.

terest of the Allies to grant it. The terms proposed were very different from those offered after the triumph of Jena: there were no more declarations that the House of Brandenburg must resign half its dominions (3), or that he would make the Prussian nobles so poor that they should be reduced to beg their bread (4).

(1) Wils. 109, 111. Dum. xviii. 49, 51.

(2) When Napoleon began the battle of Eylau, he never doubted he would be in Königsberg next day. In his proclamation to his soldiers, before the action commenced, he said, "In two days the enemy will cease to exist, and your fatigues will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose."

And on the same day Berthier wrote to Josephine—"The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen on the road to Russia; to-morrow Königsberg will receive the Emperor."—WILSON, 113.

(3) Hard. ix. 395, 399. Lucches. Bign. vi. 154.

155.

(4) Napoléon's letter to the King of Prussia was

Which are
refused by
Prussia.

Frederick William, however, was not led to swerve from the path of honour even by this tempting offer. Widely as the language of the French Emperor differed from that which he had formerly employed, and clearly as his present moderation evinced the extent of the losses he had sustained at Eylau, still the existing situation and recent engagements of the Prussian monarch precluded his entering, consistently with national faith, into a separate negotiation. The Emperor of Russia had just given the clearest indication of the heroic firmness with which he was disposed to maintain the contest, by the vigorous campaign which he had commenced in the depth of winter, and the resolution with which he had sustained a sanguinary battle of unexampled severity. The conduct of England, it is true, had been very different from what it had hitherto been during the Revolutionary War, and hardly any assistance had been received, either from its arms or its treasures, by the Allies engaged in a contest of life or death on the shores of the Vistula; but this parsimonious disposition had recently relented, and some trifling succours had just been obtained from the British government, which, although unworthy for England to offer, were yet gratefully received, as indicating a disposition on the part of its cabinet to take a more active part in the future stages of the struggle (1). Under the influence of these feelings and expectations, the Prussian government, notwithstanding the almost desperate situation of their affairs, and the occupation of nine-tenths of their territories by the enemy's forces, refused to engage in any separate negotiation; an instance of magnanimous firmness in the extremity of danger which is worthy of the highest admiration, and went far to wipe away the stain which their former vacillating conduct towards Napoléon had affixed to the Prussian annals (2).

Napoléon retreats, and goes into cantonments on the Passarge.
Foiled in his endeavours to seduce Prussia into a separate accommodation. Napoléon was driven to the painful alternative of a retreat. Orders were given on the 17th for all the corps to fall back, the advanced posts being strengthened, in order to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of what was going forward or commencing a pursuit. Eylau was evacuated, and six hundred wounded abandoned to the humanity of the enemy; and the army, retiring by the great road through Landsberg, spread itself into cantonments on the banks of the Passarge from Hohenstein, where it takes its rise, to Braunsberg, where it falls into the Baltic Sea. Headquarters were established at Osterode, in the rear of the centre of the line; the bulk of the army was quartered between that place and Wormditt. Lefebvre received orders to return to Thorn, unite with the Polish and Saxon contingents, and resume the siege of Dantzic, the preparations for which had been entirely suspended since the general consternation which followed the battle of Eylau (3).

In these terms:—"I desire to put a period to the misfortunes of your family, and organize as speedily as possible the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediate power is necessary for the tranquillity of Europe. I desire peace with Russia—and, provided the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has no designs on the Turkish Empire, I see no difficulty in obtaining it. Peace with England is not less essential to all nations; and I shall have no hesitation in sending a minister to Menet to take part in a Congress of France, Sweden, England, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey. But as such a Congress may last many years, which would not suit the present condition of Prussia, your Majesty therefore will, I am persuaded, be of opinion that I have taken the simplest method, and which is most likely to secure the prosperity of your subjects. At all events I entreat your

Majesty to believe in my sincere desire to re-establish amicable relations with so friendly a power as Prussia, and that I wish to do the same with Russia and England."—HARD, ix. 396; SCHÖL, viii. 37—405.

(1) They consisted only of L. 80,000 in money. A further subsidy of L. 100,000, and L. 200,000 worth of arms and ammunition, which, with the promise of future succours, were furnished by the British government in May following, in return for a solemn renunciation, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, to all claim to the Electorate of Hanover.—HARD, ix. 397; *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 23; *Parl. Deb.* ix. 937.

(2) Bign. vi. 158. *Parl. Deb.* ix. 939. HARD, ix. 398. *Lacches.* i. 290, 291.

(3) WILSON, 115, 116. *Dam.* xviii. 56, 64.

The Russians advance, and also go into cantonments.

Benningsen hastened to occupy the country which the enemy had evacuated, and on the 23th February his headquarters were advanced to Landsberg. As the Russian army passed over the bloody fields of Preussisch-Eylau and Hoff, still encumbered with dead, and strewed with the remains of the desperate contest of which they had recently been the theatre, they felt that they had some reason to claim the advantage in those well-fought fields; and Benningsen issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he now openly claimed the victory (1).

Both parties claim the victory at Eylau.

Napoléon also addressed his soldiers; but though it was with his usual confidence, yet it was impossible to conceal from the men or from Europe that the Grand Army had now for the first time retreated, and that the remains of their comrades on the field of battle had to trust to the humanity of an enemy for their sepulture (2). In truth, however, not only the battle but the objects of the winter campaign had been equally divided. It was not to draw the French army from the Vistula to the Passarge, a distance of above a hundred miles, that Benningsen had concentrated his troops and resumed offensive operations in the depth of winter; and it was not to retire from within sight of the steeples of Königsberg, to the wretched villages on the latter stream; that Napoléon had fought so desperate a battle at Eylau. The one struck for Dantzic, the other for Königsberg, and both were foiled in their respective objects—fifty thousand men had perished without giving a decisive advantage to either of the combatants (3).

Operations of Essen against Savary. Combat of Ostrolenka.

To this period of the Polish war belong the operations of Essen and Savary on the Narew and the neighbourhood of Ostrolenka. Savary had occupied that town with a large part of Lannes' corps, who, as already mentioned, was sick; and Essen having received considerable accessions of force from the army of Moldavia, which raised his disposable numbers to twenty thousand men, received orders, early in February, to attack the French in that quarter, and engage their attention, in order to prevent any reinforcements being drawn from that corps to the main army, then advancing to the decisive battle of Eylau. Essen advanced with his corps on each side of the river Narew. That commanded by the Russian general in person on the right bank encountered Savary, who was supported by Suchet with his brilliant division; a rude conflict ensued, in which the Russians were finally worsted. Greater success, however attended their efforts on the left bank: supported by the fire of fifty pieces of artillery, they drove back the French to the walls of Ostrolenka, and entering pell-mell with

(1) Benningsen said—"Soldiers! As the enemy was manœuvring to cut us off from our frontiers, I made my army change its position, in order to defeat his projects. The French, deceived by that movement, have fallen into the snare laid for them. The roads by which they followed us, are strewed with their dead. They have been led on to the field of Eylau, where your incomparable valour has shown of what the Russian heroism is capable. In that battle more than thirty thousand French have found their graves. They have been forced to retire at all points, and to abandon to us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage. Warriors! you have now reposed from your fatigues; forward, let us pursue the enemy, put the finishing stroke to our glorious deeds, and after having, by fresh victories, given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country."—DUMAS xviii. 67.

(2) Napoléon's address was as follows:—"Soldiers! we were beginning to taste the sweets of re-

pose in our winter quarters, when the enemy attacked the first corps on the Lower Vistula; we flew to meet him; pursued him sword in hand for eighty leagues; he was driven for shelter beneath the cannons of his fortresses, and beyond the Pregel. In the combat of Bergfried, Dippen, Hoff, and the battle of Eylau, we have taken sixty pieces of cannon, sixteen standards; killed, wounded, or taken more than 40,000 Russians; the brave who have fallen on our side have fallen nobly, like tried soldiers. Their families shall receive our protection. Having thus defeated the whole projects of the enemy, we will draw near to the Vistula, and re-enter our winter quarters; whoever ventures to disturb our repose, shall repent of it—for beyond the Vistula as beyond the Danube, in the depth of winter as in the heat of summer, we shall always be the soldiers of the Grand Army."—DUM. xviii. 63.

(3) DUM. xviii. 64, 67. Wilson, 116.

the fugitives, penetrated into the principal square, and were on the point of obtaining decisive success, when Oudinot, who was marching with six thousand of the Guard to join the Grand Army from Warsaw, arrived with his division of fresh troops, and uniting with Suchet, who halted in the midst of his pursuit on the right bank to fly to the scene of danger, succeeded, after a bloody encounter in the streets, in driving them into the sand-hills behind the town, where a destructive cannonade was kept up till nightfall. In this affair the Russians lost seven guns and fifteen hundred men, and the French as many: but having succeeded in their object in defending the town, and keeping the communication of the Grand Army open with Warsaw, they with reason claimed the victory (1):

Immense sensation excited by the battle of Eylau in Europe. The battle of Eylau excited a prodigious sensation in Europe, and brought Napoléon to the very verge of destruction. Had a ministry of more capacity in military combination been then at the head of affairs in England, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the triumphs of 1813 might have been anticipated by seven years, and the calamities of Europe at once arrested. The first accounts of the battle received through the French bulletins, rendered it evident that some disaster had been incurred, and the anxious expectation every where excited by this unsatisfactory communication, was increased to the highest pitch of transport, when, from Benningsen's report, it appeared that he claimed the victory, and, from the stationary condition of the Russian army in front of Königsberg, and the ultimate retreat of the French to the banks of the Passarge, that these pretensions were not devoid of foundation. It was confidently expected that, now that Napoléon had for once been decisively foiled, the Austrians would instantly declare themselves, and their forty thousand men in observation in Bohemia be converted into a hundred thousand in activity on the Elbe (2). To stimulate and support such a combination, the public voice in England loudly demanded the immediate despatch of a powerful British force to the mouth of the Elbe: and recollecting the universal exasperation which prevailed in the north of Germany at the French, in consequence of the enormous requisitions which they had every where levied from the inhabitants, whether warlike or neutral, there cannot be a doubt that the appearance of fifty thousand English soldiers would have been attended with decisive effects both upon the conduct of Austria and the future issue of the war. Nothing, however, was done; the English ministry, under the direction of Lord Howick, notwithstanding the most urgent entreaties from Russia and Prussia, sent no succours in men or money. The decisive period was allowed to pass by without any thing being attempted in support of the common cause, and the British nation in consequence had the Peninsular war to go through to regain the vantage ground which was then within their grasp (3).

(1) *Sav.* iii. 36, 39. *Wilson*, 119. *Jour.* ii. 367, 368. *Dom.* xviii. 69, 75.

(2) "I trembled," says Jomini, speaking in the person of Napoléon, "lest 150,000 of those mediators had appeared on the Elbe, which would have plunged me in the greatest difficulties. I there saw that I had placed myself at the mercy of my enemies. More than once I then regretted having suffered myself to be drawn on into those remote and inhospitable countries, and received with so much asperity all who sought to portray its danger. The Cabinet of Vienna had then a safer and more honourable opportunity of re-establishing its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813, but it had not resolution enough to profit by it, and my firm confidence proved my salvation."—*JOMINI*, ii. 369.

(3) "Repeated and urgent applications were made in February and March, 1807, for an English army, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to co-operate with the Swedish forces in Pomerania, but in vain.—Some subsidies were granted in April, but no troops sailed from England till July, when they consisted only of 8000 men, who were sent to the Island of Rugen." To the earnest request for an auxiliary force, Lord Howick replied on March 10—"Doubtless the spring is the most favourable period for military operations, but at the present juncture the allies must not look for any considerable land force from Great Britain." This was after the battle of Eylau was known by the cabinet of London.—See *Annual Register*, 1807, 23, and *LUCASSEN*, ii. 295—296.

Universal
consternation
at Paris on the
news being
received of
Eylau.

In proportion to the sanguine hopes which this bloody contest excited in Germany and England, was the gloom and depression which it diffused through all ranks in France. The Parisians were engaged in a vortex of unusual gaiety; balls, theatres, and parties succeeded one another in endless succession, when the news of the battle of Eylau fell at once on their festivity like a thunderbolt. They had learned to distrust the bulletins; they saw clearly that Augereau's divergence had been occasioned by something more than the snow-storm. The funds rapidly fell, and private letters soon circulated and were eagerly sought after, which rendered a true and even exaggerated account of the calamity. Hardly a family in Paris but had to mourn the loss of some near relation: the multitude of mourners cast a gloom over the streets, the general consternation suspended all the amusements of the capital. The most exaggerated reports were spread, and found a ready entrance in the excited population; one day it was generally credited that Napoléon had fallen back behind the Vistula; the next that a dreadful engagement had taken place, in which he himself with half his army had fallen. So far did the universal consternation proceed, that the members of the government began to look out for their own interests in the approaching shipwreck; and even the Imperial Family itself was divided into factions, Joséphine openly supporting the pretensions of her son, Eugene, to succeed to the throne, and the Princess Caroline employing all the influence of her charms to secure Junot, governor of Paris, in the interest of her husband Murat (1).

Napoléon
demands a
third con-
scription
from the
14th Octo-
ber.

The general gloom was sensibly increased when the message of Napoléon, dated March 26, to the Conservative Senate, announced that a fresh conscription was to be raised of eighty thousand men, in March, 1807, for September, 1808. This was the third levy which had been called for since the Prussian war began; the first when the contest commenced, the second during the triumph and exultation which followed the victory of Jena, the third amidst the gloom and despondency which succeeded the carnage of Eylau. No words can do justice to the consternation which this third requisition excited amongst all classes, especially those whose children were likely to be reached by the destructive scourge. In vain the bulletins announced that victories were gained with hardly any loss. The terrific demand of three different conscriptions, amounting to no less than two hundred and forty thousand men in seven months, too clearly demonstrated the fearful chasms which sickness and the sword of the enemy had made in their ranks. The number of young men who annually attained the age of eighteen in France, which was the period selected for the conscription, was about two hundred thousand. Thus, in half-a-year, more than a whole annual generation had been required for a service which experience had now proved to be almost certain destruction. So great was the general apprehension, that the government did not venture to promulgate the order, until, by emissaries and articles in the public journals, the public mind had been in some degree prepared for the shock; and when it was announced, Régnaud de Saint-Jeand'Angely, the orator intrusted with the task, shed tears, and even the obsequious Senate could not express their acquiescence by any of the acclamations with which they usually received the imperial mandates. So powerful was the public feeling, so visible and universal the expression of terror in the capital, that it was found necessary to assuage the general grief by a clause, declaring that the new levy was at first to be merely organized as an army of

reserve for the defence of the frontier, under veteran generals, members of the Conservative Senate. These promises, however, proved entirely elusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Caudine Forks, or the murder of the Guerillas in the fields of Spain (4).

Immense activity of Napoleon to repair his losses. Meanwhile, the prodigious activity of the Emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organize the new levies, wring the *shew*s of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depots on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula, were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony, provided for the remounting of the cavalry and artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions every where in Germany (2), furnished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the Emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was in fact making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. All the fortresses on that river, and on the Flemish frontier, were armed, and put in a posture of defence, and the new levy directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organized into battalions with the coast guard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and La Vendée. "It is necessary," said he, "that, at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surrounds our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which covers our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation (3)."

Extreme danger of Napoleon's situation at this juncture. Neither Napoléon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau; nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterwards said to the ministers of the French Emperor, "we can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master; and such, in

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 167, 169. Bign. vi. 239.

(2) The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost tremendous extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoléon at this time: and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own side, indispensable for the equipment of his own troops. By an imperial decree, in March 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish,

200,000 pairs of shoes;
50,000 great-coats;
16,000 coats;
37,000 waistcoats.

M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execution of this order, had

no alternative but to contract with *English houses* for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the result was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that too at a time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort. A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807 will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources, the magnitude of which almost exceeds belief.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 293, 294.

(3) Bign. vi. 238, 239, Ann. Reg. 1807, 3.

truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoléon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the privilege of opinion or popular passion, whether democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an unbroken series of triumphs, is indispensable to the existence of such an authority; it has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has periled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoléon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances; it obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest. It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoléon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage ground which he had gained, which was the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain but by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin.

Ruinous
effect of the
surrender of
the Prussian
fortresses.

The Polish winter campaign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the common cause, and in an especial manner the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lestocq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right; yet, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear, Ney around the walls of Magdeburg, Davoust before Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organize the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoléon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula—a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty.

Observa-
tions on the
military
movements
of both par-
ties.

Benningsten's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johannesberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland, and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and if executed with more vigour at the moment of attack, would have led to the most important results; his subsequent retreat in presence of the grand army, without any serious loss, and the desperate stand he made at Eylau, as well as the skill with which the attacks of Napoléon were baffled on that memorable field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of that age of glory. Napoléon's advance to Pultusk and Golymin, and subsequently his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg, in the depth of winter, were distinguished by all his

usual skill in combination and vigour in execution ; but the results were very different from what had attended the turning of the Austrian and Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena—columns were here cut off, communications threatened, corps planted in the rear ; but no serious disasters followed ; the Russians fronted boldly and fought desperately on every side, and from the hazardous game the assailant suffered nearly as much as the retiring party ; a striking proof of what so many other events during the war conspired to demonstrate, that a certain degree of native resolution will often succeed in foiling the greatest military genius, and that it was as much to the want of that essential quality in his opponents, as his own talents, that the previous triumphs of Napoléon had been owing.

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR. FOX'S ADMINISTRATION.

FEBRUARY 1806—MARCH 1807.

ARGUMENT.

Important Civil Changes which originated during the War—Effects of the Accession of the Whigs to Power—Their Plan for a new system for the Recruiting of the Army—Great Changes introduced in this particular—Argument in support of it by Mr. Windham—Reply of the former Ministers on the Subject—The Bill passes—Reflections on this Subject—Error of the Ministerial measure as far as regards the Volunteers—Temporary Service now in a great degree abandoned—Abolition of the Slave Trade—Argument against the Change by the West India Planters—Argument of Mr. Wilberforce and others for the Abolition—The Abolition is carried—Deplorable effects of the Change hitherto on the Negro race—but they are not chargeable on its authors, but on subsequent alterations—Lord Henry Petty's plan of Finance—Argument in favour of it—Argument against it by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Perceval—Counter Plan proposed by them—Reflections on this Subject—Prejudicial Effect in the end of these discussions—General Character of the Whig measures at this period—Their combined humanity and wisdom—Foreign Transactions—First Expedition to South America—Capture of Monte-Video—A Second Expedition against Buenos-Ayres is resolved on—Its Failure—Court-martial on General Whitelocke, the Commander, who is cashiered—Capture of Curaçoa, and Establishment of the Republic of Hayti—State of Affairs in Turkey—Dismissal of the Waywodes of Walachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim—Violent Remonstrances of Russia and England, which produce the Repeal of the Measure—Meanwhile the Russian armies invade the principalities—and War is declared—Rapid progress of their Troops in these Provinces—They require the aid of a Naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to—Description of the Dardanelles—Ultimatum of Great Britain, and declaration of War by Turkey—Sir John Duckworth passes the Dardanelles—The Divan resolve on submission, but are roused to exertion by General Sebastiani—The Turks negotiate to gain time and complete their preparations—The English renounce the enterprise, and with difficulty repass the Dardanelles—Blockade of those Straits, and naval action off Tenedos—Descent by the British on the coast of Egypt—which is Defeated—Great Discontents at these repeated disasters throughout Great Britain—Bill for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick—Argument in favour of it by Lord Howick—Argument against it by Mr. Perceval—Change of Ministry—Cause which led to it—Composition of the New Cabinet—Arguments in Parliament against the King's conduct—and in support of it by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning—Dissolution of Parliament—General Election, and Great Majority in favour of the New Ministry—Character of the Whig Ministry, and effects of their fall—Reflections on their Foreign Measures—Violent Irritation arising from them in Russia—Repeated and ineffectual applications which Alexander had made for aid from England during the Polish War—The Dardanelles Expedition is an exception to the general inexpedience of their foreign policy—The defeats of England during their Administration were ultimately beneficial.

Important civil changes which originated during the war. If history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and calamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military adventure appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when

no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national mind : Mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, the social dispositions, the abstract sciences are cultivated; the violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness; but it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires; but we shall look in vain, in the authors or statesmen of either, for the original thought and vigorous expressions which characterized the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoléon.

Effects of
the accession
of the
Whigs to
power.

The accession of the Whig Ministry to the direction of affairs, was an event eminently calculated to afford full scope to the practical application, to the measures of the legislature, of those ideas of social improvement which the agitation and excitement of the preceding fifteen years had caused to take deep root among a large proportion of the thinking part of the people. The men who had now succeeded to the helm, embraced a considerable part of the aristocracy, much of the talent, and still more of the philanthropy of the state. For a long course of years they had been excluded from power; and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attention to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when their leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which revolutionary principles receive by falling upon the highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country.

Their plan
for a new
system for
the recruiting
of the
army.

The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system, in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censures which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr. Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evident, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoléon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting which can ever exist in a free country, are altogether unequal to those which are at the command of despotism, whether monarchical or democratic, unless in those rare periods of public excitement when the intensity of patriotic feeling supplies the want of powers of compulsion on the part of the executive; and accordingly, throughout the whole war, great difficulty had been experienced by the British government in providing a proper supply of soldiers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment—the jealousy of a free constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the

militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom—and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line, by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve, in 1803, had not been such as to hold out any inducements for a repetition of the attempt. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued, it being thought that in a country where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service was over, might endanger the state, by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr. Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment; but the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system, by the introduction of enlistments for a limited period of service (1).

Great change in the composition of the army. Arguments in support of it by Mr. Windham.

(1) It was argued in Parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially Mr. Windham—"The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel; and when the champion falls, the cause is lost. The notion of a levy *en masse* or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened, that when the army was defeated the contest has been restored by a contest of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never perhaps be made capable of producing much effect in war, till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which more than any other two have decided the fate of the present world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men, burning with patriotic ardour, were around the Emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity.

"Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, how are they to be obtained? Above all, how are we to insure to this country, what unquestionably it has never had, a never failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things, choice or force. In the continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes, and undoubtedly, wherever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry, and force them to become soldiers, there can be

no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country; not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes, a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer do, that something effectual must be done; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us; but unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed.

"Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us; and yet the experience of thirteen years' warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated, that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupation of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army? Without this, our means of recruiting must be little better than deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price they ask for them; and, accordingly, none but the ignorant and thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a height has this arisen, that of late years our only resource has been recruiting boys; men grown up, even with all the grossness, ignorance, and improvidence incident to the lower orders, are too wary to accept our offers; we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation the weakness and improvidence of youth. The practice of giving bounties is decisive proof of this; whatever is bestowed in that way, shows that the service does not stand upon its true footing. Men require no temptation to engage in a profession which has sufficient inducements of its own. Never can the system of supplying the army be considered as resting upon its proper basis, till the necessity of bounties shall have ceased, and the calling of a soldier shall be brought to the level with other trades and professions, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is frequently paid for permission to enter.

The Bill
passed.

The bill met with a most strenuous opposition, although the early divisions which took place upon it evinced a clear preponderance in favour of Ministers (4); but it at length passed both Houses by a decided

"The great change by which this might, at first sight, appear to be effected, is by raising the pay. But independently of the financial embarrassments which any considerable alteration in that respect would produce, there is an invincible objection to such a change in the licentious habits, inconsistent with military discipline, which an undue command of money would generate among the soldiers. Provision in sickness and old age; pensions for the wounded; honorary distinctions suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party, are much safer recommendations; but, above all, a change in the service of enlistment from life to a limited period, is the great alteration to which we must look for elevating the attractions of the army. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe, except our own, and it is the condition of entering that large and efficient part of our own forces, now 100,000 strong, which is composed of the regular militia. That this system will have the effect of inducing men to enter, is so clear, so certain, so totally incontrovertible, that it is unnecessary to urge it. There is no man who would not prefer having an option to having none. Our immense armies in India are all raised, and that, too, without the slightest difficulty, for limited service. A system of rewards for the regular and faithful soldier should also be established; and that severity of discipline which is at present so much an object of terror to all persons of regular habits, should be materially softened; not that it will, in all probability, ever be possible to dispense entirely with corporal punishment in the army, for there are some turbulent spirits who can only be repressed by the fear of it, but the discipline may be rendered infinitely less rigorous. By this means a better description of men will be induced to enter the army; and the better men you get, the less necessity will there be for severe punishment. By these changes, also, the temptation to desertions will be greatly diminished; the great and alarming frequency of which, of late years, has been mainly owing to high bounties and bad regulations; and in legislating for this matter, it is material to invest courts-martial with a discretionary power to modify the penalty of desertion more materially, or take it away altogether, if it has been committed only in a moment of intoxication, or from the influence of bad example, or the soldier has made amends by returning to his colours.

"It is a mistake to argue that the benefits I have proposed to introduce, being for the most part prospective, and to be reaped only at the end of seven or fourteen years, will not influence the inconsiderate description of men who form the great bulk of our common soldiers. That may be true as it relates to the description of men who, under the combined influence of bounties and intoxication on the one hand, and service for life and flogging on the other, almost exclusively enter our service. But the great benefit which may fairly be expected to result from a measure of the sort now proposed is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless or inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages which the military service holds out. Such considerations may frequently, indeed, have little weight with the young man himself, but will they prove equally unavailing with his relations, arrived at a more advanced period of life, and familiar, from experience, with the difficulty of getting on in

every profession? What attracts young men of family into the East India Company's service, notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a lifetime spent in exile, and a climate so deadly, that not one in ten ever survives it? Not present advantages, for the pay, for the first ten years, hardly equals the young man's expenses. It is ultimate benefits; the spectacle of nabobs frequently returning with fortunes; the certainty that all who survive will become entitled, after a specified period of service, to pensions considerable, with reference to the rank of life to which they belong. Such considerations may not be so decisive with the lower orders as the higher, but there is no rank to whom the sight of the actual enjoyment of the advantages of a particular profession will not speedily prove an attraction.

"To effect these objects, I propose that the term of military service should be divided into three periods, viz for 7, 14, and 21 years for the infantry, but for 10, 16, and 5 for the artillery and cavalry, in consideration of the additional time requisite to render men efficient in those branches of service. At the end of each of those periods, the soldier is to have right to his discharge. If discharged at the close of the first, he is to have right to exercise his trade or calling in any town of the kingdom; at the end of the second, besides that advantage, to a pension for life; at the end of the third, to the full allowance of Chelsea, which should be raised to 9d. and in some cases 1s. a-day. If wounded or disabled in the service, to receive the same pension as if he had served out his full time. Desertion to be punished, in the first instance, by the loss of so many years' service; in very aggravated cases only by corporal infliction.

"Great exaggeration appears to have prevailed as to the benefits to be derived from the volunteer system. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that such a force can be brought to such a state of efficiency as to be able to cope with regular forces. Essential service may be derived from such a force, but not in the line to which they have at present been directed. With a view to bring them back to their proper sphere, as they were originally constituted in 1798, it would be advisable to reduce their allowances and relax their discipline. Those corps only which are in a rank of life to equip themselves, and are willing to serve without pay, should be retained; the remainder of the population should be loosely trained, under regular officers, to act as irregular troops. It is not by vainly imitating the dress, air, and movements of regular troops, that a voluntary force can ever be brought to render effectual service. These are my fixed ideas; but as I find a volunteer force already existing, it would not be politic at once to reduce it. All I propose, in the mean time, is to reduce the period of drilling from 85 days to 26, and make other reductions which will save the nation £.857,000 a-year; all future volunteers to receive their pay only, and the trained bands to receive a shilling a-day for 14 days a-year, but not to be dressed as soldiers, and not drilled or exercised as such. Rank should be taken from the volunteer officers; their holding it is monstrous injustice to the regular army." [Parl. Deb. vi. 652, 690. Ann. Reg. 1806, 48, 50.]

Reply of the former ministers on the subject.

To these admirable arguments it was answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—"At no period of our history has the science, uniformity,

(1) The division which decided the principle of the bill took place on March 14, 1806, when the

numbers were—Ayes, 285; Noes, 119; Majority, 166.—Ann. Reg. 1806, p. 51.

majority, the numbers in the Peers being 97 to 40, giving a majority to Ministers of 57. The clauses regarding the volunteer force, however, were abandoned or modified in the ultimate stages of the discussion, the effect of the

and discipline of the army been comparable to what it is at this moment; and for these immense benefits, the profession at large are aware we are more indebted to the improvements of the present Commander-in-chief (the Duke of York), than of any other individual in existence. Under his able administration, the army is considerably superior in number to what it ever was at any former period (*). The recruiting, as it now exists, is steadily producing sixteen thousand soldiers a-year; and when the act for its future regulation is generally enforced, which is not yet the case, this number may be expected to be greatly increased. Is this a crisis to break up a system producing, and likely to produce, such results? The average tear and wear of the army is about fifteen thousand a-year; so that the present system is not only adequate to the maintenance of its numbers, but likely to lead to its increase. The proposed alteration on the term of service in the army, is one of the most momentous that Parliament can be called on to discuss; and for this alone all other reasons, that the change once introduced is irreparable: be it good or be it bad in its results, it cannot be departed from; for when the soldiers have once tasted the sweets of limited, they will never submit to the restraint of unlimited service. Surely, on so vital a subject, and where a false step once taken is irretrievable, it is expedient to proceed with caution, and make the experiment on a small scale before we organize all our defenders on the new system.

"The system of enlisting for a limited period is no novelty; its application on a great and universal scale alone is so. For the last three years, our endeavours have been directed, while a superior encouragement was held out to persons entering for general service, to obtain at the same time the utmost possible number of men for limited service in the army—both in the army of reserve, and laterly under the additional force act. If, then, we have failed in obtaining an adequate supply of men even, under a limited scale, both in time and space, how can we expect to obtain that advantage by taking away one of these limitations? If, indeed, we could not, under the present system, obtain an adequate force liable to be detached abroad, there might be a necessity for some change in our system; but when we have one hundred and sixty-five thousand liable to be sent abroad, and the only check upon so employing them is the necessity of not weakening ourselves too much at home, why should we preclude ourselves from raising, by the present method, such a description of force as experience has proved, in this country at least, is most easily obtained? The expiry of the soldiers' term of service must, independent of any casualties, produce a large chasm in the army; and what security have we, that if the whole or the greater part of the army is raised in that way, a great, it may be a fatal, breach may not at some future period occur in our ranks at the very time when their service is most required? What the inconvenience of the soldiers being entitled to their discharge at the end of each period during a war is likely to prove upon experience, may be judged of by recollecting how embarrassing this system, some years back, was found to be in the militia, notwithstanding the great comparative facility of replacing men when serving at home—an embarrassment so great, that

it led, as a matter of necessity, to the extension of the service in that branch of our military system. What reason is there to suppose that the soldiers in the regular army will not be as prone as their brethren in the militia to take advantage of the option of a discharge when their title to demand it arrives? And if so, and this heavy periodical drain be added to the existing casualties of the troops, what chance have we of keeping up a force which even now wants twenty-five thousand men to complete its ranks?

"It is in vain to refer to foreign states as affording precedents in point; their situation is totally different from ours. In Russia unlimited service prevails, and the same was the case in Austria during the best days of the monarchy. In 1797 a similar regulation to the one under discussion was passed prospectively for the future, to take effect at the expiration of a certain number of years, but it has not yet, I believe, been acted upon; and if it has, the disasters of Ulm and Hohenlinden afford but little reason to recommend its adoption. Napoleon's soldiers are all raised by the conscription for unlimited service; and although, in the old French monarchy, troops in sufficient numbers were certainly obtained by voluntary enlistment for limited periods, yet the period of service was more extended than that now proposed; and the circumstances of that country, abounding in men, with few colonies to protect, and still fewer manufactures to draw off its superfluous hands, and a strong military spirit in all classes, can afford no precedent for this country, where, employment, from the prevalence of manufactures, is so much more frequent—whose population is by nearly a half less—which is burdened with a vast colonial empire, all parts of which require defence—and where the natural bent of the people is rather to the sea than the land service. Nor is the reference to our East India possessions more fortunate; for the enlistment for a limited period prevailed in the Company's European regiments for a number of years, yet their battalions raised in this way were always weak in numbers and inefficient, and were all reduced on that very account during Lord Cornwallis's first government of India. All the prepossessions of Mr. Pitt were in favour of limited service—his opinions on this subject were repeatedly stated to the house. The opinions of a great variety of military men were taken on the subject; but these opinions were so much divided, that he arrived at the conclusion that the inconveniences and risks with which the change would be attended more than counterbalanced its probable advantages.

"The proposed changes on the volunteer force appear to be still more objectionable. Admitting that it is desirable to diminish the great expense of that part of our establishment; allowing that, now that the corps have attained a considerable degree of efficiency, it may be advisable to diminish considerably the number of days in which they are to serve at the public expense, is that any reason for substituting a tumultuary array, without the dress, discipline, or habits of soldiers, for a body of men qualified not only to act together, but capable, if drafted into the militia or the line, of at once acting with regular soldiers? Will the volunteer corps exist for any length of time under so marked a system of discouragement as it is proposed to

(*) Regulars and Militia, 1st January, 1802,
— — 1st January, 1804,
— — 1st March, 1806;

bill as to them being limited to a proper restriction of the period of permanent duty. But the great principle of enlisting for a limited service, was by its passing introduced into the British army, and has never since been totally abandoned; and, considering the great achievements which it subsequently wrought, and the vast consumption of life which the new system adequately supplied, its introduction is to be regarded as a memorable era in the history of the war (1).

Reflections on the measure. If called upon to decide in favour of one or other of the able arguments urged on the opposite sides of this important question, it might, perhaps, be no easy matter to say on which the weight of authority and reason preponderated. But experience, the great resolver of political difficulties, has now settled the matter, and proved that Mr. Windham rightly appreciated the principles of human nature on this subject, and was warranted in his belief that, without any increase of pay, limited service, with additional encouragements in the way of retiring allowances and privileges, would provide a force perfectly adequate even to the most extensive military operations of Great Britain. From the official returns it appears that the rate of recruiting rose in a rapid and striking manner after the system of limited service was adopted, and before the expiration of a year from the time it was first put in force, had more than doubled the annual supply of soldiers for the army (2). Though variously modified, the same system has ever since prevailed with perfect success in every branch of the service, and to its influence, combined with the improved regulations for its discipline, pay, and retired allowances, great part of the glories of the Peninsular campaigns is to be ascribed. On examining the confident opinions expressed by many eminent and respectable military men on the impossibility of providing a supply of adequate force for the English army by such a method, it is difficult to avoid the inference, that implicit reliance is not always to be placed on the views of practical men in legislative improvements; that their tenacity to existing institu-

impose upon them, without pay, without rank, without public favour? And is this the moment, when the whole military force of the continent, with the exception of Russia, is in the hands of our enemies, to incur the hazard of substituting, for a voluntary disciplined, a motley array of undisciplined forces, and run the risk of exciting the disaffection of the powerful hands who at the call of their sovereign have so nobly come forward in the public defence? [Parl. Deb. vi. 652, 706.]

"At the commencement of the present war we raised 80,000 men by the operation of the ballot. That system has its evils; but when it is indispensable in a given time to raise a large force for the public service, there is no alternative. In recognising this right, however, which flows necessarily from the acknowledged title of the sovereign power to call for the assistance, in times of public danger, of all its subjects, parliament has been careful to fence it round with all the safeguards which the essence of a prerogative so liable to abuse will admit of: it is determined by lot; the person drawn has the option to provide a substitute; and this is the footing upon which the militia stands. A still further limitation exists where the call is made, not upon the individual, but the district; and the

district is allowed the option, instead of providing the man, to pay a fine; and this is the principle on which the additional force bill, at present in operation, which we are now called on to repeal, is founded. But the ballot for the militia is, by the proposed change, to cease on the termination of the war; it then ceases to be a militia, and becomes a part of the regular force raised by the Crown. The act proposed to be repealed is producing at the rate of 18,000 recruits a-year, besides the men raised by ballot for the militia. Proposing, as the Ministers now do, to abandon at once both these resources, are they prepared to show that the new measures will supply this great deficiency? Would it not be expedient first to try the experiment on a small scale, to be assured of its success, before we commit the fortunes of the state to the result of the experiment? It is an old military maxim, not to manoeuvre in presence of an enemy; but the measures now in agitation do a great deal worse, for they not only change the composition of your force, but shake the loyalty and submission of the soldiers, in presence of the most formidable military power Europe has ever possessed." [Parl. Deb. vi. 967, 990.]

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 62.

(2) OLD SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1, to July 1, 1806.	10,922
July 1, to January 1, 1806,	9,042
January 1, to July 1, 1806,	10,783
July 1, to January 1, 1807,	6,276

(New system in operation since January 1, 1807.)

NEW SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1, to July 1, 1807,	11,412
July 1, to January 1, 1808,	7,734
Rate of recruiting from January 1, to April 1,	21,000
Ditto from April 1, to July 1,	21,000

—Ann. Reg. 1806, 40, 41.

tions is often as great as the proneness of theoretical innovators to perilous change; that little credit is to be given to the most eminent professional persons when they claim for the people of a particular country an exemption from the ordinary principles of human nature; and that true political wisdom is to be gathered, not by discarding the lessons of experience, but extending the basis on which they are founded, and drawing conclusions rather from a general deduction of the history of mankind, than the limited views, however respectably supported, of particular individuals.

Error of the Ministerial plan so far as regards the volunteers.

To these observations on Mr. Windham's military system, however, one exception must be made in regard to that part of his plan which related to the volunteers. There can be no doubt that in this particular he did not display the same knowledge of human nature which was elsewhere conspicuous. Admitting that the volunteers were very far indeed from being equal to the regular forces; that their cost was exceedingly burdensome, and that they could not be relied on as more than auxiliaries to the army; still in that capacity they were most valuable, and not only qualified to render some service by themselves, but as forming a reserve to replenish the ranks of the regular forces of incalculable importance. The campaigns of 1812 and 1813 demonstrate of what vast service such a force, progressively incorporated with the battalions of the regular army, comes to be when their ranks are thinned in real warfare, and how rapidly they acquire the discipline and efficiency of veteran troops: and in this view the tumultuary array of Mr. Windham, without the clothing, discipline, or organization of soldiers, could have been of little or no utility. Nor is it of less moment that the volunteer corps, by interesting vast multitudes in the occupations, feelings, and honour of soldiers, powerfully contribute to nourish and expand that military ardour in all ranks which is indispensable to great martial achievements. Veteran troops, indeed, may smile when they behold novices in the military art imitating the dress, manners, and habits of soldiers; but the experienced commander, versed in the regulating principles of human exertion, will not deem such aids to patriotic ardour of little importance, but willingly fan the harmless vanity which makes the young aspirant imagine that his corps has in a few weeks acquired the efficiency of regular forces. Imitation even of the uniform, air, and habits of soldiers is a powerful principle in transferring the military ardour to the breasts of civilians. Philopœmen judged wisely when he recommended his officers to be sedulously elegant in their dress, arms, and appointments. He was well acquainted with human nature who said, that to women and soldiers dress is a matter of no ordinary importance. Many nations have been saved from slavery by the passion for what an inexperienced observer would call mere foppery.

Temporary service now in a great degree abandoned.

In later times the system of temporary service has been in some degree superseded in the British army, and the majority of recruits are now enlisted for life. And in weighing the comparative merit of these two opposite systems, it will probably be found that the plan of enlisting men for limited periods is the most advisable in nations in whom the military spirit runs high, or the advantages of the military service are such as to secure at all times an ample supply of young men for the army, and where it is of importance to train as large a portion as possible of the population to the skilful use of arms, in order to form a reserve for the regular force in periods of danger; and that enlistment for life is more applicable to those nations or situations where no national danger is apprehended, and it is the object of government to secure rather a permanent body of disciplined men, subject to no causes of decrease but the ordinary casualties of the service, for

the ordinary pacific duties, rather than spread far and wide through the nation the passion for glory or the use of arms. A provident administration will always have a system established, capable either of contraction or expansion, which embraces both methods of raising soldiers; and this, for nearly thirty years, has been the case with the British army.

Abolition of the slave trade. Important as the matter thus submitted to Parliament in its ultimate consequences undoubtedly was, when it is recollected what a great and glorious part the British army bore in the close of the struggle, it yet yielded in magnitude to the next great subject which the new Ministers brought forward for consideration. This was the ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE; a measure, which in its remote effects appears to affect the fortunes of half the human race. This great change was not finally completed till the following session of Parliament; but the preparatory steps were taken in this, and it belongs properly to the present period of English history, which treats of the measures of the Whig Administration.

Arguments against the change by the West India interest. It was urged by Mr. Hibbert and the advocates of the West India interest, both in and out of Parliament,—“That the British West India Islands were settled, and have ever been cultivated under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and those acts of Parliament which have confirmed the West India Islands in the most perfect assurance that they should continue to receive supplies of negroes from Africa; that the cultivation of these colonies cannot be carried on but by means of slave labour; and the cultivation of their interior, which is indispensable to their security, cannot be promoted if the slave trade be abolished. If this bill shall pass into a law, the very worst effects may be anticipated from the change, not only to the colonies themselves, but the general interests of the empire. The commerce which the West Indies maintain, is the most important of the whole British dominions. It pays annually in duties to the public treasury upwards of L.3,000,000; employs more than 46,000 seamen; contributes one-third to the whole exports, and one-third to the imports; takes off L.6,000,000 a-year worth of domestic manufactures; and is pre-eminently distinguished above all others by this important feature, that it is all within ourselves, and not liable, like other foreign trade, to be turned to our disadvantage on a rupture with the power with whom it is conducted. This measure, however, if carried into effect, must in a few years diminish the property vested in the British West India Islands, and open the means of hastening the progress of rival colonies, to whom the advantages of a full supply of negroes will still remain open. It must forbid the supply of losses to the negro population, which originate in accident or diseases peculiar to the climate, and which the most humane and provident management is unable altogether to prevent; stop the completion of establishments already begun; and altogether prevent the extension of cultivation into the interior of the islands, without which they can never either attain a state of security or reach the degree of wealth and splendour of which they are susceptible.

“The most disastrous effects, both to individuals and the public, may be anticipated from the ultimate consequences of the measure under consideration, not to mention the confusion and ruin which it must occasion to families; the capital now sunk in cultivation which it must destroy; the calamities attendant on revolt and insurrection which it must occasion; the emigration it will induce in all who have the means of extricating themselves or their capital from so precarious a situation; the despair and apathy which it must spread through those who have not the means of escape; what incalculable

evils must it produce among the black population? The abolition of the slave trade is a question which it is at all times perilous to agitate, from the intimate connexion which it has in the minds of the negroes with the abolition of slavery itself, and the necessary effect which it must have in perpetuating the discussion of that subject in the mother country to the total destruction of all security in the planters, or repose in the minds of the slave population. From the moment that this bill passes, every white man in the West Indies is sleeping on the edge of a volcano, which may at any moment explode and shiver him to atoms. Throwing out of view altogether all considerations of interest, and viewing this merely as a question of humanity, it is impossible to contemplate without the utmost alarm the perils with which it is fraught. The existence of a black power in the neighbourhood of the most important island of the British West Indies, affords a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade. It is impossible to contemplate that volcano without the deepest alarm, nor forget that its horrors were produced by well-meant but ill-judged philanthropy, similar to that which is the prime mover in the present question (1).

"It is a total mistake to suppose that the evils, enormous and deplorable as they are, of Central Africa, arise from the slave trade. These evils are the consequence of the cruel habits and barbarous manners of its inhabitants; they existed for thousands of years before the slave trade was heard of, and will continue for thousands of years after it is extinct. Civilize the interior of the vast continent—humanize their manners—abolish the savage practice of selling or putting to death captives made in war, and you indeed make a mighty step in extirpating the evils which we all lament. But as long as these savage customs prevail; as long as the torrid zone is inhabited by a thousand tribes all engaged in contests with each other, and with all of whom slavery to prisoners made in war is the only alternative for death, it is hopeless to expect that the stoppage even of the whole vent which the purchase of negroes by Europeans affords, would sensibly affect the general prevalence of the slave traffic. What are the 50,000 whom they annually transport across the atlantic, to the innumerable multitudes who are driven across the Sahara Desert, or descend to Egypt for the vast markets of the Mussulman world? But to suppose that the partial stoppage of it in the British dominions: that the prohibition to transport the fifteen thousand negroes who are annually brought to our shores could have a beneficial effect, is ridiculous. So far from producing such a result, its tendency will be diametrically the reverse: it will drive the slave trade from the superior to the inferior channel; from the great merchants of Liverpool, who have done so much—for their own interest perhaps, but still done so much—to diminish its horrors, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are as yet totally unskilled in its management, and treat the captives with the utmost barbarity: as our own colonies decline from the stoppage of this supply of labourers, those of the others nations who have not fettered themselves in the same way will augment; the cultivation of sugar for the European market will ultimately pass into other hands, and we shall in the end find that we have cut off the right arm of our commerce and naval strength, only to augment the extent and increase the horrors of the slave trade throughout the world (2)."

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Wilberforce, Lord Howick, and Lord Grenville; "A higher principle than considerations of mere expedience, the

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. 331.

(2) Parl. Deb. vi. 979, 998.

Arguments of Mr. Wilberforce and others for the abolition. dictates of justice, require that this infamous traffic should be abolished. Were it merely a question of humanity, we might consider how far we should carry our interference; were the interests of the British empire alone involved, it might possibly be a matter of expedience to stop a little short of total abolition. But in this instance, imperious justice calls upon us to abolish the slave trade. Is it to be endured that robbery is to be permitted on account of its profits? Justice is still the same; and you are called upon in this measure, not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but to your own planters; to interfere between them and their otherwise certain destruction, and, despite their fears, despite their passions, despite their prejudices, rescue them from impending ruin. This trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in: when it is recollected what guilt has been incurred in tearing the Africans, by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their social ties, their country, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery: when it is considered also that the continuance of this atrocious traffic must inevitably terminate in the ruin of the planters engaged in it, surely no doubt can remain that its instant abolition is called for by every motive of justice and expedience.

"Much is said of the impossibility of maintaining the supply of negroes in the West Indies, if the slave trade is abolished. Are we then to believe that the Divine precept, 'Increase and multiply,' does not extend to those islands; that the fires of youth, adequate to the maintenance and growth of the human species in all other countries and ages of the world, are there alone, in the midst of plenty, unequal to their destined end? But the fact is adverse to this monstrous supposition; and it is now distinctly proved that the slave colonies are perfectly adequate to maintain their own numbers (1). The excess of deaths above births in Jamaica is now only 1-24th *per cent*; and when it is recollected that the registers of mortality include the deaths among the negroes who are newly arrived and set to work, which always amounts, between those who perish in the harbours and shortly after being set to work, to at least 10 *per cent*, it is evident that the numbers of the settled Africans are more than maintained by their own increase. Nor is the argument that the importation of negroes is requisite to cultivate the waste lands in the interior of the islands, better founded. If the numbers of the Africans increase, it is altogether incredible that their labours should not be adequate to clear the wastes of those diminutive islands. According to the most moderate computation, it would require the slave trade to be continued for two centuries to cultivate the whole interior of Jamaica and Trinidad; and can it be endured that so frightful a traffic as this, fraught as it must be with the tearing of above two millions of Africans from their families and country, should be endured for such a period, for an object which, in one-fourth of the time, might by the native increase of their numbers in those islands be attained (2)?

(1) Excess of deaths above births in Jamaica from 1698 to 1730.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>per cent</i> .
— " — " 1730 to 1755.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>per cent</i> .
— " — " 1755 to 1769.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ <i>per cent</i> .
— " — " 1769 to 1780.	3-5ths <i>per cent</i> .
— " — " 1780 to 1800.	1-24th <i>per cent</i> .

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 658.

(2) It is now completely demonstrated, by an experiment on the greatest scale, that the African race, even when in a state of slavery, is not only able to maintain its own numbers, but rapidly to increase them. In the slave States of America there

are 2,200,000 negroes; and from 1790 to 1830, the whites have augmented in the proportion of 80 to 100; but the blacks in that of 112 to 100.—*Toussaint's Democracy in America*, ii. 345, 346, note.

"Let us then instantly abolish this infamous traffic; and we may then with confidence look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree the natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection afforded them; and they may gradually be prepared for that character, when the blessings of freedom may be securely extended to them. Throughout all history we shall find that slavery has been eradicated by means of the captives being first transformed into predial labourers, attached to the soil, and from that gradually ascending to real freedom. We look forward to the period when the negroes of the West India islands, become labourers rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country which has extended to them these benefits, and when they may be securely called on to share largely in the defence of those islands, in which at present they are only a source of weakness. The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave trade is, that by closing that supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all their undertakings, we will compel them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their own estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus, not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented, in so far at least as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that, too, on the securest of all foundations, the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed.

"It is in vain to argue that, according to the barbarous customs of Africa, captives made in war are put to death, and thus if the outlet of the slave trade is closed, the reproach to humanity arising from the sale of captives will be prevented from taking place. The most recent and intelligent travellers, on the contrary, have informed us, what every consideration on the subject *a priori* would lead us to expect, that the existence of the slave trade is itself, and ever has been, the great bar to the civilisation of the interior of Africa, by the temptation held out to the chiefs on the coast to engage in the traffic of negroes, and the continual encouragement thus afforded to the princes in the interior to carry on constant wars, from the vast profit with which the sale of their captives is attended. It forms, in fact, with a great many of those robber chieftains, a chief branch of revenue. If we would promote, therefore, the great and truly Christian work of civilizing Central Africa, we must first commence with abolishing the slave trade; for as long as it continues, the selfishness and rapacity of the native chiefs will never cease to chain its unhappy inhabitants to a life of violence and rapacity in the powerful, of misery and degradation in the poor.

"The argument, that if we do not carry on the slave trade some other nations will, possibly with less commiseration for the sufferings of the captives, if admitted, would shake to their foundation every principle of public and private morality. At that rate every band of robbers might plead in their justification, that if they did not knock down and plunder travellers, other banditti might do the same, and possibly superadd murder to their other atrocities, and therefore the lucrative rapine should not be discontinued. This argument, however, bad as it is, has not even the merit of being founded on fact. If we abolish the slave trade, who is to take it up? The Americans have already preceded us in the race of humanity, and fixed a period in 1808, when the traffic is immediately to cease; and a bill is at present in progress through their legislature, to affix the penalty of death to a violation of this enactment. How are France and Spain to carry it on, when they have

hardly a ship on the ocean? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and where is she to get capital to carry it on?

"The dangers, so powerfully drawn, as likely to result from this measure, are really to be apprehended, not from it, but from another with which it has no connexion, viz., the immediate emancipation of the negroes. This, it is said, flows necessarily from the step now about to be taken; if you do not follow it up in this manner, you stop short half way in your own principles; in fact, the ulterior measure, if the first be adopted, cannot be averted. It is to be hoped, indeed, that this great step will, in the end, lead to the abolition of slavery in all our colonies; but not in the way or with the dangers which are anticipated. On the contrary, it is here that another of the great benefits of the measure under consideration is to be found. By the effects of this measure it is to be hoped *slavery will gradually wear out without the intervention of any positive law*, in like manner as it did in a certain degree in the States of Greece and Rome, and some parts of the states of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom; and as has been permitted with the happiest effects in the colonies of Spain and Portugal. In America, measures for the gradual emancipation of the negroes have been adopted, and nothing could conduce more powerfully to insubordination, than if, by the continuance of the slaves, similar steps were not to be introduced in the West India islands, and the slaves there were perpetually tantalized by the sight of the superior comforts of their brethren on the main land. The dangers apprehended *would indeed be real, if immediate emancipation were to be proposed*, for that would produce horrors similar to those which have happened in St.-Domingo; but nothing of that kind is in contemplation; on the contrary, it is expressly to exclude them, and induce that gradual emancipation which is called for, alike by justice to the planters and the interests of the slaves themselves, that the measure under discussion is proposed (1)."

The abolition is carried, June 21, 1806.

The latter arguments, enforced with much eloquence, and supported by the great principles of Christian charity, prevailed with the legislature. By a series of enactments, passed in the course of the sessions of 1806, the slave trade was restrained within very narrow limits; and at length, in the succeeding session, it was entirely abolished, and the penalty of transportation affixed to every British subject engaged in it; the numbers were, in the Commons, 283 to 16, majority 267; in the Peers, 100 to 36, majority 34—and thus was the stain of trafficking in human flesh for ever torn from the British name (2).

Deplorable effects of the change hitherto on the negro race.

There can be no question that this great step was recommended by every consideration of justice and humanity; nevertheless its effects hitherto have been in the highest degree deplorable. Never was a more striking example than this subject has afforded in its later stages, of the important truth that mere purity of intention is not sufficient in legislative measures, and that unless human designs are carried into execution with the requisite degree of foresight and wisdom, they often become the sources of the most heart-rending and irremediable calamities. The prophecy of Mr. Hibbert and the opponents of the abolition, that the

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 652, 666, 947, 955.

Lord Grenville concluded his speech with these eloquent words—"I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that eminent person (Mr. Wilberforce), on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life carried into effect—a measure so

truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous prosperity of his country, and the welfare of mankind—a measure which will diffuse happiness among millions now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn."—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 664.

(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 672, 995.

slave trade, instead of ceasing, would only change hands, and at length fall into the management of desperate wretches who would double its horrors, has been too fatally verified, and to an extent even greater than they anticipated. From the returns laid before Parliament, it appears that the slave trade is now *four times* as extensive as it was in 1789, when European philanthropy first interfered in St.-Domingo in favour of the African race, and twice as great as it was when the efforts of Mr. Wilberforce procured its abolition in the British dominions. Great and deplorable as were the sufferings of the captives in crossing the Atlantic, in the large and capacious Liverpool slave-ships, they are as nothing compared to those which have since, and are still endured by the negroes in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese traders, where several hundred wretches are stowed between decks in a space not three feet high; and in addition to the anguish inseparable from a state of captivity, they are made to endure, for weeks together, the horrors of the blackhole of Calcutta. Nearly two hundred thousand captives, chained together in this frightful manner, now annually cross the Atlantic; and they are brought, not to the comparatively easy life of the British West India Islands, but to the desperate servitude of Cuba or Brazil; in the latter of which several hundred negroes are worked, like animals, in droves together, without a single female among them, and without any attempt to perpetuate their race (1), they are worn down by their cruel taskmasters to the grave by a lingering process, which on an average terminates their existence in seven years (2)!

But they are not chargeable on its authors, but subsequent changes.

This lamentable and heart-rending result of such persevering and enlightened benevolence, however, must not lead us to doubt the soundness as well as humanity of the principles which Mr. Wilberforce so eloquently advocated, or to imagine that the general rules of morality are inapplicable to this question, and that here alone in human affairs it is lawful to do evil that good may come of it. The observation, that it was our duty to clear our own hands of the iniquity, leaving it to Providence to eradicate the evil in others at the appointed time, was decisive of the justice of the measure; the evident necessity which it imposed on the planters of attending, for their own sakes, to the comfort of the negroes, and providing means for the multiplication of their numbers, conclusive as to its expedience. It is not the abolition of the slave trade, but the subsequent continuance of ruinous fiscal exactions, and at last the irretrievable step of unqualified emancipation, which have given this deplorable activity to the foreign slave trade. The increase in the foreign slave colonies for the last

(1) Walsh's Brazil, ii. 474, 485.

Enormous present extent and horrors of the slave trade.—now the number is at least 200,000. It appears from the Consular Returns to Parliament, that in 1829, 74,653 slaves were embarked for Brazil alone from the African coast, of whom 4579 died in the short passage of one month; and in the first half of 1830 the numbers were no less than 47,258, of whom 8 per cent died on the passage. At the same period 13,000 were annually imported into the Havannah, and at least an equal number into the other slave colonies, making in the year 1830 about 130,000. [Parl. Pap. 1830, B. 82, 89, 138.] But these numbers, great as they are, have now received a vast increase from the effects of the British Slave Emancipation Act, passed in 1833. In fifteen months, ending January 1835, there sailed from the single

port of Havannah 170 slave-ships, capable of containing, on an average, each at least 400 persons: the importation of slaves into Cuba is now above 85,000 a-year, while the numbers imported into Brazil, from the stimulus given to slave labour by the anticipated decline of produce in the British islands consequent on that measure, have increased in nearly the same proportion. Nor is it surprising that, in spite of all the efforts of the British government, and all the vigilance of the British cruisers, this infernal traffic should now advance at this accelerated pace; for such is the demand for slaves, occasioned by the continual decline in the cultivation of sugar in the British West India islands, under the combined influence of heavy taxation and the Emancipation Act, that the profit on a single cargo of slaves imported into the Havannah is 100 per cent, and the adventurers cannot be considered as losers if one vessel arrives safe out of three dispatched from the coast of Africa.—Parl. Pap. 1835. A. 115—116.

wenty years, at a time when the British West India Islands were comparatively stationary, has been so rapid, that it was evident some powerful and strong causes have been at work to occasion the difference (1). These causes are to be found, in a great measure, in the heavy duties on British colonial produce, amounting at first to 30s., then to 27s., and latterly to 24s. on each hundredweight of sugar, from which the foreign growers were exempted in the supply of foreign markets. This enormous burden, which, on an average of prices since 1820, has been very nearly 75 per cent on that species of produce, has, notwithstanding all their efforts, for the most part, if not entirely, fallen on the producers (2).

Nor is this all—the precipitate and irretrievable step of emancipation, voted on the legislature by benevolent, but incautious and perhaps mistaken, feeling, has already occasioned so great a decline in the produce of the British West Indies, and excited such general expectations of a still greater and increasing deficiency, that the impulse thereby given to the foreign slave trade to fill up the gap has been unbounded, and, it is to be feared, almost irremediable (3).

Immense increase of produce in the above colonies of late years. (1) Twelve years ago, the only exports of Puerto-Rico were cattle and coffee, and the only sugar she received was from importation. In 1833 she exported 83,750 tons—more than a sixth of the whole British consumption. The export of sugar from Cuba was on an average of 1814, 1815, and 1816, 51,000 tons; in 1833 it had risen to 120,000 tons. In 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average exports of sugar from Brazil was 26,250 tons; in 1833, though a bad year, the exports were 70,970 tons. To increase, since the Emancipation Act passed, is been still greater—but no official accounts of late years have yet been made public.—See *Parl. Report* on the commercial state of the West Indies, 1836.

Comparatively stationary condition of the British Islands. On the other hand, the produce of the British West India Islands during the same period, has been comparatively stationary. The colonial produce exported from those islands to Great Britain in the year 1812, was 124,200 tons of sugar, and 6,290,000 gallons of rum; in 1830, 85,000; and in 1833, 265,000 tons of sugar, and 3,920,000 gallons of rum; the shipping in the former period was 180,000; in the latter, 263,338 tons. The total value of the produce of the islands in the former period was £1,185,160,000; in the latter, including all the colonies gained by the peace of Paris in 1814, only £22,496,000.—*PARRA*, 309; *COLQUHOUN*, 378—341; *POWELL'S Parl. Tables*, 1—124, 128.

Enormous annual injustice to which they have been exposed. (2) There is no opinion more erroneous than that which commonly entertained, that the import duties on sugar, like other taxes on consumption fall on the purchaser. There is always, indeed, a struggle between the producer and consumer, so to who should bear the burden—but it is not always in the power of the former to throw it on his latter. In this instance the attempt has almost totally failed. It appears from the curious table of prices compiled by Mr. Colquhoun, that even during the high prices of the years from 1807 to 1812, the West India proprietors paid from a third to a half of the duties on sugar, without being able to lay it on the consumers; the average of what they paid for those years being £1,115,251 per annum. The estimated revenue of these proprietors, during those years, was under £4,000,000; so that at that period they paid 20 per cent on their incomes to government. In addition to this, it was proved by

the documents laid before the committee of the House of Commons in February 1831, that an annual burden of £1,023,299 was laid on the British West India Islands, in consequence of the enhancement of the price of necessary articles to which they were exposed under the restrictive system. In this way, even under the high prices from 1807 to 1812, they were paying at least 50 per cent on their incomes in taxation; and as the price, since that time, of their produce, has fallen at least two-thirds, with a reduction of only a ninth (3s.) on the import duty, it may be safely concluded, that since 1820 the West India proprietors have paid, directly and indirectly, at least seventy-five per cent on their income, to government, and in the years when prices were low, at least a hundred per cent. Nothing more is required to explain the distressed condition of these colonies, even before the Emancipation Bill was passed, which at once, without any equivalent, confiscated at least 60 per cent on their remaining property. The value of slaves was estimated by Colquhoun in 1812, at £55 a head, but in 1833, when the Act passed, it had risen to at least £1.75 over head, notwithstanding the change in the value of money; and the compensation money (£20,000,000 on 631,000 slaves) will not, after all deductions are made, yield £1.25 a head, or more than 38 per cent to the proprietors. Few such instances of the destruction of property by fiscal and legislative enactments are to be found in the history of mankind.—See *PARRA*, 304, and 307; *COLQUHOUN*, 59, 325; and *Report on West India affairs*, Commons, 7th February 1831.

It is frequently said that the increase in the produce of these colonies since the peace, is a proof that their alleged distresses are either unfounded or exaggerated. This is a complete mistake; the planters had no other way to meet the enormous fiscal burdens laid upon them, since a diminution in the cost of production was out of the question, after the abolition of the slave trade, but by making the utmost exertions to augment its quantity, and thence the increase of colonial produce, which, by perpetuating the lowness of price, rendered it totally impossible for them to lay the enormous import duty, now 100 per cent, on the consumers. Like a man sunk in a bottomless bog, all the efforts they could make for their extrication tended only to land them deeper and more irretrievably in the mire.

(3) The following table shows the decline of colonial produce exported from Jamaica under the first year of the Emancipation Act.

It is in these measures that the real cause of the lamentable increase in the foreign slave trade is to be found; it is the multitude who forced on these measures, who have frustrated all the benevolent efforts of Mr. Wilberforce and Mr. Fox, and rendered the abolition of the slave trade in the British dominions, the remote and innocent cause of boundless misfortunes to the negro race. The British slaves, since the slave trade was abolished, had become fully equal to the wants of the colonies; their numbers, without any extraneous addition, were on the increase; their condition was comfortable and prosperous beyond that of any peasantry in Europe; and large numbers were annually purchasing their freedom from the produce of their own industry. Here then was a *stationary* negro population, rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent feudal serfs of Europe, and from which they might, in like manner, have been emancipated singly, as they acquired property, which all had the means of earning, without either risk to themselves, injury to their masters, or increase to the demand for foreign slave labour. But now all these admirable effects of the abolition of the slave trade have been completely frustrated, and the humane but deluded inhabitants of Great Britain are burdened with twenty millions, to ruin, in the end, their own planters, consign to barbarism their own negroes, cut off a principal branch of their naval strength, and double the slave trade in extent, and quadruple it in horrors, throughout the world. A more striking instance never was exhibited of the necessity of attending, in political changes, not only to benevolent intentions, but prudent conduct; and of the fatal effect of these institutions, which, by giving the inhabitants of a particular part of the empire an undue share in the general administration, or admitting the torrent of public feeling to sway directly the measures of government, too often destroy prosperity the most extensive, and occasion calamities the most unbounded (1).

SUGAR.			RUM.		COFFEES.	
Years.	Cwts.	Hogsheds.	Punchons.	Gallons.	Casks.	Lbs.
1834	1,525,154	79,465	30,676	3,189,949	22,384	17,859,277
1835	1,319,023	68,087	27,038	2,660,687	13,495	10,489,292
Decrease,	206,131	11,378	3,638	529,262	8,889	7,369,985

Taking an average of these various sorts of produce, it is evident that, notwithstanding an uncommonly fine season, and the vigorous exertions of the stipendiary magistrates, the produce of the island has fallen off in one year nearly a fourth of its total amount! The Parliament of Jamaica, in their address to the governor of the island on August 10, 1835, observed, "There never was a finer season or more promising appearance of canes; but, nevertheless, the crop is greatly deficient, and many British ships have in consequence returned with half cargoes, some with none at all. Our decided opinion is, that each succeeding crop will progressively become worse. In a few cases the apprentices do work for wages; but the opposite disposition so immeasurably preponderates, that no confidence whatever can be placed on voluntary labour. Knowing, as we do, the prevailing reluctance of the negroes to work of any kind, the thefts, negligences, and outrages of every sort which are becoming of frequent occurrence; seeing large portions of our neglected cane fields overrun with weeds, and a still larger

extent of our pasture lands returning to a state of nature; seeing, in fact, desolation already overspreading the very face of the land, it is impossible for us, without abandoning the evidence of our senses, to entertain favourable anticipations, or divert ourselves of the painful conviction, that the progressive and rapid deterioration of property will continue to keep pace with the apportionship, and that the termination thereof must, unless strong preventive measures are applied, complete the ruin of the colony." Making every allowance for the passions and exaggerations of a tropical climate, this statement here made is too strongly borne out by the decrease in the official returns, and examples of corresponding measures in St. Domingo, to leave a doubt that they are, in the main at least, founded in truth—See *Custom Returns, Kingston, Jamaica, 2d August 1835; and Address of Assembly, August 10, 1835.*

(1) The British Ministry who, in 1834, passed the measure of Slave Emancipation are always answerable for these consequences; on the contrary, they

An important change in the British system of finance was also made by the same administration, which, although not brought forward till the spring of 1807, may be fitly considered now, in order not to interrupt the narrative of the important military events which at that period occurred on the continent of Europe

The foundation of this plan, which was brought forward by Lord Henry Petty on the 29th January, 1807, was, that the time had now arrived when it had become expedient to make a provision for a permanent state of warfare; that the bad success of all former coalitions had demonstrated the slender foundation on which any hopes of overthrowing the military power of France on the continent of Europe must rest, while the hostile disposition and immense power of Napoléon gave little hope that any durable accommodation could be entered into with him. "All nations," said his lordship, "that still preserve the shadow even of their independence, have their eyes fixed on us as the only means of regaining the freedom they have lost. It becomes the government of Great Britain, seeing the proud eminence on which they are placed, to take an enlarged view of their whole situation, and to direct their attention to that future, which, notwithstanding the signal deliverance they have hitherto obtained, seems still pregnant with evil. Our present permanent revenue is above L.32,000,000 a-year, being more than three times what it was at the close of the American war; and there can be no doubt that means might be found in additional taxes to pay the interest of loans for several years to come. But looking, as it is now our duty to do, to a protracted contest, it has become indispensable to combine present measures with such a regard for the future, as may give us a reasonable prospect of being enabled to maintain it for a very long period.

"In considering our resources, the two great objects of attention are the Sinking-Fund and the system of raising the supplies as much as possible within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of war taxes.

The first of these is a durable monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom; it had the support of his illustrious political opponent, Mr. Fox; and, however widely these two great men were divided on most other subjects, it at last received that weight of authority which arises from their entire coincidence of approbation. When this system was commenced in 1786, the sinking-fund was only $\frac{1}{11}$ th part of the debt; whereas it is now $\frac{1}{4}$ of the whole debt, and only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the unredeemed portion; a result at once striking and satisfactory, more especially when it is recollected that it has been obtained in twenty years, whereof fourteen have been years of war. The war taxes, which have been raised to their present amount chiefly by the operation of the heavy direct taxes; are first, the treble assessed taxes introduced by Mr. Pitt, and more lately the property-tax which has been substituted in its room. The experience of the last year has amply demonstrated the expedience of the augmentation of that impost to ten per cent, which it was our painful duty to propose last year; for under its operation the war taxes have now reached L.21,000,000 a-year, and the sinking-fund amounts to L.8,300,000 annually.

deserve the highest credit for the courage they displayed, in opposition to the wishes of many of their supporters, in carrying through the great grant of twenty millions to the planters—a relief so seasonable and extensive, that hitherto, at least, it has almost entirely to the persons who received it, prevented the natural consequences of the emancipation from being felt. The torrent of public feeling was irresistible; all they could do was to moderate its effects, which by the protracted period of ap-

pronticeship, and the grant to the slave-owners, was done to a very great degree. The English people must answer for the measure, be its ultimate effects on themselves and the negro race good or bad. The reflection suggested is:—What is the character of national institutions which permit a measure, likely to be attended with such cruel and disastrous consequences, to be forced against their will on a reluctant government?

"In the present state of the country our war expenses cannot be calculated at less than thirty-two millions annually. To provide for this, independent of additional war taxes, which are now so heavy that we are not warranted in calculating on any considerable addition to their amount as likely to prove permanently productive, is the problem we have now to solve. To effect this, it is proposed in this and the three following years to raise a loan of L.12,000,000; for the fourth year, or 1810, L.14,000,000; and for the ten succeeding years, if the war should last so long, L.16,000,000 annually. In each successive year in which these loans shall be raised, it is proposed to appropriate so much of the war taxes as will amount to ten per cent on the sum so raised. Out of this ten per cent the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking-fund to provide for the redemption of the capital. When the funds are at 60, or interest at five per cent, such a system will extinguish each loan in fourteen years after it was contracted. The moment this is done, the war taxes impledged for the redemption of that loan should be repealed. Thus, as the loan of L.12,000,000 will, on this supposition, be paid off by 1831, the L.1,200,000 a-year of war taxes now pledged to its redemption, will in that year be remitted. Upon examining this system, it will be found that it may be carried on for seven years, viz. from 1807 to 1814, without impledging any part of the income tax; so that if peace is thus concluded, the whole income tax may, without violating any part of the present system, be at once remitted—a most desirable object, as that is a burden which nothing but the last necessity should induce us to perpetuate beyond the continuance of hostilities.

"As, however, the ten per cent on the loan annually contracted is in this manner to be taken from the war taxes, means must be provided to supply that deficiency, which, if the war continues for a long tract of years, will, from the progressive growth of those burdens on the war taxes, become very considerable. To provide for this deficiency, it is proposed to raise in each year a small supplementary loan, intended to meet the sum abstracted for the charges of the principal loan from the public treasury, and this supplementary loan is to be borrowed on Mr. Pitt's principle of providing by fresh taxes, laid on in the indirect form, or by the falling in of annuities for the interest of the debt, and one per cent more to create a fund for its redemption. The loan so required this year, will, from the excess of the war taxes above the war expenditure, be only L.200,000; the annual charges of which on this principle will be only L.13,333; and as annuities to the amount of L.13,000 will fall in this year, it will not be necessary, either for the principal or supplementary loan, to lay on any new taxes this year. Taking an average so as to diffuse the burden created by these supplementary loans as equally as possible over future years, and setting off against them the sums which will be gained annually by the falling in of annuities, the result is, that it will only be necessary to raise in seven years immediately subsequent to 1810, L.203,000 annually by new taxes; a sum incredibly small, when it is recollected that we are now in the fifth year of a renewed war, the most costly and momentous in which the country ever was engaged.

"Under the present system, with regard to the public debt, framed upon the acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, no relief whatever will be experienced from the public burdens till a very distant period, probably from 1834 to 1844; and during the latter years of the operation of the sinking fund, it will throw such immense sums, not less than forty millions annually, loose upon the country, as cannot fail to produce a most prejudicial effect upon the money market; while the sudden remission of taxes to the amount of

L.30,000,000 a-year, would produce effects upon artisans, manufacturers, and holders of property of every description, which it is impossible to contemplate without the most serious alarm. In every point of view, therefore, it seems to be highly desirable to render the sinking fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present power, and diffusing over a greater number of years those extensive effects, which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last year of its operation. The arrangements prepared with this view are founded on the superior advantage of applying to the redemption of debt a sinking-fund of five per cent on the actual money capital, instead of one per cent on the nominal capital or amount of stock. This is to be the system applied to the loans of the first ten years; and in return for this advantage, it is proposed that, when the present sinking-fund shall have so far increased as to exceed in its amount the interest of the debt then unredeemed, such surplus shall be at the disposal of Parliament. By this means a larger sum will be annually applied to the sinking-fund from henceforward, than could have been obtained under the old system; the whole loans contracted in future during the war will be redeemed within forty-five years from the date of their creation, and without violating any of the provisions of the act 1792, establishing the present sinking-fund. Parliament, during the years of its final and greatest operation, will be enabled to administer a very great relief to the public necessities, and obviate all the dangers with which an undue rapidity in the contraction of debt would otherwise be attended (1)."

Argument
against it
by Lord
Castlereagh
and Mr. Per-
ceval.

In opposition to these able arguments, it was urged by Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Perceval, "That the proposed plan of finance proposes gradually to mortgage for fourteen years the whole of the war taxes for the interest of loans in war, a decided departure from all our former principles, which were to preserve religiously the distinction between war and permanent taxes, and would, if carried into effect for any considerable time, deprive the nation of almost all the benefit to which it is entitled to look upon the termination of hostilities. The new plan, moreover, will require loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year, than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were adhered to. At the end of twenty years it appears, from the calculations laid before Parliament, that this excess will amount to the enormous sum of L.193,000,000. The whole machinery of the new plan is cumbersome and complicated: the additional charges arising from that circumstance will amount to a very considerable sum. The ways and means intended to prevent the imposition of new taxes in future, viz.—the expired annuities, together with the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, are equally applicable *pro tanto* to mitigate their increase, under any other mode of raising loans that may be decided on; and their application in this way would be more advantageous than in the other, inasmuch as it is better to avoid contracting debt than gain relief by a remission of taxation.

Counter
plan pro-
posed by
them.

"It is futile to say that the public necessities compel us to have recourse to the perilous system of mortgaging the war taxes for the interest of future loans. It is here that the great danger of the new system is to be found: it is in breaking down the old and sacred barrier between the war and peace expenses, that the seeds of inextricable confusion

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 586. 594.

The speech of Lord Henry Petty on this occasion, is well worthy of the attention of all who wish to make themselves masters of the British Finances

during the Revolutionary War. It is the most distinct, luminous, and statesmanlike exposition on the subject, which is to be found in the whole range of the Parliamentary debates after the death of Mr. Pitt.

to our finances in future are to be found. It is quite possible, as appears from the authentic calculations before Parliament, to obtain the eleven millions a-year required for the deficiency of the war taxes below the war charges, without mortgaging the war taxes, without the immense loans required under the new system, and without any material or unbearable addition to the public burdens. The mode in which this great object is to be attained is, by resolving that when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking-fund in such year, instead of making provision for the interest of such loan in the taxes, the same shall be provided for out of the interest receivable on the amount of stock redeemed by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in that year. Any excess of national expenditure above the thirty-two millions to be fixed as the average amount of war expenditure, to be provided for in the usual manner. The data laid before Parliament prove, that under this plan, in fourteen years of war, one hundred and ten millions less will be borrowed than under that proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and though doubtless the sinking-fund will be greatly impaired, yet, after making allowance for its restricted operation from the charge of future loans on its amount, yet the total debt at the expiration of that period will be upwards of forty millions above that now proposed (1). Great evils both to the stockholders and the country must arise from the adoption of the new plan, in consequence of the enormous and inordinate loans, amounting before the close of the new plan, to not less than forty or fifty millions of stock annually, which must be contracted. Such immense loans must tend powerfully to lower the value of the public securities, lead to an extensive and undue increase of the circulating medium, and a rapid depreciation in the value of money, attended with the most prejudicial effects upon many branches of industry, and a general insecurity on the part of the holders of property. Above all, the principle of placing at the disposal of Parliament the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed, is calculated to lead to a much more extensive diversion of that fund from its destined purpose, than the system which Mr. Pitt had established; inasmuch as the latter only proposed to derive aid from the sinking-fund during war, and only to the precise extent of the interest of the sum redeemed within the year, leaving the fund in undiminished extent to operate upon the public debt on the return of peace; whereas the former places the surplus of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, absolutely and unreservedly at the disposal of Parliament, in peace as in war, without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802 shall be redeemed within forty-five years from that period. It is easy to foresee that such a power of appropriating a large part of the sinking-fund will be too powerful a temptation for the virtue of future governments; and that the practical result will be, that that noble institution will be irretrievably mutilated, and the nation lose the whole benefit of the immense sacrifices for the benefit of posterity which it has made during the whole continuance of the present contest. The equiva-

(1) Lord H. Petty's plan—

War loan for 14 years,	£.210,000,000
Supplementary loans for do.	94,200,000
	£.314,200,000
War taxes rendered permanent,	401,231,000
Unredeemed debt in 1820, at end of same time,	9,180,000
New taxes imposed,	2,051,000
New loans in 1820,	32,000,000
Sinking funds in 1820,	47,744,021

Lord Castlereagh's plan—

War loans, 11 millions a year, for 14 years,	£.154,000,000
Debt unredeemed at end of 1820,	358,000,000
War taxes rendered permanent,	none.
New taxes imposed,	2,547,000
New loan in 1820,	11,000,000
Sinking fund in 1820,	9,180,000

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 1014.

lent proposed to the fundholders of an additional five per cent sinking-fund on the war loans, is entirely deceptive; inasmuch as the depreciation of his property which must ensue from the improvident accumulation of loans in the market, with their necessary concomitant, an extensive and undue paper currency, must much more than compensate any additional value which it might acquire from this augmentation of the means of its liquidation (1)."

^{Budget for 1807.}
^{March 4.} The budget for the year 1807 was based on the new plan of finance; it included a loan of only L.12,000,000, which was contracted on very advantageous terms, and the whole expenditure was calculated on that system of making preparations for a long and protracted struggle (2), which the disastrous issue of the Prussian war gave too much reason to apprehend awaited the country (3).

^{Reflections on this subject.} The debates on Lord Henry Petty's able plan of finance are of little moment at this time, abandoned as his system soon was amidst the necessities and changes of future years; but the views brought forward on both sides were an essential deviation from the great principle of Mr. Pitt's financial policy, and presaged the approach of times when the provident policy so long upheld by his foresight, was to be abandoned with the common consent of both the great parties alternately intrusted with the administration of affairs. Mr. Pitt's principle was to provide the interest of each loan annually contracted, and the one per cent destined for the extinction of its principal, by means of indirect taxes which thereafter formed part of the permanent revenue of the country till the debt was extinguished; but both Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh seem to have imagined that the time had now arrived when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise an increased revenue in this form; and accordingly the plans of both were characterised by the great and decisive step of providing for the charges of future debt, not by future and permanent taxes, but by other means imposing no additional present burden on the country, but of course, for that very reason, trenching on its ultimate resources. The former proposed to do this by mortgaging the war taxes for the charges of all the debt which might hereafter be contracted, and rendering the amount of those taxes thus mortgaged a permanent part of the peace revenue: the latter, by leaving untouched the war taxes, but appropriating to the interest of future loans part of the present sinking fund, and thereby impairing to a proportionate extent its efficiency on the return of peace. Both implied a deviation from the cardinal point of Mr. Pitt's system, the providing for the discharge of the interest of all debts out of indirect taxes religiously set apart for that purpose; and it is remarkable, as an example how much the fortunes and destinies of a state are often determined by the character and life of a single master-

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 1004, 1018.

(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 1076.

(3) The budget for 1807 was stated by Lord Henry Petty as follows:—

Supply.		Ways and Means.	
Navy,	L. 16,997,837	Land and Mah,	L. 2,750,000
Army, ordinary,	15 465,311	Surplus of Consolidating Fund,	3,500,000
Extraordinaries arising,	4,333,710	War taxes,	19,800,000
Ordnance,	3,743,715	Lottery,	320,000
Miscellaneous,	1,860,000	Vote of credit,	3,000,000
Vote of credit,	3,000,000	Loans,	12,000,000
Interest of Exchequer bills,	1,200,000	Surplus of 1805,	171,000
Loyalty loan,	350,000		
Deficiency of Malt tax, 1805,	200,000		
			L. 41,541,000

—See Parl. Deb. viii. 1075.

For Great Britain and Ireland,	47,150,573
Deduct £17ths for Ireland,	5,545,677

Expenditure of Great Britain, L. 41,601,896

spirit, that this vast change, fraught, as experience has since proved it to have been, with the ruin of our financial prospects and probable ultimate subjugation as an independent state, was simultaneously proposed by the leaders of both Whigs and Tories, the moment that great statesman and his illustrious rival were mouldering in their graves.

Prejudicial
effect in the
end of these
discussions.

Had the period arrived, when it was totally impossible to provide for the charges of additional loans by progressive additions to the peace revenue, this change, however prejudicial, would not have been a matter of regret more than any other unavoidable calamity. But experience has now sufficiently demonstrated, that this was very far indeed from being the case; for, down to the very end of the war, new taxes were imposed to an extent, that *a priori* would have been thought impossible. As it was, therefore, the discussions which ensued on the rival finance projects of Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh, unnecessarily gave the first rude shock to the firm and provident system of Mr. Pitt's finance, by breaking down the barrier which had hitherto kept the funds destined for the discharge of the debt sacred from the avidity and short-sighted desires of the people, and accustoming them to regard both the revenue set apart for that purpose and the war taxes during peace, as a fund to which they might have recourse to relieve the war pressure of the moment. Of the two, if it had become necessary to make choice of one or other, the system of Lord Henry Petty was the most manly and statesmanlike with reference to domestic administration: inasmuch as it was not calculated to trench upon the sinking fund, until it had become equal to the loans annually contracted, by which means the increase of the amount of the whole debt, after that period, would have been rendered impossible, and in the mean time, to pledge the war taxes for the interest and charges of the sums borrowed; whereas that of Lord Castlereagh proposed at once to lay violent hands upon the sinking funds for the charges of all future loans, and yet give the nation the full benefit of the remission of all the war taxes on the return of peace. The former system, however, though well adapted for a state of uniform and long-continued hostility, was totally unsuitable to the varying circumstances and fleeting changes which were likely to ensue in the course of the contest in which the nation was actually engaged; and by encouraging a morbid sensitiveness to any extraordinary advances at a particular time, beyond what the general system warranted, was too likely to occasion the loss of the fairest opportunities of bringing it to a successful issue. Of this unhappy tendency the issue of the war in Poland, starved out, as we shall presently see it was, by an ill-judged economy on the part of Great Britain, afforded a memorable example. And in the habit acquired by the nation in these discussions to regard the sinking fund, not as a sacred deposit set apart, like the life insurance of an individual, for the benefit of posterity, but as a resource which might be instantly rendered available to present necessities, is to be found the remote cause of the great change of 1813 in our financial policy, and the total departure from any regular system for the redemption of the public debt—a change which is perhaps to be regarded as the greatest evil entailed upon the nation by the moneyed embarrassments and democratic ascendancy in later times.

General
character of
the Whig
measures at
this period.
Their com-
bined hu-
manity and
wisdom.

Long as the preceding summary of the principal domestic measures of the Whig Administration has been, it will not in all probability be regretted by the reflecting reader. It is not as the record of mere events, but of thoughts and the progress of opinion, that history is valuable; and independent of the importance of the

changes which have been discussed upon the future history of the empire, they are in an especial manner worthy of attention, as embodying the principal domestic designs of the great party, which, after so long a seclusion from office, at that period held the reins of power; and which, besides the acknowledged ability of its leaders, embraced a large portion of the thought and learning of the State. And upon an attentive consideration of these measures, it must be obvious to the candid reader, that they were founded on just principles, and directed to important ends; that humanity and benevolence breathed in their spirit, and wisdom and foresight regulated their execution. Above all, they were characterised, equally with the measures of Mr. Pitt, by that regard for the future, and resolution to submit to present evils for the sake of ultimate advantage, which is the mainspring of all that is really great or good, both in individuals and nations. On comparing the statesmanlike measures of the Whigs at that period in England, with the frantic innovations which tore society in pieces in France on the commencement of their revolution, the difference appears prodigious, and is highly deserving of attention. Thence may be learned both the important tendency of free institutions to modify those ardent aspirations after equality, which, when generally diffused, are, of all other political passions, the most fatal to the cause of freedom, and the wide difference between the chastened efforts of a liberal spirit, when guided by aristocratic power, and modifying, not governing, the measures of government, and the wild excesses or atrocious crimes, destructive at once to the present and future generations, which spring from the surrender of the actual direction of affairs to the immediate control or the passions of the people.

Foreign transactions. It remains to detail, with a very different measure of encomium, the principal foreign policy of the Whig Administration, from the period when the Prussian war commenced on the continent of Europe.

French expedition to South America. It has been already mentioned how Sir Home Popham, without authority from the British Government, proceeded from the Cape of Good Hope to Buenos Ayres with a small military force, and the disastrous issue of that expedition (4). But the general transports of joy at the brilliant prospects which this acquisition was supposed to open to British commerce, were so excessive, that Government, while they very properly brought Sir Home to a court-martial for this unauthorized proceeding, which,

March 7, 1807. in March 1807, reprimanded him for his conduct, had not firmness enough to withstand the general wish that an expedition should be sent to the river La Plata, to wipe away the disgrace which had there been incurred from the British arms, and annex such lucrative dependencies to the British crown. No sooner, accordingly, had it become evident, from the failure of the negotiations for peace at Paris, that a protracted struggle

Oct. 1806. was to be apprehended, than a reinforcement of three thousand men was sent to the British troops in that quarter, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On arriving at the Rio de la Plata, he found the remnant of the English force cooped up in Maldonado, with hardly any provisions, and daily exposed to the insults of the accomplished horsemen of that country. Deem-

Capture of Monte Video. ing that town unfit for being rendered a dépôt and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video, a fortified seaport, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great difficulties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood; but on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were

encountered. The defences of the place were found to be much stronger than had been expected; the whole powder in the fleet was almost blown away in the first five days' firing; entrenching tools were wanting to make the breaches; and four thousand regular troops, with twenty pieces of cannon, a force fully equal to the besiegers', was rapidly approaching to raise the siege. Feb. 2, 1807. In these critical circumstances, he resolved to hazard an assault, though the breach could as yet scarcely be called practicable; and orders were issued for the attack an hour before daybreak. Owing to the darkness of the night the head of the column missed the breach, and remained under the ramparts for twenty minutes exposed to a heavy fire, every shot of which told in their dense ranks; but as the day dawned, it was discerned by Captain Renny of the 40th regiment, who gloriously fell as he mounted it; the troops emulated his bright example, rushed in with irresistible violence, cleared the streets of all the cannon which had been placed to entlade them, and made prisoners all the enemy who attempted any resistance. In this glorious storm, the loss of the British was about six hundred, but twice that number of the enemy fell, and two thousand were made prisoners, besides a thousand who escaped in boats, so that the numbers of the garrison at first had been greater than that of the besieging force (1).

A second expedition against Buenos Ayres is resolved on.

It would have been well for the British arms, if their attempts on South America had terminated here; but the discomfiture of Sir Home Popham's expedition to the Rio de la Plata, unhappily led both the Government and the nation to conceive, that the honour of the British arms was implicated in regaining the ground they had lost in that quarter. With this view an additional expedition, under the command of General Craufurd, consisting of four thousand two hundred men, which had been sent out in the end of Oct. 1806, destined originally to effect the conquest of Chili, on the other side of Cape Horn, was, when news arrived of the expulsion of the English from Buenos Ayres, ordered to stop short, and attempt the re-conquest of that important city. General Craufurd, agreeably June 2, 1807. to these orders, made sail for the Rio de la Plata, and effected a junction with Sir Samuel Auchmuty at Monte Video in the beginning of June. As the united force now amounted to above nine thousand men, it was deemed advisable to make an immediate attempt on Buenos Ayres; and, in pursuance of express directions from Government (2), the command of the force for this purpose was given to General Whitelocke. That officer arrived at Monte Video on the 9th May, and preparations were immediately made for the proposed enterprise (3).

Its failure. The force which set out on this expedition consisted of seven thousand eight hundred men, including eighteen pieces of field artillery. After several fatiguing marches, the whole reached Reduction, a village about nine miles from Buenos Ayres, and having manœuvred so as to deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage, succeeded in crossing the river, with very little loss, at the ford of Passo Chico. The army having been assembled on the right bank, orders were given for a general attack on the town. Great preparations for defence had been made by the inhabitants; above two hundred pieces of cannon were disposed, in advantageous situations, in the principal streets, and fifteen thousand armed men were stationed on the flat roofs

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 213, 214. See S. Auchmuty's Despatch, 652.

(2) "As it has been thought advisable," said Mr. Windham in his official orders, "that an officer of high rank, as well as talent and judgment, should be sent to take the command of his Majesty's forces in

South America, it was his Majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of General Whitelocke." — *Mr. Windham's Instructions to General Whitelocke*, 5th March, 1807. Ann. Reg. 1807, 216.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1807, 214, 217.

of the houses to pour their destructive volleys on the columns who might advance to the attack. The measures of the English general, so far from being calculated to meet this danger, the magnitude of which is well-known to all experienced military men, betrayed a fatal and overweening contempt for his opponents. The different columns of attack were directed to advance by the principal streets to the great square near the river Plata; but by an inconceivable oversight, they were not allowed to load their pieces, and no firing was permitted till they had reached the final place of their destination. The consequence was, that those brave men were exposed, as they advanced through the long streets leading to the great square, without the possibility of returning it, to a destructive shower of musketry, hand-grenades, and stones from the tops of the houses, all of which were flat, and covered with an armed and enthusiastic population; while strong barricades were drawn

July 5. at intervals across the streets, mounted by a plentiful array of heavy artillery. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, however, the formidable nature of which were so fatally experienced by Charles X in the streets of Paris in 1830, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, by a vigorous attack on the right, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. General Whitelocke himself had gained possession of an advanced post in the centre, and the Residencia, a commanding station on the left, had also fallen into the hands of the British. But these advantages were dearly purchased, and in other quarters, the plunging fire to which the troops had been exposed, without the possibility of returning it, had proved so destructive, that three regiments were compelled to lay down their arms, and the attacking force was weakened by the loss of 2500 men. On the following morning the Spanish general, Linieres, offered to restore all the prisoners which had been taken, on condition that the British forces should withdraw altogether from Monte Video, and all the settlements which they held on the Rio de la Plata. Such was the consternation produced by the disasters of the preceding day, and such the difficulties with which the farther prosecution of the enterprise appeared to be attended, that, notwithstanding the brilliant success of Sir July 7, 1807. Samuel Auchmuty, and the capture of so large a portion of the enemy's artillery, these terms were agreed to, and a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole British troops were withdrawn from the river Plata, was signed on the following day (1).

Court-martial on General Whitelocke, who is cashiered. The public indignation knew no bounds when the calamitous issue of this expedition was made known in Great Britain; and the outcry was the more vehement from the glorious success at Monte Video having inspired the people with an unreasonably low estimate of the South American forces. So violent was the clamour, that Government, in order to appease it, were compelled to bring General Whitelocke to trial, and the court-martial which investigated the charges brought against him, in January 1809, sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from his Majesty's service. No opinion, however, can be formed of the real merits of the case from this decision, whatever may have been the respectability of the officers composing it; for such was the happy ignorance which then generally prevailed in Great Britain on military subjects, that the members of the court-martial required to be told what the right bank of a river, in military language, means (2); and such is frequently the vehemence and unreasonableness of the public mind in England on such occasions, that the strength

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 219, 221.

(2) South. Pen. War, i. 73.

of scarcely any intellect is equal to withstanding the torrent. The examples of Saragossa, Gerona, and Paris also, have, since that time, abundantly demonstrated that the resistance of an insurgent population in barricaded streets and on the roofs of stone houses, is often extremely formidable, even to powerful bodies of disciplined troops. But on a calm retrospect of the transactions at this distance of time, it cannot be denied that an energetic and skilful general might, in all probability, have extricated the British army, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, from this ill-concerted enterprise. The orders to traverse the streets with muskets unloaded, after a desperate resistance was prepared and foreseen, though expressly approved of by the court-martial, seems hardly reconcilable to any rule of military policy or common sense; and, above all, the omission to take advantage of the great success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the powerful train of artillery which he had captured, if not to achieve success, at least to avert dishonour, must justly be considered as a matter of reproach to the British general. Much allowance must, however, be made for the critical situation of an inexperienced officer, plunged, in his first essay in a separate command, in difficulties, under which the intellects of Marmont and Lefebvre subsequently reeled; but the same excuse cannot be made for the Government, which selected an officer unknown to fame for so important a service, where many others had proved their capacity even in the comparatively inconsiderable military operations in which England had hitherto been engaged (1). But this weight of secret Parliamentary influence is the inherent bane of a free constitution; it appeared afterwards, on a still greater scale, on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, and continued to paralyse all the military operations of England, till the commanding genius of Wellington burst through the trammels, and fixed the flickering light of its glory in a star of unquenchable lustre (2).

Jan. 1.
1807.
Capture of
Curaçoa,
and esta-
blishment of
the Repub-
lic of Hayti.
In other colonial transactions, the British arms during this Administration were more prosperous. Curaçoa, early in the year, was taken, with hardly any resistance, by a squadron of frigates under the command of Captain Brisbane; the advantages of sharing in British commerce, and obtaining the protection of the British flag, having now disposed the planters, in all the colonial possessions of other states, to range themselves under its banners. Soon after, a regular constitution was proclaimed in Hayti, by which slavery was for ever abolished; property and persons placed under the safeguard of the law; the first magistrate of the republic declared the generalissimo of its forces by sea and land; and a code established, breathing a spirit of wisdom, philanthropy, and moderation. The establishment of such a republican government, coming so soon after the heroic resistance which the negroes had opposed to the attempt at their subjugation by Napoléon, would have been a subject of the highest interest, and deserving of the warmest sympathy of every friend to humanity, were it not that experience has since abundantly proved what historical information might even then have too clearly led the well-informed to anticipate; that all such attempts at the regeneration of mankind, by immediate changes, are not only delusive, but pernicious; that to give to savages the liberty and institutions of civilisation, is to consign them to immediate suffering and ultimate slavery; and that every attempt to transfer suddenly into

(1) The appointment of General Whitelocke over the head of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the hero of Monte Video, appears the strongest confirmation of these remarks, but in reality it is not so; for that town was stormed on Feb. 2, and General Whitelocke's appointment is dated March 5, in the same

year; so that the one was not known till the other took place. It is the overlooking the many officers who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, at Maida, and in India, which forms the real reproach to the British Government on this occasion.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 219, 224. Dnn. xv. 32. 33.

one age or nation the institutions of another, is as hopeless a task as to expect in the nursery seedling the strength and solidity of the aged oak, or in the buoyancy and irreflection of childhood the maturity and perseverance of maturer years.

This untoward expedition to the shores of the La Plata, was not the only one which brought disgrace upon the arms of England at this period—enterprises equally unfortunate took place both on the shores of the Bosphorus and the banks of the Nile.

State of affairs in Turkey. It has been already mentioned that Russia (1) had unhappily selected the moment when the Prussian war, if not actually commenced, was at least obviously approaching, to invade the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia by the army of General Michelson, and we have noticed the disastrous effect which that distraction of force had upon the issue of the contest on the Vistula. This irruption, however ill-timed or imprudent, when so serious a war nearer home awaited the Russian forces, was not, however, unjustifiable; on the contrary, it was provoked by the ambition of the French Government, and the intrigues of their ambassador at Constantinople, which, by precipitating the Divan into a breach of the existing treaty with the Court of Russia, gave to that power too plausible a ground for resuming its long-established schemes of ambition on the banks of the Danube.

By the treaty of Jassy, which terminated the bloody and disastrous war which the Turks had long waged with the might of Muscovy and the genius of Suwarrow, it had been covenanted that the hospodars or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia should not be dismissed from their high functions for the space of seven years; and, by the supplementary treaty of 24th September 1802, it had been expressly stipulated that they should not be removed without the consent of Russia (2). No sooner, however, had it become evident to Napoléon that a war was impending with Prussia and Russia, than he dispatched a firm and skilful ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to do every thing in his power to produce a rupture between the Turks and Russians, and in this manner effect a powerful diversion to the Muscovite forces on the banks of the Danube. This diplomatic agent was General Sébastiani, a military officer of great experience, and whose subtle and penetrating genius, formerly nourished in a cloister, and since matured by the experience of camps, was admirably adapted for the mingled acuteness and resolution required in the mission with which he was now intrusted. His secret instructions were, in the first instance, to endeavour to procure the dismissal of the Princes Ypsilanti and Morusi from the government of these provinces, who were in the interest of Russia, and place in their stead princes of the rival families of Suzzo and Callimachi, who it was known would incline to the French alliance (3).

Dismissal of the Wai-wodes of Wallachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim. When Sébastiani arrived at the Turkish capital, in August 1806, he found matters in a situation extremely favourable to the attainment of these objects. Sultan Selim, in his attempts to introduce the European tactics and discipline into his armies, of the need of which the recent wars with Russia had given repeated and fatal experience, of which a detailed account will be given in a future chapter (4), had become embarrassed with very serious difficulties, and found himself obstinately resisted not only by the proud and disorderly bands of the Janizaries, but

(1) *Ante*, vi. 4.

(2) Martens, v. 67. Ann. Reg. 1806, 208.

(3) Bign. vi. 177, 178. Dom. xvii. 257, 259. Hard. ix. 366. Ann. Reg. 1807, 193, 195.

(4) See below, chap. lii.

that powerful party in all the Ottoman provinces who were attached to their national and religious institutions, and regarded the introduction of European customs, whether into the army or the state, as the first step in their national ruin. In this extremity he gladly embraced the proffered counsel and assistance of the French ambassador, who represented a power which naturally connected itself with the innovating party in every other state, and whose powerful armaments, already stationed in Dalmatia, promised the only effectual aid which could be looked for from the European nations against the Turkish malecontents, whom it was well known Russia was disposed to support. The difficulty arising from the necessity, in terms of the treaty, of consulting Russia in regard to the removal of the obnoxious hospodars, was strongly felt : but the art of Sébastiani prevailed over every difficulty. At a private conference with the Sultan in person, he succeeded in persuading that unsuspecting sovereign that the clause in the convention of 1802 applied only to the removal of the waiwodes on the ground of maladministration in their respective provinces, but could not extend to a case where it was called for by the general interests of the empire : that the present was an instance of the latter description, from the notorious intrigues of those princes with the hereditary enemies of the Ottoman faith ; and, in pursuance of these representations, a hattî-scheriff appeared on the 30th August, dismissing the reigning waiwodes, and appointing Princes Suzzo and Callimachi in their room (1).

Violent remonstrances of Russia and England.

This decisive step was taken by the Sublime Porte not only without the concurrence of Russia, but without the knowledge of any members of the diplomatic body at Constantinople, and as its immediate effect in producing a rupture between the Divan and the court of St.-Petersburg was distinctly foreseen, the effect produced by its promulgation was very great. The Russian ambassador, M. Italinski, loudly complained of the infraction of the treaty, in which he was powerfully supported by Mr. Arbuthnot, the minister of Great Britain, who openly threatened an immediate attack on the Turkish capital from the fleets of their respective sovereigns. Sébastiani, however, skilfully availed himself of the advantages which the course of events gave him, to secure and increase the French influence with the Divan. No sooner, therefore, did intelligence arrive of the refusal of the Russian government to ratify the treaty concluded by d'Oubril at Paris, than he renewed his efforts, and representing the cause of France as now identified with that of the Sublime Porte, loudly demanded that the Bosphorus should be closed to Russian vessels of war or transports, and announced that any continuation or renewal of alliance with England or Russia would be considered as a declaration of war against the French Emperor (2). These remonstrances proved successful ; and a few days afterwards a Russian brig, which presented itself at the mouth of the Bosphorus, Sept. 21. was denied admission. These measures irritated so violently the Russian ambassador, that he embarked on board the English frigate *Canopus*, and threatened instantly to leave the harbour, if the dismissed waiwodes were not forthwith reinstated in their possessions. In these efforts he was powerfully seconded by Mr. Wellesley Pole, who, in the absence of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was detained by fever at Bujuchdere, presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced, that if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded

(1) *Dum.* xvii. 237, 264. *Bign.* vi. 177, 179. *Hard.* ix. 364, 365.

(2) Note of 16th Sept. 1806.

to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes. Intimidated by this bold language, and the haughty air of the person who used it, and secretly aware of the weakness of the defences of the capital on that side, the counsellors of Selim recommended a temporary concession to the demands of the Allied Powers; the waiwodes were reinstated in their governments, and ample promises made to the Russian ambassador of satisfaction for all his demands. But these conciliatory measures were only intended to gain time; and in a secret conference with Sébastiani, the Sultan informed that minister that he had only yielded to the storm till he was in a condition to brave it, and that his policy, as well as his inclinations, were inseparably united with the Emperor Napoléon (1).

Meanwhile the Russian armies invade the principalities. Matters were now, to all appearance, accommodated between the Divan and the cabinet of St.-Petersburg; but the great distance between the two capitals brought on a rupture when all causes of irritation had ceased, at the point where their interests came into collision. As soon as intelligence of the dismissal of the waiwodes reached the Russian cabinet, they dispatched orders to General Michelson, as soon as he could get his preparations ready, to enter the Turkish territory; and when intelligence was received of their being re-instated on the 15th October, which did not arrive at the Russian capital till the beginning of November, it was too late to prevent the operations of the previous orders and the commencement of hostilities. Michelson accordingly entered Moldavia on the 23d November, and having once drawn the sword, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg had not sufficient confidence in the sincerity of this forced submission on the part of the Sublime Porte to restore it to its sheath, or possibly they were not sorry of an opportunity of extending themselves towards the Danube, and advancing their permanent schemes of conquest towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the restoration of the hospodars, therefore, their armies continued to advance, driving the Turks before them, to the no small confusion of M. Italinski, who had uniformly declared, both in public and private, that as soon as that event was known at St.-Petersburg, their march would be countermanded. Sébastiani, meanwhile, made the best use of this now unjustifiable invasion, as well as of the consternation produced by the victories of Napoléon in Prussia, to increase the French influence at the Divan; and strongly represented that now was the time, when Russia was already hard pressed by the victorious arms of the French Emperor on the Vistula, to throw their weight into the scale, and regain, in a single successful campaign, the influence and possessions which had been wrested from them by their inveterate enemies during more than a century of previous misfortunes. Persuaded by such plausible arguments, and irritated at the continued stay of the Russian troops in the principalities after the causes which had justified their entrance into them had ceased, the hesitations of the Divan were at length overcome, and war was formally declared against Russia in the end of the year. To protect the Russian ambassador from the fury of the Mussulmans, which was now fully aroused, the Sultan stationed a guard of janizaries over his palace. Mr. Arbuthnot strongly remonstrated against his being sent, according to previous custom, to the Seven Towers. General Sébastiani had the generosity to employ his powerful influence for the same purpose, and, by their united influence, this bar-

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, p. 208, 209. *Bign.* vi. 182, 184. *Hard.* ix. 364, 365.

barous practice was discontinued, and M. Italinski was permitted to embark on board the English frigate *Canopus*, by which he was soon after conveyed into Italy. Less humane, however, towards his own satraps than the ambassadors of his enemies, the Sultan dispatched his messengers with the bowstring to Prince Ypsilanti; but that nobleman, in whom energy of mind supplied the want of bodily strength, succeeded in throwing down the executioners after they had got hold of his person, and had the good fortune to escape into Russia (1).

Rapid progress of the Russians in the principalities.

Though war was thus resolved on, the Porte was far from being in a condition at the moment to oppose any effectual resistance to the powerful army of General Michelson, which had entered the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia—forty thousand Russian troops, amply provided with every necessary, were irresistible. Moldavia was speedily overrun, the victorious bands, following up their success, entered Wallachia; a tumultuary force which the Pacha of Rudchuck had raised to arrest their progress was defeated; and Bucharest, the capital of the latter province, and a city containing eighty thousand inhabitants, fell into their hands. Before the end of the year, and before war had been formally declared on either side, they were already masters of all the territory to the north of the Danube; and their outposts, preparing to cross that river, were already in

Dec. 27.

communication with Czerni George, the chief of Servia, who had revolted from the Grand Seignior, defeated his forces in several encounters, and was at this time engaged in the siege of the important fortress of Belgrade (2).

The Russians require the aid of a naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to.

The rapidity and magnitude of these successes, however, was the occasion of no small disquietude to the court of St.-Petersburg; they had now felt the weight of the French troops on the Vistula; their arms had retired from doubtful and well-debated fields at Golymin and Pultusk; and they were fully sensible of the imprudence of engaging at the same time in another contest, and dispersing the troops so imperiously required for the defence of their own frontier on the banks of the Danube. Already an order had been dispatched to recall four divisions to support the extreme left of the army in Poland, whose arrival and operations under Essen, against Bernadotte at Ostrolenka, have been already noticed (3). But this was not sufficient; their diminished forces on the Danube might be exposed to serious danger from the efforts, and now fully aroused national spirit, of the Turks; and as the duration of the contest with France could not be foreseen, it was of the utmost moment to deprive the Emperor Napoléon of that powerful co-operation which he was likely to derive from the war so imprudently lighted up on the southern frontier of the empire. The naval forces of England appeared to be precisely calculated to effect this object; and as they were cruising at no great distance in the Egean sea, it was hoped that a vigorous demonstration against Constantinople might at once terminate the contest in that quarter. Application was made to the British government for this purpose, and the cabinet of St.-James's, however unwilling, under the direction of Mr. Fox's successors, to engage in any military enterprises in conjunction with the continental powers, was not averse to the employment of its naval forces in the support of the common cause, and felt the necessity of doing something, after the refusal of both subsidies and land forces to Russia, to convince that power of the sincerity of its desire, with its appropriate weapons, to maintain the contest. Orders,

(1) *Hard.* ix. 365. *Bign.* vi. 184, 189. *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 208, 211.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 211.
(3) *Ann.* vi. p. 46.

therefore, were given to Sir John Duckworth, who, at the close of the year, was cruising off Ferrol with four ships of the line, to proceed forthwith to the mouth of the Dardanelles, where Admiral Louis was already stationed with three line-of-battle ships and four frigates; and his orders were to force the passage of these celebrated straits, and compel the Turks, by the threat of an immediate bombardment, into the relinquishment of the French and adoption of the Russian and English alliance (1).

Description of the Dardanelles. The Hellespont, which, from the days of Homer and the war of Troy to these times, has been the theatre of the most important operations in which the fate of Europe and Asia were concerned, is formed by the narrow strait through which the waters of the Black Sea discharge themselves from the lesser expanse of Marmora into the Mediterranean. Its breadth varies from one to three miles; but its course, which is very winding, amounts to nearly thirty; and the many projecting headlands which advance into the stream, afford the most favourable stations for the erection of batteries. Its banks are less precipitous and beautiful than those of the Bosphorus, which is the appellation bestowed on the still more bold and romantic channel which unites the sea of Marmora to the Euxine; but they possess, both from historical association and natural variety, the highest interest; and few persons possessed even of the rudiments of education can thread their devious way through the winding channel and smiling steepes, which resemble the shores of an inland lake rather than the boundary of two hemispheres, without recurring in imagination to the exploits of Ajax and Achilles, whose tombs still stand at the entrance of the strait, the loves of Hero and Leander, the memorable contests of which it was the theatre during the Byzantine empire, the glowing picture by Gibbon of the Latin Crusade, and the thrilling verses of Lord Byron on its classic shores.

Ultimatum of Great Britain, and declaration of war by Turkey. The fortifications of these important straits, the real gates of Constantinople, had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, still stood in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of the Crescent, at the narrowest part of the passage; but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside. The efforts of Sébastiani, seconded by the spirit of the Turks, whose religious enthusiasm was now fully awakened, had endeavoured in vain to attract the attention of the Divan to the danger which threatened them in this quarter. True to the Musulman principle of foreseeing nothing and judging only of the future by the past, they bent their whole attention to the war on the Danube, and dispatched all their disposable forces to arrest the progress of the Servians and Czerni George, when a redoubtable enemy threatened them with destruction at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Duly informed of these circumstances, Mr. Arbuthnot was no sooner apprised of the arrival of Sir John Duckworth Jan. 26, 1807. off Tenedos, than he delivered the ultimatum of Great Britain, which was the immediate dismissal of M. Sébastiani; the entrance of Turkey into the alliance of Russia and Great Britain, and the opening of the Dardanelles to the vessels of Russia. These offers were peremptorily declined, and their refusal accompanied by a significant hint from General Sébastiani, that the Berlin decree, recently received at the Turkish capital, required the immediate arrest of all British subjects in all the territories of the allies of France, and that *Turkey was one of these allies*. Deeming his stay at

Constantinople no longer secure, Mr. Arbuthnot, under colour of going to dine with Admiral Louis, who in the *Endymion* frigate lay off Seraglio Point, withdrew from Constantinople, having first recommended his family to the care of General Sébastiani. That General honourably discharged the trust; but he was too skilful not to turn to the best advantage so unexpected an occurrence in his favour, and war was immediately declared by the Divan against Great Britain (1).

Sir John Duckworth passes the Dardanelles. Hitherto every thing had seconded, beyond his most sanguine expectations, the efforts of the French ambassador, but he was unable to persuade the Turkish government to take the requisite measures of precaution against this new enemy who had arisen. In vain he urged them instantly to put in repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles; in vain he predicted a formidable immediate attack from the fleet of England; nothing was done to give additional security to the strait, and the Divan, persuaded that the only serious danger lay on the side of the Danube, continued to send all their disposable forces in that direction. Meanwhile the squadrons of Sir John Duckworth and Admiral Louis having effected a junction off Tenedos, their united forces amounted to eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb-vessels; but the *Ajax* of 74 guns having unfortunately been destroyed by fire at this critical moment, the squadron was reduced to seven line-of-battle ships. With these, however, the British Admiral resolved to force the passage. Having taken his measures with much skill, he advanced with his ships in single file at moderate intervals, and with a fair Feb. 19. wind, on the morning of the 19th of February, entered the straits. So completely were the Turks taken by surprise, that a feeble desultory fire alone was opened upon their ships as they passed the first batteries, to which the English did not deign to reply; but when they reached the castles of Europe and Asia, where the straits are little more than a mile broad, a tremendous cannonade assailed them on both sides, and enormous balls, weighing seven and eight hundred weight, began to pass through their rigging; but the British sailors meanwhile were not idle; deliberately aiming their guns, as the ships slowly and majestically moved through the narrow channel, they kept up an incessant discharge to the right and left, with such effect, that the Turkish cannoniers, little accustomed to the rapid fire of modern times, and terrified at the crash of the shot on the battlements around them, took to flight. Following up his triumphant course, the English admiral attacked and burned the vessel of the Capitan Pacha lying at anchor in the straits; Sir Sidney Smith, the second in command, compelled four frigates to surrender, which were immediately after committed to the flames; a fifth, after an obstinate resistance, shared the same fate; and a brig, which with difficulty escaped from the conflagration, had scarcely announced the alarming tidings at Constantinople, when the British fleet, with all sails set, was seen proudly advancing, and cast anchor off the Isle of Princes, within three leagues of Seraglio Point (2).

The Divan resolve on submission, but are roused to exertion by General Sébastiani. No words can adequately paint the terror which prevailed in Constantinople, when the increasing sound of the approaching cannonade too surely announced that the defences of the straits had been forced; and shortly after, the distant light of the conflagration gave token of the rapid destruction of the fleet. This was much increased when a message was received from Admiral Duckworth, half

(1) Bign. vi. 191, 192. Dum. xvii. 271, 273. Ann. Reg. 1807, 1808.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 1808. Dum. xvii. 275, 276. Bign. vi. 194, 195. Journ. ii. 374.

an hour after his arrival, which, after recapitulating all the instances of fidelity to the Turkish alliance which England had so long afforded, concluded by the declaration that if, in twenty-four hours, the demands of Great Britain were not acceded to, he would be reduced to the painful necessity of commencing hostilities. The capital was totally defenceless, not ten guns were mounted on the sea batteries, and a furious crowd was already assembled in the streets, demanding the head of the Reis Effendi and General Sébastiani, the authors of all the public calamities. The consternation was universal; the danger, from having been never anticipated, was now felt with stunning force; and the Divan, having been assembled in the first moments of alarm, sent an intimation to General Sébastiani that no defence remained to the capital; that submission was a matter of necessity, and that, as the people regarded him as the author of all their misfortunes, his life was no longer in safety, and he would do well instantly to leave the capital (4). But his answer was worthy of the great and gallant nation which he represented. Receiving the messenger of the Sultan in full dress, surrounded by all his suite, he immediately replied—"My personal danger cannot for an instant occupy my attention, when the maintenance of the French alliance and the independence of the Ottoman empire are at stake. I will not quit Constantinople, and I confidently expect a new decision more worthy of Sultan Selim and the Turkish nation. Tell your powerful monarch, that he should not for a moment think of descending from the high rank where the glorious deeds of his ancestors have placed him, by surrendering to a few English vessels a city containing nine hundred thousands souls, and abundantly provided with magazines and ammunition. Your ramparts are not yet armed, but that may soon be done; you have weapons enough; use them but with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to a part of the town—granted; but without the assistance of a land army, it could not take possession of the capital, even if you were to open your gates. You sustain every year the ravages of accidental conflagration, and the more serious calamities of the plague; and do you now scruple at incurring the risk of inferior losses in defence of your capital, your country, your holy religion (2)?"

This noble reply produced a great effect upon the Divan; and it was resolved, that before submitting they should at least try whether, by gaining time in parleying, they could not in some degree complete their preparations. Sébastiani accordingly dictated a note in answer to the communication from the English admiral, in which the Sultan professed an anxious desire to re-establish amicable relations with the British government, and announced his appointment of Allet-Effendi for the purpose of conducting the negotiation. The unsuspecting English admiral, who, from the illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, was intrusted with the negotiation, was no match for the wily French general in the arts of diplomacy, fell into the snare. The British *ultimatum* was sent ashore the following morning, which consisted in the provisional cession of their fleet to England, the dismissal of Sébastiani, and the re-establishment of amicable relations with Russia and the British government. Half an hour only was allowed to the Divan, after the receipt and translation of this note, to deliberate and reply. Had this vigorous resolution been acted upon, it must have led to

The Turks
suspense to
gain time,
and com-
plete their
prepara-
tions.

Feb. 22.

(4) I have been informed by Sir Stratford Canning, the well-known and able British diplomatist at Constantinople, that a tradition prevails in the East, that Sébastiani was at first disposed to submit, and that it was the Spanish ambassador's remonstrances

which awakened him to the energetic conduct which has shed such a lustre around his name.

(2) *Dunn*. xvii. 278, 280. *Bign.* vi. 197, 198. *Ann. Reg.* 1807. 196, 197.

immediate submission; for the batteries were not yet armed; the fleet, the arsenals, the seraglio, and great part of the town lay exposed to the fire of the English squadron, and during the terror produced by a bombardment, the greater part of the capital, which is chiefly built of wood, must have been reduced to ashes (1).

Vast energy displayed by the Mussulmans in their defence. Unfortunately, instead of doing this, Sir John Duckworth, possessed with the belief that the Sultan was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, and that the desired objects might be obtained without the horrors of a conflagration, or an irreparable breach with the Ottoman empire, imprudently gave time, and suffered himself to be drawn into a negotiation. Day after day elapsed in the mere exchange of notes and diplomatic communications; and mean-while, the spirit of the Mussulmans, now raised to the highest pitch, was indefatigably employed in organizing the means of defence. The direction of the whole was intrusted to General Sébastiani, for whom a magnificent tent was erected in the gardens of the Seraglio, and who communicated to the ardent multitude the organization and arrangement which long warlike experience had given to the officers of Napoléon. Men and women, grey hairs and infant hands, the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, were to be seen promiscuously labouring together at the fortifications. Forgetting, in the general transport, the time-worn lines of religious distinction, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs set the first example of a cordial acquiescence in the orders of government; Selim himself repeatedly visited the works; his commands were obeyed by two hundred thousand men, animated by religious and patriotic ardour to the greatest degree; while the French engineers, who had been sent by Marmont to aid in the war with the Russians, communicated to the busy multitude the inestimable advantages of scientific direction and experienced skill. Under such auspices, the defences of the harbour were speedily armed and strengthened; the naval arsenal furnished inexhaustible resources; in three days, three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the batteries—at the end of a week, their number was increased to a thousand; temporary parapets were every where formed with gabions and fascines, where regular defences were wanting; the tower of Leander was armed with heavy artillery; a hundred gun-boats were drawn across the mouth of the Golden Horn; twelve line-of-battle ships within stood apparently ready for action (2); fireships were prepared, and numerous furnaces with red-hot shot kept constantly heated, to carry into the British fleet the conflagration with which they menaced the Turkish capital (3).

The English renounce the enterprise, and with difficulty repass the Dardanelles. Although the English officers perceived, by means of their telescopes, the preparations which were going forward, and though the peril to the fleet was hourly increasing from the long continuance of a southwest wind, which rendered it impossible to repass the straits; yet nothing was done adequate to the emergency. The fleet, indeed, was brought nearer to the Seraglio, and every effort made to bring the enemy, by negotiation, to an accommodation; but the pride of the Mussulmans, now fully aroused, would not have permitted the government to come to terms, even if they had been so inclined; and the influence of Sébastiani was successfully exerted to protract the conferences till the preparations were so far

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 196, 199. Dum. xvii. 230, 232. Bign. vi. 193, 200.

(2) Journ. ii. 375, 377. Dum. xvii. 234, 236. Bign. vi. 200, 204. Ann. Reg. 1807, 196, 199.

(3) The number of guns mounted on the batteries

in six days was 917 pieces of cannon and 300 mortars—an instance of vigour and rapidity in preparing the means of defence, perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world.—See HARR. xi. 406. *Pieces Just.*

completed as to enable them to bid defiance to the enemy. Four days after the English fleet appeared off Constantinople, the coasts were so completely armed with artillery, as to render an attack eminently hazardous; in a week it was totally hopeless. The object of the expedition having failed, nothing remained but to provide for the safety of the fleet: but this was now no easy matter; for during the week lost in negotiation, the batteries of the Dardanelles had all been armed, and the castles of Europe and Asia so strengthened as to render it an extremely hazardous matter to attempt the passage. To complete the difficulties of the English admiral, the wind, which generally blows at Constantinople from the northeast, continued, ever after his arrival, fixed in the south-west, so as to render it totally impossible for him to retrace his steps. At length, on the 1st March, a breeze having sprung up

March 1. from the Black Sea, all sails were spread, and the fleet re-entered the perilous straits. But it was without difficulty, and with considerable hazard, that the passage was effected. A heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries; the headlands on either side presented a continued line of smoke; the roar of artillery was incessant; and enormous stone balls, some of them weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, threatened at one stroke to sink the largest ships. One of these massy projectiles carried away the main-mast of the Windsor Castle, which bore the Admiral's flag; another penetrated the

March 1. poop of the Standard, and killed and wounded sixty men. At length the fleet cleared the straits, and cast anchor off Tenedos, in such a situation as to blockade the Dardanelles, having sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men in this audacious expedition, which, though it proved unsuccessful from the errors attending its execution, was both boldly and ably conceived, and produced a very great impression in Europe by revealing the secret weakness of the Ottoman empire, and demonstrating how easily an adequate maritime force, by thus bursting through its defences, and aiming a stroke at once at the vitals of the state, could subdue all the strength of Islamism, and at once compel the submission of a power, before which, in former times, all the monarchies of Europe had trembled (1).

Blockade of the Dardanelles. No. 1. After the departure of the English fleet, all amicable relations were, of course, suspended with the Turkish government; the preparations of the Sultan to strengthen the batteries both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, continued with undiminished activity; and the influence of General Sébastiani with the Divan became unbounded. The case, however, with which the British fleet had surmounted all the defences of Constantinople, and the imminent risk which he had run of being deprived, by one blow, of the powerful auxiliary aid of Turkey, gave the utmost uneasiness to Napoléon; and he dispatched, without delay, orders both to Marmont in Illyria, and Eugene in Italy, to forward, instantly, a number of able officers, among whom were Colonel Haxo of the engineers, and Colonel Foy of the artillery, to co-operate in the strengthening of the defences of Constantinople; while six hundred men were directed to be forthwith put at the disposal of the Grand Seigneur, and authority given for the transmission of five thousand, with abundant supplies in money and ammunition, if required. These reinforcements, however, were not required; for though the English fleet was shortly after joined by the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, yet they had too recently experienced the dangers of the straits to venture a second time into them, after their defences had been so mate-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 200. Sir J. Dackworth's Despatch, ib. 664. Journ. II. 376, 377. Dam. xvii. 281, 282. Bign. vi. 204, 207.

rially strengthened as they soon were by the operations of the French engineers. Contenting themselves, therefore, with taking possession of Lemnos and Tenedos for the service of their fleet, they established a close blockade of the entrance to the straits from the Archipelago; and as a similar precaution was adopted at the mouth of the Bosphorus, the supply of the capital by water-carriage on both sides was interrupted, and before long a very great dearth of provisions was experienced. The Turkish government made the utmost efforts to man their squadron; but this was no easy matter, as the blockade by the Russians deprived them of all intercourse with the Greeks, who constituted almost exclusively the nautical portion of their population. At length, however, the scarcity became so great that serious commotions took place in the capital; and the government having at length forced an adequate number of hands on board the fleet, the Capitan Pacha ventured to leave the protection of the forts in the Dardanelles, and give battle to the Russian fleet. But the result was what might have been expected from a contest between an inexperienced body of men, for the most part unacquainted with naval affairs, and a squadron manned by seamen who yield to none in Europe in the

July 1. resolution with which they stand to their guns (1). Though the Turks fought with great gallantry, they could not withstand the superior skill and more rapid fire of their antagonists; four of their ships were early in the day drifted out of the line, and their unskilful crews were unable to bring them again into fire; the remainder, after this great loss, were surrounded, and in great part destroyed. Four ships of the line were taken with the vice-admiral, three were burnt, and the remainder driven for shelter under the cannon of the Dardanelles. So overbearing did the pressure of the Russians at sea now become, that it threatened the utmost dangers to the Ottoman government; when the blockade of the capital was raised, and a temporary respite obtained by the treaty of Tilsit, which, as will immediately appear, established a short and fallacious truce between these irreconcilable enemies (2).

Descent by
the British
on the coasts
of Egypt.

Not content with this attack on the Turkish capital, the British government, at the same time, effected a descent on the coasts of Egypt. Deeming the opportunity favourable for regaining possession of that important country, which was still warmly coveted by Napoleon, and the cession of which into the feeble hands of the Mussulmans had been long a subject of regret, the British government resolved to send an expedition to the shores of the Nile, at the same time that it threatened with bombardment the Turkish capital. The land troops, under the command of General Mackenzie, set sail from Messina on the 6th of March, and

March. 6. landed near Rosetta on the 18th. Alexandria speedily capitulated; Damietta was also occupied without resistance; and General Fraser detached with two thousand five hundred men to effect the reduction of Rosetta, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile, and the possession of which was deemed essential to the regular supply of Alexandria with provisions. This place,

April 22. however, held out; and as immediate succour was expected from the Mamelukes, Colonel Macleod was stationed with seven hundred men at El Hammed, in order to facilitate their junction with the besieging force. This detachment was speedily surrounded by an overwhelming body of Turkish horse, and after a gallant resistance, which repelled the attacks of their numerous squadrons till the whole ammunition was exhausted, an-

(1) "Lay your ship alongside a Frenchman," said Nelson, "but try to out-manceuvre a Russian."

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 201, 202. Dem. xvii. 272. 293. Jom. ii. 376, 379.

tirely cut off; the promised Mamelukes never made their appearance; and General Stewart, severely weakened by so great a loss, with difficulty made good his retreat, fighting all the way, to Alexandria, where he arrived with a thousand fewer men than he had set out. The fortifications of that place, however, enabled the British to bid defiance to their desultory opponents; and it soon was found that the apprehensions of scarcity which had prompted this ill-fated expedition to Rosetta were entirely chimerical, as provisions speedily became more abundant than ever. But the British government, in whom an important change at this time took place, became sensible of the impolicy of longer retaining this acquisition at a crisis when every nerve required to be exerted to protect their shores from the forces of Napoléon. It was with lively satisfaction, therefore, that they heard of the conclusion of a convention in autumn, by which it was stipulated that all the British prisoners in the hands of the Turks should be released, and Alexandria surrendered to their arms; in virtue of which the English troops set sail from the mouth of the Nile in the end of September, and were brought to Gibraltar, where they were stationed, to co-operate in the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from the Tagus, and ultimately took a share in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns (1).

Which is debated.

Sect. 22.

The public dissatisfaction arising from these repeated defeats was so strong, that it seriously shook the stability of Ministers, and produced a very general impression even among that portion of the community who had hitherto supported them, that, however well qualified to direct the state during a period of profound peace, and when ample leisure was to be had for carrying into effect their projected reforms, they were not calculated for the existing crisis, in which these pacific ameliorations were of comparatively little consequence, and what was imperatively called for was the capacity of warlike combination. But room was not afforded for this growing discontent to manifest itself in the usual way, so as to affect the fortunes of the administration, from another event at this time, which brought them into collision with the religious feelings of the sovereign, and ultimately led to their retirement from office.

It has been already mentioned that the general question of Catholic Emancipation was brought forward in the session of 1803, and supported with all the weight and eloquence of the Whig party. The ministerial leaders felt the necessity of making some effort, when in power, to redeem the pledges which they had so freely given when on the opposition benches. Lord Grenville, in particular, who had formed part of the administration which resigned in 1801, in consequence of the declared repugnance of the sovereign to those concessions to the Catholics which Mr. Pitt then deemed essential to the security of the country, considered himself called upon by every consideration, both of public policy and private honour, again to press them upon the legislature. In consequence of these impressions, Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey) moved, on the 5th of March, for leave to bring in a bill which should enable persons of every religious persuasion to serve in the army and navy, without any other condition but that of taking an oath specified in the bill which was repugnant to no religious opinions. By the existing law, a Catholic in Great Britain could not rise to the rank even of a subaltern, in consequence of the necessity of officers of every grade taking the Test oath; while in Ireland, under an act passed in the Irish parliament in 1793, persons of that religious persua-

Measures for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick.

March 5.

sion were permitted to rise to any situation in the army, excepting Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, Master-General of the Ordnance, or General on the Staff. "Was it prudent," said Lord Howick, "when we were contending with so powerful an enemy, to prevent, in this manner, a large portion of the population of the country from concurring in the common defence? What can be more anomalous than that in one united empire so great a discrepancy should prevail, as that on one side of St. George's Channel a Catholic may rise to the highest rank in the army, but on the other he cannot hold even an ensign's commission? It was declared in 1783, when this restriction was removed by the Irish parliament, by his Majesty's Ministers in both houses, that in two months they would grant a similar indulgence to persons of the Romish persuasion in Great Britain, but this had never yet been done, and this monstrous inconsistency continued to disgrace the laws of the United Kingdom. It may fairly be admitted that the principle of this relaxation applies equally to dissenters of every description, and that it must lead to a general admission of persons of every religious persuasion to the army and navy; but where is the danger of such liberality? The proposed measure only enables the sovereign to appoint such persons to offices of high importance. It does not compel him to do so; their appointment would still depend on the executive government, who would, of course, avoid any dangerous or improper use of their authority; and would, on the contrary, be enabled to take advantage in the common defence of the whole population of the country, without any of those restrictions which now, with a large proportion, damped the spirit or soured the affections (1)."

Arguments
in favour of
it by Lord
Howick.

Arguments
against it by
Mr. Perceval.

On the other hand it was strongly contended by Mr. Perceval—
The objections to this measure, strong as they are, are not so insuperable as to the system of which it forms a part, which originates in a laxity of principle on matters of religion, which is daily increasing, and threatens in its ultimate results to involve all our institutions in destruction. If it is desirable to preserve any thing in our ancient and venerable establishments, it is indispensable to make a stand at the outset against any innovations in so essential a particular. This measure is, in truth, a partial repeal of the Test Act; if passed, it must at no distant period lead to the total repeal of that act, and with it the downfall of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. The advocates of the Catholics argue as if their measures were calculated to support toleration, whereas, in reality and in their ultimate effects, they are calculated to destroy that great national blessing, by subverting the Protestant establishment, by whom toleration has been always both professed and practised, and reinstating the Romish, by whom it has been as uniformly repudiated. From the arguments that are advanced at the present day, one would be inclined to imagine that there was no such thing as truth or falsehood in religion; that all creeds were equally conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind; and that, provided only the existing heats and dissensions on the subject could be allayed, it mattered not to what religious tenets either a government or a people inclined. True toleration is indeed an inestimable blessing, but it consists in permitting to every man the free exercise of his religion, not in putting into the hands of the professors of a hostile creed the means of overturning what they will never cease to regard as a pestilent heresy, and resuming from its present Protestant possessors the lost patrimony of St.-Peter in these islands. In point of law, it is incorrect to say, that a Catholic who has obtained a commission in Ireland is

liable to any penalties; the Mutiny Act authorizes the king to require in any part of his dominions the services of every man in his army, and this is of itself a practical repeal of the disability affecting Catholics; for no man can be compelled to do what would subject him to a penalty. The argument that all offices should be thrown open to persons of all religious persuasions, is inconsistent with the British constitution as settled in 1688, which is root and branch a Protestant establishment. If pushed to its legitimate length, it would throw open all offices, even the crown itself, to Catholic aspirants. What then becomes of the Act of Settlement, or the right of the House of Hanover to the throne? If this is to be the policy of our country, there is but one thing to be done; to do every thing to transfer the church lands in Ireland to the Catholics, re-establish the Catholic faith, and call over the Pretender to the throne of these realms. These are the great and dazzling objects which the Romish party have in view; it was to exclude them that all the restrictions were imposed by our ancestors on the persons professing that faith; it is to gain them that all these minor concessions are demanded by their adherents; their advances are only the more dangerous that they are gradual, unperceived, and veiled under the colour of philanthropy. The Catholics already enjoy every thing which toleration can demand; to ask more, is to demand weapons to be used against ourselves. The consequences of a storm are little to be apprehended; it is the gradual approaches which are really dangerous. If Parliament goes on allowing this accumulation, it will ultimately have that extorted from its weakness which its wisdom would be desirous to withhold (1)."

Change of ministry. Causes which led to it. March 24. The second reading of this interesting bill was adjourned from time to time, without the nation being either alive to its importance or aware of the quarter in which obstacles to its progress existed. But on the 24th March, it was suddenly announced in the newspapers that Ministers had been dismissed, and two nights after, Lord Grenville, in the House of Lords, and Lord Howick, in the House of Commons, gave a full statement of the circumstances which led to so unlooked-for a change. The draft of the bill, as usual in all matters of importance, had been submitted to his Majesty for his consideration, and it contained a recital of the Irish Act which opened the army to Catholics for every grade, with the restriction of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, and General of the Staff; and then provided that the services of the Catholics should be received without any restriction, and the condition only of taking the oath of allegiance. On this bill being proposed, the King manifested considerable objections, but these were at length so far overcome that Ministers were authorized to bring in the bill, and communications were made to the heads of the Catholics in Ireland, that they were to be admitted to every situation in the army without exception. The King, however, had laboured under some misapprehension as to the extent and tendency of the measure which was to be brought forward; and believed that it was not intended to enlarge the facilities of admission, created by the Act of 1793 for Ireland, but only to make that act the general law of the empire; for no sooner was its import explained in the debate which occurred on the first reading in the House of Commons, of which an abstract has already been given, than he

(1) Parl. Deb. ix. 9, 11.

Subsequent events have rendered these early debates and predictions on the effects of concession to the Catholics in the highest degree curious and interesting. Without pronouncing any decided opinion on a subject on which the light of expe-

rience is only now beginning to shine upon the world, it is the duty of the historian to point out the discussions on this subject to the attentive consideration of every candid enquirer, either into political wisdom or historic truth.

intimated to the government that he had invincible objections to the proposed change. After some ineffectual attempts at a compromise, Ministers finding the King resolute, determined to withdraw the bill altogether, and intimated this decision to his Majesty, accompanied, however, with the conditions that they should not be precluded from stating their opinions on the general policy of the measure in Parliament, and that they should be at liberty, from time to time, to bring the matter again under his Majesty's consideration. The answer of the King, after expressing regret at the difference of opinion which had arisen, rejected these conditions as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the Constitution, that the acts of Government are to be held as those of the responsible Ministers, and that the adoption or rejection of no measure is to be laid upon his Majesty; and not less at variance with the fundamental basis of the Act of Settlement, which is rested on the exclusion of Catholics from the highest office in the realm; and it therefore required a written pledge from Ministers that they would propose no further concessions to the Catholics. This pledge Ministers, on their side, considered as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of a free constitution, which is that the King can do no wrong, and that the responsibility of all public measures must rest with his advisers, and equally repugnant to that progressive change in human affairs which might at no distant period render a repetition of the proposal a matter of necessity. They therefore declined, though in the most respectful terms (1), to give the proposed pledge, and the consequence was, that the King, in gracious terms, sent them an intimation that their services were no longer required; and on the same day the Duke of Portland, Lord Hawkesbury, and Mr. Perceval received the royal commands to form a new Administration.

Arguments
in Parlia-
ment against
the King's
conduct.

Parliament, after this unexpected event, was adjourned till the 8th April, and on that day the new Ministers took their seats (2). The change of Administration, of course, formed the first and most anxious subject of debate; and the interest of the country was excited to the highest degree, by the arguments which were urged for and against that important and unwonted exercise of the royal prerogative. On the side of the former Ministers, it was urged by Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Howick:—"The true question at issue is, whether or not it would have been constitutionally justifiable, or rather would not have been a high crime and misdemeanour, for any Minister to subscribe a written pledge that he would never in future bring a particular measure or set of measures under his Majesty's consideration. If any statesman could be found base enough to give such a pledge, he would deserve impeachment, and the House would be guilty of a dereliction of its duty, if it did not impeach a Minister who so far forgot his duty to the country. This is a matter in which the interests of the crown

(1) Lord Grenville's, Howick's, Hawkesbury's, and Mr. Perceval's Speeches, *Parl. Deb. ix.* 242, 258, 261, 278.

(2) The new Cabinet stood thus:—

Composition of the new Cabinet.	Earl Camden, President of the Council.
	Lord Eldon, Chancellor.
	Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal.
	Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury.
	Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.
	Earl of Clatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.
	Earl Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade.
	Lord Hawkesbury, Home Secretary.
	Mr. Canning, Foreign Secretary.
	Lord Castlereagh, War and Colonial Secretary.
	Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duke of Lancaster.

Not in the Cabinet.

Mr. Robert Dundas, President of the Board of Control.
George Rose, President of the Board of Trade.
Sir James Pulteney, Secretary at War.
Sir Vicary Gibbs, Attorney-General.
Sir Thomas Plummer, Solicitor-General.
Duke of Richmond, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

—See *Parl. Deb. ix.* xii.

were more at stake than even those of the people : for, if the precedent is once to be allowed, that a Minister is at liberty to surrender his own private judgment to the will of the reigning sovereign, it is impossible that the legal fiction that the King can do no wrong can any longer be maintained, and the great constitutional principle, that the acts of the King are those of his responsible advisers, would be at an end. Who could, in such a view, set bounds to the dangerous encroachments of unknown and irresponsible advisers upon the deliberation of Government, or say how far the ostensible Ministers might be thwarted, and overruled by unknown and secret influence, which might totally stop the action of a constitutional Government? The danger of the measure which has been adopted is only rendered the greater by the announcement now openly made, that in this, the most important step perhaps taken in his whole reign, his Majesty had no advisers. The constitution recognises no such doctrine; the advisers of the King throughout must be held to be those who have succeeded to his councils. There is no desire to bring the sovereign to the bar of the House of Commons; it is the new Ministers who are really the objects of deliberation. The late Administration was dismissed because they refused to bind themselves by a specific pledge never to renew the subject of Catholic concession; a new Ministry have succeeded them; they must be held, therefore, to have given that pledge, and it is for the House to say, whether such a dereliction of public duty is not utterly at variance with every principle of constitutional freedom (1)."

And to support of it by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning :—"The question, on which the imprudent zeal of the late Administration has brought them into collision with the religious scruples and political wisdom of the sovereign, is not one of trivial moment, in which the monarch may be expected to abide by the judgment of his constitutional advisers. It lies, on the contrary, at the foot of the whole constitution; it constitutes one of the foundations *non tangenda non movenda*, on which the entire fabric of our Protestant liberties has been reared. The present question regards the transference of the sword to Catholic hands; the same question on which Charles I erected his standard at Northampton—the intrusting the direction of the military force to a party necessarily and permanently inimical to our Protestant constitution, both in church and state. It is absurd to suppose this concession would do any thing towards satisfying the Catholics—it would only lead them to make fresh demands, and empower them to urge them with additional weight; and the consequence of the measure could be nothing else, in the end, but to bring Catholic Bishops into the House of Lords. Was it surprising that the King paused on the threshold of such a question, striking, as it evidently did, at the root of the tenure by which his own family held their right to the throne? In demanding a pledge that such a proposal should not be renewed, he acted without any adviser, upon the unaided dictates of his own masculine understanding, aided by the conscientious scruples of his unsophisticated heart. All the talent of the Cabinet could not blind him to the evident and inevitable, though possibly remote, consequences of such a fatal precedent as was now sought to be forced upon him. It is a palpable mistake to say he drew back in the later stages of the negotiation from what he had previously agreed to; he first gave a reluctant consent to the extension of the Irish Act of 1793 to Great Britain, in the firm belief that this was all that was required of him; so the proposed measure was explained to and understood by him, and that he was not singular in that

belief is proved by the fact, that the Irish Secretary had his doubts upon it, and that the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question as to the second reading of the bill, said there was no particular reason for the Irish members being present on that occasion, as they were already acquainted with the measure. Three Cabinet Ministers, viz., the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Ellenborough, refused to concur in the measure, when they understood how far it was to be carried; the Chancellor was not even summoned to the council at which it was to be discussed, though he was in a peculiar manner the keeper of the King's conscience; and even the person who was commissioned to procure the King's consent to the measure did not understand the extent to which it was to be carried. Having thus been misled, whether designedly or inadvertently, it mattered not, in so vital a particular by his Ministers, was it surprising that the King should have required from them a pledge that they would not again harass him on the same subject? Undoubtedly no Minister should give a pledge to fetter the exercise of his own judgment on future occasions; but that was not here required; for if circumstances in future might render a renewal of the measure necessary, they might at once resign. The King regarded this measure as a violation of his coronation oath, as destructive to the Protestant Church in Ireland, and in its ultimate effects likely to endanger our whole Protestant constitution. Unquestionably it was to be regretted, that on any occasion the private opinion of the Sovereign should be brought forward apart from that of his constitutional advisers: but for this evil those must answer, who, by forcing on a rash and unnecessary measure, compelled him to rely on his own judgment alone; and it is some consolation to reflect, that in proportion as the Sovereign has been made more unconstitutionally responsible in his own person, he must become better known to his people; and the soundness of judgment, promptness and vivacity of intellect, which have enabled him to bear up alone against the united weight of the Cabinet, have only evinced, in the more striking manner, how worthy he is to fill the throne which his family attained by the principle he has now so manfully defended (1)."

Upon a division, there appeared 238 for the new Ministers, and 226 for the old, leaving a majority of thirty-two for the existing Government (2).

This majority, though sufficient to enable Ministers to conduct the public business during the remainder of that session, was not adequate to carry on the government during the arduous crisis which awaited them in the administration of foreign affairs. They resolved, therefore, to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of Parliament; and the event decisively proved that the King had not miscalculated the loyalty and religious feeling of the English people on this trying emergency. Parliament was prorogued on the 27th April, and soon after dissolved by royal proclamation. The utmost efforts were made by both parties on this occasion to augment their respective forces; to the usual heats and excitement of a general election being superadded the extraordinary passions arising from the recent dismissal of an administration from office, and consequent elevation of another in their stead. All the usual means of exciting popular enthusiasm were resorted to without scruple on both sides; the venality and corruption of the Tories, so strikingly evinced in their recent elevation of Lord Melville, after the stain consequent on the Tenth Report of the Commissioners, were the subject of loud declamation from the Whigs: the scandalous attempt to force the King's conscience, and induce a Popish ty-

Dissolution of Parliament, and great majority for the new Ministers.

(1) Parl. Deb. ix. 314, 321, 342, 346.

(2) Ibid. ix. 346.

runny on the land, yet wet with the blood of the Protestant martyrs, was as vehemently re-echoed from the other : "No Peculation," "No Popery," were the war-cries of the respective parties ; and amidst banners, shouts, and universal excitement, the people were called on to exercise the most important rights of free citizens. To the honour of the empire, however, this great contest was conducted without bloodshed or disorder in any quarter ; and the result decisively proved, that, in taking his stand upon the inviolate maintenance of the Protestant constitution, the King had a great majority of all classes throughout the empire on his side. Almost all the counties and chief cities of Great Britain returned members in the interest of the new ministry : defeat after defeat in every quarter told the Whigs how far they had miscalculated the spirit of the age : and on the first division in the ensuing Parliament they were defeated by a great majority in both Houses ; that in the Peers being 97, in the Commons no less than 193 (1).

Character of the Whig Ministry, and effects of their fall. On reviewing the external measures of the Whig Administration, it is impossible to deny that their removal from office at that period was a fortunate event for the British empire in its ultimate results, and proved eminently favourable to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Notwithstanding all their talent—and they had a splendid array of it in their ranks—notwithstanding all their philanthropy, and their domestic measures were generally dictated by its spirit—they could not at that period have long maintained the confidence of the English people ; and their unfortunate shipwreck on the Catholic Question only accelerated a catastrophe already prepared by many concurrent causes. External disaster, the reproaches of our allies, the unbroken progress of our enemies, must ere long have occasioned their fall. The time was not suited, the national temper not then adapted for those domestic reforms on which the wishes of their partisans had long been set, and which in pacific times were calculated to have excited so powerful a popular feeling in their favour. The active and ruling portion of the nation had grown up to manhood during the war with France ; the perils, the glories, the necessities of that struggle were universally felt ; the military spirit had spread with the general arming of the people to a degree unparalleled in the British islands. Vigour in the prosecution of the contest was then indispensably necessary for general support ; capacity for warlike combination the one thing needful for lasting popularity. In these particulars the Whig Ministry, notwithstanding all their talents, were eminently deficient ; and the part they had taken throughout the contest disqualified them from conducting it to a successful issue. They had so uniformly opposed the war with France, that they were by no means equally impressed with the nation either with its dangers or its inevitable character : they had so strenuously on every occasion deprecated the system of coalitions, that they could hardly, in consistency with their former principles, take a suitable part in that great confederacy by which alone its overgrown strength could be reduced. Their system of warfare, accordingly, was in every respect adverse to that which the nation then desired : founded upon a secession from all alliances, when the people passionately desired to share in the dangers and glories of a continental struggle ; calculated upon a defensive system for a

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 226, 229.

The numbers were—

In the Peers for the Whigs,	67
For the Tories,	104
Majority,	97

In the Commons for the Whigs,	155
For the Tories,	350

long course of years, when the now aroused spirit of the empire deemed it practicable, by a vigorous and concentric effort, to bring the contest at once to a successful termination.

Reflections
on their
foreign mea-
sures.

The foreign disasters which attended their military and naval enterprises in all parts of the world profoundly effected the British people, more impatient than any in Europe of defeat in warlike adventure. The capitulation at Buenos Ayres, the flight from the Dardanelles, the defeat in Egypt, succeeding one another in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly that they occurred on the theatres of our greatest triumphs by land and sea, or blasted hopes the most extravagant of commercial advantage. And yet it is now abundantly evident that defeat on the shores of the la Plata and the banks of the Nile, was more to be desired than victory; and that no calamity could have been so great as the successful issue of these expeditions. They were framed in the most inconsiderate manner, and aimed at objects which, if gained, would have paralysed the strength of the empire. At the moment when the armies of Napoléon were crossing the Thuringian forests, ten thousand English soldiers embarked for South America: when the scales of war hung even on the fields of Poland, five thousand men were sent to certain destruction amidst the cavalry of Egypt. Their united force, if thrown into the scale at Eylau, would have driven the French Emperor to a disastrous retreat across the Rhine, and induced, seven years before they occurred, the glories of Leipsic and Waterloo. What could be more impolitic than, after Russia had given such decisive proof of its extraordinary resolution and devotion to the cause of Europe, in February, 1807, to send out a miserable little expedition to Alexandria in March following, too large for piracy, too small for conquest, and the success of which could have no other effect but that of riveting the hostility of Turkey to Russia and its allies, and thereby securing to Napoléon the inestimable advantage of a powerful diversion on the

Violent irri-
tation aris-
ing from it
in Russia.

side of the Danube? What more impolitic than, when the finances of that great power were exhausted by the extraordinary expenses of the contest, to refuse to the Emperor not only a subsidy, but even the British guarantee to a loan which he was desirous of contracting in the British dominions, unless accompanied by the cession of customhouse duties in Russia in security; dealing thus with the greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was periling his very crown in our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief? The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for contracting the closest alliance with the Russian government; the instant advance of loans to any amount; the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoléon had drawn him into a situation full of peril; for the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle, and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitations of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French Emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals in his applications for assistance, and

saw the land force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the hazardous conflict in which he was now exclusively engaged (1)?

The Dardanelles expedition is an exception to the general impolicy of their foreign policy. To these general censures on the foreign policy of England at this juncture, an exception must be made in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was ably conceived, and vigorously entered upon. The stroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart of her adversary; the fire of Duckworth's broadsides was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylau; if successful, they would have added forty thousand men to the Russian standards. This object was so important that it completely vindicates the expedition; the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the disposal of the British admiral was not such as to

Reputed and (1) "In the Foreign office," said ineffectual Mr. Canning, when Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1807, "are to be found not one but twenty letters from the Marquis of Douglas, Ambassador to the from England Whigs at St Petersburg, intimating, during the in the strongest terms, that unless Polish war. effectual aid was sent to the Emperor of Russia he would abandon the contest." Ample proofs of this exists, in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid before Parliament. On 23th November, 1806, the Marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, from St Petersburg,—"General Budberg lately told me that his Imperial Majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coasts of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his Imperial Majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in England." On 18th December, 1806, he again wrote,—"At court this morning his Imperial Majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expediency of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe, by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On 2d January, 1807,—"I have again heard the strongest complaints that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January 14th,—"I must not conceal from your Lordships that the silence of his Majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." On January 26th,—"Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has

now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February 4th,—"During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February 15th,—"I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances, and urgent calls for aid, the British government did nothing; they declined to guarantee the loan of six millions which was indispensable to the equipment of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On Jan. 13, Lord Howick wrote,—"In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his Majesty feels it to be his duty to preserve as much as possible the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in history an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony; "husbanding," as Mr. Canning afterwards said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of the disposable force then lying dormant in the British Islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos-Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of eighty thousand men in the British Islands. Her military force, Jan. 1807, was as follows:—

Regulars.		Militia.		Volunteers.	
Cavalry at home, .	20,041	In Great Britain, .	53,810	Infantry, . . .	254,544
Infantry ditto, .	61,447	In Ireland, . . .	24,180	Cavalry, . . .	25,342
				Artillery, . . .	9,420
Total ditto, . . .	81,488		77,990		289,306
Infantry abroad, .	93,114				
Cavalry ditto, . . .	6,274				
Total,	180,876				
Total in arms in the British Isles—of whom 81,488 were regulars,					
					448,784

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1806, England had about seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in

Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.—See *Parl. Paper, July 18, 1807; Parl. Deb ix. 111; Appendix.*

have rendered victory a matter of certainty. As it was, however, it was adequate to the object; and this bold and well-conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sébastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British admiral, who, however gallant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

These defeats were ultimately beneficial.

After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expeditions, and the severe mortification which their failure occasioned to the British people, had a favourable effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr. Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric character of his maritime expeditions; but they were important in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowing by their grandeur and extent his continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources to the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disasters and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic as well as unworthy of its resources for so great a nation to waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue: the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired; and that general longing after military glory was felt, which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular war, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

ARGUMENT.

Negotiations and Treaties between the Allies for the vigorous prosecution of the War—Treaties between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein, to which England accedes—But too late to prevent the irritation of Russia—Unwise refusal of military succour by England—Violent Irritation which it occasioned in the breast of Alexander—Negotiations of Napoleon during the same period—Auxiliary Force obtained under Romana from Spain—Operations in Pomerania, and Viages of Napoleon regarding Sweden—Armistice between the Swedes and French—Sweden again reverts to the Alliance—Formation of an Army of Reserve on the Elbe—Negotiation with Turkey and Persia by Napoleon—Jealousy excited in the Divan by the summoning of Parga—Measures taken to organize the military strength of Poland—Winter Quarters of the French Army—Cantonments of the Russians—Combat of Guttstadt—Great Views of Napoleon at this period for the interior of his empire—He fixes on a design for the Madeleine at Paris—Finances of France during this period—Receipts and Expenditure of the year—Statutes of the Grand Sanhedrim of the Jews at Paris—Progress of the sieges in Silesia during the interval of hostilities—Fall of Schweidnitz—and of Neiss—and Glatz—Siege of Dantzig—Description of that fortress—First Operation of the besieging force—Capture of the Isle of Nebrung—Progress of the siege—Unsuccessful attempt of the Allies to raise it—Growing Difficulties of the besieged, and Fall of the place—Reinforcements which arrived to the Russian Main Army—Its Strength and Position—Strength and Distribution of the French army—Defensive Measures previously adopted by the Russians—Design on Ney's corps—and Plan of Operation—Feigned Assault on the bridge of the Passarge, and real Attack on Marshal Ney—Napoleon concentrates his army, and the Russians fall back—and, pursued by the French, retire to Heilsberg—Different Plans of Operations which present themselves to Napoleon—His Advance upon Heilsberg—Description of the Position and Entrenched Camp of the Russians—Battle of Heilsberg, which is unsuccessful to the French—Fresh attack by Lannes, which is also repulsed—Violent explosion between Lannes, Murat, and Napoleon in consequence—Frightful appearance of the slain after the Battle—Napoleon turns the Russian flank and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg—Movements of the two armies before the battle of Friedland—Description of the Field of battle—Benningen resolves to attack Lannes' corps—Its Situation—He crosses the Alle and attacks the French Marshal—No decisive success is gained on either side, before the arrival of the other French corps—Preparatory Disposition of forces by Napoleon—Battle of Friedland—Splendid Attack by Ney's corps—Gallant Charge of the Russian Guard nearly regains the day—Progress of the action on the Russian centre and right—Measures of Benningen to secure a retreat—Immense Results of the Battle—The Russians retire without molestation to Allenberg and Wehlau—Capture of Konigsberg—Movements of Napoleon, and retreat of the Russians to the Niemen—The Emperor Alexander proposes an Armistice—Reasons which made Napoleon rejoice at that step—Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation—Conclusion of an Armistice—Napoleon's Proclamation there on to his troops—Interview on the Raft at Tilsit between the two Emperors—Commencement of the Negotiations at that town—Napoleon's Interviews with the Queen of Prussia—Napoleon's Character of the Queen of Prussia—Convivialities between the Russian and French officers—Napoleon's admiration of the Russian Imperial Guard—Treaty of Tilsit—Its leading Provisions—Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and Kingdom of Westphalia—Treaty with Prussia—Immense Losses of that Power by this Treaty—Secret Treaty for the Partition of Turkey—and regarding England and all Neutral Fleets—and the Dethronement of the Princes of the Spanish Peninsula—Decisive Evidence of these Projects of Spoliation which exists both from the Testimony of the French and Russian Emperors—Measures of Napoleon to follow up his anticipated Turkish acquisitions—Convention regarding the Payment of the French Contribution in Prussia—Noble Proclamation of the King of Prussia to his lost subjects—Enormous Losses sustained by the French during these Campaigns—Memorable Retribution for the Partition of Poland, which was now brought on the Partitioning Powers—Terrible Punishment that was approaching to France—Evil Consequences of the Treaty of Tilsit in the end to Napoleon—His disgraceful

Perfidy towards the Turks—No Defense can be made for it, in consequence of the Revolution at Constantinople—Mutual Projects of the two Emperors for the Spoliation of the other European Powers—Napoléon's leading object in the Treaty was the humbling of Great Britain—But England could not complain of its Conditions—It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the War was prolonged.

Negotiations and treaties between the Allies for the vigorous prosecution of the war.

THE change of ministry in England was attended with an immediate alteration in the policy pursued by that power with respect to continental affairs. The men who now succeeded to the direction of its foreign relations had been educated in the school of Mr. Pitt, and had early imbibed the ardent feelings of hostility with which he was animated towards the French Revolution, and to the insatiable spirit of foreign aggrandisement to which the passions springing from its convulsions had led. Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh were strongly impressed with the disastrous effects which had resulted from the economical system of their predecessors, and the ill-judged economy which had led them to starve the war at the decisive moment, and hold back, at a time when, by a vigorous application of their resources, it might at once have been brought to a triumphant conclusion. No sooner, therefore, were they in possession of the reins of power, than they hastened to supply the defect, and take measures for bringing the might of England to bear on the contest in a manner worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown. An immediate advance of L.100,000 April 2, 1807. was made to the King of Prussia; arms and military stores were furnished for the use of his troops to the amount of L.200,000; and negotiations set on foot for concluding with the cabinets of St.-Petersburg, Berlin, and Stockholm, conventions for concerted operations and a vigorous prosecution of the war. In April, the cabinet of Vienna interposed its good offices to effect an adjustment of the differences of the Allied Powers; but Mr. Canning, while he accepted the offer of a mediation, did so under the express condition of its being communicated to the other belligerent Powers, and their accession to its condition. But, as they had already concluded engagements for the active prosecution of the contest, the proposed negotiation never took place; and England, under the guidance of its new administration, instead of entering into terms with France, reverted, in the most decided manner, to Mr. Pitt's system of uncompromising hostility to its ambition. A treaty was signed at Bartenstein, in East Prussia, in April 25. the end of the same month, between Russia and Prussia, for the future prosecution of the war. By this convention it was stipulated that neither of the contracting parties should make peace without the concurrence of the other; that the Confederation of the Rhine, which had proved so fatal to the liberties of Germany, should be dissolved, and a new confederacy, for the protection of its interests, formed, under the auspices of its natural protectors, Austria and Prussia; that the latter power should recover the dominions which it had held in September 1803, and that Austria should be requested to accede to it, in order to recover its possessions in Tyrol and the Venetian provinces, and extend its frontier to the Mincio. Finally, Great Britain was formally invited to accede to this convention, by furnishing succours in arms, ammunition, and money to the belligerent Powers, and the debarkation of a strong auxiliary force at the mouth of the Elbe, to co-operate with the Swedes in the rear of the enemy, while Austria should menace his communications, and the combined Russian and Prussian armies should attack him in front (4).

April 20-

To this convention Sweden had already given its adhesion by the signature of a treaty, six days before, for the employment of an auxiliary force of twelve thousand men in Pomerania; and England hastened to unite itself to the same confederacy. By a convention signed at London on the

June 17.
Treaties
between
Prussia and
Russia at
Bartenstein,
to which
England
accedes.
June 23.

17th June, England gave its accession to the treaty of Bartenstein, and engaged to support the Swedish force in Pomerania by a corps of twenty thousand British soldiers, to act against the rear and left flank of the French army, while, by a relative agreement on the 23d, the Swedish auxiliary force in British pay was to be raised to eighteen thousand men, and the provisions of the fundamental treaty of alliance in April 1805, were again declared in force against the common enemy. Shortly after, a treaty was signed at London between great Britain and Prussia, by which a subsidy of a million sterling was promised to the latter power for the campaign of 1807, and a secret article stipulated for succours yet more considerable, if necessary, to carry into full effect the purposes of the convention of Bartenstein. Thus, by the return of England to the principles of Mr. Pitt's foreign policy, were the provisions of the great confederacy of 1805 again revived in favour of the northern Powers; and it is not the least honourable part, as Mr. Canning justly observed, of these transactions to Great Britain, that the treaty with Prussia was signed when that power was almost entirely bereft of its possessions, and agreed to by Frederick William in the only town that remained to him of his once extensive dominions (1).

But too late
to prevent
the irritation
of Russia.

But it was too late: the succours of England came too late to counterbalance the disasters which had been incurred, the change of system too tardy to assuage the irritation which had been produced. By withholding these at an earlier period (2), the former Ministry had not only seriously weakened the strength of the Russian forces, by preventing the arming of the numerous militia corps which were crowding to the imperial standards, but left the seeds of irreconcilable dissatisfaction in the breast of the Czar (3), who, not aware of the total change of policy which the accession of the Whig ministry had produced in the cabinet of St.-James's, and the complete revolution in that policy which had resulted from their dismissal, was actuated by the strongest resentment against the British government, and loudly complained that he was deserted by the ancient ally of Russia at the very moment when, for its interests even more than his own, he was risking his empire in a mortal struggle with the French Emperor (4). Such was the state of destitution to which the ill-judged parsimony

(1) Schoell. ix. 141. Lucches. ii. 302, 303. Bign. vi. 234. Dum. xviii. 216, 217. Hard. ix. 402, 405. Parl. Deb. ix. 974; and x. 102, 103.

(2) It is the most signal proof of the obstinacy with which the British government, under the direction of Lord Howick, adhered to their ill-timed system of withdrawing altogether from continental affairs, that they clung to it even after the account of the battle of Eylau had arrived in London, and it was universally seen over Europe that a crisis in Napoleon's fate was at hand. In the end of February 1807, earnest applications were made by the cabinets of St.-Petersburg and Berlin for the aid of a British auxiliary force to menace the coasts of France and Holland, and land on the coast of Pomerania. The advantage was pointed out of "dispatching, without a moment's delay, on board the swiftest ships of Great Britain, a strong British auxiliary land force to co-operate with the army of Gustavus Adolphus, and thereby compel the French

to retreat. They were engaged in the siege of Stralsund, and in laying waste that province; and if the British force did not arrive in sufficient time to dislodge them, they might steer for some harbour in the Baltic, from whence their junction with the allied armies could certainly be effected." Lord Howick replied on the 10th March—"The approach of spring is doubtless the most favourable period for military operations; but in the present juncture the Allies must not look for any considerable aid from the land force of Great Britain."—See *LOCUTES* ii. 295, 296, and *Despatches between England and Russia* in 1806 and 1807. London, 1806, p. 120.

(3) Hard. ix. 417.

(4) These angry feelings are very clearly evinced in General Sudberg's answer to Lord Leveson Gower's (the British ambassador at St Petersburg) remonstrance on the conclusion at Tilsit of a separate peace by Russia with France. "The firmness and perseverance with which his Majesty, during eight months, maintained and defended a

of the late administration had reduced the British arsenals, and such the effect of their total dismissal of transports in the royal service, that it was found impossible by their successors to fit out an expedition for the shores of the Baltic for several months after their accession to office; and, in consequence, the formidable armament under Lord Cathcart, which afterwards achieved the conquest of Copenhagen, and might have appeared with decisive effect on the shores of the Elbe or the Vistula at the opening of the campaign, was not able to leave the shores of Britain till the end of July, a fortnight after the treaty of Tilsit had been signed, and the subjugation of the continent, to all appearance, irrevocably effected (1).

While the Allies were thus drawing closer the bonds which united their confederacy, and England, rousing from its unworthy slumber, was preparing to resume its place at the head of the alliance, Napoléon on his side was not idle, and from his camp at Finkenstein carried on an active negotiation with all the powers in Europe. In his addresses to the French Senate, calling out the additional conscription of 80,000 men, which has been already mentioned, he publicly held out the olive branch; the surest proof of the magnitude of the disaster sustained at Eylau, and the critical situation in which he felt himself placed, with Austria hanging in dubious strength in his rear on one side, and Great Britain preparing to organise a formidable force on the other. "Our policy is fixed," said he: "we have offered to England peace before the fourth

Negotiations of Napoléon during the same period. Auxiliary forces obtained under Romana from Spain.

cause common to all sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles. Never would his Imperial Majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he had hitherto pursued, if he had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his allies. But having, from the separation of Austria and England, found himself reduced to his own resources; having to combat with his own means the immense military forces which France had at her disposal, he was authorized in believing, that, in continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he might ultimately come to compromise the fate of his own empire. The conduct of the British government in later times has been of a kind completely to justify the determination which his Majesty has now taken. The diversion on the continent which England so long promised, has not to this day taken place; and even if, as the latest advices from London show, the British government has at length resolved on sending ten thousand men to Pomerania, that succour is noways proportioned either to the hopes we were authorized to entertain, or the importance of the object to which these troops were destined. Pecuniary succours might, in some degree, have compensated the want of English troops; but not only did the British government decline facilitating the loan the Imperial court had intended to negotiate in London, but when it did at length resolve upon making some advances, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the Allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expenses of Prussia. In fine, the use which, instead of co-operating in the common cause, the British government, during this period, has made of its forces in South America and in Egypt, the latter of which was not even communicated to the Imperial cabinet, and was entirely at variance with its interests, at a time when, by giving them a different destination, the necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the Danube might have been prevented, and the disposable force on the Vistula proportionally increased, sufficiently demonstrates that the Emperor of Russia

was virtually released from his engagements, and had no course left but to attend to the security of his own dominions." It is impossible to dispute the justice of these observations.—*Note, General Bessier to Lord Lanesdowne, Tilsit, 30th Jan. 1807; Parl. Deb. x. 111, 112.*

(1) *Parl. Deb. x. 1036, 1038. Harb. ix. 425. Ann. Reg. 1807, 22, 23.*
 "... When the present ministers came into office," said Mr. Canning, then Foreign Minister, on July 31, 1807, "they found the transport department totally dismantled. This originated in the economical system of Lord E. Petty; but it was a false parsimony, evidently calculated, at no distant period, to render necessary a profuse expenditure. The mandate of dismissal came from the Treasury, and was applicable to all transports but those necessary to maintain the communication with Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey. The saving produced by this order did not amount to more than £4000 a-month, and it dispersed 60,000 tons of shipping which was left to the late ministry by their predecessors. Ministers thus, in the beginning of April last, had not a transport at their disposal; and from the active state of trade at the same time, it required several months before they could be collected. If they had existed, a military force would in that very month have been sent out, and twenty thousand British troops would have turned the scale at Friesland. This ill-judged economy was the more criminal, that, by having a fleet of transports constantly at command, and threatening various points, twenty thousand men could easily paralyse three times that force on the part of the enemy. The Whigs had apparently parted with this transport force for no other purpose but that of registering their abandonment of the Continent." The facts here alleged, Mr. Windham, on the part of the late government, did not deny, alleging only "the absurdity of sending British forces to the Continent: which required no reply!"—a curious argument from so able a man, when it is recollected that the action was on the verge of Wellington's career.—*See Parl. Deb. x. 1035-1038.*

coalition; we repeat the offer: we are ready to conclude a treaty with Russia on the terms which her ambassador subscribed at Paris: we are prepared to restore its eight millions of inhabitants and capital conquered by our arms to Prussia." There was nothing said now about making the Prussian nobility so poor that they should have to beg their bread; nor of the Queen, like another Helen, having lighted the fires of Troy. But amidst these tardy and extorted expressions of moderation, the Emperor had nothing less at his heart than to come to an accommodation; and his indefatigable activity was incessantly engaged in strengthening his hands by fresh alliances, and collecting from all quarters additional troops to overwhelm his enemies. The imprudent and premature proclamation has been already mentioned, by which the Prince of Peace (1) announced, on the eve of the battle of Jena, his preparations to combat an enemy which no one could doubt was France. Napoleon dissembled for a while his resentment, but resolved to make this hostile demonstration the ground for demanding fresh supplies from Spain; and accordingly great numbers of the Prussian prisoners were sent into the Peninsula to be fed and clothed at the expense of the court of Madrid, while an auxiliary force was peremptorily demanded from that power to co-operate in the contest in the north of Europe. Trembling for its existence, the Spanish government had no alternative but submission; and accordingly sixteen thousand of the best troops of the monarchy, under a leader destined to future celebrity, the MARQUIS DE ROMANA, crossed the Pyrenees early in March, and arrived on the banks of the Elbe in the middle of May. Thus was the double object gained of obtaining an important auxiliary force for the grand army (2), and of securing, as hostages for the fidelity of the Court of Madrid, the flower of its troops in a remote situation, entirely at the mercy of his forces.

Sweden was another power which Napoléon was not without hopes, notwithstanding the hostile disposition of its Sovereign, of detaching, through dread of Russia, from the coalition. Immediately after the battle of Eylau he began to take measures to excite the court of Stockholm against the alliance (3). "Should Swedish blood," said he, in the bulletin on the 23d April, "flow for the defence of the Ottoman empire, or its ruin? Should it be shed to establish the freedom of the seas, or to subvert it? What has Sweden to fear from France? Nothing. What from Russia? Every thing. A peace, or even a truce with Sweden, would accomplish the dearest wish of his Majesty's heart, who has always beheld with pain the hostilities in which he was engaged with a nation generous and brave, linked alike by its historic recollections and geographical position to the alliance with France." In pursuance of these instructions, Mortier inclined with the bulk of his forces towards Colberg, to prosecute the siege of that town, leaving only General Grandjean with a weak division before Stralsund. Informed of that circumstance, General Essen, the governor of the fortress, conceived hopes of capturing or destroying the presumptuous commander who maintained a sort of blockade with a force so much inferior to

(1) *Ann.* v. 250.

(2) *Ibid.* vi. 239, 242.

(3) March 4. In furtherance of this design, early in March, he explained to Marshal Mortier, who was intrusted with the prosecution of the war in Pomerania, that the real object of hostilities in that quarter was not to take Stralsund, nor inflict any serious injury on Sweden, but to observe Hamburg and Berlin, and defend the mouths of the Oder. "I repeat much what has already happened," said

he, "and most of all that the fine suburbs of Stralsund have been burned. It is not our interest to inflict injury on Sweden, but to protect that power from it. Hasten to propose an armistice to the governor of Stralsund, or even a suspension of arms, in order to lighten the sufferings of a war which I regard as criminal, because it is contrary to the real interests of that monarchy."—*72 Bulletin, Camp. on Saxe et en Pologne*, iv. 243, 246.

April 3. that which was assembled within its walls. Early in April, accordingly, he issued from the fortress, and attacked the French with such superior numbers, that they were compelled to retire, first to Anclam, where they sustained a severe defeat, and ultimately to Stettin, with the loss of above two thousand men. No sooner did he hear of this check, than Mortier assembled the bulk of his troops, about fourteen thousand strong, under the cannon of that fortress, and prepared for a serious attack upon the enemy. The Swedes, though nearly equal in number, were not prepared for a conflict with forces so formidable, and, retired to Stralsund with the loss of above a thousand prisoners, and three hundred killed and wounded : among the latter of whom was General Arnfeld, the most uncompromising enemy of France in their councils (1).

Armistice
between the
Swedes and
French.

After this repulse, Mortier renewed his secret proposals of a separate accommodation to the Swedish generals, and on this occasion he found them more inclined to enter into his views. The

Swedish government at this period was actuated by a strong feeling of irritation towards Great Britain for the long delay which had occurred in the remittance of the stipulated subsidies; and its generals at Stralsund were ignorant of the steps which were in progress, since the change of ministry in England, to remedy the defect. Deeming themselves, therefore, deserted by their natural allies, and left alone to sustain a contest in which they had only

April 13. a subordinate interest, they lent a willing ear to Mortier's proposals, and concluded an armistice, by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease between the two armies - that the Islands of Usidom and Wollin should be occupied by the French troops - the lines of the Peene and the Trebel separate the two armies - no succours, direct or indirect, should be forwarded through the Swedish lines either to Dantzic or Colberg - and no debarkation of troops hostile to France take place at Stralsund (2). The armistice was not to be broken without ten days' previous notice, which period was, by a

April 29. supplementary convention on the 29th April, extended to a month. No sooner was this last agreement signed, than Mortier in person resumed the blockade of Colberg, while a large part of his forces was dispatched to aid Lefebvre in the operations against Dantzic, and took an important part in the siege of that fortress, and the brief but decisive campaign which immediately ensued. The conditions of the new treaty between England and Sweden, signed at London on the 17th June, came too late to remedy these serious evils, and thus, while the previous ill-timed defection of the cabinet of London from the great confederacy for the deliverance of Europe, had sown the seeds of irreconcilable enmity in the breast of the Emperor Alexander, it entirely paralysed the valuable force in the rear of Napoléon, which, if thrown into the scale at the decisive moment, and with the support of a powerful British auxiliary force, could not have failed to have had the most

(1) Dum. xviii. 108, 117. Bign. vi. 244, 245.

(2) In the letter of Napoléon, which Mortier dispatched to Essen on that occasion, he said—"I have nothing more at heart than to re-establish peace with Sweden. Political passion may have divided us; but state interest, which ought to rule the determinations of sovereigns, should reunite our policy. Sweden cannot be ignorant that, in the present contest, she is as much interested in the success of our arms as France itself. She will speedily feel the consequence of Russian aggrandizement. Is it for the destruction of the empire of Constantinople that the Swedes are fighting? Sweden is not less interested than France in the diminution of the enormous

maritime power of England. Accustomed by the traditions of our fathers to regard each other as friends, our bonds are drawn closer together by the partition of Poland and the dangers of the Ottoman empire; our political interests are the same: why, then, are we at variance?" And in the event of the Swedish general acceding to these propositions, the instructions of Mortier were—"Instantly to send to Dantzic and Thorn all the regiments of foot and horse which can be spared; to resume without delay the siege of Colberg, and at the same time hold himself in readiness to start with the whole blockading force, at a moment's warning, either for the Vistula or the Elbe."—JOURNAL, ii, 389, 391.

important effects, both upon the movements of Austria and the general issue of the campaign (1).

Sweden again reverts to the alliance. In justice to the Swedish monarch, however, who, though eccentric and rash, was animated with the highest and most romantic principles of honour, it must be noticed, that no sooner was he informed of the change of policy on the part of the cabinet of London, consequent on the accession of the new administration, and even before the conclusion of the treaty of 17th June, by which efficacious succours were at length promised on the part of great Britain, than he had manifested the firm resolution to abide by the Confederacy, and even pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons as the condition on which alone peace appeared practicable to Europe, or a curb could be imposed on the ambition of France, Early in June he wrote to the King of Prussia with these views, and soon after refused to ratify the convention of 29th April for the extension of the period allowed for the denouncing the armistice with France, in a conversation with Marshal Brune, successor to Mortier; so curious and characteristic as to deserve a place in general history (2).

Not content with thus drawing to the northern contest the force of the monarchy of Charles V, and neutralizing the whole forces of Sweden with the important *point d'appui* for British co-operation in his rear, Napoléon, at the same time, directed the formation of a new and respectable army on the banks of the Elbe. The change of ministry in England had led him to expect a much more vigorous prosecution of the war by that power; the descent of a large body of English troops in the north of Germany was known to be in contemplation; and with his advanced and critical position in Poland, the preservation of his long line of communication with France was an object of vital importance. To counteract any such attempt as might threaten it, two French divisions, under Boudet and Mollitor, were summoned from Italy, and, united with Romana's corps of Spaniards and the Dutch troops with which Louis Bonaparte had effected the reduction of the fortresses of Hanover, formed an army of observation on the Elbe, which it was hoped would be sufficient at once to avert any danger in that quarter, hold in respect Hamburg and Berlin, and keep up the important communications of the Grand Army with the banks of the Rhine (3).

Formation of an army of reserve on the Elbe. With a view still further to strengthen himself in the formidable contest which he foresaw was approaching, Napoléon, from his headquarters at Finkinstein, opened negotiations both with Turkey and Persia, in the hope of rousing those irreconcilable enemies of the Muscovite empire to a powerful diversion in his favour on the Danube and the Caucasus. Early in March a magnificent embassy was received by the Emperor at Warsaw, both from the Sublime Porte and the King of Persia. A treaty,

(1) *Diss.* xviii. 118, 121. *Bign.* vi. 245, 246.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 398, 392.
 (3) "Nothing," said he, in his letter of 2d June to the King of Prussia, "would gratify me more than to be able to contribute with you to the establishment of general order and the independence of Europe; but to attain that end I think a public declaration should be made in favour of the legitimate cause of the Bourbons, by openly espousing their interests, which is plainly that of all established governments. My opinion on this point is fixed and unalterable, as well as on the events which are passing before our eyes." And two days afterwards the following conversation passed between the King of Sweden and Marshal Brune:—"Do you forget, Marshal, that you have a lawful sovereign, though

he is now in misfortune?"—"I know that he exists," replied the Marshal.—"He is exiled," rejoined the King; "he is unfortunate; his rights are sacred; he desires only to see Frenchmen around his standard."—"Were is that standard?"—"You will find it wherever mine is raised."—"Your Majesty then regards the Pretender as your brother?"—"The French should know their duties without waiting till I set them an example."—"Will your Majesty then consent to the notification of ten days before breaking the armistice?"—"Yes, but if a month should be secretly agreed on—"
 "You know me little if you deem me capable of such a deception."—See *HAB.* ix. 411—412: and *Diss.* xix. 139.

(3) *Jom.* ii. 392, 394.

May 7. offensive and defensive, was speedily concluded between the courts of Paris and Teheran, by which mutual aid and succour was stipulated by the two contracting parties; and the better to consolidate their relations, and turn to useful account the military resources of the Persian monarchy, it was agreed that a Persian legation should reside at Paris, and General Gardanne, accompanied by a skilful body of engineers, set out for the distant capital of Persia. Napoléon received the Turkish ambassador, who represented a power whose forces might more immediately affect the issue of the combat, with the utmost distinction, and lavished on him the most flattering expressions of regard. In a public audience given to that functionary at Warsaw on the 28th May, he said, "that his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him." Memorable words! and highly characteristic of the Emperor, when his total desertion of that potentate in two months afterwards, by the treaty of Tilsit, is taken into consideration. In pursuance, however, of this design, at that time at least sincerely conceived, of engaging Turkey and Persia in active hostilities with Russia, he wrote to the Minister of Marine:—"The Emperor of Persia has requested four thousand men, ten thousand muskets, and fifty pieces of cannon—when can they be embarked, and from whence? They would form a rallying point, give consistency to eighty thousand horse, and would force the Russians to a considerable diversion. Send me without delay a memoir on the best means of fitting out an expedition to Persia." At the same time he conceived the idea of maritime operations in the Black Sea, in conjunction with the Ottoman fleet; and in a long letter to the Minister of Marine enumerated all the naval forces at his disposal and on the stocks, in order to impress him with the facility with which a powerful squadron might be sent to the Bosphorus, in order to co-operate in an attack upon Sebastopol (1).

Still more extensive operations were in contemplation with land forces; orders were sent to Marmont to prepare for the transmission of twenty-five thousand men across the northern provinces of Turkey to the Danube; and a formal application was made at Constantinople for liberty to march thence through Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. In these great designs, especially the missions of General Gardanne to Persia, more important objects than even a diversion to the war in Poland, vital as it was to his interests, were in the contemplation of the Emperor; the appearance of the ambassadors of Turkey and Persia at his head quarters when five hundred leagues from Paris, on the road to Asia, had strongly excited his imagination; his early visions of Oriental conquest were revived, and the project was already far advanced to maturity of striking, through Persia, a mortal stroke at England in her Indian possessions.

Jealousy
excited in
the Divan
by the sum-
moning of
Parga.

These extensive projects, however, which the rapid succession of events on the Vistula prevented from being carried into execution, were wellnigh interrupted by a precipitate and ill-timed step on the part of the Governor of the Ionian Islands, Caesar Berthier. The consent of the Divan had just been given to the march of the French troops across the northern provinces of the empire, when intelligence was received that the towns of Parga, Prevliso, and Butrin, on the coast of the Adriatic, though then in the possession of the Turks, had been summoned in the most peremptory manner by that officer, as dependencies of the Venetian States, out of which the modern republic of the Seven Islands had been framed, with the threat to employ force if they were not immediately surrendered. This

May 29.] intelligence excited the utmost alarm at Constantinople; the Turks recollected the perfidious attack which, under the mask of friendship, the French had made on their valuable possessions in Egypt, and anticipated a similar seizure of their European dominions from the force for whom entrance was sought on the footing of forwarding succours to the Danube. Napoléon, though this step was taken in pursuance of orders emanating from himself, expressed the utmost dissatisfaction at their literal execution at so untimely a crisis; the Governor was recalled, and the utmost protestations of friendship for the Sultan made. But the evil was done, and was irreparable: Turkish honesty had conceived serious suspicions of French fidelity; the passage of the troops was refused, and the foundations laid of that well-founded distrust which, confirmed by Napoléon's desertion of their interests in the treaty of Tihit, subsequently led to the conclusion of a separate peace by the Osmanlis with Russia in 1812, and the horrors of the Beresino to the grand army (1).

Measures to organize the military strength of Poland. A nearer and more efficacious ally was presented to Napoléon in the Polish provinces. The continuance of the war in their neighbourhood, the sight of the Russian prisoners, the certainty of the advance of the French troops, and the exaggerated reports every where diffused of their successes, had, notwithstanding the measured reserve of his language, excited the utmost enthusiasm for the French Emperor in the gallant inhabitants of that ill-fated monarchy. Of this disposition, so far as it could be done without embroiling him with Austria, he resolved to take advantage. His policy towards that country uniformly was to derive the utmost aid from the military spirit of its subjects which could be obtained, without openly proclaiming its independence, and thereby irrevocably embroiling him with the partitioning powers. In addition to the Polish forces organized under former decrees, and which now amounted to above twenty thousand men, he took into his pay a regiment of light horse raised by Prince John Sulkowski; subsequently decreed the formation of a Polish-Italian legion, and the incorporation of one of their regiments of hussars April 6. with his guards; and authorized the provisional government at Warsaw to dispose of royal domains in Polish Prussia to the extent of eighteen millions of francs, and Prussian stock to the extent of six millions. His cautious policy, however, shortly after appeared in a decree, by which the commissary-general at Warsaw was enjoined to limit his requisitions May 29. to the territory described by the original decree establishing his powers, which limited them to Prussian Poland. By these means, though he avoided giving any direct encouragement to rebellion in the Russian and Austrian shares of the partitioned territory, he succeeded in generally diffusing an enthusiastic spirit, which, before the campaign opened, had brought above thirty thousand gallant recruits to his standards. This disposition was strongly June 4. increased by two decrees which appeared early in June, on the eve of the resumption of hostilities, by the first of which Prince Poniatowski was reinstated in a starosty of which he had been dispossessed by the Prussian cabinet; while, by the second, the provisional government at Warsaw was directed to set apart 20,000,000 of francs (L.800,000) as a fund to recompense those who should distinguish themselves in the approaching campaign (2).

Winter quarters of the French army. The headquarters of Napoléon in the first instance had been fixed at Osterode, on the margin of one of the lakes which form the feeders of the Driewentz; but, on the representations of the learned

and humane Larrey, that that situation was low and unhealthy for the troops, he moved to Finkensteen, where all the important negotiations which ensued in that cessation of active hostilities were conducted. The guard were disposed around the Emperor's residence; and not only that select corps, but the whole army, were lodged in a more comfortable manner than could have been anticipated in that severe climate. After a sharp conflict in the end of February, the important fortified post of Braunsberg, at the entrance of the river Passarge into the Frisch-Haff Sea, was wrested from the Prussians by Bernadotte, and the *tête-de-pont* there established secured all the left of the army from the incursions of the enemy. On the left bank of that river no less than four corps of the army were cantoned, while all the passes over it were occupied in such strength as to render any attempt at a surprise impossible. Secure behind this protecting screen, the French army constructed comfortable huts for their winter quarters, and all the admirable arrangements of the camp at Boulogne were again put in force amidst the severity of a Polish winter. The streets in which they were disposed resembled in regularity and cleanliness those of a metropolis. Constant exercises, rural labours, warlike games, and reviews, both confirmed the health and diverted the minds of the soldiers; while the inexhaustible agricultural riches of Old Prussia kept even the enormous multitude, which was concentrated over a space of twenty leagues, amply supplied with provisions. Immense convoys constantly defiling on all the roads from the Rhine, Silesia, and the Elbe, provided all that was necessary for warlike operations; while the numerous conscripts, both from France and the allied states, and the great numbers of wounded and sick who on the return of spring were discharged from the hospitals, both swelled the ranks and reassured the minds of the soldiers. The magnitude of the requisitions by which these ample supplies were obtained, and the inferrible severity with which they were levied from the conquered states, was indeed spreading the seeds of inextinguishable animosity in his rear; but the effects of that feeling were remote and contingent, the present benefits certain and immediate; and the Russians had too much reason to feel their importance, in the numbers and incomparable discipline of the troops by whom they were assailed upon the opening of the campaign (1).

Winter
quarters of
the Rus-
sians.
Combat of
Guttstadt.

The Russian army was far from being equally well situated, and the resources at its disposal were by no means commensurate to those which were in possession of the French Emperor. The bulk of the Allied army was cantoned between the Passarge and the Alle, around Heilsberg, where a formidable entrenched camp had been constructed. The only contest of any moment which took place while the army occupied this position, was in the beginning of March at Guttstadt, which was attacked and carried by Marshal Ney, with the magazines which it contained; but the French troops having imprudently advanced into the plain beyond that town, several regiments were surrounded by the Cossacks, pierced through and broken; so that both parties were glad to resume their quarters without boasting of any considerable advantage. Headquarters were at Bartenstein, and the advanced posts approached to those of Marshal Ney, on the right bank of the Passarge. These cantonments, with the great commercial city of Königsberg in their rear, were very comfortable, and the army was daily receiving important accessions of strength from the sick and wounded who were leaving the hospitals. Thirty thousand fresh troops, also, including the Grand Duke Constantine, with the remainder of the guard, and

(1) Dum. xviii. 75, 85, 206, 207, and xix. 436, 442. Wilson, 118.

several batteries of light artillery, joined the army while they lay in their winter quarters; and in the end of March the Emperor Alexander left St.-Petersburg and arrived at Bartenstein, where the King of Prussia had already taken up his headquarters, and where the imperial and royal courts were established (1). But although the Russian and Prussian governments both made the utmost efforts to recruit their forces and bring up supplies from their rear, yet the succours which they were enabled to draw from their exhausted provinces were very different from what Napoléon extracted from the opulent German states which he held in subjection; and the addition to the respective forces which the cessation of hostilities occasioned was in consequence widely different. Now was seen how immense was the advantage which the French Emperor had gained by having overrun and turned to his own account the richest part of Europe; as well as the magnitude of the error which the British government had committed, in refusing to the northern powers, now reduced to their own resources, and with nine-tenths of Prussia in the hands of the enemy, the supplies by which alone they could be expected to maintain the contest (2).

March 7. Great designs of Napoléon at this time for the interior of his empire. During the pause in military operations which took place for the three succeeding months, the active mind of Napoléon resumed the projects which he had formed for the internal ameliorations of his immense empire. Early in March he wrote to the Minister of the Interior as to the expedience of granting a loan, without interest, to the mercantile classes, who were labouring under distress, on the footing of advancing one-half of the value of the goods they could give security over; and he announced his design of establishing a great bank in connexion with the state, for the advance to manufacturers or merchants in difficulties, of sums on the security of their unsold property. Orders, were sent to the French ambassadors at the Courts of Madrid and Constantinople, to use their endeavours to obtain the removal of certain restrictions which existed on French manufactures, and which, in the mortal commercial struggle between France and England, it might be of importance to have recalled.

April 14. The bridge recently built in front of the Champ-de-Mars received the name of Jena, an appellation destined to bring that beautiful structure to the verge of destruction in future times; a statue was ordered to be erected to D'Alembert, in the hall of the Institute; the prize formerly

March 27. promised to the ablest treatise on galvanism was directed to be paid to the author who had deserved it; the important and difficult subject

May 7. of the liberty of the press, occupied his serious thoughts and engrossed much of his correspondence with the Minister of the Interior (3); the

April 19.

(1) Dum. xviii. 203, 207. Wilson.

(2) Dum. xviii. 86, 91, 203, 207. Wilson, 122, 133.

While occupying these cantonments, a truce in hostilities, as usual in such cases, took place between the advanced posts of both armies, and this led to an incident equally characteristic of the gallantry and honourable feelings of both. The Russian and French outposts being stationed on the opposite banks of a river, some firing, contrary to the usual custom, took place, and a French officer advancing, reproached the Russians with the discharge, and a Russian officer approaching the Frenchman, requested him to stop the firing of his people, in order that, if necessary, they might determine by single combat who was most courageous. The French officer assented, and was in the act of commanding his men to cease firing, when a Russian ball pierced him to the heart. The Russian officer instantly rushed forward, and cried

out to the French soldiers—"My life shall make reparation for this accident—let three marksmen fire at me as I stand here!" and turning to his own soldiers, ordered them "to cease firing upon the French, whatever might be his fate, unless they attempted to cross the river." Already a Frenchman had levelled his piece, when the French subaltern next in command struck it down with his sword, and running to the Russian took him by the hand, declaring that no man worthy of the name of Frenchman would be the executioner of so brave a man. The French soldiers felt the justice of the sentiment, and confirmed the feeling by a general acclamation. See Wilson, 120. With truth did Montesquieu say that honour was, under a monarchical government, the prevailing feeling of mankind.

(3) "An effective mode of encouraging literature," said Napoléon, "would be to establish a journal, of which the criticism is enlightened, ac-

project for establishing an university for literary and political information, was discussed (1) : a prize of twelve thousand francs (L.4800), announced for June 4. the best treatise on the best means of curing the croup, which at that period was committing very serious ravages on the infants of France, and of which the child of the Queen of Holland had recently died; a daily correspondence was carried on with the Minister of Finance, and long calculations, often erroneous, but always intended to support an ingenious opinion, transmitted to test the accuracy and stimulate the activity of the March. 24. functionaries in that important department (2); and the great improvement of keeping accounts by double entry was adopted from the example of commerce, first by the recommendation of the Emperor, and after its advantages had been fully demonstrated by experience, formally enforced Jan. 2, 1808. by a decree of the government. Nor, amidst weightier cares, were the fine arts neglected; the designs for the Temple of Glory, ordered by the decree of 9th November, from Posen, were submitted to the Emperor's consideration, and that one selected which has since been realized in the beautiful peristyle of the Madeleine; while all the departments of France were ordered to be searched for quarries of granite and marble capable of furnishing materials of durability and elegance for its interior decorations, worthy of a monument calculated for eternal duration (3).

tuated by good intentions, and free of that coarse brutality which characterises the existing newspapers, and is so contrary to the true interests of the nation. Journals now never criticise with the intention of repressing mediocrity, guiding inexperience, or encouraging rising merit; all their endeavour is to wither, to destroy. I am not insensible to the danger, that in avoiding one rock you may strike upon another. It may doubtless happen, that if they dare not criticise, they may fall into the still greater abuse of indiscriminate panegyric; and that the authors of those books with which the world is inundated, seeing themselves praised in journals which all are obliged to read, should believe themselves heaven-born geniuses, and by the facility of their triumphs, encourage still more despicable imitation. Articles should be selected for the journals where reasoning is mingled with eloquence; where praise for deserved merit is tempered with censure for faults. Merit, however inconsiderable, should be sought for and rewarded. A young man who has written an ode worthy of praise, and which has attracted the notice of the minister, has already emerged from obscurity; the public is fixed; it is his part to do the rest."—*Napoleon's Letter, 19th April, 1807, to the Minister of the Interior; Bion. vi. 262, 264.*

(1) "You should occupy yourself with the project of establishing an university for literature, understanding by that word, not merely the belles letters, but history and geography. It should consist of at least thirty chairs, so linked together as to exhibit a living picture of instruction and direction, where every one who wishes to study a particular age should know at once whom to consult, what books, monuments, or chronicles to examine; where every one who wishes to travel should know where to receive positive instructions, both as to the government, literature, and physical productions of the country which he is about to visit. It is a lamentable truth, that in this great country a young man who wishes to study, or is desirous of signalizing himself in any department, is obliged for long to grope in the dark, and literally lose years in fruitless researches, before he discovers the true repositories of the information for which he seeks. It is a lamentable fact, that in this great country we have no depot for the preservation of knowledge,

on the situation, government, and present state of different portions of the globe, but the student must have recourse either to the office of Foreign Affairs, where the collections are far from complete, or to the office of the Minister of Marine, where he will with difficulty find any one who knows any thing of what is asked. I desire such institutions; they have long formed the subject of my meditation, because in the course of my various labours I have repeatedly experienced their want."—*Napoleon to Minister of Interior, 19th April, 1807; Bion. vi. 261, 269.*

(2) "The good order which you have established in the affairs of the Treasury, and the emancipation which you have effected of its operations from the control of bankers, is an advantage of the most important kind, which will eminently redound to the benefit of our commerce and manufactures."—*Napoleon to the Minister of Finance, Ostende, 24th March, 1807.* In truth, however, what the Emperor here called the emancipation of the Treasury from the bankers, arose, not so much from the regulations of the minister of that department, as from the extraneous sources from whence the chief supplies for the army were now derived, and which rendered the anticipation of revenue by discounting long dated Treasury bills at the bank of France unnecessary. He admitted this himself in the same letter—"I am now discharging the arrears of the army from the beginning of October 1806 to the end of February 1807; we shall see hereafter how this will be arranged with the Treasury; in the mean time, the payment comes from Prussia, and that will put us greatly at ease." The pay thus extracted from the conquered states amounted to the enormous sum of 3,300,000 francs, or L.132,000 a month, supposing 150,000 men only so maintained, which for those five months alone was no less than 16,500,000 francs, or L.600,000 sterling.—*See Bion. iv. 374, 376.*

(3) *Bion. vi. 257, 278.*
Napoleon
saw on a
design for
the Made-
leine at
Paris.
"After having attentively considered," said Napoleon, "the different plans submitted to my examination, I have not felt the smallest doubt on that which I should adopt. That of M. Vignon alone fulfilled my wishes. It is a temple which I desire, and not a church. What could you erect as a church which could keep its ground

Finances of
France dur-
ing this
year.

The finances of France during this year exhibited the most flattering prospect: but the exposition published was entirely fallacious, so far as the total expenditure was concerned, because a large portion of the supplies were drawn by war contributions from foreign states, and upwards of half the army were quartered for all its expenses on the vanquished territories. The revenue of the empire, as exhibited in the budget, amounted to 685,057,953 francs, or L.25,507,900, and its expenditure to 771,850,000 francs, or L.32,000,000 (1); but the Emperor did not reveal to the public, what was not less true, that the sums levied on the countries lying between the Rhine and the Vistula, between the 14th October, 1806, when the war commenced, and the 14th June, 1807, when it terminated, amounted to the enormous, and if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of 604,227,922 francs, or L.24,000,000; that above a million annually was levied on the kingdom of Italy (2); that the arrears paid up by Austria for the great war contribution of 1805 were double that sum; that the war subsidies extracted from Spain and Portugal, in virtue of the treaty of St.-Ildefonso, were above L.3,000,000 yearly. Finally, that the grand army, two hundred thousand strong, had, since it broke up from the heights of Boulogne, in September 1806, been exclusively fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of the German states (3). The revenues of France, therefore, did not furnish more than half the total sum required by the expensive and gigantic military establishment of the Emperor; while its inhabitants received almost the whole benefit from its expenditure; a state of things which at once explains the necessity under which he lay of continually advancing to fresh conquests; the extraordinary attachment which the French so long felt to his government; the vast internal prosperity with which it was attended, and the grinding misery as well as inextinguishable hatred with which it soon came to be regarded in foreign states (4).

Early in March a grand convocation of the Jews assembled in Paris, in pursuance of the commands of Napoleon, issued in the July preceding.

against the Panthéon, Notre-Dame, or above all, St.-Peter's at Rome? Every thing in the Temple should be in a chaste, severe, and durable style; it should be fitted for solemnities at all times, at all hours; the Imperial Throne should be a curule chair of marble, seats of marble for the persons invited, an amphitheatre of marble for the performers. No furniture should be admitted but cushions for the seats; all should be of granite, of marble, and of iron. With this view, searches should be made in all the provinces for quarries of marble and granite. They will be useful, not merely for this monument, but for others, which I have it in view to construct at future times, and which by their nature will require thirty, forty, or fifty years for their construction. Not more than 3,000,000 of francs (L.120,000) should be required, the temples of Athens having not cost much more than the half of that sum; fif-

teen millions have been absorbed, I know not how, in the Panthéon, but I should not object to an expenditure of five or six millions for the construction of a temple worthy of the first city in the world."

—*Napoleon to the Minister of Interior; Finkinstein, 18th April, 1807; Biog. vi. 270, 272.* It was from this determination of the Emperor that the present exquisite structure of the Madeleine took its rise; but his real design in the formation, on so durable and gigantic a scale, of this noble monument was, as already mentioned, still more extensive than the honour of the Grand Army; and he in secret intended it as an expiatory monument to Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution.—*Vide Ante, vi., and Las Cas. i. 370, 371.*

(1) Gaeta, i. 305.

(2) Darr's Report. *Dum. xix. 464. Pièces Just.*

(3) *Jom. ii. 437.*

(4) The receipts and expenditure of France, as exhibited in the Budget of the Minister of Finance for this year, were as follows:—

		Receipt.	
		Francs.	
Receipts and expenditure of the year.			
Dutch Taxes,	311,840,685	or L.12,040,000
Register and Crown Lands,	172,227,000	6,900,000
Customs,	90,115,728	3,360,000
Lottery,	12,233,837	369,000
Post-Office,	9,968,134	400,000
Excise,	75,808,358	3,032,000
Salt and tobacco,	6,900,000	276,000
Salt Mines of Government,	3,230,000	130,000

682,323,740 fr. L.26,507,000

Statutes of
the Grand
Sanhedrim
of the Jews
at Paris.
March. 9.

Seventy-one doctors and chiefs of that ancient nation attended this great assembly; the first meeting of the kind which had occurred since the dispersion of the Israelites on the capture of Jerusalem. For seventeen hundred years the children of Israel had sojourned as strangers in foreign realms; reviled, oppressed, persecuted, without a capital, without a government, without a home; far from the tombs of their forefathers, banished from the land of their ancestors; but preserving unimpaired, amidst all their calamities, their traditions, their usages, their faith; exhibiting in every nation of the earth a lasting miracle to attest the verity of the Christian prophecies. On this occasion the great Sanhedrim, or assembly, published the result of their deliberations in a variety of statutes and declarations, calculated to remove from the Israelites a portion of that odium under which they had so long laboured in all the nations of Christendom; and Napoléon, in return, took them under his protection, and, under certain modifications, admitted them to the privileges of his empire. This first approach to a re-union and settlement of the Jews, impossible under any other circumstances but the rule of so great a conqueror as Napoléon, is very remarkable. The immediate cause of it, doubtless, was the desire of the Emperor to secure the support of so numerous and opulent a body as the Jews of Old Prussia, Poland, and the southern provinces of Russia, which was of great importance in the contest in which he was engaged, but it is impossible not to see in its result a step in the development of Christian prophecy. And thus, from the mysterious manner in which the wisdom of Providence

Expenditure.

Public Debt,	Fr. 105,959,000 or L. 4,240,000	
Civil List,	28,000,000	1,120,000
Public Justice,	22,012,000	880,000
Foreign Ministers	10,379,000	420,000
Interior Ministers,	54,901,000	2,170,000
Finance do,	25,624,000	1,022,000
Public Treasury,	8,571,000	335,000
War,	195,695,000	7,900,000
Ordnance,	147,654,000	5,850,000
Marine,	117,397,000	4,900,000
Public Worship,	12,342,000	550,000
General Police,	708,000	34,000
Roads and Bridges,	38,215,000	1,900,000
Incidental Charges,	10,283,000	410,000

Francs, 777,850,000 L. 32,241,000

But as the Grand Army, 200,000 strong, was solely maintained, paid, and equipped at the expense of Germany, this table exhibited a most fallacious view of the real expenditure and receipts of Napoléon during the year. Without mentioning lesser contributions, the following table exhibits the enormous

sums which, by public or private plunder, for it deserves no better name, he was enabled, during the same period, to extract from the tributary or conquered states, and their application to the expenses of the war or otherwise :—

Receipts.

War contribution levied on Germany from October 1806, to July 1807,	Fr. 604,227,922 or L. 24,000,000	
Tribute from Italy,	30,000,000	1,200,000
— from Spain,	72,000,000	2,880,000
— from Portugal,	15,000,000	600,000
War contribution from Austria, arrears of 1805,	50,000,000	2,000,000

Fr. 772,227,922 or L. 30,880,000

Expended.

Costs of the Grand Army from October 1806, to July 1807,	Fr. 228,944,353 or L. 9,130,000	
Leaving to be applied to the internal service of France in this or succeeding years,	543,282,559	21,740,000

Fr. 772,227,922 L. 30,870,000

makes the wickedness and passions of men to work out its great designs for the government of human affairs, did the French Revolution, which, nursed in infidelity and crime, set out with the abolition of Christian worship, and the open denial of God by a whole nation, in its secondary results lead to the first great step which had occurred in modern Europe to the reassembling of the Jews, so early foretold by our Saviour; and in its ultimate effects is destined, to all human appearance, by the irresistible strength which it has given to the British navy, and the vast impulse which it has communicated to the Russian army, to lead to the wresting of Jerusalem from the hands of the infidels, and the spread of the Christian faith alike over the forests of the New and the deserts of the Old World (1).

Sieges in Silesia during the interval of hostilities. The two grand armies, in their respective positions on the Passarge and the Alle, remained for nearly four months after the sanguinary fight of Eylau in a state of tranquillity, interrupted only by skirmishes at the outposts, followed by no material results, and too inconsiderable to deserve the attention of the general historian. Both parties were actively engaged in measures to repair the wide chasms which it had occasioned in their ranks, and preparing for the coming struggle which was to decide the great contest for the empire of Europe. But Napoléon felt too strongly the imminent risk which he had run of total ruin by a defeat on the frontiers of Russia, before the fortresses in his rear were all subdued, to incur it a second time, until his right flank was secured by the reduction of the remainder of the powerful chain of fortresses in Silesia, which still hoisted the Prussian colours, and his left by the surrender of the great fortified emporium of Dantzic. To these two objects accordingly his attention was directed during the cessation of active hostilities in the front of the Grand Army; and his operations in these quarters were not only great in themselves, but had the most important effect upon the future fortunes of the campaign (2).

Fall of Schweidnitz. Schweidnitz and Neiss were invested about the same time, in the end of January; but serious operations were not attempted against the latter fortress, which was the chief stronghold of the province, till the former was reduced. The siege accordingly was carried on with great activity of the former, and with such success, that it capitulated, after a feeble resistance, in the middle of February. The reduction of the capital of

Feb. 7. Silesia was of the highest importance, not merely as putting at the disposal of Napoléon a powerful fortress, commanding a rich territory, but giving him a supply of extensive stores in ammunition and artillery, which were forthwith forwarded to Dantzic and Neiss, and proved of the utmost service in the siege of both these towns. The resources of Silesia, now almost entirely in the hands of Vandamme, were turned to the very best account by that indefatigable and rapacious commander; heavy requisitions for horses, provisions, and forage, followed each other in rapid succession, besides grievous contributions in money, which were so considerable, and levied with such severity on that opulent province, that before the end of March 1,500,000 francs (L.60,000) was regularly transmitted once a-week to the headquarters of Napoléon, and this plentiful supply continued undiminished till the end of the war (3).

And of Neiss. No sooner was the besieging force before Neiss strengthened by the artillery, and reinforcements which were forwarded from

(1) D'Ab. ix. 218. Bign. vi. 269. 270.

(2) Journ. ii. 399. Dum. xviii. 86, 87.

(3) Marten's Sup. 417. Dum. xviii. 98, 99. Journ. ii. 399.

Schweidnitz, than the operations of the French for its reduction were conducted with more activity. This fortress, originally situated exclusively on the right bank of the river, which bears the same name, was extended by Frederick the Great to the left bank, where the principal arsenals and military establishments were placed. The works surrounding the whole were extensive, but in some places not entirely armed, or clothed with masonry; but a garrison of six thousand men, great part of which occupied an entrenched camp without the fortress, promised to present a formidable resistance. Finding, however, that the trenches had been opened, and that the place was hard pressed, on April 30.

an attempt to relieve it was made by General Kleist with four thousand men, drawn from the garrison of Glatz. Their effort, which took place on the night of the 20th, was combined with a powerful sortie from the walls of the place; but though the attack at first was attended with some success, it was finally defeated by the opportune arrival of Jérôme Bonaparte with a powerful reinforcement, who had received intelligence of the projected operation, and arrived in time to render it totally abortive. The defeated troops took refuge in Glatz, after sustaining a loss of seven hundred men. Immediately after, the bombardment was resumed with fresh vigour, the town was repeatedly set on fire in many different places; the outwork of the Black-hausen was carried by assault; already the rampart was beginning to be

June 7. shaken by the breaching batteries; and the explosion of one of their magazines spread consternation through the garrison, when the governor offered to capitulate on the same conditions as the other fortresses of Prussia. This offer was agreed to; and on the 16th June, this great stronghold, with three hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, 200,000 pounds of powder, a garrison still above five thousand strong, but entirely destitute of provisions, fell into the hands of the enemy (1).

And of Glatz.
June 14. Glatz alone remained to complete the reduction of the province, and it did not long survive its unfortunate compeers. Prince Jérôme commanded the attacking force, and though the garrison was numerous, it was so much discouraged by the bad success of the besieged in all the other fortresses of the province, that it made but a feeble resistance. The entrenched camp which communicated with the town having been attacked and carried, this last bulwark of Silesia capitulated on the 14th June, the very day when the battle of Friedland was fought. Thus were all the strongholds of this province, so long the bulwark of Prussia, reduced, by a force hardly equal to the united strength of their garrisons, and Vandamme, with a corps not exceeding twenty-five thousand men, had the glory of wresting from the enemy six first-rate fortresses, containing above twelve hundred pieces of cannon. The defence which they made did little credit to the Prussian arms, as not one of them had resolution enough to stand an assault, and almost all lowered their colours while the rampart was still unbreached (2).

Siege of Dantzic.
Description of that fortress. The siege of Dantzic was an operation of more difficulty, and of much more immediate influence upon the fate of the campaign. Napoléon felt the imminent danger which he would have run if Benningsen's army, during the irruption which preceded the battle of Eylau, had succeeded in throwing a powerful reinforcement into that fortress; thirty thousand men, resting on its formidable ramparts, and amply supplied with every necessary from the sea, would have paralysed all the movements of the Grand Army. This important city, formerly one of the most flourishing of the Hanse Towns, had fallen to the lot of Prussia on occasion of the last par-

tion of Poland in 1794; and though it had much declined in wealth and population since the disastrous era when it lost its independence, yet it was still a place of great importance and strength. Its situation at the mouth of the Vistula gave it a monopoly of all the commerce of Poland: it served as the great emporium of the noble wheat crops which, in every age, have constituted almost exclusively the wealth of that kingdom; and imported, in return, the wines, fruits, dress, and other luxuries which contributed to the splendour of its haughty nobles, and the rude garments which clothed the limbs of its unhappy cultivators. The river Mottaw, a tributary stream to the Vistula, traverses the whole extent of the city, and serves as a canal for the transport of its bulk in merchandise, while its waters fill the wet ditches, and contribute much to the strength of the place. Previous to the war its fortifications had been much neglected, as its remote situation seemed to afford little likelihood of its being destined to undergo a siege; but after the battle of Jena, General Manstein, the governor, had laboured indefatigably to put the works in a good posture of defence; and such had been the success of his efforts, that they were in March all armed and in a condition to undergo a siege. It was surrounded in all places by a rampart, wet ditch, and strong palisades, in most by formidable outworks; the fort of Weischelmunde, in its vicinity, commanding the opening of the Vistula into the sea, required a separate siege for itself, and was connected with the town, from which it was distant four miles, by a chain of fortified posts. But the principal defence of the place consisted in the marshy nature of the ground in its vicinity, which could be traversed only on a few dykes or chaussées; and the power which the besieged had, by the command of the sluices of the Vistula, the waters of which, from their communication with the Baltic, are almost always at the same level, of inundating the country for several miles in breadth round two-thirds of the circumference of the walls. The garrison consisted of twelve thousand Prussians and five thousand Russians, under the command of Field-marshal Kalkreuth, a veteran whose intrepid character formed a sufficient guarantee for a gallant defence (1).

First operation of the besieging forces.

To form the besieging force, Napoléon had drawn together a large body of Italians, Saxons, Hessians, troops of Baden, with a division of Polish levies, and two divisions of French, in all, twenty-seven thousand men. The most inefficient part of this motley group was employed in the blockade of Colberg and Graudentz; and the flower of the troops, consisting of the French divisions, a Saxon brigade, and the Baden and Polish hussars, amounting to about twenty thousand men, was destined to the more arduous undertaking of the siege of Dantzic. The artillery was commanded by the gallant General Lariboissière, the engineers under the able directions of General Chasseloup; Marshal Lannes, with the grenadiers of the Guards, formerly under Oudinot, who was confined by sickness, formed in the rear of the Grand Army the covering force; and he was in communication with Masséna, who had superseded Savary in the command of the corps which had combated at Ostrolenka (2), and was reinforced by the warlike Bavarian grenadiers of Wrode. Thus, while twenty thousand men were assembled for the siege, thirty thousand, under the most experienced marshals of France, were stationed so as to protect the operations against any incursions of the enemy.

Capture of the Isle of Mottaw.

So early as the middle of February, the advanced posts of the besiegers had begun to invest the place, and on the 22d of that month, a sanguinary conflict ensued between the Polish hussars, who composed their

(1) Dum. xviii. 124, 126, 141. Jom. ii. 397.
Ann. Reg. 1807, 23.

(2) Jom. ii. 396, 397. Dum. xviii. 126, 129.
Ann. Reg. 1807, 23.

vanguard, and a body of fifteen hundred Prussians, at Dirschau, which terminated, after a severe loss on both sides, in the retreat of the latter under the cannon of the ramparts. After this check, General Manstein no longer endeavoured to maintain himself on the outside of the walls; and as the French troops successively came up, the investment of the fortress was com-

March 18. pleted. The first serious conflict took place on the island or peninsula of Nehrung, the well-known tongue of land which separates the waters of the salt lake, called the Frische-haff, and the Vistula from the Baltic sea. It is twelve leagues in length, but seldom more than a mile or two in breadth, composed of sand hills thrown up by the meeting of the river with the ocean, in one part of which the waves have broken in and overflowed the level space in its rear, which now forms the Frische-haff; and as it communicates with Dantzic, which stands at its eastern extremity, the approaches to the town on that side could not be effected until it was cleared of the enemy. Sensible of its value, the besieged had spared no pains to strengthen themselves on this important neck of land, and the besiegers were equally resolute to dislodge them from it, and thereby complete the investment of the fort-

March 20. ress. Early in the morning of the 20th March, a French detachment crossed the Frische-haff in boats, and surprised the Prussian posts on the opposite shore; fresh troops were ferried over in rapid succession, and the besiegers, before evening, established themselves in such force in the island, that though Kalkreuth despatched a body of four thousand men out of the place to reinforce his posts in that quarter, they were unable to dislodge the enemy, who not only kept their ground, but progressively advancing

March 22. two days afterwards, entirely cleared the peninsula of the Prussians, and completed the investment of the town on that side. By this success the communication of Dantzic with the land was entirely cut off; but the besieged, by means of the Island of Holm and Fort of Weischelmunde, with the entrenched camp of Neufahrwasser, which commands the entrance of the Vistula into the Baltic, had still the means of deriving succour from the seaside (1).

Progress of the siege. After full deliberation among the French engineers, it was determined to commence the siege by an attack on the fort of Hagel-

berg, which stands on an eminence without the rampart on the western side of the town, which was the only one entirely free from inundations. The first parallel having been completed, a heavy fire was opened on the works

April 2. in that quarter on the night of the first of April, though at the distance of eight hundred toises; a fortnight after, the second parallel

April 16. was also finished, notwithstanding several vigorous sorties from the garrison; and by the 25d, amidst snow and sleet, the batteries were all armed and ready to play on the ramparts at the distance only of sixty toises. On

April 23. the following night, a tremendous fire was opened from fifty-six pieces of heavy cannon and twelve mortars, which, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the garrison, soon acquired a marked superiority over the batteries of the besieged. For a week together this cannonade continued without intermission night and day; a brave sortie was unable

April 26. to arrest it more than a few hours: but although the city was already on fire in several places, and the artillery on the ramparts in part dismounted, yet, as the exterior works were faced with earth, not masonry, little progress was made in injuring them, and no practicable

May 2. breach had been as yet effected. Finding themselves foiled in this species of attack, the French engineers had recourse to the more

certain, but tedious method of approach by sap; the besieged countermined with indefatigable perseverance, but notwithstanding their utmost

May 5. efforts, the mines of the French were pushed to within eighteen

May 6. yards of the salient angle of the outermost works of Hagelsberg. At

the same time a separate expedition against the Island of Holm, which formed the western extremity of the peninsula of Nehrung, from whence it was separated only by one of the arms of the Vistula, proved successful; the garrison, consisting of five hundred men with fifteen pieces of cannon, was made prisoners, and the city by that means deprived of all the succour which it had hitherto obtained by the mouths of that river (1)."

Unsuccessful attempt of the Allies to raise the siege. Invested now on all sides, with its garrison weakened by the casualties of the siege, and the enemy's mines ready to blow its out-

works, on the side assailed, into the air, Dantzic could not be expected to hold out for any length of time. Not deeming himself in sufficient strength to attempt the raising of the siege by a direct attack upon the enemy's cantonments on the Passarge, Benningsen, with the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander, had resolved to attempt the relief of the fortress by a combined attack by land and sea, from the peninsula of Nehrung and the mouths

May 7. of the Vistula. The preparations made with this view were of the most formidable kind, and had wellnigh been crowned with success. General Kamenskoi, with five thousand men, was embarked at Pillau, under convoy of a Swedish and English man-of-war and landed at Neufahrwasser, the fortified post at the mouth of the Vistula, distant four miles from Dantzic; while two thousand Prussians were to co-operate in the attack, by advancing along the peninsula of Nehrung, and the Grand Army was to be disquieted and hindered from sending succours by a feigned attack on Marshal Ney's corps; and at the same time General Tutschakoff, who had succeeded Essen in the command of the troops on the Narew and the Bug, was to engage the attention

May 14. of Masséna's corps in that quarter. All these operations took place, and, but for an accidental circumstance, would, to all appearance, have proved successful: the proposed feints were made with the desired effects on the side of Guttstadt and the Narew; but unfortunately, the delay of the Swedish man-of-war, which had twelve hundred men on board, rendered it impossible for Kamenskoi to commence his attack before the 15th inst. In the meanwhile Napoléon, who had received intelligence of what was in preparation, and was fully aware of the imminent danger to which Lefebvre was exposed, had time to draw a large body of troops from Lannes' covering corps by the bridge of Marienswerder to the scene of danger. This great reinforcement, comprising among other troops the grenadiers of the guard under Oudinot, turned the scale, which at that period quivered on the beam. Early on the morning of the 15th, Kamenskoi marched out of the trenches of Neufahrwasser, and after defiling over the bridge of the Vistula into the peninsula of Nehrung, advanced with the utmost intrepidity to the attack of the strong fortifications which the enemy had erected to bar their advance among the hills and copsewoods of that sandy peninsula. Their first onset was irresistible. The entrenchments were carried in the most gallant style, and all

(1) *Dumas*, xviii. 148, 169. *Bign.* vi. 285, 286. *Widdes*, 129, 130

A remarkable incident occurred on this occasion, highly characteristic of the heroic spirit with which both parties were animated. A chasseur of the 12th regiment of French light infantry, named Fortunas, transported by the ardour of the attack, fell, in the dark, into the midst of a Russian detachment, and

in a few minutes that detachment itself was surprised by the company to which the French soldier belonged. The Russian officers exclaimed, "Do not fire, we are French;" and threatened the chasseur with instant death if he betrayed them. "Fire instantly," exclaimed the brave Fortunas, "they are Russians;" and fell, pierced by the balls of his comrades.—*Dumas*, xviii. 169.

their cannon ~~then~~ success appeared certain, as the defeated Saxons and Poles were flying in great disorder out of the woods into the sandy hills which lay between them and the town of Dantzic, when the victors were suddenly assailed in flank, when disordered by success, by Marshal Lannes, at the head of Oudinot's formidable grenadiers of the guards. Unable to resist so vehement an onset, the Russians were in their turn driven back, and lost the entrenchments; but rallying again with admirable discipline, they renewed the assault and regained the works; again they were expelled with great slaughter; a third time, stimulated by desperation, they returned to the charge, and routed the French grenadiers with such vigour that Oudinot had a horse shot under him, and fell upon Marshal Lannes; and both these valiant chiefs thereafter combated on foot in the midst of their faithful grenadiers. But fresh reinforcements from the left bank were every moment received by the enemy: Kalkreuth, confining himself to a heavy cannonade, had made no sortie to aid this gallant effort to cut through the lines; and to complete Kamenskoi's misfortune, he received intelligence, during the action, that the Prussian corps of two thousand men, which was advancing along the Nehrung to co-operate in the attack, had been assailed by superior forces at Karlsberg, and routed with the loss of six hundred men and two pieces of cannon. Finding the undertaking, in these circumstances, hopeless, the brave Russian, at eight at night, ordered his heroic troops to retire, and they regained the shelter of the cannon of Weischelmunde without being pursued, but after sustaining a loss of seventeen hundred soldiers; while the French had to lament nearly as great a number of brave men who had fallen in this desperate conflict (1).

Growing difficulties of the besieged, and fall of the place.

No other serious effort was made by the Allies for the relief of Dantzic. The besieged had provisions enough, but it was well known that their ammunition was almost exhausted, and that without a speedy supply of that indispensable article, the place must ere long capitulate. An English brig of 23 guns, under Captain Strecher, with one hundred and fifty barrels of powder on board, made a brave attempt to force its way up the river, though the Vistula is a rapid stream, not more in general than sixty yards broad, and the passage was both defended by numerous batteries and a boom thrown across the channel; but a cannon-shot having struck the rudder, and the rigging being almost entirely cut to pieces by the French fire, she was forced to surrender. Meanwhile, the operations against the Hagelsberg were continued without intermission; the springing of several mines, though not attended with all the ruin which was expected by the besiegers, had the effect of ruining and laying open the outworks, and preparations were already made for blowing the counterscarp into the ditch. In vain a sortie from the ramparts was made, and at first attended with some success, to destroy these threatening advanced works of the enemy; the besieged were at length driven back, and on the next day the arrival of Marshal Mortier with a large part of his corps from the neighbourhood of Stralsund and Colberg, nearly doubled the effective strength of the enemy. Kalkreuth, however, was still unsubdued, and the most vigorous preparations had been made on the breaches of the ramparts to repel the assault which was hourly expected, when a summons from Le-fevre offered him honourable terms of capitulation. The situation of the brave veteran left him no alternative; though his strength was unsubdued, his ammunition was exhausted, and nothing remained but submission. The

May 20.

May 21.

May 24. terms of capitulation were without difficulty arranged; the garrison was permitted to retire with their arms and the honours of war, on condition of not serving against France or its allies for a year, or till regularly exchanged; and on the 27th this great fortress, containing nine hundred pieces of cannon, but hardly any ammunition, was taken possession of by the French troops. The garrison, now reduced to nine thousand men, was marched through the peninsula of Nehrung to Königsberg: Kamenskoi, unable to render any assistance, set sail from Fort Weischelmonde with his own division (1), and its original garrison and a few invalids only remained on the 26th to open its gates to the enemy.

While this desperate struggle was going on round Dantzic, the Russians were making the utmost efforts to reinforce their principal army; but the time which they had was not sufficient to bring up from its immense extent the distant resources of their empire, and though men were in abundance in the nearer provinces, both money and arms were wanting to equip them for the field. In the end of March and beginning of April, however, reinforcements to a considerable amount arrived on the Alle, among which were chiefly to be noticed the superb corps of the guards under the Grand Duke Constantine, consisting of thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons, full twenty thousand men, the flower of the Imperial army. A powerful reserve, drawn from the dépôts in the interior of the empire, of thirty thousand men, was also advancing under Prince Labanoff; but it was so far in the rear, that it could not arrive at the scene of action before the end of June, and was, therefore, not to be relied on for the early operations of the campaign. The whole army which Benningesen had at his command, on the resumption of hostilities, was only one hundred and twenty thousand men, including in that force the detached corps of sixteen thousand Prussians and Russians in front of Königsberg under Les-locq, and the left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy, which was fifteen thousand strong; so that the force to be relied on for the immediate shock on the Alle or the Passarge was scarcely ninety thousand. These were, however, all veterans inured to war, and animated in the highest degree both by their recent success at Eylau (2), and the presence of their beloved Emperor, who, since the end of March, had been at the headquarters of the army (3).

By incredible exertions Napoleon had succeeded in assembling a much greater force. Notwithstanding the immense losses of his bloody winter campaign in Poland, such had been the vigour of his measures for recruiting his army, and such the efficacy of the continued influence of terror, coercion, military ardour, and patriotic spirit, which he had contrived to bring to bear upon the warlike population of France, Germany, and Poland, that a greater host than had ever yet been witnessed together in modern Europe, were now assembled round his eagles. Exclusive

(1) *Dow.* xviii. 180, 181. *Bign.* vi. 287, 289. *Wils.* 134, 135. *Marten's Sup.* iv. 420.

(2) *Dow.* xviii. App. Table iii. and p. 220, 221. *Jom.* ii. 400. *Wilson*, 135, 136.

(3) The Russian army, when the campaign opened, was as follows:—

Centre under Benningesen on the Alle, at Arensdorff, Neuhoff, Bergfried, and Bovern,	88,000
Right wing under Leslocq, near Königsberg and at Pillau,	18,000
Left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy,	15,800

121,800

—See *Dow.* xviii. 220, 221, and *Wils.* 136.

The militia, which the patriotic ardour of the Russians led them to raise, were unable to march from want of arms and ammunition, which the ill-timed parsimony of England withheld. One hundred and sixty thousand muskets, sent out in haste by

the British government after the change of ministry, arrived at Königsberg in June, just in time to be seized by the French after the battle of Friedland.—*Ilamp.* iv. 417.

of the army of observation on the Elbe, and the garrisons and blockading corps in his rear, no less than a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, and thirty-five thousand horse, were ready for immediate action on the Passarge and the Narew. Nor was it merely from its nominal strength that this immense force was formidable; its discipline and equipment had attained the very highest perfection; the requisitions, enforced by the terrors of military execution, had wrenched out of Germany all the supplies of which it stood in need; the cavalry were remounted, the artillery waggons and carriages repaired and in the best condition; the reserve parks and pontoon trains fully supplied; the return of spring had restored numbers of the veterans to their ranks, the never-failing conscription filled up the chasms produced by Pultusk and Eylau; while the recent successes in Silesia and at Dantzic, had revived in the warlike multitude that confidence in themselves and in their renowned leader which the disasters of the winter campaign had much impaired, but which has ever been found, even more than numbers or skill, to contribute to military success (1). Vast as the resources of Russia undoubtedly are, when time has been afforded to collect into one focus its unwieldy strength, it was now fairly overmatched by the banded strength of western Europe on its own frontier (2); and though Alexander might possibly have combated on equal terms with Napoléon on the Wolga or the Dneister, he was inadequate to the encounter on the Alle or the Narew.

Defensive
measures
of the Rus-
sians.

The Emperor Alexander had arrived at the headquarters of his army on the 28th March, and resided since that time with the King of Prussia at Bartenstein; a little in the rear of the cantonments of the soldiers. There they had, for two months, carried on a sort of negotiation with the French Emperor by means of confidential agents; but this shadow of pacific overtures, which were only intended on either side to give time and propitiate Austria, by seeming to listen to her offers of mediation, was abandoned in the middle of May, and both parties prepared to determine the contest by the sword. To compensate for his superiority of force, and provide a point of support for his troops, even in the first line, Benningsen had, with great care, constructed a formidable entrenched camp, composed of six great works regularly fortified, and sixteen lunettes or armed ravelins, astride on the opposite banks of the river Alle. Thither he proposed to retire, in the event of the enemy bringing an overwhelming force to bear upon his columns; but he did not conceive himself sufficiently strong until the reinforcements under Prince Labanoff arrived, to commence any serious offensive movement against the French army, and in consequence allowed the

(1) The composition and distribution of this force previous to the resumption of hostilities, was as follows:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Stationed at
First Corps, Bernadotte, . . .	23,547	3,744	Braunsberg and Spandau.
Fourth do., Soult,	30,190	1,366	Liebstadt and Alkin.
Sixth do., Ney,	15,883	1,117	Guttstadt and the right of the Passarge.
Third, Davoust,	28,445	1,125	Osterode and Allenstein.
Imperial Guard, Bessières, . .	7,319	1,808	Finckenstein.
Reserve Cavalry, Murat, . . .		21,428	Passarge and Lower Vistula.
Reserve Corps, Lannes, . . .	15,090	250	Marientberg.
Eighth Corps, Mortier, . . .	14,900	1,000	Lower Vistula.
Second Corps, Masséna, . . .	17,580	2,604	Narew.
	<hr/> 152,063	<hr/> 34,442	

Exclusive of officers, which made the force at least 155,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry. The corps of Lefebvre, after the capture of Dantzic, was melted down and divided between those of Lannes and Mortier and the garrison of the place; the second corps was in Dalmatia, under Marmont; the ninth

in Silesia, under Vandamme. Augereau's corps was divided among the other corps after its terrible losses in the battle of Eylau.—*Dux*, xviii. 223-223; *Pièces Just.* No. 3, and *Jour.* i. 403.

(2) *Ann.* xviii. 220, 221. *Wilson*, 136. *Jour.* ii. 401. *Bign.* vi. 294.

siege of Dantzic, as already mentioned, to be brought to a successful issue, without any other demonstration for its relief than the cannonade against Ney's corps, intended as a diversion in favour of Kamenskoi's attack. The army, though so much inferior in numerical strength to the French, was animated with the best spirit, and the great magazines and harbour of Königsberg supplied it with every necessary; although the situation of that city, without fortifications, and with its back to the gulf of the Curishé, from whence retreat was impossible, rendered it a situation extremely ill adapted, as the event proved, for the stores on which its operations depended (1).

Designs of
the Rus-
sians on
Ney's corps.

After the fall of Dantzic, and when the French army was reinforced by full thirty thousand men from the covering and besieging force, Benningsen was seduced, by the exposed situation of Marshal Ney's corps at Guttstadt, on the right bank of the Passarge, midway between the two armies, to hazard an attack on that insulated body. He had been stationed there by Napoléon, expressly in order to serve as a bait to draw the Russian generals into that perilous encounter; and the event proved with perfect success. Early in June all the corps of their army were put in motion, in order to envelope the French marshal. For this purpose, he proposed to make a feint of forcing the passage of the

June 4.
Russian plan
of opera-
tions.

Passarge, at the two points of Spandau and Lomitten, and at the same time assail Ney in his advanced position at Guttstadt, in front and both flanks. If, by these means, the corps which he commanded could be destroyed, it was intended on the following day to renew the attack on the bridges in good earnest, and fall with the whole centre of the Russian army on the corps of Soult, cantoned behind the Passarge, and at such a distance from that of Davoust, as to afford some ground for hope that it, too, might be seriously injured before the remainder of the French troops could advance to its relief. Should this daring attack fail, it was always in their power to retire to the fortified central position of Heilsberg (2), and there endeavour to arrest the enemy, as Kray had done with Moreau at Ulm, till the great reinforcements, under Labanoff, should enable them to resume the offensive.

Frigid
attacks on
the bridges
of the Pas-
sarge, and
real attack
on Marshal
Ney.

June 5.

Early on the morning of the 5th June, the whole Russian army was put in motion for the execution of this well conceived enterprise. The feigned attacks, intended to distract the enemy's attention, on the two fortified bridges of Spandau and Lomitten, took place at the prescribed time, and perfectly answered the object in view. The Prussians at the former point, and the Russians at the latter, pressed the enemy so severely, and with forces so considerable, that they supposed the forcing of the bridges was really intended, and in consequence, when they drew off in the evening, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded, from each of these places, represented their retreat as evidence of a repulse. Bernadotte, who commanded at Spandau, and had collected his whole corps to defend that important passage, was wounded by a musket-ball on the head, during the heat of the action, and replaced in command by General Dupont. Meanwhile the real attack was directed against Ney's corps, in its advanced position at Guttstadt, full seven miles to the right of the Passarge, and so completely in the midst of the Russian army, now that their advanced columns were assailing the bridges over that river, that its destruction appeared inevitable. In effect, the Marshal was taken so completely by surprise, that if Benningsen had pressed the retiring

(1) *Jom. ii. 401, 402. Wilson, 136, 137. Dum. xviii. 211, 217.*

(2) *Jom. ii. 403. Wilson, 136. Dum. xviii. 231.*

columns with any thing like the vigour which Napoléon would have exerted on a similar occasion, they must inevitably have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, orders had been issued for the different corps to delay the onset till they were in a condition to render assistance to each other; and as some were impeded in the march by unforeseen accidents, the serious attack on Guttstadt did not take place till two o'clock in the afternoon. It was then carried by assault, and four hundred prisoners, with considerable magazines and several guns, were taken; but after having thus made themselves masters of his headquarters, the Russians, though more than double in number to the enemy, exerted so little activity in following up their success, that Ney, who displayed on this trying occasion all his wonted skill and firmness, was enabled to effect his retreat, with comparatively little loss, to Ankendorf and Heiligenthal, where he passed the night. On the following

June 6. morning he resumed his march, though pressed on all sides by greatly superior forces; imposed on the enemy in the middle of it by a bold and well-conceived return to Heiligenthal, which gave time for his artillery and horse to defile over the bridge in his rear; and at length passed the Passarge at Dippen, with the loss, in the whole of his retreat, of only a thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number made prisoners. On arriving at the heights of Dippen, as the rearguard of Ney was defiling over, the Russians had the mortification of discovering that the bridge was not only altogether unprotected by a *tête-de-pont*, but completely commanded by the heights on which they stood on the right bank; so that if they had exerted ordinary vigour in the attack of the preceding day, the negligence of Napoléon had given them the means of totally destroying the exposed corps of his gallant lieutenant (1).

Napoléon concentrates his army, and the Russians fall back.

This sudden and unfortunate attack on the centre of his position, very much disconcerted the Emperor Napoléon, the more especially as he received intelligence, the same day, of the passage of the Alle by Platoff, at the head of his Cossacks, and the surprise of five hundred men who were made prisoners (2), and also of a regiment of Cossacks having swum the Passarge, and cut to pieces an escort of cavalry, and captured some artillery and baggage. He instantly commenced the concentration of his army. The corps of Ney, escaped from so serious a danger, was united to that of Lannes, which had suffered no loss; the guard and reserve cavalry under Murat commanded to assemble and support him with the utmost expedition; Mortier was ordered up by forced marches by

June 7. Mohrungeu; the corps of Bernadotte, which, since his wound, was intrusted to the directions of Victor, ordered to concentrate itself for the protection of Elburg; and Soult, who had assembled his corps at Leibstadt, enjoined to force the passage of the Passarge at Wolkendorf, in order to threaten the communications of the enemy with their entrenched camp at Heilsberg; while Davoust connected himself by the right with Ney, and formed an imposing mass behind the Passarge, against which, it was hoped, all the efforts of the enemy would be shattered. But these great preparations were

(1) Wilson, 136, 137. Dum. xviii. 230, 246. Jom. ii. 403, 405.

(2) The French officer in command owed his life to the fortunate incident of his giving the Russian commander the freemasons' sign when seizing his hand just as a lance was about to pierce his breast. — WILSON, 138 — In reviewing Sir Robert Wilson's work, the Edinburgh Review says, this is an anecdote so incredible, that no amount of testimony could make them believe it; but this only shows the

critic's ignorance. The same fortunate presence of mind, in making use of the freemasons' sign, saved the life of a gallant officer, the author's father-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler, during the American war, who, by giving one of the enemy's officers the freemasons' grip when he lay on the ground with a bayonet at his breast, succeeded in interesting the generous American in his behalf, and saving his life.

suitable rather to the confidence which Napoléon felt in himself than that with which his adversaries were inspired. Having failed in his original and well-conceived project of cutting off the corps of Marshal Ney in its advanced position close to his cantonments, Benningsen had no intention of hazarding his army by commencing offensive operations against a force so greatly superior, with a few bridges over the Passarge for his only retreat in case

of disaster. On the morning of the 8th, the increasing forces which the enemy displayed at Dippen, and the vivacity of their cannonade at that point, prognosticated some decisive movements, and about noon the loud shouts of the soldiers announced the arrival of Napoléon in person. Soon after, General Havoiski, with a body of Cossacks, part of the army opposed to Soult, surprised three regiments of horse, the advanced guard of Soult's corps, which had obeyed its orders by crossing the river at Wolfendorf, and made three hundred prisoners, besides killing a still greater number. But these partial successes were insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, whose masses, now rapidly arriving on its banks, gave him a decided superiority; and Benningsen resolved to fall back to the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, while Bagration covered the retreat on the left with five thousand foot and two thousand horse, and Platoff with three thousand Cossacks on the right (1).

The retreat, however, which was now commenced, was far more hazardous than that which they had just effected with such skill, for it was to be made in presence of Napoléon and a hundred thousand men. No sooner had the Russian carriages begun to defile to the rear, than the French crossed the Passarge in great strength at all points; the guards and cavalry, with the Emperor at their head, at Elditten, and the other Marshals at Spandau, Lomitten, and Dippen. Their immense masses converged from all these different points towards Guttstadt and Altkirch, whither the Russian army had retired in one compact body, following the direct road to their entrenchments at Heilsberg. The great bulk of the army was so far advanced as to be beyond the reach of danger; but the rearguard, under Bagration and Platoff, was exposed to the most imminent hazard; especially when, towards evening, it became necessary to halt and arrest the enemy, in order to give time to the numerous carriages and guns in their rear to defile over the Alle by the four bridges by which alone Heilsberg could be reached. The brave Russian, however, took post at Glottaw, and sent forth the cavalry of the Imperial Guard and Cossacks into the plain to check the advance of his pursuers. The French infantry instantly halted and formed squares, while twelve thousand of Murat's dragoons rushed upon the rearguard at full speed, threatening to annihilate them by their thundering charge. Such, however, was the steadiness and intrepidity of the Russian horse, that they successfully combated against the fearful odds by which they were assailed: several brilliant charges took place without any decisive result on either side; but not one square of the retreating rearguard was broken, not one squadron dispersed; and after a sanguinary conflict Bagration, having gained time for the whole artillery and carriages in his rear to defile over the bridge, withdrew to the other side of the Alle, abandoning Guttstadt, with no greater loss in killed and wounded than he had inflicted upon the enemy:—a rare example of intrepidity and skill in such trying circumstances, even more remarkable than the retreat of Marshal Ney two days before, as his own force was much less, and the pursuing host

The Russians pursued by the French, fall back to Heilsberg. June 9.

incomparably greater. At the same time, Platoff on his side, also gained the river, and crossed the bridges in safety, having, in order to give an example of coolness to his men, dismounted from his horse, and, with the tranquillity of parade exercise, withdrawn his forces in small bodies, with large intervals between them, which so effectually imposed upon the enemy, that he sustained no serious molestation in his retreat (1).

Having thus succeeded in throwing the river Alle between themselves and the French army, and broken down all the bridges over that river, the Russians were enabled without farther molestation, to withdraw all their troops into the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, where they stood firm under the cover of most formidable field-works. Napoleon had now one of two courses to follow. In his front was the great fortified camp of the enemy, by storming which he might hope to terminate the war in a single bloody battle; a little to his left was the city of Königsberg, containing the whole magazines and reserve stores of their army. The most obvious course would have been, to have executed a general movement with the right in front, passing Heilsberg, so as to establish the French lines between that place and Bischofstein, with the right extending towards Bartenstein, and the left reaching to Guttstadt; repeating thereby the circuitous sweep round the enemy's position, which his great numerical superiority so easily gave him the means of effecting, and which had proved so fatal to the Austrians at Ulm, and the Prussians at Jena; the second was to advance with the main body of the army straight against their entrenchments at Heilsberg, and in the event of their proving so strong as to defy open force, threatening to turn them by the advance of fifty thousand men on the left towards Eylau, so as to menace the communications of the enemy with his magazines at Königsberg. The first plan offered the most decisive results, as the Russian army, if cut off from its own frontier, by being turned on the right, would have been exposed to total destruction in the event of being thrown, after a defeat, upon Königsberg and the *cul-de-sac* of the Curishé; but the second was most easy of immediate execution, from its avoiding the difficult and intricate country into which an advance upon Bischofstein would have led the army; and, notwithstanding the obvious risk to which his left wing would be exposed by advancing between a superior mass of the enemy and the sea, Napoleon flattered himself that he would so engage his attention in front as to prevent him from taking advantage of the chances thus offered in his favour (2).

On the 10th June, accordingly, preparations were made for a front attack upon the entrenched camp of Heilsberg, while Davoust and Mortier moved forward on the French left to turn its right flank, and menace the enemy's communication with Königsberg. For this purpose the cavalry of Murat led the advance against the Russian entrenchments, which were about ten miles distant; bridges were speedily thrown across the Alle at various points; they were immediately followed by the corps of Soult, Lannes, Ney, and the infantry of the guard, who pursued on both sides of that river to Heilsberg, which is situated farther down its course. As long as Bagration was pursuing his way through the broken ground on the other side of Guttstadt, he was enabled to keep the enemy tolerably at bay; but when he was obliged to evacuate that favourite cover, and enter upon the open plain which extended on both sides of the Alle to Heilsberg, his task of covering the retreat became much more difficult. In vain the Russian cavalry, by repeated char-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 171. Wilson, 140, 143. Dum. xviii. 258, 264. Jun. ii. 405.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 171. Jun. ii. 408. Dum. xviii. 263, 264.

ges, strove to retard the advance of their indefatigable pursuers: in vain the infantry retired by echelon in alternate lines to sustain by continued fire their retrograde movements: the French cavalry and horse artillery incessantly pressed on; by degrees the losses of the Russians became more severe, and they were beginning to fall into confusion, when the opportune arrival of fifteen squadrons of Prussian cavalry, with a troop of horse artillery which Benningsen sent to his succour, gave him great relief, and by their gallant bearing enabled Bagration to maintain the fight, though with serious loss, till six at night, when the whole allied army had got within its lines. Then, on the word given, the Russian and Prussian cavalry withdrew by their flanks, exposing to view within half-cannon shot the formidable entrenchments, bristling with bayonets, and armed in this part with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. Instantly a fire of grape of extraordinary severity was opened upon the enemy, which speedily swept off all the squadrons who could not escape from its fury; and though Murat brought up several batteries of cannon, and swarms of tirailleurs occupied every thicket and kept up an incessant rattle along the whole front of the lines, yet they produced no impression, and the superiority of the Russian fire was very apparent (1).

Description of the position and entrenched camp of Heilsberg. The position of Heilsberg, however, was too important for Napoléon to relinquish the prospect of making himself master of it by main force without a struggle. Situated on a clustre of heights on both banks of the Alle, of which the town covered a part, it commanded the three roads of Wormditt, Mohlsack, and Landsberg, which intersected each other within the entrenched camp, and in this way blocked up the access to Eylau and Königsberg. As long as the Russians held this important position, and at the same time maintained the course of the lower Passarge towards Braunsberg, their line might be considered unassailable. But from the moment that they were driven from the latter ground, and the enemy's columns began to interpose between the entrenched camp and the sea, threatening Eylau and Friedland, its advantages were at an end, because it was cut off from its communication with the very dépôts which it was designed to protect. Its weakest side was that on the left bank of the Alle, which was connected with the redoubt on the other side by four bridges. Nearly eighty thousand men were here assembled, under the cover of above five hundred pieces of cannon, in nine divisions; of whom seven, under the Grand Duke Constantine, occupied the left bank of the river, and two, under Prince Gortchakoff, the right bank; while Kamenskoi was stationed in the redoubts which covered the front of the position (2).

Battle of Heilsberg. Napoléon having collected forty pieces of artillery, under the command of General Dulauiy, on his left, pushed them forward, and by the vivacity of their fire, in some degree weakened that of the enemy. The divisions of St.-Cyr and Legrand, part of Soult's corps, with Murat's cavalry, advanced about seven in the evening, by the villages of Laudén, Langwiesse, and Bewernicken, to the attack of the enemy's redoubts on the right bank of the river. These brave men had no sooner quitted the cover of the ravine which for some time sheltered them from the enemy's fire, than they rushed forward with such vigour that, in the first onset, they carried the principal redoubt of the Russians in that quarter, with all the guns which it contained; while St.-Hilaire, with his division, penetrated between that entrenchment and the neighbouring works. The moment was critical, and the least wa-

(1) Wilson, 144, 146. *Jom.* ii. 409. *Dum.* xviii. 264, 266, 272.

(2) Wilson, 145, 146. *Dum.* xviii. 266, 268. *Bign.* vi. 298.

Which is unsuccessful to the French. vering would have exposed the Russians to total ruin, for a line of redoubts broken in upon at one point is wellnigh lost; but Benning-sen was at the head of men who were equal to any emergency. Prince Gortchakoff, who commanded the Russian right wing, instantly ordered the divisions under his command to charge; the animating hurrahs of his men demonstrated that he had not calculated in vain on their intrepidity at that trying crisis: on they rushed with fixed bayonets, and the two regiments which occupied the redoubt were almost totally destroyed, and their eagles taken. Following up their success, the Russians burst out into the plain between the wood and the redoubts, and forced Soult's divisions to give ground. With the steadiness of discipline, however, they retired in hollow square by echelon, which vomited forth an incessant rolling fire upon their pursuers: the approach of night gave these moving citadels the appearance of being encircled with flame, while the intrenchments represented a line of volcanoes in vehement irruption. At length, the retreat of Legrand and St.-Cyr obliged St.-Hilaire, who had penetrated to the very foot of the redoubt, and had borne without flinching their terrible discharge of grape, also to retire: Savary, with two regiments of the guard and twelve guns, came up to cover his retreat; he, in his turn, however, was surrounded. The French at all points retired to the cover of the woods, and narrowly escaped being made prisoners by the allied cavalry; and at length, grievously shattered, the victorious Russians were again withdrawn into their entrenchments (1).

Fresh attack by Laners, which also proves unsuccessful. The vehement cannonade which had so long illuminated the heavens now ceased, and the cries of the wounded, in the plain at the foot of the entrenchments, began to be heard above the declining roar of the musketry. At eleven at night, however, a deserter came into the Russian lines, and announced that a fresh attack was preparing. Suitable arrangements were accordingly made; and hardly were they completed, when dark masses of the enemy were seen, by the uncertain twilight of a midsummer night, to issue from the woods, and advance with a swift pace across the bloody plain which separated them from the redoubts. Instantly the batteries opened on the moving masses; they staggered under the discharge, but still pressed on, without returning a shot; but when they arrived within reach of the musketry, the fire became so vehement that the heads of the columns were entirely swept away, and the remainder driven back in great disorder, after sustaining a frightful loss. At length, at midnight, after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the firing entirely ceased, and nothing was heard in the narrow space which separated the two armies but the groans of the wounded, who, anticipating a renewal of the combat in the morning, and

(1) Wilson, 145, 146. Dum. xviii. 272, 277. Bign. vi. 299. Savary, iii. 53.

"I had on this occasion," says Savary "an exceedingly warm altercation with the Grand Duc de Berg (Murat), who sent to me, in the very thickest of the action, orders to move forward and attack; I had the officer who brought the order go to the devil, asking, at the same time, if he did not see how we were engaged. That Prince, who would have commanded every where, wished that I should cease firing, at the hottest period of the fight, to march forward; he would not see, that if I had done so, I should infallibly have been destroyed before reaching the enemy. For a quarter of an hour I exchanged grape with the enemy—nothing enabled me to keep my ground but the rapidity of my

fire. The coming on of night was most fortunate—while every one slumbered, the Emperor sent for me. He was content with my charge, but scolded me for having failed in the support of Murat. When defending myself, I had the boldness to say he was a fool, who would some day cause us to lose a great battle; and that it would be better for us, if he was less brave and had more common sense. The Emperor bade me be silent, saying I was in a passion, but did not think the less of what I had said. Next day he was in very bad humour; our wounded were as numerous as in a pitched battle."—Savary, iii. 54. "He was particularly angry at the cavalry, saying, they had done nothing he had ordered."—Wilson, 149.

tortured by pain, implored removal, relief, or even death itself, to put a period to their sufferings (1).

Heavy rain fell in the early part of the night, which, though it severely distressed the soldiers who were unhurt, in their bivouacs, assuaged the thirst and diminished the sufferings of the host of wounded of both armies who lay mingled together on the plain. With the first dawn of day the Russians again stood to their arms, expecting every moment to be attacked; but the morning passed over without any movement on the part of the enemy. As the light broke, the French were descried on the skirts of the wood in order of battle; but, more even than by their well appointed battalions and squadrons, the eyes of all were riveted on a spectacle inconceivably frightful between their lines and the redoubts. This space, about a quarter of a mile broad and above a mile in length, presented a sheet of naked human bodies, the greater part dead, but some showing by their motions that they preserved consciousness or implored relief. Six thousand corpses were here lying together as close as they had stood in their ranks, stript during the night of every rag of garment by the cupidity of the camp-followers of either army, ghastly pale, or purple with the blood which was still oozing from their wounds. How inured soever to the horrors of a campaign; the soldiers of both armies, even while they loathed it, felt their eyes fascinated by this harrowing spectacle, which exhibited war, stript of all its pomp, in its native barbarity; and, by common consent, the interval of hostilities was employed in burying the dead, and removing the shivering wounded to the rear of the armies (2).

Napoléon was extremely disconcerted by this repulse, and vented his ill-humour in violent sallies of passion against his generals. The butchery had been worse than useless—it had been hurtful. The Russians still held, in unshaken strength, their entrenchments; twelve thousand French had fallen around their redoubts, without having gained at the close of the day the mastery of one of them; the ditches were filled with their dead bodies, but no part of them had been crossed. Eight thousand Russians also were killed and wounded; and this loss, though less than that of their opponents, from their having fought in part under cover, was still greater perhaps in proportion to the relative strength of their army. The French Emperor, however, had felt too severely the strength of the enemy's position to venture upon a renewal of the attack, and therefore he resolved to compel the Russians to evacuate it by manœuvring on their flank.

(1) Wilson, 146, 147. Dum. xviii. 276, 278. Napoléon takes their flank, and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg.

Sign vi. 290. Sav. iii. 53, 54. Violent explosion of Lannes. Murat, and Napoléon, in consequence of passion, even with the Emperor himself. It is thus narrated, with dramatic power, by the Duchesse of Abrantes:—"Your brother-in-law is a mountebank, Sire—a tight-rope dancer, with his white dancing plume."—"Come now, you are joking," answered Napoléon, in good humour: "is he not brave?"—"And who is not so in France? We point with the finger at a coward, Soult and I have done our duty: we refuse to allow the honour of the day to your brother-in-law—to his Serene and Imperial Highness Prince Murat! Truly these times make one shrug his shoulders! The mania of Royalty has seized him also; and it is to tack his mantle to your own, that you wish to rob us of our glory. You have only to speak: we have enough remaining—we will willingly give it to him."

"Yes!" exclaimed Napoléon, no longer able to contain himself; "I will bestow or take away glory as I please: for, hear ye! It is I alone who give you both glory and success."—"On this, Lannes became pale with rage; and with a voice quivering with passion, he exclaimed, 'Yes! yes! because you have marched up to the sunken to gore in this bloody field, you think yourself a great man; and your fine enplumed brother-in-law crows on his own dunghill, I will have no more of this. And this fine victory of yours—a great triumph truly!—twelve thousand corpses lying on the plain to keep the field for your honour, where you can only trace the French uniform by fractures and mutilation: and yet to deny to me—to me, Lannes—my due share in the honours of the day!'"—"D'ABRANTES, ix. 369, 372. The lively Duchesse, with her usual inaccuracy on military details, recounts this scene as relating to the battle of Eylau; but that is impossible, as Lannes was not in that battle at all, but sick in the rear.—*Vide ante*, vi. 36.

(2) Wilson, 147. Sav. iii. 54.

June 11. For this purpose, he took advantage of the arrival of Marshal Davoust's corps to push it forward at noon on the Lausberg road toward Eylau and Königsberg. This movement alarmed Benningsen, who, though not apprehensive of being forced in his entrenched position, was extremely afraid of being cut off from his supplies at Königsberg, on which the army depended for its daily subsistence; and at the same time, an order of Napoléon to Victor was intercepted, which contained commands to attack Lestocq and the right wing of the Allies at all points, and push on for Königsberg. Seeing the movement of the enemy to turn his right flank and threaten his magazines now clearly pronounced, the Russian general gave orders to retreat; the entrenched camp was evacuated at nightfall, and the army marched all the night of the 11th, and established themselves, at break of day, in a position in front of Bartenstein, headquarters being transferred to that town. Though great part of this operation was performed after daybreak on the 12th, in sight of the enemy, yet such was the respect produced by the battle of Heilsberg, that they made no attempt whatever to molest the retreat (1).

Movements
of the two
armies be-
fore the
battle of
Friedland.

No sooner was this retrograde movement perceived by the French Emperor, on the morning of the 12th, than he detached Murat's dragoons to follow upon the traces of the enemy, and he himself, moving forward his whole army, established his headquarters in the evening on the bloody fields of Preussich-Eylau. It was no longer a shivering scene of ice and snow; green fields were to be seen on all sides; clear and placid lakes gave variety and animation to the landscape; woods, resplendent with the early green of summer, fringed the rising grounds; and numerous white villages, with handsome spires, rose above their summit, attesting the industry and prosperity of the inhabitants under the paternal government of Old Prussia. The French soldiers could hardly recognise, in the gay and smiling objects around them, the frightful scene of devastation and blood which was imprinted in such sombre colours in their recollection during the preceding winter. Meanwhile General Lestocq resolved to break

June 12. up from Braunsberg and the Lower Passarge, and retire by the margin of the Frischaff towards Königsberg, a measure which had become indispensable to prevent his being entirely cut off from his communication with the main army, and thrown back without resource on the margin of the sea. Kamenskoi was also directed by Benningsen to march upon Königsberg; but on arriving at Mulhausen, on the road to that city, he found it already occupied by the advanced guard of Davoust, and only reached the object of his destination by making a very long circuit. During the night of the 12th, the Russians resumed their march through Schippenheil, and on the following morning had reached the banks of the Alle. On arriving there, however, Benningsen received information that the French had, by the rapidity of their movements, and by following the chord of the arc which led to Königsberg, while his own troops were traversing the circumference, anticipated him in his march upon that city, and were already so far advanced on the road that

June 13. they could not be overtaken. Murat and Victor were in full advance from Eylau to Königsberg. Soult was marching on Creutzburg; Napoléon himself, at the head of the corps of Lannes, Ney and Mortier, was approaching to FRIEDLAND by Domnau, at which latter place the Imperial Guard was already arrived. A glance at the map must be sufficient to show that by these different movements, not only was the bulk of the French Army interposed between the Russian general and Königsberg, where all his magazines

were placed, but Napoléon was in a situation, by a rapid advance upon Wehlau, to threaten his line of retreat to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances, no time was to be lost; and though the troops were dreadfully fatigued, orders were given to continue the march all day, and by great exertions the army reached Friedland, where headquarters were established in the evening (1).

*Description
of the field
of Fried-
land.*

Friedland, which has acquired immortal celebrity by the memorable battle of which it was the theatre, is a considerable town situated on the left bank of the river Alle, which there flows in a

northern direction towards the Baltic Sea. It is situated between the river and a large artificial lake or fish-pond, which lies to the north, and has been formed by damming up a rivulet called the Mill Stream, which flows from the high grounds to the westward near Posthenen into the Alle, and falls into it at right angles. The windings of the Alle serve as a natural wet ditch round Friedland on the south and east; the artificial lake protects it on the north; in a military point of view, therefore, it is only accessible on the western side, where it is approached by the road from Eylau, which the French were pursuing, and from which side also set out the roads to Königsberg to the north, and Wehlau and Tilsit on the north-west. In that direction there is a large open space, dotted with villages and cultivated ground, neither hill nor plain, but an undulated surface, intersected only along its whole extent, by the ravine formed by the Mill Stream, which is very deep, with rugged sides, and in many places, from the reflux waters, scarcely fordable. At the distance of two miles from Friedland as a centre, the cultivated plain to the westward is bounded by a semicircle of woods, which fringe the higher grounds and form the horizon when looking in that direction from the town. The banks of the Alle on the eastward are very steep; and though there are three bridges over that river, two of which were formed by the Russians with pontoons at the town itself, in other quarters it could be passed only at a few fords, which were unknown to the Allies till late in the evening, and at that period, from the recent heavy rains, were scarcely practicable (2).

*Benningsen
resolves to
attack Lan-
nes' corps.
Situation of
that corps*

In the night of the 13th, Benningsen received information that the corps of Lannes, which had suffered so severely at Heilsberg, was lying at Posthenen, a village about three miles from Friedland on the road to Königsberg. The exposed situation of that corps,

which formed the vanguard of the French army, and the well-known losses which it had sustained at Heilsberg, inspired the Russian general with the hope, that by a sudden attack it might be destroyed before the main body of Napoléon's forces could advance to its relief. This resolution was taken at two in the morning of the 14th; orders were immediately dispatched, and at four the Russian vanguard was already defiling over the bridge of Friedland. The opportunity was tempting, and to all appearance the corps of Lannes was placed in a situation of great danger; it consisted now of only twelve thousand infantry and three thousand horse; and though the corps of Mortier, Ney, and Victor, with great part of the cavalry of Murat, might be shortly expected to arrive at the scene of action, yet some hours must elapse before the foremost of these powerful auxiliaries could be relied on; and in the meanwhile this detached body was exposed to the shock of above fifty thousand veteran troops who, by proper exertion, might be directed against it. Here, in short, as at Marengo, the French army was to be attacked when

(1) Wilson, 150, 152. Dum. xviii. 280, 287.
Ism. ii. 410, 411. Sav. iii. 54, 55. Bigu. vi. 299.

(2) Wilson, 152, 153. Dum. xix. 6. Bel. de la
Camp. par un Témoin oculaire, 74.

on a line of march in echelon, by the concentrated masses of the enemy, who fell first on the leading corps; but there was this essential distinction between its position on these two memorable days, that on the former occasion the army was stationary or retreating, so that the distant corps could not arrive till late on the field of battle, whereas, here it was advancing, and consequently, unless decisive success were gained in the outset, the assailants would have the whole hostile body upon their hands (1); and in case of defeat could retreat only by the bridge of the Alle, which was wholly inadequate to afford an issue to so large a force.

He crosses the Alle, and attacks the French marshal. No sooner were the advanced posts of the Russians descried by the videttes of Lannes' corps, than a sharp fire of musketry began, which was soon increased to a heavy cannonade as the dark masses of infantry and cavalry were seen swiftly advancing through the grey twilight of the summer morning. The French tirailleurs fell back, skirmishing, however, sharply as they retired; the alarm was speedily communicated to the rear, and the whole corps stood to arms. A single Russian division had at first been passed over, but the enemy's troops were so constantly fed from the rear, and the resistance opposed so considerable, that Benningsen soon found himself under the necessity of passing over another to its support; three pontoon bridges were constructed to facilitate the passage, and by degrees, as the increasing masses of the enemy showed that other corps had arrived to the support of Lannes, the whole army was brought across. Thus was the Russian general, who at first contemplated only a partial operation, insensibly drawn into a general action, and that too in the most disadvantageous of all possible situations, with a superior force of the enemy in front, and a deep river traversed only by a few bridges in his rear (2).

Disposition and arrangement of the Russian army. The corps of Mortier arrived to the support of Lannes in a short time after the firing commenced, and both corps withdrew to the heights stretching from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, about three miles to the westward of the river Alle. Deeming these the only forces with which he had to contend, and considering himself adequate to their destruction, Benningsen drew up his whole forces as they successively arrived on the field from the bridges, in the narrow plain, backed by Friedland and the Alle, facing towards the westward, about half a mile in front of that town. The Mill Stream, flowing in a perpendicular direction to his line, nearly cut it in two equal parts; the right wing extended from the rivulet to the Alle, through the wood of Domerauer; the left, which was less considerable in length, stretched in a southerly direction also to the Alle, across the wood of Sortlack, and barring the roads of Eylau, Bartenstein, and Schippenheil, nearly at the point where they intersected each other. The whole army was drawn up in two lines facing to the west; the first and third battalions of each regiment, in battle array, composing the first line; the second, in close columns behind the intervals between them, forming the second. Thus the Russians stood on the arc of the segment of a circle formed by the river Alle in their rear. Only one division, of nine regiments and twelve squadrons of horse, remained on the right bank. Gortchakoff commanded the right wing, Bagration the left; Uvaroff and Gallitzin the cavalry of the right, Kollagriboff the horse on the left. After taking into view the losses in the preceding actions, and the large detachment under Kamenskoi to the right, to the support of Lestocq, the whole force of the Russians, on both sides of the river,

(1) Wilson, 152, 153. Jom. ii. 411, 412. Bign. vi. 312, 313. Dum. xix. 3, 9.

(2) Wilson, 152, 153. Dum. xix. 7, 10. Jom. ii. 412, 413.

did not exceed fifty-five thousand men, of whom about ten thousand were cavalry. They were all brave and experienced soldiers, but exhausted by fatigue and want of sustenance for several days; and every man in the array was entirely exposed to fire, and every movement distinctly seen, while that of the enemy was for the most part concealed or sheltered by the woods and rising grounds which fringed the plain to the westward, and bounded the horizon on that side (4).

No decisive success is gained on either side before the arrival of the other French corps.

Even with this comparatively inconsiderable force, however, the Russian general might, at least in the earlier part of the day, have gained considerable, perhaps decisive success, against the corps of Lannes and Mortier, which alone had come up to the field of battle, had he acted at once with the vigour and decision which the opportunity afforded, and the critical circumstances in which he was placed imperatively required. But, unfortunately, he was so prepossessed with the idea that he had no other antagonist to expect than the two corps actually on the spot, that the precious hours, big with the fate of Europe and the world, were allowed to elapse without any decided movement being attempted. Lannes gradually fell back from the place in front of Friedland, as the successive divisions of the enemy crossed the bridges, and established themselves on the left bank of the river; skilfully availing himself, however, of every advantage which the inequalities of the ground afforded to retard the advance of the enemy, and covering his movements with a cloud of light troops, whose incessant fire concealed the real amount of his force. A severe action took place on the right, while a body of thirty French squadrons tried to turn the Russian right in front of Heinrichsdorf, and at first with some success; but the advance of some fresh regiments compelled the assailants to give ground in that quarter. Soon after a column of three thousand men advanced straight against Friedland; they were permitted to approach close to the Russian cannon without a single shot being fired, when suddenly the whole opened with grape, and with such effect, that in a few minutes a thousand men were struck down, the column routed, and an eagle was taken. Encouraged by this success, the Russians advanced their left wing, and drove back the French right with such vigour, that it was thought they were retiring altogether towards Eylau; but this success was of short duration—fresh reinforcements arrived to the enemy—the lost ground was regained, and a tremendous cannonade along the whole line announced that the other corps were arriving, and that a general battle was at hand (2).

Preparatory dispositions and forms of Napoleon.

Napoléon was at Domnau, ten miles distant, when the first sound of distant cannon was heard. He immediately mounted on horseback, and rode rapidly forward to the front, where the increasing cannonade and the quick rattle of musketry announced that a serious conflict was already engaged, dispatching, at the same time, orders for the corps in the rear to hasten their march. About one o'clock in the afternoon he arrived on the heights behind Heinrichsdorf, which overlook the field of battle, and immediately sent out the officers of his staff in different directions to observe the motions of the enemy. Savary speedily returned with information that the march of troops over the bridge of Friedland was incessant; that none were retracing their steps, that three additional bridges had been constructed to facilitate the passage, and that the masses in front were every minute increasing and extending themselves. "Tis well," replied the Emperor; "I

(1) Wilson, 153, 156. Dum. xix. 9, 11. Jom. ii. 413, 418.

(2) Dum. xix. 12, 14. Jom. ii. 412, Wilson, 154, 156.

am already prepared; I have gained an hour upon them, and since they wish it, I will give them another: this is the anniversary of Marengo: the battle could not have been fought on a more propitious day." Orders were dispatched for all the corps of infantry, as they came up, to concentrate themselves in the immense woods behind Heinrichsdorf, on the skirts of which Marshal Lannes was combating; the artillery alone was placed on the great roads leading from Eylau and Domnau; the cavalry in the large apertures which had been cut for objects of agriculture in these extensive forests. The firm countenance and dense masses of the enemy, who appeared even more numerous than they really were, as seen from the heights of Heinrichsdorf, at first made the Emperor doubtful whether he should not postpone the attack till the following day, when the remainder of the cavalry of Murat and the corps of Davoust might be expected to join from the side of Königsberg (1); but the successive arrival of the corps of Ney and Victor (2), with the infantry and cavalry of the Guard and part of Murat's dragoons, at two and three o'clock, joined to the obvious and flagrant disadvantages of the enemy's position, induced him not to lose a moment in bringing matters to a decisive issue. Orders were accordingly dispatched for all the troops to prepare for action in an hour. Meanwhile the soldiers were ordered to sit down and rest themselves, while the most minute inspection took place in the ranks, to see that the firelocks were in good condition, and the cartridge-boxes amply supplied. The order of battle was soon fixed. Ney occupied the right, directly in front of Friedland; next stood Mortier, on the extreme right of Lannes. In the second line Victor's corps was stationed immediately behind Ney; the Imperial Guard, with a numerous brigade of fusiliers, under the orders of Savary; and the cavalry, under Grouchy, Latour-Maubourg, and Nansouty, behind the centre and right. The whole army was directed to advance in echelon, with the right in front and the left slightly thrown back; thus Ney would be first engaged; and the artillery received orders to redouble their fire along the whole line as soon as the heads of their columns were seen emerging from the woods. By four o'clock seventy thousand infantry and ten thousand horse were assembled, in the highest spirits and the finest state of discipline and equipment; while Benningsen, who, from seeing the formidable accumulation of forces in his front, had deemed it necessary to detach six thousand men to his rear to secure the bridge of Wehlau over the Pregel, had not more than thirty-eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse to oppose to their attack (3).

Battle of
Friedland.
June 14.

The cessation of any serious attack for some hours after noon led the Russian general, who had long since abandoned his original project of surprising Lannes, and was desirous only of maintaining his ground till the approach of night gave him the means of regaining, without molestation, the right bank of the Alle, to indulge a hope that nothing further would be undertaken during that day: but he was soon painfully undeceived. At five o'clock, on a signal given by a discharge of twenty pieces of cannon

(1) Accordingly, at one o'clock, he wrote to that general from the field—"The enemy is in battle array in front of Friedland, with all his army. At first he appeared desirous of moving on by Stoekein on Königsberg; but now he appears only desirous of receiving battle on the ground he has chosen. I hope that by this time you have entered Königsberg: and as the corps of Soult is sufficient for the protection of that city, you will without doubt retrace your steps as rapidly as possible with the remainder of the cavalry and Davoust's corps towards Friedland. It is the more necessary that you should

do so, as very possibly the affair may be protracted till to-morrow. Use your utmost efforts, therefore, to arrive here by one o'clock in the morning. If I perceive in the outset of the action that the enemy is in such strength as to render the result doubtful, it is possible that I may engage only in a cannonade to-day, and await your arrival before commencing serious operations."—*JOURNAL*, ii. 414.

(2) Formerly of Bernadotte, who had been wounded at Spandau.

(3) Sav. iii. 56, 58. Wilson, 155, 156. *Jour. ii.* 413, 415. *Dum.* xix. 16, 17. *Bign.* vi. 302, 303.

from the French centre, the whole army stood to their arms, and immediately the heads of Marshal Ney's column were seen emerging from the woods behind Posthnen and rapidly advancing straight upon Friedland. On all sides the enemy's forces at once were seen; from the steeples of Friedland, through the interstices of the trees, or in the openings of the forest, they were descried in masses of enormous power and depth. From the plain, the horizon appeared to be bounded by a deep girdle of glittering steel. At one glance the most inexperienced could see the imminence and magnitude of the danger, for no preparations to cover the retreat over the Alle had been made, and the enemy's force appeared at least double that of the Russians.

Spontaneous attack by Ney's corps. But there was no time for consultation or defensive measures. On came Ney's column with the fury of a tempest, driving before them, like foam before the waves, the Russian chasseurs of the guards and several regiments of cavalry and Cossacks who were placed in advance, and had endeavoured to check their progress. Some regiments of militia, stationed on the low grounds near the Alle, also broke and fled towards the bridges, spreading confusion and alarm through the whole rear of the army. At the same time Victor's corps, placed at first in the second line, advanced to the ground originally occupied by Ney; and its artillery, consisting of forty pieces, under the command of General Senarmont, pushed on four hundred paces farther, and, from a rising ground, thundered over the whole Russian line, and effectually prevented any succours being sent to the distressed left. That portion of their army was now every where shaken; the loud shouts of Ney's column were heard along the whole line; their advanced guards were close to Friedland, and, encouraged by this rapid and splendid success (1), they were already preparing to storm the town and complete the ruin of the enemy by gaining possession of the bridges in his rear.

Gallant charge of the Russian Guard nearly regains the day. At this instant the Russian Imperial Guard, which was placed in reserve behind the artificial lake to the north of Friedland, was ordered to advance. They rushed forward with fixed bayonets, but not in compact order, yet with such vigour, that the leading divisions of Ney's corps, assailed in front and flank, were pierced through, trodden down, and driven back with prodigious slaughter. Such was the change produced by this vehement onset, that the day seemed all but regained; they were repulsed to a considerable distance, and the Russian left wing in its turn became the assailants. Then it was, that the six thousand men detached in the forenoon to Wehlau, might have changed the destinies of Europe. But the Russian guards, being unsupported by any further reserve, could not singly maintain the contest with the overwhelming odds which were directed against them. As they hurried on in pursuit of Ney, they came upon the reserve under Victor, which had advanced to his support; and one of his divisions, under Dupont, charged them so opportunely in flank, while disordered by the vehemence of their pursuit, that they were in their turn repulsed to the edge of the town. Encouraged by this turn of fortune, Ney's soldiers now returned to the charge. Dupont's division, emulating the deeds of its old comrades in the camp of Boulogne, pressed on in hot pursuit; Senarmont's terrific battery advanced, playing without intermission on the crowded ranks of the retreating Russians, and soon the confusion and press in Friedland appeared so great, that the leading French divisions were tempted to hazard an assault (2). After an obstinate resistance, the streets were forced; some of

(1) Sav. iii. 58, 59. Dum. xix. 17, 19. Wilson, 159, 160. Sav. iii. 58, 59. Jour. ii. 418. (2) Sav. iii. 58, 59. Dum. xix. 19, 21. Wilson, 159, 160. Jour. ii. 417, 418. Biga. vi. 303, 304. Digitized by Google

(2) Sav. iii. 58, 59. Dum. xix. 19, 21. Wilson, 159, 160. Jour. ii. 417, 418. Biga. vi. 303, 304.

(2) Sav. iii. 58, 59. Dum. xix. 19, 21. Wilson, 159, 160. Jour. ii. 417, 418. Biga. vi. 303, 304.

the principal buildings in the town took fire; in the first moments of consternation the fugitives applied the torch to the bridges over the river—in a few minutes they were wrapped in flames, and the volumes of smoke which rolled over the whole field of battle, spread a dismal feeling in the breasts of the soldiers.

Progress of
the action
on the
centre and
right of the
Russians.

While this decisive success was gaining on the left, the centre and right of the Russians kept their ground with undaunted firmness under a dreadful cannonade, which told with fatal effect on the dense masses, which, from the limited extent of the ground, were there accumulated between the front and the river. They had even gained considerable success; for some battalions, having broken their array in crossing the deep ravine of the Mill Stream, with which they were unacquainted, were charged before they could re-form by the Russian cavalry, and cut to pieces. But when the retreat of the left wing and the Guards had uncovered their flank, the infantry in the centre were exposed to the most serious danger, and must have given way, had not the Russian cavalry galloped forward at full speed, and charged the corps who threatened them, who were the left of Oudinot's grenadiers, with such vigour that they were in a few minutes trampled under foot and destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the infantry of the centre also moved forward, and threw in so destructive a flanking fire, as effectually covered the retreat of their horse; but at this moment the flames of Friedland and the bridges were seen to arise, and the vast clouds of black smoke which darkened the atmosphere, told too plainly that their retreat was cut off, and that success was hopeless. Then indeed their hopes fell, and despair took possession of every heart. Still, however, the Russian courage was unshaken; uniting the fronts of battalions, closing the ranks of the soldiers, they presented, in circumstances which seemed well-nigh desperate, an unbroken front to the enemy. In vain the artillery, approaching to half cannon-shot distance, ploughed through their dense array—in vain the French infantry threw in a destructive fire with ceaseless vigour—in vain the grenadiers of their guard charged repeatedly with the shouts and confidence of victory; not one square was broken—not one gun was taken. Slowly and in solid order they retired, leisurely retracing their steps towards the river, keeping up an incessant rolling fire from the rear, which faced the enemy, and charging with the bayonet whenever hard pressed by their pursuers (1). Whoever witnessed the conduct of that devoted host during these trying hours, must have felt that Russia, if adequately directed, was destined in the end to take the lead in the deliverance of Europe.

Benning-
sen's mea-
sures to
secure a
retreat.

Benningesen, meanwhile, without losing his presence of mind in the general wreck, did all that prudence could suggest to repair the consequences of the error into which he had been drawn in the earlier part of the day. His first care was to discover a ford for the cannon,

(1) Wilson, 160, 161. Sav. iii. 59. Jom. ii. 418, 419. Dum. xix. 20, 21. Saalf. i. 646.

"But yet, though thick the shafts as snow,
Though charging knights like whirlwinds go,
Though bill-men ply the ghastly blow,
Unbroken was the ring;

Each stepping where his comrade stood,

The instant that he fell.

No thought was there of dastard flight;
Link'd in the serried phalanx tight,
Groom fought like noble, squire like knight,
As fearlessly and well;

Till utter darkness closed her wing
O'er their thin host and wounded king.

Then skill'd Napoleon's sage commands
Led back from strife his shatter'd bands;

And from the charge they drew,
As mountain-waves, from wasted lands,
Sweep back to ocean blue.

Then did their loss his formen know:
Their chiefs, their lords, their mightiest low,
They melted from the field, as snow,
When streams are swoln and south winds blow.

Dissolves in silent dew.

Alle's echoes heard the ceaseless plash,

While many a broken band,

Disorder'd through her currents dash,

To gain the Russian land."

as Friedland was in the hands of the enemy, and the bridges were no longer passable by friends or foes. Happily some peasants pointed out one where the great park of artillery might be got across; and it was in the first instance withdrawn, with the exception of a few pieces which fell into the enemy's hands, while the firm countenance of the infantry warded off the assault of his impetuous columns; but the water came up to the horses' middles, and what remained of the ammunition was utterly spoiled. A hundred guns were immediately after the passage planted on the right bank to retard the enemy; but so closely were the columns on the opposite sides intermingled, that it was dangerous to fire lest the balls should fall in the Russian lines. Meanwhile two of their divisions, impatient of the slow progress at the ford, and unable to endure any longer the incessant showers of musketry and grape, threw themselves, sword in hand, into Friedland, and endeavoured to open a passage with fixed bayonets to the bridge. A desperate struggle ensued with the troops of Ney and Victor in the streets, but the despair of the Russians prevailed over the enthusiasm of the French, and they made their way through the burning houses to the water's edge. There, however, they found the bridges destroyed; and these brave men, after having so heroically cut their way through the hostile ranks, found themselves stopped by an impassable barrier, while the increasing masses of the enemy now enclosed them, amidst fire and darkness, on every side. Still, however, no one thought, even in circumstances all but desperate, of surrender; with heroic courage they fought their way back, though with prodigious slaughter, to the ford, and during the darkness of the night plunged into the stream. The water was breast-high, and many missing the fords were drowned; several guns were abandoned, from the impossibility of dragging them through the press; but such was the unconquerable valour of the rearguard to the very last, that not one battalion capitulated, and, with the exception of five thousand wounded, few prisoners fell into the enemy's hands (1).

Immense
results of
the battle.

Such was the disastrous battle of Friedland, which at one blow dissolved the great confederacy which the genius and foresight of Mr. Pitt had formed for the coercion of Napoléon's ambition, and left Great Britain alone to maintain the contest with the whole force of the Continent arrayed under his banners. Grievously, then, was felt the want of British aid, and woful were the consequences of the ill-timed parsimony which had withheld all subsidies from Russia during this desperate struggle; thirty thousand of the militia, whom even a small loan would have clothed and armed, might have averted the catastrophe; twenty thousand British auxiliaries would have converted it into a glorious victory, and thrown Napoléon back upon the Vistula and the Elbe. The losses of the Russians, though nothing like what they had experienced in the decisive overthrow of Austerlitz, were still very severe. Seventeen thousand men had fallen, either killed or wounded, and five thousand of the latter had been made prisoners; but of those unhurt not more than five hundred had become captives; no colours were taken, but seventeen guns remained in the enemy's power. The French had lost eight thousand men, and two eagles wrested from them in fair combat. Nothing

(1) Sauff, i. 647, 648. Wilson, 159, 161. Jom. ii. 419, 421. Dum. xix. 19, 23. Sav. iii. 59. Bigu. vi. 304, 305.

In describing this battle, Lord Hutchinson, who witnessed it, stated, in his official despatches to the British government—"I want words sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which alone would have rendered their success un-

doubted, if courage alone could secure victory; but whatever may be the event, the officers and men of the Russian army have done their duty in the noblest manner, and are justly entitled to the praise and admiration of every person who was witness of their conduct."—Lord Hutchinson's *Despatch*, June 15, 1807; See Roskar Wilson, 162.

can illustrate more clearly the desperate resistance made by the Russians than the small number of guns taken, under circumstances when, with less steady troops, the whole artillery would have been abandoned (1).

The Russians retreat without molestation to Allenberg and Wehlau. June 15.

During the evening, the right wing of the Russians and part of the cavalry retired by the left bank of the Alle, and crossed without molestation at the bridge of Allenberg. Thither, on the morning after the battle, the remainder of the army retired by the other bank, without being at all harassed on the march; indeed, it is a remarkable and unaccountable circumstance, that though fifteen thousand French horse were in the field, they were little engaged in the action after Napoleon arrived on the spot, nor once let loose in the pursuit (2). On the day following they reached Wehlau, where the Alle and the Pregel unite in the midst of a marshy plain, traversed by a single chaussée. By that defile, not only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but the immense baggage and ammunition train, which had evacuated Königsberg, had to pass; and although no enemy was in sight, yet such was the confusion produced by the enormous accumulation of cannon and chariots on a single chaussée, and such the apprehensions inspired by the evident dangers which would ensue if the rearguard were to be attacked, that on a few muskets being accidentally discharged, a general panic took place, and horse, foot, and cannon rushed tumultuously together to the bridge, and the strongest throwing down and trampling under foot the weaker, broke through and spread in the wildest disorder into the town. Such was the uproar and consternation which ensued, that it was with the utmost difficulty that order could be restored by the personal efforts of Sir Robert Wilson and a few Russian officers who happened to be on the spot; and it inspired these gallant chiefs with the melancholy conviction, that if Napoleon had followed up his success with his wonted vigour, the Russian host would have been utterly annihilated (3). But on this occasion, as on many others in the memorable campaign of 1812, it was apparent that the vigour of the Emperor in following up his victories was by no means proportioned, either to what it had been in the German or Italian wars, or to the successes which he claimed at the moment: a circumstance for which his panegyrists find it impossible to offer any explanation, but which in truth is susceptible of a very easy solution, when the desperate nature of the resistance opposed to him in these northern latitudes, and the consequent magnitude of his losses, is taken into consideration (4).

June 16.

Capture of Königsberg. June 16.

The catastrophe at Friedland, and subsequent retreat of the Allies behind the Pregel, rendered the city of Königsberg, which was situated considerably in advance of that river on the left bank or front of its course, no longer tenable. General Lestocq had, with his wonted ability,

(1) Wilson, 163. Dum. xix. 21, 23. Jom. ii. 420, 421. 79th Bull. Camp. de Saxe, iv. 334. Sav. iii. 59, 60.

The French say, in the bulletins, that they took 80 pieces of cannon, and that the Russians had 18,000 killed, and that they lost on their own side only 500 killed and 3000 wounded. Berthier estimated the real loss at Tilsit to Sir R. Wilson at more than 8000; and that officer makes the Russian loss only 12,000 men. The latter estimate, however, is obviously too low, as the peace which immediately followed demonstrated; the account in the bulletin was, as usual, from a third to a fourth of its real amount.—79th Bulletin; Camp. de Saxe, iv. 334; and Wilson, 163.

(2) "The Russians had on their right 22 squadrons of cavalry, who covered the retreat; we had

more than 40 with which we should have charged them; but, by a fatality without example, these forty squadrons received no orders, and never so much as mounted their horses; they remained during all the battle on foot behind our left; on seeing that, I lamented that the Grand Duke of Berg had not been there: if he had, these forty squadrons would certainly have been employed; and not a Russian would have escaped."—Savary, iii. 60.

(3) Et si continuo victorem ex cura subiret, Ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.

In the first alarm, the Cossacks crowded down to the right bank of the Alle, and swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side and discharged a volley of arrows with considerable effect at the enemy.—Wilson, 163, 165.

(4) Wilson, 164, 165. Dum. xix. 24, 25.

conducted the retreat of his little army with very little loss, till he was joined on the 12th, in front of Königsberg, by the corps of Kamenskoi. Even their united forces, however, not more than twenty-four thousand strong, could hardly hope to save that town without the assistance of the main army, when they were attacked by the corps of Soult and Davoust, and the greater part of the cavalry under Murat, amounting to full fifty thousand men, of whom above twelve thousand were horse in the finest condition. Notwithstanding this overwhelming odds, however, Lestocq made the attempt, and by the firm countenance which he assumed, and the devoted heroism of his rearguard in the retreat from the Lower Passarge, succeeded in so far retarding the enemy, as to gain time for the evacuation of almost all the magazines and stores in the city, even by the narrow and crowded defile of Wehlau. But this great object was not gained without sustaining a considerable loss.

June 14. A battalion was surrounded and made prisoners which had been left to defend the passage of the Frisching; and on the following day a column

June 15. of twelve hundred men, which was enveloped by St.-Cyr's division and Murat's cavalry, was, after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender. Weakened by these losses, Lestocq, however, still maintained his ground in Königsberg, repeatedly repulsed the attempts to storm it which were made by the Brandenburg gate, and remained there all the day, putting the mouldering fortifications in a respectable posture of defence, and

June 16. pressing the evacuation of the magazines; but on the day following, having received accounts of the battle of Friedland, he ordered the garrison to be under arms, under pretence of making a sally; and when evening approached, the whole took the direction of Labian and the Pregel, leaving General Sutterheim with two battalions of light infantry to man the walls. He also evacuated the place at midnight, and on the following morning the magistrates sent the keys of the city to Marshal Soult. Three thousand sick or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy; but such was the activity of General Lestocq, and the skill with which Sutterheim conducted his measures, that no magazines or stores of any importance were taken, and the rearguard, though frequently molested, effected its retreat, without any serious loss, to Wehlau, where they joined the main army as it was defiling over the bridge (1).

(1) Wilson, 167, 169. Dum. xix. 33, 36.

Napoleon, with his usual mendacious policy, gave out, in his 79th bulletin, that he had taken in Königsberg not only twenty thousand prisoners and immense public magazines, but 160,000 British stand of arms! It appeared a happy stroke to make the Parisians believe that the tardy succours of Great Britain had arrived just in time to arm the French troops. "This assertion," Sir R. Wilson justly observes, "is a falsehood of the most extravagant character, and which finds no parallel but in the catalogue of their own compositions." In truth, the British arms escaped by a circumstance more discreditable to England than the falsehood which Napoleon asserted; they had not yet arrived. The cannon, ammunition, and arms for Prussia were sent by Lord Hutchinson, after the armistice, to a Swedish port; those for Russia were landed at Riga, and delivered to the Russian troops.—*Parl. Return*, 1807; *Parl. Hist.* ix. App.; and Wilson, 167. The falsehood in regard to the stores taken at Königsberg appeared in the bulletin giving the details of the battle of Friedland, dated Wehlau, June 17, the very day on which that town was taken by the French troops. He there said, "Marshal Soult has entered Königsberg; where we found many hundred thousand

and quintals of wheat, more than 20,000 Russians and Prussians wounded, and all the military stores which England had sent out; among the rest, 160,000 muskets, still on shipboard." This fabrication was made at Wehlau on the 17th, which is thirty miles from Königsberg, before it was possible that any thing further than the bare capture of the city could have been heard of by the French Emperor. The falsehood in the first bulletin, which corresponded to his wishes rather than the reality, was so gross, that it could not be repeated in the succeeding one, dated Tilsit, 19th June, which, after recapitulating the successes of Soult and the fall of Königsberg, said, "In fine, the result of all these affairs has been, that 4000 or 5000 prisoners and 15 pieces of cannon have fallen into our hands. Two hundred Russian vessels, and great stores of subsistence, wine, and spirits, have been found in Königsberg." Yet so little do the French writers attend to accuracy in their detail, that the enormous falsehood in the first bulletin, even when abandoned by the second, has been adopted by all their historians, even Jomini and Dumas, whose accuracy is in general so praiseworthy.—See Dum. xiv. 33; and Jom. ii. 422; and 79th and 80th Bullet. *Camp. de Saxe*, iv. 338, 342 and Biaz. vi. 308; and NORVINS, iii. 27.

Measures of
Napoleon,
and retreat
of the Rus-
sians to the
Niemen.

Meanwhile Napoleon, after his usual custom, rode on the following morning over the field of battle. It presented a ghastly spectacle, second only to the terrific field of Eylau in circumstances of horror. Then might be seen evident proofs of the stern and unconquerable valour with which the Russians had combated : the position of the squares of infantry could be distinctly traced by the dead bodies of the men, which still preserved their regular array : the station of the cavalry was seen by the multitude of horses, which lay dead as they had stood in squadrons or battalions on the field. In the pursuit, however, he exerted none of his usual vigour, and threw away, in the prosecution of a minor object, the fairest opportunity he had ever enjoyed of destroying the Russian army. Intent only on cutting the enemy off from Königsberg, and securing to himself that noble prize of victory, he totally neglected the following up of his success on the right bank of the Alle, and suffered the disorganized and shattered Russian army to retire without molestation through the narrow defile that penetrated the marshes of Wehlau and over the single bridge of the Pregel, when a little additional vigour in the pursuit would at least have compelled them to abandon, at the entrance of these passes, the greater part of

June 19. their baggage and artillery. On the evening of the 18th, the allied army, which had united at Wehlau with the troops under Kamenskoi and Lestocq, falling back from Königsberg, reached Tilsit on the Niemen, and early on the following morning the mighty array began to defile over the bridge. For forty hours successively the passage continued without inter-
June 19. mission ; horse, foot, cannon, baggage-waggon, store-chariots, succeeding each other in endless array : it seemed as if the east was swallowing up the warlike brood which had so long contended with the west for the mastery of Europe. Still, though a hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, were hardly a day's march in the rear, no attempt was made by Napoleon to molest their passage. A few cannon-shots alone were exchanged between the Cossacks and the horse-artillery of Murat (1), which, on the mor-
June 20. ning of the 20th, approached the town of Tilsit, which was shortly evacuated by Bagration with the Russian rearguard, who withdrew without molestation across the river, and burned the bridge.

The Em-
peror Alex-
ander pro-
poses an
armistice.

In truth, hostilities were no longer either required or expedient. Disheartened by the defeat which he had experienced ; chagrined at the refusal of succours either in men or money from England ; irritated at the timid policy of Austria, when the fairest opportunity that ever yet had occurred was presented for her decisive interposition ; foiled in the objects for which he had originally begun the war, and deserted by those for whose advantage, more than his own, it had been undertaken, the Emperor Alexander had taken his resolution. He deemed it unnecessary and improper to risk the independence of Russia in a quarrel not directly affecting its interests, and from which the parties immediately concerned had withdrawn. On the 18th, therefore, General Benningsen wrote a letter to Prince Bagration, desiring him to make known to the French generals the Emperor's
June 19. desire for an armistice ; this was accordingly communicated to Murat on the forenoon of the following day, and orders were immediately transmitted for hostilities to cease at all points. Thus was this mighty conflagration, which originally commenced on the banks of the Danube, finally stilled on the shores of the Niemen (2).

(1) Wilson, 168, 170. Dum. xix. 35, 40. Bign. vi. 508, 509.

(2) Wilson, 170, 171. Dum. xix. 42, 44.

During this desperate struggle between the Emperor and the Niemen, a conflict of some importance, but overlooked amidst the shock of such mighty

Reasons which made Napoleon rejoice at this step. These proposals on the part of the Russian Emperor gave the highest satisfaction to Napoléon. It had ever been his policy to offer peace to his enemies during the first tumult and consternation of defeat; and more than once, by such well-timed advances, he had extricated himself from a situation of the utmost peril. To be anticipated in this manner in his desires, and have the public demonstration afforded of the reality of his victory by the enemy proposing an armistice, was a circumstance, of all others the most gratifying, which raised him at once to the highest point of glory. He was not ignorant that here, as at Leoben and Austerlitz, a further continuance of the contest might be attended with very serious dangers. England, it is true, had hitherto, in an unaccountable manner, kept herself secluded from the struggle: but a change had taken place in her councils; a close alliance had been contracted with Prussia; powerful succours in arms and ammunition were on their route, and the greatest military expedition she had ever sent forth was preparing to hoist the flag of a national war on the banks of the Elbe. The dubious policy of Austria rendered it more than probable that in such an event she would throw off the mask; and that eighty thousand armed mediators might suddenly make their appearance under the walls of Dresden, and totally intercept the communications of the Grand Army with France. Russia, it was true, was defeated; the army of Bagration was little more than half its former amount; but thirty thousand men were advancing, under Prince Labanoff, to repair its losses; and if its frontiers were invaded, and a national resistance aroused, there were four hundred thousand militia enrolled, who would speedily fill the ranks of the regular army. Napoléon, indeed, could collect, notwithstanding the losses of the short campaign, a hundred and fifty thousand men on the Niemen; but even this mighty host appeared hardly adequate to the task of subduing an empire whose dominions on this side of the Ural Mountains exceeded all the rest of Europe put together. How were the conquered provinces to be kept in subjection; how the fortresses taken garrisoned; how the immense lines of communication kept up when the war was to commence at the distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Rhine, and the Scythian monarch, if resolute on preserving his independence, might retreat a thousand miles farther without coming to the verge of his European dominions (1)?

Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation. Nor were the considerations less powerful which induced Alexander to desire an accommodation. By engaging in the war on this desperate principle indeed, and drawing the enemy into the heart of his dominions, he had every chance of defeating the invasion of this second Darius into the deserts of Scythia; but this could only be done by great sacrifices, and at the hazard of throwing back for a long period the internal improvement of his rising dominions. For what object were these sacrifices to be made? For the preservation of Prussia? She was already crushed, and a few inconsiderable forts, with the town of Graudentz, were all

lost, took place on the banks of the Narrew. Tolstoy had there gained some successes over Masséna, and in particular made himself master of the entrenched camp of Borki; but the French having attacked it some days after with increased forces, it again fell into their hands, and the Russians, following the retreat of their principal army, had retired from Ostolenka towards Tircisau, when the armistice of Tilsit put a period to their operations.—DUMAS, xix. 41, 43.

(1) H. R. ix. 426.

The following regular forces, exclusive of 400,000 militia, were still at the command of the Russian government:—

Remains of the army which fought at Friedland,	28,000
Kamenskoi's corps,	9,000
Reinforcements which joined at Tilsit, or on march,	9,000
At Olita half of Labanoff's corps,	15,000
Prussians retired with Lestock,	18,000
Tolstoy's corps on the Narrew,	18,000
On march from Wilna,	15,000

Total regulars, 112,000

—WILSON, 176.

that remained to Frederick William of the dominions of his illustrious ancestors. For the safety of England? She was sufficiently protected by her invincible fleets; and the interests she had evinced in the struggle had not been such as to render it imperative on the Czar, either in honour or policy, to continue the contest on her account (1). For the sake of the balance of power? That was an object, however important, which could not be brought about by the unaided efforts of a single empire; and if Austria, whose interests were more immediately concerned in its preservation, was not inclined to draw the sword in the conflict, it did not appear that Russia, whose independence had never yet been seriously threatened, was called upon to continue it unaided for its restoration. Now was an opportunity when the war might be terminated, if not with advantage, at least without dishonour: in the fields of Pultusk, Eylau, and Heilsberg, the Russians had sufficiently vindicated their title to military glory; and objects of immediate importance were to be gained nearer home, both on the Danube and the Neva (2), amply sufficient to indemnify the empire for a temporary withdrawal from the general theatre of European strife.

Conclusion
of an armistice.
June 22.

When such were the dispositions on both sides, there was little difficulty in coming to an understanding. France had nothing to demand of Russia except that she should close her ports against England: Russia nothing to ask of France but that she should withdraw her armies from Poland, and permit the Emperor to pursue his long-cherished projects of conquest in Turkey. The map of Europe lay before them, out of which these two mighty potentates might carve at pleasure ample indemnities for themselves, or acquisitions for their allies. No difficulty, in consequence, was experienced in settling the terms of the armistice: the Niemen separated the two armies; the headquarters of Napoléon were fixed at Tilsit, on the left bank of the river; those of Alexander at Piktupohnen, a mile distant on the right bank. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the officers and men of the two armies: they had felt each other's valour too strongly not to be inspired with sentiments of mutual respect; while Napoléon, in eloquent terms, addressed his soldiers on this glorious termination of their labours, in one of those proclamations which made Europe thrill from side to side (3).

Interview
on the raft
at Tilsit.

An armistice having been thus concluded, it was agreed that the two Emperors should meet to arrange, in a private conference, the

(1) The secret motives which induced the Emperor Alexander to conclude the treaty of Tilsit, were the refusal by Lord Howick (now Earl Grey) to guarantee the Russian subsidies, and that too in a manner peculiarly painful to the feelings of the Emperor; a refusal the more inexplicable, as that minister was the very person who had, after the catastrophe of Jena, warmly solicited the Czar to fly to the succour of Prussia; the delay in the arrival of the troops promised by England in the island of Rugen; the tardiness of the new administration in furnishing the promised supplies in money, arms, and ammunition; circumstances which had warmly irritated him against the English government; the refusal of Austria to accede to the convention of Martenstein, or take any part in the contest; as well as the exhaustion of his own finances, the penury of arms and ammunition, the famishing state of the troops, and the risk of total overthrow to which they were exposed.—HARDENBERG, ix. 425; and LUCCHESI, i. 322, 323.

(2) Bontourlin, Camp. de 1812, i. 21, 22. HARD. ix. Lucchesi, i. 322, 323.

(3) Bign. vi. 308, 312. Dum. xix. 44, 50.

Napoléon's "Soldiers!—On the 5th June, we proclaimed we were attacked in our cantonments by 100,000 Russians; the enemy mistook us for the Russian army; the enemy mistook his troops, understood the cause of our inactivity. He has learned, when it was too late, that our repose was that of the lion; he now repeats having forgotten it. In the days of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in the ever-memorable field of Friedland, in a ten days' campaign, in short, we have taken 130 pieces of cannon, 7 standards, killed or wounded 60,000 Russians, wrested from the enemy's army all its magazines and hospitals, the fortress of Königsberg, with three hundred vessels which it contained, loaded with ammunitions of war of all sorts, and especially 160,000 muskets sent by England to arm our enemies. From the shores of the Vistula we have arrived on those of the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of my coronation; but you have this year worthily commemorated that of Marengo, which terminated the war of the second coalition. Frenchmen, you are worthy of yourselves, and of

destinies of the world. It took place, accordingly, on the 25th, under circumstances eminently calculated to impress the imagination of mankind.

June 25. By the direction of the French general of engineers, Lariboisière, a raft of great dimensions was constructed on the river Niemen; *the raft of Tilsit*, which will be recollected as long as the cage of Bajazet or the conquests of Alexander. It was moored in the centre of the stream, and on its surface a wooden apartment, surmounted by the eagles of France and Russia, framed with all the possible magnificence which the time and circumstances would admit. This was destined for the reception of the Emperors alone; at a little distance was stationed another raft, less sumptuously adorned, for their respective suites. The shore on either side was covered with the Imperial guard of the two monarchs, drawn up in triple lines, in the same firm and imposing array in which they had stood on the fields of Eylau and Friedland. At one o'clock precisely, amidst the thunder of artillery, each Emperor stepped into a boat on his own side of the river, accompanied by a few of his principal officers; Napoléon was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt: Alexander by the Grand Duke Constantine, General Benningsen, Prince Labanoff, General Ouvaroff, and Count Lieven; the numerous and splendid suite of each monarch followed in another boat immediately after. The bark of Napoléon, rowed by the marines of his Guard, advanced with greater rapidity than that of Alexander. He arrived first at the raft, entered the apartment, and himself opened the door on the opposite side to receive the Czar, while the shouts of the soldiers on either shore drowned even the roar of the artillery. In a few seconds Alexander arrived, and was received by the conqueror at the door on his own side: their meeting was friendly; and the very first words which he uttered bespoke both the lacerated feelings occasioned by the conduct of the government of Great Britain during the war, his deep penetration, and clear perception of the ruling passion of Napoléon—"I hate the English," said he, "as much as you do, and am ready to second you in all your enterprises against them." "In that case," replied Napoléon, "every thing will be easily arranged, and peace is already made." The interview lasted two hours, during which Napoléon exercised all the ascendant which his extraordinary talents and fortune, as well as singular powers of fascination gave him, while the Russian Emperor gave proof of the tact and finesse, as well as diplomatic ability, by which his nation beyond any other in Europe is gifted. Before they parted, the outlines of the treaty were arranged between them—it was not difficult to come to an understanding—the world afforded ample room for the aggrandizement of both (1).

Commence-
ment of the
negotiations
in Tilsit.
June 26.

On the day following, a second interview took place at the same town, at which the King of Prussia was present; the first had been arranged, and the preliminary terms agreed to, without any con-

no. You will return to your country covered with laurels, and after having gained a peace which will be its own guarantee. It is time that our country should live in repose, sheltered from the malignant influence of England. My benefactions to you shall testify the large measure of my gratitude, and the whole extent of the love which I bear you." Already was to be seen, not merely in Napoléon's thoughts, but in his words, a return to the celebrated maxim of Louis XIV., "L'état c'est moi."—Blox. vi. 311, 312.

(1) Sav. iii. 76, 77. Bign. vi. 315, 316. Dum. xix. 53, 55.

Savary, who had been nominated governor of Königsberg, received orders, when the French army

first approached the Niemen, to get ready a pontoon train, which had been left in the arsenal of that city, for immediate operation. Next day, however, he received the following significant note from Talleyrand:—"Be in no hurry with your pontoons; what would we gain by passing the Niemen? what is there to be acquired beyond that river? The Emperor must abandon his ideas in regard to Poland; that nation is fit for nothing; disorder alone is to be organized out of its inhabitants. *We have another far more important matter to settle*; here is a fair opportunity of terminating the present dispute; we must not let it escape." Already the Spanish invasion had entered into the calculations of the rulers of Europe on the Niemen.—SAVARY, iii. 76.

cert with that unhappy prince. He was no longer in a situation to stipulate any conditions; bereft of his dominions, driven up into a corner of his territories, destitute of every thing, he had no alternative but submission to the stern law of the conqueror (1). As it was now evident that an accommodation was about to take place, arrangements were made for conducting it with more convenience to the exalted personages concerned. Part of the town of Tilsit was declared neutral, and allotted to the accommodation of the Emperor of Russia and his suite; thither he repaired, on the afternoon of the same day, and was received with all imaginable courtesy by Napoléon himself, upon landing on the left bank of the river from his boat. Amidst discharges of artillery, and the acclamations of a vast multitude of spectators whom the extraordinary spectacle had collected together, did these two Sovereigns, whose hostility had so lately dyed the fields of Poland with blood, ride side by side, to the quarters prepared for the Czar, through a triple line of the French Imperial Guard. The attention of Napoléon descended to the most minute particulars; the furniture in the Emperor of Russia's rooms was all sent from the French headquarters; a sumptuous train of cooks and other attendants were in readiness to make him forget the luxuries of St.-Petersburg; even his couch was prepared in a camp bed of the French Emperor's, which he had made use of in his campaigns. The King of Prussia also arrived, two days after, in Tilsit, with his beautiful and unfortunate Queen; and the ministers on both sides, Talleyrand on the part of France, and Prince Kourakin on that of Russia, and Marshal Kalkreuth on that of Prussia; but they were of little service, for such was the extraordinary length to which the intimacy of the two Emperors had gone, that not only did they invariably dine and pass the evening together, but almost all the morning conferences, during which the destinies of the world were arranged, were conducted by themselves in person (2).

Napoléon's
Interview
with the
Queen of
Prussia.

"Had the Queen of Prussia arrived earlier at our conferences," says Napoléon, "it might have had much influence on the result of the negotiations; but happily, she did not make her appearance till all was settled, and I was in a situation to decide every thing in twenty-four hours. As soon as she arrived I went to pay her a visit; she was very beautiful, but somewhat past the first flower of youth. She received me in despair, exclaiming, 'Justice! justice!' and throwing herself back with loud lamentations. I at length prevailed on her to take a seat; but she continued, nevertheless, her pathetic entreaties. 'Prussia,' said she, 'was blinded in regard to her power; she ventured to enter the lists with a hero, oppose herself to the destinies of France, neglect its fortunate friendship! She has been well punished for her folly—the glory of the Great Frederick, the halo his name spread round our arms, had inflated the heart of Prussia—they have caused her ruin.'" Magdeburg, in an especial manner, was the object of her entreaties; and when Napoléon, before dinner, presented her with a beautiful rose, she at first refused it, but immediately after took it with a smile, adding at the same time, "Yes! but at least with Magdeburg."—"I must observe to your Majesty," replied the Emperor, "that it is I who give, and you only who must receive." Napoléon had the talents of Cæsar, but not the chivalry of Henry IV. "After all," said he, "a fine woman and gallantry are

(1) At this period he wrote to the King of Sweden — "Immediately after the armistice, my imperial ally concluded peace on his own account, alone. Abandoned in this manner, and left without support on the great theatre of war, I found myself forced, how painful soever to my feelings, to do the same,

and to sign a peace, though its conditions were to the last degree hard and overwhelming." — SCHÖNBERG, viii. 410; and LUCASSEN, i. 328.

(2) SAV. iii. 77, 78. (BIGNON, vi. 316, 317. DUM. xix. 55, 57. Digitized by Google)

not to be weighed against affairs of state." He had frequently, during the repast, found himself hard pressed by the talent and grace of the Queen, and he resolved to cut the matter short. When she had retired, he sent for Talleyrand and Prince Kourakin, arranged the few remaining points of difference, and signed the treaty. The Queen was violently affected next day when she learned that all was concluded; she refused to see the Emperor, and loudly protested she had been deceived by him, an assertion which he positively denies, and which his selfish intellectual character rendered highly improbable. At length she was prevailed on by Alexander to be again present at dinner; and when Napoléon conducted her down stairs after it was over, she stopped in the middle, pressed his hand as he bade her farewell, and said, "Is it possible that, after having had the good fortune to be so near the Hero of the Age, he has not left me the satisfaction of being able to assure him that he has attached me to him for life." "Madame," replied the Emperor, "I lament, if it is so; it is the effect of my evil destiny;" and they separated, never again to meet in this world (1).

The Russians at Tilsit did not consider themselves as vanquished; on the contrary, they felt, after all their misfortunes, much of the exultation of victory. Proud of having so long arrested the progress of the conqueror of the world, glorying even in the amount of their losses and the chasms in the ranks, which told the desperate strife in which they had been engaged, they mingled with their recent enemies with feelings unlacerated by the humiliation of defeat. It was obvious that peace was equally necessary to both Emperors; it was soon whispered that it was to be concluded on terms eminently favourable to the Russian empire. The utmost cordiality, in consequence, soon prevailed between the officers and soldiers of the two armies; fêtes and repasts succeeded one another in rapid order, given by the warriors so recently hostile to each other. In these entertainments, the officers of the two Imperial Guards, and in particular Prince Murat and the Grand Duke Constantine, were peculiarly cordial and complimentary to each other. On one of these occasions, to such a length did the effusions of mutual respect and regard proceed, that the officers of the two Guards, amidst the fumes of wine and the enthusiasm of the moment,

(1) *Las Cases*, iv. 224, 228.

"The Queen of Prussia," said Napoléon's character of her, "unquestionably possessed talents, great information, and singular acquaintance with affairs; she was the real sovereign for fifteen years. In truth, in spite of my address and utmost efforts, she constantly led the conversation, returned at pleasure to her subject, and directed it as she chose; but still with so much tact and delicacy that it was impossible to take offence. And in truth it must be confessed, that the objects at stake were of infinite importance; the time short and precious. One of the high contracting parties frequently repeated to me, that I should forgive every thing or nothing at all; but I answered that I had done every thing in my power to put things in such a train. The King of Prussia requested an interview that very day to take leave: I put it off for twenty-four hours, at the secret solicitation of Alexander: he never forgave me that postponement. I discovered in all our conversations that the violation of the territory of Anspach, during the advance to Ulm, had been the original cause of his irritation. In all our subsequent interviews, how great soever may have been the interests of the moment, he abandoned them, without hesitation, to prove to me that I had really violated his territory on that occasion. He was wrong; but still I must allow his indignation was that of an honest man."

"Almost every day at Tilsit the two Emperors and the King of Prussia rode out together; but this mark of confidence led to no good result. The Prussians could not conceal how much they suffered at seeing it; Napoléon rode in the middle between the two sovereigns, but the King could hardly keep pace with the two Emperors, or deemed himself *de trop* in their *tête-à-tête*, and generally fell behind. When we returned, the two Emperors dismounted in a moment; but they had generally to wait till the King came up, which caused them to be frequently wet, to the great annoyance of the spectators, as the weather was rainy at the time. That incident was the more annoying, as Alexander's manners are full of grace, and fully on a level with the highest elegance which the saloons of Paris can exhibit. He was sometimes fatigued with his companion, whose chagrin was so evident that it damped our satisfaction. We broke up in consequence our dinner parties at an early hour, under pretence of business at home; but Alexander and I remained behind to take tea together, and generally prolonged the conversation till past midnight."—*LAS CASES*, iv. 228, 230. Every thing conspires to indicate, that at this period the Emperor Alexander was completely dazzled by the grandeur and fascinations of Napoléon, and that, under the influence of these feelings, he entirely forgot the interests and misfortunes of his unfortunate ally.—*SAVARY*, iv. 92, *Note*.

mutually exchanged their uniforms; French hearts beat under the decorations won amidst the snows of Eylau, and Russian bosoms warmed beneath the orders bestowed on the fields of Austerlitz: last and most singular effect of civilized life and military discipline, to strengthen at once the fierceness of national passions and the bonds by which they are to be restrained, and join in fraternal brotherhood, one day, those hands which, on another, had been dyed by mutual slaughter, or lifted up in relentless hostility against each other (1).

Napoleon's
admiration
of the Rus-
sian Impe-
rial Guard.

In the course of their rides together, the two Emperors had frequent opportunities of observing the flower of their respective armies. Napoleon afterwards acknowledged that he had never seen any thing which impressed him so much as the appearance of one of the regiments of the Russian Guard. Albeit noways an admirer of the rigid formality of German tactics, and trusting rather to the effect of proclamations on the spirit of his troops than the influence of discipline on their movements, he was inexpressibly struck with the military aspect of its soldiers, and could not avoid the conclusion, that an army thus constituted would be the first in the world, if to the firmness and precision which it had already attained, it should come to unite the fire and enthusiasm of the French. The docility with which they submitted to the orders they received, whatever they were, struck him as particularly admirable. "My soldiers," said he, "are as brave as it is possible to be; but they are too much addicted to reasoning on their positions. If they had the impassible firmness and docility of the Russians, the world would be too small for their exploits. The French soldiers are too much attached to their country to play the part of the Macedonians (2)."

Treaty of
Tilsit. Its
leading pro-
visions.

After a fortnight of conference, the treaty of Tilsit, which had been agreed on in the leading articles in the first four days after the July 7 and 9. armistice, was formally signed and published to the world. The first treaty between France and Russia was signed on the 7th; the second between France and Prussia, on the 9th of July. By the first, the emperor Napoleon, as a mark of his regard for the *Emperor of Russia*, agreed to restore to the King of Prussia Silesia, and nearly all his German dominions on the right bank of the Elbe, with the fortresses on the Oder and in Pomerania. The provinces which, prior to the first partition in 1772, formed part of the kingdom of Poland, and had since been annexed to Prussia, were detached from that monarchy and erected into a separate principality, to be called the **GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW**, and bestowed on the King of Saxony, with the exception of the province of Bialystock, containing two hundred thousand souls, which was ceded to *Russia*, which thus participated, in the hour of misfortune, in a share, small indeed, but still a share, of the spoils of its ally. Dantzic, with a limited

Art. 5.

Art. 9.
Creation of
the Grand
Duchy of
Warsaw,
and King-
dom of
Westphalia.

Art. 6.

portion of territory around it, was declared a free and independent city, under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, which was in effect declaring it, what it immediately after became, a frontier town

Art. 7.

of France. A right to a free military road was granted to the King of Saxony across the Prussian states, to connect his German with his Polish

Art. 8.

dominions; the navigation of the Vistula was declared free to Prussia, Saxony, and Dantzic; the Dukes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were

Art. 12.

reinstated in their dominions, but under the condition that their harbours should all be occupied by French troops, so as to exclude the introduction of English merchandise. The mediation of the Emperor of Russia

Art. 13.

was accepted with a view to the arrangement of a general peace;

(1) Bign. vi. 317, 318.

(2) Jom. ii. 423, 424.

the Kings of Naples and Holland, with the Confederation of the Rhine, were recognised by the Emperor of Russia; a new kingdom, to be called the

Art. 10. **KINGDOM OF WESTPHALIA**, was erected in favour of Jerome Bonaparte, the Emperor's brother, composed of the whole provinces ceded by Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, which was recognised by the Emperor of Russia. Hostilities were to cease between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, and the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to be evacuated by the Russian troops, but not occupied by those of the Sultan till the ratification of a general peace; the Emperor of Russia accepted the mediation of Napoléon for the conclusion of his differences with Turkey; the Emperors of Russia and France mutually guaranteed their respective dominions, and agreed to establish commercial relations with each other on the footing of the most favoured nations (1).

Treaty with Prussia By the second treaty, concluded two days after, between France and Prussia, the King of Prussia recognised the Kings of Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and concluded peace with the sovereigns of those respective states, as well as with the Emperor of France: he ceded to the kings or princes who should be designed by the Emperor Napoléon, all the dominions which at the commencement of the war he possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, and engaged to offer no opposition to any arrangement in regard to them which his Imperial Majesty might choose to adopt: the King of Prussia ceded, in addition, to the King of Saxony, the circle of Gotha, in Lower Lusatia: he renounced all right to his acquisitions in Poland subsequent to 1st January 1772, and to the city and surrounding territory of Danzig; and consented to their erection into a separate duchy in favour of the King of Saxony, as well as to the military road through his dominions to connect the Polish with the German possessions of the latter sovereign: he agreed to the extension of the frontiers of Russian Poland, by the cession of the provinces of Bialystock: consented, till the conclusion of a general maritime peace, to close his harbours without exception to the ships and commerce of Great Britain; and concurred in the formation of a separate convention, having for its object the restoration of the strongholds of Prussia at certain fixed periods, and the sums to be paid for their civil and military evacuation (2).

Immense losses of Prussia by this treaty The losses of Prussia by this treaty were enormous. Between the states forming part of her possessions ceded to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and those acquired by the Kingdom of Westphalia, she lost 4,236,048 inhabitants, or nearly a half of her dominions, for those retained contained only 3,034,504 souls (3). But overwhelming as these losses were,

(1) Mart. Sup. iv. 436, 444. Dum. xix. 58, 64.

(2) Mart. Sup. iv. 444, 451. Dum. xix. 64, 71.

(3) She lost on the east of the river Elbe: —

	Souls.
Circle of Kottbus.	33,500
Of Western Prussia.	262,286
Southern Prussia, Old Poland, . . .	1,282,189
New Eastern Prussia,	904,518
	<hr/>
	2,482,493

On the west of the Elbe: —

	Carry.	Souls.
Circle of Old Munich and Prenzitz, . .		2,482,493
Duchy of Magdeburg,		112,000
Halberstadt,		250,039
Hildesheim,		143,230
Ecclesfeld and Erfurth,		130,069
Meiden and Ravensberg,		164,690
Paderborn, Munster, Leugen, and Teck- lenberg,		159,776
La Marche, Essen, Elten, and Wreden, .		268,542
East Friedland,		162,101
Bayreuth,		119,803
		<hr/>
		233,305

4,236,048

they constituted but a small part of the calamities which fell on this ill-fated monarchy by this disastrous peace. The fortresses left her, whether in Silesia or on the Oder, remained in the hands of France, nominally as a security for payment of the war contributions which were to be levied on the impoverished inhabitants, but really to overawe its government, and entirely paralyse its military resources. A garrison of twenty thousand French soldiers was stationed in Dantzic—a frontier station of immense importance, both as hermetically closing the mouths of the Vistula, giving the French authorities the entire command of the commerce of Poland, and affording an advanced post which, in the event of future hostilities, would be highly serviceable in a war with Russia. The newly established kingdoms of Westphalia and Saxony, with the military road through Prussia, terminating in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, gave the French Emperor the undisputed control of Northern Germany; in effect, brought up the French frontier to the Niemen, and enabled him to commence any future war with the same advantage from that distant river as he had done the present from the banks of the Rhine. At the same time enormous contributions, amounting to the stupendous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of *six hundred millions of francs*, or twenty-four millions sterling, were imposed on the countries which had been the seat of war between the Rhine and the Niemen; a sum at least equal to a hundred millions sterling in Great Britain, when the difference in the value of money and the wealth of the two states is taken into consideration. This grievous exaction completely paralysed the strength of Prussia (1), and rendered her for the next five years totally incapable of extricating herself from that iron net in which she was enveloped by the continued occupation of her fortresses by the French troops (2).

Important as the changes introduced by these public treaties of Tilsit were to the political interests of Europe, they were far inferior in daring

(1) Hard. ix. 490, 491.

(2) This war contribution on the north of Germany was so prodigious a burden, and in its first effects was so instrumental in increasing the power of France, and in its ultimate results in occasioning

its overthrow, that the particulars of it are here given, taken from the authentic archives of *Comte D'Artois*, the chief commissioner intrusted by Napoleon with its collection, as one of the most instructive and curious monuments of the revolutionary wars.

War contributions imposed since the 15th October, 1806, and levied

before the 1st January, 1808,	Fr. 474,352,650 or L. 19,000,000	
Remaining still to recover,	39,391,759	1,600,000
Contributions levied in kind,	90,483,511	3,600,000
	<hr/>	
	604,227,920	L. 24,200,000

—See *DARU'S Report to NAPOLEON, 1st Jan 1808*; DUM. xix. 462, 465; *Pièces Just.*

In the Prussian estimate, the amount is stated considerably higher—even in so far as it was levied on the Prussian states alone. It stood thus:—

War contributions, in specie,	Fr. 220,000,000 or L. 8,800,000	
Maintenance of the fortresses,	40,000,000	1,600,000
Contributions in kind, without counting the balloting of soldiers,	345,800,000	14,500,000
Miscellaneous losses,	8,000,000	320,000
Losses sustained in the local taxes,	75,000,000	3,000,000
Ditto in the general revenue,	50,000,000	2,000,000
	<hr/>	
	738,800,000	L. 30,320,000

—See SCHÖLL, vi. 518.

When it is recollected that the whole revenues of Prussia were only about L. 6,000,000; that money at that period was at least of twice the value there that it was in England; and that the monarchy was already exhausted by the immense efforts made for the campaign of 1806, either of these estimates must appear among the most enormous instances of military exaction on record in history.

In addition to all this, Napoleon and his generals, with disgraceful rapacity, carried off from the dif-

ferent palaces in Prussia no less than 127 paintings, most of them by first rate masters, and 238 marbles or statues, besides all the manuscripts, curiosities, and antiquities they could lay their hands on. The movables thus carried away contrary to all the laws of war, were worth above L. 300,000. They were all re-claimed and got back by the Prussians on the capture of Paris in 1815.—See the *Official List* in SCHÖLL, vi. 261, 289.

Secret
treaty for
the partition
of Turkey.

and magnitude to the provisions of the secret conventions concluded at the same place between the French Emperor and the Russian Autocrat. These two mighty potentates, who so lately had been actuated by the strongest hostility against each other, deeming themselves invincible when they had united their arms together, had conceived, beyond all question, the project of dividing the world between them. To Russia was assigned; with hardly any limitations, the empire of the East : France acquired absolute sway in all the kingdoms of the West; both united in cordial hostility against the maritime power of Great Britain. Turkey, in consequence, was abandoned almost without reserve to the Russian Autocrat. To the cession of Constantinople alone, Napoléon never would agree, and rivalry for the possession of that matchless capital, itself worth an empire, was one of the principal causes which afterwards led him into the desperate changes of the Moscow campaign. The clause on this subject was in the following

terms :—" In like manner, if in consequence of the changes which have recently taken place in the government of Constantinople, the Porte shall decline the intervention of France; or, in case, having accepted it, the negotiation shall not have led to a satisfactory adjustment in the space of three months, France will make common cause with Russia against the Ottoman Porte, and the two high contracting parties will unite their efforts to wrest from the vexations and oppression of the Turkish empire, all its provinces in Europe, Rometia and Constantinople alone excepted (1) ".

Secret
articles
regarding
England
and all neu-
tral ports.

The abandonment of all Turkey, with the exception of its capital and the small adjacent province, to the ambition of its hereditary and inveterate enemies, called for a similar concession to the leading objects of French ambition. This was provided for in the articles regarding the prosecution of the war against England, and the cession of the Spanish Peninsula to the French Emperor. In regard to the first object, it was provided, that in case the proffered mediation of France to adjust the differences with the cabinet of St.-James's should not be accepted, Russia should make common cause with France against England, with all

its forces, by sea and land; or " if, having accepted it, peace was not concluded by the 1st November, on terms stipulating that the flags of every power should enjoy a perfect and entire equality on every sea, and that all the conquests made of French possessions since 1803 should be restored; in that case also, Russia shall demand a categorical answer by the 1st December, and the Russian ambassador shall receive a conditional order to quit London." In the event of the English Government not having made a satisfactory answer to the Russian requisition, " France and Russia shall jointly summon the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon, to close their harbours against English vessels, recall their ambassadors from

London, and declare war against Great Britain." Hanover was to be restored to England in exchange for the whole colonies she had conquered during the war; Spain was to be compelled to remain in the alliance against Great Britain; and the Emperor of France engaged to do nothing tending to augment the power of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, or which might lead to the re-establishment of the Polish monarchy (2).

(1) Bign. vi. 336, 340. Hard. ix. 430.

(2) Bign. vi. 336. Hard ix. 431. Jom. ii. 434, 435. Art. 5.

These secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which are of such moment, both as illustrating the general character of Napoleon's policy, and affording an unanswerable vindication of the Copenhagen expe-

dition, have been literally transcribed from Bignon's work. As that author was not only for long the French ambassador at Berlin, but was also nominated by Napoléon in his testament as the author to whom was committed, with a legacy of 100,000 fr., the task of writing a history of his diplomacy, which he has executed with great ability, it is im-

Secret
agreement
between the
Emperors
about Spain
and Italy.

This was the whole extent to which the formal secret treaty of Tilsit went; but, extensive as the changes which they contemplated were, they yet yielded in magnitude to those which were also agreed on, in a convention still more secret, between the two Emperors. By this, which may literally be called spoliating, agreement, the shares which the two imperial robbers were to have respectively in the partition of Europe, were chalked out. The mouths of the Cattaro, which had been ostensibly at least the original cause of the rupture, were ceded by Russia to France, as well as the seven Ionian islands. Joseph Bonaparte was to be secured in the possession of Sicily as well as Naples; Ferdinand IV., the reigning King of Sicily, was to receive an indemnity in the Isle of Candia, or some other part of the Turkish empire; the dominions of the Pope were to be ceded to France, as well as Malta and Egypt; the *Sovereigns of the houses of Bourbon and Braganza, in the Spanish Peninsula, were to be replaced by princes of the family of Napoleon*; and when the final partition of the Ottoman empire took place, Wallachia, Moldavia, Servia, and Bulgaria were to be allotted to Russia; while Greece, Macedonia, Dalmatia, and all the sea-coasts of the Adriatic, were to be enjoyed by France, which engaged in return to throw no obstacles in the way of the acquisition of Finland by the Russian Emperor (1).

possible to quote them from a more unexceptionable authority; and he himself says he has given them "textuellement." They are not yet to be found in any diplomatic collection.—*Biox.* vi. 342.

(1) *Bign.* vi. 347, 348. *Hard.* ix. 431, 432.

As the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are given chiefly on the authority of M. Bignon, as a chosen partisan of Napoleon, and therefore a valuable unwilling witness, it is proper to mention that he does not admit the express signature of a convention regarding the dethroning of the French and Russian Spanish and Portuguese sovereigns, and the partition of the Turkish empire, but says that "these projects were merely sketched out in the private conferences of the two Emperors, but without being actually reduced to writing,"—while the author of Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs, whose accuracy and extent of secret information are in general equally remarkable, asserts that they were embodied in an express treaty.—*See Biox.* vi. 345, and *Hard.* ix. 433. It is of little importance whether they were or were not embodied in a formal convention, since there is no doubt that they were verbally agreed on between the two Emperors. We have the authority of the Emperor Alexander that Napoleon said to him at Tilsit, "I lay no stress on the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by your troops; you may protract it if you desire. It is impossible any longer to endure the presence of the Turks in Europe; you are at liberty to chase them into Asia; but observe only, I rely upon it that Constantinople is not to fall into the hands of any European power."—*Hard.* ix. 432. Napoleon, in conversation with Escoiquiz at Bayonne in the following year, said, "the Emperor Alexander, to whom I revealed at Tilsit my designs against Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would throw no obstacle in the way."—*Escoiq.* This coincides with what Savary affirms, who says,—"The Emperor Alexander frequently repeated to me, when I was afterwards ambassador at St Petersburg, that Napoleon had said to him that he was under no engagements with the new Sultan, and that the changes which had supervened in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to

each other. I saw at once that this point had formed the subject of their secret conference at Tilsit; and I could not avoid the conviction that a mutual communication of their projects had taken place, because I could not believe that we would have abandoned the Turks without receiving some compensation in some other quarter. I have strong reasons for believing that the Spanish question was brought under discussion at Tilsit. The Emperor Napoleon had that affair strongly at heart, and nothing could be more natural than that he should frankly communicate it to the Czar: the more especially as he had on his side a project of aggrandisement, in which, without previous concert, France might be disposed to throw obstacles. I was the more confirmed in this opinion by observing the conduct and language of the Emperor Alexander, when the Spanish war broke out."—*SAVARY*, iii. 98, 99. And Napoleon said at St. Helena—"All the Emperor Alexander's thoughts are directed to the conquest of Turkey. We have had many discussions about it, and at first I was pleased with his proposals, because I thought it would enlighten the world to drive those brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But when I reflected upon its consequences, and saw what a tremendous weight of power it would give to Russia, on account of the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who would naturally join the Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted to get to Constantinople, which I would not allow, as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that France would gain Egypt, Syria, and the islands, which would have been nothing in comparison with what Russia would have obtained."—*O'MEARA*, i. 382. "Was there," says Bignon, "any express treaty assigning to each Emperor his share of the Turkish dominions? No; but that there was an agreement on that subject between the two Emperors is beyond a doubt; but no formal treaty." We shall find numberless proofs of this, in the sequel of this work, in the language used by the Emperor Alexander, and the actions of Napoleon. They had even gone so far as to assign a portion also to the Emperor Francis—"Something," in Alexander's words, "to Austria, to soothe her vanity rather than satisfy her ambition."—*Biox.* vi. 343. Digitized by Google

Memorandum of Napoleon to follow up his anticipated Turkish acquisitions.

Napoléon was not long of taking steps to pave the way for the acquisition of his share of the Ottoman dominions. On the day after the secret treaty with Russia was signed, he dispatched a letter to the King of Naples, informing him of the cession of Corfu to France, and directing him to assemble, in the most secret manner, four thousand men at Otranto and Tarentum, to take possession of that island, and of the mouths of the Cattaro (1). On the same day he enjoined Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, to send a force of six thousand men into Dalmatia (2), while Marshal Marmont, who commanded in that province, was directed, instead of attacking the Montenegrins, as he was preparing to do, to do every thing in his power to make these mountaineers receive willingly the French government, beneath which they would soon be placed; and at the same time, to transmit minute information, both as to the resources, population, and revenue of Bosnia, Thrace, Albania, Macedonia, and Greece, and what direction two European armies should follow; entering that country, one by Cattaro, the other by Corfu (3). At the same time Count Guilleminot was dispatched from Tilsit on a double mission; the first, open and ostensible, to General Michelson's army on the Danube, the other, secret, to General Sébastiani at Constantinople; in the course of which he was to acquire all the information he could on the subject of the population, riches, and geographical position of the country through which he passed (4). Finally, to General Sébastiani himself he fully explained the whole design, which was, as stated in his letters, that, as no European power would be permitted to possess Constantinople and the Hellespont, the first thing to be done was "to draw a line from Bourgas, on the Black Sea, to the Gulf of Enos in the Archipelago; and all to the eastward of that line, including Adrianople, was to remain to Turkey; Russia was to obtain Moldavia, Wallachia, and all Bulgaria, as far as the left bank of the Hebrus; Servia was to be allotted to Austria; and Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Peloponnesus, Attica, and Thessalia to France (5)". Sébastiani at the same time received orders to prepare and transmit without delay to the French Emperor a memorial, containing exact details, to define the geographical boundaries of the acquisitions of the three powers interested in the partition.

Convention regarding the payment of the French contribution on Prussia.

While Napoléon and Alexander were thus adjusting their differences at Tilsit, by the spoliation of all the weaker powers in Europe, partitioning Turkey, and providing for the dethronement of the sovereigns in the Spanish peninsula, the chains were drawn yet more closely round unhappy Prussia. In the treaty with that power it had been provided that a subsidiary military convention should be concluded, regarding the period of the evacuation of the fortresses by the French troops, and the sums of money to be paid for their ransom. Nominally, it

(1) Nap. to Murat, Tilsit, 8th July.

(2) Nap. to Eugene, 8th July.

(3) To Marmont Napoleon wrote, on July 8, from Tilsit—"Set to work as vigorously as possible to obtain, by officers whom you shall send forward with that view, or in any other way, and address directly to the Emperor, in order that he may know, by confidential officers, both geographically and civilly, all the information you can acquire regarding Bosnia, Macedonia, Thrace, Albania, &c. What is the gross amount of its population, what resources in clothing, provisions, or money those provinces would furnish to any European power which might possess them? In fine, what revenue could be drawn from them at the moment of their occupation, for the principles of their occupation are at present without any proper foundation. In a second memoir state, in a military point of view, if

two European armies should enter these provinces at once, the one by Cattaro and Dalmatia into Bosnia, the other by Corfu, what force would be required for each to ensure success; what species of arms would be most advantageous; how could the artillery be transported; could horses for its transport be found in the country; could recruits be raised there; what would be the most favourable times for military operations? All these reports should be transmitted by confidential persons in whom you have perfect reliance. Keep on good terms with the Pacha of Bosnia; but nevertheless gradually let your relations with him become more cold and reserved than formerly."—NAPOLÉON TO MARMONT, Tilsit, July 8, 1807; *Doc.* xix. 341, 342.

(4) Nap. to Count Guilleminot, 9th July.

(5) *Bign.* vi. 344, 345. *Dum.* xix. 337, 344. Which contains *Pièces Just.*

was provided that they should be evacuated by the 1st October, with the exception of Stettin, which was still to be garrisoned by French troops; but, as

Art. 4. it was expressly declared as a *sine qua non*, that the whole contributions imposed should be paid up before the evacuation commenced, and that the King of Prussia should levy no revenue in his dominions till these exactions were fully satisfied, and that the Prussians, meanwhile, should

Art. 5 feed, cloth, and lodge all the French troops within their bounds, the French Emperor had in reality the means of retaining possession of them as long as he chose, which he accordingly did. In addition to the enormous

Note, p. 142. war contributions already mentioned, of which 513,744,000 francs, or L.20,500,000, fell on Prussia alone, further and most burdensome com-

Nov. 10 and Dec. 10 missions were forced on Prussia in the end of the year, in virtue of which Count Daru, the French collector-general, demanded

154,000,000 francs, or L.6,160,000 more from that unhappy and reduced state; an exaction so monstrous and utterly disproportioned to its now scanty revenue, which did not exceed L.3,000,000 sterling, that it never was or could be fully discharged; and this gave the French a pretence for continuing the occupation of the fortresses, and wringing contributions from the country till five years afterwards, when the Moscow campaign commenced (1).

Noble proclamation by the King of Prussia to his lost provinces

Bereft by this disastrous treaty of half his dominions, nothing remained to the King of Prussia but submission; and he won the hearts of all the really generous in Europe by the resignation and heroism with which he bore so extraordinary a reverse of fortune.

In a dignified proclamation, which he addressed to the inhabitants of his lost provinces upon liberating them from their allegiance to the Prussian throne, he observed, "Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns! My arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my forces have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundary of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice, and sign a peace, no choice remained to me but to follow his example. That peace imposed on me the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocal ties of love and duty, the fruit of ages of labour, have been broken asunder. All my efforts, and they have been most strenuous, have proved in vain. Fate ordains it. A father is compelled to depart from his children. I hereby release you from your allegiance to me and my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare, will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereigns. Be to them what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever sever the remembrance of you from my heart (2)."

Enormous losses sustained by the French during the campaign.

Vast as had been the conquests, unbounded the triumphs of France during the campaign, the consumption of life to the victors had been, if possible, still greater: and it was already apparent that war, conducted on this gigantic scale, was attended with a sacrifice of human beings, which for any lengthened time would be insupportable. The fearful and ominous call for eighty thousand conscripts, *thrice repeated* during the short period of eight months, had already told the French people at what cost, of their best and their bravest, they followed the car of victory; and the official details which have since come to light, show that even the enormous levy of two hundred and forty thousand men in that short period was not disproportioned to the expenditure of the campaign. Authentic documents prove that the number of sick and wounded who were received

(1) Daru's Report, *Dam.* xix. 85, and *Hard.* ix. 453, 454.

(2) Scott's *Nap.* v. 411, 412.

into the French hospitals during the campaign, from the banks of the Saale to those of the Niemen, amounted to the stupendous number of FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND; of whom, at an average, not more than a ninth were prisoners taken from the Allies (1)! If such were the losses to the victors, it may readily be believed that those of the vanquished were still greater; and putting the two together, it may fairly be concluded that, from the 1st October 1806, to the 31st June 1807, that is, during a period of nine months, a million of human beings were consigned to military hospitals, of whom at least a hundred thousand perished, independent of those slain in battle, who were at least as many more! The mind finds it impossible to apprehend such enormous calamities; like the calculations of the distance of the sun, or the fixed stars, they elude the grasp of the most vivid imagination; but even in the bewildering impression which they produce, they tend to show how boundless was the suffering then occasioned by human ambition, how awful the judgment of the Almighty then executed upon the earth (2)!

Memorable
retribution
for the par-
tition of
Poland on
the partit-
ioning
powers.

Nor is it difficult to discern what were the national sins which were thus visited with so terrible a punishment. Fourteen years before, Austria, Russia, and Prussia had united their armies to partition Sarmatia, and Suwarrow had entered Warsaw while yet reeking with Polish blood. In the prosecution of this guilty object, they neglected the volcano which was bursting forth in the west of Europe; they starved the war on the Rhine to feed that on the Vistula, and opened the gates of Germany to French ambition. Prussia, in particular, first drew off from the European alliance, and after the great barrier of frontier fortresses had been broken through in 1793, and revolutionary France stood, as Napoléon admits, "on the verge of ruin," allowed her to restore her tottering fortunes, and, for ten long years, stood by in dubious and selfish neutrality, anxious only to secure or increase her ill-gotten gains. And what was the result? Poland became the great theatre of punishment to the partitioning powers; her blood-stained fields beheld the writhing and the an-

(1) The following are the details of this enormous catalogue of human suffering:—

In hospital of the army on 1st October, 1806,	408
Admitted till 31st October, 1807,	421,416
Total treated in the hospital	421,810
Of whom died there,	31,916
Discharged cured,	370,478
Sent back to France,	11,455
Remained in hospital on 17th October, 1806,	7,975
	421,810

The average stay of each patient in the hospital was 29 days. The proportion of maladies out of 200 was as follows:—

Fever,	105
Wounded,	47
Veneral,	31
Variola,	17

200

This is a striking proof how much greater the mortality occasioned by fevers and the other diseases incident to a campaign, is, than the actual number killed or wounded in the field. Applying these proportions to the total number of 420,000, we shall have the whole numbers nearly as follows:—

Fever,	210,000
Wounded,	100,000
Veneral,	62,000
Miscellaneous,	48,000

420,000

The immense number of wounded being at least five times what the bulletins admitted, demonstrates, if an additional proof were wanting, the total falsehood in the estimate of losses by which these reports were invariably distinguished. The great number of venereal patients is very curious, and highly characteristic of the French soldiers.—Daru's Report to Napoleon; *Duis.* xix. 486, 487.

It appears from Savary's report of the number of sick and wounded in the great hospital at Königsberg, of which city he received the command after the battle of Friedland, that at the end of June 1807, they amounted to the immense number of 27,376. Preparations were made for the reception of 57,000; but the sudden conclusion of the peace at Tilsit rendered them in a great degree unnecessary.—Nevertheless, the whole hospitals of the army were again overflowing in spring 1808, in every part of the north of Germany.—SAVARY, *iii.* 66, 69.

(2) Daru's Report to Napoleon, in *Duis.* xix. 486. *Pièces Just.*

guish of the victors. Pierced to the heart by hostile armies, driven up to a corner of her territory, within sight almost of the Sarmatian wilds, Austria saw her expiring efforts for independence overthrown on the field of Austerlitz. Rest of her dominions, bound in chains for the insult of the conqueror, with the iron driven into her soul, Prussia beheld her last hopes expire on the shores of the Vistula. Banished almost from Europe, conquered in war, sullied in fame, Russia was compelled to sign the ignominious peace on the banks of the Niemen, the frontier of her Lithuanian spoils. The measure of her retribution is not yet complete; the Grand Duchy of Warsaw is to become the outwork of France against Muscovy; the tide of war is to roll on to Red Russia; the sacred towers of Smolensko are to be shaken by Polish battalions, the sack of Praga is to be expiated by the flames of Moscow. That Providence superintends the progress of human affairs, that the retributions of justice apply to political societies as well as single men, and that nations, which have no immortality, are destined to undergo the punishment of their flagrant iniquities in this world, was long ago announced in thunders from Mount Sinai, and may be observed in every subsequent page of civilized history. But it is often on the third and fourth generation that the retribution descends, and in the complicated thread of intervening events, it is sometimes difficult to trace the connexion which we know exists between the guilty deeds and deserved suffering. In the present instance, however, the connexion was immediate and palpable; the actors in the iniquitous spoliation were themselves the sufferers by its effects; it was the partition of Poland which opened the gates of Europe to France; it was the partitioning powers that sunk beneath the car of Napoléon's ambition.

And was France, then—the instrument of this terrible retribution—that was approaching to escape herself the punishment of her sins? Was she, stained with the blood of the righteous, wrapt in the flames of the church, marked with the sign of the miscreant, to be the besom of destruction to others, and to bask only in the sunshine of glory herself?—No! the dread hour of her retribution was steadily approaching; swift as was the march of her triumphant hosts, swifter still was the advance of the calamities which were to presage her fall. Already to the discerning eye was visible the handwriting on the wall which foretold her doom. At Tilsit she reached the highest point of her ascendant; every subsequent change was a step nearer to her ruin. True, the Continent had sunk beneath her arms; true, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had successively fallen in the conflict: true, she had advanced her eagles to the Niemen, and from the rock of Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea, no voice dared to breathe a whisper against her authority; still the seeds of destruction were implanted in her bosom. Her feet were of base and perishable clay. The resources of the empire were wasting away in the pursuit of the lurid phantoms which its people worshipped; its strength was melting under the incessant drains which the career of victory demanded; a hundred and fifty thousand men were annually sacrificed to the Moloch of its ambition. They saw it not—they felt it not: joyfully its youth, “like reapers, descend to the harvest of death.” “They REPENTED NOT of their sins, to give glory to the Lord (1).” But the effect was not the less certain, that the operation of the circumstances producing it was not perceived; and among the many concurring causes which at this period were preparing its fall, a prominent place must be assigned to that very treaty of Tilsit which apparently carried its fortunes to their highest elevation.

(1) Rev. xvi. 8. 9.

Evil consequences of the treaty of Tilsit in the road to Napoleon.

In this treaty were to be discerned none of the marks of great political capacity on the part of the conqueror; in the harshness and perfidy with which it was accompanied, the foundation was laid for the most powerful future alliances to the vanquished. The formation of the kingdom of Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with three or four millions of souls, each connected only by a military road across the impoverished and indignant remaining dominions of Frederick William, could not be supposed to add, in any considerable degree, to the strength of the French empire. The indignities offered to Prussia, the slights shown to her beautiful and high-spirited Queen; the enormous contributions imposed upon her inhabitants, the relentless rigour with which they were levied, the forcible retention of her fortresses, the tearing away of half her dominions, were injuries that could never be forgiven. Her people, in consequence, imbibed the most unbounded horror at French oppression; and though the fire did not burst forth for some years in open conflagration, it smouldered incessantly in all ranks, from the throne to the cottage, till at length its force became irresistible. And what allies did Napoleon rear up on the Vistula by the arrangements of Tilsit, to prove a counterpoise to the deadly hostility of Prussia, thus gathering strength in his rear? None equal to the enemies whom he created. Saxony, indeed, was made a faithful ally, and proved herself such in the hour of disaster as well as the day of triumph; but the hopes of the Poles were cruelly blighted, and that confidence in the restoration of their empire by his assistance, which might have rendered their warlike bands so powerful an ally on the shores of the Vistula, for ever destroyed (1). Instead of seeing their nationality revived, the ancient line of their princes restored, and their lost provinces again re-united under one sceptre, they beheld only a fragment of their former empire wrested from Prussia, and handed over, too weak to defend itself, to the foreign government of the house of Saxony. The close alliance with Russia, and still more the extraordinary intimacy which had sprung up between the two Emperors, precluded all hope, that the vast provinces of Lithuania would ever again be restored to the dominion of the Jagellons or the Sobieskis. The restoration of Poland thus seemed farther removed than ever, in consequence of the successful efforts which a portion of its inhabitants had made for their liberation; they appeared to have now as much to fear from the triumphs of the French as the Russian arms. Thus, the treaty of Tilsit irrevocably alienated Prussia, and at the same time extinguished the rising ardour of Poland; and, while it broke down the strength of all the intervening states, and presaged a future desperate strife between the despots of the East and the West on the banks of the Niemen, laid no foundation in the affections of mankind for the moral support by which its dangers were to be encountered.

Disgraceful perfidy of Napoleon towards the Turks.
Jan. 2 1807.

But if the treaty of Tilsit involved serious errors in policy, so far as Poland and Prussia were concerned, much more was it worthy of reprehension when the provisions for the immediate partition of Turkey are taken into consideration. Six months had not elapsed since he had written to Marmont "to spare no protestations or assistance to

(1) "The treaty of Tilsit," says Oginski, "spread consternation through all the Polish provinces. Numbers in Lithuania and Wolhynia had left their homes to join the army raised under the auspices of Napoleon, and knew that their safety was compromised. Those who waited only for his passage of the Niemen to declare themselves, were disappointed.

ed. Universally, the treaty was regarded as the tomb of all the hopes which had been entertained of the restoration of the ancient monarchy, and from that moment, the confidence of all the Poles in the good intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, were irrecoverably weakened."—Oginski, *Mém. sur la Pologne*, ii. 315.

Turkey, since she was the faithful ally of the French empire (1).” Seven months had not elapsed since he had publicly declared at Posen “that the full and complete independence of the Ottoman empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor, as it is indispensable to the security of France and Italy: he would esteem the successes of the present war of little value if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete in-

On 18th May,
1807.

dependence (2):” *one month* had not elapsed since he had said to the Turkish ambassador, in a public audience at Finkenstein, that *his right hand was not more inseparable from his left* than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him (3).” In consequence of these protestations, Turkey had thrown itself into the breach: She had braved the whole hostility of Russia, and defied the thunders of England when her fleets were anchored off the Seraglio Point. And what return did Napoléon make to these faithful allies for the exemplary fidelity with which they had stood by his fortunes when they were shaking in every quarter, and Europe, after the battle of Eylau, was ready to start up in fearful hostility in his rear? The return he made was to sign a convention with Alexander for the partition of all their European dominions; and, not content with assuring the Czar that he was at perfect liberty to chase the Ottomans into Asia, provided only he did not lay violent hands on Constantinople, he stipulated for the largest share of the spoils, including Thrace, Albania, Dalmatia, Epirus, and Greece, for himself; while the consent of Austria was to be purchased by the acquisition of Servia! A more iniquitous and shameless instance of treachery is not to be found even in the dark annals of Italian perfidy; and it is sufficient to demonstrate, what so many other circumstances conspire to indicate, that this great man was as regardless of the sanctity of treaties as he was of the duty of veracity: that vows were made by him only to be broken, and oaths intended to be kept only till it was for his interest to violate them; and that in prosperous equally as adverse fortune, no reliance could be placed upon his feelings of gratitude, if a present interest was to be served by forgetting them.

No defence
can be made
for it in
consequence
of the Re-
volution at
Constanti-
nople.

The excuse set up for this monstrous tergiversation by the French writers, viz., that a few weeks before the battle of Friedland an insurrection of the Janizaries had taken place at Constantinople, and the ruling powers there had been overturned by open violence, is totally without foundation. The deposition of one sultan—no unusual occurrence in Oriental dynasties—had made no change whatever in the amicable disposition of the Divan towards France, or their inveterate hostility to the ancient and hereditary rivals of the Mahommedan faith: on the contrary, the party of the Janizaries which had now gained the ascendancy, was precisely the one which has ever been inclined to prosecute hostilities with Russia with the most fanatical fervour. It ill became France to hold out a revolution in the seraglio as a ground for considering all the existing obligations with Turkey as annulled, when her own changes of government since the Revolution had been so frequent, that Talleyrand had already sworn allegiance to *ten* in succession. And, in truth, this violation of public faith was as shortsighted as it was dishonourable; the secret articles soon came to the knowledge of the British government—they were communicated by their ambassador to the Divan, and produced an impression which was never forgotten. Honest and sincere, without foresight equally as deceit, the Turks are as incapable of betraying an ally as they are of forgetting an act of trea-

(1) Ante, vi. 9.
(2) Ante, vi. 9.

chery committed to themselves. The time will come in this history when the moment of retribution arrives, when Napoléon, hard pressed by the storms of winter and the arms of Russia, is to feel the bitterness of an ally's desertion, and when the perfidy of Tilsit is to be awfully avenged on the shores of the Berezina (1).

Towards the other powers of Europe the conduct of the two Imperial despots was alike at variance with every principle of fidelity to their allies, or moderation towards their weaker neighbours.—France abandoned Finland to Russia, and Alexander felt no scruples at the prospect of rounding his territories in the neighbourhood of St.-Petersburg by wresting that important province from his faithful ally the King of Sweden; and even went the length of advancing his western frontier, by sharing in the spoils of his unhappy brother the King of Prussia; while Russia surrendered Italy to France, and engaged to shut her eyes at the appropriation of the Papal States by Napoléon, who had resolved upon seizing them, in return for the condescension of the head of the Church in recently travelling to Paris to place the imperial crown on his head. The rulers of the Continent drew an imaginary line across Europe, and mutually gave each other *carte blanche* in regard to spoiliations, how unjustifiable soever, committed on their own side of the division. Napoléon surrendered half the European territories of Turkey to Alexander, and appropriated the other half to himself; while Alexander engaged to throw no obstacles in the way of the dethronement of the sovereigns of the Spanish Peninsula, to make way for the elevation of princes of the Bonaparte family. Both appear to have conceived that in thus suddenly closing their deadly strife, and turning their irresistible arms against the secondary states in their vicinity, they would gain important present objects, and mutually find room for the exercise of their future ambition, without encroaching on each other; forgetting that the desires of the human heart are insatiable; that the more powerful empires become, the more ardently do they pant after universal dominion; and that the same causes which arrayed Rome against Carthage in ancient, and brought Tamerlane and Bajazet into fierce collision in modern times, could not fail to become more powerful in their operation from the mutual aggrandizement which their gigantic empires received. "Nec mundus," said Alexander the Great, "duobus solibus regi potest, nec duo summa regna salvo statu terrarum potest habere (2)."

(1) The perfidious conduct of Napoléon towards Turkey has been almost overlooked by the liberal writers of Europe, in the vehemence of their indignation at him for not re-establishing the kingdom of Poland. Without doubt, if that great act of injustice could have been repaired by his victorious arm, and a compact, powerful empire of sixteen millions of souls re-established on the banks of the Vistula, it would have been alike grateful to every lover of freedom, and important as forming a barrier against Muscovite aggrandizement in Europe. But was it possible to construct such an empire, to form such a barrier, out of the disjointed elements of Polish anarchy? That is the point for consideration; and if it was not, then the French Emperor would have thrown away all the advantages of victory, if for a visionary and impracticable scheme of this description he had incurred the lasting and indelible animosity of the partitioning powers. With the aid of two hundred thousand brave men, indeed, which Poland could with ease send into the field, he might for a season have withstood the united armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but could he rely on their tumultuary assemblies sustaining the steady and durable efforts requisite for permanent suc-

cess? What made Poland originally fall a victim to the coalesced powers, once little more than provinces of its mighty dominion? "The insane ambition," as John Sobieski said, "of a plebeian noblesse;" the jealousy of six hundred thousand electors, incapable alike of governing themselves or of permitting the steady national government of others. Was this fatal element of discord eradicated from the Polish heart? Is it yet eradicated? Was it possible, by re-establishing Poland in 1807, to have done any thing, but, as Talleyrand well expressed it, "organized anarchy?" These are the considerations which then presented and still present an invincible obstacle to a measure, in other points of view recommended by so many considerations of justice and expedience. It is evident that the passions of the people, their insane desire for democratic equality, were so powerful, that if re-established in its full original extent, it would speedily have again fallen under the dominion of its former conquerors; the same causes which formerly proved fatal to its independence would, without doubt, again have had the same effect.

(2) Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 11.

"It cannot admit of a doubt," says Bignon,

Napoléon's leading object in the treaty was the humbling of Great Britain.

The great and ruling principle which actuated Napoléon in the negotiations at Tilsit, was the desire to combine all Europe into a cordial union against Britain. For this end, he was willing to forego or postpone his rivalry with Russia; to permit her to emerge, apparently crowned with the laurels of victory, from defeat; and

derive greater advantages from the rout of Friedland, than she had reaped even from the triumph of Pultowa or the sack of Ismael. All these sources of aggrandizement to his great continental rival were to Napoléon as nothing, provided they only led to the overthrow of the maritime power of England. That accomplished, he anticipated little comparative difficulty even with the colossal strength of the Scythian monarch. In yielding to his seductions, Alexander appears to have been impressed with a belief that he was the man of destiny, and that in continuing the combat, he was striving against fate (1).

England could not complain of its conditions.

Nor had England any great cause of complaint against him for violating his engagements to her, whatever Sweden or Turkey might have for the ambitious projects entertained at their expense.

The Cabinet of St.-James's had themselves receded from the spirit as well as the letter of the confederacy; the subsidies promised by Mr. Pitt had disappeared; the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg had been drawn, for the interest of Germany and England, into the contest; and both had withdrawn or been overthrown, leaving Russia alone to maintain it. So circumstanced, Great Britain had no reason to be surprised if Alexander took the first opportunity to extricate himself from a struggle, in which the parties chiefly interested no longer appeared to take any share; nor could she complain if she was left alone to continue a contest which she seemed desirous of reducing to a mere maritime quarrel. Deeply did England and Austria subsequently suffer from this infuriated and ill-timed desertion of the confederacy, at the very moment when the scales hung nearly even, and their aid might have been thrown in with decisive effect upon the balance. They might have stood in firm and impregnable array beside the veterans of Russia on the Vistula or the Elbe; they were left to maintain singly the contest on the Danube and the Tagus; they might have shared in the glories of Pultusk and Eylau, and converted the rout of Friedland into the triumph of Leipsic; and they expiated their neglect in the carnage of Wagram and the blood of Talavera.

It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the war was prolonged.

But though the timidity of Austria, when her forces were capable of interfering with decisive effect on the theatre of European contest, and the supineness of England, when she had only to appear in adequate force to conquer, were the causes to which alone we are to ascribe the long subsequent continuance, multiplied disasters, and unbounded ultimate bloodshed of the war, yet for the developement of the great moral lesson to France and mankind, and the illustration of the glories of patriotic resistance, it was fortunate that, by protracting it, opportunity was afforded for the memorable occurrences of its later years. But for that circumstance, the annals of the world would have lost the strife in the Tyrol,

"that in the treaty of Tilsit, as in all the actions of his life, it was the desire to force England to conclude peace, that was the sole, the only principle of Napoléon's actions. A prolonged state of war with Russia, or even the conclusion of a treaty which would have only put a period to the bloodshed, would not have satisfied him. It was necessary, not merely that he should have an enemy the less; he required an ally the more. Russia, it is true, had ceased to combat his army, but he required that she should enlist herself on his side; that she should enter into the strife with England, if not with arms,

at least by joining in the continental blockade, which was to aim a deadly thrust at her power. All his lures held out to Alexander were calculated for that end; it is with reference to that object that all the minor arrangements to which he consented are to be regarded."—BRONX, vi. 351-352.

(1) "Sire," said one of the Russian counsellors to Alexander at Tilsit, "I take the liberty of reminding you of the fate of your father, as the consequence of French alliance." "Oh my God!" replied the Emperor, "I know it; I see it; but how can I withstand the destiny which directs me!"—SAYATZ, iii. 92.

the patriotism of Aspern, the siege of Saragossa, the fields of Spain. Peace would have been concluded with France as an ordinary power; she would have retained the Rhine for her boundary, and Paris would have remained the depositary of revolutionary plunder; the Moscow campaign would not have avenged the blood of the innocent, nor the capture of their capital entered like iron into the soul of the vanquished. The last act of the mighty drama had not yet arrived; it was the design of Providence that it should terminate in yet deeper tragedy, and present a more awful spectacle of the Divine judgments to mankind. England would have saved three hundred millions of her debt, but she would have lost Vittoria and Waterloo; her standards would not have waved in the Pass of Roncesvalles, nor her soldiers entered in triumph the gates of Paris; she would have shared with Russia, in a very unequal proportion, the lustre of the contest, and to barbaric force, not freeborn bravery, future ages would have awarded the glory of having struck down the Conqueror of the World.

CHAPTER XLVII.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON.

JULY 1807—AUGUST 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Change in Napoleon's Projects for the Subjugation of England—Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental System—And getting the Command of and Concentrating their Fleets in the French and Flemish Harbours—Object of the Berlin Decree—Its Provisions and vigorous Execution—First Order in Council by the British Government, Jan. 7, 1807—Reasons which led to a Further and more Rigorous Measure—Order in Council of 11th Nov. 1807—Import of these Orders—Milan Decree of 17th Dec. 1807, published by Napoleon—Argument in Parliament against the Orders in Council—Reply of their Supporters in both Houses—Able Note of Lord Howick on this Subject to the Danish Minister—Reflections on this Debate, and the Justice of the Orders—Comparative Blame attaching to each Party—Reflections on their Policy—Jesuits' Bark Bill in England—Vast ultimate Effects of the Continental System—Introduction of the License System—Evasions of the Decrees on both Sides by the great Extension of this System—Universal Joy at Napoleon's Return to Paris—Unbecoming Adulation of the Orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies—Grand Fête in Honour of the Grand Army—Suppression of the French Tribunate—Slavish Submission with which the Change was received in France—Establishment of a Censorship of the Press—Identity of the Imperial Tyranny of Napoleon and the Democratic tyranny of the United States—Banishment of Madame de Staël and Madame Récamier—The Judges are rendered removable at pleasure—Severe Decrees against any Connivance at English Commerce—Rapid Progress of the System of Centralization in France under the Imperial Government—Policy of the Emperor in this particular—He Re-establishes Titles of Honour—Principles on which the Change was founded—Re-establishment of Hereditary Titles in addition to Personal ones—Speeches on the Subject in the Legislative Body—Address of the Senate to the Emperor on the occasion—Endowment of the new Peers with Revenue drawn from foreign States—List of the Revenues bestowed from the Electorate of Hanover—System of fusion which Napoleon pursued of the Ancient and Modern Noblesse—Total Departure thus made from the Principles of the Revolution—Rapid Progress of Court Etiquette at Paris—Great Internal Prosperity of France under the Empire—Its Revenues from 1808 to 1813—Vast Effects of the Foreign Plunder and Contribution on its Industry—Striking Account of the Public Works in progress in August 1807, by the Minister of the Interior—General Delirium which it produced—French Finances under the Empire—Budget of 1808—Despotic Character of the new Law of High Treason—Decree Establishing Eight State Prisons in the French Empire—Extraordinary Assemblage of Persons who were brought together in them—Slight Causes for which Prisoners were immured—Vast Extent of Napoleon's Power, and great Aggravation it was of his Persecution—Universal and Slavish Obedience to his Authority—Enormous Consumption of Human Life under his Foreign wars, and the System of the Conscription—Excessive Rigour of the Conscriptive Laws—System of the Imperial Education—Ecclesiastical Schools, Lyceums, and Military Academies—Formation of the Imperial University, Lyceums, or Military Academies—Their Constitution and great importance—Rapid Transition in France from Republicans to Despotic Ideas—Remarkable Difference between the English and French Revolutions in this respect—Its Causes—Superior Violence and Injustice of the French Convulsion—But this alone will not explain the difference—It was not the love of freedom, but the desire for individual Elevation which was the ruling Principle in France—The Principles of Freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution—General Corruption of Public Opinion which it produced—Rapid Growth of Centralization in this state of Public Feeling—But this, how great soever an evil, was unavoidable in the state in which France was at the termination of the Revolution—Striking Opinion of M. de Tocqueville on this Subject—Ability with which Napoleon took advantage of these circumstances to establish Despotic Power—Ultimate Effect to General Freedom of the resistance to Democracy in England, and its Triumph in France.

Change in
Napoleon's
projects for
the subjugation
of Eng-
land.

WHEN the battle of Trafalgar annihilated the prospect of invading England, and extinguished all his hopes of soon bringing the maritime war to a successful issue, Napoleon did not abandon the contest in despair. Quick in perception, he saw at once that the vast

preparations in the Channel must go for nothing; that the flotilla at Boulogne would be rotten before a fleet capable of protecting its passage could be assembled; and that every successive year would enable England now exclusively to engross the commerce of the world, and banish his flag more completely from the ocean. But he was not on that account discouraged. Fertile in resources, indomitable in resolution, implacable in hatred, he resolved to change the method, not the object of his hostility; and indulged the hope that he would succeed, through the extent and terror of his continental victories, in achieving the destruction of England, by a process, more slow indeed, but in the end, perhaps, still more certain. His design in this view consisted of two parts, both essential to the success of the general project, and to the prosecution of which his efforts, during the whole remainder of the war, were directed (1).

Plan of
uniting all
Europe in
the Conti-
nental Sys-
tem.

The first part of his plan was to combine all the continental states into one great alliance against England, and compel them to exclude, in the most rigid manner, the British flag and British merchandise from their harbours. This system had long obtained possession of his mind; he had made it the conditions of every treaty between a maritime state and France, even before he ascended the Consular throne (2). The adroit flattery which he applied to the mind of the Emperor Paul, and the skill with which he combined the northern powers into the maritime confederacy in 1800, were all directed to the same end; and, accordingly, the exclusion of the English flag from their harbours was the fundamental condition of that alliance (3). The proclamation of the principles of the armed neutrality by the northern powers at that crisis, filled him with confident expectations that the period had then arrived when this great object was to be attained; but the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen dissolved all their hopes, and threw him back to the system of ordinary warfare, so cruelly afterwards defeated by the battle of Trafalgar. The astonishing results of the battle of Jena, however, again revived his projects of excluding British commerce from the Continent; and thence the BERLIN DECREE, to be immediately considered, and the anxiety which he evinced at Tilsit to procure, by any sacrifices, the accession of Alexander to the confederacy.

And getting
hold of and
concentra-
ting their
fleets in the
French and
Flemish
harbours.

The second part of the plan was, to obtain possession, by negotiation, force, or fraud, of all the fleets of Europe, and gradually bring them to the great central point near the English coast, from whence they might ultimately be directed, with decisive effect, against the British shores. By the Continental System, he hoped to weaken the resources of England, to hamper its revenue, and by the spread of commercial distress, break up the unanimity which now prevailed among its inhabitants. But he knew too well the spirit of the ruling part of the nation to expect that, by the spread of commercial distress alone, he would succeed in the contest. He was desirous of reducing its strength by a long previous

(1) *Las Cas*, v. 8, 15.

(2) *Ante*, iv. 216.

(3) The Directory had previously adopted the system of compelling the exclusion of English goods from all the European harbours; but the multiplied disasters of their administration prevented them from carrying it into any general execution. By a Jan. 18, 1798. decree, issued on 18th January, 1798, it was declared, "That all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, shall be held good prize, whoever is the proprietor of such merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its foreign settle-

ments; that the harbours of France should be shut against all ships having touched at England, except in cases of distress - and that neutral sailors fished on board English vessels should be put to death." *Nap.* Feb. 9, 1800. prison, soon after his accession to the Consular throne, issued a decree, revoking this and Jan. 28, 1800. all other decrees passed during the Revolution; and reverting to the old and humane laws of the monarchy in this particular; but in the *Ante*, iv. 235. exultation consequent on the battle of Jena, he very nearly returned to the violence and barbarity of the decree of the Directory. — *Vide Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 54, 55; and 1807, 226, 227.

blockade, but it was by an assault at last that he hoped to carry the day. In order to prepare for that grand event, he was at the utmost pains to increase his naval force; amidst all the expenditure occasioned by his military campaigns, he proposed to construct, and to a certain extent actually did construct, from ten to twenty sail of the line every year, while vast sums were annually applied to the great naval harbours at Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, and Brest. The first, from its admirable situation and close proximity to the British shores, he considered as the great outwork of the Continent against England; he regarded it, as he himself has told us, as "itself worth a kingdom;" and but for the invincible tenacity with which he held to this great acquisition, he might with ease have obtained peace in 1814, and have left his family at this moment seated on the throne of France (1). But it was not with the fleets of France alone that he intended to engage in this mighty enterprise; those of all Europe were to be combined in the attempt; the navies of Denmark and Portugal in virtue of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit (2), were to be required from their respective sovereigns, and seized by force, if not voluntarily surrendered; that of Russia was to come round from the Black Sea and the Baltic to Brest and Antwerp, and join in the general crusade, until at length a hundred ships of the line and two hundred thousand men were prepared, on the coasts of the Channel, to carry to the shores of England the terrors of Gallic invasion. "When in this manner, said Napoléon, "I had established my ground, so as to bring the two nations to wrestle, as it were, body to body, the issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium (3).

Object of
the Berlin
Decree.

It was therefore no momentary burst of anger or sudden fit of exultation, occasioned by his unparalleled triumphs, which induced Napoléon, by his celebrated decree from Berlin, to declare the British islands in a state of blockade. It was the result of much thought and anxious deliberation, of a calm survey of the resources at his disposal, and the means

(1) Las Cas. v. 8, 15.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 143.

(3) Las Cas. v. 8, 14. *Jom.* ii. 449.

Napoléon's projects in regard to the maritime war against England, have been already explained [*Ante*, v. 62] but this is a point of such vital importance to the future security of the British empire, that it will well bear a second note from an additional authority. "He said," says Las Casas, "that he had done much for Antwerp, but nothing to what he proposed to have done. By sea, he proposed to have made it a mortal point of attack against the enemy; by land, he wished to render it a sure resource in case of great disasters—a true point of refuge for the national safety; he wished to render it capable of containing an entire army in its defeat, and of resisting a year of open trenches, daring which the nation might have risen in a mass for its relief. The world admired much the works already executed at Antwerp—its numerous dockyards, arsenals, and wet docks; but all that, said the Emperor, was nothing—it was but the commercial town; the military town was to have been on the other bank, where the land was already purchased; three-deckers were to have been there constructed, and covered sheds established to keep the ships of the line dry in time of peace. Every thing there was planned on the most colossal scale. Antwerp was itself a province. That place, said the Emperor, was the chief cause of my having been here; for if I could have made up my mind to give up Antwerp, I might have concluded peace at Chatillon in 1814."—Las Cas., vii. 43, 44.

Gigantic as these designs for Antwerp were, they were but a part of what Napoléon meditated or had constructed for his grand enterprise against England. "Magnificent works," says Las Casas, "had been set going at Cherbourg, where they had excavated, out of the solid rock, a basin capable of holding fifteen ships of the line and as many frigates, with the most splendid fortifications for their protection; the Emperor intended to have prepared that harbour to receive thirty more line-of-battle ships of the largest size. Innumerable works had been prepared to receive and protect the flotilla which was to be immediately concerned in the invasion of England; Boulogne was adapted to hold 2000 gunboats; Vimereux, Etaples, and Amblières, 1000 more. The harbour of Flushing was to have been rendered impregnable, and enlarged so as to hold twenty of the largest ships of the line; while dockyards for the construction of twenty line-of-battle ships were to be formed at Antwerp, and constantly kept in full activity.—So immense were the preparations on the French coast for the invasion of England! The Emperor frequently said that Antwerp was to him an entire province; a little kingdom in itself. He attached the greatest importance to it, often visited it in person, and regarded it as one of the most important of all his creations."—Las Cas., vii. 51, 57.—It is not a little curious that, within twenty years after his fall, the English government should have united its forces to those of France to restore this great outwork against British independence to the dominion of Belgium, and the rule of the son-in-law of France.

of resistance which yet remained to his antagonists. The treaty of Tilsit gave the English government ample room for serious reflection on the danger which now beset them. The accession of Russia to the continental league was thereby rendered certain; the secret articles of the treaty, of which, by great exertions, they soon obtained possession (1), made them acquainted with the intention of France and Russia, not only to unite their forces against Great Britain, but to compel Denmark and Portugal to do the same. In addition to having their flag proscribed, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Gulf of Bothnia, they had the prospect of seeing all the maritime forces of Europe arrayed against their independence. The assistance of Sweden could not much longer be relied on, pressed as she would soon be by her colossal neighbour; the harbours of South America were still closed to her adventure; the neutrality of North America was already more than doubtful, and would certainly be soon abandoned to range the United States by the side of France, in open enmity with Great Britain. Thus had England, proscribed from all civilized commerce over the whole world, and weakened in her resources by the internal suffering consequent on such a deprivation, the prospect of soon being compelled to maintain a contest with all the naval and military forces of Europe, directed by consummate ability, and actuated by inveterate hostility against her independence and renown. A clear and constant perception of this prospect, is indispensable both to the formation of a just opinion on the measures to which she was speedily driven in her own defence, and of the character of the illustrious men who, called to the direction of her councils and armies in such a gloomy situation, speedily raised her fortunes to an unparalleled pitch of glory and prosperity.

Berlin Decree of 21st Nov.

The English government, in 1806, after the occupation of Hanover by the Prussian troops, had issued an order, declaring the coasts of Prussia in a state of blockade. That the English navy was amply adequate to establish an effectual blockade of the two rivers which constitute the only outlet to Prussian commerce, cannot be doubted (2). This blockade, how-

(1) They were obtained by the agency of the Count D'Autraignes.—HAB. ix. 431, note.—In the King's speech, on 21st January, 1808, it was said—"We are commanded by his Majesty to inform you, that no sooner had the result of the negotiations at Tilsit confirmed the influence and control of France over the powers of the Continent, than his Majesty was apprised of the intention of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his Majesty an insecure and ignominious peace. That for this purpose it was determined to force into hostility against this country, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality; and to bring to bear upon different points of his Majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. To place those fleets out of the power of such a confederacy, became, therefore, the indispensable duty of his Majesty." The complete accuracy of these assertions has been abundantly proved by the quotations from the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, already given; and ample confirmation of them will appear in the sequel of this chapter. Ministers, in the course of the debates which ensued on the Copenhagen expedition, were repeatedly called upon to produce their secret articles, or specify what private information they had received; but they constantly declined doing so, and in consequence it became a very general opinion at the time, that there, in reality, were no such secret articles, and that this assertion was put forward

without foundation in the King's speech, to palliate an aggression which, on its own merits, was indefensible. It is now proved, however, that they had the secret information, and that they had the generosity to bear this load of obloquy rather than betray a confidence which might prove fatal to persons high in office in the French government. This was fully explained, many years afterwards, when the reasons for concealment no longer existed, by Lord Liverpool in Parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.* x. 1.

April 5, 1806. (2) As this Order in Council is referred to by the French writers and their supporters in this country, as a vindication of the Berlin Decree, its provisions merit attention. It proceeds on the narrative, "that the Prussian government has, in a forcible and hostile manner, taken possession of the Electorate of Hanover, and has also notified that all British ships shall be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade therein;" and then declares, "That no ship or vessel belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects be permitted to enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or stop be made of all Prussian ships and vessels whatever, now within, or hereafter which shall come into, any of the ports, harbours, or roads, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of the cargoes on board of the said ships or vessels, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be

ever, and one at the same time declared, of the coasts of the Channel, gave Napoléon an excuse for the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which, on the narrative, "that the British government had violated the law of nations, so far as regarded neutral vessels; that it regards as enemies every individual belonging to a hostile state, and, in consequence, makes prize, not merely of the crews of merchant vessels equipped as privateers, but also those of such vessels when merely engaged in the transport of merchandise; that it extends to the ships and the objects of commerce that right of conquest which does not properly belong but to public property; that it extends to commercial cities and harbours, and mouths of rivers, the hardships of blockade which, on the best interpretation of the law of nations, is applicable only to fortified places; that it declares blockaded harbours, before which it has not a single ship of war, although a place cannot be considered as blockaded till it is in such a manner beset that entry cannot be obtained without imminent danger; that it even declares blockaded places, which all its naval forces are inadequate to blockade, as entire coasts and a whole empire; that this monstrous violation of the law of nations has no other object but to obstruct the communications of other people, and elevate the industry and commerce of England upon the ruins of that of the Continent; that this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the Continent in British merchandise, by that very act favours its designs, and becomes participant in them; that this conduct of England, worthy of the first barbarous ages, has hitherto turned to its own great profit and the detriment of all other states; and that the law of nature entitles every belligerent to oppose its enemy with the arms with which it combats, and the mode of hostility which it has adopted, when it disregards every idea of justice and liberality, the result of civilisation among mankind;" therefore it declared:—

Its provisions.

"1. The British islands are placed in a state of blockade. 2. Every species of commerce and communication with them is prohibited; all letters or packets addressed in English, or in the English characters, shall be seized at the post-office, and interdicted all circulation. 3. Every British subject, of what rank or condition whatever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or those of our allies, shall be made prisoner of war. 4. Every warehouse, merchandise, or property of any sort, belonging to a subject of Great Britain, or coming from its manufactories or colonies, is declared good prize. 5. Commerce of every kind in English goods is prohibited; and every species of merchandise belonging to England, or emanating from its work-shops or colonies, is declared good prize. 6. The half of the confiscated value shall be devoted to indemnifying those merchants whose

sustained."—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677. This was followed, upon 16th May, 1806, by an Order in Council, signed by Mr. Fox, which, "considering the new measures adopted by the enemy for the obstruction of British commerce, declared the whole coasts, harbours, and rivers, from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, as actually blockaded; provided always that this blockade shall not extend to neutral vessels having on board merchandise not belonging to the enemies of his Majesty, and not contraband of war; excepting, however, the coast from (tend to the mouth of the river Seine, which is hereby declared subject to a blockade of the strictest kind [*Mart. Sup.*, v. 437.]." There can be no doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were, in the strictest sense, subject to such declaration, when the peril of leaving the harbours they contained was such, that not one of the enemy's armed vessels ventured to incur it. This decree, such as it was, was repealed as to

all ports from the Elbe to the Rhine inclusive, by a British Order in Council of 26th September, 1806.—See *MARTENS*, v. 469, *Sup.* These Orders in Council, thus providing only for the blockade of harbours and coasts, which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to enter, or for the interdicted of the Prussian cargoes, in retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian troops, and exclusion of British commerce, in pursuance of the offers of Napoléon already detailed, was clearly within the law of nations, as admitted by the French Emperor himself, and, in truth, a most moderate exercise of the rights of war [*Ante*, v. 396, 397]. They afford, therefore, no excuse or palliation whatever for the Berlin Decree.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677. And see the previous Prussian proclamation excluding British trade on 23th March, 1806, *ibid.* 668. and *MARTENS*, *Sup.*, v. 435. ogle

vessels have been seized by the English cruisers for the losses which they have sustained. 7. No vessel coming directly from England, or any of its colonies, or having touched there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received into any harbour. 8. Every vessel which, by means of a false declaration, shall have effected such entry, shall be liable to seizure, and the ship and cargo shall be confiscated as if they had also belonged to England. 9. The prize court of Paris is intrusted with the determination of all questions arising out of this decree in France, or the countries occupied by our armies; that of Milan, with the decision of all similar questions in the kingdom of Italy. 10. This decree shall be communicated to the kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and to our other allies, whose subjects have been the victims, like our own (1), of the injustice and barbarity of English legislation. 11. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, of Marine, of Finance, and of Justice, of Police, and all postmasters, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree (2)."

In rigorous execution. Such was the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which was only an extension to all Europe of the declaration and order that all English merchandise should be liable to confiscation, which had been issued by Napoléon at Leipsic on the 18th of October preceding, and at Hamburg on the 3d November (3). It was not allowed an instant to remain a dead letter. Orders were dispatched in all directions to act upon it with the utmost rigour; and with undisguised reluctance, but trembling hands, the subject monarchs and prefects prepared to carry the stern requisition into execution. So strongly was its unjust character and ruinous tendency felt in Holland, that Napoléon's own brother Louis, King of that country, at first positively refused to submit to its injustice; and at length could only be prevailed on, in the first instance, to promulgate it in the foreign countries occupied by the Dutch troops, reserving its execution in his own dominions till it should be ascertained whether the measures already in force should prove insufficient (4). So strongly did this opposition on the part of

(1) *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 261. *Schmöl.* ix. 344. and *Dum.* xvii. 46, 47.

(2) Two days after the publication of the Berlin Decree, Napoléon wrote the following highly characteristic letter to Junot, then governor of Paris:—"Take especial care that the *ladies* of your establishment take Swiss tea; it is as good as that of China. Coffee made from chicorie is noways inferior to that of Arabia. Let them make use of those substitutes in their drawingrooms, instead of amusing themselves with talking politics, like Madame de Staël. Let them take care also that no part of their dress is composed of English merchandise; tell that to *Madame Junot*: if the wives of my chief officers do not set the example, whom can I expect to follow it? It is a contest of life or death between France and England; I must look for the most cordial support in all those by whom I am surrounded."—*Nav. to Junot*, 23d Nov. 1806; *D'ANNALES*, ix. 287, 288.

(3) *Ans.* v. 373.

(4) "This decree," says Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, "was as unjust as it was impolitic. The command that it should be obeyed by the Kings of Spain, Holland, Naples, and Etruria, was the commencement of universal empire, if it had any meaning; if not so intended, it was senseless. The ground of justification put forth in the decree, viz. 'that England applies the right of blockade, not only to fortified places and the mouths of rivers, and whole coasts, when the law of nations only authorizes that rigour in the case of places so closely invested that they cannot be entered or quitted without danger,' is itself its chief condemnation; for a nation whose

vessels can proceed to a distance from its frontiers, even to the waters of the countries belonging to its enemies, is undoubtedly better entitled to say that it blockades coasts and ports, than a nation without a navy to say that it blockades an island surrounded by numerous fleets. In this last case, it is the continental power which voluntarily places itself in a state of blockade. Besides, wrong cannot authorize wrong, nor injustice injustice. The 4th and 5th articles of the Berlin Decree are atrocious. What! because the English seize merchants travelling from one place to another, and subject the vessels of individuals to ill treatment, shall we, in an age of reason, dare to seize every Englishman, and whatever of their property we can lay hold of? This was augmenting and justifying the injury of the English government. The 6th article is barbarous, the 8th still worse. Here, by a single stroke of the pen, the property of all Frenchmen who, up to that period, had traded in English goods, is taken from them; vessels even thrown on the coast by tempests, are to be refused admission into any port. Enough has been said to justify the extreme repugnance of the King of Holland to carry this decree into execution: it threw him into the utmost consternation; he felt at once, that it would speedily prove the ruin of Holland, and afford a pretext for oppressing it. This measure appeared to him as singular and revolutionary as denationalizing. He ventured to write to the Emperor that he believed this gigantic measure to be imposed, and calculated, to effect the ruin of France and all commercial nations connected with it, before it could ruin England. Obligated,

his brother irritate Napoléon, that he declared, in a fit of ill-humour, "that if Louis did not submit to his orders, he would cause domiciliary visits to be made through the whole of Holland." Nevertheless, as Louis perceived, what every person in the country knew, that this rigorous decree, if fully acted upon, would occasion the total ruin of his dominions, it was enforced in a very loose manner in the United Provinces. In the north of Germany, however, it was not only most rigorously put in force, but the decree was made a pretence for a thousand iniquitous extortions and abuses, which augmented tenfold its practical oppression. An army of locusts, in the form of inspectors, customhouse-officers, comptrollers, and other functionaries, fell upon all the countries occupied by the French troops, and made the search for English goods a pretext for innumerable frauds, vexations, and iniquities. "They pillaged, they plundered," says Bourrienne, "in a systematic manner, in all the countries of the north of Germany to which my diplomatic mission extended. Rapine was in a manner established by law, and executed with such blind fury, that often the legalized robbers did not know the value of the articles they had seized. All the English merchandise was seized at Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the other Hanse Towns; and Berthier wrote to me, that in that way I should obtain ten millions of francs for the Emperor. In point of fact, I compounded with the proprietors for twenty millions (L.800,000); and yet, such was the demand for these useful articles, that when exposed to sale by the proprietors, after paying this enormous ransom, their advanced prices brought them a very handsome profit (1)."

First Order
in Council
by the Bri-
tish govern-
ment.

Jan. 7. 1807.

The English government replied to the Berlin Decree, in the first instance, by an Order in Council of 7th January, 1807, issued by Lord Howick, which, on the preamble of the French decree, and the right of retaliation thence arising to Great Britain, declared, "That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, if both belong to France or her allies, and shall be so far under her control as that British vessels are excluded therefrom; and the captains of all British vessels are hereby required to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to such other port, to discontinue her voyage; and any vessel, after being so warned, or after having had a reasonable time allowed it for obtaining information of the present Order in Council, which shall, notwithstanding, persist in such voyage to such other port, shall be declared good prize." The spirit of this order was to deprive the French, and all the nations subject to their control, which had embraced the Continental System, of the advantages of the coasting trade in neutral bottoms; and, considering the much more violent and extensive character of the Berlin Decree, there can be no doubt that it was a very mild and lenient measure of retaliation. This order was relaxed soon after as to vessels containing grain or provisions for

however, to carry it into effect, under the penalty of a complete rupture with France, he only endeavoured to do so in the least illegal and most independent manner possible."—LOUIS BONAPARTE, *Documents sur la Hollande*. i. 294, 307, 308.

(1) Bour. vii. 265, 326, 327. Louis Bonaparte *Doc. sur la Hollande*, i. 295, 309.

A striking instance occurred, a few months after the promulgation of the Berlin Decree, of the utter impossibility of carrying such a monstrous system of legislation into execution. Shortly after the Berlin Decree had been issued, there arrived at Hamburg a thundering order for the immediate furnishing of 50,000 greatcoats, 200,000 pairs of shoes, 16,000 coats, 37,000 waistcoats, and other articles

in proportion. The resources of the Hanse Towns were wholly unequal to the supply of so great a requisition in so short a time; and after trying in vain every other expedient, Bourrienne, the French diplomatic agent, was obliged to contract with English houses for the supply, which speedily arrived; and while the emperor was denouncing the severest penalties against the possession of English goods, and boasting, that by the Continental System he had excluded British manufactures from the Continent, his own army was clothed with the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and his soldiers would have perished amidst the snow of Preussisch-Eylau but for the reasonable efforts of British industry. — See BOURRIENNE, vii. 292, 294.

Great Britain, and as to all vessels whatever belonging to the Hanse Towns, if employed in any trade to or from the dominions of Great Britain (4).

Reasons
which led to
a further
and more
rigorous
measures.

After the treaty of Tilsit, however, had completely subjected the Continent to the dominion or control of the French Emperor, it soon appeared that some more rigorous and extensive system of retaliation was called for. A few months' experience was sufficient to show that the Berlin Decree, while it rigorously excluded every species of British manufacture or colonial produce from the ports of the continent, by no means inflicted a proportional injury upon the inhabitants of the countries where its provisions were put in force; and that, in truth, it opened up a most lucrative commerce to the industry and colonies of neutral powers, at the expense of the vital interests of the British empire. By prohibiting, under the penalty of confiscation, the importation of every species of British produce, it necessarily left the market of the Continent open to the manufacturing industry and colonial produce of other states; and this in the end could not but prove highly injurious to English industry. The obvious and direct retaliation would have consisted, in prohibiting the importation into the British dominions of the produce of France, or its dependencies which had embraced the Continental System, whether in their own or neutral bottoms; but it was extremely doubtful whether this would have been by any means a retribution of equal injury. England was essentially a commercial state. The resources from which she maintained the contest were in great part drawn from the produce of her colonies or manufactories; and the general cessation of commercial intercourse, therefore, could not fail to be felt with more severity in her dominions than in the continental nations. What to them, considered as a whole, was secondary, to her was vital; the suffering which with them would be diffused over a wide circle, to her would be concentrated in the narrow space of a few counties. In these circumstances, some measure seemed indispensable which should inflict upon the enemy not merely the same *injustice*, but the same *suffering* which he had occasioned; and by causing his own subjects to feel in their own persons the consequences of his aggression, produce that general discontent which might arm them against his authority, or render necessary a return to more equitable measures.

Orders in
Council of
11th Nov.
1807.

Under the influence of these ideas, the celebrated Orders in Council of 11th November, 1807, were issued, which, on the preamble of the British islands having been declared by the Berlin Decree in a state of blockade, and of all importation of British merchandise having been absolutely prohibited, and of the mitigated measure of retaliation adopted in the Order in Council of 7th January, 1807, having proved inadequate to the object of effecting the repeal of that unprecedented system of warfare, declared that from henceforth "all the ports and places of France and her allies, from which, though not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were *actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner*; and that all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed to be unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize; declaring always that nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to capture or detention, of any vessel or cargo which shall belong to a country not declared by this order subject to a strict blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from such port to

(1) Parl. Deb. x. 127, 130. Ann. Reg. 1807, 671, 672.

which she belongs, either in Europe or America, or from some free port in the British colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free port is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his Majesty's enemies, or from those colonies direct to the countries to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his Majesty's colonies; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to a country not at war with his Majesty, which shall have cleared out from some port in this kingdom, and shall be proceeding direct to the port specified in her clearance; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe declared by this order to be subject to a strict blockade, destined to some port or place in Europe belonging to his Majesty, and be on her voyage direct thereto." All vessels contravening this order are declared good prize. "And whereas countries not engaged in the war have acquiesced in the orders of France, and have given countenance and effect to these prohibitions by obtaining from agents of the enemy certain documents styled 'certificates of origin,' therefore if any vessel, after having had reasonable time to receive notification of the present order, shall be found carrying any such certificate, it shall be declared good prize, together with the goods on board (1)."

Divested of the technical phraseology in which, for the sake of legal precision, these orders are couched, they in effect amount to this: Napoléon had declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and subjected all goods of British produce or manufacture to confiscation, within his dominions, or those of the countries subjected to his control, and prohibited all vessels from entering any harbour which had touched at any British port; and the English government, in reply, proclaimed France and all the Continental states in a state of blockade, and declared all vessels good prize which should be bound for any of their harbours, excepting such as had previously cleared out from, or touched at, a British harbour. Thus France prohibited all commerce with England, or traffic in English goods, and England prohibited all commerce between any of the states which had embraced the continental system and each other, unless in vessels bound for some British harbour.

Milan Decree, 17th Dec. 1807.
published by Napoléon.

Napoléon was not slow in replying to these Orders in Council. By a decree dated from Milan on 17th December, 1807, he declared—

1. That every vessel, of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to be searched by British cruisers, or paid any impost levied by the English government, shall be considered as having lost the privileges of a neutral flag, and be considered and dealt with as English vessels.—2. Being so considered, they shall be declared good prize.—3. The British islands are declared in a state of blockade. Every vessel, of whatever nation, and with whatever cargo, coming from any British harbour, or from any of the English colonies, or from any country occupied by the English troops, or bound for England, or for the English colonies, or for any country occupied by the English troops, is declared good prize (2).—4. These rigorous measures shall cease in regard to any nations which shall have caused the English government to respect the

(1) *Parl. Deb.* x. 134, 138.

Additional Orders in Council, 25th Nov. 1807, and 18th Dec. 1807.

By a supplementary Order in Council, the severe enactments of this regulation were declared not to extend to "articles of the produce and manufacture of the blockaded countries which shall be laden on board British ships;" and by a more material one, passed six

weeks afterwards, it was provided, "that nothing in the order of 11th November, shall be construed so as to permit any vessel to import any produce or manufactures of the enemy's colonies in the West Indies, direct from such colonies to any part in the British dominions." [*Ibid.* x. 143.]

(2) *Mart. Sup.*, v. 453; *Ann. Reg.* 1807, p. 777. *State Papers.*

rights of their flag, but continue in regard to all others, and never be released till Great Britain shows a disposition to return to the law of nations as well as those of justice and honour."

It may safely be affirmed, that the rage of belligerent powers, and the mutual violation of the laws of nations, could not go beyond those furious manifestoes. They produced, as might have been expected, most important effects, both on the Continent and the British isles, and gave rise to memorable and luminous debates in Parliament, in which all that could be advanced, both for and against the justice and expedience of these measures, was fully brought forward.

Arguments
in Parlia-
ment
against the
Orders in
Council.

On the one hand, it was strongly urged by Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and Lord Erskine—"Let the case at once be stated in the manner which has produced the whole controversy. France, on the 21st November, issued her decree, which announced the intention to distress this country in a way unauthorized by the public law; subjecting to confiscation the ships and cargoes of neutrals with British merchandise, or going to or coming from Great Britain, with their accustomed trade. Such a decree undoubtedly introduced a rule which the law of nations forbids, as being, even as between belligerents, and much more as with neutrals, an aggravation of the miseries of war, and unauthorized by the practice of civilized states. If carried into execution, it would vest the suffering belligerent with the right of retaliation; and indeed, as between the belligerents only, it may be admitted that the mere publication of such a decree would authorize the nation so offended to disregard the law of nations towards the nation so offending. But that is not the present question; the point here is, not whether we would have been justified in retaliating upon France the injury she has inflicted upon us, but whether we are justified in inflicting, in our turn, a new and still more aggravated species of injury on *neutral* states. If A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking him, and neither law nor reason will weigh very nicely the comparative severity of the blow given, from that at first received. But it is a new application of the term retaliation, to say, that if A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking B. If the interdiction of a neutral from trading with us is submitted to by him from favour to the belligerent, he directly interposes in the war, and his character of a neutral is at an end; if he does so from terror or weakness, in that case too he ceases to be a neutral, because he suffers an unjust pressure to be affixed upon us. But admitting that, the question remaining, what right have we to retaliate upon a neutral upon whom the decree has never been executed; who in no shape has been made either the instrument or the victim of oppression by the enemy?

"Now that is the real question, and the only question here. America, the only great maritime power which has not now taken a decided part in the contest, was virtually excluded from its operation. The air was white with her sails; the sea was pressed down with her shipping, nearly half as numerous as our own, bringing her produce into every port of England, and carrying our commodities and manufactures into every corner of Europe. Up to the date of the Orders in Council, she continued to take, without the least defalcation, ten millions of our manufactures, and she carried to other nations what was beyond her own consumption. She carried on this traffic, in the face of the French decree of 21st November, when we could not have done it for ourselves. She did this, it is true, from no feeling of friendship towards us, but from self-interest to herself; but Providence has so arranged human affairs, that by a wise pursuit of self-interest, every thing is full and stands in its proper place. We had so much the start of other nations, that we had

only to lie by, and they, for their own purposes, came to our relief. America smuggled our goods into France for her own interest, and France bought them for hers. The people cheered the Emperor at the Tuilleries every day, but they broke his laws every night. The Berlin Decree, in fact, had become a dead letter, either from the connivance or the licenses for contraband trade issued by the French government; she had no ships to carry her decrees into effect; and the barbarous system of the enemy was rapidly falling into that neglect in which Mr. Pitt, with great sagacity, left the corresponding decree of the Directory in 1798.

“Such was the state of matters, when, in an evil hour, our own government interfered, and gave a helping hand to the enemy. The Orders in Council were the real executors of the Berlin Decree. Under it we employ our own shipping to stop our own trade upon the sea; we make prisons of our own ports to terrify away the neutral seaman, who otherwise would carry on our traffic, and find a vent for our manufactures; and, playing the very game of France, by throwing neutral powers into her arms instead of our own. And this, it seems, is retaliation! Can we, who do such things, object to the Irish rebels who burned the notes of an obnoxious banker to ruin his trade? Our Orders in Council have thrown the mistake of the ignorant Irish into the shade.

“The order of 7th January, 1807, was liable to none of these objections. It introduced or adopted no new or illegal principle; it merely reprobated the illegal decree of France, and asserted the right of retaliation by actual blockade—a restriction which, it is admitted on all hands, neutrals must submit to. But the order of 11th November stands in a very different situation. Sir William Scott has told us, in the case of the *Maria, Robinson*, i. 154, that no blockade can be made by the law of nations, unless force sufficient is stationed to prevent an entry. Can this be predicated of all Europe put together? Is every harbour and river, from Hamburg to Cadiz, so closely watched that no vessel can enter any of them without evident risk of capture? Such a proposition is clearly out of the question; and therefore government has issued an Order in Council, which its own prize courts, if adjudicating in conformity with their former principles, must declare to be contrary to the law of nations, and therefore refuse to execute.

“Nor is it in this view only that these orders are illegal. They purposed to interrupt the commerce of neutral and unoffending nations, carrying on their accustomed traffic in innocent articles, between their own country and the ports of our enemies not actually blockaded, and even between their own country and our allies; they compel neutrals, under the pain of confiscation, to come to our ports, and there submit to regulations, restrictions, and duties, which will expose them to certain destruction the moment they approach the enemy's shore; they declare all vessels good prize which carry documents or certificates declaring that the articles of the cargo are not the produce of his Majesty's dominions, contrary alike to the law of nations and the rights and liberties of the people of this realm—such a monstrous system of aggression never was, and never should be, successful. Let us leave to our enemies the guilt of discord and bloodshed, and seek to support our country by the virtues of beneficence and peace (1).

“The idea that you can starve the enemy into submission, or the adoption of a more reasonable mode of hostility, is founded on an essential and fatal mistake in regard to the relative situation of Great Britain and the continent—

tal states in the contest. The former must of necessity be the greatest sufferer. The continental nations will lose only articles of luxury, but the British will be deprived of those of necessity; sugar may rise to an extravagant price in Germany, but the manufacturers will be deprived of their daily bread in England. The greatest calamity which could befall this country in her present predicament, would be a war with America, both as depriving her of the chief vent for her manufactured industry, and of the advantage of neutral carriers, who would contrive, for their own profit, to elude every continental blockade, in order to introduce them into the continental states. And surely the present moment, when we have all Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against us, is not that when it is expedient, gratuitously and unnecessarily to withdraw so beneficial a customer from our markets, and add his forces to those of the enemy."

Reply of
the sup-
porters of
the Orders
in both
Houses

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Hawkesbury, the Advocate-General, and Lord Chancellor Eldon—"It is in vain to refer to the law of nations for any authority on this subject, in the unprecedented circumstances in which this country is now placed.

What usually passes by that name, is merely a collection of the *dicta* of wise men who have devoted themselves to this subject in different ages, applied to the circumstances of the world at the period in which they wrote, or circumstances nearly resembling them; but none having the least resemblance to the circumstances in which this country is now placed. Such as they are, however, they all admit, what indeed common sense dictates, the right of retaliation, or of resisting an enemy by the same means by which he attacks ourselves. Nothing can be more expedient in the general case, than to adhere, with scrupulous exactness, to the law of nations; but if one belligerent commences a violation of them, it is sometimes indispensable, in order to put an end to the enormity, to make the enemy feel its effects. In some cases the most civilized nations have been driven to the melancholy necessity of putting prisoners to death to terminate a similar practice on the part of their enemies; doubtless, in the general case, quarter should be given, but during the fury of a charge, or the tumult of an assault, it is universally felt by the experience of mankind, that a less humane rule must be followed. Every belligerent should usually adhere to the ordinary instruments of human destruction; but if your enemy fires red-hot shot, you are entitled to do the same. Russia herself acted on this principle in repelling, when still a neutral power, the aggressions of France; she authorized the seizure of all ships proceeding to France.—Lord Howick himself, in his letter to the Danish Minister, in relation to the Order of 7th January, clearly vindicated the justice, not only of his own measure (1), but of the more extensive measure, based on the same principles, which was ultimately adopted (2).

(1) Parl. Deb. x. 674, 971, and 975.

Able note of Lord Howick on this subject to the Danish Minister. "The French government, in adopting a measure at once so violent in itself, and so unjust in its consequences, committed a manifest act of aggression, though immediately levelled at Great Britain, against the rights of every state not engaged in the war, which, if not resisted on their part, must unavoidably deprive them of the privilege of fair neutrality, and suspend the operation of treaties formed for the protection of their rights in relation to Great Britain. The injury which would be sustained by

England, if she suffered her commerce with foreign nations to be thus interdicted, while that of the enemy with them should remain unmolested, is so manifest, that it can require no illustration. It never could have been supposed that his Majesty would submit to such an injury, waiting in patient acquiescence till France might think proper to attend to the slow and feeble remonstrances of neutral states, instead of resorting immediately to steps which might check the violence of the enemy and retort upon him the evils of his own injustice. Other powers would have had no right to complain, if, in consequence of this unparalleled aggression, the King had proceeded immediately to declare all the countries occupied by the enemy in a state of blockade, and to prohibit all trade in the produce of those coun-

"The Berlin Decree of 21st November is at once the foundation and the justification of the present proceeding. That decree declared the British Islands in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce, even in neutral ships, in the produce or manufactures of this country—it went so far as even to exclude the possibility of one neutral nation trading in safety with another. But it is said that this threatened blockade was not, in point of fact, carried into effect; and that, in some other less exceptionable mode, its consequences might have been avoided. But it is immaterial whether it was executed at sea or not; unquestionably it received execution, and the most rigorous execution, at land. Foreign ships were only enabled to come to this country with their foreign produce; they were not permitted, under the pain of confiscation, to take away our goods in return—and can it be said, that this is not a real execution?

"The French government justify, in the preamble of their decree, their proceedings on the previous proclamation of the late Administration in April 1806, which declared the coasts of the Channel in a state of blockade. But that is a mistake in point of fact, for in no one single instance did they declare either a harbour, or a coast containing several harbours, in a state of blockade, without having previously invested it. The coasts of the Channel, it is well known, when this blockade was declared, were so closely blockaded that not a praam could venture to leave the range of their own batteries without incurring the most imminent risk of capture. The French government, on the other hand, in their decree, declared this country in a state of blockade, not only without making any attempt to invest it, but without being able to send out a single vessel to endanger the neutral vessels who might attempt to violate their blockade. Therein lay the difference, the vital difference between the proceedings of the two countries: the British government declared coasts and rivers blockaded when their maritime force was so great, and so stationed, that the enemy themselves evinced their sense of the reality of the investment, by never venturing to leave their harbours; the French declared an imaginary blockade on the seas, and acted upon it in their condemnations on land, when they not only had not a single vessel at sea to maintain it, but their enemies were insulting them daily in their very harbours. Such a proceeding was as absurd as if England, without having a soldier on the continent, were to declare Bergen-op-Zoom or Lisle in a state of blockade, and act upon this order by seizing all goods belonging to citizens of those towns, wherever she could find them in neutral bottoms on the high seas.

"But it is said the neutral nations did not acquiesce in these decrees, and therefore we were not justified in retaliating in such a way as would affect their interests. Where then did they result? What followed the Berlin decree—did the three nations, whose next decree materially affected Denmark, Portugal, and America, either remonstrate or take up arms to compel its repeal? Not one of them did so. The Danish government, indeed, complained in strong terms of the British Order of 7th January 1807, but were com-

tries; for, as the French Decree itself expresses it, the law of nature justifies the employment against our enemies of the same arms which he himself makes use of. If third parties suffer from these measures, their demand for redress must be directed against that country which first violates the established usages of war, and the rights of neutral states. Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in taking advantage, for the neutral profit, of every

situation between the belligerents whereby advantage may be made, but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either, and particularly in so far restraining its trade to its accustomed trade in time of peace, as to prevent one belligerent enjoying the effect of the other's hostilities."—*Lord Hawke's Letter to Mr. Astor, 17th March, 1807. Parl. Deb. x. 403, 406.*

pletely silent on the previous and far stronger Berlin Decree of 21st November 1806, to obviate which alone it was issued. This temper savoured pretty strongly of the principle of the armed neutrality, which it has ever been the anxious wish of the Danish government to establish as the general law of the seas. Portugal was not to be blamed because she had no force at her command to make any resistance; and accordingly the port of Lisbon was made the well-known *entrepôt* for violating our Orders of 7th January, and restoring to the enemy, under neutral colours, all the advantages of a coasting trade. But America was completely independent of France, and has she done any thing to evince a repugnance to the French decree? When the corresponding decree of the French Directory was issued in 1798, it was noticed in the President's speech as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and such as could not be allowed to exist without subverting the independance of their country. What has America now done in relation to the Berlin Decree? Nothing; and that too although Napoléon himself announced his resolution to make no distinction between the United States and other neutrals in this particular, and acted upon this resolution in the Spanish decree issued on the 17th February, which contained no exception whatever in favour of the Transatlantic states. Having acquiesced in the violation of the law of nations in favour of one belligerent, America is bound, if she would preserve her neutral character, to show a similar forbearance in regard to the other.

"But it is said these orders are injurious to ourselves, even more than our enemies, and that they exclude us from a lucrative commerce we otherwise might have carried on in neutral bottoms, either by connivance or licenses with our enemies. Let it be recollected, however, that when these orders were issued, we were excluded from every harbour of Europe except those of Sweden and Sicily; and these answered what trade we could have carried on with the continental states, or what we can have lost by our retaliatory orders. It is in vain to pretend that these orders were never meant to be acted upon by Bonaparte, and that, but for our Orders in Council, they would have sunk into oblivion. Such a dereliction of a great object of settled policy is entirely at variance with the known character of the French Emperor and his profound hostility to this country, the ruling principle of his life. It is contradicted by every newspaper, which, before the Orders were issued, were full of the account of the seizure of English goods in every quarter of Europe; and by his unvarying state policy, which, in every pacification, and especially at Tilsit, made the rigorous exclusion of British goods the first step towards an accommodation (1)."

Upon a division, both Houses supported Ministers, in the upper by a majority of 127 to 61; in the lower by 214 to 94 (2).

In endeavouring, at the distance of thirty years, to form an impartial opinion on this most important subject, it must at once strike the most cursory observer, that the grounds on which this question were debated in the British Parliament, were not those on which its merits really rested, or on which they were placed by Napoléon at the time, and have been since argued by the continental historians. On both sides in England it was assumed that France was the first aggressor by the Berlin Decree, and that the only question was, whether the Orders in Council exceeded the just measure of retaliation, or were calculated to produce more benefit or injury to this country? Considered in this view, it seems impossible

Reflections
on this de-
bate and the
justice of the
Orders
in Council.

to deny that they were at least justifiable in point of legal principle, whatever they may have been with reference to political expedience. The able argument of Lord Howick to the Danish Minister is invincible on this subject (4). If an enemy adopts a new and unheard-of mode of warfare, which affects alike his opponent and neutral states, and they submit without resistance to this novel species of hostility, either from a feeling of terror or a desire of profit, they necessarily contract the obligation to be equally passive in regard to the measures of retaliation which the party so assailed may think it necessary to adopt. If they act otherwise, they lose the character of neutrality, and become the disguised, but often the most effective and the most valuable allies of the innovating belligerent.

But was the Berlin Decree the origin of the commercial warfare; or was it merely, as Napoléon and the French writers assert, a retaliation upon England, by the only means at the disposal of the French Emperor, for the new and illegal species of warfare which, in the pride of irresistible maritime strength, they had thought fit to adopt? That is the point upon which the whole question really depends; and yet, though put in the foremost rank by Napoléon, it was scarcely touched on by either party in the British Parliament. Nor is it difficult to see to what cause this extraordinary circumstance was owing; both the great parties which divide that assembly were desirous of avoiding that question; the Whigs, because the measure complained of by Napoléon, and on which the Berlin Decree was justified by the French government, had been mainly adopted by Mr. Fox, and subsequently extended by Lord Howick; the Tories, because they were unwilling to cast any doubt on the exercise of maritime powers, in their opinion of essential importance to this country, and which gave them the great advantage of having their political adversaries necessarily compelled to support the general principle on which the measures in question had been founded.

Compara-
tive blame
attaching to
each party.

History, however, must disregard all these temporary considerations, and in good faith approach the question, whether, in this great debate, England or France was the real aggressor. And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found, that there were faults on both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant violation of the law of nations was committed by Napoléon; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British islands in a state of blockade—a proceeding similar to what it would have been, had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strasburg or Magdeburg. Most certainly, also, the resolution of the French Emperor to reduce England, by means of a Continental System, had been formed long before the blockade of the French coasts in April 1806, by Mr. Fox; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the British historian must lament, that the English government had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only by issuing, in May 1806, the blockade of the French coasts of the Channel. True, this was any thing rather than a mere paper blockade; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence; true, it was so effective, that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their batteries: still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred

miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war; and which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the measure in return which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account, as the French Emperor.

Retractions on their policy. In regard to the policy of the Orders in Council, there is perhaps less difficulty in forming a decided opinion. It was foretold at the time, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that in the mutual attempt to starve each other out, the manufacturing state, the commercial emporium, would of necessity be more exposed to suffering than the nations with whom she carried on mercantile transactions, on the same principle on which a besieged town must, in the end, be always reduced by the concentric fire of a skilful assailant. The ruin and suffering on the one side is accumulated on a single spot, or within a narrow compass; on the other it is spread over an extensive surface; the sum total of distress may be, and probably will be equal on both sides; but how wide the difference between the garrison which sustains it all on a single breach, or a few hospitals, and the army without, which repairs its losses by the resources of a great empire. Sound policy, therefore, recommended, on the commencement of this novel and dangerous species of hostility, the adoption of a system on the part of Great Britain which should bind more closely the cords which united her to the few remaining neutrals of the world; and which, by opening up new markets for her produce in states beyond the reach of the French Emperor, might enable her to bid defiance to the accumulated hostility of all the nations who were subjected to his control. This important subject, however, will more properly come under consideration in a subsequent volume, when the practical operation of the Continental System, and the Orders in Council for several years, is to be developed; and the able arguments on the part of the English Opposition are recounted, which, together with the multiplied complaints of the neutral powers, and the abandonment of the Continental System by Napoléon, at length brought about their repeal.

Jessie's Mark bill in England. April 7, 1808. There is one measure on the part of the British government connected with commercial transactions, however, on which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr. Perceval, and which passed both Houses of Parliament (1), for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took with it a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy of the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance, or violence on the part of the enemy, should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war not on the French Emperor, but the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Safety had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed (2), which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilized warfare (3). But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides, by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an overwhelming, and in some in-

(1) In the Lords, by a majority of 110 to 44; in the Commons, by 92 to 29.—*Parl. Deb.* x. 1170 and 1325.

(2) *Ante*, ii. 254.

(3) *Parl. Deb.* x. 1323-5; 1168-70.

stances, mistaken feeling of state necessity led men to commit many actions foreign alike to their usual principles and previous conduct.

Vast ultimate effects of the Continental System.

Long as the preceding disquisition on the Continental System and the Orders in Council has been, it will not, to those who consider the importance of the subject, appear misplaced. It relates to the ruling principle, the grand object of Napoléon's life; one which he pursued with a degree of perseverance with which no other object was followed, and which, by imposing on him the necessity of general obedience, left him no other alternative but universal empire or total ruin. As such, it is closely linked with the attack on Spain and Portugal, and the long-continued carnage of the Peninsular war; the seizure of the Roman States, and incorporation of the ecclesiastical dominions by the successor of Charlemagne; the incorporation of the ephemeral kingdom of Holland with the great empire; in fine, the grand invasion of Russia in 1812, and the unspeakable horrors of the Moscow campaign. In the history of Napoléon, more perhaps than that of any other man that ever existed, the close connexion between one criminal act and another, and the irresistible force of the moral law by which the audacious in wickedness are impelled from one deed of darkness to those which succeed it, till a just retribution awaits them in the natural consequences of their own iniquities, is clearly evinced. The lustre of his actions, the bright effulgence of his glory, has shed an imperishable light over every step of his eventful career; and that mysterious connexion between crime and punishment, which in most men is concealed by the obscurity of their lives, and can only be guessed at from the result, or believed from the moral laws of the universe, is there set forth, link by link, in the brightest and most luminous colours (1). The grandeur of his intellect precludes the idea of any cause having co-operated in his fall but the universal and irresistible laws of nature; and the first capacity of modern times was subjected to the most memorable reverse, as if to demonstrate the utter inability of the greatest human strength to combat the simple law which brings upon the impetuous prodigal the consequences of his actions.

Introduction of the system of licenses.

It is observed by Dr. Johnson, that no man ever rose to supreme power among men, in whom great qualities were not combined with certain meannesses which would be deemed inconceivable in ordinary men. Never was the truth of this singular but just remark more clearly evinced than by Napoléon on this great subject of the Continental System. While it was the great object of his life from this period—while it was the secret key to all his negotiations, all his wars, and all his conquests—while, to enforce its rigorous execution, he put all the forces of Christendom in motion, and hurled the strength of the south in desperate fury at the power of the north, he himself was the first to set the example of the evasion of his own decrees, and for a temporary profit to himself to establish a system which, in a great degree, subverted the whole objects for which these mighty risks and sacrifices were undergone. Many months had not elapsed, after the publication of the Berlin decree, before it was discovered that a lucrative source of revenue might be opened up, by granting, at exorbitant prices, licenses to import British colonial produce and manufactures; and though this was done under the obligation of exporting French or continental produce to an equal amount, this condition soon became illusory. Old silks, satins, and velvets, which had completely gone out of fashion, were bought

(1) Quanto vita illius preclatior ita socordia flagitiosior est. Et profecto ita se res habet, majorem

gloria posterioris lumen est, neque bona verum mala eorum in occulto patitur.—*Sall. Bel. Jug.*

ap at fictitious prices, and when the vessels which took them on board were clear of the French coasts, thrown into the sea, and rich cargoes of English goods brought back in return; and such were the exorbitant prices at which they were sold, that they yielded a very handsome profit to the merchants, an enormous ransom to the Emperor for the licenses, and defraying the cost of all the French goods which were lost to give a colour to the transactions. British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant height, and as a natural consequence, they became the fashion and the object of universal desire. A pair of cotton stockings were sold for six or seven shillings, and worn by ladies, and in dress, in preference to the finest silk; sugar was soon five shillings, coffee ten shillings a-pound. Such enormous prices excited the cupidity alike of those who were engaged in promoting, and those whose duty it was to repress, the contraband traffic; the vast profits of such cargoes as could be sold, on any terms, compensated the loss of several in the perilous undertaking; and fiscal corruption, taking example from the open sale of licenses at the Tuileries, seized every opportunity of realizing a temporary profit from the sufferings of the people (1).

England was not slow in following the example thus set by the French Emperor. Even more dependent than her great antagonist on the disposal of the national produce, the British government gladly availed themselves of a system which promised to mitigate, in so important a particular, the severity of the continental blockade, and restore, under the safeguard of Imperial licenses, the wonted encouragement of European wealth to British industry. Thence arose a system on both sides, the most extraordinary and inconsistent that ever existed upon earth. While the two governments were daily carrying on their commercial warfare with increased virulence; while Napoléon was denouncing the punishment of *death* against every government functionary who should connive in any way at the introduction of British merchandise (2); and consigning to the flames all the bales of English manufactures that could be discovered by fiscal cupidity in all the extensive dominions subjected to his control; while these terrible severities were carried into rigorous execution wherever his influence reached, and piles of British goods were frequently burnt in the public market-places of all the chief continental cities, and unhappy wretches shot for conniving at the lucrative contraband traffic in the forbidden articles (3); while the English Court of Admiralty was daily con-

Extension of
the decree
on both sides
by the vast
extension of
this system.

Nov. 18, 1810.

Aug. 27.

(1) Bour. vii. 232, 237.

The following instance will illustrate the mode in which the love of gain, in all the Imperial functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, counteracted all the state objects of the Berlin Decree. The English, in the summer of 1807, had made themselves masters of Heligoland, from whence enormous quantities of British produce were smuggled into Holstein, from whence they were conveyed, at a charge of from 33 to 40 per cent, within the French custom-house line. This regular traffic being well known to the Imperial authorities, and probably secretly connived at by them for a share of its enormous profits, Bourrienne, then the French resident at Hamburg, represented to Napoléon, that he had much better at once authorize the trade on these terms, and realize for himself this contraband profit. Napoléon adopted the proposal, and, in consequence, 60,000,000 worth of English produce (L.2,400,000) was, in 1811, imported openly into that town alone, at a profit of 33 per cent to the Emperor? The same system was soon after adopted in Prussia, but notwithstanding this relaxation, the legions of dou-

niers and coast-guards who were quartered on the country were so prodigious that they were of necessity in part lodged in the public prisons and hospitals, and the unhappy captives and patients crowded into confined and unhealthy corners.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 237, 238, 240.

(2) The Imperial Decree November 18, 1810, created provost-marshal for the summary punishment of all customhouse officers, carriers, coach-guards, tide-waiters, and others engaged in repressing illicit commerce, and authorized them to pronounce and carry into instant execution the most severe and infamous punishments, including death, without appeal or respite of any kind.—*Moniteur*, 18th Nov. 1810 and MONTGAILLARD, vii. 54.

(3) At Hamburg, in 1811, under the government of Davoust, an unhappy father of a family was shot, for having introduced into his house a little sugar loaf, of which his family stood in need; and at that very moment, perhaps, Napoléon was signing a license for the importation of a million such loaves. Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, and the government carried it on with the

demning merchant vessels which had contravened the Orders in Council, and issuing the strictest injunctions to its cruisers to carry them into full execution, both governments were the first to set the example of the open and undisguised violation of the very decrees, to which they required such implicit obedience in others. British licenses were openly sold at the public offices in London, and became the vehicles of an immense commerce with the Continent; and Napoléon at length carried the system of authorizing this illicit traffic to such a height, that by a decree issued from Antwerp in July 25, 1810. July 1810, it was expressly declared, "subsequent to the first August no vessel shall issue from any of our ports, bound for any foreign port, without being furnished with a license, signed with our own hand (1)." Thus the Continental System, and the retaliatory measures of the Orders in Council, were mutually abandoned by the government, on both sides, though rigorously exacted as the first of public duties from their subjects; the whole prohibitions of the Orders in Council disappeared before the magic of a writing from Downing Street, and the boasted *grande pensée* of Napoléon degenerated into a mere pretext for exacting, under the name of licenses, an immense annual profit for the behoof of the Great Imperial Smuggler in the Tuileries. To such a height was this practice carried by the French Emperor, that it opened up new channels of commerce to British industry, quite equal, on the continent of Europe, to those his Decree had destroyed; and the suffering experienced in England during the continuance of the Continental System was almost entirely owing, not to this Berlin Decree, but to the loss of the great North American market, which the Orders in Council ultimately closed against British industry. Thus, in this the greatest measure of his life, on which he staked his influence, his fame, his throne, the mighty intellect of Napoléon was governed by the same regard to inferior interests which prompted the Dutch, in former times, to sell ammunition and provisions at an exorbitant rate to the inhabitants of a town besieged by their armies; resolved, at all events, to make profit by their hostilities, and if they could not reduce their enemies to subjection, at least realize an usurious profit from their necessities. To such a length did the license system proceed under the Imperial government, that it constituted a principal source of the private revenue of the Emperor; and we have the authority of Napoléon himself for the assertion, that the treasure thus accumulated, in hard specie, in the vaults of the Tuileries, amounted, at the opening of the Russian war in 1812, to the enormous and unprecedented sum of four hundred million francs, or above sixteen millions sterling (2).

Universal
Joy at Na-
poléon's re-
turn to
Paris. 27th
July

The return of Napoléon to Paris, after the glorious termination of the Polish campaign, diffused an universal enchantment. Never, since the commencement of the Revolution, had the triumph of their arms been so glorious, and never had the French people such universal cause for exultation. No commercial crisis had brought the treasury to the brink of ruin, as at the close of the campaign at Austerlitz; no

greatest scale; the same regulations filled the European prisons with victims, and the Imperial coffers with riches.—BOUASSIER, vii. 233-234.

(1) Mart, Sup., v. 512.

(2) Las Cas. iv. 115.

The accounts and details of this immense treasure were all entered in a little book kept by the Emperor's private treasurer; and no part of them appeared in the public accounts of the nation or the armies. The greater part of it was drawn out and applied to the necessities of the state during the disasters of 1813 and 1814, and in this resource is to

be found one great cause of the stand made by him against the forces of combined Europe in those memorable years. As the expenses of the state always exceeded the income under Napoléon's government, and the contributions levied by the armies, how vast soever, were all absorbed in the cost of their maintenance, this secret fund must have been chiefly, if not entirely, realized from the sale of licenses, and its great amount furnishes an index to the extent to which that traffic was carried.—See LAS CAS, iv. 115. by Google

gloomy presentiments of a future desperate war in the North, as at Jena, alloyed the buoyancy of their present transports. The great contests appeared to be over; the forces of the South and the North had been brought into collision, and the latter had been discomfited; the strength of Russia, instead of an inveterate antagonist, had been converted into the firmest support of the French empire; and, emerging from all the gloom and darkness of a Polish winter, the star of Napoléon again appeared resplendent in the zenith. Their standards had been advanced in triumph to the Niemen; the strength of Prussia was to all appearance irrevocably broken; Austria had been throughout overawed; Russia at last defeated. No power of the Continent seemed to be longer capable of withstanding the French Emperor; for the forces of Sweden, far removed from the theatre of European strife, would soon, it was foreseen, be compelled to yield to the domineering influence of Alexander. England alone maintained, with unconquerable resolution, the maritime contest: but the very greatness of the triumphs of the two hostile powers on their respective elements precluded, to all appearance, the possibility of their being brought into collision; and, like land and sea monsters, the Colossus of the earth and of the deep regarded each other with fruitless rage and impotent fury (1).

Slavish adulation of the orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.

So unprecedented a series of triumphs might have turned the heads of a nation less passionately devoted than the French to military glory, and it will excuse much in the way of flourishing declamation. But the oratorical effusions of the public bodies in France, went beyond every allowable limit. Theirs was not the exultation of freemen, but the adulation of slaves; and the classical scholar recognised with pain, in their studied flowers, the well-known language of Byzantine servitude. Already it had become evident that the passions of the Revolution, withdrawn from their original objects, had become wholly centred on military aggrandizement; and that the generous glow of freedom, chilled by suffering or extinguished by disappointment, was wholly absorbed in selfish ambition—the grave in every age of durable liberty. “We cannot adequately praise your Majesty,” said Lacépède, the President of the Senate: “your glory is too dazzling; those only who are placed at the distance of posterity can appreciate its immense elevation.” “The only *éloge* worthy of the Emperor,” said the President of the Court of Cassation, “is the simple narrative of his reign; the most unadorned recital of what he has wished, thought, and executed, of their effects (2), past, present, and to come.” “The conception,” said Count de Fabre, a senator, “which the mother of Napoléon received in her bosom, could only have flowed from *Divine inspiration*.”

Great fête in honour of the Grand Army, 25th Nov.

Shortly after the return of the Emperor, a military spectacle of the most animating and imposing kind took place in the French capital. The Imperial Guard made its entry in state into Paris, amidst an enthusiasm and transport, which can hardly be imagined by any but those, who were eyewitnesses to the vehemence of the military ardour which in France had succeeded to the passions of the Revolution. A triumphal arch was erected on the road to Mayence, at a considerable distance from Paris, from which, to the capital, the way was thronged by innumerable spectators: in brilliant order and proud array the Guard marched, through a double file of soldiers, by the Port St.-Martin to the Tuileries, where they defiled under the new triumphal arch, opened for the first time on that day.

(1) Savary, iii. Dum. xix. 138. Mont. vi. 278. Bign. vi. 400.

(2) Montg. vi. 275.

There they deposited their eagles in the Palace—they piled their arms, and then passed through the gardens of the Tuileries to the Champs-Élysées, when they sat down to a repast laid with ten thousand covers. The animating strains of the military bands, which made the air resound along the whole length of this magnificent procession; the majestic aspect of the soldiers, who were almost all picked men, bronzed by service, but undaunted in aspect; the admirable discipline which they preserved, and the recollection of their recent glorious exploits, with the renown of which the world resounded, filled every heart with transport. In the evening the theatres were all opened gratis; universal delirium prevailed. It was spectacles of this heart-stirring kind, intermingled with the astonishing external triumphs which he achieved, which gave Napoléon his magical influence over the French people, and makes them still look back to his reign, notwithstanding the numberless calamities with which it was at last attended, as a brilliant spot in existence, the recollection of which obliterates all the remembrance of later times, and fixes every eye by a glow of almost insupportable brightness (1).

Suppression
of the
French Tri-
bunate, 16th
Aug.

Napoléon, seeing his advantage, took the favourable opportunity which this burst of enthusiastic feeling afforded, to eradicate the last remnants of popular institutions from the constitution. In the speech which he addressed to the Legislative Body on his return from Poland, he announced his intention "of simplifying and bringing to perfection the national institutions." It soon appeared what was in contemplation: the "simplifying" consisted in the destruction of the only remaining relic of democratic power; the "bringing to perfection," in vesting the whole powers of legislation in a Council of State, presided over by the Emperor, and composed entirely of persons paid by government, and appointed by himself. It has been already mentioned (2), that by the existing constitution three public bodies were required to concur in the formation of the laws: the Council of State, the members of which were richly endowed, and all appointed by the Emperor: the Tribune, in which they were discussed and approved of, and the members of which, though also in the receipt of salaries from government, were, to a certain degree, dependent on popular election: and the Legislative Body, which, without enjoying the privilege of debate, listened in silence to the pleadings of the orators appointed by the Council of State, for the measures proposed by government and those of the Tribune, either for or against their adoption. But notwithstanding the influence of the Emperor over a legislature thus in a great part appointed, and wholly paid by himself, the debates in the Tribune occasionally assumed a freedom which displeased him; and, while he was willing to allow any latitude in argument to the discussions in the Council of State, addressed to himself or his confidential advisers, he could not tolerate public harangues in another assembly, calculated to arouse extraneous or controlling influence, or revive in any form the passions of the Revolution. For these reasons, he resolved on the entire suppression of the Tribune, which, having been already reduced from a hundred to fifty members, and stripped by imperial influence of its most distinguished orators, had lost much of its consideration; and on the elevation of the age requisite for admission into the Legislative Body to forty from thirty years, a period of life when it might be presumed that much of the fervour in support of political innovation would be extinguished. The previous discussion on the laws proposed by government, which alone en-

(1) Thib. vi. 247, 248.

(2) *Ante*, iii. 330.

joyed the power of bringing them forward, was appointed to take place in three commissions, chosen from the Legislative Body by the Emperor; but their debates were not to be made public. Thus was a final blow given to popular influence in France, and the authority of the executive rendered absolute in the legislature, as it had long been in the other departments of government, just eighteen years after it had been established, amidst such universal transports, by the Constituent Assembly (1).

Slovenish submission with which this change was received in France.

What effect did this important change, which annihilated all the objects for which the Revolution had been commenced, and restored government to a despotic form, more strict and powerful than that of the old monarchy, produce in France? Did it convulse that enthusiastic empire to its centre, and revive again the terrible democratic fervour of 1789? Did clubs reappear, and popular ambition arise from its ashes, and the stern virtue of the old patriots obliterate the more modern illusions of military glory? It did none of these things; it was hardly noticed amidst the blaze of the Emperor's triumphs; it did not excite a murmur, or awaken an expression of discontent from Calais to the Pyrenees. Numbers of pamphlets appeared on the subject, but they were all in warm and earnest commendation of the change; one would have supposed that two centuries, instead of eighteen years, had rolled over the head of the nation; that the days of Mirabeau and Danton had passed into the vaults of forgotten time; that the transports of Gracchus had melted away into the servility of Constantinople. The very body which was to be annihilated was the first to lick the hand which was destroying it; if liberty arose in France amidst the tears of suffering and by the light of conflagration, it expired amidst the servility of eunuchs and the adulation of the East. When the fatal decree was read in the hall of the Tribunate, thunders of applause shook the walls, and Carrion Nisas, a member of that body, and cousin of Cambacérés, exclaimed, "This communication has been accompanied with so many expressions of esteem and affection, on the part of our sovereign, for his faithful subjects in the Tribunate; these assurances are of such inestimable importance, they have been brought forward with so much lustre, that I am sure, gentlemen, I am the organ of your sentiments when I propose that we should lay at the foot of the throne, as the last act of our honourable existence, an address which may impress the people with the idea that we have received the act of the Senate, without regret at the termination of our political existence, without disquietude for the destinies of our country, and that the sentiments of love

(1) De Stoll, *Dix ans d'Em.* 37, 38. Moutq. vi. 217, 218. Bign. vi. 398. Priet, 150, 153.

The project of extinguishing the Tribunate had been long entertained by Napoleon. In the Council of State, on 1st December, 1803, he said:—"Before many years have elapsed, it will probably be advisable to unite the Tribunate to the Legislative body, by transferring its powers to committees of the Litter Assembly. The Senate, too feebly constituted in the outset, will require some strengthening. The other legislative bodies have no consistency; none of them could secure the nation from becoming the prey of a cohort of bores who may have four thousand men at his disposal. The only institutions which offer any security to the public safety are the Senate and Medocral Colleges." "The Legislative Body," said he, on 29th March, 1806, "should be composed of individuals, who, after the termination of their public services, have some private fortune to fall back upon, without the necessity of giving them a pension for their subsistence. Nevertheless, there are every year sixty legislators dis-

charged from the Legislative Body, whom you know not what to make of: those who are not in office carry back nothing but ill-humour to the departments. I would wish to see these proprietors of a certain age, married, attached by the bond either of children or some fortune, to the public welfare. These men would come annually to Paris, would speak to the Emperor, and live in his circle, and return to their departments illuminated with the slender share of his lustre which had fallen on their heads. The public functionaries should also be members of the Legislative Body: you cannot render the legislature too manageable; if it becomes so strong as to be seized with the desire of ruling, it would destroy the executive, or be destroyed by it." See *PARR*, 148, 152—an able and authentic brief record of the discussions in the Council of State, at which the Emperor presided, and his opinions on the most important subjects of government; of which an accurate and valuable translation has just been published by Mr. Cadell at Edinburgh, executed by the author's valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.

and devotion to the monarch which animated our body; will live for ever in the breasts of all its members." The address was voted by acclamation, and these sentiments found a responsive echo in the Legislative Assembly. Its president, Fontanes, said, in the name of the whole body, "The majesty of the National Assembly is about to revive under the auspices of a great man; these walls, which once resounded with so much clamour, were astonished at their silence, and that silence is about to terminate. Popular tempests shall no longer roll there: they will be succeeded by wise and temperate discussions. He who has enchained the demon of faction, no longer desires that voices respectful but free should be banished from these walls. Let us show ourselves worthy of such a gift: let the Tribune reappear without its storms; let truth shine there in its native lustre, mingled with the radiance of wisdom. A great prince must love its *éclat*; it alone can fitly illuminate his path. What has he to fear from it? the more he is regarded, the more majestic he appears; the more he is scrutinized, the more subjects of admiration are discovered." These extravagant sallies excited no general burst of indignation; they were silently read in the *Moniteur*; and the Tribunate, the last relic of freedom, sunk unheeded into the grave (4). "When the citizens," says Rousseau, "fallen into servitude, enjoy neither liberty nor the power of choice, terror and selfishness convert their suffrages into acclamations—deliberation is at an end; every one adores in public, or execrates in private. Such was the manner in which the Senate was regarded under the Roman Emperors (2)." How little did the eloquent apostle of freedom anticipate another confirmation of the same remark, from the very people whom his fervent declamations had roused to such unanimous enthusiasm in the cause of liberty.

Establishment of a censorship of the press
27th Sept

The complete success of this great infringement on the only remaining popular part of the constitution, encouraged Napoléon to undertake still more decisive measures against the liberties of the people. Six weeks after, an Imperial decree, professing to establish the freedom of the press, in reality annihilated it, by enacting that no bookseller was to publish any work without its having previously received the sanction of the censors of the press! The same restriction had previously been imposed on journals and periodical publications; so that, from this time forward down to the fall of Napoléon, no thought could be published to the world without having previously received the sanction of the Imperial authorities. Under the active administration and vigilant police of the empire, these powers were so constantly and rigorously exercised, that not only was the whole information on political subjects or public affairs, which was permitted to reach the people, strained through the Imperial filters, but all passages were expunged from every work which had a tendency, however remote, to nourish independent sentiments, or foster a feeling of discontent with the existing government. So far was this carried, that when the Allies entered France in 1814, they found a large proportion of the inhabitants ignorant of the battle of Trafalgar. The years of the empire are an absolute blank in French literary annals in all matters relating to government, political thought, or moral sentiment. The journals were filled with nothing but the exploits of the Emperor, the treatises by which he deigned to enlighten the minds of his subjects on the affairs of state, or the adulatory

(1) "The change," says Bignon, "in the age of eligibility to the Legislative Body, and even the suppression of the Tribunate, now so important in our eyes, were hardly thought of in 1807; and so little was public opinion regarded, that the former

change was introduced by the sole authority of the Emperor, without the concurrence of any of the legislative bodies."—BIGNON, vi. 308—9.

(2) MONTG. vi. 277, 230. BIGN. vi. 307, 309.

addresses presented to him from all parts of his dominions: the pamphlets and periodicals of the metropolis breathed only the incense of refined flattery, or the vanity of Eastern adulation. Talent in literature took no other direction but that pointed out by the Imperial authorities; genius sought to distinguish itself only by new and more extravagant kinds of homage. The press, so far from being the safeguard of the people against these evils, became their greatest promoter by exerting all its powers on the side of despotism. Whoever attentively considers the situation of France, the most enlightened monarchy of Europe, and so recently teeming with democratic fervour, during the ten years of the Imperial government, will at once perceive the groundless nature of the common doctrine that the press is, under all circumstances, the bulwark of liberty, and that despotism is impossible where it exists. They will rather concur in the opinion of Madame de Staël, that the effect which this mighty instrument produces, is entirely dependent on the power which gains possession of its resources; that it is only in a peculiar state of the public mind, and when a certain balance exists between political parties, that it is exerted beneficially on the side of freedom, and that at other periods, or under the influence of more corrupted feelings, it may become the instrument of the most immovable popular or Imperial despotism which ever was riveted upon mankind (1).

(1) Montg. v. 222. De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 331, 332.

Identity of the Imperial tyranny of Napoleon, and the democratic tyranny of America. Observe the picture of the identity of the effects of the press under the Imperial despotism of Napoleon, and the democratic tyranny of the majority in the American Union, as delineated by two masters, Madame de Staël and M. de Tocqueville.—“This police, for which we cannot find terms adequately contemptuous, was the instrument which Bonaparte made use of to direct public opinion in France; and in truth when there is no such thing as the freedom of the press, and the censors of the press, not confining themselves to erasing, dictate to writers of every description the opinions they are to advance on every subject of politics, religion, manners, books, and individual character, it may be conceived into what state a nation must fall which has no other nutriment for its thoughts but such as a despotic authority permits. It is not surprising, therefore, that French literature and criticism descended to the lowest point during the empire. The restrictions on the press were far less severe under Louis XIV than Napoleon. The profound saying, ‘Paper will receive any thing,’ never received a more appalling illustration. The journals were filled only with addresses to the Emperor, with his journeys, those of the Princes and Princesses of his family, the etiquettes and presentations at court. They discovered the art of being tame and lifeless at the epoch of the world’s overturn; and but for the official bulletins which from time to time let us know that half the world was conquered, one might have believed that the age was one only of roses and flowers, and sought for weeds in vain but those which the ruling powers let fall on their prostrate subjects. A few courageous individuals published books without the censorship of the press, and what was the consequence?—the impression was seized, and themselves persecuted, banished, or shot like the unhappy Fehn. Such terrible examples spread such an universal terror, that submission became universal. Of all the grievances which the slavery of the press produced, perhaps the most bitter was the daily spectacle of those we held most dear insulted or reviled in the journals or works published by author-

ity, without the possibility of making a reply, over half of Europe.”—De STAËL, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 377, 383.

So far Madame de Staël, in painting the perversion of the press to the purposes of despotism in Imperial France; mark now the picture of its operation in America, under the unrestrained sway of a numerical majority of electors. “Among the immense crowd,” says Tocqueville, “who, in the United States, take to the career of politics, I have met with few men who possess that independence of thought, that manly candour, which characterised the Americans in their war of independence. You would say, on the contrary, that all their minds are formed on the same model, so exactly do they adopt the same opinions. I have sometimes met with true patriotism among the people, but rarely among their rulers. This is easily explained.—Supreme power ever corrupts and depraves its servants before it has irrecoverably tainted its possessors. The courtiers in America, indeed, do not say *Sire!* your Majesty! Mighty difference. But they speak without intermission of the natural intelligence of their many-headed sovereign; they attribute to him every virtue and capacity under Heaven; they do not give him their wives and daughters to make his mistresses—but by sacrificing their opinions, they prostitute themselves to his service? What revolts the mind of an European in America, is not the extreme liberty which prevails, but the slender guarantee which exists against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers from injustice in the United States from the majority, to whom is he to apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It is elected by the majority. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and is the mere executor of its wishes. How cruel or unjust soever may be the stroke which injures you, redress is impossible, and submission unavoidable. I know no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion, as in America. The majority raises such formidable barriers to liberty of opinion, that it is impossible to pass them; within them an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if ever he step beyond them. In democratic states,

Banishment
of Madame
de Staël and
Madame
Recamier.

Under the combined influence of the entire suppression of the liberty of the press and the unwearied activity of Imperial censors and police agents, every approach even to a free discussion on public affairs, or the principles either of government or social prosperity, was stifled in France and its dependent monarchies, and one-half of Europe, in the opening of the nineteenth century, and the close of a struggle for extended privileges and universal information, was brought back to a darkness more profound than that of the middle ages. Never did Papal ambition draw so close the fetters on human thought as Imperial France; the Jesuits were not such active agents in the extension of spiritual, as the police were in the establishment of temporal power. Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier were illustrious instances that the jealousy of the Imperial government could not be relaxed even by the most brilliant or captivating qualities of the other sex. The former, long the object of Napoléon's hostility, from the vigour of her understanding and the fearlessness of her conduct, was at first banished forty leagues from Paris, then confined to her château on the lake of Geneva, where she dwelt many years, seeking in vain, in the discharge of every filial duty to her venerable father, to console herself for the loss of the brilliant intellectual society of Paris. At length the rigour of the *espionnage* became such, that she fled in disguise through the Tyrol to Vienna, and hunted out thence by the French agents, continued her route through Poland into Muscovy, where she arrived shortly before the invasion of 1812, happy to find in the dominions of the Imperial autocrat that freedom which old Europe could no longer afford. Her immortal work on Germany was seized by the orders of the police, and consigned to the flames; and France owes the preservation of one of the brightest jewels in her literary coronet to the fortuitous concealment of one copy from the myrmidons of Savary. The world has no cause to regret the severity of Napoléon to the illustrious exile, whatever his biographer may have; for to it we owe the *Dix Années d'Exil*, the most admirable of her moral sketches; the three volumes on Germany, the most eloquent of her critical dissertations; and the profound views on the British Constitution, with which she has enriched her great work on the French Revolution. Madame Recamier shared the rigours of Napoléon from her generous attention to her persecuted friend; a transient visit of a few days to Coppet, was the pretence for including her also in the sentence of banishment; the graces which had won the admiration of all Europe, and which had disdained the advances of the Emperor himself (1), were consigned, in a distant province, to the privacy of rural retirement, and the ruler of the East and West deemed himself insecure on the throne of Charlemagne, unless the finest genius then in Eu-

organized on the principles of the American Republics, the authority of the majority is so absolute, so irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he means to stray from the track which it lays down. If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event will arise from the unlimited tyranny of the majority; anarchy will be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism." To the same purpose is the opinion of President Jefferson, the ablest advocate for democratic principles that ever appeared in the United States—"The executive power," says he, "is not the chief danger to be feared; the tyranny of the legislature is the danger most to be feared." What testimonies from such minds, to the identity of the effect so long observed by political writers, by unrestrained

power, whether in an absolute despot or an irresponsible numerical majority; and of the necessity of establishing the foundations of the breakwater which is to curb the force of either Imperial or democratic despotism in another element than that by which its own waves are agitated! And how remarkable a confirmation of the profound remark long ago made by Aristotle, that *oligarchies and democracies not only bear a strong resemblance to each other, but are in fact the same men, varying only in their external character according to the ruling power which they severally worship!*—See *Tocqueville's*, *De l'Amérique*, ii. 145, 146, 156, 157; *Jeffer-son's Correspondence*, iv. 452; and *Azarenza de Pol.* c. 27.

(1) *D'Abr. xiii.* 124. Google

rope, and the most beautiful woman in France, were exiled from his dominions (1).

Judges are
restored
responsible
at pleasure.
22nd Oct.

Another decree of the Senate soon after inflicted a mortal wound on the independence of the judicial establishment, by enacting that their commissions for life should not be delivered to them till after five years' previous service, and then only on the condition that their conduct had been entirely satisfactory to the Emperor. He reserved to himself the exclusive power of judging on the continuance or dismissal of every judicial functionary, from the highest to the lowest, with the aid of commissioners, appointed and exclusively directed by himself. From this time, the independence of the bench over the whole French empire was totally destroyed and practically every judge held his office during the pleasure merely of the Emperor. Several instances of arbitrary dismissal of judges, if they pronounced decrees disagreeable to government, took place; but they were less frequent than might have been expected, from the universal spirit of slavish submission which seized the magistrates of every grade, and rendered them not merely, during the whole reign of Napoléon, the servile instruments of his will, but led them formally, after his fall, to invoke the re-establishment of despotic power (2).

Decree de-
crees against
very recent
venue at
English
commerce.

Following up the same arbitrary system, it was enacted by an Imperial decree on January 11th, that not only should every seaman or passenger on board a vessel arriving in any harbour of France who should declare that it came from an English harbour, or been searched by English cruisers, receive a third of the value of the vessel or cargo, but that every public functionary who should connive in the slightest degree at the infringement of any of the decrees against English commerce, should be brought before the Criminal Court of the Department of the Seine, which was erected into a tribunal for that special purpose, and indicted for *high treason*. Bales of English goods, of great extent, were publicly burnt in all the chief cities of the countries which directly or indirectly acknowledged the French influence; and at the moment that the unhappy owners were begging from the executioners a few shreds which the flames had spared, to cover their children from the inclemency of the weather, the Emperor, by means of licenses, was daily carrying on an extensive commerce in these very articles, and amassing enormous sums at the Tuileries by the sale of the right to deal in those goods which brought death to any inferior functionary (3).

Meanwhile, the thirst for public employment in France, always great

(1) De Staël, *Dix Années d'Exil*, 74, 75, 177, 191.
M. Rev. Franc. II. 309.

Napoléon's jealousy of Madame Récamier's beauty and influence carried him to still more unjustifiable lengths. Her husband, who was a great banker in Paris, became bankrupt, and he seriously proposed in the Council of State, that she should be subjected to a joint responsibility with him for the debts of the bank! "I am of opinion," said he, "that in case of bankruptcy, the wife should be deprived of all her conjugal rights; because our manners sanction the principle, that a wife must follow the fortune of her husband, and that would deprive her of all inducement to make him continue his extravagances." "The class of bankers," says Fœt, the impartial reporter of these important debates, "always excited the Emperor's jealousy, because they were an independent class who had no need of the government, while the government often stood in need of their assistance. Besides that, in wishing to render Madame Récamier responsible for her husband's

debts, he was actuated by a special spite against that celebrated lady. The little court with which she was surrounded, on account of her incomparable beauty, excited his jealousy as much as the talents of Madame de Staël. Elevated as he was above all others, he could not see, without pain, that she shared with him the public attention. He was more irritated by it than he would have been by a decided opposition to his government. Even the celebrity of M. Gall, and his well-known system of craniology, excited his jealousy; he could not endure that he should be more talked of than himself."—*Palmer, Opinion de Napoléon dans le Conseil d'Etat*, 261. The well-known story in Boswell of Goldsmith, at Antwerp, taking the pot, because two handsome young ladies at the window of the inn excited more attention than himself, is nothing to this.—See Boswell's *Johnson*.

(2) Montg. vi. 282, 283.

(3) Montg. vi. 299. De Staël, *Rev. Franc.* II. 251.

among that energetic and aspiring people, rose to a perfect mania. The energy of the Revolution, the ardent passion for individual elevation which constituted its secret but main spring, was now wholly turned into that channel, and by a change of circumstances, remarkable indeed, but not unnatural, the same desire which, when revolutionary elevation was practicable, convulsed all the nation with democratic fervour, now that count favour was the only avenue to promotion, led to the extremity of Oriental obsequiousness. The prefects, who had the patronage of all the numerous government offices within their jurisdictions, held a court, and exercised an influence equal to that of petty sovereigns; the ministers of state were besieged with innumerable applications for every office which fell vacant; the Emperor himself received hundreds of petitions for every situation in his gift, from the highest to the lowest. All ranks, classes, and parties, concurred in this selfish struggle; the old noblesse, with a few honourable exceptions, vied with each other for the most trifling appointments in the Imperial antechambers; the patriots of 1789 burned with ardour to share in the advantage of the Imperial government; even such of the blood-stained Jacobins of 1793 as the guillotine and subsequent proscriptions had spared, sunk down into obscure pamphleteers or functionaries in the employment of the despot who had extinguished their extravagant chimeras (1). When such was the disposition of the leading parties in the Revolution, both on the royalist and republican side, it may readily be conceived with what eagerness the rising generation, the young men who had grown up to manhood under the star of Napoléon's glory, who knew of the fervour of democracy only as a hideous dream of former days, the immense mass who looked to advancement in life, and saw no hope of attaining it but in the favour of government, rushed into the same career, and how completely every feeling, down to the fall of Napoléon, was absorbed in the general desire to bask in the sunshine of Imperial favour. Such was the universality and vehemence of this passion, that it superseded every other feeling, whether private, social, or political, and with the exception of a few rigid republicans, such as Carnot and Lafayette, swept before it the whole democratic principles of France (2).

Rapid progress of the system of centralisation in France under the Imperial government.

The Constituent Assembly had paved the way for this great alteration by the suppression of the privileges of the nobles, and the annihilation of all provincial and local authority, which necessarily devolved in every branch of the administration, either on the popular assemblies or the central government; the Legislative Assembly followed it up by banishing all the clergy and landholders, and issuing the iniquitous decrees for the confiscation of their property; and the Convention put the finishing stroke by inhumanly massacring their leading members, and rendering the reparation of this injustice even to their heirs impossible, by alienating their possessions to the innumerable millions of revolutionary proprietors. It is in these frightful deeds of national injustice, that we are to look for the remote but certain cause of the rapid centralization of the subsequent governments, and the unbounded extent of the Imperial authority. When Napoléon succeeded to supreme power, he found all local or subordinate sources of influence or authority closed up or annulled, and nothing remained but the central government. The people had effectually succeeded in destroying the counteracting influence of all other bodies

(1) Even Barrère was employed in this capacity by Napoléon, and dragged out an obscure existence as a hired pamphleteer and eulogist of the Imperial

government, till its fall in 1814.—*Biog. des Contemporains*, Sup. *Vie de Barrère*.

(2) De Staël, ii. 372, 373. *Dis. Am. d'Hist. G.* Les Caus. vii. 106, 107.

or individuals in the state; but they had been unable to retain in their own hands the power which they had, in the first instance, erected on their ruins. Such had been the corruption, selfishness, incapacity, or wickedness of the functionaries appointed by the masses, that by common consent they had been deprived, either formally or tacitly, of their power of nomination; and every appointment, without exception, in the empire, flowed from the central government. Not only were the whole members of the Council of State, the Senate, and the Legislative Body, selected by the Emperor; but he had the appointment of the whole officers in the army and navy, and the police, whether local or general: the whole magistrates of every degree; the judges, whether supreme or inferior; all persons employed in the collection of the revenue, the customs, and excise; the whole ministers of the Church; all the teachers of youth; all the professors in the universities, academies, and schools; all persons in the post-office, or concerned in the administration of the roads, bridges, harbours, fortresses, and cities in the empire. In a country deprived of its great landed proprietors by the confiscations of the Revolution, bereaved of commerce and colonies by the events of the war, and almost destitute of capital or private fortunes from the preceding convulsions, these different employments constituted the only avenues to subsistence or eminence which remained to those who were either averse to, or above the rank of manual labour, or retail trade. This state of matters, incident to a people highly excited and inspired with the strongest feelings of individual ambition, can alone account for the universal passion for government employment which seized all ranks of the French nation during the latter years of the reign of Napoléon; and before we censure them as volatile and inconsistent, when we contrast this mania with the democratic fervour of 1793, we would do well to reflect whether any other people, under similar circumstances, would have remained more steadfast to their original professions; and whether both dispositions of the public mind were not in truth, at bottom, the result of the same thirst after individual distinction, varying in the effect it produced (1) according to the change in the means of obtaining elevation which the altered circumstances of society had occasioned (2).

Dutty of the Emperor in this respect. Napoléon seized, with all his wonted ability, on the extraordinary combination of circumstances which had thus in a manner thrown absolute power into his hands. "His system of government," says Madame de Staël, "was founded on three bases—To satisfy the interests of men at the expense of their virtue; to deprave public opinion, by falsehoods or sophisms perpetually repeated from the press; and to convert the passion for freedom into that for military glory. He followed up this system with rare ability." The Emperor himself has given us some important information on his designs, and what he had effected in this respect. "I had established," said he, "a government the most compact, carrying on its operations with the most rapidity, and capable of the most nervous efforts that ever existed upon earth. And, truly, nothing less was required to triumph over the immense difficulties with which we were surrounded, and produce the marvels which we accomplished. The organisation of the prefectures, their action, and results,

(1) *Las Cas. vii. 161. De Staël, Rév. Franç. ii. 372, 374. Id. Dix. An. d'Ét. ii. 38, 39.*

(2) Napoléon has left some precious observations on this important subject. "Our excuse for the boundless thirst for employments which existed under the empire," said he, "is to be found in the misfortunes and convulsions of the Revolution. Every one was displaced; every one felt himself

under the necessity of sending himself again; and it was in order to aid that feeling, and give way to that universal necessity, that I felt the propriety of endowing all the principal offices with so much riches, power, and consideration; but in time, I would have changed that by the mere force of opinion.—*Las, Cas. vii. 162.*

were alike admirable. The same impulse was given at the same instant to more than forty millions of men; and by the aid of these centres of local activity the movement was as rapid at all the extremities as at the heart of the empire. Strangers who visited us were astonished at this system; and they never failed to attribute the immense results which were obtained, to that uniformity of action pervading so great a space. Each prefect, with the authority and local patronage with which he was invested, was in himself a *little Emperor*; but, nevertheless, as he enjoyed no force but from the central authority, owed all his lustre to official employment, and had no natural or hereditary connexion with the territory over which his dominion extended, the system had all the advantages of the feudal government without any of its inconveniences. It was indispensable to clothe them with all that authority; I found myself made Dictator by the force of circumstances; it was necessary, therefore, that all the minor springs should be entirely dependent on and in complete harmony with the grand central moving power. The spring with which I covered the soil required a prodigious elasticity, an unbounded tension, if we would avert the stroke which were levelled at our authority. Education may subsequently effect a change; but our generation were inspired with such a thirst for power, and exercised it in so arrogant a manner, to give it the mildest name, and at the same time were so headlong in their passion to fawn upon greatness and wear the chains of slavery, that no other system of government was practicable (1)."

He re-establishes titles of honour. Principles on which it was founded.

But with all his admiration for the centralized government which he had established, and of the machinery of prefects, mayors, adjoints, and other functionaries, by which it was carried into effect, no man knew better than Napoléon that it was not in such a system that the foundation for a durable dynasty on the throne could be laid. The system of prefects enjoying absolute power, but deriving all their consideration from transient government appointments, was in reality nothing else but the system of Oriental pachas, held in subjection by a vigorous Sultan; and all history told that such government rarely descended to the third generation from their original founder. "An aristocracy," says Napoléon, "is the true, the only support of a monarchy; without it, the state is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. A true aristocracy, however, must be ancient; therein consists its real force; and that was the only thing which I could not create. Reasonable democracy will never aspire to any thing more than obtaining an equal power of elevation to all. The true policy in these times was to employ the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and the spirit of democracy. Above all, it was necessary to take advantage of the ancient historic names; it was the only way to throw the halo of antiquity over our modern institutions. My designs on this point were quite formed, but I had not time to bring them to maturity. It was this, that every lineal descendant of an old marshal or minister should be entitled at any time to get himself declared a duke by the government, upon proving that he had the requisite fortune; every descendant of a general, or governor of a province, to obtain the title of count upon obtaining a similar endowment. This system would have advanced some, excited the hopes of others, awakened the emulation of all without injuring any one; pretty toys, it is true, but such as are indispensable for the government of men. Old and corrupted nations cannot be governed on the same principle as simple and virtuous ages; for one, in these times, who would sacrifice all to the public

good, there are thousands and millions who are governed only by their interests, their vanity, or their enjoyments; to attempt to regenerate such a people in a day, would be an act of madness. The true genius of the workman consists in making a right use of the materials which he has at his disposal, to extract good even from the elements which appear at first sight most adverse to his designs; and there is the real secret of the revival of titles, ribbons, and crosses. And, after all, these toys are attended with few inconveniences, and are not without some advantages. In the state of civilisation in which we are placed, they are proper to awaken the respect of the multitude, and not without influence in producing a feeling of self-respect in their owners; they satisfy the vanity of the weak, without giving any just cause of offence to the strong (1)."

Re-establishment
of hereditary
titles of
honour,
11th March,
1808.

Proceeding on these principles, a *Senatus Consultum*, in March 1808, re-established hereditary titles of honour, under the denomination of Prince, Duke, Count, Baron and Chevalier. The persons so ennobled were empowered to entail a certain income, under the name of *majorsats*, in favour of their direct descendants. This was the first formal re-establishment of a nobility; but Napoléon had previously, on repeated occasions, exercised the power of conferring titles on the leading persons in his government or army, without any other authority than his own will; and among others had, by a patent dated 28th May, 1807, created Lefebvre Duke of Dantzig, with an hereditary succession to his son; and all the marshals of the empire, as well as grand officers of the Imperial Court, had already been created Princes or Dukes, shortly after the campaign of Austerlitz (2). But these titles were all connected with foreign estates or possessions, or named after some glorious foreign exploit, and did not infringe, except indirectly, on the equality in France itself, which it had been the great object of the Revolution to establish. Now, however, this fundamental principle was openly violated; and in the lifetime of the generation which had waded through oceans of blood to abolish these distinctions they were re-established in greater numbers, and on a more rigid style of etiquette than ever (3).

Speeches on
the subject
in the legis-
lative body.

Such a stretch, coming so soon after the universal passion for equality, which, bursting forth in 1789, had since convulsed France and Europe, was of itself sufficiently remarkable; but it was ushered into the Legislative Body. "Senators!" said Cambacérès, "know that you are no longer obscure plebeians or simple citizens. The statute which I hold in my hand confers on you the *majestic title of Count*. I myself, Senators, am no longer merely the citizen Cambacérès: as well as the great dignitaries of the empire, I am a prince, your most Serene Highness! and my most serene person, as well as all the other holders of the great dignities of the empire, will be endowed with one of the grand duchies reserved by the Imperial decree of 30th March, 1806 (4). As the son of a prince cannot, in the noble hierarchy, descend to a lower rank than that of a duke, *all our children* will enjoy that title. But the new order of things erects no impassable or invidious barrier between the citizens; every career remains open to the virtues and talents of all; the advantage which it awards to tried merit will prove no injury to that which has not yet been put to the test." Thunders of applause shook the Senate at this announcement; and that body, composed almost entirely of persons of plebeian birth, whom success in the Revolution

(1) *Les Cœs.* v. 23, 24.
(2) *Ante* v. 654.

(3) *Montg.* vi. 303, 305. *Dum.* xii.
(4) *Ante* v. 643.

had raised to eminence, and many of whom had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis, not only accepted with gratitude the Imperial gift, which was thus the price of abandoning all their former principles, and put on with alacrity the state livery which was the badge of their servitude, but unanimously embodied their devotion in an address to the Emperor on the occasion, which must be given entire, as one of the most memorable monuments of political tergiversation and baseness which the history of the world has to exhibit (1).

Endowment
of the new
Peers with
revenues
from foreign
states.

The institution of this new hereditary noblesse was attended with one peculiarity, which was at once indicative of the ephemeral basis on which it was founded, and the incapability of the infant order to answer any of those important purposes in the state which an ancient and independent aristocracy afford. Most of the new nobles were soldiers of fortune; almost all of them were destitute of any property, but such as their official emoluments or the opportunities they had enjoyed of foreign plunder had afforded. To obviate this inconvenience, and prevent the new nobility from degenerating into a mere set of titled menials, or pensioned functionaries, Napoléon fell upon the expedient of attaching to these titles rich endowments, drawn from the revenue of foreign countries conquered by the French arms, or held by them in subjection. All the French marshals and the chief dignitaries of the empire were in this manner quartered on the German or Italian states, and large sums, drawn from the industry or resources of their inhabitants, annually brought to the great central mart of Paris to be expended (2). The increase of opulence to the Imperial capital was thus indeed most sensible; and, in a similar proportion, did the Imperial government, the author of so many benefits to its citizens, become popular and respected; but the effects of this perpetual abstraction of wealth from other countries to the metropolis of the great nation, were, to the last degree, vexatious to their inhabitants, and proved one con-

(1) Montg. vi. 304, 306.

Address of the Senate to the Emperor. "Sire! The Senate presents to your august Majesty the tribute of its gratitude for the goodness which has prompted you to communicate, by his most Serene Highness the Chancellor of the Empire, the two statutes relative to the erection of Imperial titles of the 30th March, 1806, and the 19th August in the same year. By that great institution, Sire! your Majesty has affixed the seal of durability to all the others which France owes to your wisdom. In proportion, Sire, as one observes the mutual links which connect together the different parts, so multiplied and yet so firmly united, of that great fabric; in proportion as time, which alone can develop the full extent of its benefits, shall have fully unfolded them, what effects may not be anticipated from your august wisdom! A new value awarded to the recompenses which your Majesty never fails to award to real merit, in what obscurity soever fortune may have placed it, and how varied soever may be the services which it has rendered to the state; new motives to imitate such great examples; fresh bonds of fidelity, devotion, and love towards our country, its sovereign, and his dynasty; a closer bond of union between our institutions and those of confederate or friendly nations; fathers recompensed in what is most dear to them; the recollections of families rendered more touching; the memory of our ancestors enshrined; the spirit of order, of economy, and of conservation strengthened by its most obvious interest, that of its descendants; the first bodies of the empire, and the most noble of our institutions drawn closer together;

all dread of the return of the odious *Féodal System* for ever abolished; every recollection foreign to what you have established extinguished; the splendour of the new families deriving fresh lustre from the rays of the crown; the origin of their illustration rendered contemporary with your glory; the past, the present, and the future attached to your power, as in the sublime conceptions of the great poets of antiquity, the first link of the great chain of destiny was placed in the hands of the gods. Such, Sire, are the results of the institution to which your Majesty has given life. The combination of such important results, giving security to those to whom the present is as nothing, when there is no guarantee for the future, consolidates in its foundations, fortifies in all its parts, brings to perfection in its proportions, and embellishes in its ornaments, the immense social edifice, at the summit of which is placed the resplendent throne of the greatest of monarchs."—See *Moniteur*, 11th March, 1807, and *Morve*. vi. 306, 308. The extraordinary nature of this address will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that a considerable proportion of these obsequious senators, now so ready to wear the Imperial livery and form a part in the great pyramid which supported the throne, were once furious Jacobins, stained with the worst atrocities of the Reign of Terror, and almost all at one period ardent supporters of the principles of liberty and equality. It is sufficient to mention the names of Carnot, Fouché, Siéyès, Merlin de Douai, Carnot, Bréguet, Cornudet, Pastour, Viennet-Vaublanc, Fontane, Fabre de l'Aude, etc., besides a host of others.

(2) As a specimen of the manner in which the

admirable cause of the deep-felt and far-spread hatred which ultimately occasioned its fall. In this respect Napoleon not only evinced none of his wonted sagacity, but acted in direct opposition to what common sense dictated as the fitting course for the monarch of a great and varied empire. How different was the policy of the Romans, who not only left at the disposal of the municipalities in their extensive dominions the greater proportion of their local revenues, but annually remitted large sums from the imperial treasury for the construction of edifices of utility or embellishment in all their principal cities; so that the sway of the Emperors was felt chiefly in the increasing opulence and splendour of their provincial capitals (1).

It was another part of Napoleon's system, which he laboured assiduously to promote, to effect an amalgamation, or *fuscon* as he called it, of the ancient with the modern noblesse, that, burying in oblivion former discord, they should cordially unite in resisting any farther changes, and supporting the Imperial throne. With this view he not only opened his antechambers to the old nobility, who rushed in in crowds to occupy them, but promoted to the utmost of his power the distribution of the old families through the innumerable offices of his dominions, and did all that he could, by the offer of splendid establishments, to overcome the repugnance of the ancient noblesse to matrimonial alliances with the soldiers of fortune who had risen from the ranks to greatness under the banners of the empire. In one respect, this system succeeded even beyond his expectation. Fondly attached, notwithstanding all their reverses, to feudal ideas, clinging still, notwithstanding a total change of manners, to antiquated customs, the old nobility found themselves suddenly elevated to an extraordinary and unhopcd-for degree of importance in the

Imperial generals or dignitaries were endowed out of the revenues of the conquered or subject states, it may be sufficient to cite those who were allocated on the domains of the small Electorate of Hanover.

(List of the revenues bestowed from the Electorate of Hanover.)

Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel,	140,000 frs. or L. 5,000 a-year.	
Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo,	100,000	4,000
Mortier, Duke of Treviso,	100,000	4,000
Duroc, Duke of Friuli,	85,000	3,400
Ney, Duke of Elchingen,	83,000	3,180
Angereau, Duke of Castiglione,	80,000	3,200
Massena, Duke of Rivoli,	80,000	3,200
Caulincourt, Duke of Vicenza,	68,000	2,700
Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt,	60,000	2,400
Soult, Duke of Dalmatia,	53,000	2,150
Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic,	50,000	2,000
Prince Lebrun,	50,000	2,000
Lannes, Duke of Montebello,	50,000	2,000
Marshal Bessières,	50,000	2,000
Gen. Sebastiani,	40,000	1,600
Janot, Duke of Abrantes,	35,000	1,450
Gen. Friand,	30,000	1,200
Gen. Bessen,	30,000	1,200
Generals Victor, Oudinot, St.-Hilaire, Gardencu, Gazan, Caffarelli, Dupas, Lassalle, Klein, Soulis, Dorsenne, Rapp, each 20,000, in all,	240,000	9,600
Generals Mullin, Drouot, Compans, Gudin, Verdier, Monmies, Lacoste, Duroc, and others, in all 13, 25,000 each,	325,000	13,000
Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, Maret, Fouché, Decrès, Regnier, Mollin, Gudin, Champagny, Lemaurois, Clarke, Cretel, Bertrand, Moncey, Pérignon, Serrière, Marchand, Ségur, Dupont, 20,000 each, in all, 19 individuals,	380,000	15,200
Mouton, Belhand, Savary, Lariston, each 15,000,	80,000	2,400
General Becker,	12,000	480
Ragaud St-Jean d'Angely, Dufermier, Lacrier, Gen. Grouchy, Gen. Nansouty, Bigot, each 10,000, in all,	60,000	3,200
Total,	2,259,000 frs.	L.91,160 yearly.

court of the new Emperor; and, by the grace of their manners, the brilliancy of their conversation, and their perfect familiarity with the formalities and etiquette of the ancient régime, soon acquired a marked superiority in that field over the soldiers or civilians of humble birth whom the changes of the Revolution had elevated to greatness. By a singular, but not unnatural feeling also, they were destitute of the scruples at accepting offices in the household, which persons of less illustrious descent might have felt. A Montmorency would willingly become maid of honour to the Empress, or even descend to lace her shoe, which a lady of plebeian birth might have deemed a degradation. Thus the court was soon filled with the descendants of the old noblesse, and widely as the Emperor opened his doors for their reception, amply as he multiplied the chamberlains, equerries, lords in waiting, ladies of the bed-chamber, squires, pages of the antechambers, and other functionaries of the palace, he found it impossible to keep pace with the crowds of titled applicants who incessantly besieged its gates for admission. The new nobility soon conceived a violent jealousy at these intruders who had supplanted them in the court circles, and openly testified their animosity even in presence of the Emperor himself. The system of fusion met with very little success with the ladies of the rival classes of nobility; but the substantial advantages of great fortune and dignified station, reconciled the plebeian duchesses to the superior favour shown to their patrician rivals, while the brilliant uniforms, high stations, and military lustre of the young generals induced not a few of the descendants of the oldest families in France to ally their fortunes to the sons of those upon whom their parents would have deemed it a degradation to have bestowed a look (4).

Great discontent of the French Republicans at this step, and their views regarding it.

Notwithstanding all his efforts, however, it was impossible for Napoléon to conceal from the clear-sighted republicans of France that the restoration of hereditary titles of honour was an entire departure, in the most vital points, from all the principles of the Revolution. In fact, the only surprising thing is, that he himself did not perceive how completely its ultimate effect was subversive of all the passions which had agitated France in 1789, and during the whole fervour of its subsequent changes. It was in vain to say that titles of honour were now restored as a personal, not a hereditary distinction; that the career of merit, both in the civil and military department was open to all; and that every peasant's son might indulge the hope, by bravery in the field, of fighting his way from the humble rank of a grenadier to a marshal's baton and dukedom; or, by skill and address in diplomacy, of advancing from the counter of the tradesman to the dignity of ambassador and prince of the empire. During the reign of Napoléon, indeed, and under the pressure of those national difficulties which rendered it indispensable to look for talent in every grade, even the lowest in the state, there might be some foundation for this observation; and doubtless the aspiring temper of the *tiers état* could not but feel gratified, at beholding the number of their own, or an inferior rank, who

(1) Pelet, 107, 108. *Las Cas*. ii. 238, 239. *De Staël*, *Rev. Franc.* ii. 333, 335. *D'Abr.* ix. 287; ii. 324.

The reasons assigned by Napoléon in the Council of State for the employment of the ancient in preference to the modern noblesse was as follows:—"It is among the old families that you can alone find still some remains of great fortune; by that means they exercise a great influence on government. How could you compose a court with the men of the Revolution? You find in their ranks only honourable functionaries without fortune, or opulent contractors without character—a court

of salaried officials would be at once common to the state, and without dignity in the eyes of the people. If the old fortunes are divided by distributions on death, they are restored by successions: the new fortunes have nothing to look to in that way; on the contrary, they are surrounded with needy relatives. Government can now no longer enrich, as formerly, its servants by the donation of the crown or confiscations; it ought, therefore, as much as possible to take advantage of fortunes already made, and employ them in its service."—PELET, *Conseil d'Etat de Napoléon*, 107, 108.

now as warriors or statesmen occupied the highest stations in the empire. But to those who carried their views beyond the reign of the emperor or the existing generation, and looked to the present institutions as a guarantee for republican equality in future times, these considerations afforded little matter for consolation. They could not disguise from themselves that the new imperial dignities, though the reward of merit to the present holders, would become the birthright of descent to the next generation; they could not hope that the same stirring and anxious times would always continue which rendered it necessary for government to throw themselves for support on the middling classes of the people; and they anticipated the time with dismay, when, during the pacific periods of subsequent reigns, the imperial nobility would come to monopolize the influence, offices, and power of the state, as completely as ever had been the case by their feudal predecessors in the days of Francis I. or Louis XIV. What was the origin of all nobility but personal merit? every family, how great soever in its subsequent stages, had some obscure citizen for its original founder; the first king had been a fortunate soldier. If an aristocracy existed at all, abstracting the rise of inferior citizens, and monopolizing for a privileged class the influence and riches of the state, it would be no consolation to the friends of equality to assert that it took its origin from the revolutionary, not the feudal wars, and that its paladins were to be found not in the Round Table of Charlemagne, but the marshals of Napoleon.

In truth, the Emperor was too far-sighted not to feel the justice of these observations; and although, in his addresses to the people, he was cautious to hold out the new nobility as the reward of merit only, yet he secretly felt that it was in fact the revival of a family distinction. But he was also aware that the favour of the populace cannot be relied on for the durable support of government; that an hereditary monarchy cannot exist without an hereditary aristocracy, whose interests are entwined with its fate; and that, without such lasting support, founded on the permanent interests of a privileged class, his throne would be lost by his descendants as speedily as it had been won by himself. All history, and especially that of the Asiatic empires, proves that no family, how great soever in its original founder, could long keep possession of the throne, unless it had cast its anchor either in the interests of an hereditary nobility or religious attachment centered in the descendants of a single family. And the friends of freedom, had they possessed more penetration than at that time, or even now prevails on this subject in France, might have been consoled by the reflection that, however hostile to the equality, the passion for which formed the leading principle of the Revolution, such an aristocracy formed an essential element in the formation of lasting freedom; and that although there were many instances in which such an aristocracy had proved an insurmountable bar to the elevation of the middling classes of society, there was not one example of liberty not having entirely perished, without such a barrier to resist its encroachments, under the degrading influence of a centralized despotism.

Rapid progress of court etiquette at Paris.

The rapidity with which court etiquette, and all the minutiae of regal manners now spread, exceeds belief, and notwithstanding the abundance of contemporary proof, appears almost incredible in a country so recently convulsed with revolutionary passions. The old archives of the monarchy were ransacked to discover the whole details of the ancient ceremonials; whoever could point out an additional bow to be made, a more respectful mode of presenting an address to be adopted, a more gorgeous display of pomp or splendour to be introduced, was received as a bene-

factor of the human race. The old ceremonies at the rising and retiring to rest of the kings were re-established, though abridged in some of their details; the ancient forms of presentation were revived; and it was seriously debated at court whether the fatiguing form of dining in public once a-week should not be restored. In magnificence and splendour the Imperial court far exceeded not only any thing in Europe, but all that the pride of Louis XIV. had conceived. The whole royal palaces, with the exception of Versailles, were refurnished in the most sumptuous style; the value of the plate and furniture which they contained was estimated at fifty millions of francs, or two millions sterling. At the marriage of the Empress Marie Louise, four queens held her train (1). In the antechambers of the Emperor, seven kings were sometimes to be seen. And when this first occurred, it was just seventeen years since it had been written, with universal consent, over the principal archway in the Tuileries—"Monarchy is abolished in France, and will never be restored (2)."

Great internal prosperity of France under the empire.

While not merely the forms of monarchical, but the essence of despotic power, were, in this manner re-established in France, amidst the general concurrence of the nation, the Emperor was careful to accompany the change with such substantial benefits and real ameliorations as amply reconciled the great mass of the citizens to the loss of the once prized democratic powers which had brought such unheard-of disasters on their possessors and the whole community. Though completely despotic, the Imperial government had one incalculable advantage; it was regular, conservative, and systematic. The taxes were heavy, but the government expenditure was immense, and enabled the people to pay them with facility: no forced loans or arbitrary confiscations swept off, as in the time of the Republic, the accumulations of years by one fell exaction; no uncertainty as to enjoying the fruits of industry paralysed in any branch of employment the hand of the labourer. Every thing was orderly and tranquil under the Imperial sway; the Emperor demanded, indeed, more than half their sons from his subjects of every degree, but a boundless career was opened to the conscripts; and visions of a marshal's baton or a general's staff danced before the eyes of many a youthful aspirant, who was destined to an early and unheeded grave in the field of battle or amidst the horrors of the military hospital. The stoppage of all external commerce, combined with the vast and constantly increasing expenditure of government, produced an extraordinary degree of vigour in domestic industry and internal communication; the roads, the canals which connected the provinces with each other, were covered with waggons or boats laden with the richest merchandise; the cultivators every where found an ample market for their produce, in the vast consumption of the armies; the manufacturing cities vied with each other in activity and enterprise; and even commercial wealth, reviving from its ashes under the firm rule of the Emperor, exerted its energies on internal traffic, and turning inwards, promoted internal circulation through the great arteries of the empire. Beet root was largely cultivated as a substitute for the sugar cane, and though the saccharine matter obtained from that useful vegetable was inferior in sweetness and richness to that which the West India islands yielded, yet it was superior in clearness and delicacy; and, as a native production, was justly admired. Lyon, Rouen, and the Flemish cities again resounded with the activity of the artisan; their ruined fabrics were restored,

(1) *Las Cas*, ii. 290, 291. *De Ségur*, *Rec. Franç.* ii. 384, 335.

(2) *De Ségur*, ii. 235.

the empty warehouses replenished; and the vast internal consumption of the empire, deprived of all foreign competition, rapidly raised from the dust the prosperous manufactures of the monarchy which the confiscation of the Revolution had to all appearance irrevocably destroyed (1).

Great effect
of the for-
eign plun-
der and con-
tribution on
the industry
of France.

Much as this extraordinary flood of internal prosperity was owing to the rapid circulation of wealth, occasioned by the great expenditure, exceeding thirty millions sterling, which was drawn from the ordinary revenue of the empire (2), more still was to be ascribed to the enormous sums which were extracted from one-half of Europe in the shape of subsidies, contributions, or the maintenance of the Imperial armies, which was all expended, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the French people. The immense sums, amounting to above twenty-four millions sterling, have been already mentioned (3) which were extracted from Prussia and the countries between the Elbe and the Vistula, in two years subsequent to the irruption of the French armies into their territories in October 1806. But exorbitant as this was, it constituted but a part of the great system of foreign plunder which formed so important an element in the general system of the Imperial government. We have the authority of the able and impartial biographer of Napoléon for the assertion, "that since their departure from the heights of Boulogne, two hundred thousand French soldiers had been constantly fed, clothed, paid, and lodged, at the expense of foreign states; above four hundred millions of contributions (L.16,000,000) had, in addition, been levied in money or goods, from the countries occupied by the Imperial troops, the treasury had received part of this sum, and the remainder, expended on the services of the army, had reduced by one-half the amount required from the French Exchequer for its support. A few years before, Louisiana had been sold by the First Consul to America, to obtain a supply for the pressing wants of the treasury; on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the Emperor found the treasury exhausted, and the bank on the eve of insolvency; but the campaigns of the two next years gave him a year's revenue in advance in the coffers of the state, besides a large reserved treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries (4). When such extraordinary supplies were obtained by foreign plunder for the French treasury, it is not surprising that a very great degree of prosperity should have pervaded all its departments, and in an especial manner made itself felt at the metropolis; and, in truth, all the great and splendid works thenceforward undertaken by the Emperor, and which have shed such an imperishable lustre round his name,

(1) *Bign.* vi. 403, 407. *Jom.* ii. 442, 444.

(2) Revenue of the empire, exclusive of contributions from foreign states and all extraordinary supplies:—

(its revenues from 1806 to 1813.)

In 1806,	664,379,901 francs, or	L.26,500,000
1809,	723,513,020	29,000,000
1810,	744,392,027	29,700,000
1811, including Roman States, . . .	907,295,657	36,200,000
1812,	876,236,180	35,200,000
1813,	824,273,749	33,000,000

—*DUC DE GANTZ, l. 307, 308.*

It is not going too far to say, that the sums drawn during these years, directly or indirectly, by plunder, contributions, tribute in subsidies from foreign states, amounted to at least half as much more: and the sums, from the difference in the value of money, were equal to almost double their nominal amount in the currency of Great Britain. Thus, during the six last years of Napoléon, an ex-

penditure equal to nearly a hundred millions sterling in England took place in the French empire; of which more than a third was drawn from foreign countries. It is not surprising that such a government for the time should be popular, notwithstanding its despotic character and the conscription.

(3) *Ante*, vi. 98.

(4) *Jom.* ii. 437, 438.

were carried on by funds wrung, directly or indirectly, from the suffering inhabitants of his subject territories (1).

Striking account of the public works of France by the Minister of the Interior, Aug. 26, 1807.

And these works, undertaken under the Imperial government, were really such as to justify the enthusiastic admiration of a people even less passionately devoted than the French to public splendour. They were thus noticed in the report of the Minister of the Interior in August 1807, when Napoléon met the Chambers after his return from Tilsit; and, after making every allowance for the exaggerated style of such state papers, much remains to attract the admiration of succeeding ages, and demonstrate the great objects to which, in domestic administration, the ambition of the Emperor was directed "Thirteen thousand leagues of public roads have been kept in order or repaired; the two greatest works undertaken for centuries, the roads of Mont Genis and of the Simplon, have, after six years of labour, been completed. The road from Spain to Italy is in progress: the Apennines are the theatre of a series of works which will unite Piedmont to the shores of the Mediterranean, and complete the union of Liguria to France: eighteen rivers have seen their navigation improved or prolonged beyond hitherto impassable barriers, by means of locks, dykes, or towing paths: four bridges have been erected during the last campaign: ten others are in full progress; ten canals, almost all commenced during the present reign, are in full activity. Nor do the maritime harbours offer fewer prodigies. Antwerp, so recently insignificant, has become the centre of our great maritime preparations: for the first time, that part of the Scheldt sees vessels of 74 and 80 guns floating on its bosom: fourteen ships of the line are on the stocks within its walls; many are finished, and have descended to Flushing: that harbour has seen its docks deepened, its entrance improved, and it is already capable of containing a squadron: at Dunkirk and Calais piers have been constructed; at Cherbourg two vast breakwaters erected; at Rochefort and Marseilles equally important maritime improvements are in progress. The existence of our cotton manufactures being secured, investigations are in progress for the discovery of places suited to the culture of that important article: the improvement of the linen fabrics has been the object of constant solicitude: veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners; a code is preparing for the regulation of commerce: the School of Arts and Mechanics at Compeigne flourishes, and has been transferred to Chalons; others on a similar plan are in the course of formation; Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry: the war, changed into a contest for commercial independence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry; every one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encouragement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the Emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendour so glorious a destiny. At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another, a second is commencing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through centuries, the successive ages of Francis I., of Henry IV., of Louis XIV., restored to life by the voice of Napoléon: fountains without number flow night and day in all parts of the city, testifying, even to the humblest classes, the care which the Emperor bestows on their most trifling accommodation. Two

(1) *De Staël, Rev. Franç. N. 200.*

triumphal arches are already erected, or founded, one in the centre of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory; the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest city in the world. The tomb of Desaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection in the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valour. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvass the glorious exploits of our armies, while the mind of the Emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has selected for his antagonist the demon of ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge in the most essential subjects of public instruction (1) ”.

General
distribution
which it
produced.

When the French people saw this magnificent announcement of internal improvement, contemporaneous with the official promulgation of the treaty of Tilsit, the conquest of Prussia, the restoration of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the erection of the Kingdom of Westphalia, it is not surprising that they were dazzled by the brilliancy of the spectacle, and yielded to the pleasing illusion that the Revolution, nursed in violence and baptized in blood, was to set amidst a blaze of unprecedented glory. But the querulous discontent and substantial oppression of other nations, might have even then taught them that this splendid fabric rested on a dangerous foundation, and that the system was not likely to be durable which impoverished all others to enrich one favoured state; while a sagacious observer of this long and glowing enumeration of the internal projects of the Emperor could hardly have avoided the inference that the government had now drawn to itself the patronage and direction of domestic improvement of every description; that the very magnitude and universality of public undertakings proved that private enterprise had sunk into the dust; and that, reversing the whole principles of the Revolution, the welfare of society had come to depend on the point of the pyramid.

French
resources
under the
empire.

The finances of France, in an especial manner, occupied the attention of the Emperor; and the talent of his subjects, adapted beyond any other people in Europe to organization and accuracy in matters of detail, brought that important branch of administration to an extraordinary degree of perfection. The official exposition set forth by his ministers annually, exhibited an excess of income above expenditure (2); but no

(1) *Mem. v. 402, 407.*

(2) The Budget exhibited to the Chambers for 1808, was as follows:—

(Budget of 1808.)

INCOME.		EXPENDITURE.	
	Francs.		Francs.
Direct contributions.	295,241,651	Public debt.	74,000,000
Registers and crown lands.	181,458,491	Pensions.	31,000,000
Customs.	75,973,797	Civil list.	28,000,000
Lottery.	12,804,486	Judges.	22,000,000
Post-office.	8,624,586	Foreign relations.	2,000,000
Excise.	82,772,692	Minister of the Interior.	52,000,000
Salt and Tobacco, by the Alps.	5,104,198	— of Finance.	21,900,000
Salt Mines.	3,000,000	— of Treasury.	8,000,000
		— of War.	201,619,000
	664,879,901	Ordinance.	134,880,000
	or L. 26,500,000	Marine.	117,200,000
		Religion.	14,000,000
		Police general.	1,055,000
		Negotiations.	8,000,000
		Miscellaneous.	6,316,000
			730,000,000
			or L. 29,200,000

reliance can be placed on these statements as a true picture of the financial condition of the empire, when ten or fifteen millions sterling were annually drawn from foreign nations by contributions or subsidies, which did not appear in the yearly budgets; and all the armies quartered beyond the frontiers of the empire, whether in Germany, Italy, or the Spanish peninsula, were systematically and invariably maintained and paid at the exclusive expense of their inhabitants. It is sufficient to observe, therefore, that as long as the empire of Napoléon endured over foreign nations, no want of money was ever experienced at the Imperial headquarters, and that the sums extracted from them during its continuance amounted to at least a half of those derived from the legitimate taxation of his own subjects. The longer his experience extended, the more was he attached to the admirable system of indirect taxation, the only secure basis for the permanent income of a great nation. "The principle I should wish to see established," said he, on 20th February 1806, "is to introduce a great number of moderate indirect taxes, susceptible of augmentation, when the public necessities call for their elevation (1)".

Despotic
character
of the new
law of high
treason.

But the march of despotism is not for ever on flowers; nor is it always blessings and splendid improvements only which it confers upon its subjects. It soon appeared, that the brilliant public works and bewildering enumerations of great undertakings with which the Minister of the Interior dazzled the eyes of the people, were but the splendid covering with which Napoléon was gilding over the old and well-known chains of Roman servitude. On the 1st February, 1810, the Penal Code made its appearance; and the few real patriots who had survived the storms of the Revolution perceived with grief, that out of 480 crimes which it enumerated, no less than 220 were state offences (2). In this long and portentous enumeration were included almost all the offences embraced under the denomination of lese-majesty in the jurisprudence of the lower empire: among others the non-revelation of crimes affecting the security of the state which have come to any one's knowledge; illegal societies or assemblages of any kind; and seditious offences, committed either by writings published or unpublished, images, or engravings. The punishment of such non-revelation was declared to be the galleys, if the crime not disclosed was lese-majesty; imprisonment from two to five years, if seditious. So special and minute are the crimes against the security of the state, and so slender the evidence required to establish them, that in troubled times, and in the hands of a despotic monarch, they furnished the most ample means of totally extinguishing the liberties of the people, and rendering every person amenable to punishment who in the slightest degree obstructed the measures of government (3).

Decree establishing eight state prisons in France, March 3, 1810.

Imprisonment has ever been the great instrument of despotic power: it is not by heart-rending punishments inflicted on its victims in presence of the people, but by the silent unseen operation of confinement and seclusion, that the spirit of freedom has in general been broken. Founded, as the empire of Napoléon was, on the suppression of all the passions of the Revolution, and succeeding, as it did, to a period when great political parties had been interested in their preservation,

—See *l'UC DE GAETA*, i. 306; and *MONTGAILLARD*, vi. 364, 365.

The Kingdom of Italy alone produced to Napoléon a yearly tribute of 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000, and for this we have the authority of his own words; but no mention of this contribution, any more than the £3,400,000, paid annually

by Spain and Portugal, or the £24,000,000 levied on the north of Germany, appears in these annual budgets.—See *Sources*, 7 April, 1806; *Paris*.

(1) *Pelet*, 236.

(2) *Code Penal* sec. 75 to 131, and sec. 132 to 294.

(3) *Code Penal*, Art. 130-294.

it was not to be expected that this great engine was to remain powerless in his hands. It is a remarkable fact, highly characteristic of the ambitious spirit which inspired, and the absence of all regard for real freedom which distinguished, the whole changes of the Revolution, that not one of the successive parties which were elevated to power during its progress ever thought of the obvious expedient, essential to any thing like freedom, of limiting by law the period to which imprisonment, at the instance of government, without bringing the accused to trial, could extend. Each was perfectly willing that arbitrary imprisonment should continue, provided only that they enjoyed the power of exercising it. During the Reign of Terror, this iniquitous system was carried to a height unparalleled in any former age; and above two hundred thousand captives at one time groaned in the state prisons of France. Even under the comparatively regular and constitutional sway of the Directory, it was still largely acted upon: the first use of their power made by each faction, as they got possession of the executive, was to consign all the dangerous persons of the opposite parties to prison; and we have the authority of Napoléon for the assertion, that at one time the state prisoners under their rule amounted to sixty, and when he took possession of power, were still nine, thousand (1). Under his more vigorous, but humane administration, the amount was much lessened, but still it was considerable; and great numbers of persons constantly remained in jail, without any means either of procuring their liberation or forcing on their trial. Their number and unhappy condition had long attracted the attention of the Emperor; and at length a

March 2. decree was passed, regulating their treatment and places of confinement, and defining the authorities by whom their detention was to be authorized. By this decree eight state prisons were established in France, viz.—Saumur, Ham, H, Landskrown, Pierre Chatel, Fenestrelles, Campiano, and Vincennes. The detention of prisoners in them required to be on a warrant of the Private Council of the Emperor, on a report of the Minister of Police, or Public Justice. The former was invested with the power of putting any person that he thought proper under the surveillance of the police. The captives in the state prisons retained the power of disposing of their effects, unless it was otherwise ordered; but they could not receive any money or movables but in the presence of the governor of the prison, and by his authority. All correspondence or intercourse with the rest of the world was rigorously forbidden; and any jailer who should permit or connive at the correspondence of any prisoner with any person whatever, was to be dismissed, and punished with six months' confinement (2).

Extraordinary assemblies of persons in those state prisons.

Under this rigorous system, great numbers of persons of the highest rank and noblest character were confined in these state prisons during the whole reign of Napoléon, not only from France itself, but from Piedmont, Lombardy, the Roman States, Germany, and Switzerland. An order, signed by Napoléon, the Minister of Police, or the Privy Council, was a sufficient warrant in all those countries, not only to occasion the arrest of any suspected person, but his detention in one of these gloomy fortresses, to all appearance for the whole remainder of his life—nobles of the highest rank, priests of the most exalted station, citizens of the most irreproachable lives, were seized in every part of Europe subject to the French influence, paraded through the towns of the country to which they belonged, with shackles on their hands or chains round their necks, and then

(1) Napoléon in Month. i. 178.

(2) Decree, March 2, 1810. *Moniteur* and *Montg.* vii. 11, 12.

consigned to the gloomy oblivion of the state prisons, there to languish in captivity for the remainder of their lives. The offences for which this terrible penalty, worse than death itself, was inflicted, were of the most trivial kind; their being regarded as punishable at all, savoured rather of the dark policy of Tiberius than the more lenient administration, even of despotic countries, in modern times. An unhappy *bon mot*, a cutting jest at the expense of any of the Imperial authorities, a few sarcastic lines, were sufficient to consign their unfortunate authors to close confinement for the rest of their days (1). The state prisons exhibited the most extraordinary assemblage of persons; those on the north of the empire were chiefly filled with ardent democrats, or devoted partisans of the House of Bourbon; those in the southern provinces with ecclesiastics or priests who had expressed themselves incautiously regarding the captivity and dethronement of their spiritual sovereign; but numbers were there immured against whom no definite charge or overt act could be brought, but who, from some unknown cause, had excited the jealousy of the Emperor or some of the Imperial authorities. One day there arrived at the doors of these gloomy abodes a young nobleman of elegant figure, gay manners, and dissipated habits; the next an aged priest, in the decline of life, whose grey hairs were sent to bleach amidst the snows of the Alps; next came a violent democrat, who, untaught by the disasters of twenty years, was still raving about the Rights of Man; then a faithful adherent of the fallen dynasty, or an uncompromising assertor of the wrongs of the conquered provinces. All who in any way, or from any motive, had excited either the displeasure or the fears of the Emperor, were sent into captivity; but the greater proportion were ecclesiastics, among whom was the intrepid and able Cardinal Pacca, who had, in an especial manner, roused his indignation, by his bold counsels to the Pope, soon the companion of his captivity, to resist the Imperial aggressions on the Holy See (2).

Universal extent of Napoleon's power, and great aggravation it was of his persecutions.

One circumstance of peculiar and unprecedented severity attended the state victims of Napoléon, which had been unknown in Europe since the fall of the Roman empire. The extent of his dominions, the wide sway of his influence, rendered it almost impossible to fly from his persecution. By passing the frontier, and escaping into other states, no asylum, as in former times, was obtained; the influence of the Imperial authorities, the terrors of the Imperial sway, pursued the fugitive through

Slight causes for which persons were immured.

(1) Cardinal Pacca, long a victim of the tyrannical government of Napoleon, on account of the courageous stand which he made against his spoliation of the Holy See; and who, for six years, was confined in the state prison of Fenestrelles among the solitudes of the Alps, has given us the following account of some of his fellow-captives:—"On my arrival in the prison, one of the first persons I met was the arch-priest of Fontanelle, in the Duchy of Parma, *vir simplex et timens Deum*, who had been sentenced to three years' confinement for having written, in 1809, to a neighbouring curate that the Archduke John was advancing with his army; the next was Tognetti de Pise, condemned to six months' imprisonment for having imprudently repeated a satire he had heard against the Emperor; Girolamo de Forte, also, for having composed some poems in favour of the Austrians, when in 1800 they chased the French from Italy; and Leonard de Modigliano, Dean of Forlì, for having been imprudent in his language against the French Emperor, were sentenced to an unlimited period of captivity, and only received their liberation on the downfall of Napoleon. They tra-

versed the most populous cities of Lombardy in the course of their transmission to prison, the former with handcuffs, the latter with a chain about his neck, of which he still bore the marks when I saw him in the prison of Fenestrelles."—*Mémoires du Cardinal Pacca*, i. 237, 238.

(2) Pacca's Mem. i. 237, 270, 271, 274. These ecclesiastics were sentenced to unlimited imprisonment for the most trifling causes. Out of nineteen who were imprisoned along with Cardinal Pacca in the fortress of Fenestrelles, amidst the Savoy Alps, three Spaniards by birth were there for having declared, at Parma, against the inglorious war which the Emperor was waging against their nation; another for being suspected of having carried on a secret correspondence with the Pope when in confinement in France; others for having refused to take the oath of fidelity to the French Emperor in the Roman States; one from Bastia in Corsica for having preached a sermon containing some passages which were thought to be a satire on the Emperor, in regard to the affairs of the church. He was seized before he had concluded his discourse, and instantly conducted to prison.—*Pacca*, i. 271, 272.

the whole of Europe; and, as in the days of Caligula or Nero, the victim of Imperial jealousy could find no resting-place on the Continent till he had passed the utmost limits of civilisation, and amidst the nomadic or semi-barbarous tribes on the frontiers of Europe, found that security which the boasted institutions of its ancient states could no longer afford. The mandates of the Emperor, the inquisition of his police, reached the trembling fugitive as effectually on the utmost verge of the Austrian or Spanish dominions, in the extremity of Calabria, or in the marshes of Poland, as in the centre of Paris; and it was not till he had escaped into the Ukraine, or the Turkish provinces, or had found an asylum in the yet unsubdued realm of Britain, that the victim of Imperial persecution could find a secure resting-place. The knowledge of this, which universally prevailed, added fearfully to the terrors of the Imperial government; the firmest mind, the most undaunted resolution despaired of entering the lists with an authority which the whole civilized world seemed constrained to obey; and the immense majority of the prudent and the selfish quailed under the prospect of incurring the displeasure of a power whose lightest measure of animadversion would be banishment into the savage or uncivilized parts of the earth (1). Such was the weight of this despotism, that even the brothers of Napoléon could not endure it. Louis resigned the throne of Holland, and Lucien sought in England that freedom, for the loss of which all the grandeur and power of the brother, whom his presence of mind had seated on the Consular Throne, could afford no compensation.

Universal and slavish obedience to his authority. With such powers to support his authority, and such terrors to overawe discontent or stifle resistance, Napoléon succeeded, without the least difficulty, in maintaining a despotism in France, during the whole remainder of the empire, unparalleled for rigour and severity in modern times. Not a whisper of resistance was any where heard to his orders throughout all his vast dominions. The Senate joyfully and servilely registered his decrees, voted his taxes, and authorized his conscriptions; the press was occupied only with narrating his journeys, transcribing his eulogies, or enforcing his orders; the Chamber of Deputies vied with their dignified brethren in the upper Chamber in addressing the Emperor only with the incense of Eastern adulation. The Legislature voted, and the nation furnished to their ruler, during the ten years which elapsed from his assuming the Imperial throne to his abdication, the stupendous number of TWO MILLIONS THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSCRIPTS, of which above *two millions two hundred thousand* perished in his service (2). The taxes, enormously heavy, were only prevented from being screwed up to the highest possible amount by the systematic plunder of all the tributary countries of Europe. Yet his government was not only obeyed without a murmur during all that time, but

(1) De Staël. Dix Ans d'Exil. 219, 229. Id. Rev. Franç. ii. 400.

Madame de Staël has left a graphic picture of the terrors with which the jealousy of Napoléon was attended even to the softer sex; and which prompted her to undertake a perilous journey from Geneva by the Tyrol, Vienna, and Galicia, into Russia, in the depth of winter, in order to fly the intolerable anxiety of her situation. The Austrian police, acting under his orders, continued the same odious system; and it was not till she reached the frontiers of Old Russia, and war was declared between that power and Napoléon in 1812, that she was able to draw breath. The duchess of Abrantes has given a still more romantic and interesting account of the extraordinary adventure of Mrs. Spenser Smith, wife of the British resident at Stutgard, who incurred the real or feigned displeasure of Napoléon in

1804, at the time of the Duke d'Enghien's murder, and the alleged counterplot in which he was participant to dethrone the Emperor. [*Ann.* v. 93, 95.] She was actively pursued by the bloodhounds of the French police, solely on account of her husband's acts, from the neighbourhood of Vicenza, across the Julian and Tyrol Alps to the romantic shores of the König Sea, near Heligoland, where she for the first time got beyond their reach, by escaping into the Austrian territories, which were not at that period (1804) subjected to the disgrace of being forced to yield obedience to the mandates of the French police.—See D'Ale. xlii. 124. A few years later she could have found no security till she had traversed the whole Imperial territories, and reached the Ottoman dominions.—*Dix Ans d'Exil* 230, 250.

(2) The following is a summary of the men levied and destroyed in France during the ten years of the

these terrible sacrifices, draining as they did its heart's blood from the nation, were passively yielded by all classes; and the despot, who was visibly leading them to perdition, was surrounded on all sides, and at all times, by the incense of flattery and the voice of adulation (1).

So severely, however, did the conscription press upon the natural feelings of the human heart, both in parents and their offspring, that although the salaried dependents of the Emperor, in the Legislature and elsewhere, obsequiously voted all his demands for men, and the press lavished nothing but encomiums on his measures, yet it was not without extreme difficulty and excessive rigour that it could be carried into execution, especially in the rural districts of the empire. The infirmities which might be pleaded in exemption were severely scrutinized, and inveterate asthma, habitual spitting of blood, or incipient consumption, alone sustained as a sufficient excuse. Exemptions at first were allowed to be purchased for three hundred francs; but this privilege was soon repealed, and in the latter years of the empire a substitute could not be procured for less than eight hundred or a thousand pounds. No Frenchman, liable, or who once had been liable to the conscription, could hold any public office, receive any public salary, exercise any public right, receive any legacy, or inherit any property, unless he could produce a certificate that he had obeyed the law, and was either legally exempted, in actual service, discharged, or that his services had not been required. Those who failed to join the army, when drawn, within the prescribed time, were deprived of their civil rights, and denounced to all the gendarmerie in the empire as deserters. Eleven depots were appointed for the punishment of the refractory, where they wore the uniform of convicts, received their fare, and were employed to labour on fortifications or public works without any pay. The terrors of this treatment, however, being at length found to be insufficient to bring the conscripts to their colours, it was decreed that a deserter or person who failed to attend should be fined fifteen hundred francs, and sentenced to three years' hard labour in the interior, with his head shaved but his beard long; if he deserted

Emperor's reign; the most extraordinary instance of the destruction of the human species by the operation of regular government that exists in the annals of the world :—

(Enormous destruction of human life under his foreign wars and the conscription.)

Dates of the decrees of the Senate.	
24th Sept. 1805,	80,000 men.
Nov. 1806,	60,000
7th April, 1807,	80,000
21st Jan. and 10th Sept. 1808,	240,000
18th April and 5th Oct. 1809,	76,000
13th Dec. 1810,	160,000
20th Dec. 1811,	120,000
18th March, 1st Sept. 1812,	237,000
13th Jan., 3d April, 24th } Aug., 9th Oct., 11th } Nov., 1813. }	1,040,000
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In ten years,	2,113,000 exclusive of voluntary enlistment.
Army in existence in 1804,	640,000
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Departmental Guards, Vo- luntary Levies, and Ley on masse, in 1814, }	250,000
<hr/>	
	3,003,000
Remained alive in arms, } or prisoners in 1814, }	802,600
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Destroyed in 10 years,	2,200,400

—See DUPRÉ. *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 3; and *Moniteur*, dates *ut supra*.

(1) Montg. vi. 276, 277.

from the army, his punishment was to be undergone in a frontier place, where he was sentenced to hard labour for ten years, on bread and water, with a bullet of eight pounds' weight chained to his leg, and with a shaved head and unshaved beard; a penalty, in comparison of which death itself would have appeared an act of mercy. Such were the punishments which awaited, without distinction, all the youth of France, if they tried to evade a conscription which was cutting them off at the rate of two hundred and twenty thousand a-year. The practical result of this excessive severity, joined to the known impossibility of earning a subsistence in a country where landed property was already subdivided into eight millions of hands, and commercial enterprise annihilated, by any other means than the favour or employment of government, was, that the whole youth of the nation, of the requisite age and capable of undergoing its fatigues, were voluntarily or involuntarily enrolled in the profession of arms (1).

System of
the imperial
education.
Ecclesiasti-
cal schools,
and lycæums
and military
academies.

The public instruction established in France under the empire was eminently calculated to favour the same tendency. The schools were of two kinds, the ecclesiastical schools and the lycæums. The ecclesiastical schools were established by the bishops and clergy, chiefly for the education of the young persons destined for their own profession, and in them the elements of grammar were taught along with a system of religious education. As they were supported, however, by voluntary contributions alone, they were few in comparison with the numbers of the people, and totally inadequate to the purposes of national instruction. Such as they were, however, they excited the jealousy of the Emperor, who was unwilling that any considerable establishment in the empire, especially in relation to so important a matter as public education, should exist independent of the patronage and authority of government. It was decreed, therefore, that there should be no more than one ecclesiastical school allowed in each department; and that that one should be in a large town where a lycæum or government academy was established; all others were to be shut up in a fortnight, under heavy penalties, and their property of every description applied to the use of the great Imperial establishment called the University (2).

The Imperial University was the chief instrument which the Emperor had set on foot for obtaining the entire direction of public education in all its branches. This body was totally different from an university in our sense of the term: it was rather a vast system of instructing police diffused over the country, in connexion with and dependent on the central government. At its head was placed a Grand Master, one of the chief dignitaries of the state, with a salary of 150,000 francs (L. 6000) a-year. Under him were an ample staff, all of whom were nominated by himself, and extending over the whole empire, viz.—a treasurer and chancellor, ten counsellors for life, twenty in ordinary, and thirty inspectors-general, all endowed with ample salaries; under them were the rectors of academies, as they were called, who, in no respect, corresponded to the English functionaries of the same name, but were elevated officers, analogous to and ranking with the bishop of the diocese, as numerous in the empire as there were courts of appeal, and each possessing an inferior jurisdiction and staff of officers similar to the Grand Master. Under each rector were placed the faculties or schools of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, physical sciences, the lycæums, colleges, institutions, and pensions, and even the schools of primary instruc-

Constitu-
tion of the
Imperial
University.

(1) Code Nap. Art. Conscription. Southey's Pen. War. i. 23, 28.

(2) Thib. Hist. de Nap. vi. 539, 555. Southey's Pen War. i. 47, 48.

tion. The teachers in all these various schools were either nominated directly by the Grand Master or by the inspectors, counsellors, or rectors who owed their appointments to him; so that, directly or indirectly, they were all brought under the control of the central government. Voluntary schools, or communal colleges as they were called, established by the communities of rural divisions of the empire, were not prohibited, and about four hundred of them were set on foot in the early years of the empire; but it was required that every person who taught in them should take out a graduation at the university, and pay for his license to teach from 200 to 600 francs every ten years; and besides, that the whole sums which they drew should be thrown into a common fund, to be apportioned out by the central government, not according to the number of the scholars which each could produce, or the expenditure which it might require, but the pleasure of the minister to whom the distribution was confided. Under such restrictions it may easily be believed that the communal or voluntary schools rapidly died away, and nearly the whole education of the empire was brought directly under the direction and appointment of government (1).

*Lyceums or
military
academies.
Their regu-
lations and
great im-
portance.*

The government schools, which thus, under the successive gradation of schools of primary instruction, colleges, and lyceums, pervaded the whole empire, were the great instrument to which Napoleon trusted, both for the formation of the national temper into a docile and submissive character, and the direction of its whole moral energies to the purposes of military aggrandizement. All the boys who, in the primary schools, evinced talent, spirit, or aptitude for military exploit, were transferred to the colleges, and from thence to the lyceums. In the latter academies every thing bore a military character; the pupils were distributed into companies, having each its sergeant and corporal; their studies, their meals, their rising and going to bed, were all performed by beat of drum—from the age of twelve they were taught military exercises; their amusements, their games were all of a military character. Nor were other encouragements of a more substantial description wanting. To each lyceum one hundred and fifty bursaries were annexed, paid by government, and bestowed on the most deserving and clever of the young pupils, in order to defray their expenses at the higher military academies, or polytechnic school at Paris; and from the many thousand salaried scholars thus chosen, two hundred and fifty were annually transferred to the special military academies, where they were exclusively maintained at the expense of the state, and when they arrived at the proper age, provided with commissions in the army, or offices in the civil departments of government. Nor was this all—two thousand four hundred youths of the greatest promise, were annually chosen from the conquered or dependent territories, and educated at the military schools at the public expense; and in like manner apportioned out, according to their disposition and talents, into the military or civil services of the empire. At all these schools religion was hardly mentioned; political studies were altogether prohibited; moral disquisitions little regarded; but geography, mathematics, mechanics, the physical sciences, fortification, gunnery, engineering, and whatever tended directly or indirectly to the art of war, sedulously taught and encouraged. The professors in the lyceums and colleges were bound to celibacy; the primary teachers might marry, but in that case they were compelled to lodge without the precincts; a regulation which, to persons of their limited income, seldom exceeding twenty pounds a-year,

amounted to a prohibition. All the teachers, of whatever grade, were liable to instant dismissal on the report of the rectors or inspectors, that any of the rules were infringed. Their emoluments were all derived from government, and their promotion depended entirely on the same authority. The scholars were debarred from all correspondence except with their parents; and letters even from them could only be received in presence of the master. Thus, not only were the whole schools of the empire directed to the purposes of war or abject submission, and directly placed under the control of government, but a spiritual militia established in them all, to enforce every where the mandates and doctrines which it promulgated. Napoléon did not discourage education, but rendered it solely and exclusively subservient to his purposes. He did not destroy the battery, but seized its guns, and skilfully turned them on the enemy. Combining into one government all the known modes of enslaving and degrading mankind, by the conscription, he forced, like Timour or Genghis Khan, all the physical energies of his subjects into the ranks of war, and the prosecution of military aggrandisement: by the police, the state prisons, and the censorship of the press, he enforced every where, like the Byzantine Emperors, implicit obedience to his civil administration, and directed at pleasure the thoughts of his subjects; while, by means of a vast system of centralized education skilfully directed to the purposes of conquest or despotism, and maintained by an order of educational Jesuits abjectly devoted to his will, he aimed, like Loyola or Hildebrand, at throwing still more irremovable chains over the minds of the future generations of mankind (1).

Rapid trans-
ition from
republican
to despotic
ideas.

On one occasion, when the learned and intrepid M. Suard had concluded, in Napoléon's presence, a warm eulogium on the talent with which Tacitus had portrayed the lives and vices of the Roman Emperors, he observed,—"You say well; but he would have done still better if he had told us how it happened that the Roman people tolerated and even loved those bad emperors. It is that which it would have been of the most importance for posterity to know (2)". If this observation is just, as it undoubtedly is, with reference to the Roman emperors, how much more is it applicable to Napoléon himself; for nothing is more certain than that, in the midst of all this despotic rule, when the Emperor was overturning all the principles of the Revolution, draining France of its heart's-blood, and training the generation, educated amidst the fumes of equality, to the degradation of slavery, he was not only tolerated, but almost worshipped by his subjects. This extraordinary change also took place, not as in the Roman empire, after the lapse of centuries, but in one generation. The age of Gracchus was in France instantly succeeded by that of Caligula; the democratic fervour of the contemporaries of Marius, plunged at once into the Eastern adulation of the successors of Constantine.

Remarkable
difference
between the
English and
French Re-
volutions in
this respect.

In this respect, there is a most remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions. In both, indeed, a brief period of democratic fervour was succeeded, as it ever must be in an old state, by a military despotism; but the temper with which this change of government was received in the two countries, was totally at variance, and the frame of government which has been left in each is essentially different. "The English aristocracy," says Madame de Staël, "had more dignity in their misfortunes than the French; for they did not commit the two

(1) Thib. vi. 540, 547. Southey, i. 48, 55. Génie de la Rév. i. 392.

(2) De Staël, Rev. Franç. ii. 387.

immense faults from which the French will never be able to exculpate themselves—the first, that of having united themselves to strangers against their native country; the second, that of having condescended to accept employments in the antechambers of a sovereign who, according to their principles, had no right to the throne (1).” But this remarkable difference was not confined to the aristocracy; all classes in England evinced an early and decided aversion to the violent measures of the army and its chiefs: the nobles and landed proprietors kept aloof from the court of the Protector, neither assisting at his councils nor accepting his repeated offers of lucrative situations; and such was the temper of the Commons, that Cromwell soon found they were totally unmanageable, and therefore disused them as jurymen, and they returned such refractory representatives to Parliament, that none of the Houses which he summoned were allowed to sit more than a few days. England, therefore, was overwhelmed by a military usurpation, but the spirit of the nation was not subdued; and even in its gloomiest periods might be seen traces of a free spirit, and growing marks of that independent disposition which waited only for the death of the unfortunate Usurper to re-establish the national liberties. In France, on the other hand; all classes seemed to vie with each other in fawning upon the triumphant conqueror who had subverted the Revolution; the nobles rushed in crowds into his antechambers, and laid the honours of the monarchy at his feet; the burghers vied with each other in obsequious submission to his will, or graceful flattery to his actions; the *tiers-état* joyfully clothed themselves with his titles, or accepted his employment; the peasantry gave him their best blood, and cheerfully yielded up their children to his ambition. The senate was the echo of his sentiments; the council of state the organ of his wishes; the legislative body the register of his mandates; the legislature was submissive; the electors pliant; the jurymen obedient; and, in the whole monarchy, so recently convulsed with the fervour of democracy, was to be heard only the mandates of power, the incense of flattery, or the voice of adulation.

Its causes.
Superior
violence and
influence of
the French
convulsion.

Much of this extraordinary difference between the immediate effects of the Revolutions in the two countries is, without doubt, to be ascribed to the greater devastation, more sweeping changes, and deeper guilt of the French convulsion. The bloody proscriptions, and unbounded confiscations of the popular party, were the cause which at once occasioned and justified the emigrations of the noblesse. Though political wisdom, equally as true patriotism, should have forbid their uniting their arms, under any circumstances, with the stranger against their native land, yet some allowances must be made for the lacerated feelings of men first driven into exile by a blood-thirsty faction, and then deprived of their estates and reduced to beggary, because they declined to return and place their necks under the guillotine. We can sympathize with the implacable vengeance of those who had seen their parents, brothers, sisters, or children, massacred by an inhuman party, who, by rousing the cupidity of the working classes, had succeeded in establishing the most infernal despotism in their country which had ever disgraced mankind. The excessive misery, too, which democratic ascendancy had produced upon all ranks, and especially the lowest, induced, as its natural result, that universal and ardent desire for the establishment of a powerful and energetic government, which woful experience had proved to be the only practicable mode of terminating the general calamities. The reaction of order and tranquillity against republican

violence and misery, was more powerful and widespread in France than England, because the suffering which had preceded it had been more acute and universal. The despotism of Napoléon was more oppressive and more willingly acquiesced in than that of Cromwell, from the same causes which had rendered the atrocities of the revolutionists in France more excessive than those of the republicans in England.

But this alone will not explain the difference. But after making every allowance for the weight and importance of these circumstances, it is evident that something more is required to explain the extraordinary change in the national disposition which took place from the days of the Revolution to those of the empire. That suffering should produce an alteration of opinion in regard to the merits of the changes which had occasioned it—that the now universally felt evils of democratic government should incline all classes to range themselves under the banners of a single chief, is indeed intelligible; and in truth nothing more than the operations of experience upon the great body of mankind. But that this experience should produce individual baseness—that the fumes of Republicanism should be succeeded, not by the caution of wisdom, but the adulation of selfishness—and that the riot of European liberty should plunge at once into the servility of Eastern despotism, is the extraordinary thing. It is in vain to attempt the explanation of this phenomenon in the influence of an extraordinary man, or the mingled sway of the ambitious passions which an unprecedented career of success had brought to bear upon the nation. These circumstances will never at once alter the character of a people; they cannot convert public spirit into selfishness; they cannot do the work of centuries of progress, or change the age of Fabricius into that of Nero.

It was not the love of freedom, but the desire of elevation which convulsed France. An attentive consideration of these particulars must, with every impartial mind, lead to the conclusion that it was not the spirit of genuine freedom which convulsed France and desolated Europe, but the bastard passion for individual elevation. Both these passions are, indeed, essential to a successful struggle in the later stages of society in favour of liberty, because such a struggle requires the general concurrence of mankind; and such concurrence, except in cases of extraordinary fervour or rural simplicity, is not to be gained but by the combined influence of the selfish and the generous passions of our nature. But every thing in the final result depends on the proportion in which these noble and base ingredients are mingled in the public mind. In either case, if democracy becomes triumphant, suffering will be induced, and a reaction must ensue; but if the generous flame of liberty is the ruling passion, the period of despotic sway and military force will be one of indignant silence, convinced reason, or compulsory submission; if the selfish passion for distinction, or the ardent thirst for authority is the moving power, it will be distinguished by the baseness of servility, the lust of corruption, the rhetoric of adulation. The reason is obvious. In the excesses of power, whether regal, aristocratic, or republican, the disinterested friends of freedom, either in the conservative or liberal ranks, can discover nothing but a matter of unqualified hatred and aversion; but the aspirants after distinction, the candidates for power, the covetous of gold, find in those very excesses the precise objects of their desire, provided only that their benefits accrue to themselves. If, therefore, from the temper of the public mind, it has become evident that democratic anarchy can no longer be maintained, and that the stern sway of authority has, for a season at least, become unavoidable, the selfish and corrupt hasten to throw themselves into its arms, and lavish that flattery on the

single which they formerly bestowed on the many-headed despot, in the hope that they may thus secure to themselves the real objects of their ambition; while the virtuous and patriotic retire altogether from public life, and seek in the privacy of retirement that innocence which can no longer be found in the prominent stations of the world. Then is the period when the indignant lines of the poet are indeed applicable—

“When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station.”

The principles of freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution.

That the spirit of freedom was at no period the ruling passion of the French Revolution, has been declared by all its observers, and clearly demonstrated by the events of its progress. Napoleon and Madame de Stael have concurred in stating, that the desire for equality was the moving principle, and this desire is but another name, in an advanced age, for the selfish passion for individual aggrandisement. Men profess, and for the time perhaps feel, a desire that all should start equal, in order that their own chance of being foremost in the race should be improved: but if they can turn the advantage to their own side, they are in no hurry to share it with those whom they have outstripped. The most ardent of the French Revolutionists showed, by their subsequent conduct, that they had no sort of objection to the most invidious and exclusive distinctions being re-established, provided only that they were conceived in their own favour. The remarkable and luminous facts, that not one of the successive factions which rose to power in the course of the convulsion, ever thought either of limiting the period within which an accused party may be detained in prison, without being brought to trial, or abolishing the odious and degrading fetters of the police, or securing to the minority in opposition to the ruling power, the means of influencing public opinion, by a practically free press, and the undisturbed right of assembling to discuss the measures of government in public meetings, afford insurmountable proofs that nothing was ever farther from their real intentions than the establishment of the principles of genuine freedom. All these parties, indeed, when struggling for power, were loud in their demand for these essential guarantees to liberty, without the full establishment of which its blessings must ever be an empty name: but none, when they attained it, ever thought of carrying their principles into practice, or putting that bit in their own mouths which they had been so desirous of placing in those of their antagonists. None of them evinced the slightest hesitation in taking advantage of, and straining to the utmost, those arbitrary powers which, by common consent, seemed to be left at the disposal of the executive government. The conclusion is unavoidable, that throughout the whole period it was selfish ambition which was the real principle of action; and that, if the love of freedom existed at all, it glowed in so inconsiderable a number of breasts as to be altogether incapable of producing any durable impression on the national fortunes. Nor is this surprising, when it is recollected in what an advanced age of society, and among what a corrupted, and above all, irreligious people the Revolution broke out. The degrees in which the spirit of public freedom and the desire of private aggrandisement will be mingled in every democratic convulsion, must always be almost entirely dependent on the proportion in which the generous and disinterested, or the selfish and grasping passions, previously prevail in the public mind. And, without disputing the influence of other causes, it may safely be affirmed that the main cause of the difference is to be found in the prevalence or the disregard of religious feeling; that it is in its ascendancy that the only effect-

ual safeguard can be found against the temptations to evil, which arise during the progress of social conflicts; and that of all desperate attempts, the most hopeless is, to rear the fabric of civil liberty or public virtue, on any other basis than that Faith, which alone is able to overcome the inherent principles of corruption in the human heart.

General corruption of public opinion which the French Revolution produced.

Of all the manifold and lasting evils which the thorough ascendency of democratic power, even for a short time, produces, perhaps the most lamentable and that of which France, under the empire, afforded the most memorable example, is the utter corruption of public opinion and confusion of ideas which it necessarily induces, terminating at last in the general application to public actions, of no other test but that of success. The way in which this deplorable consequence ensues is very apparent, and it points in the clearest manner to the principle on which alone a good government can be formed. Where property is the ruling, and numbers the controlling power, the opinion of the multitude is necessarily, in the general case, in favour of a virtuous administration, and adverse to the corruptions or oppression of government, because the majority have nothing to gain by such abuses; and where private interest does not intervene, it will always, as in a theatre, be on the side of virtue. However much disposed the holders of authority in such a state may be, unduly to extend its limits, or apply it to their own private purposes, as well as the public service, they are prevented from pushing such abuses to any great excess by the watchful jealousy of the popular classes in the state: But when the people are themselves, or by means of their demagogues, in possession, not merely of the power of controlling and watching the government, but of actually directing its movements and sharing in its profits, this salutary and indispensable check is at once destroyed. From being the determined enemies, the democratic party become at once the most decided supporters of every species of corruption, because they are now to profit by its effects; and although the opposite party, now excluded from office, may be loud in their condemnation of such proceedings, yet, being overthrown in the conflict, they are no longer able to direct the measures of government, and but a minority in the state, they are not, at least till after the lapse of a very long period, able to bring over the majority to their sentiments, or form that general concurrence which can properly be called public opinion. In the interim, every species of abuse is not only practised but loudly applauded by the democratic body now interested in their continuance; and hence, not only the destruction of that invaluable check which, under other circumstances, the opinion of the majority in opposition forms to the misdeeds of the few in power, but the total corruption and depravation of the feelings on public matters of that majority itself. The restraining has now become the moving power; the check upon evil the stimulant to corruption; the flywheel instead of the regulator of the machine, the headlong force which is to hurl it to destruction. Such is the extent of this evil, and such the rapidity with which, under the combined influence of temptation to themselves and impotence in their adversaries, the tyrant majority are seduced into depraved principles and a course of iniquity, that it may perhaps be pronounced the greatest, because the most lasting and irremediable, of the evils of democratic government.

Rapid growth of centralization in this state of public feeling.

CENTRALIZATION in such a state of public feeling, is the great enemy which freedom has to dread, because it is the one which addresses itself to the principles which possess the most durable sway over the human heart. More than military force or anarchical

misrule, it has in every age been the grave of real liberty. If such a withering system is attempted in the healthful state of the body politic, that is, where property and education are the ruling, and numbers and popular zeal the controlling power, it will always experience from the natural jealousy of government on the part of all who do not participate in its advantages, the most decided opposition, and except in extraordinary circumstances, is not likely to meet with any considerable success. But the case is widely different when the democratic rulers are themselves in power. Centralization then goes on at the gallop; and for a very obvious reason, that both the necessities of government, the interests of its democratic supporters, and the experienced evils of the popular election of public functionaries concur in recommending it. The executive being erected on the ruins of, or against the wishes of the holders of property, has nothing to expect from their support, and, therefore, is fain to extend its influence, and provide for its numerous and needy followers, by the multiplication of offices all in the appointment of the central government; the popular leaders, hoping to profit largely by this accumulation of official patronage in the hands of their chiefs, not only in no ways oppose, but give their most cordial support to the same system; while the great mass of the people, disgusted with the weak or corrupt administration of the municipal or local functionaries who owed their elevation to popular election, rapidly and inevitably glide into the opinion, that no mode of appointment can be so bad as that under the evils of which they are now suffering, and that a practically good government can never be attained till the disposal of all offices of any importance is vested in the executive authority. Thus all classes, though for very different reasons, concur in supporting the system of centralization; a system, nevertheless, which, though doubtless often productive of improvement in the outset, in practical administration and local government, is the most formidable enemy in the end which the cause of freedom has to combat, and against which, therefore, it behoves its real friends in an especial manner to be on their guard. The anarchy which is the first effect of democratic ascendancy, necessarily and rapidly terminates in military despotism, that despotism itself, from its brutality and violence, cannot, in any well-informed state, be of very long endurance; but the irresistible sway of a centralized government, established by a democratic executive and sustained by the aid of selfish support from the popular party, may finally crush the spirit and extinguish all the blessings of freedom, by removing all the practical evils which preceding convulsions had occasioned, enlisting alike the friends of order and the partizans of democracy in its ranks, and engaging the most influential portion of the people by interested motives in its support. It was neither the vengeance of Marius, nor the proscriptions of Sylla, neither the aristocracy of Pompey, nor the genius of Cæsar, which finally prostrated the liberties of Rome; it was the centralized government of Augustus which framed the chains which could never be shaken off. There is the ultimate and deadly foe of freedom; there the enemy, ever ready to break in and reap the last spoils of the discord and infatuation of others. And wherever such a centralized system has grown up in an old established state, after a severe course of democratic suffering, it is not going too far to assert that the cause of freedom is utterly hopeless and that the seeds of death are implanted in the community (1).

Striking
opinion of
M. de Toc-
queville on
this subject.

(1) I am happy to find this opinion, which I have long entertained, supported by the great authority of M. de Tocqueville. "If absolute power," says he, "should re-establish

itself, in whatever hands, in any of the democratic states of Europe, I have no doubt it would assume a new form unknown to our fathers. When the great families and the spirit of chivalry prevailed the individual who had to contend with tyranny

Ability with which Napoleon took advantage of these circumstances to establish despotic power.

It is in these predisposing circumstances that we must look for the real causes, not merely of the despotism of Napoléon, but, of the ready reception which it met with from all classes, and the alacrity with which the fervent passions of democracy were converted at once into the debasing servility of Asiatic despotism. The Republican writers fall into the most palpable error when they accuse that great man of having overturned the principles of the Revolution, and of being the real cause of its terminating in the establishment, of arbitrary power. So far from it, he worked out these principles to their natural and unavoidable result; he did no more than reap the harvest, from the crop which had been sown by other and very different hands. The real authors of the despotism of Napoléon, were those who overturned the monarchy of Louis. It was Siéyès and Mirabeau, and the exalted spirits of the Constituent Assembly, who set in motion the chain of causes and effects which necessarily, in their final result, induced the chains of the empire. Doubtless, Napoléon availed himself with great skill of the extraordinary combination of circumstances, which had thus in a manner presented despotism to his grasp. The leading principles of his government, as Madame de Staël has well observed, were to respect studiously the *interests* which the Revolution had created, to turn its *passions* into the career of military conquest, or civil ambition, to open the career of success alike to all who deserved it, and to govern public opinion by a skilful use of the influence of the press (1). No maxims more likely to govern an active, energetic and corrupted people could possibly have been devised; but still they would have failed in producing the desired effect, and the attempt to enslave France would have proved abortive, even in his able hands, if success had not been rendered certain by the madness and guilt which preceded him. And in executing the mission on which he firmly believed he was sent, to close the wounds and put a stop to the horrors of the Revolution, we are not to imagine that he was to blame, so far at least as his domestic government was concerned. On the contrary, he took the only measures which remained practicable to restrain its excesses, or put a period to its suffering; and subsequent experience has abundantly proved that every government which was founded on any other principles, or practically gave the people any share of that power for which they had so passionately contended, involved in itself the seeds of its speedy destruction.

never felt himself alone, he was supported by his clients, his relations, his friends. But when his estates are divided, and races are confounded, where shall we find the spirit of family? What force will remain to the influence of habit among a people changing perpetually, where every act of tyranny will find a precedent in previous disorders, where every crime can be justified by an example; where nothing exists of sufficient antiquity to render its destruction an object of dread, and nothing can be figured so new that men are afraid to engage in it? What resistance would manners afford which have already received so many shocks? What could public opinion do, when twenty persons do not exist, bound together by any common tie; when they can no more meet with a man, a family, a body corporate, nor a class of society, which could represent, or act upon that opinion; when each citizen is equally poor, equally impotent, equally isolated, and can only oppose his individual weakness to the organized strength of the central government? To figure any thing analogous to the despotism which would then be established amongst us, we

would require to recur not to our own annals, we would be forced to recur to the frightful periods of Roman tyranny, when manners being corrupted, old recollections effaced, habits destroyed, opinions wavering, liberty deprived of its asylum under the laws, could no longer find a place of refuge; where no guarantee existing for the citizens, and they having none for themselves, men in power made a sport of the people, and princes wore out the clemency of the Heavens, rather than the patience of their subjects. They are blind indeed who look after democratic equality for the monarchy of Henry IV or Louis XIV. For my own part, when I reflect on the state to which many European nations have already arrived, and that to which others are fast tending, I am led to believe that soon there will be no place among them but for *democratic equality or the tyranny of the Caesars*." TOCQUEVILLE, ii. 253, 259. What a picture of the effects of democratic triumph from a liberal writer, himself an eyewitness to its effects!

(1) Rev. Franç. ii. 255. d by Google

But this
how great
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the Revolu-
tion.

And although nothing can be more certain than that centralization is the ultimate extinguisher of freedom, and the insidious foe which, elevated on its triumphs, is finally destructive of its principles; yet it is not, in such a state of society as France was in the time of Napoléon, to be regarded as an evil which it was the duty of a real patriot to resist. As long, indeed, as the elements of freedom exist in a state,—that is, as long as the higher and middling classes retain their public spirit and their possessions, it is impossible that public jealousy can be too strongly aroused on this subject, or that it can be too strongly impressed upon the people; that if all the interests of the state are centred in the hands of the executive, be it monarchical or democratic, the extinction, not only of the rights, but of the spirit, of freedom is at hand, and nothing remains to the state but an old age of decrepitude and decline. But if the people would shun these evils, they must pause in the threshold of their career, and avoid the destruction of those classes inferior to the throne, though superior to themselves, whose influence forms an essential ingredient in the composition of public freedom. The English did so—the rights of the middling ranks, the church, and the aristocracy, survived the triumphs of Cromwell, and in consequence, two hundred years of liberty have been enjoyed by the British nation. The French did not do so—the church, the middling ranks, and the aristocracy were utterly destroyed during the fervour of the Revolution; and in consequence, notwithstanding all their sufferings since that time, they have not enjoyed one hour of real freedom. Many struggles have ensued, and may ensue, for the possession of supreme power; many revolutions of the palace have shaken, and may hereafter shake, the fabric of their society; but no attempt has been made, or will be made, to limit the power of their executive or extend the liberty of their people. The centralized, despotic government of Napoléon, still remains untouched—the question with all parties is, not whether its powers shall be restrained, but who shall direct them? The more popular and democratic the faction is which gains the ascendancy, the more formidable does the action of the state machine become, because the weaker is the counteracting force which is to restrain its motions. If the extreme democratic party were to succeed to power, the force of the centralized government, based on the support of the people, would, in a short time, become wellnigh insupportable. In the triumphs which they achieved, and the crimes which they committed, the early revolutionists poured the poison which ever proves fatal to freedom through the veins of their country; with their own hands they dug the grave of its liberties; nothing remained to their descendants but to lie down and receive their doom. When this last deplorable effect has taken place, it becomes the duty of the patriot no longer to resist the centralizing system; but to support it as the only species of administration, under which, since freedom is unattainable, the minor advantage of a tranquil despotism can be attained.

Ultimate
effect on ge-
neral free-
dom of re-
sistance to
democracy
in England,
and its tri-
umph in
France.

It was a rule in one of the republics of antiquity, that no public monument should be voted to any person who had been engaged in the administration of affairs till ten years after his death, in order that the ultimate effect of his measures, whether for good or for evil, should be first fully developed. Judging by this principle, to how few characters in the French Revolution will the friends of freedom, in future times, rear a mausoleum; to how many will the abettors of arbitrary power, if their real opinions could be divulged, be inclined to erect statues! Looking forward for the short period of only

eighteen years, not a month in the lifetime of a nation, and seeing in the servility and sycophancy of the empire the necessary effects of the vehemence and injustice of the Constituent Assembly, what opinion are we to form of the self-styled patriots and philosophers of the day, who thus, in so short a time, blasted the prospects and withered the destiny of their country? Who were the real friends of freedom? Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke, who, by combating the ambition of democracy and coercing its extravagance in this country, have bequeathed to their descendants the glorious and enduring fabric of British liberty; or Mirabeau and Danton, who, by achieving for its votaries a bloody triumph on the banks of the Seine, plunged their children and all succeeding ages into the inextricable fetters of a centralized despotism? It is fitting, doubtless, that youth should rejoice; but it is fitting also that manhood should be prosperous and old age contented; and the seducers, whether of individuals or nations, are little to be commended, who, taking advantage of the passions of early years or the simplicity of inexperience, precipitate their victims into a course of iniquity, and lead them, through a few months of vicious indulgence or delirious excitement, to a life of suffering and an old age of contempt!

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS OF EUROPE FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

JULY 1807—SPRING 1808.

ARGUMENT.

General Suffering and Dismay produced in Russia by the treaty of Tilsit—Universal feeling of Despondence which it occasioned in Great Britain—Continental Changes by which it was followed—Constitution for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw—Constitution of the Kingdom of Westphalia—Oppressive Military Government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Hanse Towns—Excessive Rigour of the treatment which Prussia experienced—Fresh Requisitions imposed on its inhabitants—Limitation of its regular forces, and intersection of its territory by military roads—Wise internal measures adopted by the Prussian Government—Accession of Baron Stein to the Ministry—His firm Character and admirable Measures—Salutary Reforms which he introduced into the kingdom—Varied Causes of Distress in Prussia, which lead to the exile of Stein—History, Character, and great military Reforms of Scharnborst—Rise and progress of the Tugendbund and Secret Societies in the north of Germany—Illustrious and patriotic Characters which that Secret Society embraced—Situation, Statistics, and Power of Austria at this period—She joins the Continental System, and thereby obtains the evacuation of Brauneau—Resources, Statistics, and Strength of the Austrian monarchy—Affairs in Sweden—its Continental forces are shut up in Stralsund—Siege and Fall of that fortress—Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen—Reasons which led to the Copenhagen Expedition—Resolution of the British Cabinet in regard to it—Equipment and departure of the Expedition—Ineffectual Negotiation with Denmark—Proclamation of Lord Cathcart to the inhabitants of Zealand, and reply of the Prince Regent of Denmark—Siege of Copenhagen—First action of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Europe—Surrender of the City and Fleet to the English forces—Great sensation excited in Europe by the Expedition—Justification of it soon afforded by Napoléon—General Feeling of England on the subject—Argument in Parliament against the Expedition—Argument in support of it by the Ministers—The secret Article of the Treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet is at length produced, which settles the question—Napoléon's real opinion regarding it—Ineffectual mediation of Russia between England and France—Rupture of that power with Great Britain—Concurring statement of the English and French Ambassadors on its causes—The Russians declare war against Sweden—Russian Manifesto against England—Declaration by Great Britain in reply—Denmark enters cordially into the war against Sweden and England—Affairs of Russia and Turkey—Curious secret Despatch from Savary at St. Petersburg to Napoléon on this subject—The Turks, finding themselves betrayed by the French, prepare themselves to renew the war—Changes in Constitution of the Italian States—Union of Parma and Placentia to France—Great Works undertaken at Milan—and state of Italy at this period—Farther encroachments of Napoléon on the side of Holland, Germany, and Italy—Reflections on the imminent hazard to Europe from the Treaty of Tilsit, and from the division of its kingdoms between two potentates—Importance of the blow already struck by England at Napoléon's new naval confederacy.

General suffering and dismay produced in Russia by the Treaty of Tilsit.

If the treaty of Tilsit was productive of glory to the Emperor Napoléon, and transport and opulence to the citizens of his victorious capital, it was the commencement of a period of suffering, ignominy, and bondage to the other capitals of continental Europe. Russia, it was true, had extricated herself unscathed from the strife; her military renown had suffered no diminution on the field of Eylau, or in the agony of Friedland; it was apparent to all the world, that she had been outnumbered by banded Europe, not conquered by France, in the strife. But still she had failed in the object of the war; her arms, instead of being advanced to the Rhine, were thrown back to the Niemen; in indignant silence her warriors had re-entered their country, and surrendered to their irresistible rivals the mastery of Western Europe. If the Czar had been seduced

by the artifice of Napoléon, or dazzled by the halo of glory which encircled his brows; if the army was proud of having so long arrested, with inferior forces, the conqueror before whom the Austrian and Prussian monarchies had sunk to the dust, the nobles were not carried away by the general illusion; they saw clearly, amidst the flattery which was lavished on their rulers, the gilded chains which were imposed on their country. They could not disguise from themselves that France had not only acquired by this treaty an irresistible preponderance in Western and Central Europe, but subjected Russia herself to her command; that the price at which all the advantages of the treaty to the empire of the Czar had been purchased was its accession to the Continental System, and the closing of its ports to the ships of Great Britain; and that thus not only were they likely to be deprived of half their wonted revenue from their estates, by losing the principal market for their produce, but compelled to contribute to the aggrandizement of a rival empire, already too powerful for their independence, and which, it was foreseen, would, ere long, aim a mortal stroke at their national existence. So strong and universal were these feelings among the whole aristocratic and commercial circles, that when General Savary, whom Napoléon had chosen as his ambassador at the Russian capital, on account of the address he had exhibited, and the favour with which he had been received by Alexander at the time of the battle of Austerlitz (1), arrived at St.-Petersburg, he experienced, by his own avowal, the utmost difficulty in finding any furnished hotel where he would obtain admission; and during the first six weeks of his stay there, though he was overwhelmed with attention from the Emperor, he did not receive one invitation from any of the nobility; and while he saw the guests whom he met at the palace depart in crowds to the balls and concerts of that scene of festivity, he himself returned, mortified and disconsolate, from the Imperial table to his own apartments (2).

General feeling of despondence which prevailed in Great Britain. In the British dominions the disastrous intelligence produced a different, but perhaps still more mournful feeling. England was, by her maritime superiority, relieved from the apprehensions of immediate danger, and the general resolution to maintain the contest continued unabated; but a feeling of despondence pervaded the public mind, and the strife was persevered in rather from the stern principle of dogged resistance, or a sense of the impossibility of making a secure accommodation, than from any hope that the war could be brought to a successful issue. This general impression cannot be better portrayed than in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, the able champion, in its early days, of the French Revolution:—"I do not indeed despair of the human race; but the days and nights of mighty revolutions have not yet been measured

(1) *Ante*, v. 225.

(2) Savary, *iii.* 98. 100. *Hard*, x. 28, 29.

In Savary's case the general aversion to the cause of France was increased by the part which he was known to have taken in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, which had been one of the leading causes of the irritation which led to the war. Napoléon, charmed at having extricated himself with credit from so perilous and unprofitable a contest, gave the most positive injunctions to his envoy at the Russian court at all hazards to avoid its renewal. "I have just concluded peace," said he to Savary; "they tell me I have done wrong, and that I shall repent it; but, by my faith, we have had enough of war—we must give repose to the world. I am going to send you to St Petersburg as chargé d'affaires till an ambassador is appointed; you will have the direction of my affairs there; lay it down as the

ruing principle of your conduct that any further contest is to be avoided; nothing would displease me so much as to be involved in that quarter in fresh embarrassments. Talleyrand will tell you what to do, and what has been arranged between the Emperor of Russia and me. I am about to give repose to the army in the country we have conquered, and to enforce payment of the contribution; that is the only difficulty which I anticipate; but regulate yourself by this principle, that *I will on no account be again drawn into the contest*. Never speak of war; in conversation studiously avoid every thing which may give offence; contravene no usage; ridicule no custom. Neglect nothing which may draw closer and perpetuate the bonds of alliance now contracted with that country."—SAVARY, *iii.* 96, 97, and *HARD*, x. 29.

by human intellect. Though the whole course of human affairs may be towards a better state, experience does not justify us in supposing that many steps of the progress may not be immediately for the worse. The race of man may at last reach the promised land; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity, of all that we can discover, is very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France is the least part of the evil; it might be necessary for a time to moderate the vibrations of the pendulum in that agitated state; but what are the external effects of these convulsions? Europe is now covered with a multitude of dependant despots, whose existence depends on their maintaining the paramount tyranny in France. *The mischief has become too intricate to be unravelled in our day; an evil greater than despotism, or rather the worst and most hideous form of despotism, approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established; then all the spirit, variety, and emulation of separate nations, which the worst forms of internal government have not utterly extinguished, will vanish. And in that state of things, if we may judge from past examples, the whole energy of human intellect and virtue will languish, and can scarce be revived otherwise than by an infusion of barbarism (1).*" Such were the anticipations of the greatest intellects of the age, even among those who had originally been most favourable to the democratic principle, and that, too, on the eve of the Peninsular campaign, and at no great distance from the general resurrection of Europe after the Moscow retreat; a memorable example of the fallacy of any political conclusions founded upon the supposed durability of the causes at any one time in operation; and of the oblivion of that provision for the remedy of intolerable evils, by the reaction of mankind against their sufferings, and of the general intermixture of the principles of good and evil in human affairs, which, as it is the most general lesson to be deduced from history, so is it fitted above all others to inspire moderation in prosperous, and constancy in adverse affairs.

Constitution for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The political changes consequent in Central Europe on the treaty of Tilsit were speedily developed. On his route to Paris, Napoléon met a deputation of eight of the principal nobles, in the French interest, of Prussian Poland at Dresden; and Talleyrand, in a few days, produced a constitution for the Grand Duchy, calculated, as he thought, at once to satisfy the general wish for a restoration of their nationality, and accord with the despotic views of the Emperors of the East and West. By this deed, which was produced with more than usual rapidity, even in those days of constitution manufacture, the ducal crown was declared to be hereditary in the Saxon family; the Grand Duke was invested with the whole executive power, and he alone had the privilege of proposing laws to the Diet, with whom the prerogative remained of passing or rejecting them. This Diet was composed of a Senate of eighteen, named by the Grand Duke, embracing six bishops and twelve lay nobles, and a Chamber of Deputies of a hundred members; sixty being named by the nobility, and forty by the boroughs. The Chambers, like those at Paris, were doomed to silence; they could only decide on the arguments laid before them, on the part of the Government, by the orators of the Council of State—and of the Chambers, by commissions appointed by them. This mockery of a Parliament was to assemble only once in two years, and then to sit only fifteen days. The ardent plebeian noblesse of Poland, whose democratic passions had so long brought desolation on their

(1) Sir James Mackintosh to W. Ogilvie, Feb. 24, 1800. Mem. i. 383, 384.

country, found little in these enactments to gratify their wishes; but a substantial improvement was made in the condition of the peasantry, by a clause declaring that the whole serfs were free. No time, however, was left for reflection; the deputies were constrained to accept it; and the new constitution of Poland was not only framed, but sworn to at Dresden during the brief period of Napoleon's sojourn there on his route to Paris (1).

Constitution of the Kingdom of Westphalia, Dec. 18. 1807. The constitution given to the new kingdom of Westphalia was, in like manner, founded entirely upon the model of that of France. It contained a King, Council of State, Senate, silent aristocratic Legislature, and public orators, like all those cast at this period, from the Parisian mould. The throne was declared hereditary in the family of Jérôme Bonaparte, the Emperor's brother, and first sovereign; one half of the allodial territories of the former sovereigns, of which the new kingdom was composed, were placed at the disposal of Napoleon, as a fund from which to form estates for his military followers; provision was made for payment of the military contributions levied by France, before any part of the revenue was obtained by the new sovereign; the kingdom was declared to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, and its military contingent, drawn from a population of about two millions of souls, fixed at 25,000 men; in default of heirs-male of his body, the succession to the throne was to devolve to Napoleon and his heirs by birth or adoption. Every corporate right and privilege was abolished—trial by jury and in open court introduced in criminal cases; all exclusive privileges and exemptions from taxation annulled—the nobility preserved, but deprived of their former invidious rights. The Chamber of Deputies consisted of a hundred members, of whom seventy were chosen from the landed aristocracy, fifteen from the commercial, and fifteen from the literary classes. Salutary changes! if the equality which they were calculated to induce was the enjoyment of equal rights and general security, but utterly fatal to freedom, if they were only fitted to introduce an equality of servitude, and disable any individuals or associated bodies from taking the lead in the contest for the public liberties with the executive power (2).

Oppressive military government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Rhine Towns. The states of the Rhenish confederacy had flattered themselves, that the general peace concluded on the shores of the Niemen would finally deliver them from the scourge of warlike armaments and military contributions, but they were soon cruelly undeceived. Shortly after the general pacification, and before they had recovered from the burden of maintaining, clothing, and lodging the numerous corps of the Grand Army which traversed their territories on the road to the Rhine, they were overwhelmed by the entry of a fresh body of forty thousand men, who issued from France and took the route of the Vistula, still at the sole expense of the allied states. They were speedily followed by a body of Spaniards, drawn from Italy, and which went to augment the corps of Romana, under the orders of Bernadotte, on the shores of the Baltic; a sad omen for succeeding times, when the conclusion of peace was immediately succeeded by fresh irruptions of armed men, and burdensome preparations, at the cost of the allied states, for future hostilities. It soon appeared that the stipulations in favour of the conquered territories in the formal treaties, were to be a mere empty name; it had been provided at Tilsit that Bantzig was to be a free city, governed by its own magistrates; but Rapp, the new governor, was speedily introduced at the head of a numerous

(1) Harj. ix. 448, 449. Bign. vi. 387, 388. Lucches ii. 14, 19.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 783. State Papers. Bign. vi. 389, 390. Mart. Sup., iv. 493.

French garrison, who summarily expelled the Prussian inhabitants, and began the rigorous enforcement of the French military contributions and the Continental System. The same system of government was sternly acted upon in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, and all the Hanse Towns; Bourrienne continued to enforce it with such severity at Hamburg, that the trade of the place was entirely ruined, and large sums remitted quarterly to the Taileries, out of the last fruits of the commercial enterprise of the Hanse Towns (1).

But most of all did the ruthless hand of conquest fall with unmitigated rigour on the inhabitants of Prussia. Hard as their lot appeared to be, as it was chalked out in the treaty of Tilsit, it was yet enviable, compared to that which, in the course of the pacification which followed, actually ensued from the oppressive exactions of the French Government, and the unbounded insolence of its soldiery. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty which reft them of half their dominions, the King and Queen repaired to Memel, where they were compelled to sign a fresh convention, which, under pretext of providing for the liquidation of the contributions and speedy evacuation of their territories, in effect subjected them, without any appearance of termination, to those intolerable burdens. By this treaty it was provided that the evacuation of the fortresses, with the exception of Stettin, Custring, and Glogau, should take place before the 1st November; but that on the condition only, that the whole contributions were previously paid up; a condition which it was well known could not be complied with, as they amounted to above four times the revenue of the whole kingdom before its dismemberment (2), in addition to the burden of feeding, clothing, paying, and lodging above one hundred and fifty thousand men, for which no credit was given in estimating their amount by the French commissaries. By a second convention, concluded at Elbing three months afterwards, the

King and Queen repaired to Memel, where they were compelled to sign a fresh convention, which, under pretext of providing for the liquidation of the contributions and speedy evacuation of their territories, in effect subjected them, without any appearance of termination, to those intolerable burdens. By this treaty it was provided that the evacuation of the fortresses, with the exception of Stettin, Custring, and Glogau, should take place before the 1st November; but that on the condition only, that the whole contributions were previously paid up; a condition which it was well known could not be complied with, as they amounted to above four times the revenue of the whole kingdom before its dismemberment (2), in addition to the burden of feeding, clothing, paying, and lodging above one hundred and fifty thousand men, for which no credit was given in estimating their amount by the French commissaries. By a second convention, concluded at Elbing three months afterwards, the

unhappy monarch, instead of the single military road through his territories from Dresden to Warsaw, stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit, was compelled to allow five passages, two for troops and five for commercial purposes, to Saxony, Poland, and their respective allies—a stipulation which in effect cut them through the middle, and subjected the inhabitants on these roads to unnumbered exactions and demands, both from the French and allied troops. Rapp soon after, instead of a territory of two leagues in breadth around the walls of Dantzic, as provided in the treaty, seized upon one two German miles, or eight English miles broad, counting from the extreme point of its outworks; while by a third convention, in the beginning of November, Prussia was not only forced to cede to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw New Silesia and the circle of Michelau, no inconsiderable addition to the losses, already enormous, imposed by the treaty of Tilsit, but to ratify the ample grants out of the hereditary revenues of the Prussian crown made by the Emperor Napoléon in favour of Berthier, Mortier, and other of his military chiefs (3).

Vexatious as these fresh demands were, and cruelly as their bitterness was aggravated by the arrogant manner in which compliance was demanded by the French authorities, they were inconsiderable compared to the enormous burden of the military requisitions which, from this time till the opening of the Russian campaign, perpetually drained away all the resources of Prussia. Not content with the crushing exactions to the amount of six hundred millions

Excessive
rigour of the
treatment
which Prussia
experienced.

Fresh re-
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imposed on
Prussia,
limitation of
its regular
forces, and
imposition
of fresh mi-
litary roads.

(1) Bour. vii. 231, 240. Hard. ix. 442, 443, Lucches. ii. 14, 17.

(2) They amounted to 600,000,000 francs, or L.24,000,000; and the revenue of Prussia, before

the war, was about L.4,500,000.—*See ante*, v. 67, and vi. 142.

(3) Hard. ix. 451, 454. Mart. Sep. iv. 452, 474.

of francs (L.24,000,000), already imposed during the war; Daru, the French receiver-general for the north of Germany, brought forward after the peace fresh claims to the amount of 154,000,000 (L.6,200,000); and although that able functionary, on the earnest representations of the King, consented to take 35,000,000 francs off this enormous requisition, the French minister Champagny, by the directions of Napoléon, raised it again to the original sum. It was at length fixed at one hundred and forty millions, (L.5,600,000), and Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin pledged for its final liquidation, on condition that, till that took place, a French corps of ten thousand men, should be put in possession of these fortresses, and maintained there entirely at the expense of Prussia. All this was exclusive of the cost of feeding, paying, and clothing the whole French troops still on or passing through the Prussian territory, who were not short of a hundred thousand men. In addition to this, the King was obliged to bind himself not to keep on foot during ten years, more than forty-two thousand men, and to permit his dominions to be traversed by five additional military roads between Warsaw, Dresden, Dantzic, and Magdeburg. Thus, while his territory was intersected in every direction by military chaussées for the benefit of his enemies, his chief fortresses still in their hands, and his subjects oppressed by the merciless exactions of a prodigious army, quartered apparently without end upon their industry, his own troops were reduced to so low an amount as to be barely equal to the collection of the revenue required by so vast a host of depredators. And to complete the picture of his misfortunes, the King was immediately compelled to adopt the Continental System, and declare war against Great Britain; a measure which, by exposing his harbours to blockade, and totally destroying his foreign commerce, seemed to render utterly hopeless the discharge of the overwhelming pecuniary burdens with which his kingdom was loaded (1)!

While internal measures adopted by the Prussian government.

To all human appearance the power of Prussia was now completely destroyed; and the monarchy of the Great Frederick seemed to be bound in fetters more strict and galling than had ever, in modern times, been imposed on an independent state. And, doubtless, if these misfortunes had fallen on a people and a government not endowed in the highest degree with the spirit of patriotism and constancy in misfortune, this effect would have taken place. But adversity is the true test of political as well as private virtue, and those external calamities which utterly crush the feeble or degenerate, serve only to animate the exertions and draw forth the energy of the uncorrupted portion of mankind. While the diplomatists of Europe were speculating on the entire extinction of Prussia as an independent power, and the only question appeared to be, to what fortunate neighbour the remnant of her territories would be allotted, a new and improved system of administration was adopted in all the branches of her government, and the foundation was laid in present suffering and humiliation, of future elevation and glory. Instead of sinking in despair under the misfortunes by which they were oppressed, the King and his Ministers were only roused by them to additional exertions to sustain the public fortunes. During the long period of peace which Prussia had experienced since the treaty of Basle, in the midst of wars and disasters all around her, Frederick William had enjoyed ample opportunities for cultivating his natural taste for the fine arts; and already a gallery of paintings was, at the opening of the campaign, far advanced at Berlin, which promised ere long to rival the far-famed mu-

seums of Munich, Dresden, or Paris. But all these gems in his crown were torn away by the ruthless hand of conquest; and his much loved monuments of genius now adorned the halls of the Louvre or graced the palace of the French Emperor. Driven by necessity to more important pursuits, the first care of the King, upon the termination of hostilities, was to free the public service from those whose temporizing and unworthy policy, or treacherous and pusillanimous conduct, had induced the general calamities. Haugwitz remained forgotten and neglected at his country residence; Hardenberg, whose great abilities were loudly called for in the present crisis, and who had been the leading Minister since hostilities had been resolved on, was compelled by the jealousy of Napoléon, not only to leave the government, but retire from the country; and it was only after the withdrawal of the French armies that he obtained leave to re-enter Prussia and return to his rural seat of Templeberg. The chancellor Goldbeck and all the inferior ministers, Massow, Reck, d'Auger, Thulmeyer, and their coadjutors, were dismissed, to the great satisfaction of the public; and the generals and inferior officers, who had so disgracefully yielded up the bulwarks of the monarchy after the catastrophe of Jena, were in a body removed from the army. Yet even here the humane and perhaps prudent disposition of the King, prevailed over the justly roused feeling of general indignation at such unworthy betrayers of national trusts; and instead of grounding their dismissal on their notorious dereliction of duty, it was in general rested on the destitute state of the public treasury and the necessity of rigorous economy in every branch of administration. The enquiry, however, under the direction of the Princes Royal, was carried through every department and grade in the army; and to demonstrate its entire impartiality, the heroic Blücher himself was subjected to the same test with his less intrepid brethren in arms (1)!

Accession of
Baron Stein
to the Mi-
nistry. His
firm charac-
ter, and ad-
mirable
measures.

Deprived by the unworthy jealousy of Napoléon of the assistance of Hardenberg's counsels, the King of Prussia had still the courage, in the almost desperate state of his fortunes, to have recourse to a statesman who, like him, had been distinguished in an especial manner by his hatred. It is to the great abilities, enlightened patriotism, and enduring constancy of the BARON STEIN, that Prussia is indebted for the measures which laid the foundation of the resurrection of the monarchy. This eminent man, born in 1736, had entered the public service in the Administration of the State Mines, under the great Frederick, in 1780; but his admirable talents for business soon raised him to the direction of the customs and excise in 1784, which he held till the breaking out of the war in 1806, when he withdrew to his estates, and remained in retirement till again

called to the public service in the beginning of October, 1807. During his active employment he acquired, by the accuracy and fidelity of his administration, the esteem both of his sovereign and his fellow-citizens; and, during his subsequent retirement, he had ample opportunities for meditating on the causes which had brought such calamities on his country. So clearly were his ideas formed, and so decided his conviction as to the only means which remained of reinstating the public affairs, that he commenced at once a vigorous, but yet cautious system of amelioration; and, only four days after

his appointment as Minister of the Interior, a royal decree appeared, which introduced a salutary reform into the constitution (2).

By this ordinance, the peasants and burghers obtained the right, hitherto confined to the nobles of acquiring and holding landed property, while they

(1) Hard. ix. 456, 459. Lucches. ii. 8, 17.

(2) Hard. ix. 460, 461.

Admirable
reforms
which he
introduced
in Prussia.

in their turn were permitted, without losing cast, to engage in the pursuits of commerce and industry. Landholders were allowed, under reservation of the rights of their creditors, to separate their estates into distinct parcels, and alienate them to different persons. Every

species of slavery, whether contracted by birth, marriage or agreement, was prohibited subsequent to the 11th November, 1810; and every servitude, *corvée*, or obligation of service or rent, other than those founded on the rights of property or express agreement, was for ever abolished. By a

second ordinance, published six weeks afterwards, certain important franchises were conferred on municipalities. By this wise decree, which is in many respects the magna charta of the Prussian burghs, it was provided that the burghers should enjoy councillors of their own election, for regulating all local and municipal concerns: that a third of the number should go out by rotation, and be renewed by an election every year; that the council thus chosen should assemble twice a-year to deliberate on public affairs; that two burgomasters should be at the head of the magistracy, one of whom should be chosen by the King from a list of three presented, and the other by the councillors; and that the police of the burgh should be administered by a syndic appointed for twelve years, and who should also have a seat in the municipal council. The administration of the *haute Police*, or that connected with the state, was reserved to government. By a third or-

Nov. 24. dinance, an equally important alteration was made in favour of the numerous class of debtors, whom the public calamities had disabled from performing their engagements, by prohibiting all demand for the capital sums till the 24th June, 1810, providing at the same time for the punctual payment of the interest, under pain of losing the benefit of the ordinance. Thus, at the very moment that France, during the intoxication consequent on the triumphs of Jena and Friedland, was losing the last remnant of the free institutions which had been called into existence during the fervour and crimes of the Revolution, Prussia, amidst the humiliation of unprecedented disasters, and when groaning under the weight of foreign chains, was silently relaxing the fetters of the feudal system, and laying the foundation, in a cautious and guiltless reformation of experienced grievances, for the future erection of those really free institutions which can never be established on any other basis than those of justice, order, and religion (1).

Various
causes of
distress in
Prussia.
Stein ex-
cited.

In the prosecution, however, of these glorious, because wise and judicious, plans of public improvement, Stein had great difficulties to encounter. Government was overwhelmed by a multitude of civil servants, to the number of seven thousand, who had been deprived of their situations in the ceded provinces, and whose just prayers for relief could not be attended to by a treasury drained of the last farthing by the charges of the war, and the inordinate requisitions of the French armies. The rapid absorption of the precious metals by these rigorous taskmasters, the general practice of hoarding which their depredations occasioned, and the necessity in consequence of having recourse to a currency of a baser alloy, or paper money, to supply the deficiency, had totally deranged the monetary system, and occasioned a rapid enhancement of prices, under which the labouring classes suffered severely. The closing of the harbours against foreign commerce, in consequence of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, put the finishing stroke to the public distress, and raised such a ferment that the King was obliged to yield to the general clamour and the representations

of the French authorities, who dreaded the effects of such an intrepid system of government, and sent Stein into honourable exile in Russia. So rapidly was this insisted on by the Ministers of Napoléon, that the last of these regenerating measures, dated 24th November, 1807, were signed by his successors, M. Dohna and Altenstein. But by this ebullition of jealousy the French Emperor gained nothing; the merit of Stein was too generally known by the intelligent classes to be forgotten; from his retreat in Courland he really directed the Prussian councils; and by the appointment of SCHARNHORST to the elevated office of Minister of War, the door was opened to a variety of important changes in that department, which were of the highest consequence six years afterwards in the mortal struggle for European freedom (1).

History,
character,
and great
military re-
forms of
Scharn-
horst.

Gerard David de Scharnhorst, who was now intrusted with the military direction of Prussia, and whose great scientific abilities subsequently rendered him so distinguished in the fields of European glory, had quitted the Hanoverian service for that of Prussia in 1801. Taken prisoner at Lubeck, but subsequently exchanged, he had powerfully contributed, by his decisive conduct at the critical moment with Lestocq's corps, to the brilliant result of the battle of Eylau. In him a blameless life and amiable manners were combined with the purest patriotism and the soundest judgment; exalted attainments were undisfigured by pride; vigour of thought was adorned by simplicity of character. The perfection of the French military organization, as well as the energy of their army, appeared to him in painful contrast beside the numerous defects, and dejected spirit, of that over which he now presided; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of his situation, he was only inspired by the magnitude of the evil with additional ardour in the work of amelioration, and induced, like Stein, to take advantage of the general consternation to effect several salutary reforms; which, in more tranquil times, might have been seriously obstructed by the prejudices of aristocratic birth, or the suggestions of interested ambition. Boldly applying to the military department the admirable principles by which Stein had secured the affections of the burgher classes, he threw open to the whole citizens the higher grades of the army, from which they had hitherto been excluded, abolished the degrading corporal punishments by which the spirit of the soldier had been withered, and removed those invidious distinctions, which, by exempting some classes from the burden of personal service in the army, made its weight fall with additional severity on those who were not relieved. Every department of the service underwent his searching eye; in all he introduced salutary reforms, rectified experienced abuses, and electrified the general spirit, by opening to merit the career of promotion; while the general strength of the army was silently augmented to an extent which afterwards became in the highest degree important, by the introduction of an equally simple and efficacious regulation. By the subsisting engagements with Napoléon, it was provided that Prussia should not keep on foot more than forty-two thousand men, a stipulation which at once cast her down to the rank of a fourth-rate power, and totally disabled her from assuming the attitude of resistance to the numerous and hourly increasing demands of the French armies. To elude its operation, and at the same time avoid any direct or obvious infringement of the treaty, he took care never to have more than the agreed on number of men at once in arms, but no sooner were the young soldiers sufficiently drilled than they were sent home to their hearths, and other recruits called

Der. 15.
1807, and
Jan. 7. 1808.

to the national standards, who, in like manner, after a brief period of service, made way for others in succession. By this simple but admirable system, which is the true secret of the political strength and military renown of Prussia, so much beyond the physical resources of the monarchy, a military spirit was diffused through the whole population; service in the army came to be considered, instead of a degradation, as an agreeable recreation after the severe labours of pacific life; the manner, carriage, and intelligence of those who returned from their standards were so much superior to those of the rustics who had remained at home, that no Prussian damsel would look at a youth who had not served his country; the passion for arms became universal; and while forty thousand only were enrolled in the regular army, two hundred thousand brave men were trained to arms and ready at a moment's warning to join the standards of their country (1).

Rise and
progress of
the Tugend-
bund and se-
cret socie-
ties.

From these salutary changes, joined to the oppressive exactions of the French armies, and the enormous contributions levied by the government through the whole of the north of Germany, arose another effect, not less important in its ultimate consequences upon the future fate of Europe. Grievously oppressed by foreign depredation, deprived by national disaster of domestic protection, surrounded within and without by rapacious enemies or impotent friends; deprived of their commerce, their manufactures, the vent for their industry, with their farm produce, liable to perpetual seizure by hands of rapacious men armed with imperial authority, the inhabitants both of the towns and the country had no resource but in mutual and voluntary associations. The universality of the suffering produced a corresponding unanimity of opinion; the divisions which existed before the war disappeared under the calamities to which it had given birth; the jealousies of rank or class yielded to the pressure of common distress. Genius and learning, amidst the general despondency, stood forth as the leaders, privately and cautiously indeed, but still the leaders, of public thought. Societies were every where formed, in profound secrecy, for the future deliverance of Germany; the professors at the Universities were at their head; the ardent youth who attended their seminaries joyfully enrolled themselves in their ranks; the nobles and statesmen at the helm of affairs lent them what, with such materials, was much required, the aid of their wisdom and the benefits of their experience. Stein was at their head; from his retreat in Russia he exercised a secret but unlimited sway over the minds of all the energetic and generous portion of the north of Germany. Arndt, who was soon after compelled to seek an asylum from French persecution under the same empire, lent the cause all the aid of his nervous eloquence; Professor Jahn supported it with powerful zeal; Hardenberg was active in its behalf; Scharnhorst, and almost all the councillors of the King, though compelled publicly to discountenance its proceedings, were in reality, either in secret members of the TUGENDBUND (2), or warmly disposed to second its efforts (3).

There, too, were to be seen those exalted spirits, who subsequently, through evil report and good report, in prosperity and adversity, stood foremost in the hands of European freedom: Schill, whose ardent patriotism, in advance of his countrymen, precipitated, in 1809, to his own ruin, that premature resistance which four years longer of ignominy and bondage were required to render universal; Wittgenstein, the future antagonist of Napo-

(1) Hard. ix. 467, 468.

(2) Society or Bond of Virtue.

(3) Hard. ix. 467, 469.

léon, whose clear judgment, notwithstanding the prudent reserve of his character, saw in these associations the only means of future salvation; Blücher, whose generous and inconsiderate ardour threw him early into their arms, as it afterwards warmed him in the headlong charge against the enemy; Gneisenau, whose scientific abilities supplying what was wanting in his gallant associate, proved so fatal to the arms of France. The nobles, straitened in their fortunes by the French requisitions, and insulted in their persons by the French officers; the peasants, ground to the dust by merciless exactions supported by military force; the merchants, ruined by the Continental System, and reduced to despair by the entire stoppage of foreign commerce; the burghers, become the bitterest enemies of Napoléon; from his entire overthrow of those liberal principles on which the early fortunes of the Revolution had been founded—all combined to join the secret societies, from which alone they could one day hope for the deliverance of their country. The machinery put in motion for the attainment of these objects, was indeed highly dangerous and capable of being applied to the worst purposes; but the necessities of their situation gave the lovers of the Fatherland no alternative. Alike in town and country, equally among the rich and the poor, the Tagendbund spread its ramifications; a central body of directors at Berlin guided their movements; provincial committees carried their orders into effect; and, as is usual in such cases, a dark, unseen authority, was obeyed with an implicit alacrity unknown to the orders of the successor of Charlemagne. Thus, while France, rioting in the triumph of Tilsit, and deeming her power established on an immovable basis, was fawning on her rulers with Eastern adulation, and bartering her freedom for the enjoyments of gold, Prussia, taking counsel from adversity, was preparing in silence, in the amelioration of her institutions and the energy of her inhabitants, that real regeneration which, independent of individuals, unstained by crime, was destined hereafter to raise her from the lowest state of depression to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory (4).

Situation,
statistics,
and power
of Austria.

Bent to the earth by the disasters of Austerlitz, but still possessing the physical and material resources of power, Austria, during the desperate strife from the Saale to the Niemen, was silently but uninterruptedly repairing her losses, and preparing to resume her place in the rank of independent nations. If she had lost the opportunity, during the preceding winter, of interposing with decisive effect on the banks of the Elbe, she had the magnitude of previous losses, the mortal hazard of an unsuccessful demonstration, to offer in her excuse. Sufficient reliance, it was thought, could not yet be placed on the constancy of Russia; suffering had not adequately tamed the hereditary jealousy of the Prussian government. But the observers of the Imperial cabinet augured, not less from the measures which they were in the course of adopting, than the known perseverance and constancy of their policy, that they had by no means relinquished the contest, and that if a favourable opportunity should occur, they would yet appear foremost in the struggle for European freedom. During the interval of hostilities, the Aulic Council had been indefatigable in their efforts to restore the equipment and revive the spirit of the army. The artillery, abstracted from the arsenal of Vienna, had been regained in great part, by purchase from the French government; vast exertions had been made to supply the horses wanting in the cavalry regiments; the infantry had been, to a considerable extent, recruited by the prisoners who returned from France, or the

new soldiers who had been unostentatiously invited to the Imperial standards (4).

She joins the Continental System, and obtains the evacuation of Braunau. In open violation of the treaty of Presburg, however, France had hitherto retained the fortress of Braunau, on their western frontier, on the absurd pretext, that Russia, an independent power, over whom the Imperial cabinet had no control, had not, agreeably to that treaty, evacuated the mouths of the Cattaro. Other measures, equally significant, told them that they were regarded by the great conqueror only in the highest rank of vassals. Andreossi, the French ambassador at Vienna, openly used the most menacing language, both before and after the treaty of Tilsit; new states were, without either notice or negotiation, added by a simple decree of the French Emperor to the Confederation of the Rhine (2); and Aug. 24. 1807. by a summary decree the Cabinet of Vienna was ordered, forthwith, to adhere to the Continental System. By yielding on this vital point, however, and at the same time making a skilful use of the termination of the dispute with Russia about the mouths of the Cattaro, by the treaty of Tilsit, and the growing anxiety of the French Emperor to increase his forces on the Pyrenean frontier, with a view to his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, Metternich, to the great joy of the inhabitants of Vienna, who regarded its prolonged occupation as a continued badge of subjection, at length succeeded in obtaining the removal of the French troops from the ramparts of Braunau; and the Imperial dominions, still flourishing and powerful, notwithstanding all their losses, ceased to be polluted by the presence of a stranger (3).

(1) Hard. ix. 445, 446. Report of Archduke Charles, Aug. 10, 1807.

(2) The principalities of Anhalt, Reuss, Ladepe, Schwartzburg, and Waldeck.

(3) Hard. ix. 445, 447.

The resources of Austria in 1807, notwithstanding the loss of Tyrol and other provinces by the peace of Presburg, were still very great; and they are an object of interest, considering the prominent share which that power soon after took in the war. They are thus stated by Baron Lichtenstein:—

(Resources and statistics of the Austrian empire.)

Population,	24,900,000
Inhabited towns,	796
Burghs,	2,012
Villages,	65,572

Composed of

Germans,	6,400,000
Slavonians,	13,000,000
Hungarians,	8,400,000
Poles, Jews, Bohemians,	2,100,000
	<hr/> 24,900,000

Divided by religion as follows:—

Catholics,	19,292,000
Greek Church,	2,100,000
Zwinglians,	2,000,000
Protestants,	1,000,000
Jews,	508,000

	Florins.	24,900,000
Revenue,	100,000,000, or	L. 8,000,000
Public debt,	900,000,000, or	72,000,000
Civil list and court annual charges,	11,800,000, or	900,000
Army,	40,000,000, or	3,200,000
Interest and charges of debt,		3,900,000
Army—Infantry,	271,800	
Cavalry,	50,000	
Artillery,	14,300	
Guards,	3,000	
	<hr/> 339,100 men.	

Besides the Hungarian Insurrection, or levy en masse.

	Florins.	
Annual produce of Agriculture,	760,000,000, or	L. 61,000,000
Minerals,	47,000,000, or	3,600,000
Number of oxen,	3,000,000	
horses,	1,500,000	

—LICHTESTEIN'S *Stat. de la Monarchie Autrichienne*, and HARD. ix. *Pièces Just. K.*

Affairs of Sweden. The Swedes are shut up in Stralsund.

In the general wreck of the hopes of Europe on the shores of the Niemen, the King of Sweden, who possessed a spirit worthy of a more powerful monarchy and a greater part on the political theatre, was not discouraged. His semi-insular situation enabled him to bid defiance to the threats of the French Emperor; the passage round the Gulf of Bothnia was scarcely practicable; and with the assistance of England, he did not despair of being able to make head against his enemies, even if Russia should be added to their already formidable league. No sooner, therefore, did the English squadron, with the advanced guard of the land forces, which had been destined for the support of Russia and Prussia, appear in the

July 3. Baltic, than he denounced the armistice, just nineteen days after the battle of Friedland. Napoléon, noways displeased at this unexpected resumption of hostilities, immediately made preparations for bringing them to a rapid conclusion. Thirty thousand men were speedily assembled under Marshal Brune, who, as soon as hostilities recommenced on the 13th July,

July 13. began to press on all sides the fifteen thousand Swedes who occupied Pomerania. Unable to bear up against so great a preponderance of force,

July 13. the Swedish generals, after some inconsiderable combats, took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund; and Brune completed the investment of the place in the middle of July (1).

Siege and fall of that fortress.

The King of Sweden was soon made to perceive, from bitter experience, that after the pacification of Tilsit, the possession of his transmarine dominions was held by the most precarious tenure. At first, the English troops under Lord Cathcart, above ten thousand strong and in the finest condition, formed part of the garrison; and the presence of this imposing force appeared to promise to Gustavus, who commanded in person, the means of making a defence which might rival that by which Charles XII. had immortalized its walls. At this period the Swedish monarch appeared to be passionately desirous of military renown, and so ambitious was he of the perils and glories of actual warfare, that he went so far as to send a flag of truce to the French marshal, offering a purse of gold to the gunner in the French lines who had levelled the piece of ordnance whose shot had struck the wall a few feet from the place where he was standing, a proceeding which the English general justly considered as savouring rather of a romantic or highly excited temperament, than the sober judgment befitting the ruler of a nation (2). But stern necessity soon put a period to these chivalrous illusions.

July 30. The English troops were withdrawn in the end of July, to co-operate in the great armament intended for the reduction of Copenhagen and seizure of the Danish fleet, of which mention will immediately be made; and the Swedish garrison, without any external aid, was left to make head alone against the hourly increasing forces of the French marshal, which already were more than double their own. The evident hopelessness of the attempt to preserve the place after the treaty of Tilsit was known, and it had become apparent that the French Emperor could increase the besieging force at pleasure to quadruple its present amount, damped the military ardour of the Swedes, and induced them to prolong the defence rather from a sense of duty

Aug. 15. than any hope that it could ultimately prove successful. Trenches were opened on the night of the fête of the Emperor, by seven thousand workmen, and advanced, under the scientific direction of General Chasseloup,

(1) Dum. xix. 138, 145. Jom. ii. 456, 457.

(2) I received this anecdote from my venerable and much esteemed friend the Earl of Cathcart; whose recollections of all the events of that memo-

orable period, in which he bore so prominent a part, is still as vivid and correct, though at a very advanced age, as when they occurred thirty years ago.

with extraordinary vigour. Contrary to all previous example, the approaches were made on three fronts at the same time, and pushed with such rapidity, that in four days they were within three hundred yards of the external palisades, the batteries already armed, and every thing prepared for a bombardment. Seeing their city about to be ruined, for no political or national

Aug. 20. purpose but a mere point of military honour, the magistrates threw themselves at the feet of the King, and besought him to spare the inhabitants the horrors of an unavailing defence. He could not resist the appeal, and withdrew with almost the whole garrison into the adjacent island of Rugen, while Stralsund itself, with four hundred pieces of cannon and immense military magazines, fell into the hands of the enemy (1).

Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen.

Still the enemy kept their ground in the isles of Rugen and Danholm, which not only completely blockaded the harbour, but neutralized all the advantages otherwise consequent on the possession of this extensive fortress. Marshal Brune showed great activity in the measures adopted to root the Swedes out of this their last stronghold on the German shore. Three days after the capitulation two hundred boats and small craft were assembled, chiefly by means of land carriage, in the harbour

Aug. 25. of Stralsund, with which, on the night of the 25th, a descent was effected on the isle of Danholm, which fell into the hands of the French, with twenty pieces of cannon and its little garrison of a hundred and eighty men. Still the isle of Rugen, with the bulk of the Swedish forces, remained in the possession of the king; but the troops, wearied of a fruitless contest which they deemed foreign to the real interests of the monarchy, and strongly impressed with the idea that the military excitement of their sovereign bordered on insanity, murmured so loudly on the further continuance of the contest, that he was obliged to yield; and a convention was concluded on

Sept. 7. the 7th September, by which the island was to be given up to the French troops, and the King, with the whole garrison and fleet, were to withdraw to the Swedish shore. This convention relieved Napoléon from all anxiety in the north of Germany, and put the finishing stroke to the continental war in that part of the world; but it was far from answering the expectations of the French Emperor, who had calculated on the capture of the Swedish King, or at least the whole of his garrison (2); and it was the occasion of Marshal Brune falling into a disgrace from which he never afterwards was able to recover.

While the last flames of the continental war were thus expiring around the walls of Stralsund, a blow of the highest importance on the future prospects of the maritime contest was struck by the vigour and decision of the British Cabinet.

Reasons which led to the Copenhagen expedition.

Notwithstanding all the precautions taken by the two Emperors, in their negotiations at Tilsit, to bury their designs in profound secrecy, the English Government were possessed of a golden key, which laid open their most confidential communications. They were made aware of the determination of the Imperial despots to seize the fleets of Denmark and Portugal, not only before it was reduced to a regular treaty, but almost as soon as it itself was formed; and the vast forces at the disposal of the French Emperor left no room for doubt that they possessed ample means to carry their intentions into effect. Not a moment was to be lost; for in the final treaty, as already noticed (3), the first of September was fixed as the

(1) *Dum.* xix. 146, 161. *Jom.* ii. 456, 457.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 456, 457. *Dum.* xix. 161, 165.

(3) *Ante.* vi. 143. Digitized by Google

period when the Courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon were to be summoned to place their fleets at the disposal of the combined powers, and enter into the general confederacy against Great Britain. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry, when the French forces, under Bernadotte and Davoust, began to defile in such numbers towards Holstein, and assumed so menacing a position, that it was evident that Denmark would speedily lose her whole continental possessions, if she resisted the demands of the combined Emperors. Nor did there appear any reason to believe, that the Cabinet of Copenhagen would incur any such hazard to maintain their neutrality. On the contrary, there were the strongest grounds for concluding, that they would readily embrace so favourable an opportunity of contending, with the aid of such powerful allies, for those maritime changes which had long constituted the ruling objects of their ambition. In 1780, they had been the first to join the Northern Confederacy against England, and proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality; in 1801, they had exposed themselves for the same object, in the front rank, to the cannon of Nelson and all the terrors of the English navy. More lately, their conduct had savoured still more strongly of aversion to the English and partiality for the French alliance. The Berlin Decree of 21st November, which inflicted so unexampled and fatal a wound on neutral commerce, had drawn forth no complaints from the Danish Government; but no sooner did the British Order in Council of 7th January issue, which provided only a mild, and as it proved ineffectual measure of retaliation, by putting a stop to the coasting trade of neutrals from one French harbour to another, than the Danish minister made loud complaints, which drew forth the able and unanswerable reply from Lord Howick, which has already been quoted (1). No remonstrances had been made by the Danish Government against the threatening accumulation of forces on the frontier of Holstein; no advances to secure aid, in the peril which was evidently approaching, from the British or Swedish Cabinets. On the contrary, although Napoleon had, previous to the battle of Friedland, made proposals to Gustavus, with a view to detach him from the Russian alliance, and actually offered, as an inducement, to wrest the kingdom of Norway from the Danish Crown, and annex it to that of Sweden; yet even the generous refusal of this offer by that upright monarch, accompanied by its instant communication to the Cabinet of Copenhagen (2), had made no alteration in their line of policy, and they declined all offers of assistance against a power which had manifested so little scruple at the prospect of partitioning their dominions.

Resolution
of the British
cabinet.

In these circumstances the cabinet of Great Britain had a most serious duty to perform. They were menaced with an attack from the combined navies of Europe, amounting to one hundred and eighty sail of the line; and of that immense force they were well aware that the Baltic fleet would form the right wing (3). No time was to be lost: every hour was pre-

(1) March 17, 1807. *Ante*, vi. 166. and *Parl. Deb.* x. 402.

(2) *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 249, 255. *Parl. Deb.* x. 402, 407. *Jom.* ii. 450, 451.

(3) General Jomini has given the following summary of the design of Napoleon and Alexander after the treaty of Tilsit to unite all the navies of Europe against England, and of the probable forces at their disposal. Speaking in the person of the French Emperor, he says "After Russia had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her example; Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope, alone required to be gained over, for we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our

arms. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole maritime forces of the Continent were to be employed against her, and they could muster 180 sail of the line. In a few years, this force could be raised to 250. With the aid of such a fleet, and my immense flotilla, it was by no means impossible to land an European army in London. One hundred ships of the line employed against her colonies in the two hemispheres, would have sufficed to draw off a large portion of the British navy; while eighty more, assembled in the Channel, would have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outraged rights of nations. Such was at bottom my plan, which only failed of success from

cions : in a few days an overwhelming French force would, to all appearance, be assembled on the shores of the Great Belt ; and, if ferried over to Zealand, might enable the Danish government securely to comply with the requisition of the combined Emperors, and bid defiance to all the efforts of Great Britain. In these circumstances they took a resolution similar to that adopted by Frederick the Great in regard to Saxony, when he received authentic intelligence of the accession, or probable accession of Saxony to the league of Russia and Austria against his existence ; and resolved, by a vigorous stroke, not only to deprive the enemy of the prize he was so soon to seize, but convert its resources to their own defence (1).

Equipment and departure of the expedition. Accidental circumstances gave the British government, contrary to the usual case with an insular power, the means both with respect to land and sea forces of instantly acting on this vigorous resolution. The first division of the expedition which had been so long in preparation to aid the Allies on the shores of the Baltic was already in the Isle of Rugen, and the remainder were in such a state of forwardness as to be ready to embark at a few days' notice. A large naval force was also assembled to act as occasion might require, and this was speedily added to with extraordinary July. 27. expedition. Such was the activity displayed that in the end of July twenty-seven ships of the line, having on board twenty thousand land troops, set sail from the British harbours, besides other smaller vessels, amounting in all to ninety pendants, and stretched across the German Ocean for the shores

of Denmark. They arrived off the Danish coast on the 3d August, and immediately stationed such a force under Commodore Keats, in the Great Belt, as effectually cut off all communication between the Island of Zealand

Aug. 2. and the adjacent isles, or shores of Jutland (2). At the same time, the troops from Stralsund, under Lord Cathcart, arrived, who immediately took the command of the whole expedition ; and the formidable armament, spreading their sails before a favourable wind, passed the Sound, and cast anchor in appalling strength before the harbour of Copenhagen.

Ineffectual negotiation with Denmark. It was no part, however, of the design of the British government to precipitate the country into hostilities ; on the contrary, they were on many accounts most desirous to avoid, if possible, proceeding to that extremity, and rather to gain the object in view by diplomatic arrangements than actual force. With this view they had sent Mr. Jackson with the armament, who had resided as envoy of Great Britain for many years at the court of Berlin, and was supposed to enjoy, in a very high degree, the confidence of the northern powers. As soon as he arrived off the Danish coast, Mr. Jackson landed at Kiel, and proceeded to announce the purport of his instructions to Count Bernstorff, and request an audience of the Prince Royal. By the former he was received with the indignant vehemence natural to a patriotic minister, who saw, from what he conceived to be foreign injustice, a grievous misfortune impending over his country ; by the latter, with the mild but courageous dignity which added lustre to a

the fruits committed in the Spanish war."—JONES, *Fie de Navarion*, ii. 449.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 255, 257. Jom. ii. 450, 451.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 257. Lord Cathcart's Despatch, 14th Aug. 1807. *Ibid.* 681, 682.

<i>Vessels.</i> —French ships of the line,	60
Spanish do	40
Russian do	25
Swedish do	15
Danish do	13
Dutch do	15
Portuguese do	10

Total, . . . 180

throne under the storms of adversity. The instructions of the English envoy, however, were peremptory, and as the Prince Royal positively refused to accede to the terms proposed, which were that the fleet should be deposited with the British government in pledge, and under an obligation of restitution, till the conclusion of a general peace, he had no alternative but to declare that force would be employed. Upon this, the Prince Royal, with praiseworthy resolution, declared his determination to share the dangers of his capital, and immediately set out for Copenhagen. He was allowed by the British cruisers to pass the Great Belt with all the officers of his staff, and was soon after followed to the capital by the British envoy; but having no power to accede to an accommodation on the basis proposed, the negotiation broke off, Aug. 16.

and both sides prepared to decide the matter in dispute by the sword. At the same time a proclamation was issued by the English commanders, declaring in precise terms the object of their hostility, disclaiming all idea of conquest or capture, but demanding the fleet in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace (1).

Siege and
capture of
Copenha-
gen.

The British troops commenced their disembarkation without resistance on the 16th; and in three days the whole force was landed, and the investment of the town completed. It then appeared that, however much the Danish government might have been inclined to accede to the summons of the combined Emperors, and unite their navy to the general maritime confederacy, they at least had no expectation of being so soon involved in hostilities on their own shores, and were totally unprepared for the formidable forces now arrayed by sea and land against them. Such had been the vigilance of the cruisers in the Great Belt, that no troops whatever had been ferried over from the adjacent shores; and no preparations had on their arrival been made in Zealand itself. The ramparts were unarmed; the fleet unequipped; and though great fermentation, and the most honourable patriotic zeal prevailed in the capital, few regular troops

(1) *Parl. Deb.* x. 222, 223. *Ann. Reg.* 258. 261. *Dum.* xix. 167, 173.

Proclamation of Lord Cathcart on landing in Zealand. "Whereas the present treaties of peace, and the changes of government and of territory acceded to and by so landing in many powers, have so far increased the influence of France on the Continent of Europe, as to render it impossible for Denmark, even though it desires to be neutral, to preserve its neutrality, and absolutely necessary for those who continue to resist the French aggression, to take measures to prevent the arms of a neutral power from being turned against them; in this view, his Majesty cannot regard the present position of Denmark with indifference, and he has therefore sent negotiators with ample powers to his Danish Majesty, to request, in the most amicable manner, such explanations as the circumstances require, and a concurrence in such measures as can alone give security against the further mischief which the French meditate through the acquisition of the Danish navy. The King, therefore, has judged it expedient to demand the temporary deposit of the Danish ships of the line, in one of his Majesty's ports. The deposit seems to be just, and so indispensably necessary, under the relative situation of the neutral and belligerent powers, that his Majesty has further deemed it a duty to himself and to his people to support his demand by a powerful fleet, and by an army amply supplied with every necessary for the most active and determined enterprise. We come, therefore, to your shores, inhabitants of Zealand, not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of

Europe from compelling the force of your navy to be employed against us. *It is asked—do we not look to capture?* So far from it, the most solemn pledge has been offered to your government, and it is hereby renewed, in the name and by the express commands of the King our master, that if our demand is acceded to, every ship belonging to the Danish navy, shall, at the conclusion of a general peace, be restored to her, in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the protection of the British flag. It is in the power of your government, by a word, to slay our swords, most reluctantly drawn against you; you will be treated on the footing of the most friendly power; property of all sorts will be respected and preserved; the most severe discipline enforced; every article required paid for at a fair price; but if these offers are rejected, and the machinations of France render you deaf to the voice of reason and the call of friendship, the innocent blood that will be shed, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your own heads, and those of your cruel advisers."—*See Parl. Deb.* x. 222. The Prince Royal replied: "No example is to be found in history of an odious aggression as that with which Denmark is menaced; more honour may now be expected from the pirates of Barbary, than the British government. You offer us your alliance; do we not know what is its worth? your allies, easily expecting your succours for an entire year, have taught us what is the worth of English friendship."—*See Dumas*, xix. 171.

were assembled within its walls, and little progress could in so short a time be made in the organization of a voluntary force. The sudden calm, however, which ensued, and prevented the ships from approaching the coast to land the heavy ordnance and siege equipage, retarded for several days the approaches, and afforded the Danes a breathing-time, of which they actively availed themselves, both to prepare for their defence and retard the operations of the besiegers. But this respite was of short duration, and, by inspiring the inhabitants with fallacious hopes, in the end only led to additional

and lamentable calamities. The heavy artillery was at length landed, and brought up to the trenches: the assistance of the sailors enabled the works to be prosecuted with great rapidity; and on the 1st September they were so far advanced as to have every thing in readiness for the bombardment to commence. The place was then summoned, and the same

terms generously offered which had before been rejected (1). Meanwhile, **SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY**, who then began in high command that career in Europe which has rendered his name and country

immortal, moved with ten thousand men against a body of twelve thousand militia, supported by a few regular troops which had assembled in the interior of the island at Kioje, and by a sudden attack, in which the 92d and 52d regiments distinguished themselves, dispersed them with the loss of several hundred killed, and twelve hundred prisoners (2).

The offer of accommodation being rejected, the bombardment began, and was continued with uncommon vigour, and with only a short interruption, for three days and nights. The inhabitants sustained with heroic resolution the flaming tempest, and all classes were indefatigable in their endeavours to carry water to the quarters where the city had taken fire; but in spite of all their efforts the conflagration spread with frightful rapidity, and at length a great magazine of wood and the lofty steeple of the church of Our Lady took fire, and the flames, curling to a prodigious height up its wooden pinnacles, illuminated the whole heavens, and threw a lurid light over all the fleet and army of the besiegers. With speechless anxiety the trembling citizens watched the path of the burning projectiles through the air, while the British soldiers and sailors from afar beheld with admiration the heavens tracked by innumerable stars, which seemed to realize more than the fabled splendours of Oriental fireworks. At length the obvious danger of the total destruction of the city by the progress of the flames, overcame the firmness of General Peymann, to whom the Prince Royal had delegated his command; and on the forenoon of the 5th, a flag of truce appeared at the British outposts to treat for a capitulation (3). But the period of equal negotiation was past; the Danes had perilled all on the issue of the sword; and no other terms would be agreed to but the unconditional surrender of the whole fleet, with all the artillery and naval

(1) The summons set forth:—"To convince the Danish government and the whole world of the reluctance with which his Majesty has recourse to arms, we, the undersigned, at the moment when our troops are before your gates, and our batteries ready to open, renew to you the offer of the same advantageous terms which we formerly proposed: viz. if you will consent to deliver up the Danish fleet, and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit merely, and restored in as good a state as received, with all its equipments, as soon as the provisions of a general peace shall have removed the necessity which occasioned this demand. But if this offer is now rejected, it cannot be repeated."—CATHART, GARDNER, Sept. 1, 1807.

(2) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1807, 703. Dum. xix. 171, 176.

(3) "From the top of a tower," says a respectable eyewitness, "I beheld, in October 1807, the extent of the devastation—whole streets were level with the ground; 1000 houses were destroyed; the principal church was in ruins; almost every house in the town bore some marks of violence; 1500 of the inhabitants had lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. The Danes certainly defended themselves like men, and left to the English the poignant regret that the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte had converted this gentle people into our enemies."—BAYLY'S *Naval History*, II. 177.

stores which the place contained. Hard as these terms appeared, necessity left the Danes no alternative; and a capitulation was signed on such conditions two days afterwards, in virtue of which the British troops were immediately put in possession of the citadel, gates, and arsenal; and, by the united efforts of friends and foes, a stop was at length put to the progress of the conflagration, but not before it had consumed an eighth part of the city (1).

By the terms of the capitulation, it had been stipulated that the English should evacuate the citadel of Copenhagen within six weeks, or a shorter time, if the fleet could be got ready before the expiry of that period. But such was the expedition with which the operations were conducted, and the activity displayed by both the naval and military departments, that long before the expiry of that period the fleet was equipped, the stores on board, and the evacuation completed. Early in October, the British fleet and army returned to England, bringing with them their magnificent prize, consisting of eighteen ships of the line in excellent condition; fifteen frigates, six brigs, and twenty-five gun-boats, beside two sail of the line and three frigates which had been destroyed as not worth the removal (2).

Great sensation excited in Europe by this expedition.

The Copenhagen expedition excited a prodigious sensation throughout Europe; and as it was a mortal stroke levelled at a neutral power, without any previous declaration of war then ascertained, or ground for hostility, it was generally condemned as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. "Blood and fire," said Napoléon, "have made the English masters of Copenhagen;" and these expressions were not only re-echoed over all the Continent by all that great portion of the public press which was directly subjected to his control, but met with a responsive voice in those nations, who, chagrined with reason at the refusal of its government to lend assistance in men or money at the decisive moment on the banks of the Vistula, were not sorry of this opportunity of giving vent, apparently on very sufficient grounds, to their displeasure. The Russians were loud in their condemnation of the English administration; the Emperor, with that profound dissimulation which formed so remarkable a feature in his character, affected to be deeply afflicted by the catastrophe, though none knew so well the reality of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit which had rendered it necessary; even their long-established national rivalry with the Danes, could scarcely induce the Swedes to receive with satisfaction the intelligence of so serious an invasion of neutral rights. Thus, on all sides and in all countries, a general cry of indignation burst forth against this successful enterprise; and the old jealousy at the maritime power of England revived with such vehemence, as for a time to extinguish all sense of the more pressing dangers arising from the military power of France (3).

Count Romanoff's Note to Lord G. L. Gower.

But whatever might be the general impression of Europe as to the Copenhagen expedition immediately after it occurred, Napoléon was not long of affording it a complete vindication. It has been already mentioned that it was stipulated in the treaty of Tilsit that, in the event of England declining the proffered mediation of Russia, the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon should be summoned to join the Continental League, and unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. On the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 263. Lord Cathcart's Despatch. Ibid. 766, 707. *Dum.* xix. 175, 181. *Jom.* ii. 454, 455.

(2) Lord Gambier's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1807, 698, 699. *Dum.* xix. 179, 180.

Including the cannon placed on the praams and floating batteries which were brought away, the ar-

tillery taken amounted to 3500 pieces. The prize money due to the troops engaged, was estimated by Admiral Lord Gambier at £300,000.—*See HANDELSMAN*, x. 42.

(3) *Hard.* x. 42, 45. *Rigu.* vi. 422, 423. *Parl. Deb.* x. 214. Digitized by Google

12th August, a note was transmitted to the French minister at Lisbon, peremptorily requiring that the Portuguese fleet should co-operate with the French and Danish in the maritime war, and that the persons and property of all Englishmen in Portugal should be forthwith seized. And it soon after appeared, that on the same day similar orders had been transmitted to the cabinet of Copenhagen. In a public assembly of all the ambassadors of Europe, at the Tuileries, the Emperor Napoléon demanded of the Portuguese ambassador whether he had transmitted to the court of Lisbon his orders to join their fleet to the general maritime confederacy against England, and confiscate all English property within their dominions? And having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish ambassador, and asked him whether he had done the same? The note addressed to the Portuguese government was immediately communicated by its ministers to the British cabinet: that to the Danish was concealed, and its existence even denied. Thus, at the very time that the English expedition was, unknown to France, approaching the Danish shores, the diplomatic papers and public words of Napoléon were affording decisive evidence of his preconceived designs against the Danish fleet, while the conduct of their government was equally characteristic of an inclination to slide, without opposition, into the required hostility against this country (1).

General
feeling of
England on
the subject.

But these diplomatic communications, little understood or attended to at the time by the bulk of the people, produced no general impression in England; and a very painful division of opinion existed for a considerable time, both as to the lawfulness of the expedition and the justice of the retaining the prizes which had been made. Whatever violence might have been meditated by the French Emperor, it was very generally said it would have been better to have suffered him to perpetrate it, and then made open war on his vassals, than to forestall his iniquity in this manner by its imitation. This feeling was as creditable to the public mind and the severe principles of morality which religious faith and long-established habits of freedom had produced in Great Britain, as the conception of the measure itself was honourable to the government. It was a memorable thing to see the people of England repudiate a triumph won, as it was thought, by injustice; disregard security purchased by the blood of the innocent, and look with shame on the proudest trophy of maritime conquest ever yet brought to an European harbour (2), as long as a doubt existed as to the justice of the means by which it had been acquired. Contrasting this honourable feeling with the utter confusion of all moral principle which in France resulted from the Revolution, and the universal application to public measures of no other test than success, it is impossible to deny that the religious feelings and the tempered balance of power which in England both saved the country from a disastrous convulsion, and, by restraining the excesses of freedom, preserved its existence, were equally favourable to the maintenance of that high standard of morality, which, in nations as well as individuals, constitutes the only secure basis of durable prosperity.

The Copenhagen expedition, as might have been expected, led to vehement debates in both Houses of Parliament, which, though now of comparatively little importance, as the publication of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit

(1) Lord Wellesley's Statement. *Parl. Deb.* x. 345. and Lord Hawkesbury's. *Ibid.* x. 371.

(2) There is no example in modern times of such an armament being at once made prize and brought home by any power. At Trafalgar, only four ships of the twenty taken were brought to the British

harbours; at La Hogue, none of the prizes were saved, out of eighteen taken; and at Toulon, in 1793, no more than three sail of the line and three frigates were brought away out of the vast fleet there committed to the flames. See *SKELLETTS History*, ii. 151; and *ante*, ii. 173.

has completely justified the expedition, are of historical value, as indicating the opinions entertained, and the arguments advanced at the time in the country, on a subject of such vital importance to the honour and security of the empire (1).

Argument in Parliament against the Copenhagen expedition.

(1) On the part of the Opposition, it was strongly urged by Mr. Granville Sharpe, Mr. Ponsonby, and Lord Erskine.—The ground stated in the King's speech for the Copenhagen expedition was, that the government were in possession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which it was stipulated that the Danish fleet should be employed against this country. If so, why is it not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet for such a purpose on the first summons. If this is really the case, on what grounds is the charge supported? True, the ships at Copenhagen were in a certain degree of preparation, but not more so than they have been for the last half century. Was it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the Island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by French troops? If history be consulted, it will be found that no considerable armament has crossed the Great Belt on the ice for 150 years. In the face of an allied British and Swedish naval force, such an attempt would never have been thought of; so that the Danes had no reason to tremble for their capital. When the Copenhagen expedition set sail, there were 350 Danish ships in British harbours, with cargoes worth two million; and when the British Consul applied to the Chamber of Commerce, at the Danish capital, he received for answer, that there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as no such circumstances existed as were calculated to disturb the neutrality of Denmark. The plea, therefore, of impending danger, to justify so flagrant a breach of neutral rights, has not even for its basis the essential ground of correctness in point of fact.

"The vindication of this step, supposing that some danger had been shown to have existed, must rest upon its necessity; for the first principles of justice demonstrate, and the concurring testimony of all writers on the law of nations has established, that one belligerent could not be justified in taking its property from a neutral state, unless it is clearly established that its enemy meant and was able to take possession of it, and apply it to the purposes of its hostility. Now, then, is it to be justified, when every appearance is against the opinion that the enemy had either the inclination or the power to convert the Danish navy into an instrument of our destruction? But this is not all.—Supposing it proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that Bonaparte intended to have seized the Copenhagen fleet, and had a force at his command adequate to that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at Lisbon, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that our enemy was meditating a similar spoliation, and that it was best to be beforehand with him? It is a principle of morality applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not authorize another; and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation from the laws and precepts of war; how much more, therefore, is an illegal act indefensible, committed not in retaliation for, but in anticipation of, a similar unjustifiable stretch on the enemy's part! Better, far better that Bonaparte should have carried his alleged designs into full effect, and united the Danish navy to his own, than that we should have stained our national character by an act, indefensible by those who were to profit, execrable in the estimation of those who were to suffer by it.

"A comparison of dates is alone sufficient to demonstrate the untenable grounds on which this expedition was sent out. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 8th July; the orders for the sailing of the expedition was issued on the 19th of the same month, and for several days previously the newspapers had announced its destination. How was it possible that in so short a time preparations could have been made for so vast an armament? Admitting that a military armament, to co-operate with Russia or Sweden, and act as occasion might require, in the Baltic, had previously been resolved on, and was in a great state of forwardness, still the peculiar force employed in that expedition, the great quantity of battering cannon and besieging stores, as well as the vast amount of the naval force, proves that, long before the treaty of Tilsit was either signed or thought of the resolution to spoliate Denmark had been formed.

"We have got possession, indeed, of the Danish fleet; but is that the real or the principal object which we have to dread, in the great maritime confederacy which an inveterate enemy is forming against us? Do we esteem as nothing the now ardent and envenomed recruitment of the Danish sailors; the dubious neutrality of Russia, converted by our rapacity into real and formidable hostility; the indignation of all neutral and maritime powers at our unparalleled injustice; the loss of the character which formerly rendered us the last asylum of freedom and independence throughout the world? Better, far better would it have been, to have had to combat the Danish fleet manned by disaffected seamen, and fitted out by a reluctant government, than to have, as now, the fleets of France and Russia to fight, manned with the indignant and exasperated sailors of the north. With what countenance can we now reproach the French Emperor with his attack on Egypt, his subjugation of Switzerland, his overthrow of Portugal! We have ourselves furnished his justification; we have for ever closed our lips from the most powerful argument which we could ever have used to effect the future liberation of mankind. Will no recollection of our violence in Denmark, lie heavy on our spirits when called upon to resist the violence of the enemy retaliating upon us? Will not the hostile myriads on the opposite shores be animated with fresh ardour and confidence, that they are no longer following the banners of a desolating conqueror, but revisiting upon us the aggressions of our own fleets and armies? When we reflect on the little we have gained, and the much we have lost by this aggression, it clearly appears to have been not less impolitic and inexpedient, than iniquitous and unjust." [Part. Deb. x. 234. 267. 355, 358, 1185, 1205.]

Powerful as these arguments were, and warmly as they spoke to the best and noblest feelings of our nature, they were met by others not less cogent, and perhaps, when the period for impartial decision arrived, still more convincing. It was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Secretary Canning: "It is needless to ask for additional documents to justify that great and saving measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident that, after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated his present hopes of maritime ascendancy, and the victory of Friedland had laid all the Continental States prostrate at his feet, all the efforts of Bonaparte would be turned against the power and resources of the British empire. Was any proof requisite of his desire to annihilate our independence, nay, destroy our very existence as a nation; or was any neces-

The great circumstance which long suggested a painful doubt as to the justice of the Copenhagen expedition, was the non-production of the alleged clauses in the secret treaty of Tilsit, of which Ministers asserted they were

sure as to the mode in which, being actuated by such motives, he would proceed? How has he uniformly acted in his acquisitions at land? By compelling the powers whom he had conquered or intimidated, into an alliance to co-operate with him in his future hostility against such as still remained to be subdued. Was it to be supposed that profound statesman and consummate general would not proceed in the same manner in the great object of his life, the destruction of the maritime strength and resources of this country? Actuated by such motives and principles, is it conceivable that, after his great land victory, and when he had for the first time the maritime resources of the whole Continent at his command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner within his grasp, to his resources?

But the matter does not rest on probabilities and inferences. The French Emperor announced his intention, almost in direct terms, immediately after the battle of Friedland, of uniting all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against this country, and all his subsequent conduct has been regulated by this same principle. His plan was not confined to Denmark; it extended also to Portugal; these two powers were placed in exactly the same situation, and in both of these countries all British property was to be seized, and their respective courts compelled to unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. It was well known that, before the 1st September, the Emperor Napoleon publicly demanded of the Portuguese ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the court of Portugal, to join their fleets to the maritime confederacy against England, to shut their ports against the British flag, and confiscate the property of its subjects within the Portuguese territory; and having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish minister and asked if he had transmitted the same order to his own court. The cabinet of Lisbon have transmitted official intelligence to the government of Great Britain, that a formal demand had been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and the closing of their ports against English commerce, and the confiscation of all English property within their territories; and upon their failure to comply with the last only as the most unjust of these demands, they received a notification in the *Moniteur*, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign, a clear demonstration of what fate awaited the Danish court, if they hesitated a moment to obey the same haughty summons.

"Difficulties, it has been said, existed in the way of the French troops effecting the passage of the Great Belt, and compelling the Danes to join in the maritime confederacy against this country. These difficulties have been much exaggerated; for it is well known that Copenhagen depends almost entirely for its supply of provisions on Jutland and Holstein, and the occupation of these provinces by the French troops would soon starve the government into submission. It was idle to suppose that the Danish troops, which did not at the utmost exceed twenty thousand men, could cope with the united armies of France and Russia. Even supposing that, with the aid of British valour, they could for a time have made a successful stand, was it likely that they would not be paralyzed by the dread of engaging in a conflict with these two colossal empires, whose strife had so recently resounded through the world? And even if the Danish cabinet, in a cause in which they were heartily engaged, possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, is it not

notorious that their wishes, in this instance, would have led them to join their forces, at the first summons, to those of France? It is in vain to refer to the dangers which their transmarine possessions would run from the hostility of Great Britain. They braved these dangers in 1780, in prosecution of the object of the armed neutrality; they braved them in 1801, when the cannons of Nelson were pointed at their arsenals, though on neither of these occasions were they supported by such a gigantic continental confederacy as now summoned them to take their place at its side. Their inclinations and secret bias have been clearly evinced by their public acts; and he has studied the history of the last fifty years, indeed, to little purpose, who does not perceive that they would enter the alliance, not as reluctant neutrals, but ardent belligerents, contending for objects which they have long had at heart.

"The power of France, already sufficiently formidable by land, and daily receiving important additions by sea, would have been increased in the most alarming manner by the fleet and the armaments of Denmark. Twenty ships of the line, ready for sea, backed by a great supply of naval and military stores, constitute a force, in addition to that already possessed by the enemy, on which England, with all her maritime strength, cannot look without alarm. But this is not all. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to at least as many more; the Russian fleet in the Buxine had already proceeded to Lisbon, to join the Portuguese squadron, which together amounted to twenty ships of the line. Spain could furnish the like number, and thus Napoleon would soon have been enabled to direct against this country a centre of fifty ships of the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, with two wings each of forty, supplied by his northern and southern confederates. He is a bold man who can look unmoved on such a prospect. Had ministers not acted as they have done they would have neglected their first and greatest duty, that of preserving the independence of their country, and with it the liberties of the world. Self-preservation is the law of nature, and that law loudly called for the adoption of this vigorous step which has at least completely paralyzed the designs of their confederates in the north seas. Here was an instrument of war within the grasp of our inveterate enemy; we interposed and seized it, as he was stretching out his hand for the same purpose, and that act of energy and wisdom has the hard epithets of rapine and impiety ascribed to it! The bloodshed and devastation which occurred in the execution of this necessary act, are indeed deeply to be deplored: but the Danes had themselves to blame for these calamities, by refusing to deliver up their fleet in deposit, till the conclusion of the war, as originally and rightly proposed by the English government. The expedition had been originally destined for co-operation with the Russians and Prussians; but upon the peace of Tilsit, with a promptitude and energy worthy of the highest commendation, ministers at once gave it a different destination; and though this bold step may now be unanimously blamed on the Continent by writers who take their opinions on every subject from the beck of one or other of the imperial despots who rule its empires, it will one day be applauded by an impartial posterity as the salvation of the British empire." [Part. Deb. x. 267, 287, 342, 350.]

Upon a division both Houses supported ministers; the Commons by a majority of 263 to 100; the Peers by one of 105 to 48. [Ibid. x. 310, 383.]

The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet, is at length produced. in possession, which provided for the seizure of the fleet by France and Russia. Notwithstanding all the talents with which they were assailed on this subject, they for long withheld its production from the public, and it came in consequence to be seriously doubted whether such an agreement article really existed, until at length, in 1817, when the reasons for withholding it had ceased by the death of the persons by whom the discovery had been made, the decisive article was publicly revealed in Parliament (1). Thus had the British cabinet the merit of having at once early discovered, and instantly acted upon, the hidden designs of the enemy; paralysed by the vigour of their measures, the formidable naval force which was preparing against them in the north; and afterwards, for a long course of years, generously borne the whole load of opprobrium with which they were assailed, rather than by a premature publication of the secret information they had received, endangered the persons by whom it had been transmitted (2).

Ineffectual mediation of Russia, and rupture of that power with England. Aug. 5. Aug. 29. The negotiations contemplated by the treaty of Tilsit were not long of being set on foot. Early in August, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg tendered their good offices to that of London for the conclusion of a general peace. To which Mr. Canning answered, that Great Britain was perfectly willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desirable an object; and required in return a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as the best pledge of the friendly and pacific intentions of his Imperial Majesty. Baron Budberg, on the part of Alexander, eluded this demand; and instead, entered into a statement of many grievances of Russia against this country, some of which, especially the want of co-operation when the contest was quivering in the balance on the Vistula, were too well founded. Matters were in this dubious state, when intelligence arrived of the landing of the British forces in Zealand, and the demand made for the delivery, in deposit, of the Danish fleet. From the outset, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg manifested the utmost inquietude at this intelligence, and loudly protested against it as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. In reply, the British ambassador explicitly stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the destined co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion, by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations, and of the grounds on which France was willing to treat, and which appeared to the cabinet of St.-Petersburg so reasonable, that they gave them the additional weight of their interposition. The Russian cabinet, however, both when Baron Budberg had the direction of its foreign affairs, and after Sept. 2. he was succeeded, early in September, by Count Romanzoff, con-

(1) Parl. Deb.

(2) The writers on the law of nations are clear that in such circumstances as the Danish fleet was here placed, its seizure was perfectly justifiable. "I may," says Grotius, "without considering whether it is merited or not, take possession of that which belongs to another, if I have reason to fear any evil from his holding it; but I cannot make myself master or proprietor of it, the property having nothing to do with the end which I propose. I can only keep possession of the thing seized till my safety is sufficiently provided for."—Grotius, b. iii. c. i. § 2.—This was precisely what the English government proposed to Denmark.

Napoléon's secret opinion regarding it.

Napoléon felt the Copenhagen blow most keenly, the more so that it was achieved by a vigour and decision in the English councils, to which they had long been strangers, and which, in that instance, even surpassed his own promptitude. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fauché, "was the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to have been put at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoléon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous *coup-de-main* was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."—*Mémoires de Fouché*, ii. 137.

stantly eluded this demand; and the intelligence of the capture of the Danish fleet gave them a plausible pretext for breaking off the negotiation, without complying with so inconvenient a requisition (1). Upon that event being known in the Russian capital, the Emperor demanded of the English ambassador, whether the fleet would be restored at the conclusion of a general

Oct. 29. peace. To which Lord Leveson Gower replied, that, "the object for which the expedition had been undertaken, viz., the removing of the Danish fleet, during the continuance of hostilities, beyond the reach of France, having been accomplished, the English government was perfectly willing to renounce any advantage which could be derived from the continuance of the war with Denmark, and earnestly pressed the Emperor to recommend neutrality, on these conditions, to the Prince Royal." These moderate views so far prevailed with the Russian cabinet, that a note

Nov. 2. was presented by them to Savary, to signify the wish of the Emperor that the neutrality of Denmark should be re-established, and there was every prospect

Nov. 4. of the peace of the north being undisturbed by any farther hostility, when the arrival of a messenger from Paris with decisive instructions from Napoléon, at once put an end to the negotiation. He brought a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the instant closing of the Russian harbours against the ships of Great Britain. The Emperor Alexander was startled with the imperative tone of the mandate, as, since his return to St.-Petersburg; he had been endeavouring to withdraw from his promises in that particular; but it was too late; Savary appealed to his personal honour pledged at Tilsit, and the Emperor, at whatever hazard to himself or his dominions, felt himself bound to comply (2). Next day a note was presented to the British ambassador, breaking off all relations between the two countries, requiring his immediate departure from St.-Petersburg, and re-announcing the principles of the

Secret satisfaction with which the expedition was viewed by Alexander.

(1) It appears, however, from the following passage in Sir Walter Scott, evidently founded on official information, that the cabinet of St.-Petersburg, though obliged to yield to circumstances, were secretly gratified

at the vigorous and decisive stroke struck at the Danish fleet. "An English officer of literary celebrity" (probably Sir R. Wilson) "was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the Emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as, with a prince who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."—Scott, vi. 24. Certainly, of all the remarkable qualities of Alexander's mind, his profound power of dissimulation was the most extraordinary; and this was the opinion formed by Lord Cathcart and all who had an opportunity of seeing him even in the most unreserved and confidential manner.

(2) See the whole Papers in Parl. Deb. x. 195, 219. Sav. iii. 126, 128.

Concurring The statements of the French statement of and English ambassadors on this English and French point are very material, as not only are they perfectly in unison with each other, but distinctly prove that the rupture with Russia had no connexion with the Copenhagen expedition, but was the result of the secret articles of the treaty at Tilsit. Savary says—

"In the first days of November I received a courier from the Emperor, which brought instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to insist upon the execution of one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. On the day following I said to the Emperor, at a special audience, 'Sire, I am charged with the desire of my master that you should unite your force to his to compel England to listen to his propositions.' 'Very well,' replied the Emperor, 'I have given him my word that I would do so, and I will keep my promise; see Romazoff, and return to speak with me on the subject.' On the day following I returned; and the Emperor then said that it had been agreed that France and Russia should unite to summon England, but that the mediation of Russia was first to be proposed, which should still be done. I represented that this had already taken place, and that England had refused his mediation. He mused a moment, and then said, 'I understand you, and since your master desires it, I am quite disposed to fulfil my engagements. I will to-day give orders to Romazoff.' Two days afterwards the hostile note against England was issued, and the British ambassador demanded his passports. Having gained this much, though well aware that the principal object of Napoléon was to strike at the English commerce, I deemed it expedient to shew my eyes to the time given to the British vessels to clear out from the Russian harbours."—SAVARY, iii. 126, 128. Lord L. Gower says, in his despatch to Mr. Canning, November 4, 1807,—"Some members of the Council who were consulted on the matter, advised the Emperor not to reject so fair an opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe; and their opinion was so far taken that a note was written to General Savary

armed neutrality; and on the day following Lord Leveson Gower set out for the British shores (1).

Oct. 6.
1807.
The Russians declare war against Sweden.
Feb. 10,
1808.

This declaration of war against Great Britain was attended by a summons to Sweden, to join in the league against the latter place; and it soon appeared, from the vigorous preparations for the prosecution of the war in that quarter, that the cession of Finland to Russia had been arranged at Tilsit, and that the Czar was resolved immediately to add that important province, lying so near his capital, to his

with the view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French general has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian cabinet, alarmed at the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overture received from England." And on 8th November he wrote to the same minister, "The inclosed note, the contents of which are so extremely important" (they contained a declaration of war), "has been produced by a peremptory demand, brought by the last messenger from Paris, of the immediate execution of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit; and the French mission boasts that, after some difficulty, they have gained a complete victory, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Bonaparte's views. I shall ask my passports tomorrow."—Lord L. Gower to M^r. CANNING, *Petersburg, 4th and 8th Nov. 1807*.—*Parl. Deb.* x. 215, 216.

Russian manifesto. (1) The Russian manifesto bore:— "The great value which the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty enhanced the regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him. Twice has the Emperor taken up arms in a cause which was directly that of England, and he solicited in vain from England such a co-operation as her own interest demanded. He did not demand that her troops should be united to his, he desired only they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her cause she did not act in union with him, but coolly contemplating a bloody spectacle in a war which had been kindled at her will, she, instead of co-operating, sent troops to attack Buenos-Ayres and Alexandria. And what sensibly touched the heart of the Emperor, was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects at the very time that the blood of the Russians was shedding in the most glorious of warfares, which drew down and fixed against the armies of his Imperial Majesty all the military force of the French Emperor, with whom the English then were and still are at war. Nevertheless, when the two Emperors made peace, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his old friendship, proffered his mediation to effect a general pacification; but the King of England rejected the mediation. The treaty between Russia and France was intended to procure a general peace; but at that very moment England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself; but it was to cast upon the north of Europe new firebrands, which were to light anew the flames of war. Her fleets and her armies appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a single example. A tranquil and moderate power sees itself assailed as if it had been forging plots and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, did not dissemble his resentment against England; new

proposals were made by England for the neutrality of Denmark, but to these the Emperor would not accede. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England, proclaims anew the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and annuls all conventions inconsistent with its spirit."—*Parl. Deb.* x. 218, 221.

Declaration by Great Britain, 18th Dec. 1807.— To this manifesto it was replied, in a long and able declaration by Great Britain, drawn by Mr. Canning— "His Majesty was apprised of the secret conditions which had been imposed upon Russia in the conference at Tilsit, but he indulged a hope that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and the interests of the Russian empire, would have led him to extricate himself from these trammels, contracted in a moment of despondency and alarm. His Majesty deemed it necessary to demand a specific explanation from Russia with respect to these arrangements with France, the concealment of which could not but confirm the impression already received as to their character and tendency. The demand was made in the most amicable manner, and with every degree of delicacy and forbearance; but the declaration of war by the Emperor of Russia proved but too distinctly that this forbearance was misapplied. It proves, unhappily, that the influence acquired over Russia by the inveterate enemy of England is such as to excite a causeless animosity between the two nations, whose long connexion and mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation. The King of England does full justice to the motives which induced the Emperor of Russia twice to take up arms in the common cause. But surely the Emperor of Russia, on the last occasion, had a more pressing call to join his arms to those of his ally, the King of Prussia, than Great Britain, then actually at war with that power. The reference to the war with the Porte is peculiarly unfortunate, when it was undertaken at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining the Russian interests against those of France. It, however, the peace of Tilsit was really a punishment for the inactivity of Great Britain, it was singularly unfortunate that it took place at a time when England was making the most strenuous exertions in the common cause, and had actually got that great armament prepared which she has since been obliged to employ to disconcert a combination directed against her own immediate interests and security. The complaint of vexations to Russian commerce, is a mere imaginary grievance, never heard of before, and now put forth only to countenance the exaggerated declamations by which France strives to inflame the animosity of the other continental powers. The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his Majesty—they are not yet communicated—not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so un-

extensive dominions. As fast as the troops arrived from the Niemen of St.-Petersburg, they were passed through to the frontiers of Finland, and such a force was soon accumulated there as rendered hopeless the preservation of that bright jewel to the Swedish crown. A formal declaration of war was, however, delayed till the spring following, when the preparations of the cabinet of St.-Petersburg were completed, and the season of the year enabled them to resume military operations. In the interval, the Swedish government had so carefully abstained from giving any cause of complaint to the Northern Autocrat, that when he came to assign his reasons for a rupture to the world, he could find no ground whatever on which to justify his hostilities, but that the Swedish monarch had not acceded to his proposal to break with England and join his forces to those of Russia, and was desirous of preserving throughout the contest a strict neutrality; a pretext for a war which came with a singularly bad grace from a power which affected to feel such indignation at the English government for having, for a similar reason, and when well informed of the secret designs of France against the Danish fleet, commenced hostilities against the court of Copenhagen.

Feb. 6, 1808. This declaration was immediately followed by a proclamation to the Fins by the Russian commander, in which he declared that he entered their territory with no hostile intentions, and solely to preserve them from the horrors of war, and invited them to abstain from hostilities or revolt to Russia: a promise instantly belied by the formal occupation of the whole provinces by the Muscovite forces, and the establishment of Russian authorities in every part of them excepting those fortresses still held by Swedish garrisons. Meanwhile the King of Sweden, faithful to his engagements, relying on the support of Great Britain, and encouraged by the great blow struck at the Danish power by the English armament, bid defiance to the united hostility of France and Russia, and replied to the Russian manifesto in a dignified proclamation, a model for greater powers and more prosperous fortunes, in which he bitterly complained of the invasion of his dominions and the incitement held out to his subjects to revolt by the Russian forces, without any declaration of war or ground of hostility; contrasted the present subservience of Russia to France, with the repeated declarations she had made, that its ambition was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, and her solemn engagements to conclude no peace with that power which should be "inconsistent with the glory of the Russian name, the security of the empire, the sanctity of alliances, and the general security of Europe (1)," and justly observed, that the present war, based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign connexions to the Northern Powers, was undertaken for no other object but to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and

suitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit: conditions to which the Emperor of Russia could not object, as the first was the same which the Emperor had himself annexed to the mediation of Austria between himself and France, not four months before; and the second was clearly called for by the previous, and long-established relations between Russia and Great Britain. Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war."—*English Declaration, December 18, 1807; Parl. Deb.* x. 118-122. It will be observed how studious, by, in these diplomatic papers, Russia eludes all al-

lusion to the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. "The capture of the Danish fleet," says Hardenberg, "was not the cause, but the pretext, of Russia's rupture with England. The cabinet of St.-Petersburg, if the truth were known, was not sorry of so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the North, as it already was in the South of Europe; and, notwithstanding all the loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, beheld, with more satisfaction, the success of England in that quarter, than it would have done the junction of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of the French Emperor."—*Hardenberg, x. 49.*

(1) See Russian manifesto, 30th Aug. 1806.

compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Constadt and Revel (1).

Denmark
enters cor-
dially into
the war.

It was not to be supposed that Denmark, after the grievous though unavoidable losses she had sustained, should not resent to the utmost of her power the hostility of Great Britain. She threw herself, therefore, without reserve into the arms of France, and made every preparation for the most active hostility; though the loss of her fleet and dismantling of her arsenal, deprived her of the means of carrying on any efficient warfare, and which, on the other hand, exposed her commerce and colonies to total destruction. The Prince Royal, carried away by an excusable resentment, overlooked all these considerations, and not only constantly refused to ratify the capitulation of Copenhagen, but concluded, soon after, a treaty offensive and defensive with the Emperor Napoléon, which, by a singular coincidence, was signed on the very day on which Junot, at the head of a powerful army, commenced his march from Bayonne to enforce a similar obedience to the secret resolutions adopted at Tilsit from the court of Lisbon (2).

Affairs of
Russia and
Turkey.

While a new war was thus kindling from the ashes of the old one in the north of Europe, Russia was steadily prosecuting those ambitious designs on her southern frontier, the unmolested advancement of which had constituted the principal lure held out by Napoléon to gain her alliance on the shores of the Niemen. In this attempt, however, she did not experience all the facilities which she expected. As the main object of Napoléon, in the negotiations at Tilsit, was to accelerate the rupture of Russia with Great Britain, and procure her accession to the Continental System (3), so the ruling principle of Russia was to obtain facilities for the prosecution of her designs against the Ottoman empire, and in the mean time to postpone the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, till she was better prepared to carry her projects of conquest into effect. Napoléon, as already stated, had agreed at Tilsit, that the evacuation should be indefinitely postponed (4); but hardly had he returned to Paris, when, being engrossed with his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, and unable to appropriate to himself in consequence his anticipated share of the Ottoman spoils, he repented of the ready consent which he had given to the advances of Russia in that direction, and became desirous to throw every obstacle in the way of their further prosecution. In terms of the stipulation to that effect in the

Aug. 24. formal treaty, the mediation of France had been offered to the Divan, which having been accepted, and an armistice concluded, nothing remained to justify the prolonged occupation of the principalities. It appeared the more necessary to bring it to a termination, as the Turks, though they gladly availed themselves of the French mediation at first, did so in the belief that they were to obtain thereby the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; but no sooner did they discover that this was not really intended, and that the Muscovite standards were still to remain on the Danube, than they loudly expressed their resolution to continue, in preference, the conflict. They said, with justice, "In what worse situation could we be, if the French, instead of being victorious, had been beaten in Poland? Is this the Emperor's care of his allies, whom he has drawn into the conflict, to leave their richest provinces in the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1808, 237, 303 and 307. Sav. iii. 112.

(2) Hard. x. 48, 49.

(3) Bign. vi. 429.

(4) *Ante*, vi.

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"Vous pouvez la traîner en longueur."

hands of their enemies (1)?" Savary, therefore, received orders to insist in the mildest possible manner, but still to insist, for the evacuation of the Principalities; and to consent to the prolonged occupation of them by the Russian forces, only on condition that Alexander sanctioned the continued possession of Silesia by the French troops. This was at once agreed to; the two Autocrats readily consented to wink at their mutual infraction of the rights of other states; and as the Turks found that they had been betrayed by Napoleon, and some account of the secret article of the treaty of Tilsit which provided for their partition had reached them, they declined the further intervention of the French, and prepared to renew the war (2).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 742. State Papers, Sav. iii. 110, 111. Bign. vi. 429, 430. Harl. x. 51, 53. Corresp. Conf. de Nap. vii. 364, 385.

(2) The negotiation between Savary and Romanzoff, and his conversations with Alexander himself on this important subject, which are given in the secret and confidential correspondence of Napoleon, are highly curious, as indicating the ulterior ambitious views of the great empires which they severally represented, and the seeds of that jealousy which, in the midst of unbounded protestations of present regard, was laying the foundation of future and mortal hostility. By despatches from Napoleon, dated Fontainebleau, 14th Oct. 1807, Savary was required to enquire what was the cause which had retarded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops, and to observe that peace could not be re-established between Russia and the Porte till that evacuation had taken place; as it was the condition which must precede the armistice which was to be the foundation of the definitive treaty; that the delay to evacuate could not fail to annul the armistice which had been concluded, and rekindle the flames of war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. In reply, the Emperor Alexander, after alleging various insignificant reasons for not commencing the evacuation, observed, "circumstances now appear to require a deviation in this particular from the strict letter of the treaty of Tilsit. The latest advices from Vienna and Odessa concur in stating that the influence of France has declined at Constantinople; it is even said that Lord A. Paget, the English ambassador, has embarked on board Lord Collingwood's fleet in the Dardanelles. There is every probability that a treaty will be concluded between England and the Porte hostile to you, and consequently to me; and that if I should evacuate these provinces I should soon have to re-enter them in order to avert the war from my own frontiers. I must revert to what the Emperor Napoleon said to me, not once but ten times, at Tilsit, in respect to these provinces, and I have more confidence in these assurances than in all the reasons of expedience or policy which may subsequently appear to thwart them. Why, then, renounce my present advantages, when past experience tells me so clearly what will ensue if I evacuate these provinces? Even supposing that you have the upper hand at Constantinople, you can never prevent bands of insurgents from crossing the Danube, and renewing the pillage of these provinces: the orders of the Porte are null a mile from Constantinople. In our conversations at Tilsit, your Emperor often said that he was no ways set on that evacuation: that it might be indefinitely postponed; that it was not possible any longer to tolerate the Turks in Europe; that he left me at liberty to drive them into Asia. It was only on a subsequent occasion that he went back of his word so far, as to speak of leaving the Turks Constantinople and some of the adjacent provinces."

Savary replied, "Russia can always renew the

war if you find it advisable. It is needless to refer to the engagements between the two monarchs; the Emperor Napoleon has too much confidence in the honour of the Emperor Alexander to doubt the validity of the reasons which have hitherto prevented him from executing these secret engagements; but still he is desirous of seeing them carried into effect, as a peace between Russia and the Porte is all that remains to conclude the execution of the stipulations of the public treaty of Tilsit. All that the Emperor Napoleon has said at Tilsit shall be religiously executed; nor is there any thing in the secret treaty which is calculated to thwart the desires of Russia. Nay, the surest and most expeditious mode to arrive at it is to carry into execution the public treaty; for we must conclude an armistice with the Turks before a treaty is concluded; or do you propose at once to write their epitaph?"

"I yesterday had a long interview," replied Alexander, "with the Swedish ambassador, and strongly urged him to enter into all the views of France, and the risk he would run in not making common cause with her and Russia. Meanwhile the march of the troops continues; in seven or eight days the last division will have arrived, and fifty thousand men will be ready to commence the war on the frontiers of Finland. When you demanded from me a declaration of war against England, I was well aware it was no trifling change of policy which was required; no slight change of system which could be altered as soon as adopted. Had I conceived it to be such I would never have put my name to it; but I viewed it in a more extended light. What am I required to do, said I to myself? To prepare great events which will cause the memory of mournful ones to be forgotten, and put the two states in such political relations as can never be disturbed. Impressed with these ideas, and within twenty-four hours after your requisition, I did what you desired, though that war was not only no ways conducive to our interests, but, on the contrary, exposed us to very serious losses. Now you insist that I should make war on Sweden; I am ready to do so; my armies are on her frontier; what return are we to obtain for so many sacrifices? Wallachia and Moldavia are the recompense which the nation expects, and you wish to bereave us of them. What reply can we make to our people if, after their evacuation, they ask us what benefits are to compensate to them for the manifold losses consequent on the war with England?"—See the whole diplomatic papers and conversations in SAVARY'S *Secret Despatch to Napoleon, St Petersburg, 18th November, 1807; Corresp. Conf. de Napoleon*, vii. 364, 385.—That confidential despatch reveals more of the real nature of the secret engagements at Tilsit than any other documents in existence; and demonstrates that both the Swedish and English war were the result of those engagements, and no ways connected with the Copenhagen expedition, which is never once mentioned as a ground of complaint against Great Britain, by either Savary, Alexander, or his minister Romanzoff.

Changes in
the consti-
tution of the
Italian
States.

Meanwhile Napoléon had set out for Italy, where great political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the great nation, to share in the rapid mutations which its government underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to accept a change in its constitution. Napoléon, in consequence, suppressed the legislative body, and substituted in its room a senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As this senate was named and paid by government, this last shadow of representative institutions became a perfect mockery. Nevertheless Napoléon was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy; their deputies, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy; they had supplicated Heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoléon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose sight of the main object of his policy, the consolidation of his dominions, the dependence of them all on his Imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. "You will always find," said he, "the source of your prosperity, the best guarantee alike of your institutions and of your independence, in the constant union of the Iron crown with the Imperial crown of France. But to obtain this felicity, you must show yourselves worthy of it. It is time that the Italian youth should seek some more ennobling employment than idling away their lives at the feet of women; and that they should spurn every lover who cannot lay claim to their favour by the exhibition of honourable scars (1)."

Union of
Parma and
Piacenza to
France.
Great works
at Milan.
State of
Italy.
Dec. 10,
1807.

From Milan the Emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice; he there admired the marble palaces, and varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amidst illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings; and returning to Milan, arranged, with an authoritative hand, all the affairs of the peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Lodi; Tuscany was taken from the King of Etruria, on whom Napoléon had settled it, and united to France by the title of the department of the Taro; while magnificent public works were set on foot at Milan to dazzle the ardent imagination of the Italians, and console them for the entire loss of their national independence and civil liberty. The cathedral was daily adorned with fresh works of sculpture; its exterior decorated and restored to its original purity, while thousands of pinnacles and statues rose on all sides, glittering in spotless brilliancy in the blue vault of heaven; the forum of Bonaparte was rapidly advancing; the beautiful basso-relievos of the arch of the Simplon already attracted the admiring gaze of thousands; the roads of the Simplon and Mont Cenis were kept in the finest order, and daily attracted fresh crowds of strangers to the Italian plains. But in the midst of all this external splendour, the remains of which still throw a halo round the recollection of the French domination in Italy, the finances of all the states were involved in hopeless embarrassments, and suffering of the most grinding kind pervaded all classes of the people; the public expenditure of the kingdom of Italy had risen to 120,000,000 francs (L.5,000,000); the annual tri-

bate of a million sterling to France was severely felt; ten thousand men had recently been raised by conscription to fill up the chasm in the army; and the misery of Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Venetian states, from the enormous contributions levied by the French troops, and the total stoppage of foreign commerce, was such as to draw forth the most piteous lamentations from its native historians (1).

Encroachments
of France on
Holland, Ger-
many, and Ita-
ly. Occupation
of Rome and
dismember-
ment of its
provinces.
Nov. 11.

The encroachments thus made on the Italian peninsula, were not the only ones which he effected in consequence of the liberty to dispose of Western Europe acquired by Napoléon at the treaty of Tilsit. The territory of the Great Nation was rounded also on the side of Germany and Holland. On the 11th of November, the important town and territory of Flushing was ceded by the King

of Holland to France, who obtained, in return, merely an elusory equivalent in East Friesland. On the 21st of January following, a decree of the

senate united to the French empire, besides these places, the important towns of Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine. Shortly after, the French troops, who had already taken possession of the whole of

Tuscany, in virtue of the resignation forced upon the Queen of Etruria, invaded the Roman territories, and took possession of the ancient capital of the world. They immediately occupied the Castle of St.-Angelo, and gates of the city, and entirely dispossessed the Papal troops. Two months afterwards, an Imperial decree of Napoléon's severed the provinces of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino, which had formed part of the Eccle-

siastical estates under the gift of Charlemagne for nearly a thousand years, and annexed them to the kingdom of Italy. The reason assigned for this spoliation was, "That the actual Sovereign of Rome has constantly declined to declare war against the English, and to coalesce with the Kings of Italy and Naples for the defence of the Italian peninsula. The interests of these two kingdoms, as well as of the armies of Naples and Italy, require that their communication should not be interrupted by a hostile power." The importance of these acquisitions, great as they undoubtedly were, especially in Italy, was not so momentous as the principles on which they were founded, and the ulterior acquisitions to which they evidently pointed. France now, without disguise, assumed the right of annexing neutral and independent states to its already extensive dominion, by no other authority than the decree of its own legislature. The natural boundaries, so long held forth as the limits of the Great Nation, were overstepped; by extending its territory beyond the Rhine, it was plain that Holland and the North of Germany were soon to be incorporated with its dominions; by stretching across the Alps, it was evident that, ere long, Rome and the whole of Italy *would* form an integral part of the dominions of Napoléon (2).

But all the other consequences of the peace at Tilsit were trifling, in comparison of those which took place in the Spanish peninsula. As the war to which they led in that quarter, however, was by far the most important and eventful which arose out of the French Revolution, brought, for the first time, the English and French armies as principals into the contest, and was the chief cause of the overthrow of Napoléon, as well as the best index to the leading features of his policy, it requires for its elucidation a separate chapter.

Reflections
on the
imminent
hazard to
Europe from
the treaty of
Tilsit.

In the consequences, however, which have already been described as flowing from the treaty at Tilsit, is to be discerned the clearest indication of the great peril which instantly threatens the cause of European independence, from the undue preponderance ac-

quired by any of its potentates, and of the absolute necessity which exists for the maintenance of that balance of power, in which superficial observers have so often seen only the prolific source of unnecessary warfare. The principle on which that policy is founded is that of *principiis obsta*; resist the encroachments which may give any one state an undue preponderance; and regard such contests at the extremity of the outworks, as the only effectual means of defending the ramparts of the place. Such a system requires a sacrifice of the present to the future; it involves an immediate expenditure to avert a remote, and possibly contingent, evil. It will, therefore, always be supported only by the wise, and be generally unpopular with the bulk of mankind. It is of great importance, therefore, to attend to the consequences which immediately resulted from the treaty at Tilst, and the effects which necessarily ensued from the overthrow of this system. The inferior powers of Europe were then overawed or subdued. England had withdrawn almost entirely from the strife; and, secluded in her inaccessible isle, had remained, according to the favourite system of a numerous class of her politicians, a neutral spectator of the wars of the Continent. What was the consequence? Was it that her independence was better secured, her interests more thoroughly established, or her ultimate safety better provided for than under the more active and costly system of former times? On the contrary, while the rights and liberties of the continental states were utterly destroyed during her secession, England herself was brought to the very edge of perdition. The European strife immediately ran into a contest between its two great powers; the whole moral as well as physical strength of the Continent was arrayed under the banners of France or Russia, and when these rival powers came to an accommodation, it was by the mutual agreement to divide between them the spoils of all subordinate or neutral states. To Russia, already enriched by a portion of Prussia, was assigned Finland, the greater part of Turkey, and an irresistible preponderance in the Euxine and Baltic Seas; to France, already master of the half of Germany, was allotted Italy, Poland, and the Spanish Peninsula. These great powers at once laid aside all moderation and semblance even of justice in their proceedings; and, strong in each other's forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states, even unoffending neutrals or faithful allies, which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire to one or other, would, it was plain, be the result of a desperate strife between them, and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts. Already this danger had become apparent; all the fleets of Europe were combined under the command of the French Emperor; and in a few years he would have two hundred sail of the line, to beat down in the Channel the naval forces of England, and carry slavery and ruin into the British dominions. Such were, then, the consequences of the subversion of the balance of power; such the dangers, which induce the far-seeing sagacity of political wisdom to commence the conflict for national independence, as soon as the rights of inferior powers are menaced.

Although, however, both the liberties of England and independence of Europe, were at this time placed in such imminent peril, yet a great step had already been made towards diminishing the danger; and the Copenhagen expedition had completely paralysed the right wing of the naval force by

Great importance of the stroke already struck at Napoleon's naval confederacy.

which Napoléon expected to effect our subjugation. The capture of twenty ships of the line, and fifteen frigates, with all their stores complete, equivalent, in Napoléon's estimation (1), to the destruction of eighty thousand land troops, was perhaps the greatest maritime blow ever yet struck by any nation, and weakened the naval resources of the French Emperor to a degree greater in extent than any single calamity yet experienced during the war. The hostility of Russia, predetermined at Tilsit, was by this stroke kept almost within the bounds of neutrality. Sweden was encouraged to continue in the English alliance: the maritime force of the Baltic was in a manner withdrawn from the contest; a few sail of the line were all that were required to be maintained by England in that quarter. It is remarkable that this great achievement, fraught with such momentous consequences at that eventful crisis, was regarded by the nation at the time with divided and uneasy sentiments; and that the Opposition never had so largely the support of the public, as when they assailed the government for a measure, calculated, in its ultimate results, to prove the salvation of the country. But it is not to be supposed that this dissatisfaction was owing to factious motives; on the contrary, it was brought about by the ascendancy in the public mind of the best and noblest principles of our nature. And it is a memorable circumstance, highly characteristic of the salutary influence of public opinion under a really free government, in bringing the actions of public men to the test of general morality, that—while in France, where revolutionary ascendancy had extinguished every feeling in regard to public matters, except the admiration of success, and in Russia, where a despotic sway had hitherto prevented the growth of any public opinion, universal satisfaction ensued at the ill-gotten gains of the respective Emperors—the English people mourned at the greatest maritime conquest yet achieved by their arms, and disdained to purchase even national independence at the expense, as it was then ignorantly thought, of the national faith.

(1) Napoléon in Month.

CHAPTER XLIX.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

ARGUMENT.

Ambitious Views of Napoleon on the Spanish Peninsula—His early Designs against Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy in July 1806—The Discovery of these Designs rouses Spain to break with France—Premature Proclamation by the Prince of Peace, announcing his Designs in October 1806—Napoleon resolves on the Dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchs—Measures arranged at Tilsit for this Purpose—Proofs of the Secret Conferences then regarding it—Steps taken by the Portuguese Government in consequence—Origin of the Spanish Intrigues—Character of the Leading Persons there—The Prince of Peace, Charles IV.—The Queen—Sketch of the Life of the Prince of Peace—The Prince of Escoiquiz and his Confidential Advisers—Escoiquiz opens a Negotiation with the Spanish Ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoleon—Treaty of Fontainebleau between Charles IV and the French Emperor—Convention at the same place by which it was followed—Napoleon's Fictitious Designs both towards Spain and Portugal in acceding to it—His Secret Instructions to Junot in the Invasion of Portugal—Extreme Difficulties of that General's march across the Peninsula—Conduct of the Portuguese Government, and Situation of Lisbon at this Crisis—After great hesitation, the Court of Lisbon determine to set sail for Brazil—Proclamation of the Prince Regent on the Subject—Embarkation of the Royal Family for the Brazils—Arrival of the French at Lisbon—The Country is occupied by them in name of the Emperor, and Enormous Contributions levied by their Troops—The Portuguese Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole Kingdom seized by the French—Complete Occupation of the Provinces by their Forces, and Despair of the Inhabitants—Arrest of Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias at the Escorial, and Seizure of his Papers—Proclamation of the King of Spain on the Subject, and Correspondence with Napoleon regarding it—Letter of Charles IV to Napoleon—Cautious Conduct of the latter on receiving it, which leads to the Pardoning of the Prince of Asturias—Entrance of the French Troops into Spain—The Prince of Peace does not venture to remonstrate against this Invasion—New Levy in France, and Treacherous Seizure of Pampeluna by the French—And of Barcelona—Figueras and St Sebastian—The Emperor speedily improves upon his success, and covers the north of Spain with his Troops—The Prince of Peace at length sees through the real designs of Napoleon—His Secret Despatch to Isquierdo at this period—Napoleon demands the Cession of the Provinces to the north of the Ebro—Godoy, at length made aware of the designs of Napoleon, prepares the Flight of the Court to Seville—Tumult at Aranjuez, and Overthrow of that Minister—His Fall, and consequent Abdication of Charles IV.—His Proclamation and Secret Opinions on the Subject—Universal Joy of the Spanish People at these events—Continued Advance of the French Troops, and Entry of Murat into Madrid—He declines to recognize Ferdinand, and takes Military Possession of the Capital—Napoleon offers the Crown of Spain to Louis Bonaparte, who Declines it—His Letter to that Monarch on this effect—Saturny is sent to Madrid—His Secret Instructions and Object of his Journey—He arrives at Madrid, and persuades Ferdinand to go to Bayonne—Journey of Ferdinand to Burgos at that Officer's earnest desire—Secret Motives of his Counsellors in agreeing to that Step—But it is strongly resisted, and his Council become divided—At length he Prolongs his Advance to Bayona, in consequence of a letter from Napoleon—Guarded, but deceitful expressions in that Letter—Energetic Efforts of the Spanish Authorities at Biscay to stop the King—Godoy, Charles IV, and the Queen, are sent by Murat to Bayonne—Great Embarrassment experienced at this time by Napoleon in regard to the Peninsular Affairs—His admirable Letter to Murat, portraying his Views on the Subject—Extreme agitation in Madrid at the approaching Departure of the rest of the Royal Family—Commotion and Tumult at that Capital on 2d May—Barbarous Massacre subsequently committed by Murat—Prodigious Effect which it produced throughout the Peninsula—Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne, and is told he must surrender the Crown of Spain—Subsequent Negotiation between his Counsellors and Napoleon—He sends for Charles IV, and has a Private Conference with Escoiquiz—Its most striking Passages—The Arrival of Charles IV solves the Difficulty—His Reception by Napoleon—Ferdinand is forced to resign the Crown in a qualified manner—But still refuses to make an Unconditional Surrender—Charles IV's Letter to his Son—Napoleon obtains an Unconditional Surrender from Charles IV—Secret Instructions of Ferdinand at this time to the

Regency at Madrid—The Intelligence of the Events there on 2d May extorts an unconditional Surrender from Ferdinand—Napoleon creates Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain, and convokes an assembly of Notables at Bayonne—His Proclamation to the Spaniards—Reflections on the unparalleled chain of fraud and perfidy by which this was accomplished—His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish Princes—Ultimate consequences of this treacherous conduct to Napoleon and his house—Its apparent wisdom, so far as mere human wisdom is concerned—The passions of the Revolution were the real cause of the disasters both to Europe and France.

Ambitious
views of Na-
poleon in the
Spanish
Peninsula.
His design
on Portugal.

No sooner had Napoleon returned to Paris, than he began to turn his eyes towards the Spanish Peninsula, and the means of bringing the resources of both its monarchies more immediately under the control of France than they had hitherto been brought, even by the abject submission of both courts to his commands. His designs against Portugal had been of very long standing; Lord Yarmouth gained a clue to them while conducting the negotiations at Paris in July 1806, for the conclusion of a general peace; and so pressing did the danger at that time appear, that July, 1806. government dispatched Earl St.-Vincent with a powerful squadron to the Tagus, to watch over British interests in that quarter, and afford to the Portuguese government every assistance in his power in warding off the danger with which they were threatened; Lord Rosslyn accompanied the expedition in a political character, and was authorized to offer the Portuguese government assistance in men and money to aid them in repelling the threatened invasion. Nor were these measures of precaution uncalled for; a corps of thirty thousand men, under the name of the "army of the Gironde," was assembling at Bayonne, under the command of Junot, and it was ascertained, by undoubted information that their destination was Lisbon (1). The presence of the British fleet under Earl St.-Vincent, in the Tagus, for a period of several months revived the drooping spirits of the Portuguese government; but after the battle of Jena, their terror of France so far prevailed as to induce them to solicit their dismissal. The march, however, of the French armies to Prussia, postponed, for a considerable period at least, the threatened invasion (2).

And against
Spain.

At the same period that these preparations, avowedly directed against Portugal, were going forward on the Pyrenean frontier, the cabinet of Madrid discovered, through their ambassador at Paris, that Napoleon was offering to bestow on others, without their knowledge or consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. It has been already noticed that, in his anxiety for peace with England, he offered to cede the Spanish settlement of Puerto Rico; and, to obtain Sicily from the British government for his brother Joseph, he proposed to give up the Balearic Isles

(1) "Switzerland," said Talleyrand to Lord Yarmouth at Paris, on 27th July 1806, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be effected but by a peace with England; but still less can we alter for any other consideration our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembled at Bayonne. This is for the consideration of Great Britain."—*LORD YARMOUTH'S Despatch, July 30 1806; Parl. Deb. viii. 134.*

(2) *Mart. p. 79. Parl. Deb. viii. 134.*

V. 350. Even so early as this period, the project of partitioning Portugal, and conferring a portion of it on the Prince of Peace, afterwards carried into effect by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was formed. "Lord Rosslyn," says General Foy, "was no sooner admitted to the council of Lisbon than he announced that it was all over with Portugal; that a French army, assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, was ready to invade it, and that its conquest was al-

ready arranged between the King of Spain and the Prince of Peace. That great project," added he, "has been confided by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale during the negotiations at Paris. The Ministers of the King of England could not see without uneasiness the peril of their ancient allies; they have flown to their succour. A corps of 12,000 men at this moment is embarking at Portsmouth, and will shortly arrive at Lisbon; meanwhile, the court of Lisbon may draw at pleasure on the treasury of England for the charges consequent on the war."—*Foy, ii. 123.* The English expedition sailed, but afterwards went on to Sicily, as the Portuguese government, relieved of their present danger by the Prussian war, and desirous not to embroil themselves further with France, not only declined their aid, but prevailed on the English government to withdraw their squadron from the Tagus.

as a compensation to the dispossessed family of Naples (1). Nor was this all—to make up the measure of indemnity, it was seriously proposed that a large annuity, imposed as a burden for ever on the Spanish Crown, should be settled on the dislodged family, and stipulations to this effect were inserted in the secret articles of the peace, which M. d'Oubril signed with France on July 19, 1806. July, 19, 1806 (2). Nor were these diplomatic arrangements unsupported by warlike demonstrations; on the contrary, the most active measures were taken to put the army on the Pyrenean frontier on the most efficient footing; and on the 19th July, Earl Yarmouth wrote to Mr. Secretary Fox: "There is a considerable army already forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men are there already; this army is ostensibly directed against Portugal but it will take Spain also (3)."

The discovery of these designs rouses Spain to break with France.

The alarming discovery of the manner in which the French Emperor was thus disposing of portions of the Spanish monarchy, with which he was in a state of close alliance at the time without ever going through the form of asking their consent to the cessions they were required to make, added to the irritation which the court of Madrid already felt at the dethronement of the Neapolitan branch of the house of Bourbon. It produced the same impression on the cabinet of Madrid, which a similar discovery, made at the same time, on the offer of Napoleon to cede Hanover, recently bestowed on Prussia by himself, to Great Britain, as an inducement to that power to enter into a maritime peace, did on that of Berlin. Both these powers had for ten years cordially supported France; Spain, in particular, had placed her fleets and treasure at her disposal; and not only annually paid an enormous tribute (£2,800,000) to the expenses of the war, but submitted for its prosecution to the destruction of her marine, and the entire stoppage of her foreign and colonial trade. When, therefore, in return for so many sacrifices, made in a cause foreign to the real interests of Spain, her Ministers found not only that the interests of the Peninsula were noways regarded by Napoleon in his negotiation with England and Russia, but that he had actually offered the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, his tried and faithful ally, to appease the jealousy or satisfy the demands of these his old and inveterate enemies, their indignation knew no bounds. The veil which had so long hung before their eyes was at once violently rent asunder: they saw clearly that fidelity in alliance and long-continued national service afforded no guarantee whatever for the continued support of the French monarch, and that, when it suited his purpose, he had no scruples in purchasing a temporary respite from the hostility of an enemy by the permanent spoliation of a friend. The Prince of Peace, also, was personally mortified at the exclusion of the Spanish minister at Paris from all share in the conferences going on with d'Oubril and Lord Yarmouth for the conclusion of a general peace. Under the influence of such pressing public and private causes of irritation, the Spanish minister lent a willing ear to the advances of the Russian ambassador at Madrid, Baron Stroganoff, who strongly represented the impolicy of continuing any longer the alliance with a conqueror who sacrificed his allies to

(1) *Ante*, v. 339.

(2) "M. d'Oubril and Talleyrand have fixed upon Majorca, Minorca, and Ivisca for his Sicilian Majesty, if they cannot prevail on us to evacuate Sicily."—Lord Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, July 19 and 20, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 122.—And again, on 26th September, Champagne proposed to Lord Lauderdale "that his Sicilian Majesty should

have the Balearic Isles, and an annuity from the court of Spain to enable him to maintain his dignity."—Lord Lambeth's Despatch to Lord Yarmouth, Paris, 26th September, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 103, 104.

(3) *Torres*, i. 6. Bign. v. 346, 348. Lord Yarmouth's Despatch, Paris, July 13, 1806. *Parl. Deb.* viii. 122.

Aug. 27, 1807, propitiate his enemies; and a convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Spanish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a party, by which it was agreed that, as soon as the favourable opportunity arrived, by the French armies being far advanced on their road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities on the Pyrenees, and invite the English to co-operate in averting the dangers with which it was menaced from the Spanish peninsula (1).

Premature proclamation by the Prince of Peace. The whole of this secret negotiation was made known to Napoleon by the activity of his ambassador at Madrid, and by the intercepting of some of the correspondence in cipher in which it was carried on. But he dissembled his resentment, and resolved to strike a decisive blow in the North of Germany before he carried into effect the views which he now began to entertain for the total conquest and appropriation of both kingdoms in the Peninsula. The imprudence of the Prince of Peace, however, publicly revealed the designs which were in agitation before the proper season had arrived; for, in a proclamation published in the beginning Oct. 5, 1807, of October at Madrid, he invited "all Spaniards to unite themselves under the national standards: the rich to make sacrifices for the charges of a war which will soon be called for by the common good; the magistrates to do all in their power to rouse the public enthusiasm, in order to enable the nation to enter with glory the lists which were preparing." This proclamation reached Napoleon on the field of Jena the evening after the battle. He was not prepared for so vigorous a step on the part of one who had so long been the obsequious minister of his will; and it may be conceived what his feelings were, on receiving accounts of so decided a demonstration in such a moment of unexampled triumph. Too skilled in dissembling, however, to give any premature vent to his feelings, he contented himself with instructing his ambassador at Madrid to demand an explanation of so extraordinary a measure, and feigned entire satisfaction with the flimsy pretence, that it was directed against an anticipated descent of the Moors. Nay, he had the address to render this perilous step the means of forwarding his ultimate designs against the Peninsula; for, by threatening the Prince of Peace with the utmost consequences of his resentment, if the most unequivocal proof of devotion to the cause of France were not speedily given, he succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cabinet of Madrid to the march of the Marquis Romana, with the flower of the Spanish army, from the banks of the Ebro to the shores of the Baltic; thereby denuding the Peninsula of its best defenders, and leaving it, as he supposed, an easy prey to his ambitious designs (2). At the same time the court of Lisbon, justly alarmed at the perilous situation in which they were placed by this ill-timed revelation of their secret designs, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project, which all concerned pretended now equally to condemn,

(1) Lord Londonderry, i. 19. *Hist.* x. 90, 81. *Torres*, i. 6, 7.

(2) *Hist.* x. 70, 81. Southey's *Pen. War*, i. 83. De Pradt, *Sur la Rev. d'Espagne*, 15. Londonderry, 6, 21, 22.

The details now given on the spoliation of Spain, which had been contemplated by Napoleon in the diplomatic conferences with the English government at Paris in July 1806, and the actual conclusion of a treaty for that spoliation with Russia in that month, are of the highest importance in the development of the remote causes of the Peninsular war, as they demonstrate that the celebrated pro-

clamation of the Prince of Peace on 5th October was not, as the French panegyrist of Napoleon represent, an uncalled-for act of original hostility on the part of the Spanish government; but a *defensive measure* merely, rendered necessary by the discovery of Napoleon's previous, declared intention of bestowing on strangers, without their consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. This important fact, demonstrated beyond dispute by the State Papers above quoted, appears to be entirely unknown to Southey (*Penins. War*, i. 83); Napier (*Penins. War*, i. 4); and even Lord Londonderry (*Londond.* i. 24, 22).

and to propitiate the conqueror by an act which they were well aware would be well received, compelled Earl St.-Vincent to withdraw with his squadron from the Tagus.

Napoléon resolves on the dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs.

This meditated though abortive resistance of Spain, however, to the projects of spoliation which he had in contemplation, produced a very great impression on Napoléon. He perceived, in the clearest manner, the risk to which he was exposed, if, while actively engaged in a German or Russian war in front, he were to be suddenly assailed by the monarchies of the Peninsula in rear; a quarter where the French frontier was in a great measure defenceless, and from which the armies of England might find an easy entrance into the heart of his dominions. He felt with Louis XIV that it was necessary there should be no longer any Pyrenees; and as the Revolution had changed the reigning family on the throne of France, it appeared indispensable that a similar change should take place in the Peninsular monarchies. By effecting that object he thought, apparently with reason, that not only would the resources of the kingdoms it contained be more completely placed at his disposal, but his rear would be secured by the co-operation of Princes whose existence depended on the maintenance of his authority; and a new family compact, founded on the same reasons of blood connexion and state policy which had rendered it so important to the Bourbon, would, in like manner, secure the perpetuity of the Napoléon dynasty. From the people, either of Spain or Portugal, he anticipated little or no opposition, deeming them, like the Italians, indifferent to political changes, provided that no diminution were made in their private enjoyments. Although, therefore, he dissembled his intentions as long as the war continued in the North of Europe, he had already taken his resolution, and the determination was irrevocable, that the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign (1).

Measures arranged at Tilsit against Spain and Portugal.

The peace of Tilsit, however, placed Napoléon in a very different situation, and gave him at once the means of providing in the most effectual manner for the concurrence of Alexander, in the dethronement of the Peninsular monarchs, by merely conniving at his advances against the Turkish empire. It has already been stated, accordingly, that the invasion of Spain was settled at this period, and that the consideration given for that act of injustice, was permission to the Czar to drive the Turks out of Europe (2). In regard to Portugal, the course to be adopted was sufficiently plain. All that was required was to summon the court of Lisbon to shut their ports against England, confiscate all English property within their dominions, and declare war against the British empire. In the course of enforcing such a requisition, it was hoped that an opportunity could hardly fail to present itself, of effecting the total dethronement of the House of Br-

(1) *Las Cas* iv. 200, 201. *Londond.* i. 22. *Hard.* x. 81, 82. *Thib* vi. 276.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 143.

Proofs of the secret conference regarding it.

"I have strong reasons to believe," says Savary, "that the affair of Spain was arranged at Tilsit. Subsequently, at St Petersburg, when the troubles in the Peninsula commenced, the Emperor seemed no ways surprised at them, and not only expressed no jealousy at the entrance of the French troops into Spain, but never once mentioned the subject. And though Napoléon wrote to me every week from Paris, he never alluded to the subject; a silence which he certainly would not have preserved had every thing not been previously arranged, especially considering how much he had at heart at that period to draw closer

the bonds of the Russian alliance."—SAVARY, iii. 99; see also THIRIAUX, *Hist. de l'Empire*, vi. 276; ASHÉ DE PABRY, *Révolution d'Espagne*, i. 7; and Recoignis has preserved a precious conversation which he had with Napoléon himself on that subject—"There is but one power," said he, "which can disturb my views, and I have no fears in that quarter. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my projects on Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour that he would throw no obstacles in their way. The other powers will remain tranquil, and the resistance of the Spaniards will not be formidable. Believe me, the countries where monks have influence are not difficult to conquer."—LACROIX, iii. 131; *Pièces Just.*

Aug. 22. ganza. This was accordingly done; and on the 12th August, the Portuguese government, as already noticed, were formally summoned, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, to declare war against England, adopt the Continental System, and confiscate all the English property within their bounds (1). At the same time, the army of the Gironde, which had been in a great measure broken up during the Prussian war, re-assembled at Bayonne, and before the end of August, Junot found himself at the head of **Aug. 29.** twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse; while Napoleon, in anticipation of an unfavourable reply to his demands, without waiting for an answer, at once seized the Portuguese ships in his harbours.

Measures of the Portuguese Government. The British government, who were speedily informed of the demand thus made upon their ancient ally, and were no strangers either to the powerful means at the disposal of the French Emperor for enforcing obedience to his wishes, or the inconsiderable force which the Portuguese government could oppose to his hostility, immediately sent the generous intimation to the court of Lisbon that they would consent to any

Aug. 30. thing which might appear conducive to the safety of Portugal, and only hoped that the threatened confiscation of British property would not be complied with. The Prince Regent in consequence consented to shut his harbours against English vessels, and to declare war against Great Britain; but he declared that his sense of religion, and the regard which he entertained for existing treaties, would not permit him to confiscate at once the

Sept. 15. property of the English merchants. Intimation was at the same time sent to the British residents, that they had better wind up their affairs and embark their property as speedily as possible. This modified compliance with his demands, however, was far from satisfying the French Emperor, to whom the confiscation of English property was as convenient as a means of gratifying his followers by plunder, as essential to the general adoption of the

Oct. 10. Continental System, which he had so much at heart. Orders, therefore, were immediately dispatched to Junot to commence his march; they

Oct. 17. reached the French General on the 17th October; two days after-

Oct. 29. wards his leading divisions crossed the Bidassoa, while the Court of Lisbon, menaced with instant destruction, soon after issued a decree, excluding English vessels of every description from their harbours, but declaring, that if the French troops entered Portugal they would retire with their fleet to the Brazils (2).

Origin of the Spanish intrigues. Events, however, succeeded one another with extraordinary rapidity; and, without any regard to the obedience yielded by the Court of Lisbon to his demands by the proclamation of the 20th October, Napoleon had not only already resolved on the total destruction of the House of Braganza, but actually concluded a treaty for the entire partition of its dominions. The motives which led to this act of spoliation are intimately connected with the complicated intrigues which at this period were preparing

(1) Thib vi. 277. Ann. Reg. 1807, 279, 280. Lond. i. 24, 25. South. i. 90. Hard. x. 99, 100. Parl. Deb. x. 345. Lord Wellesley's Statements.

The note presented by the French ambassador at Lisbon to the Portuguese government was in these terms:—"The undersigned has received orders to declare, that if, on the 1st of next September, the Prince Regent of Portugal has not manifested his resolution to emancipate himself from English influence, by declaring, without delay, war against Great Britain, dismissing the English ambassador, recalling his own from London, confiscating all the English merchandise, closing his harbours against

the English vessels, and uniting his squadrons to the navies of the Continental powers, the Prince Regent of Portugal will be considered as having renounced the cause of the Continent, and the undersigned will be under the necessity of demanding his passports, and declaring war." 12th August 1807.—*For's Pen. War*, ii. 405, 406; *Picots Just.*—By a curious coincidence, this note, which so completely justified the Copenhagen expedition, was presented at Lisbon on the very day on which the British fleet approached the shores of Zealand.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 280. Lond. i. 27, 28. Hard. x. 103, 104. Thib. Hist. de l'Empire, vi. 260, 261.

the way for the dethronement of the Spanish House of Bourbon, and the lighting up the flames of the PENINSULAR WAR.

Character of the leading persons there, the Prince of Peace, Charles IV. the Queen.

The views of Napoléon on the Spanish Peninsula, first formed in the summer of 1806, and matured by the consent of Alexander at Tilsit, required even more the aid of skilful and unscrupulous diplomatists than of powerful armies towards their developement. He found such aid in Talleyrand and Duroc, the only ones of his confidential counsellors who at this period were initiated in his hidden designs; and from the former of whom he received every encouragement for their prosecution (1), while his acute ambassador at Madrid, Beaumarchais, transmitted all the information requisite to enable him to appreciate the disposition of the leading political characters with whom he was likely, in carrying them into execution, to come into collision. The Spanish royal family at this period was divided and distracted by intrigue to a degree almost unprecedented even in the dark annals of Italian or Byzantine faction. The King, Charles IV, though a prince by no means destitute of good qualities, fond of literature and the fine arts, endowed with no inconsiderable share of political penetration, and obstinately resolute, when fairly roused, upon the maintenance of his own opinions, was nevertheless so extremely indolent, and so desirous of enjoying on a throne the tranquillity of private life, that he surrendered himself on ordinary occasions without scruple to the direction of the Queen and the Prince of Peace. She was a woman of spirit and capacity, but sensual, intriguing, and almost entirely governed by Don Manuel Godoy, a minister whom her criminal favour had raised from the humblest station to be the supreme director of affairs in the Peninsula. He was not by nature a bad man; and being endowed with considerable talents, might, under a free constitution, and in a country where greatness was to be attained by integrity of conduct and capacity for the direction of affairs, have preserved an unblemished reputation. Even as it was, his administration, among many grievous evils, conferred some important benefits on his country. But, elevated to power by the partiality of a woman, ambitious, vain, and ostentatious, surrounded by a jealous nobility, who regarded his extraordinary influence with undisguised aversion, he had no resource for the preservation of his power but in the same arts to which he had owed his rise: and an inordinate ambition, unsatiated even by the long tenure which he had held of absolute power in the Peninsula, now aspired to a throne, and aimed at the formation of a dynasty which might take its place among the crowned heads of Europe (2).

(1) Talleyrand and his partisans have taken advantage of his dismissal from the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs shortly after this period, to represent him as hostile to the war with Spain. There can be no doubt, however, from his communications to Savary at Tilsit, that he was privy then to that design, and approved of it; [*Ante*, vi.] and Napoléon constantly asserted that it was he who originally suggested the subjugation of the Peninsula to him. "Napoléon declared," says O'Meara, "that Talleyrand was the first to suggest to him the invasion of Spain."—O'Meara, ii. 330. See also TALLERAND, vi. 296.

(2) Hard. x. 85, 87. Thib. vi. 277, 278. Toranzo, i. 9, 12. Neil. i. 3, 4.

Don Manuel Godoy, born at Badajoz in 1767, of a noble but obscure family, affords as singular an example of sudden elevation as the history of Europe or the East has recorded. A mere private in the body-guard, he owed the first favour of the

Queen to the skill with which he sang and touched the lute, so favourite an instrument in that land of love and romance. Rapidly advanced by the royal favour in that dissolute court, he had the singular art, ever since 1793, not merely to lead captive his royal mistress, but to acquire an unlimited sway over the mind of the King, and at the same time live publicly with another mistress (Doña Pepa Tado), by whom he had several children. His education had been neglected, but he had considerable natural talents, which appeared in an especial manner in the numerous and successful intrigues which he carried on with the ladies of the Court, whose rivalry for his favours increased with every additional title he acquired. He was not, however, naturally bad, and never disgraced his administration by acts of cruelty. In five years he rose from being a private in the guards to absolute power, and was already loaded with honours and titles before the treaty of Basle, in 1795, which procured for him the title of Prince of the Peace. From that time, down

The Prince of Asturias, and Escoiquiz, his confidential adviser.

The Prince of Asturias, afterwards so well known in Europe under the title of Ferdinand VII, was born on the 14th October, 1784; and was consequently twenty-four years of age when the troubles of Spain commenced. Facile and indolent in general, though at the same time irascible and impetuous on particular occasions, he had fallen entirely under the guidance of those by whom he was surrounded. They were all creatures of the Prince of Peace, with the exception of the virtuous Count Alvarez, whose principles were too unbending to allow him to remain long in the corrupted atmosphere of a despotic Court; and the Canon Escoiquiz, an ecclesiastic of remarkable talents, extensive knowledge, and profound dissimulation, who, by his capacity and zeal in his service, had at length acquired the absolute direction of his affairs. The Prince of Asturias had been formerly married to a princess of the Neapolitan House of Bourbon, whose talents, high spirit, and jealousy of the exorbitant influence of the Prince of Peace, had fomented the divisions almost inseparable from the relative situation of heir-apparent and ruling monarch in an absolute government. Two parties, as usual on such occasions, formed themselves at the Spanish court; the one paying their court to the ruling power, the other worshipping the rising sun. The Prince of Peace was the object of universal idolatry to the first. Escoiquiz was the soul of the last. The Princess of Asturias, after four years of a brilliant existence, died, universally regretted, in May 1806, leaving the Spanish monarchy, at the approaching crisis of its fate, exposed, in addition to the divisions of a distracted court, to the intrigues consequent on the competition for the hand of the heir-apparent to the throne (1).

Escoiquiz opens a negotiation with the French ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoleon.

Godoy saw the advantage which his future rival was likely to derive from his ascendant over the mind of Ferdinand, and therefore he had long before taken the decisive step of exiling him from Madrid to the place of his ecclesiastical preferment at Toledo. He afterwards adopted the design of extending the influence he held over the reigning monarch to the heir-apparent, by marrying him to Dona Maria Louisa de Bourbon, sister of his own wife; and even went so far as to propose that alliance to the Prince. This project, however, miscarried, and Godoy again returned to his ambitious designs, independent of the heir-apparent, who resumed his relations with Escoiquiz and the discontented party among the nobility. No sooner, therefore, did Napoleon turn his eyes towards Spain in spring 1807, than he opened secret negotiations with him; while, at the same time, Escoiquiz, who, though banished to Toledo, was still the soul of the Prince's party, commenced underhand intrigues in the same quarter, and came privately to Madrid to arrange with the Duke del Infantado, the Duke de San Carlos, and the other leaders of the

to the period of the French invasion, his ascendant at Court was unbroken, and his influence both over the King and Queen unbending. At the special desire of the King, he at length espoused the daughter of Don Louis, brother to that monarch; and his daughter was destined in marriage to the young King of Etruria. He had all the passion for show and splendour which usually belongs to those who are elevated to a rank which they have not held from their infancy; this prodigality occasioned a perpetual want of money, which was supplied by the sale of offices and the receipt of bribes of every description, and under his administration a frightful system of corruption overspread every branch of the public service. Many public improvements, however, also signaled it. The impulse given by the Bourbons to the sciences and arts was continued and increased;

greater benefits were conferred on public industry during the fifteen years of his government than during the three preceding reigns. Schools were established for the encouragement of agriculture, the spread of medical information, and the diffusion of knowledge in the mechanical arts. He braved the Inquisition, and snatched more than one victim from its jaws. He arrested the progress of estates held in mortmain, which threatened to swallow up half the land of the kingdom. But he was unfit for the guidance of the state in the trying periods of the revolutionary wars; and drew on Spain the contempt of foreign powers by the subservience and degradation of his foreign administration.—See Godev's *Mém.* i. 1, 217; and For. ii. 250, 262.

(1) Hard, x. 88, 89. Thib. vi. 277, 278. Cevallos, 12, 13.

Prince's party, the means of permanently emancipating him from the thralldom of the ruling favourite. It was in order to foment and take advantage of these divisions that Napoléon sent Beauharnais as his ambassador to Madrid in July 1807; and that skilful diplomatist was not long in opening secret conferences with the Duke del Infantado, in which it was mutually agreed that, both for the security of the Spanish monarchy, and to form a counterpoise to the enormous power and ambitious projects of the Prince of Peace, it was indispensable that the Prince of Asturias should espouse a Princess of the imperial family of Bonaparte. Beauharnais afterwards wrote to Escoiquiz, Sept. 30. calling on him to "give a specific guarantee, and something more than vague promises on the subject." Thus encouraged, the Prince of Asturias Oct. 22. wrote directly to Napoléon a letter, in which, after the most exaggerated flattery, and a declaration that his father was surrounded by evil counsellors who misled his better judgment, he implored him to permit him the honour of an alliance with his imperial family (1).

Beauharnais had warmly entered into these views of the Prince of Asturias, in the hope, that if the proposed alliance took place, the choice of the Prince would be directed to a niece of the Emperor, and relation of his own, who was afterwards bestowed on the Duke d'Arenberg. But when the letter reached Napoléon, he had other views for the disposal of the Spanish throne. By means of Isquierdo, a Spanish agent at Paris, who was a mere creature of the Prince of Peace, he had for some time been negotiating a treaty with Charles IV, the object of which was at once to secure the partition of Portugal, and bestow such a share of its spoils on the Prince of Peace as might secure him to the French interest, and prevent him from opposing any serious obstacle to the total dethronement of the Spanish royal family. This negotiation took place, and the treaty in which it terminated was signed by Isquierdo, in virtue of full powers from Charles IV, without the knowledge of the Prince of Masserano, the Spanish ambassador at Paris: a sufficient proof of the secret and sinister designs it was intended to serve, and of the dark crooked policy which the Emperor Napoléon had already adopted in regard to Spanish affairs.

Oct. 27, 1807. By this treaty it was stipulated, that in exchange for Tuscany, which was ceded to France, the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the northern part of Portugal, comprehending the city of Oporto, should be given to the King of Etruria, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania, to revert, in default of heirs, to His Most Catholic Majesty, who, however, was not to unite it to the Crown of Spain: that the province of Alentejo and Algarves, forming the southern part of the kingdom, should be conferred on the Prince of Peace, with the title of Prince of Algarves; and in default of heirs-male, in like manner, and on the like conditions, revert to the Crown of Spain: that the sovereigns of these two new principalities should not make war or peace without the consent of the King of Spain; that the central parts

(1) Thib. vi. 280, 282. Tor. i. 12, 13. Hard. x. 89, 90. Coval. 13. *Moniteur*, Feb. 5, 1810.

"The world daily," said he, "more and more admired the goodness of the Emperor; and he might rest assured he would ever find in the Prince of Asturias the most faithful and devoted son. He implored, then, with the utmost confidence, the paternal protection of the Emperor, not only to permit him the honour of an alliance with his family, but that he would smooth away all difficulties, and cause all obstacles to disappear before the accomplishment of so long cherished a wish. That effort

on the part of the Emperor was the more necessary, that the Prince was incapable of making the smallest exertion on his own part, as it would infallibly be represented as an insult to the royal authority of his father; and all that he could do was to refuse, as he engaged to do with invincible constancy, any proposals for an alliance which had not the consent of the Emperor, to whom the Prince looked exclusively for the choice of his future Queen."—FRANÇOIS DE NAROLÉON, 11th October, 1807; *Traité*, vi. 284, 285; *Moniteur*, 5th Feb. 1810.

of Portugal, comprehending the provinces of Beira, Traz-os-Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, should remain in sequestration in the hands of the French till a general peace, to be then exchanged for Gibraltar, La Trinité, and the other Spanish colonies conquered by the English; that the sovereign of these central provinces should hold them on the same tenure and conditions as the King of Northern Lusitania; and that the Emperor Napoléon "should guarantee to His Most Catholic Majesty the possession of all his states on the continent of Europe, to the south of the Pyrenees (1)."

Convention
of Fontaine-
bleau, 27th
Oct.

To this secret treaty of spoliation was annexed a convention, prescribing the mode in which the designs of the contracting powers should be carried into effect. By this it was agreed, that a corps of twenty-five thousand French infantry and three thousand cavalry should forthwith enter Spain and march across that country, at the charge of the King of Spain, to Lisbon; while one Spanish corps of ten thousand men should enter the province of Entre Douro e Minho, and march upon Oporto, and another of the like force take possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves. The contributions in the central provinces, which were to be placed in sequestration, were all to be levied for the behoof of France; those in Northern Lusitania and the principality of Algarves for that of Spain. Finally, another French corps of forty thousand men was to assemble at Bayonne by the 20th November at latest, in order to be ready to enter Portugal and support the first corps, in case the English should send troops to the assistance of Portugal, or menace it with an attack; but this last corps was on no account to enter Spain without the consent of both the contracting parties. As the principal object of this treaty was to give France possession of Lisbon and the maritime forces of Portugal, it was communicated in substance to the Emperor of Russia; and a Russian squadron of eight ships of the line, under Admiral Siniavin, passed the Dardanelles and steered for Lisbon, to support the French army, and prevent the escape of the Portuguese fleet, a short time before Junot broke up from Bayonne for the Portuguese frontier, and long before any rupture had taken place between England and the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg (2).

Napoleon's
perfidious
designs both
towards
Spain and
the Prince
of Peace in
this treaty.

These treaties were not merely a flagrant act of iniquity on the part of both the contracting powers, by providing for the partition of a neutral and unoffending power, which had even gone so far as to yield implicit obedience, by the proclamation of the 20th October, eight days before they were signed, to all the demands of the partitioning cabinets; but they were yet more detestable, from involving a double perfidy towards the very parties who were in this manner made the instruments of the ambitious designs of the French Emperor. While Godoy was amused and for the time secured in the French interest by the pretended gift of a principality, his downfall had in reality been resolved on by Napoléon, who had never forgiven the proclamation of 5th October, 1806; and this specious lure was held out, without any design of really conferring it upon that powerful favourite, merely in order to remove him from the Spanish court, and make way for the great designs of the French Emperor in both

(1) See the treaty in Foy, ii. 406. Tor. i. 384.

(2) See the Convention in Foy, ii. 411, 412. Sav. iii. 145.

"On reaching Lisbon," says Thiebault, "we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Siniavin's orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of the alliance between France and Russia, and the war of the latter with England, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protec-

tion of the harbour, gave us in the sequel far more apprehension than security."—THIEBAULT, *Exp. de l'Armée Franç. en Portugal*, 86, 87. The presence of the Russian fleet, however, is stated by Lord Londonderry, whose means of information were far superior to those of the French military historian, to have been purely accidental.—LONDONDERRY, i. 37.

parts of the Peninsula; while the French force, which was provided for at Bayonne in the end of November, was not intended to act against either the English or Portugal, but to secure the frontier fortresses of Spain for Napoleon himself; and the Spanish forces, which were to be marched into the northern and southern provinces of Portugal, were not designed to secure any benefit for his most Catholic Majesty, but to strip his dominions of the few regular troops which, after the departure of Romano, still remained for Dec. 23.

the defence of the monarchy. So little care was taken to disguise this intention, that, by a decree soon after from Milan, Junot, the commander of the French invading force, was appointed governor of Portugal, and he was ordered to carry on the administration of the whole in the Emperor's name, which was accordingly done (1). History contains many examples of powerful monarchs combining iniquitously together to rob their weaker neighbours; but this is perhaps the first instance on record in which the greater of the partitioning powers, in addition to the spoliation of a neutral and unoffending state, bought the consent of its inferior coadjutors in the scheme of iniquity by the perfidious promise of some of those spoils which it exclusively destined for its own aggrandisement (2).

*His secret
instructions
to Junot in
his invasion
of Portugal.*

It may easily be believed, that, when such were the views entertained at this period by the French Emperor, the letter of the Prince of Asturias, written at the suggestion of Beauharnais, offering his hand to a Princess of the imperial family, was not likely to receive a very cordial reception. It was permitted, accordingly, to remain without an answer; and meanwhile the march of Junot across the Peninsula was pressed by Nov. 2.

the most urgent orders from the imperial headquarters. Early in November, General Clarke, the Minister of War, wrote by Napoleon's command, a letter to that marshal, in which he was ordered to advance as far as Ciudad Rodrigo from the 1st to the 15th November, and at latest to reach Lisbon by the 30th. His orders were to proclaim peace to Portugal, and alliance and friendship to its Prince Regent; but meanwhile to press on with ceaseless activity, and at all hazards get possession of the fleet and fortresses at Lisbon, before they could be reached by the English forces (3). Junot was not backward in acting upon the perfidious policy thus prescribed to him;

(1) By Junot's proclamation, dated 1st February, 1808, proceeding on the Milan decree of 23d December, 1807, it was declared, "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; and the Emperor Napoleon having taken under his protection the beautiful kingdom of Portugal, wills that it should be administered and governed over its whole extent in the name of his Majesty, and by the general-in-chief of his army."—See TORENO, i. 49; and Fox, iii, 343.

(2) Godoy's Mem. i. 55. Introduction, Sev. iii. 246, 247. Hard. x. 91, 92. Tor. i. 19.

(3) D'Abr. xi. 27. Hard x. 97, 98.

He was specially ordered, "on no account to stop, whether the Prince Regent did or did not declare war against England; to move on rapidly towards the capital, receiving the propositions of the Portuguese government, without returning any written answer, and to use every possible effort to arrive there as quickly as possible, as a friend, in order to effect the seizure of the Portuguese fleet. Should the Portuguese government have already declared war against England, you are to answer,—My instructions are to march straight on Lisbon, without halting a single day; my mission is to close that great harbour against England. I would be entitled to attack you by main force, but it is repugnant to the great soul of Napoleon, and to the French character,

to occasion the effusion of blood. If you make no assemblages of troops; if you dispense them so as to cause me no disquietude; if you admit no auxiliary till the negotiations set on foot at Paris are terminated, I have orders to consent to it." This is the footing on which you must represent matters; you must hold out that you are arriving merely as an auxiliary; meanwhile, a courier, dispatched twenty-four hours after the arrival of the main body of the army at Lisbon, will transmit the real intentions of the Emperor, which will be, that the propositions made are not accepted, and that the country must be treated as a conquered territory. It is on this principle that we have acted in Italy, where the property of all Portuguese subjects has already been put under sequestration. By proceeding in this manner you will, without firing a shot, make yourself master of ten sail of the line and valuable arsenals; that is the grand object, and to arrive at it you must never cease to hold out that you come, not to make war, but to conciliate." (Hard. x. 97, 98) The secret instructions of Junot, written by the Emperor with his own hand, were of the same tenor:—"They enjoined Junot," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "to do every thing in order to gain possession, not of the person of the Prince of Brazil, but of certain other persons therein named, and above all, of the city, forts, and fleet of Lisbon."—D'ANASTASIO, xi. 27.

but in the execution of it he encountered the most serious difficulties; and such was the rapidity of his march, and the state of disorganization to which his corps was reduced by the severity of the weather and the frightful state of the roads, that if any resistance whatever had been attempted by the Portuguese Government, he must infallibly have been destroyed. At first he proceeded, by easy marches, and in good order, through the north of Spain; but when he reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the orders he received to hasten his march and seize upon the fleet were so urgent (1), that he deemed it necessary to press his march with the most extraordinary expedition, and disregard every thing but the one grand object in view. He ac-

Nov. 17. cordingly issued a proclamation to the inhabitants (2), in which he disclaimed any hostile intentions, and declared he came only as an ally, and to save them from the hostility of the English (3). Two days afterwards, the army entered Portugal, where they soon gave convincing proofs how little their declared resolution of protecting property and abstaining from every species of outrage was to be relied on. Pillage of every sort was systematically practised by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier. Junot faithfully acted up to his instructions to employ the

Nov. 19. language of conciliation, but act upon the principle of the most decided hostility. Such conduct naturally made the inhabitants fly their approach; and this circumstance, joined to the forced marches the soldiers were compelled to make, the excessive severity of the rains, which fall in that country at that period of the year with all the violence of the tropics; and the rugged, impracticable nature of the roads, or rather mountain paths, which they were obliged to traverse, destitute of bridges and almost

Nov. 26. impassable for carriages, produced such an effect upon the French army, that in a few days it was as much disorganized as it would have been by the most disastrous defeat. No words can do justice to the hardships which were undergone, and the disorder which ensued, during the march from the frontier to Abrantes: the firmness of the oldest officers, even in the leading column, was shaken by it, and those which followed hurried along without any order, like a confused horde of robbers (4). Many battalions subsisted for days together on nothing but chestnuts, and the quantity even of that humble fare was so scanty, that they lost several hundred men a-day—whole companies and squadrons were washed away in the ravines by the swollen mountain torrents. At length, after undergoing incredible privations, the leading bands of the French army, two thousand strong, approached Lisbon in the end of November: but straggling in such small numbers, and in such deplorable condition, that they resembled rather the fugi-

(1) "On no account halt on your march even for a day. The want of provisions could be no reason for doing so; still less the state of the roads. Twenty thousand men can march and live any where, even in a desert."—*Napoleon to Junot, Nov. 2, 1807: Toulon, i. 35.*

(2) "The Emperor Napoleon sends me into your country at the head of an army, to make common cause with your well-beloved Sovereign against the tyrant of the seas, and save your beautiful capital from the fate of Copenhagen. Discipline will be rigidly preserved. I give you my word of honour for it; but the smallest resistance will draw down the utmost severity of military execution. The Portuguese, I am persuaded, will discover their true interests, and, seconding the pacific views of your Prince, receive us as friends; and that the city of Lisbon, in an especial manner, will behold us with pleasure within its walls, at the head of such an army as can

alone preserve it from the eternal enemies of the Continent."

(3) *Hard, x. 106, 110. Foy, ii. 335. South, i. 100. Lond. i. 31, 32. Nevis, 190, 200.*

(4) "It is impossible," says Thiebaut, an eyewitness, "to give an idea of the sufferings of the army before reaching Sobreira. In truth, if the leading columns were a prey to these horrors, which nothing could alleviate, it may easily be imagined what must have been the situation of those which succeeded them. The army, in truth, was on the verge of dissolution; it was on the point of disbanding altogether,—the general-in-chief was within a hair's breadth of being left without an army. Nevertheless, it was indispensable not to halt for a moment; every thing required to be risked: we were obliged to succeed, or bury ourselves in the mountains with the whole army."—*Thiebaut, Campaign in Portugal, 45.*

tives who had escaped from a disastrous retreat than the proud array which was to overturn a dynasty and subdue a kingdom (1).

Conduct of the Portuguese Government, and situation of Lisbon at this crisis. The elements of glorious resistance were not wanting in the Portuguese capital. Its inhabitants were three hundred thousand: its forts strong, covered with a numerous artillery, and garrisoned by fourteen thousand men: an English squadron lay in the Tagus, with Sir Sidney Smith at its head, whose versatile genius was peculiarly fitted for such an undertaking, and who had shown at Acre what vigour he could infuse into a besieged population. The English sailors longed to see the work of defence begin: Sir Sidney offered to bring his ships abreast of the quay, and there, seconded by the indignant populace, dispute every inch of ground with the invader. But the destitute condition of the French army was unknown; and even if it had been fully understood, both the Portuguese government and the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, were aware that Junot's was but the advanced guard of a greater army, which would speedily follow if the first were discomfited; and that any resistance would only serve to give the French Emperor an excuse for measures of extraordinary rigour to the Portuguese nation, without affording any reasonable prospect of ultimate success. The great object was to withdraw the royal family and the fleet from the grasp of the invaders, and secure for them a refuge in Brazil till the present calamitous season were overpast. As soon as they saw the danger approaching, therefore, the Portuguese government took every imaginable precaution to disarm the conqueror by anticipating all his requisitions: proclamation, as already mentioned, was issued, closing the harbours against English vessels, and adopting the Continental System; and, as the march of the invaders still continued, this was followed, a few days

Oct. 30. afterwards, by another in which the more rigorous step of sequestrating the property, and arresting the persons of such of the English as still remained in Portugal, was adopted; though with the secret design of indemnifying the sufferers as soon as the means of doing so were at the disposal of

Nov. 8. government. Though this last measure was known to be exceedingly painful to the Portuguese government, and was evidently adopted under the mere pressure of necessity, yet it was a step of such decided hostility, that it compelled Lord Strangford to take down the arms of Great Britain from his house and demand his passports; and soon after, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, he followed the English factory to Sir Sydney Smith's fleet (2).

After great hesitation, the court of Lisbon resolve to depart for Brazil. Although, however, the relations between the two countries were thus formally broken, yet, as it was well known that the cabinet of Lisbon had yielded only to unavoidable necessity, and as their tardiness in acceding to the demand of Napoléon for the instant seizure of British property had sufficiently demonstrated the reluctance with which measures of severity had been adopted by them, the British ambassador still remained on board the English fleet, ready to take advantage of the first opening which should occur for the resumption of more amicable correspondence. Meanwhile every thing at Lisbon was vacillation and chaos; and the Prince and his council, distracted between terror at the unceasing advance of Junot, and anxiety about the loss of their colonies and commerce by a rupture with England, hesitated between the bold counsels of Don Rodrigo de Lousa and the Count Linares, who strenuously recommended determined resistance to the invaders, and the natural timidity of a court sur-

(1) Thib. 32, 69. Fey. ii. 335, 367. Tor. i. 35, 36. Napier, i. 141. Lond. i. 33. Abr. xi. 35, 26. (2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 220. South. i. 96, 97. Fey. ii. 377, 379. Nevis, 190, 200.

rounded with dangers and debilitated by the pacific habits of successive reigns. At length, however, such information was received as determined the irresolution of the cabinet. An ominous line appeared in the *Moniteur*,—

of Nov. 12.

“the House of Braganza has ceased to reign;” and with the paper containing that announcement of the fate which awaited them, Lord Strangford transmitted to the Prince Regent copies of the secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau, by which the portions assigned to each of the partitioning powers were arranged. Intelligence received shortly after of the entrance of the Spanish troops into the Alentejo and the northern provinces of the kingdom, left no room for doubt that the copies were correct, and that the treaty was immediately to be acted upon.

Nov. 24.

At the same time Lord Strangford landed, and promised his Royal Highness, on the honour of the King of England, that the measures hitherto adopted by the Portuguese court were regarded as mere acts of compulsion, and had noways abated the friendship of her old ally, if he would still avail himself of it. These representations, seconded by the efforts of Sir Sidney Smith, who brought his squadron to the mouth of the harbour, ready alike for hostile operations or pacific assistance, gave such support to Don Rodrigo

Nov. 25.

and the patriotic party, that the court resolved, if the messenger dispatched to obtain a stoppage of Junot's advance were not successful, to

Nov. 26.

embark for the Brazils. He entirely failed in arresting the march of the French general; and orders were therefore given that the fleet should, as speedily as possible, be got ready for sea; and the Prince Regent published a dignified proclamation on the following day, in which he announced a resolution worthy of the heroic house of Braganza, and prepared to seek in Transatlantic climes “that freedom of which Europe had become unworthy (1).”

Embarka-
tion of the
Royal
Family for
Brazil, 27th
Nov.

The fleet, at first, was in a state but little prepared for crossing the Atlantic, and still less for conveying the motley and helpless crowd of old men, women, and children, who were preparing to follow the court in their migration to South America. By great exertions, however, and the active aid of the British sailors, who, overjoyed at this extraordinary energy on the part of the Prince Regent, exerted themselves with unheard-of vigour in their assistance, eight sail of the line, three frigates, five sloops, and a number of merchant vessels, in all six-and-thirty sail, were got ready on the following day, when the Royal family prepared to carry their mournful but magnanimous resolution into execution. Preceded by the archives, treasure, plate, and most valuable effects, the royal exiles proceeded in a long train of carriages to the water's edge. Never had been seen a more melancholy procession, nor one more calculated to impress on the minds even of the most inconsiderate the magnitude of the calamities

(1) *Hart.* x. 103, 111. *South.* i. 103, 110. *Foy.* ii. 380, 383. *Tor.* i. 37, 39. *Nev.* i. 165, 180. Lord Strangford's Pamphlet, 52, 75.

“Having tried, by all possible means, to preserve the neutrality hitherto enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects; having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices, even going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the King of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and consequently suffering the greatest losses in the collection of the royal revenue, I find that troops of the Emperor of France, to whom I had united myself on the Continent, in the hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of

my dominions, and are far on their way to this capital. Desirous to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create a boundless effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity, and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing any, the smallest hostility; and knowing also, that they are more particularly directed against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less exposed to danger if I were absent from the kingdom, I have resolved to retire, with the Queen and Royal Family, to my dominions in America, and establish myself in the city of Rio Janeiro till a general peace.”—*Ann. Reg.* 1807, 776, *State Papers.*

which the unbounded ambition of France had brought on the other nations of Europe. The insane Queen came in the first carriage: for sixteen years she had lived in seclusion, but a ray of light had penetrated her reason in this extremity, and she understood and approved the courageous act; the widowed Princess and the Infanta Maria were in the next, with the Princess of Brazil, bathed in tears; after them came the Prince Regent, pale and weeping at thus leaving, apparently for ever, the land of his fathers. In the magnitude of the royal distress, the multitude forgot their own dangers; their commiseration was all for the august fugitives, thus driven by ruthless violence to a distant shore—with the descendants of a long line of kings, forced to seek, in mournful exile, an asylum from the hand of the spoiler. Such was the crowd which assembled round the place of embarkation, that the Prince was compelled to force his way through with his own hand. There was not a dry eye among all the countless multitude when they stepped on board; uncovered and weeping, the people beheld, in speechless sorrow, the departure of their ancient rulers. In the general confusion of the embarkation, parents were separated from children, husbands from wives, and both remained ignorant of each other's safety till they landed in the Brazil; while the shore resounded with the lamentations of those who were thus severed, probably for ever, from those whom they most loved. It was some consolation to the crowd, who watched with aching eyes the receding sails, to see the royal fleet, as it passed through the British squadron, received with a royal salute from all the vessels; emblematic of the protection which Great Britain now extended to her ancient ally, and an earnest of that heroic support which, through all the desperate conflict which followed, England was destined to afford to her courageous inhabitants. Numbers, however, observed, with superstitious dread, at the moment of the salute the sun became eclipsed, and mournfully repeated the words, "the House of Braganza has ceased to reign." Never had a city been penetrated with a more unanimous feeling of grief; the royal family, kindly and warm-hearted, had long enjoyed the affections of the people; the bitterness of conquest was felt without its excitement. In mournful silence the people lingered on the quay from whence the royal party had taken their departure; every one, in returning to his home, felt as if he had lost a parent or a child. The embarkation took place from the Quay of Belem, on the same spot from whence, three centuries before, Vasco de Gama had sailed upon that immortal voyage which first opened to European enterprise the regions of Oriental commerce, and whence Cabral set forth upon that expedition which gave Portugal an empire in the West, and had provided for her an asylum, in the future wreck of her fortune in the Old World (1).

Arrival of
the French
at Lisbon,
Nov. 30.

Hardly had the royal squadron, amidst tempestuous gales, cleared the bar, and disappeared from the shores of Europe, when the advanced guard of Junot's army, reduced to sixteen hundred men and a few horsemen, arrived on the towers of Belem. He came just in time to see the fleet receding in the distance, and, in the ebullition of his passion, himself discharged a piece of ordnance at a merchant vessel which, long retarded by the multitude who were thronging on board, was hastening, under the walls of that fortress, to join the fleet which had preceded it. Although, however, the French troops were so few; and in such deplorable condition as to excite pity rather than apprehension, yet no resistance was attempted; the

(1) Nevil. 175, 180. South, i. 107, 113. Hard. x. 108, 111, 112. Foy, vi. 323, 300. Tor. i. 35, 40. Ann. Reg. 1807, 281.

Regency, to whom the Prince Royal had on his departure intrusted the administration of affairs, wisely deeming a contest hopeless from which the government itself shrunk, and regarding as their first duty the negotiating favourable terms for the inhabitants with the invaders. Resistance, therefore, was not attempted, and Europe beheld with astonishment a capital, containing three hundred thousand inhabitants and fourteen thousand regular soldiers, open its gates to a wretched file of soldiers without a single piece of cannon, the vanguard of which, worn out and extenuated, not fifteen hundred strong, could hardly bear their muskets on their shoulders, while the succeeding columns were scattered in deplorable confusion over mountain paths two hundred miles in length. Such was their state of starvation, that on entering the city many of the soldiers dropped down in the streets or sunk exhausted in the porches of the houses, being unable to ascend the stairs, until the Portuguese humanely brought them sustenance. It received its new masters on the anniversary of the very day (30th November) on which, a hundred and sixty-seven years before, the Portuguese had overturned the tyranny of the Spaniards, and re-established, amidst universal transport, the national independence (1).

The country is occupied by Junot in name of the French, and enormous contributions levied by their troops. Junot immediately took military possession of the country; the French troops were cantoned chiefly in the capital and the strongholds in its vicinity, while Elvas surrendered to the Spanish General Solano, and Taranco, with the northern corps of the troops of that nation, took peaceable possession of the important and opulent city of Oporto. The strict discipline maintained by these Peninsular corps, afforded a striking contrast to the license indulged to the French soldiers, whose march, albeit through a friendly state which had as yet committed no act of hostility, was marked by plunder, devastation, and ruin; and hopes began to be entertained by those in the French interest, that the independence of their country might still be preserved. But these hopes were of short duration, and Portugal soon experienced, in all its bitterness, the fate of every country which, from the commencement of the war, had received, whether as friends or enemies, the tricolor flag. Heavy contributions, both in money, subsistence, and clothing, had from the first been levied by the French troops; and Junot, with almost regal state, was lodged in the now deserted palace: but the first was ascribed by their deluded friends to the necessitous and destitute condition of the French troops; and the last was forgiven in an officer, whose head, never equal to his valour, appeared to have been altogether carried away by the novelty and importance of the situation in which he was now placed. All uncertainty, however, was soon at an end. A fortnight after their arrival, a review of six thousand troops in the capital took place; the soldiers were assembled in the principal streets and squares—the infantry in battalions, the cavalry in squadrons, the artillery limbered up and in order for service, and the whole population of the neighbourhood crowded together to witness the spectacle. Suddenly, the thunder of cannon from the Moorish fort attracted their attention; all eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and they beheld the ancient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon which the tricolor standard was mounted. The magnitude of the calamity now became apparent: Portugal, seized by a perfidious foe, was to be reduced to a province of France. At first a solemn silence prevailed; but soon a hoarse murmur, like the distant roar of the ocean, arose, and the cries, “Portugal for ever, death to

the French!" were heard on all sides. But the principal persons of the city were secured, the populace were disarmed, and the forts and batteries were all in the hands of the invaders. The evening was spent in feverish agitation; but the people, destitute of leaders, were unable to turn the general indignation to any account, and the day closed without any convulsion having occurred (1).

The Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole country seized by the French.

This measure, however significant as to the ultimate designs of the conqueror, was yet only a demonstration; and as the police of Lisbon was rigidly enforced by the French, and no other change made in the government but the introduction of two or three creatures of his into the Regency, which still administered the laws in the name of the Prince Regent, hopes began to be again entertained that it would prove only a temporary occupation. But events which rapidly succeeded, demonstrated that Portugal was destined to drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation before the day of its political resurrection arose. A forced loan of 2,000,000 cruzados (L.200,000) was exacted from the merchants,

Dec. 5.

though their fortunes were seriously affected by the blockade of the harbour, and the entire stoppage of foreign commerce and public credit. The entire confiscation of English goods was next proclaimed, and ordered to be enforced by tenfold penalties and corporal punishment; while the

Dec. 6.

rying of arms of any sort was strictly prohibited, under the pain of death, over the whole kingdom. Meanwhile, fresh troops daily poured into the capital; and, to accommodate them, the monks were all turned out of the convents, which were forthwith converted into military barracks. Still, no indication of a permanent partition of the kingdom had appeared at Lisbon, and Junot seemed chiefly intent on a small squadron which he was fitting out with great expedition in the harbour, apparently against

Jan. 1806

the English, although the Spanish officers at Oporto and in the Alentejo made no secret of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and had already begun to levy the

Feb. 1.

revenue collected there in the name of the King of Spain. But on the 1st February the mask was at once thrown aside, and it appeared that Napoléon was resolved to appropriate the whole monarchy to himself, without allotting any portion to his confederate in iniquity. On that day Junot went in state to the palace of the inquisition, where the Regency was assembled, and, after a studied harangue, read a proclamation of Napoléon, dated from Milan in the December preceding, followed by a proclamation of

Dec. 22.

his own, which at once dissolved the Regency,—appointed Junot governor of the whole kingdom, with instructions to govern it all in name of

Feb. 1, 1806.

the Emperor Napoléon,—ordained a large body of Portuguese troops to be forthwith marched out of the Peninsula, and, for the support of the Army of Occupation, now termed the Army of Portugal, imposed a contribution of a hundred million of francs (L.4,000,000), above double the annual revenue of the monarchy, upon its inhabitants, besides confiscating the whole property of the Royal family, and of all who had attended them in their flight (2).

(1) Nevis. i. 256, 273. Lond. i. 45, 46. Thib. vi. 273, 274. South. i. 123, 125. Foy. iii. 11, 14.

(2) Foy. iii. 15, 23. Lond. i. 47, 49. Tor. i. 41, 42, 49, 50. Neva. i. 263, 268.

"Inhabitants of Portugal," said Junot's proclamation, "your interests have engaged the attention of the Emperor; it is time that all uncertainty as to your fate should cease; the fate of Portugal is fixed, and its future prosperity secured, by being taken under the all-powerful protection of Napoléon the

Great. The prince of Bruch, by abandoning Portugal, has renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of that kingdom; the House of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; the Emperor Napoleon has determined that that beautiful country, governed for its whole extent in his name, should be administered by the General-in-chief of his army." Thus did Napoléon first sign a treaty at Fontainebleau for the entire spoliation of the Portuguese dominions; next, by his perfidious invasion, drive the ruling

Complete
occupation
of the king-
dom by the
French and
despair of
the inhabi-
tants.

These orders were instantly carried into effect. The Portuguese arms were every where taken down from the public offices and buildings, and those of Imperial France substituted in their room. Justice was administered in the name of the French Emperor, and by the Code Napoléon; the whole revenue was collected by the French authorities, and the regiments assigned for the foreign army moved towards the frontiers: an universal despair seized all classes at this clear manifestation of the subjugation of their country. The peasants, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow their fields with grain; the soldiers, wherever they were not overawed by a superior force of the French army, disbanded and returned home, or betook themselves to the mountains as robbers; the higher classes almost all fled from Lisbon, as from a city visited by the plague; and notwithstanding the presence and influence of the invaders, only three houses were lighted on occasion of the general illumination ordered by the French in honour of the change of government. In the provinces the general indignation was manifested in still more unequivocal colours; the growing insolence and rapacity of the French soldiers led them into frequent conflicts with the now aroused population; tumults, massacres, and military executions, occurred in almost every city, village, and hamlet of Portugal; and Junot, alarmed at the increasing ferment, formally disbanded the whole of the army which had not been ordered to proceed to France (1). Meanwhile, plunder was universal from the highest rank to the lowest; and the March 12. General-in-chief set the example of general spoliation, by appropriating to himself plate and valuable articles of every description, collected from the churches and royal palaces (2).

While the fate of Portugal was thus to all appearance sealed by the usurpation of Napoléon, events of still greater importance were in progress, in relation to the Spanish monarchy, which, in their immediate effects, precipitated the explosion of the Peninsular war.

Arrest of
Ferdinand,
and seizure
of his papers.

What care soever the advisers of Ferdinand may have taken to conceal from the reigning monarch his letter of 14th October, proposing, without his father's knowledge, an alliance with the Imperial family, so important a step did not long remain unknown to the Prince of Peace. The numerous spies in his employment who surrounded the heir-apparent, both in the French capital and his palace of the Escorial, got scent of the secret; and Isquierdo transmitted from Paris intelligence that some negotiation of importance was in progress, in consequence of which the Prince was more narrowly watched; and, as the evident anxiety and pre-occupation of his mind seemed to justify the suspicions which were entertained, he was at length arrested by orders of his father, and a seal put on all his papers. Oct. 29. He was privately examined before the Privy Council, and afterwards reconducted as a prisoner by the King himself, in great state, at the head of his guards, to the palace of the Escorial, whose walls, still melan-

choly into exile; and then assign that very compulsory departure as a reason for the previously concerted appropriation of the whole of his territories to himself.—See both the *Milan Decree* and *Junot's Proclamation* in *For*, iii. 343, 345; *Pittes Jour.*

(1) The Portuguese legion thus drafted off for France, were at first nine thousand strong, but five thousand deserted or died on the march through Spain, and not four thousand reached Bayonne. Napoleon, however, who there reviewed them, said to Prince Wolkonski, "These are the men of the South; they are of an impassioned temperament; I

will make them excellent soldiers." They served with distinction both in Austria and Russia, and were particularly noticed for their good conduct at Wagram in 1809, and Smolensko in 1812. They were faithful to their colours and oaths, though still in their hearts attached to their country, and bore on their standards this striking device,

"Vidimus immitti Danais; haud numine nostro."

—*For*, iii. 40, 41, note.

(2) *Lead*, i. 50, 54. *South*, i. 152, 153. *Novis*, i. 240, 249. *Foy*, ii. 8, 36.

chely from the tragic catastrophe of the unfortunate Don Carlos in a preceding reign, were fraught with the most sinister presages. Among his private papers were found—one written entirely by the hand of the Prince, blank in date, and with a black seal, bestowing on the Duke del Infantado the office of Governor-general of New Castile, and all the forces within its bounds, in the event of the King's death; a key to the correspondence in cipher formerly carried on by the late Princess of Asturias and the Queen of Naples her mother; and a memorial of twelve pages to the King, filled with bitter complaints of the long-continued persecution of which the Prince had been the object, denouncing the Prince of Peace as guilty of the most wicked designs, even that of mounting the throne by the death of his Royal Master, and which proposed a variety of steps to secure the arrest of that powerful favourite. A writing of five pages was also discovered, written like the preceding by Escelquiz, detailing the measures adopted by the Prince of Peace to bring about a marriage between the heir-apparent and his wife's sister, the best mode of avoiding it, and hinting at the prospect of an alliance between the Prince of Asturias and a member of the Imperial family. In these papers, thus laid open without reserve to the royal scrutiny, there was nothing, with the exception of the first, which had the appearance even of implicating the Prince in any design against his father's life or authority; though much descriptive of that envenomed rancour between his confidants and those of the reigning monarch, which the long ascendant of the Prince of Peace, and the animosity which had prevailed between him and the heir-apparent, were so well calculated to produce. Even the first, though it indicated an obvious preparation for the contemplated event of the King's decease, and fairly inferred an anxiety for that event, could not, when taken by itself, without any other evidence, be considered as a legitimate ground for concluding that so atrocious an act as the murder or deposition of the King was in contemplation; since it was equally referable to the anxiety of the heir-apparent, who had given no indications of so depraved a disposition, to secure the succession, menaced, as he conceived it to be, upon his natural demise (4).

Revealed, however, to a corrupted court, and falling into the hands of persons actuated by the worst suspicions, because themselves capable of the most nefarious designs, these papers afforded too fair an opportunity to Godoy and his party of ruining the Prince, and at the same time gave too clear indication of the hazard which they would themselves run upon his accession to the throne, to be laid aside without being made the foundation of decisive measures. On the very next day, accordingly, a proclamation was issued from the Escorial by the King, in which the Prince of Asturias was openly charged with having engaged in a conspiracy for the dethronement and death of his father, and the immediate prosecution and trial of all his advisers was announced to the bewildered public (5). At the same time despatches were forwarded to Napoleon, reiterating the same charges, and earnestly imploring his counsel and assist-

(1) Tor. i. 22, 23. Thib. vi. 222, 224. Foy, ii. 99. South. i. 197, 198.

(2) Tor. i. 23, 24. Noll. i. 4, 5. Thib. vi. 204, 206.

It was stated in this proclamation, "I was living persuaded that I was surrounded with the love due to a parent by his offspring, when an unknown hand suddenly revealed to me the monstrous and unheard-of conspiracy which had been formed against my life. That life, so often endangered, had become a burden to my successor, who, pre-occupied, blinded, and forgetful of all the Christian

principles which my care and paternal love have taught him, had engaged in a conspiracy for my dethronement. I was anxious myself to ascertain the fact, and surprising him in his own apartment I discovered the cipher which enabled him to correspond with his companions in iniquity. Every thing necessary has been done, and the proper orders given for the trial of these guilty criminals, whom I have ordered to be put under arrest, as well as the confinement of my son to his own apartments."—Proclamation, 20th October, 1807: Tor. azze, i. 24.

space in extricating his unfortunate ally from the difficulties with which he was surrounded (1).

*Cautionary
conduct of
the latter on
reading it.*

When Napoléon, however, received this letter, he was noways disposed to lend any assistance to Charles IV, on whose dethronement he was fully resolved, though he was as yet uncertain as to the particular means or course to be followed in order to effect that object. He determined immediately to keep himself entirely clear from these domestic dissensions, took the utmost care that his name should not in any way be mixed up with them, and resolved only to take advantage of them, if possible, to get quit of both father and son. He said, therefore, on receipt of the letter,—"These are domestic concerns of the King of Spain; I will have nothing to do with them:" at the same time Champagny, minister of foreign affairs, wrote to the Prince of Peace, that on no account was his name to be implicated in this affair (2); and Talleyrand gave the same assurances in the strongest terms to Isquierdo, protesting at the same time the Emperor's fixed resolution to carry into execution the whole provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau (3). Meantime, the storm which threatened such serious consequences blew over in Spain, from a discovery of the party who was at the bottom of the intrigue. The Prince of Asturias, justly alarmed for his life,

revealed, in a private intercourse with his father and mother, the letter he had written to Napoléon, proposing his hand to one of his relations, and at the same time disclosed all the parties, not excluding the French ambassador, who were privy to that proceeding. This disclosure operated like a charm in stilling the fury of the faction opposed to the Prince; ignorant of the extent or intimacy of his relations with the French Emperor, they recoiled at the idea of driving to extremities the heir of the throne, who might possibly have engaged so powerful a protector to espouse his cause. The matter was therefore hushed up; the Prince wrote penitential letters to his father and mother, avowing "that he had failed in his duty, inasmuch as he should have taken no step without their concurrence:"

and throwing himself on their mercy. Upon this a decree of the King was issued, declaring, "The voice of nature has disarmed the arm of vengeance; when a guilty party solicits pardon, the heart of a father cannot refuse it to a son. My son has disclosed the authors of the horrible plan which some wretches have put into his head; I pardon him, and shall receive him to favour when he has given proofs of sincere amendment." The trial of the

Prince's confidants went on, but terminated three months after in

Letter of Charles IV to Napoleon. (1) "Sir my brother—At the moment when I was exclusively occupied with the means of destroying our common enemy, and fondly hoped that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I discovered with horror that the spirit of intrigue had penetrated the interior of my palace, and that my eldest son, the heir-presumptive to the throne, had not only formed the design to dethrone, but even to attempt the life of myself and his mother. Such an atrocious attempt merits the most exemplary punishment; the law which calls him to the succession should be repealed; one of my brothers will be more worthy to replace him in my heart, and on the throne. I pray your Majesty to aid me by your lights and counsel."—CHARLES IV to NAPOLEON, *S. Lorenzo*, 30th October, 1807; SAVARY, iii. 143.

(2) The Emperor insists that on no account should any thing be said or published in relation to this affair, which involves him or his ambassador. He has done nothing which could justify a suspicion

that either he himself or his minister have known or encouraged any domestic intrigues of Spain. He declares positively, that he never has, and never will intermeddle with it. He never intended that the Prince of Asturias should marry a Princess of France, or Mademoiselle Tascher, long since affianced to another; he will oppose no marriage of the Prince of Asturias with any person he pleases; his ambassador Beaumarnais has instructions to take no part in the affairs of Spain."—CHAMPAGNY to the Prince of Peace, 18th November, 1807; TALLEYRAND, vi. 291, 292.

(3) "What chiefly shocked the Emperor," said Talleyrand to Isquierdo on 18th November, "was, after the treaty of 27th October, to see himself apparently implicated, in the face of Europe, in intrigues and treasons. He has expressed a natural indignation at it, because it affects his honour and probity. The Emperor desires only the strict execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau."—TALLEYRAND, vi. 291.

their entire acquittal, to the great joy of the nation, who had never attached any credit to this alleged conspiracy, but considered it as a got-up device of the Prince of Peace to ruin his rival Escotiquiz. Nevertheless, that acute counsellor, as well as the Dukes of Infantado and St. Carlos, with several others, were kept in confinement, or sent into exile; and Napoleon, who in truth had not instigated this intrigue, but saw the advantage it would give him in his designs against the Peninsula, was secretly rejoiced to see the father and son thus envenomed against each other, and resolved to dispossess them both (1).

Entrance of
the French
troops into
Spain.
Nov. 22.

It was not long before this resolution to appropriate to himself part, at least, of the Spanish dominions, without the slightest regard to his recent and solemn guarantee of their integrity in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was acted upon by the French Emperor. The force of forty thousand men, which had been provided for at Bayonne by that treaty, but which was not to enter Spain except with the consent of the King of Spain, was now increased to sixty thousand; and, without any authority from the Spanish government, and though the situation of Portugal noways called for their advance, began to cross the frontier, and take the road, not towards Lisbon, but Madrid. Twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand horse, with forty guns, under Dupont, first passed the Bidassoa, and moved towards Valladolid, where headquarters were established in the beginning

Jan. 9.

of January. A second army, under Moncey, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, three thousand horse, and forty pieces of artillery, soon followed; and such was the haste with which they were forwarded to their destination, that they were conveyed across France by post, and rapidly defiled towards the Ebro; while, on the other extremity of the Pyrenees, Desbessme, with twelve thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and twenty cannon, entered Catalonia, and took the road to Barcelona (2).

The Prince
of Peace does
not venture to remon-
strate
against this
invasion.

Although the operations in Portugal afforded no sort of reason for this formidable invasion, yet so much were the inhabitants of the country in the habit of yielding implicit obedience to the French authorities, in consequence of the submissive attitude of their government for so long a period, that it excited very little attention either in Spain or over the rest of Europe,—to the greater part of which it was almost unknown. Public attention followed the progress of the Emperor in Italy; and, dazzled by the splendid pageants and important changes which were there going forward, paid little regard to the progress of obscure corps on the Pyrenean frontier. Notwithstanding all their infatuation, however, the Cabinet of Madrid were not without anxiety at this uncalled-for and suspicious invasion of their frontiers; but they were deceived by the repeated assurances which they received, both verbally and in writing, from the French Ministers, of the determination of the Emperor to execute all the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau (3); and the Prince of Peace was fearful, lest, by starting ill-timed suspicions, he might put in hazard the brilliant prospects which he conceived were opening both to the Spanish monarchy and himself from the spoils of Portugal. They were involved in the meshes of guilty ambition, and could not extricate themselves from its toils till they had themselves become its prey (4).

The time, however, was now rapidly approaching when Napoleon deemed it safe to throw off the mask. No sooner had he returned from Italy to

(1) O'Meara, ii. 160. *Tec.* i. 26, 23. *Nell.* i. 5, 6, *Thib.* vi. 285, 297. *South.* i. 187, 191.

"I never," said Napoleon, "excited the King of Spain against his son. I saw them envenomed against each other, and thence conceived the design

of deriving advantage to myself, and disposing both."—O'Meara, ii. 160.

(2) *Foy*, iii. 72, 74. *Tec.* i. 46, 47. *Land.* i. 51, 52.

(3) See *ante*, vi. 259.

(4) *Tec.* i. 47, 48. *Nell.* i. 6, 10. *South.* i. 195.

New levy in
France.
Treachery
seizure of
Pampeluna. Paris then the Minister of War transmitted a message to the Senate, requiring the levy of 80,000 conscripts out of those who should become liable to serve in 1809,—a requisition which that obsequious body forthwith voted by acclamation, though the peace of Tilait had,

Jan. 6. to all appearance, closed the Temple of Janus for a very long period, at least in regard to Continental wars. This warlike demonstration, though levelled ostensibly at England, yet contained ambiguous expressions

Jan. 24, 1808. which pointed not unequivocally to projects of aggrandisement on the side of the Spanish Peninsula (1). Shortly after, the French forces began, by fraud and false pretences, to make themselves masters of the frontier fortresses of Spain; and the success with which their dishonourable stratagems were crowned was such as almost to exceed belief, and which could not have occurred but in a monarchy debilitated by a long period of despotic misrule. Pampeluna was the first to be surprised. Early in February, General d'Armagnac directed his steps on this perfidious mission through Roncesvalles, the fabled scene of heroic achievement. He first requested leave from the governor of that fortress, to lodge two battalions with

Feb. 9. the Spanish troops in the citadel; and when this was refused, remained for some days in the town on the most friendly terms with the Spanish garrison, until they were so completely thrown off their guard, that he succeeded in surprising the principal gate of the citadel by means of three hundred men, admitted, one by one, with arms under their cloaks, during the night, into his house, which was within the walls, while the attention of the Spanish sentinels was taken off by his soldiers playing in sport at snowballs with each other close to the drawbridge of the citadel. Next morning a proclamation appeared, beseeching the inhabitants to "consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturbing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies (2)."

Treachery
seizure of
Barcelona,
Figueras,
and St.
Sebastien
by the
French,
Feb. 13. Duhesme's instructions were, in like manner, to make himself master of Barcelona; and he was not long of effecting that object. Boldly advancing towards that fortress, under the pretence of pursuing his march to Valencia, he totally disregarded the summons of the Comde de Espeleta, captain-general of the province, who required him to suspend his march till advices were received from Madrid; and so intimidated the governor, by threatening to throw upon him the whole responsibility of any differences which might arise between the two nations from the refusal to admit the French soldiers within the walls, that he succeeded in getting possession of the town. Still, however, Fort Montjuic and the citadel were in the hands of the Spaniards; but the same system of audacious treachery shortly after made the invaders masters of the strongholds. Count Theodore Lecche, the commander of the Italian division, assembled

Feb. 28. his troops as for a parade on the glacis of the citadel. After the inspection was over, the Italian general came with his staff, on horseback, to converse with the Spanish officers, and insensibly moved forward to the draw-

(1) "There is a necessity," said Clarke and Champagney, "of having considerable forces on all points exposed to attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of any favourable circumstances which may occur to carry the war into the bosom of England, to Ireland, or the Indies. Vulgar politicians conceive the Emperor should disarm: such a proceeding would be a real scourge to France. It is not enough to have an army in Portugal; Spain is in alarm for Cadix; Ceuta is menaced; the English have disembarked many troops in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; they have directed to that quarter

those which have been recalled from the Levant, or withdrawn from Sicily. The vigilance of their cruisers on the Spanish coast is hourly increasing; they seem disposed to avenge themselves on that kingdom, for the reverses they have experienced in the colonies. The whole Peninsula, therefore, in an especial manner calls for the attention of his Majesty."

—CLARKE and CHAMPAGNEY'S Reports, *Moniteur*, 24th Jan., 1808; and *For*, iii. 76, 77.

(2) *Tor*, i. 51, 52. *South*, i. 197, 198. *Lord*, i. 56. *Foy*, iii. 81, 84.

bridge; and while still there, so as to prevent its being drawn up, a company of grenadiers stole unperceived round the palisades, and rushing in, disarmed the Spanish guard at the gate, and introduced four battalions, who got possession of the place. Montjuic fell still more easily; the governor, though a man of courage and honour, was unable to withstand the peremptory summons of the French general, who audaciously demanded the surrender of that impregnable fortress, with the menace to render him responsible for the whole consequences of war with France, which would inevitably result from a refusal (4). San Fernando de Figueras next fell into the hands of the French. The governor, on his guard against surprise, was cajoled into permitting two hundred conscripts to be lodged in the citadel, the finest fortification in Spain, under pretence that there was not accommodation for them in the town. Instead of conscripts, chosen soldiers were introduced, who, in the night overpowered the sentinels, and admitted four regiments, who lay in the neighbourhood. Finally, St.-Sebastians, the key to the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, and the destined theatre of such desperate struggles between the French and English, was obtained on still more easy terms. By permission of the Spaniards, it had become the depot for the hospital of the French regiments who had passed through; but the governor, conceiving disquietude at the visible increase in the number of these pretended patients, and having learned some indiscreet expressions of Murat as to St.-Sebastians being indispensable to the security of the French army, communicated his fears to the captain-general of the province, and also to the Prince of Peace, with an earnest request for instructions (3). The Prince, too far gone to recede, counselled submission, though his eyes were now opened to the treachery of which he had been the victim; and, to his disgrace be it said, the last bulwark of his country was yielded up in consequence of express instructions from him written with his own hand (5).

The Emperor speedily improves upon his success, and covers the north of Spain with troops.

Thus were taken, by the treachery and artifice of the French Emperor, the four frontier fortresses of Spain; those which command the three great roads by Perpignan, Navarre, and Biscay, across the Pyrenees, and the possession of which gives an invader the entire command of the only passes practicable for an army from France into the Peninsula. And they were taken not only during a period of profound peace, but close alliance between the two countries, and by a power which, only a few months before, had so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Spanish dominions! History has few blacker or more disgraceful deeds to commemorate; and, doubtless, the perpetration of them must have been a subject of shame to many of the brave men engaged in the undertaking, how much soever the better feelings of the majority may have been obliterated by

(1) "My soldiers," said he, "are in possession of the citadel: instantly open the gates of Montjuic, for I have the special commands of the Emperor Napoleon to place garrisons in your fortresses. If you hesitate, I will, on the spot, declare war against Spain, and you will be exclusively responsible for all the torrents of blood which your resistance will cause to be shed." The name of Napoleon produced all these marvellous effects; it operated like a charm in paralysing the resistance even of the most intrepid spirits; many could encounter death; few had the moral courage to undergo the political risk consequent on resistance to his mandates. The Spanish governors at this period also had another excuse,—the perfidy with which they were assailed by his orders, was so unprecedented as to be inconceivable to men of honour.—See Fox, iii. 80.

(2) Tor. i. 53, 58. Foy, ii. 78, 85. Kell. i. 10. South. i. 192, 204. Thib. vi. 312.

(3) "On the margin of the letter of the Duke de Mahon, captain-general of Gulpescun, requesting instructions, and fully detailing the danger, was written in the Prince of Peace's own hand,—'Let the governor give up the place, since he has not the means of resisting, but let him do so in an amiable manner, as has been done in other places where there were even fewer reasons or grounds for excuse than in the case of Saint-Sebastians.'—March, 1. 1808. TORRES, i. 58. The general answer returned by the Prince of Peace to the repeated demands which he received from the North, for instructions how to act, had previously been,—'Receive the French well; they are our allies; they come to us as friends.'—HARDENBERG, x. 122.

that fatal revolutionary principle, which measures the morality of all public actions by no other test but success. Napoleon, however, who never enquired into the means, provided the end was favourable, was overjoyed at this easy acquisition of the keys of Spain, and was led from it to discard all fears of a serious rupture in the course of his projected changes of dynasty in the Peninsula. With his accustomed vigour, he instantly prepared to make the most of his extraordinary good fortune in these important conquests; fresh troops were instantly poured into the newly acquired fortresses; their ramparts were armed, their ditches scoured, their arsenals filled; the monks in them were all turned adrift, and the monasteries converted into barracks. Several millions of biscuits were baked in the frontier towns of France, and speedily stored in their precious magazines. The whole country from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with armed men; the Spanish authorities in all the towns were supplanted by French ones; and before as yet a single shot had been fired, or one angry note interchanged between the Cabinets, the whole of Spain, north of the Ebro, was already wrested from the Crown of Castile (1).

The Prince of Peace at length sees through the real designs of France.

How deeply soever Godoy may have been implicated, by long established intimacy and recent lures, in the meshes of French diplomacy, he could not any longer remain blind to the evident tendency of the designs of Napoleon. The seizure of Pampeluna first

drew the veil in part from his eyes; the successive captures of Barcelona, St.-Sebastians, and Figueras, next tore it asunder; finally, the proclamation of Junot, on the first February, at once dashed to the earth all his hopes of national or individual aggrandisement. The portentous announcement that Junot was to administer the affairs of Portugal in its *whole extent*, in the name of the Emperor, evinced clearly that all the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour either of the Spanish family, who had ceded the throne of Tuscany, or the Prince of Peace individually, were blown to the winds. The private correspondence of that ambitious statesman, accordingly, at this period, evinces the utmost uneasiness at the designs of France (2). But the uncertainty of which he so bitterly complained, was of short duration.

Feb. 2. A requisition, by Napoleon, for the removal of the Spanish fleet to Toulon, which the Cabinet of Madrid were weak enough to comply with, though

Feb. 27. the rapid succession of events prevented its execution, was soon followed by a formal demand of all Spain to the north of the Ebro, to be incorporated with the French monarchy. In return, he offered to cede to the Spanish monarchy his newly acquired realm of Portugal (3); but it was readily foreseen that the proposal would prove entirely elusory, as Junot had taken possession of the whole country in the name of Napoleon, and it was

(1) Foy, iii. 85, 87, 89. Tor. i. 89, 90. South. i. 125, 205. Lond. i. 57, 60.

General Foy, though a liberal writer, and of the Napoleon school, gives a full detail, much to his credit, of these disgraceful transactions, and draws a veil over none of the dishonourable deeds by which they were accomplished.—See Foy, iii. 75, 85. This is the true and honourable spirit of history, and withal the most politic, for it gives double weight to the defence of his country on other points when undertaken by such a champion.

His secret despatch to his agent Inquierdo at Paris the Inquierdo at following secret dispatch:—"I receive no news; I live in uncertainty; the treaty is already a dead letter; this kingdom is covered with troops; the harbours of Portugal are

about to be occupied by them; Junot governs the whole of that country. We have just received a demand for the remainder of our fleets to co-operate with the French, which must be complied with. Every thing is uncertainty, intrigue, and distrust; public opinion is divided; the heir-apparent to the throne was lately involved in a treasonable conspiracy; the French troops live at free quarters on the country; the people are exhausted by their requisitions. You yourself have been to little purpose at Paris; the ambassador there is useless. What the devil is to come of all this? what will be the end of this uncertainty? If you know any thing, for God's sake let me know it; any thing is better than this uncertainty."—Gomes to Inquierdo, 24th February, 1808: THIRAPPAU, vi. 311, 312.

(3) Thib. vi. 312, 313. Hard. x. 122, 123. Tor. i. 56, 59. Foy, iii. 109.

not to be supposed he would ever relinquish his grasp of a monarchy so important in his maritime designs against Great Britain (1).

March 11. Possessed of Spain to the north of the Ebro, including, of course, Catalonia, Navarre, the whole frontier fortresses, and passing through the Pyrenees, was, in a military point of view, possession of Spain itself; not a fort existed to arrest the French between that river and the capital. The intelligence communicated by Isquierdo revealed the alarming fact, that the title of Emperor of the Indies, was to be given to Ferdinand; and that Napoleon continually reverted to the dependence of the tranquillity of France on the succession to the Crown of Spain. In the course of the conferences, the Spanish diplomatist had penetrated the real secret, and distinctly warned the Prince of Peace that the total dethronement of the House of Bourbon was resolved on. The arrival

March 12. the Queen of Etruria at Madrid at this juncture, who had been forced to renounce one throne by the French Emperor, and since insidiously deprived of the compensation promised her instead of Portugal, enhanced

March 13. the general embarrassments; and at length the arrival of Murat at Burgos, with the title of "Lieutenant of the Emperor," and an immense staff, both civil and military, left no room for doubt that Napoleon was determined to appropriate to himself the whole Peninsula. In this extremity the Prince of Peace, roused to more manly feelings by the near approach of danger, both to the monarchy and his own person, recalled a letter which

March 15. he had dispatched to Paris, consenting to the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro, and counselled the King to imitate the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal and depart for Seville, with a view to embark

March 16. for America. Preparations were immediately made for the journey; the guards were assembled at Aranjuez, then the royal residence; thirty pieces of cannon were brought from Segovia, and messengers dispatched to Gibraltar to bespeak an asylum for the fugitive monarch within its impregnable walls. Meanwhile Napoleon, keeping up to the last his detestable

March 17. system of hypocrisy, sent the King a present of twelve beautiful horses, with a letter announcing "his approaching visit to his friend and ally the King of Spain, in order to cement their friendship by personal intercourse, and arrange the affairs of the Peninsula without the restraint of diplomatic forms;" while the passage of the Bidassoa by six thousand of the Imperial Guard, the formation of a new French army, nineteen thousand strong, in Biscay, under Marshal Bessières, and the increase of the forces in Catalonia to fifteen thousand men (2), told but too clearly that if he did arrive, it would be with the pomp and authority of a conqueror.

Twentieth at Aranjuez, and overthrow of the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Asturias was offered by the King either to share the flight of the Royal family, or remain at home with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. He at first preferred the former alternative, though his confidants, not yet convinced of the total

Napoleon demands the cession of the provinces to the north of the Ebro. Paris between himself, Duroc, and Talleyrand; they here—The Emperor is desirous of exchanging Portugal with the Spanish provinces to the north of the Ebro, to avoid the inconvenience of a military road across Castile. A new treaty, offensive and defensive, appears necessary to bind Spain more closely to the Continental System. The scope of his empire requires, that the succession to the Crown of Castile should be fixed in an irrevocable

manner. His Majesty is willing to grant permission to the King to bear the title of *Emperor of the Indies*, and to grant his niece in marriage to the Prince of Asturias."—Such was the *propos-verbale*; but Isquierdo, says Foy, was too acute a diplomatist not to see that Napoleon was deceiving all the world; and that he was bent upon getting the entire command of the whole Peninsula, and disposing of it at his pleasure.—Foy, iii. 108, 110; and Isquierdo's *Despatch to the Emperor of France*, 24th March, 1808; SAVARY, iii. 142.

(2) *Tor.* i. 60, 64. *Thib.* vi. 343, 318. *Foy*, ii. 109, 113. *London* i. 60, 64.

overthrew of the dynasty contemplated by Napoleon, dissuaded him from the step, and strongly recommended him to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon. Meanwhile, the preparations for a journey by the Court, and certain vague rumours of their approaching departure from the kingdom, which had transpired, collected an unusual crowd to Aranjuez, and increased to the very highest pitch the anxiety of the people at Madrid; who, notwithstanding the ignorance in which they were kept, had still learned with dismay the seizure of the frontier fortresses, and the occupation of the northern provinces by the French troops. The French ambassador openly and loudly condemned the projected departure to the south, as uncalculated, imprudent, and calculated only to disturb the existing state of amity between the two nations,—while Murat at Burgos issued a proclamation, which arrived at this period at the capital, in which he enjoined his soldiers, “to treat the Spaniards, a nation estimable in so many respects, as they would treat their French compatriots, as the Emperor wished nothing but happiness and felicity to Spain.” Still the general effervescence continued, and the King, to March 15. calm it, issued a proclamation, in which he earnestly counselled peace and submission: an advice which had a precisely opposite effect. As the period of departure approached, the reluctance of Ferdinand to accompany the fugitive monarch became hourly stronger, and his friends gave out that he was resolved to remain at home and stand by his country: a resolution which was loudly applauded by the people, who regarded him as the only hope of the nation, and were worked up to a pitch of perfect fury against the Prince of Peace, whom they regarded as, more than he really was, the author of all the public calamities. A casual expression which dropped from the Prince on the morning of the 17th, “This night the Court sets out, but I will not accompany them,” increased the general ferment, by spreading the belief he might possibly be reluctantly torn away from the kingdom of his fathers. At length, when the royal carriages drew up to the door of the royal palace, and preparations for an immediate departure were made, matters came to a crisis: the people rose in tumultuous masses; a large body took March 17. post at the palace, cut the traces of the carriages, and put an entire stop to the intended journey, while a furious mob, composed in great part of disbanded soldiers, surrounded the hotel of the Prince of Peace, from whose guards they experienced no resistance, forced open the doors, ransacked the most private apartments in searching for the object of their indignation, who, however, for the time escaped; but still observing some moderation in their excesses, brought the Princess, with all the respect due to her rank, to the royal palace (1).

In the first moment of alarm, the Prince of Peace had escaped by a back passage, with a single roll, which was lying on the table, in his hand, and flying up to the garrets, hid himself under a quantity of mats, until the first violence of the tumult had subsided. To appease the people, the King issued a decree the following morning, by which he was deprived of his functions as Generalissimo and High Admiral, and banished from Court, with liberty only to choose his

(1) Tor. i. 69, 75. Foy, iii. 113, 117. Thib. vi. 221, 222. Lond. i. 64, 65.

The tumult at the Prince of Peace's palace first commenced from the mob recognising in the person of a veiled lady, who left the palace at dusk on the evening of the 17th, surrounded by the guards, Donna Josefa Tado, who had so long been the mistress of the favourite. His marriage with the niece of the King no more disturbed their relations, than

either the one or the other excited any jealousy in the breast of the Queen, whose criminal partiality had been the sole cause of his original elevation;—and the tumult at Aranjuez found them both reposing quietly under the same roof.—Toussie, i. 74; Foy, iii. 118. This is a clear proof that, in some cases at least, the ardour of the sun in a warm climate does not inflame the passion of the green-eyed monster.

place of retreat. This measure, however, was far from restoring general tranquillity; the violence of the public feeling was manifested by the seizure of Don Diego Godoy, a relation of the Prince, who was conducted with every mark of ignominy by his own troop of dragoons to his barracks: and secret information was received, that a new and more serious tumult was preparing for the succeeding night, having for its object a more important change than the overthrow of the ruling favourite. At the same time intelligence arrived that the guards when sounded as to whether they would repel an attack upon the palace, answered, "that the Prince of Asturias could alone ensure the public safety;" and at the same time that Prince waited on the King, and offered, by sending the officers of his household through the crowd, to disperse the assemblage; a proposal which was gladly accepted, but necessarily led to the suspicion, that he who could so easily appease, had not been a stranger to the origin, of the tumult. The night passed quietly over, but next morning, at ten o'clock, a frightful disturbance arose, in consequence of the discovery of Godoy in his own palace. *March 19.* The unhappy victim of popular fury had remained for thirty-six hours undiscovered in his place of concealment; but at length the pangs of thirst became so intolerable as to overcome the fear of death, and he ventured down stairs to get a glass of water. He was recognised by a Walloon sentinel at the foot of the steps, who immediately gave the alarm. A crowd instantly collected; he was seized by a furious multitude, and with difficulty rescued from instant death by some guards who collected around him, and, at the imminent risk of their own lives, dragged him suspended from their saddles almost in the air, covered with contusions, and half dead with terror, at a rapid pace across the Place San Antonio to the nearest prison, amidst the most dreadful cries and imprecations. Prevented from wreaking their vengeance on the chief object of their hatred, the mob divided into separate parties, and traversing the streets in different directions, sacked and levelled with the ground the houses of the principal friends and dependants of Godoy. At length Ferdinand, to whom all eyes were now turned as the only person capable of arresting the public disorders, at the earnest entreaty of the King and Queen, whose anxiety, amidst all the perils with which they were themselves surrounded, was chiefly for the life of their fallen favourite, flew to the prison at the head of his guards, and prevailed on the menacing mob by which it was surrounded to retire. "Are you as yet King?" enquired the Prince of Peace, when Ferdinand first presented himself before him. "Not as yet, but I shall soon be so." In effect, Charles IV deserted by the whole Court, overwhelmed by the opprobrium heaped on his obnoxious minister, unable to trust his own guards, and in hourly apprehension for the life, not only of Godoy, but of himself and the Queen, deemed a resignation of the crown the only mode of securing the personal safety of any of the three; and in the evening a proclamation appeared in which he relinquished the throne to the Prince of Asturias (1).

(1) Lond. i. 65, 66. Tor. i. 73, 79. Foy, iii. 118, 122. Nell. i. 15, 20. Thib. vi. 321, 323.

His proclamation, and secret feelings on the subject. "As my habitual infirmities no longer permit me to bear the weight of the government of my kingdom, and standing in need, for the re-establishment of my health, of a milder climate and a private life, I have determined after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate the Crown in favour of my heir and well-beloved son, the Prince of Asturias, and desire that this, my free and spontaneous abdication, should be fully carried into

execution in all points."—*Desree 18th March, 1808; For. iii. 371.*—On the day following, the King informed Murat of his resignation, with full details of his reasons for so doing, but without alleging any others than those set forth in the public instrument; but on the 21st he wrote a secret despatch to Napoleon, in which he asserted,—"I have not resigned in favour of my son, but from the force of circumstances, and when the din of arms and the clamours of my insurgent guards left me no alternative but resignation or death, which would speedily have been followed by that of the

Universal joy of the people at these events. The Prince was proclaimed King under the title of Ferdinand VII on the day of his father's abdication; and this auspicious event, coupled with the fall of Godoy, diffused universal transport. All ranks and classes of the people shared in it: the surrender of the frontier fortresses; the hundred thousand men in the northern provinces, the approach of Napoléon with his guards, were forgotten, now that the traitors who had betrayed the nation were fallen: the houses in Madrid were decorated during the day with flowers and green boughs; at night a vast illumination burst forth spontaneously in every part of the city. Ferdinand VII was hailed with enthusiastic applause as the saviour of his country, whenever he appeared in public; while the public fury against the Prince of Peace rose to such a height, that the people in many parts of the kingdom destroyed the institutions which he had established for the promotion even of agriculture, manufactures and the arts, from which nothing but unmingled good could have been anticipated (1).

Continued advances of the French troops, and entry of Murat into Madrid. While the Spanish people were thus abandoning themselves to transports of joy at the accession of a new monarch to the throne, Murat at the head of the French troops was rapidly approaching Madrid. On the 15th March, he set out at the head of the corps of Moncey, the imperial guard and the artillery from Burgos, taking the road of the Somo-Sierra. On the same day, Dupont, with two divisions of his corps and the cavalry, broke up for the Guadarama pass; the third division of Dupont's corps remained at Valladolid to observe the Spanish troops which occupied Galicia. No sooner had these forces advanced on the road towards Madrid, than their place at Burgos was supplied by the army of reserve under Bessiéres. The whole body moved on by brigades, taking with them provisions for fifteen days, and fifty rounds of ball cartridge each man; they bivouacked at night with patrols set, and all the other precautions usual in an enemy's territory. They every where gave out that they were bound for the camp of St.-Roque, to act against the English, at the same time belying these pacific declarations by arresting all the Spanish soldiers and posts whom they met on the road, so as to prevent any intelligence of their approach being received. In this way they passed without opposition, and almost without their advance being known, the important range of mountains which separates Old from New Castile; and Murat, having learned at Beytrajo, on their southern side, of the events at Aranjuez, redoubled his speed, and entered Madrid at the head of the cavalry and imperial guard and a brilliant staff, on the day following and took up his quarters in the Hotel of the Prince of Peace. This formidable apparition excited much less attention than it would otherwise have done, in consequence of all minds being intent on the preparation for Ferdinand VII on the following day making his public entry into the capital. He

Queen. I have been forced to abdicate, and have no longer any hope but in the aid and support of Napoléon. my magnanimous ally, the Emperor Napoléon. On the same day he drew up a secret protest, which sets forth,—“I declare that my decree of 19th March, by which I abdicated the Crown in favour of my son, is an act to which I was forced, to prevent the effusion of blood in my beloved subjects. It should, therefore, be regarded as null.”—See both documents in *For.* iii. 392, 393; *Pictures Just.*—On the other hand, the day after his abdication, Charles IV said to the diplomatic body assembled at the Escorial,—“I never performed an action in my life with more pleasure.” The truth appears to be, that the abdication, in the

first instance, was prompted chiefly by terror for the life of the Prince of Peace, for whose safety throughout the Royal pair manifested more solicitude than for their own concerns; and it was an afterthought to protest against it as null, or attempt to recede from the act. Thisbaudeau seems to incline to the opinion that the protest on 21st March was drawn out subsequent to its date, and after the arrival of Murat, though, doubtless, the resignation of the Crown, even if suggested only by terrors for Godoy's life, cannot be considered as a voluntary deed.—See *TORRESO*, i. 85, 86, and *THISBAUDEAU*, vi. 328.

(1) *Tor.* i. 84, 85. *London.* i. 66. *Southey.* i. 209, 218. *Nell.* i. 21, 22.

came in accordingly, accompanied by two hundred thousand citizens of all ranks, in carriages, on foot, and horseback, who had gone out to welcome their Sovereign; and Murat, who was an eye-witness to the universal transports which his presence occasioned, failed not instantly to write off to Napoléon intelligence of what he had seen, with many observations on the probable effect of so popular a Prince permanently retaining the supreme direction of affairs (1).

Murat declines to recognise Ferdinand, and takes military possession of Madrid.

The first care of Ferdinand, after he ascended the throne, was to transmit to Napoléon a full account of the transactions at Aranjuez, according to his version of the affair; and he anxiously awaited the answer which was to be received from the supreme arbiter of his fate. In the interim, however, he experienced from the French authorities the utmost reserve; and when he made a visit to Murat, and was announced as King of Spain, he had the mortification of being obliged to return, not only without any of the honours due to his rank, but without having had a single word addressed to him by that officer or his attendants (2). As, however, it was of the utmost importance to the new sovereign that he should be recognised by the French Emperor,—and his situation without such countenance was not only precarious but full of danger,—no pains were spared to conciliate his favour, and win the good-will of the French generals in Madrid. Flattery, caresses, obsequious obedience to every demand, were all tried, but in vain; Murat, aware of the secret designs of his brother-in-law on the throne of Spain, was careful to avoid every thing which could have the semblance even of recognising his title to the throne. Meanwhile, Charles IV and the Queen more and more alarmed for the safety of their fallen favourite, did not let a day pass without reiterating their entreaties to Murat to take him under his protection, and now openly represented the resignation as an involuntary act; while that general, careful above all to advance the interests of his master, took military possession of the capital, occupied and fortified the Retiro, reviewed all his forces on the edge of the town, and nominated General Grouchy, governor of Madrid. Every thing asked by the French authorities was instantly granted; all their requisitions for the support, clothing, or pay of the troops, were carefully complied with; and even the ungracious demand for the sword of Francis I., which had hung in the royal armoury ever since it had been taken in the battle of Pavia, was also yielded to the desire of Ferdinand to conciliate his much dreaded ally (3). A hint was next given that the journey of DON CARLOS, the King's brother, destined to celebrity in future times, to receive the emperor on the frontiers of the kingdom, would be very acceptable: this, too, was instantly acquiesced in, and preparations were made for his departure. Encouraged by such marks of compliance, Beaubarnis then insinuated that it would have the best effect upon the future relations of the two potentates, if Ferdinand himself were to go at least as far as Burgos to receive his august guest; but the advisers of the Spanish monarch

(1) Lond. i. 67, 68. South. i. 219, 225. Foy, iii. 128, 130. Tor. i. 93, 97. Thib. vi. 325.

(2) "The Queen of Etruria had, unknown to Murat, arranged matters for an interview between him and Ferdinand VII., and accordingly he made his appearance and was announced as *King of Spain*, when the French General was paying a visit to the Ex-Queen of Tuscany. Murat stood up when he entered the room, but did not advance a step to meet him: Ferdinand paused at his unexpected reserve; and the Queen, to put an end to so awkward a scene, sat down to the piano and began to play. Neither

said a word; at length Ferdinand mechanically drew near to his sister, and stood beside the instrument: Murat never stirred, and soon after, bowing to the Queen, retired, without having taken any further notice of the embarrassed monarch."—Foy, iii. 146. *note*.

(3) "It was brought in state from the Armory Real to the palace of Murat by the Count Altamira. 'It could not,' said he, 'be given up to more worthy hands than those of the illustrious general formed in the school of the hero of the age.'"—Foy, iii. 142.

were startled at this demand, especially so soon after the paragon seizure of the fortresses: and the inhabitants of Madrid, grievously offended at the coldness of the French authorities to their beloved Prince, and the unauthorized intrusion of their troops into the capital, were daily becoming more and more exasperated at their imperious allies (1).

Napoleon offers the crown of Spain to Louis Bonaparte, who abdicates it. Napoleon received the account of the events at Aranjuez, on the night of the 26th March, at Paris. He instantly took his final resolution, and next morning offered the crown of Spain to his brother Louis. His letter to that Prince still exists, and affords decisive evidence of his views on that monarchy, even at that early period, and of the profound dissimulation, as well as thorough perfidy by which his subsequent conduct, both to Ferdinand and Charles IV, was characterised (2). Louis, however, was not deceived by the specious offer thus held out to him: he had felt on the throne of Holland the chains of servitude, and the responsibility of command, and he was thinking rather of resigning his onerous charge than accepting another still more burdensome: he therefore refused. At the same time Napoleon had a long conversation with Isquierdo at St.-Cloud, as to the state of public opinion in the Peninsula, and the feelings with which they would regard a prince of his family, or even himself, for their sovereign. Isquierdo replied—"The Spaniards would accept your Majesty for their sovereign with pleasure, and even enthusiasm, but only in the event of your having previously renounced the crown of France." Struck with this answer, he meditated much on the affairs of Spain; and without revealing to him his real designs on the Spanish crown, sent Savary to Madrid, to carry into execution his intrigues in the Spanish capital; and foreseeing that the crisis of the Peninsula was approaching, and that it was indispensable that he should get both Charles and Ferdinand into his power, set out himself for Bayonne in the beginning of April (3).

(1) Lond. i. 60, 70. Foy, i. 140, 142. Thib. vi. 324, 325. i. 109.

(2) Napoleon's letter to his brother Louis was in these terms:—"27th March, 1808—The King of Spain has just abdicated; the Prince of Peace has been imprisoned; insurrectionary movements have shown themselves at Madrid. At that instant our troops were still forty leagues distant; but on the 24th, Murat must have entered that capital at the head of forty thousand men. The people demand me, with loud cries, to fix their destinies. Being convinced that I shall never be able to conclude a solid peace with England till I have given a great movement on the Continent, I have resolved to put a French Prince on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my eyes to you for the throne of Spain. Say at once what is your opinion on that subject. You must be aware that this plan is yet in embryo; and that although I have 100,000 men in Spain, yet, according to circumstances, I may either advance directly to my object, in which case every thing will be concluded in a fortnight, or be more circumspect in my advances, and the final result appear only after several months' operations. Answer categorically:—If I declare you King of Spain, can I rely on you?"—NAPOLÉON TO LOUIS, 27th March, 1808.—TOMBS, i. 100; and THIBAUDAU, vi. 334.

(3) Savary iii. 162. Torr. i. 100, 101. Thib. vi. 324, 325. Foy, iii. 142, 143.

His secret instructions for Madrid. Napoleon said and object of to him:—"Charles IV has abdicated; his journey. His son has succeeded him, and this change has been the result of a revolution in which the Prince of Peace has fallen, which looks as if

these changes were not altogether voluntary. I was fully prepared for some changes in Spain; but I think they are now taking a turn altogether different from what I intended. See our ambassador on the subject; enquire especially why he could not prevent a revolution in which I shall be forced to intervene, and in which I shall be considered as implicated. Before recognising the son, I must be made aware of the sentiments of the father; nothing will induce me to do so till I see the resignation duly legalized, otherwise a troop of traitors may be introduced into my palace during the night, who may force me to abdicate, and overturn the state. When I made peace on the Niemen, I stipulated, that if England did not accept the mediation of Alexander, he should unite his arms to mine to constrain that power to submission. I would be weak, indeed, if, having obtained that single advantage from those whom I have vanquished, I should permit the Spaniards to embroil me afresh on my weak side, and give that power much greater advantages than they had lost by the rupture with Russia. What I fear above every thing is a revolution, of which I neither know the direction nor hold the threads; doubtless, it would be a great object to avoid a war with Spain; such a contest would be a species of sacrilege, but I would willingly incur all its hazards, if the prince who governs that state is disposed to embrace such a policy. I should thus be in the same situation with Louis XIV. when he engaged, in support of his grandson, in the war of the succession; the same political necessity governs both cases. Had Charles IV. reigned, and the Prince of Peace not been overturned, we might have remained at peace, because I could rely on them; but now all is changed. But if Spain is inclined to throw itself into the opposite policy, I

He arrives
at Madrid;
persuades
Ferdinand
to go to
Bayonne.

No person could be better qualified than Savary to execute the ambiguous but important mission with which he was now charged. Devoted in his attachment to the Emperor, intimately acquainted with his most secret projects, active, insinuating, skilful, a perfect master of finesse and dissimulation, and wholly unscrupulous in the means employed for the execution of his purposes, he was admirably adapted for conducting that dark intrigue, which was intended, without a rupture, to terminate in the dethronement of the entire race of the Spanish House of Bourbon. In the most flagitious as well as important deeds of Napoleon's life, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, the Russian negotiations succeeding the Treaty of Tilsit, and in those which followed the battle of Amsterdám, he had borne a conspicuous part, and his present situation at the head of the Gendarmerie d'Elite, gave him the direction of the most important part of the state police. Fully possessed of the secret views of the Emperor, and entirely regardless of any breach of faith in carrying them into effect, he spared neither menaces, nor flattery, nor assurances of safety to accomplish the grand object of getting Ferdinand into the hands of Napoleon (1). No sooner had he arrived at Madrid than he demanded a special audience of the King, which was immediately granted. He there declared,—"I have come at the particular desire of the Emperor, solely to offer his compliments to your Majesty, and to know if your sentiments in regard to France are in conformity to those of your father. If they are, the Emperor will shut his eyes to all that is past, he will not intermeddle in the smallest particular in the internal affairs of the kingdom, and he will instantly recognise you as King of Spain and the Indies (2)." This gratifying assurance was accompanied with April 10. so many flattering expressions and apparent cordiality that it entirely imposed not only on Ferdinand, but his most experienced counsellors; and Savary's entreaties that he would go at least as far as Burgos to meet the Emperor, who was already near Bayonne, on the road to Madrid, were so pressing, that their reluctance to his departure from the capital was at length overcome, and he set out from Madrid, in company with the French envoy, to meet his august protector (3).

Journey of
Ferdinand
to Burgos
at Savary's
earnest de-
sire.

The King was every where received on his route to the northern provinces with the same enthusiastic joy as at Aranjuez and Madrid; though the simple-inhabitants of Castile, not involved in the trammels of intrigue, and uninfluenced by the delusions which

should not hesitate to enter the monarchy with all my forces; for that country, if ruled by a warlike prince, inclined to direct against us all the resources of his nation, might perhaps succeed in displacing by his own dynasty my family on the throne of France. You see what might happen in France if I do not prevent it; it is my duty to foresee the danger, and take measures to deprive the enemy of the resources they otherwise might derive from it. If I cannot arrange with either the father or son, I will make a clean sweep of them both; I will reassemble the Cortes, and resume the designs of Louis XIV. I am fully prepared for all that; I am about to set out for Bayonne; I will go on to Madrid, but only if it is absolutely unavoidable."—SAVARY, iii. 162, 166.

(1) He admitted to the Abbé de Pradt, that his mission was to get Ferdinand from Madrid.—DE PRADT, 73.

(2) Cevallos, 28, 29.

(3) Cevallos, 28, 29. Tor. i. 112, 113. Escoiq. 54. Savary, iii. 181, 182. Foy, iii. 145.

"I asked permission," says Savary, "to accompany the King on his journey to the north, solely for this reason:—I had come from Bayonne to Madrid as a common courier, as was the custom of travel-

ling at that time in Spain. I had scarcely arrived when I was under the necessity of retracing my steps in the same fashion in order to meet the Emperor; at the same time that Ferdinand was pursuing the same route. I found it much more convenient to request leave for my carriage to join that of his Majesty; I did so, and my carriage accordingly made part of the royal cortege."—SAVARY, iii. 166. 186.—It is incredible that this was the reason which induced Savary to accompany the King back to Burgos. Don Pedro Cevallos says, "General Savary made use of the most pressing instance to induce the King to go to meet the Emperor, alleging that such a step would appear infinitely flattering to his Imperial Majesty; and this he repeated so often, and in such insinuating terms, asserting, at the same time, that the Emperor might be hourly expected, that it was impossible to withhold credit from the assertion. When the day of departure was fixed, the French general, in like manner, solicited the honour of accompanying his Majesty in his journey, which could in no event be postponed beyond Burgos, according to the positive intelligence he had just received of the approach of his Majesty."—CEVALLOS, 31.

were practised on their superiors, beheld with undisguised anxiety the progress of their sovereign towards the French frontier. At Burgos, however, the uneasiness of the King's counsellors greatly increased, for not only were they now surrounded by the French troops, but the Emperor had not arrived, and no advices of his having even crossed the frontier were received. The matter was warmly and anxiously debated in his council, and opinions were much divided as to the course which should be adopted; Don Pedro Cevallos earnestly insisting, that the King should go no further, and portraying in vivid colours the evident peril with which such an inconsiderate surrender of his person into the hands of so ambitious a potentate would be attended. The other counsellors of the King were more undecided; alleging for their public justification that it was utterly inconceivable that Napoleon should entertain any sinister designs against the person of the monarch on the throne of Spain, and thus run the risk not only of lighting up the flames of a frightful war in the Peninsula, but placing the whole resources of its Transatlantic possessions at the disposal of the English government (4). Cevallos still maintained his opinion, and the ultimate determination appeared

But it is strongly resisted, and his council becomes divided.

still uncertain, when Savary joined the deliberations. He protested loudly against any change in the King's plans as uncalculated and unnecessary, prejudicial alike to the honour of the French Emperor and of himself as his envoy, and likely more than any other step which could be taken to embroil the two kingdoms, and destroy that good understanding which was just beginning to arise between their respective monarchs. "I will let you cut off my head," says he, "if,

in a quarter of an hour after the arrival of your Majesty at Bayonne, he does not recognize you as the King of Spain and of the Indies. To preserve consistency, he will, perhaps, in the first instance, address you with the title of your Highness; but in a few minutes he will give you that of your Majesty. The moment that is done, every thing is at an end: then your Majesty may instantly return into Spain (2)."

These words were decisive: the King was surrounded by eight thousand of the French troops, without a single guard to his person. The earnest manner and apparent sincerity of Savary disarmed suspicion: if it had still existed, resistance was hardly possible without a battalion to support it; and the fatal resolution to continue the journey to Bayonne was taken almost from necessity, although the people were so alive to the danger that they every where manifested the utmost repugnance to the journey being continued, and rose at Vittoria in menacing crowds to prevent it. At that place a faithful counsellor of the King, Don Mariano de Urquijo, arrived from Bilboa, and not only laid before him a memoir, distinctly foretelling the danger which awaited him from the French Emperor, but suggested a plan by which escape in disguise was still possible, and mentioned that both the captain-general of Biscay and a faithful battalion

At length he prolongs it to Bayonne in consequence of a letter from Napoleon.

(1) These, however, were not their only, nor their real reasons; in truth they had gone too far to recede; it had already transpired that Charles IV had denounced the resignation of Aranjuez as a forced act, and was doing his utmost to engage the French government in his interest. They were all, with the exception of Cevallos, involved in that transaction, and they thus saw the penalties of treason menacing them in rear; the country was overrun by French troops; a national struggle in defence of Ferdinand appeared hopeless, or at least there were no preparations for it; and

there seemed no safety even to their lives but in advancing rapidly, and by early submission and adroit flattery winning the powerful protection of the French Emperor before the partisans of the late monarch had had time to make any impression. This is the true secret of the majority of Ferdinand's counsellors advising him to go on to Bayonne, after the dangers of it had become so evident as to excite tumults even in the humblest ranks of the people.—*See Fox, iii. 146. 147.*

(2) Cevallos. 31, 32. Foy, iii. 147, 149. Escoiqu. 44, 54. Sav. iii. 186, 187.

Secret motives of his counsellors in agreeing to that step.

would be at hand at Mondragon to conduct him to Durango, and from thence to the fortified town of Bilbao. Hervaz repeated the same advice: the chief of the customhouse made offer of two thousand of his officers to protect his Majesty: the Duke of Mahon, Governor of Guipuscoa, offered to pledge his head that he should escape safely into Arragon, and to accompany him in his flight, observing that it should never be said that a great-grandson of the brave Crillon was wanting in the hour of need to a descendant of Henry IV. So many and such concurring efforts would probably have diverted the King from his design, were it not that at that very moment Savary, who had gone on to Bayonne, and seen the Emperor, returned, bringing a letter from Napoléon himself to Ferdinand, dated from that town only two days before. This letter was couched in such encouraging terms, and held out such flattering though equivocal assurances of an immediate recognition, which were strongly repeated by Savary on his word of honour, that it relieved Ferdinand's counsellors of all their perplexities; and it was finally resolved to continue the journey without delay to Bayonne (1). When the Duke de Mahon wished still to remonstrate, who entirely directed the King, interrupted him by the words,—"The affair is settled; to-morrow we set out for Bayonne; we have received all the assurances which we could desire." Still the public anxiety continued; and when the horses came to the door on the following morning, a vast crowd assembled, and cut the traces. A proclamation was immediately issued to calm the general effervescence, in which the King declared "that he was assured of the constant and sincere friendship of the Emperor of France, and that, in a few days, the people would return thanks to God for the prudence which dictated the temporary absence which gave them so much disquietude; and the carriage, surrounded by a mournful and submissive, but still unconvinced crowd, took its departure, guarded by the French division of Verdier. Two days afterwards Ferdinand crossed the Bidassoa, and proceeding to Bayonne, finally committed himself to the honour of the French Emperor (2).

Guarded but deceitful expressions in that letter.

(1) Napoléon said in this letter,—"The affair of Aranjuez took place when I was occupied with the affairs of the north. I am not in a situation to form an opinion concerning it, nor of the conduct of the Prince of Peace; but what I am clear about is, that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to the shedding of blood, and to taking justice into their own hands. The King has no longer any friends. Your Highness will have none, if ever you prove unfortunate. The people willingly take vengeance for the homage which they in general pay us. As to the abdication of Charles IV, it took place at a moment when our armies covered Spain; and, in the eyes of Europe and posterity, I shall appear to have sent my troops for no other purpose but to precipitate from the throne my friend and ally. As a neighbouring sovereign, I am called on to enquire into, before I recognise, that abdication. I declare to your Royal Highness, and to the whole world, if the abdication of King Charles was really voluntary, if he was not constrained to it by the revolt and insurrection of Aranjuez, I will, without hesitation, and at once, recognise you as King of Spain. I desire much to converse with you on this subject. The circumspection which, for some months, I have employed in these affairs, should induce you to rely with the more confidence on me if, in your turn, factions of any sort should disturb you on the throne. Your Royal Highness has now my whole thoughts. You see that I float between different

ideas, and have need to be fixed. You may, however, rest assured, that, in any event, I shall conduct myself towards you as I have done towards your father. Rely on my desire to conciliate every thing, and on my wish to find occasion to give you proofs of my affection and perfect esteem." *St. Petersburg to FERNANDEZ, Bayonne, April 16, 1808.*—When he put this insidious epistle into Savary's hands, Napoléon said to him,—"If the Prince of Asturias had followed wise counsels, I should have found him here; but from what you tell me, I suppose he conceived apprehensions from the preparations of the Grand Duke of Berg (Munster). Return and give him this letter from me; allow him to make his reflections on it. You have no need of guesses; he is more interested in it than I am. Let him do as he pleases. According to your answer or your silence, I shall take my time, and also adopt such measures as may prevent him from returning elsewhere but to his father. There is the fruit of his counsels. Here is a prince who perhaps will cease to reign in a few days, or induce a war between France and Spain." At the same time he wrote to Munster to save the life of the Prince of Peace, but send him immediately to Bayonne.—*Savary, iii. 296, 297, 218.*

(2) *Tor. i. 115, 119. Covallón, 21, 22. Euzé, 32. 56. Foy, iii. 148, 151. Thib. vi. 245, 251. De Froel. 74. Sav. iii. 216, 217.*

Godoy,
Charles IV,
and the
Queen, are
greatly
hurt by
Murat's
treachery.

Upon his departure from Madrid, Ferdinand had intrusted the government to a Regency, of which the Infant Don Antonio was the head. Murat, however, was the real centre of authority; the presence of thirty thousand French troops gave him an influence which was irresistible. No sooner had the King left the capital than he insisted that the Prince of Peace should immediately be given up to him. Don Antonio refused to do so until he received authority from Ferdinand, to whom he instantly dispatched a courier for instructions. Meanwhile the French general continued to insist for the delivery of the important prisoner, threatening, at the same time, to put to the sword, in case of refusal, the six hundred provincial guards intrusted with his custody. At length authority arrived from the King for his surrender, which the Infant communicated to the officer in command of the guards, with the simple observation, "that on

April 20. the surrender of Godoy depended the preservation of the Crown of Spain to his nephew." On the same day he set out from Madrid under a strong French escort, and six days afterwards arrived at Bayonne. Mean-

April 26. while Murat harassed the Regency with repeated and vexatious demands, apparently prompted by no other motive than to disgust them with the cares of an unsubstantial command, and accustom the people to regard the French headquarters as the centre from which all real authority emanated. Soon after he repaired in person to the Escorial, and had long and repeated conferences with Charles IV and the old Queen. The result of their deliberations soon appeared in the transmission to Don Antonio of the antedated and secret state paper, already noticed (1), in which the King protested against his abdication as brought about by constraint and intimidation; and by the earnest advice of Murat he set out immediately after, in company with the Queen, surrounded by French guards, for Bayonne, to lay his grie-

April 30. vances at the feet of Napoléon, where he arrived four days after his fallen favourite. Thus did the French Emperor, by the influence of his name, the terrors of his armies, and the astuteness of his diplomatists, succeed in inducing the leaders of all the parties which now distracted Spain, including the late and present sovereign, to place their persons at his disposal; while, at the same time, the communications on his part which brought about this extraordinary result were managed with such address, and enveloped in such mystery, that not only could none of them boast of possessing a distinct pledge of what he intended to do, but all had reason to hope that the result would prove entirely conformable to their interests (2).

Great embarrassment experienced by Napoléon in regard to the Peninsular affairs. Meanwhile Napoléon, though possessed of such extraordinary influence, and invested with almost absolute power over the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and the interests of the crowned heads which they contained, was extremely embarrassed how to act: not that he swerved in the slightest degree from his intention of making, as he himself said, a "clean sweep of them" (*maison nette*), but that he perceived, in the brightest colours, the abyss on the edge of which he was placed, and anticipated, with just and sagacious foresight, the incalculable consequences which might result from the lighting of the flames of a national war in the Peninsula. Through all the weakness and submission of the last century, he still discerned the traces of energy and resolution in the Spanish character. The timidity of its foreign conduct, the abuses of its internal administration, he justly ascribed to the corruption of the nobles, or the imbecility of the

(1) *Ante*, vi. 267.

(2) *Tor.* i. 124, 127. *Foy*, iii. 152, 155. *Tubb.* vi. 353, 354. *Hard.* x. 142, 145.

court. His generals had transmitted daily accounts of the alarming fermentation which seemed to prevail, especially in the lower classes of the community; and he rightly concluded that he would be involved in inextricable embarrassment if, on a side where he had so long been entirely secure, there should arise a contest animated by the indignant feelings of a nation hitherto virgin to revolutionary passions. His instructions to Murat, accordingly, at this period were to conduct himself with the utmost circumspection; to avoid every thing which might excite an angry feeling, or provoke a hostile collision; to strengthen his military hold of the country; but do nothing which might disturb the pacific negotiations by which he hoped, without drawing a sword, to obtain in a few days the whole objects of his ambition (1).

Murat, however, was not a character to execute with skill the delicate mission with which he was intrusted, and he was too much accustomed to

(1) Napoleon to Murat, 29th March, 1809. Sav. iii. 168.

His admirable letter to Duke of Berg, that you are deceiving me on the real situation of Spain, and that you deceive yourself also. The events of the 19th March have singularly complicated our affairs; I am in the greatest perplexity; never suppose that you are engaged with a disarmed nation, and that you have only to show yourself, to insure the submission of Spain. The revolution of 20th March proves that they still have energy. You have to deal with a virgin people, they already have all the courage, and they will soon have all the enthusiasm, which you meet with among men who are not worn out by political passions.

March 29, 1809. "The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain; if they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they will rouse the people and induce an eternal war. At present I have many partisans among them; if I show myself as a conqueror I will soon cease to have any. The Prince of Peace is defeated, because they accuse him of having given up Spain to France, that is the cry which led to the usurpation of Ferdinand; but first, the popular party would have been the least powerful. The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities essential for the chief of a nation; that want, however, will not prevent them, in order to oppose us, from making him a hero. I have no wish to use violence towards that family; it is never expedient to render one's self odious, and inflame hatred. Spain has above one hundred thousand men in arms; less would suffice to sustain an interior war; scattered over several points, they might succeed in effecting the total overthrow of the monarchy. I have now exhibited to you the difficulties which are insurmountable; there are others which you will not fail soon to discover.

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments; she sends out forces daily, while she keeps on the coasts of Portugal and the Mediterranean; she is making enrolments of Sicilians and Portuguese. The Royal family having quitted Portugal to establish itself in the Indies, nothing but a Revolution can change the state of that country and that is the event for which, perhaps, Europe is the least prepared. The persons who see the monstrous state of the government in its true light, are a small minority; the great majority profit by its abuses. Consistently with the interests of my empire, I can do infinite good to Spain. What are the best means of attaining that object? Should I advance to Madrid and assume the rights of a protector, by declaring for the father against

the son? It is difficult to re-establish Charles IV. His rule and his favourites have become so unpopular they could not stand three months. Ferdinand, again, is the enemy of France; it is because he is so, that they have put him on the throne. To keep him there would be to promote the factions, who, for twenty-five years, have wished the subjugation of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond; the Queen Elizabeth and other princesses perished miserably when they wished to sacrifice them to atrocious vengeance. I think we should precipitate nothing, and take counsels from future events.

"I do not approve of your taking possession so precipitately as you have done of Madrid; you should have kept the army ten leagues from the capital. Your entry into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully supported Ferdinand. I will write to you what part to adopt in regard to the old King; take care you do not commit me to meet with Ferdinand in Spain, unless you deem it expedient for me to recognise him as King of Spain. Above all, take care that the Spaniards do not suspect what part I am about to adopt; you can have no difficulty in doing so, for I have not fixed on one myself.

"Impress upon the nobles and clergy, that if France is obliged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges will be respected. Say to the magistrates and citizens of towns, and to the enlightened persons, that Spain requires to re-create the machine of government; that it has need of institutions which will preserve it from the weight of feudalism, and protect and encourage industry. Point to them the present condition of France, despite the wars it has undergone: the splendour of its religion; the importance of a political regeneration; the internal security and external respect which it brings in its train. I will attend to your private interests; have no thought of them; Portugal remains at my disposal. Let the French army avoid every encounter, either with the Spanish army or detached bodies; not a cartridge should be barbed on either side. Keep the army always some days' march distant from the Spanish corps. If war break out, all is lost."—*NAPOLEON TO MURAT, 29th March, 1809; SAVARY, iii. 168, 171. History does not afford a more luminous example of sagacious foresight than this letter presents; and yet the Emperor, soon after, fell headlong into the very dangers which he here so clearly depicted, and was so desirous to avoid! It is remarkable as a proof of his profound habits of dissimulation, even with his most confidential servants, that, in his letter to his lieutenant at Madrid, he makes no mention of the design to place a relation of his own on the throne of Spain, though only three days before, he had offered it to Louis King of Holland.*—*Vide ante, vi. 269.*

Symptoms
of resistance
in Spain to
the invaders.
Arrogant
conduct of
Murat.

make every thing bend to military force, to be qualified to assume at once, in circumstances singularly difficult, the foresight and circumspection of an experienced diplomatist. His precipitance and arrogance, accordingly, accelerated the catastrophe the Emperor was so solicitous to avoid. Already an alarming explosion had taken place at Toledo: cries of "Long live Ferdinand VII" had been heard in the streets

April 22. from countless multitudes; and when General Dupont was dispatched, five days afterwards, to restore order, it was only by a well-timed and earnest mediation of the archbishop that a serious conflict was avoided. The

April 26. fermentation in the capital was hourly increasing, especially since it was known that Ferdinand had crossed the frontier to throw himself into the arms of Napoléon, and that his father and the Prince of Peace had since set out in the same direction. Though the French had hitherto observed tolerable discipline, yet the disorders inseparable from the continued passage of such large bodies of men, accustomed to the license of campaigns, had produced repeated conflicts between them and the inhabitants; blood had flowed in several places, and at Burgos the assemblage had been so alarming, that it required to be dispersed by regular platoons of the French infantry. Irritated at these symptoms of resistance, and trusting to nothing but force for its suppression, Murat wrote in the most menacing terms to Don Antonio, stating, that he could permit no concourse of men in the streets; that the

April 23. anarchy which prevailed was intolerable; that his resolution to suppress it was irrevocably taken, and that if the government was not sufficiently strong to enforce obedience to its orders, he would take upon himself to maintain the public tranquillity. The Regency issued severe proclamations

April 24. against seditious assemblages or meetings, and replied in the most submissive manner to the thundering menaces of Murat; but, though no public demonstration had yet taken place, the most alarming reports were in circulation: the French officers publicly gave out that Napoléon would reinstate Charles IV on the throne; the departure of that sovereign with the Prince of Peace, for the Pyrenees, seemed to countenance that idea (1), and reports were circulated, and greedily credited, that thirty thousand armed Biscayans had fallen on Bayonne, and rescued their beloved Prince from his oppressors, while Arragon, Catalonia, and Navarre had risen in a body to cut off the retreat of the French army.

Extreme
agitation at
Madrid on
the ap-
proaching
departure of
the rest of
the royal
family.

At length, in the beginning of May, matters came to extremities. The government were a prey to the most cruel disquietude, being left in the approaching crisis of the monarchy with the responsibility of command, and without its powers: ignorant which sovereign they were ultimately to obey: fearful of betraying their country, and equally so of precipitating it into a hopeless struggle: actuated at times by a generous desire to maintain the national independence and throw themselves on public sympathy for their support, and apprehensive at others that in so doing they might mar an accommodation when on the point of being concluded, and incur the pains of treason from a government which they had involved in irretrievable embarrassments—unable to determine on any decided course, in the midst of such unparalleled difficulties, they adopted meanwhile the prudent step of confining the troops to their barracks, and exercising the most rigid vigilance, by means of the police, to prevent the quarrels, often attended with bloodshed, which were perpetually occurring between the French soldiers and the Spanish citizens. The Imperial guard, with

(1) Thib. vi. 369, 371. Tor. i. 124, 127. Foy, iii. 159, 160. Lond. i. 71, 72.

a division of infantry and brigade of cavalry, alone were quartered in Madrid : the artillery was all in the Retiro, but large bodies of troops, amounting in all to above thirty thousand men, were in the immediate neighbourhood, ready to pour in on the first signal. The whole population of the capital was in the streets : business was every where at a stand, and in the menacing looks and smothered agitation of the groups might be seen decisive proofs that a great explosion was at hand. "*Agibatur huc illuc urbs vario turbæ fluctuantis impulsu; completis undique basilicis et templis, lugubri prospectu, neque populi neque plebis ulla vox : sed attoniti vultus, et conversæ ad omnia aures : non tumultus non quies : quale magni metus et magnæ iræ, silentium* April 29. *erat* (1)." Matters were in this combustible state when Murat demanded that the Queen of Etruria, and the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio should forthwith set out for Bayonne. The government hesitated on this demand, which was in effect delivering up the whole remainder of the Royal family into the hands of the French Emperor : Murat insisted, throwing upon them the whole responsibility of a war in case of refusal : and the Minister of War, upon being referred to, drew so gloomy a picture of the military resources of the monarchy, that resistance was deemed impossible, and this last requisition was agreed to, and the hour of their departure fixed for the following morning (2).

Commutation
and massacre
at Madrid on
2d May.

At ten o'clock on that day the Royal carriages came to the door of the palace, and preparations for the departure of the Princes took place. The Queen of Etruria, who, from her long residence in Italy, had ceased to be an object of interest to the people, set off first, and was allowed to depart without disturbance, though an immense crowd was collected, and the whole city was in violent agitation. Two other carriages remained, and it was known among the bystanders that they were to convey the Infants Don Antonio and Don Francisco : a report soon spread, that Don Francisco, who was a boy of thirteen, was weeping in the apartments above, and refused to go away : presently an aide-de-camp of Murat arrived on horseback, and, making his way through the throng, ascended the stairs of the palace ; the report instantly flew through the crowd that he was come to force the Royal youth from the palace of his fathers. Nothing more was requisite to throw the already excited multitude into a combustion : the French officer was violently assailed, and would have been dispatched on the spot, if Don Miguel Flores, an officer of the Walloon Guards, had not protected him at the hazard of his own life. Both would, however, in all probability, have fallen a sacrifice to the fury of the populace, had not a French picquet at that moment come up, which withdrew the officer in safety to his comrades. Murat instantly resolved to punish severely this insult to his authority—a detachment of foot-soldiers appeared with two pieces of cannon, and by several discharges with grape-shot, within point-blank range, easily dispersed the crowd which was collected round the palace. But the sound of that cannon resounded from one end of the Peninsula to the other ; in its ultimate effects it shook the empire of Napoléon to its foundation ; it was literally the beginning of the end. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the city was in a tumult—the Spanish vehemence was roused at once into action ; all considerations of prudence, consequences, and probabilities of success, were forgotten in the intense indignation of the moment. Every where the people flew to arms : knives, daggers, bayonets, were seized wherever they could be found ; the

(1) Tac. Hist. i. 40. April 29.

(2) Tor. i. 127, 135. Foy, iii. 159, 163. Noll. i. 49, 55. Lond. i. 72, 73. Thib. vi. 370, 372.

gunsmiths' shops ransacked for fire-arms, and all French detachments passing through the streets surrounded, and in many cases cut to pieces. Such a tumultuary effort, however, could not long prevail against the discipline and skill of regular soldiers: the Spanish troops were locked up, by orders of their government, in their barracks, and could render no assistance; and though the rapid concentration of the French, when the firing commenced, induced the people for a time to imagine that they had driven them from the capital, yet they were soon, and cruelly, undeceived. Reinforced by the numerous battalions which now poured from all quarters into the city, and supported by the artillery, which on the first alarm had been brought from the Retiro, the French returned to the charge: repeated discharges of grape cleared the streets of Alcala and San Geronimo, while the Polish lancers and Mamelukes of the Imperial Guard followed up the advantage, charged repeatedly through the flying masses, and took a bloody revenge for the death of their comrades. Meanwhile the Spanish troops, agitated by the sound of the tumult and discharges of artillery, but without any orders how to act, were uncertain what to do, when they were decided by an attack of the French on one of their barracks. Determined by this hostile act, the artillerymen drew out their guns, and placing themselves in front of the people, who had retreated to them for support, fired several rounds with fatal effect into the French columns, which were approaching. By a sudden rush, however, the guns were carried, and a great part of the artillerymen bayoneted, among whom were the brave Daoiz and Velarde: illustrious as the first distinguished men who fell in the Peninsular war (1). At two o'clock in the afternoon the insurrection was suppressed at all points, and the troops on both sides had returned to their barracks:—on the side of the French three hundred had fallen: on that of the Spaniards not quite so many.

Barbarous
massacres
subse-
quently
committed
by Murat.

Hitherto neither party could be said to have been to blame: the tumult, however deplorable in its consequences, was evidently the result of a collision unpremeditated on both sides; the measures of *Napoléon* had rendered unavoidable an ebullition of indignation on the part of the outraged Spanish nation; they had burst forth, and could not complain if they met with the usual fate or hazards of war. In repelling the violence with which they were assailed, the French had not exceeded the bounds of military duty: the Spanish Ministers, especially O'Farril and Azanga, had thrown themselves into the thickest of the tumult, and earnestly imploring a cessation of the strife, and at the hazard of their own lives, saved great numbers of both nations from destruction. Many deeds of generosity had occurred on both sides, and shed a lustre alike on the French and Spanish character. But at this juncture, after the fighting had ceased and the danger was entirely over, Murat commenced a massacre as unprovoked as it was impolitic, as unjustifiable as it was inhuman. Trusting to the amnesty which had been proclaimed by the chiefs on both sides, the Spaniards had resumed in part their ordinary occupations, or were walking about the streets discussing the events of the day, when great numbers of them were seized by the French soldiers, on the charge of having been engaged in the tumult, hurried before a military commission, and forthwith condemned to be shot. Preparations were immediately made to carry the sentence into execution: the mournful intelligence spread like wildfire through Madrid; and all who missed a relation or friend were seized with the agonizing fear that he was

among the victims of military barbarity. While the people were in this state of anxiety, and when the approach of night was beginning to increase the general consternation, the firing began, and the regular discharge of heavy platoons at the Retiro, in the Prado, the Puerto del Sol, and the church of Senora de la Soledad, told but too plainly that the work of death had begun. The dismal sounds froze every heart with horror: all that had been suffered during the heat of the conflict was as nothing compared to the agonizing feeling of that cold-blooded execution. Nor did the general grief abate when the particulars of the massacre became known: numbers had been put to death, who were merely found in the streets with a knife on their persons and had never been in the conflict at all: all were denied the consolations of religion in their last moments. Tied two by two, they were massacred by repeated discharges of musketry: the murders were continued on the following morning; and nearly a hundred had perished before, on the earnest intercession of the Spanish ministers, Murat consented to put a stop to the barbarity (1).

Extreme
indignation
which this
massacre
excited in
Spain.

This atrocious massacre was as impolitic as it was unjustifiable. The Spaniards, who took up arms with such desperate, though hopeless courage, to prevent the last remnant of their royal family from being torn away from their capital, were not the subjects of the French crown, nor could they be regarded, either legally or morally, as rebels to its authority. Deprived as they were by the frauds and artifices of the French Emperor of their lawful sovereign, with their capital in the possession of his troops, and their fortresses perfidiously seized by his directions, they had no resource but in national resistance. To treat a nation so situated, when attempting to assert its rights, like rebels against their own government, and put them to death in great numbers after the conflict was over, in cold blood, was so glaring an act of cruelty and injustice as could not fail to excite the unanimous indignation of mankind. Of all people in the world the French had the least right to object to such a popular effort in defence of the national independence, as it was founded on the principle on which their whole resistance to the coalition of the European powers against their Revolution had been founded, and which they had, on numberless occasions, held up to the admiration and imitation of mankind. The indignation, accordingly, which this massacre excited throughout Spain was indescribable. With a rapidity that never could have been anticipated, in a country where so little internal communication existed, the intelligence flew from city to city, from province to province, and awakened that universal and energetic feeling of national resentment, which, if properly directed, is a certain forerunner of great achievements. With a spirit, hitherto unknown

(1) Foy, iii. 171, 172. Thib. vi. 374, 375. Tor. i. 141, 142. Lond. i. 74. South. i. 316, 317. Nap. i. 24, 25.

"Among those who were shot were many who had never been engaged in the conflict, and whose only crime consisted in being found on the streets with large knives or cutting instruments upon their persons. They were put to death without the assistance of a priest to console their last moments—a circumstance which in that religious country added to the horror which the executions excited."
—Foy, iii. 172. The honesty and candour of General Foy are as admirable as his talent and eloquence.
"At the distance of twenty years," says an eye-witness, the Spanish historian, "our hair still stands on end at the recollection of that mournful and silent night; the calm of which was only interrupted by the cries of the unhappy victims, or the

sound of the cannon and musketry discharged at intervals for their destruction. The inhabitants all retired to their homes, deplored the cruel fate which was then befalling a parent, a brother, a child. We, in our family, were bewailing the loss of the unhappy Oviedo, whose release we had been unable to obtain, when he entered pale and trembling into the house. He had been saved by the generosity of a French officer, after his hands were bound, and he was drawn up for execution in the court of the Retiro, who was melted by the energy of his address in that awful moment to break his bonds, and set him at liberty. He was hardly out of the limits of the palace when he heard the discharges which terminated the agony of his companions in misfortune. Among the victims were many priests, old men, and persons of the most respectable character."
—TORRES, i. 142, 143.

in Europe since the commencement of the first triumph of the French revolutionary armies, the people in all the provinces, without any concert amongst each other, or any direction from the existing authorities, began to assemble and concert measures for the national defence. Far from being intimidated by the possession of their capital and principal fortresses by the enemy, they were only the more roused by the sight of such advantages in the hands of a perfidious foe, to the more vigorous exertions to dispossess him. The movement was not that of faction or party, it animated alike men of all ranks, classes, and professions. The flame spread equally in the lonely mountains as in the crowded cities; among the hardy labourers of the Basque Provinces as the light hearted peasantry of the Andalusian slopes; amidst the pastoral valleys of Asturias or the rich fields of Valencia, as in the crowded emporiums of Barcelona and Cadiz. The movement was universal, unpremeditated, simultaneous; and within a week after the untoward tidings reached Bayonne, Napoléon was already engaged in a struggle which promised to be of the most sanguinary character with the Spanish people (1).

Ferdinand
arrives at
Bayonne,
and is told
he must sur-
render the
crown of
Spain.

While the perfidious invasion of Napoléon, and the cruel massacres of Murat, were thus exciting the flames of a national war in the Peninsula, matters were fast approaching to a crisis at Bayonne. Intimidated by the violence of Murat, and no longer able to withstand the commands which he conveyed to them from his Imperial master, the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio set out, the day after the tumult at Madrid was quelled, for Bayonne, leaving the capital without any native government, entirely at the mercy of the French generals. Before they could arrive at the place of their destination, however, matters had arrived at a crisis between Napoléon and the royal family of Spain. No sooner

April 30. had Ferdinand taken the fatal step of crossing the Bidassoa, and throwing himself upon the generosity of the French Emperor, than he perceived, in the manner in which he was received, such symptoms as inspired the most serious disquietude as to his future fate. The customary marks of respect to a crowned head were wanting; the French authorities addressed him only by the title of "Your Royal Highness," instead of "Your Majesty." His first reception at Bayonne, however, was calculated to dispel these sinister presentiments. Shortly after his arrival there, the Emperor came in person on horseback, attended by a brilliant staff, to pay him a visit; Ferdinand went to the end of the street to meet him; the Emperor embraced him round the neck, and, though he never used the word Majesty, yet treated him with such distinction as inspired the most flattering hopes. On the same day he went to dine at the chateau of Marac, where the Imperial headquarters were established; Napoléon sent his own carriages to bring him and his suite to his palace, where he was received by the Emperor himself, at the foot of the staircase, a piece of attention never paid by sovereigns except to crowned heads. During the entertainment the attention of the Emperor to his guest was unbounded; and although he still eluded the decisive word "Majesty," yet his manner was such as to inspire both Ferdinand and his attendants with the belief that he was their decided friend, and that every difficulty would speedily be adjusted. But this pleasing illusion was of short duration. After sitting a short time at table, Ferdinand returned to his hotel, while Escoiquiz remained, by special desire, to have a private conference with Napoléon. A few minutes after he arrived there, the Spanish King was followed by Savary, who announced, on the part of the Emperor, that his resolution was irre-

vocably taken, that Ferdinand must instantly resign the throne both of Spain and of the Indies, in both of which the family of the Bourbons was to be succeeded by a prince of the Napoléon dynasty. Should he agree amicably to these conditions, hopes were held out that he might obtain the Grand Duchy of Tuscany as an indemnity. It is remarkable that Napoléon should have chosen for the time of this stunning announcement the very moment when Ferdinand had returned from his gracious reception at the Imperial residence; and for the person to convey it the very officer who had been dispatched by himself to Madrid to induce him to advance to Bayonne to meet him, and who had offered to pledge his head, not five days before, that the moment he arrived there the Prince of Asturias would be recognised as King of Spain (1).

Subsequent
negotiation
between his
counsellors
and Napoléon.

This terrible announcement fell with the more force upon Ferdinand and his counsellors, that they were entirely unprepared for it; the assurances held out by Savary and the letters of Napoléon having inspired them with the belief, that all that was wanting to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs was, that Ferdinand should show so much deference to Napoléon as to proceed to Bayonne to meet him. Neither the prince nor his council, however, were overwhelmed by the extraordinary disclosure. Without absolutely committing themselves at first to any decided proposition, they continued the negotiation for nearly a week afterwards, both by means of Cevallos and Escoiquiz, who had frequent interviews with Napoléon in person, and Champagny, who had now succeeded Talleyrand as his minister for Foreign Affairs. These conferences, however, came to nothing. On the part of Napoléon and his Ministers it was strongly urged that the interest, not merely of France, but of Spain, imperatively required that the two monarchies should be placed under dynasties belonging to the same family; that Napoléon could not submit any more than Louis XIV to have a dubious ally or hidden enemy in his rear while engaged with the forces of Europe in front; that the secret hostility of Spain had been clearly evinced by the ill-timed proclamation of the Prince of Peace immediately before the battle of Jena; that the numberless corruptions and abuses of the Spanish internal administration loudly called for an immediate remedy, and that could never be applied with safety by any other authority but that great conqueror who, educated amidst the storms and enlightened by the experience of the Revolution, was now the master of such irresistible power as to be able to give to other states the benefits of liberal institutions suited to the spirit of the age, without the risk of those convulsions which had obliterated so many of their beneficial effects in his own country. It was replied to these specious arguments, which came with additional weight from the mouth of the Emperor, by Cevallos and Escoiquiz, that it was as impolitic as unjust to compel a sovereign who had left his own dominions to throw himself upon the honour of another, and that too at the special request of that other, to renounce the throne which had descended to him from his ancestors; that if any thing was deemed illegal in the resignation of Charles IV at Aranjuez, that might be a good reason for restoring the throne to the deposed monarch, but could be none for transferring it to the French Emperor; that the effort, however, now made to obtain a renunciation of the crown from Ferdinand evidently showed that the transaction was regarded as legal, and that the title to dispose of the crown was vested in its present holder; that the expedience of a close alliance

(1) Cev. 33, 37. Escoiq. 56, 60. Tor. i. 146, 147. Thib. vi. 356, 357. Foy, iii. 151, 152. South. i. 260, 262.

between France and Spain was indeed indisputable for both monarchies, but that France had already enjoyed it ever since the peace of Basle, and the way to secure it in future was instantly to recognise the Prince of Asturias, whereby both the monarch and his subjects would be bound by such important obligations as would render the future union between the two monarchies indissoluble; whereas, by wresting from him his sceptre, the most imminent risk would be run of exciting a national war in the Peninsula, and giving the English an advantageous base from which to direct their military efforts against Napoléon, besides the certainty of separating the Transatlantic colonies from the mother country, and throwing those vast and rising states, with their important treasures and commerce, into the arms of the inveterate enemy of the French empire. To this last argument, the justice of which could not be denied, Napoléon replied, that he was well aware of that danger, but that he had provided against it by having sent out frigates to the South American states, who were prepared to receive with thankfulness their transfer to a Prince of the Napoléon dynasty. These conferences, as might have been expected, led to no result; at a secret meeting of the counsellors of Ferdinand, April 24.

held at midnight, it was resolved to decline the propositions of the French Emperor, and demand passports for their immediate return to Spain, which was accordingly done next day. Napoléon was highly indignant at this resistance to his wishes, and refused the passports, under the pretence that till the Aranjuez affair was cleared up he could neither issue passports to Ferdinand as King of Spain, nor permit him to depart from a situation where he was liable to answer for his conduct to his justly offended parent. At the April 26. same time a decisive report was presented by Champagny to the Emperor, which was, of course, the echo merely of his private instructions. This state paper set out with his favourite maxim, that "*what state policy required, justice authorized;*" that the interests of France and Spain indispensably called for identity both in the dynasty who governed, and the institutions which prevailed among them; that to recognise the Prince of Asturias was to surrender Spain to the enemies of France, and deliver it over to English usurpation; to restore Charles IV was to renew the reign of imbecility and corruption, and occasion a boundless effusion both of French and Spanish blood; no alternative remained, therefore, but for Napoléon to dispossess them both, and establish in Spain a Prince of his own family, with institutions analogous to those of the French empire (1).

Napoléon was greatly perplexed at the steady refusal of Ferdinand to surrender the throne. He had not calculated upon such firmness in any Prince of the House of Bourbon. Not that he had the slightest hesitation of persisting in his original plan of entirely dethroning that family, but that he attached the greatest weight to the acquisition of a legal title to their possessions. No man knew better that, although force may subjugate the physical strength, a sense of legal right is generally necessary to win the moral consent of nations; and although Spain seemed prostrated with its fortresses and capital in his possession, yet he deemed his acquisitions insecure till he had obtained, in form at least, the consent of the legal inheritors of its throne. Hoping, therefore, to succeed better with the father than he had done with the son, he reiterated his directions to Murat to send on Charles IV and the Queen to Bayonne as quickly as possible; and in the mean while, in private conferences with Escoiquiz, unfolded, with

Napoléon sends for Charles IV and has a private conference with Escoiquiz.

unreserved confidence, from the very commencement, his views upon the Spanish Peninsula. They took their rise, he stated, from the proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the eve of the battle of Jena. Ever since that important revelation, he had been able to see nothing in the Spanish government but secret enemies veiled under the mask of friendship; the proposed marriage of the Prince of Asturias to a relation of his own appeared but a feeble bond to hold together nations now actuated by hostile sentiments; he proposed to give to the Prince of Asturias an indemnity in Portugal or Tuscany, and to place one of his brothers on the Spanish throne. He had now divulged to him, and him alone, the whole of his designs in regard to the Peninsula. The conversation in which the determinations were expressed by the Emperor is given at full length by Escoiquiz, and is one of the most precious historical documents of his reign (1). Though doubtless extended and amplified by the Spanish counsellor, it bears all the marks of his original thought; and Thibeaudeau, whom long acquaintance with the Emperor in the Council of State had rendered the best possible judge both of his ideas and expressions, has declared that it "bears the signal mark of truth (2)."

(1) Thib. vi. 357, 358. Tor. i. 448, 449 Escoiq. 57, 59.

Its most striking passages. (2) "I have long desired, Monsieur Escoiquiz," said the Emperor, "to speak to you on the affairs of the Peninsula, with the frankness which your talents and your office with the Prince of Asturias deserve. I cannot, in any situation, refuse to interest myself in the fate of the unhappy King who has thrown himself on my protection. The abdication of Charles IV at Aranjuez, in the midst of seditious guards and a revolted people, was clearly a compulsory act. My troops were then in Spain; some of them were stationed near the court; appearances authorized the belief that I had some share in that act of violence, and my honour requires that I should take immediate steps to dissipate such a suspicion. I cannot recognise, therefore, the abdication of Charles IV till that monarch, who has transmitted to me a secret protest against it, shall have voluntarily confirmed it by a voluntary deed when freed from restraint.

"I would say further, that the interests of my empire require that the House of Bourbon, the implacable enemy of mine, should lose the throne of Spain, and the interests of your nation equally call for the same change. The new dynasty which I shall introduce will give it a good constitution, and by its strict alliance with France preserve Spain from any danger on the side of that power, which is alone in a situation seriously to menace its independence. Charles IV is willing to cede to me his rights, and those of his family, persuaded that his sons, the Infants, are incapable of governing the kingdom in the difficult times which are evidently approaching.

"These then are the reasons which have decided me to prevent the dynasty of the Bourbons from reigning any longer in Spain. But I esteem Ferdinand, who has come with so much loyalty to throw himself into my power, and I am anxious to give him some indemnity for the sacrifices which he will be required to make. Propose to him, therefore, to renounce the crown of Spain for himself and his descendants, and I will give him in exchange Etruria, with the title of king, as well as my niece in marriage. If he refuses these conditions, I will come to an understanding with his father, and neither he nor his brother shall receive any indemnity. If, on the other hand, he does what I desire, Spain shall preserve its independence, its laws, usages, and religion. I do not desire a village of Spain for myself."

Escoiquiz then endeavoured in vain to combat the Emperor's reasons for holding the matter at Aranjuez as constrained. He then added, "but suppose it were not so, can you deny that the interests of my house require that the Bourbons should cease to reign in Spain? Even if you are right in all that you say, I should answer—bad policy." Having said these words, he took Escoiquiz by the ear, which he pulled in good humour. "Come, Canon, you are amusing me with real *châtons* in *Espagne*. Do you really think that while the Bourbons remain on the throne at Madrid, I could ever have the security which I would have, if they were replaced by a branch of my family? The latter, it is true, might have some disputes with me or my descendants; but so far from wishing, like a Bourbon, the ruin of my house, they would cling to it in moments of danger, as the only support of their own throne.

"It is in vain to speak to me of the difficulties of the enterprise. I have nothing to apprehend from the only power who could disquiet me in it. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my designs at Tilsit, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would offer no resistance. The other powers of Europe will remain quiet, and the resistance of the Spaniards themselves cannot be formidable. The rich will endeavour to appease the people, instead of exhorting them, for fear of losing their own possessions. I will render the monks responsible for any disorder, and that will lead them to supply their indifference, which you know is considerable, in suppressing any popular movements. Believe me Canon, I have much experience in these matters: the countries where the monks are numerous, are easily subjugated; and that will take place in Spain, especially when the Spaniards shall see that I am providing for the national independence and benefit of the country, giving them a liberal constitution, and at the same time maintaining their religion and usages. Even if the people were to rise in a mass, I would succeed in conquering them, by sacrificing 200,000 men. I am not blind to the risk of a separation of the colonies; but do not suppose I have been slumbering even on that point. I have long kept up secret communications with Spanish America, and I have lately sent frigates there to obtain certain advices as to what I may expect; and I have every reason to believe that the intelligence which I will receive, will prove of the most favourable description."—Escoiquiz, 107, 135; *Pieces just.*

The arrival
of Charles
IV solves
the diffi-
culty. His
reception by
Napoléon.
April 25.

From this embarrassment, however, Napoléon was soon relieved by the arrival of Charles IV and the Queen at Bayonne. Such was the impatience of the Royal travellers to arrive at the place of their destination, that they wrote from Aranda to Napoléon to inform him of their approach, and testify their anxiety to throw themselves entirely upon his protection. So sensible were the counsellors of Ferdinand of the advantage which the French Emperor would derive from the presence of the late monarch, that they were no sooner informed of his approach than they again earnestly solicited passports for Ferdinand to return to Spain, which was refused; and it was soon apparent, from the movements

April 29.

of the police, that he was detained a prisoner in his own hotel. On the 29th there appeared in the Bayonne Gazette the protest of Charles IV against his abdication, and his letter of 23d March to Napoléon: publications which sufficiently evinced the tenor of the reception which he was to experience.

April 30.

On the following day the late King and Queen entered Bayonne; ever since passing Burgos they had been received with royal honours; at the Bidassoa they were received by Berthier with great pomp; and at the gates of Bayonne by the whole garrison under arms. Soon after their arrival at the hotel, Napoléon came to visit them in person. The old King met him at the foot of the stair, and threw himself into his arms; Napoléon whispered in his ear, "you will find me always as you have done, *your best and firmest friend*." Napoléon supported him under the arm as he returned to the apartments. "See, Louisa," said the old King, "he is carrying me." Never had the Emperor's manner appeared more gracious; never did he more completely impose, by the apparent sincerity of his kindness, upon the future victims of his perfidy (1).

Ferdinand
is forced to
reign the
crown.

Immediately after the arrival of Charles IV Napoléon had a private conference with him, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, in which it was resolved, by the united authority of the Emperor and old King, to compel Ferdinand to resign the throne. He rightly judged that, having once overcome that difficulty, it would be a comparatively easy matter to extract the resignation of the crown from the old King when reinstated

April 30.

in his rights. Ferdinand accordingly was sent for next day, and the moment he came into the room, Charles IV commanded him to deliver to him, before six o'clock on the following morning, a simple and unqualified resignation of the crown, signed by himself and all his brothers. In case of refusal, it was distinctly intimated that he and all his counsellors would be proceeded against as traitors. Napoléon strongly supported the old King, and concluded with ominous menaces in the event of refusal. Ferdinand endeavoured to speak in his own defence, but he was interrupted by the King, who commanded him to be silent, and the Queen soon after broke into the apartment, with such violent and passionate expressions, that Ferdinand found it impossible to make a word be heard. He retired from the conference overwhelmed with consternation and despair. Similar threats of instant death were conveyed on the same evening by Duroc to the Infants Don Carlos and Don Antonio; and such was the impression produced by these menaces, that it was determined by the counsellors of Ferdinand that no al-

May 1.

ternative remained but immediate submission. A conditional resignation was accordingly written out and signed by them all on the following day, in which Ferdinand renounced the crown, on condition that he and his father should both return to Madrid, where the Cortes should be assem-

bled; and that if Charles declined to return to Spain to govern himself, he should govern the kingdom in his father's name and as his lieutenant (1).

Ferdinand still refuses to agree to an unconditional resignation.

This qualified resignation, however, in which the Prince of Asturias still announced his intention of returning to Madrid as his father's lieutenant, and resuming there, in his name, the royal functions, was far from meeting the views of Napoléon, who was irrevocably set upon obtaining from the young King such an unconditional surrender of his rights as might leave the throne vacant for a Prince of his own family. He wrote, therefore, a letter, which was signed by Charles IV and passed for his own production, though the depth of its thought and the energy of its expression clearly indicated the Imperial hand (2). Ferdinand, however, was still unmoved, and replied, two days afterwards, in a letter, in which he vindicated his own conduct, and expressed his astonishment at the colour now put upon the Aranjuez resignation, which had not only been uniformly represented by Charles IV as a voluntary act, but avowedly contemplated for a long time before it took place (3). This continued refusal on Ferdinand's part added extremely to the embarrassments of Napoléon, and he was at a loss to perceive any mode by which he could attain his favourite object of gaining possession of the throne of Spain, with the semblance of a conveyance from the legal owner (4).

Napoléon obtains an unconditional surrender of the throne from Charles IV.

May 5.

More successful with the father than the son, Napoléon had already obtained from Charles IV an unqualified resignation of all his rights to the throne of Spain. A treaty to this effect, agreed to on the 4th and signed on the 5th of May, by Duroc on the part of Napoléon, and the Prince of Peace, in virtue of special powers from their respective masters, contained an unqualified resignation of the crown of Spain, not only for himself and Ferdinand, but all his successors, and a transference of it in absolute sovereignty to the Emperor Napoléon. The only provisions in favour of Spain were, that the integrity of the kingdom should be

(1) *Cev.* 50, 51. *Escoiq.* 64, 65. *Tor.* i. 151, 152. *Thib.* vi. 365, 367.

His letter to (2) "What has been your conduct?" his son.

The old King was made to say; "you have spread sedition through my whole palace; you have excited my very body-guards against me; your own father became your prisoner; my first Minister, whom I had raised and adopted into my own family, was dragged, covered with blood, into a dungeon; you have withered my grey hairs and despoiled them of a crown borne with glory by my fathers, and which I have preserved without stain; you have seated yourself on my throne; you have made yourself the instrument of the mob of Madrid, whom your partisans had excited, and of the foreign troops, who at the same moment were making their entry. Old, and broken down with infirmities, I was unable to bear this new disgrace; I had recourse to the Emperor, not as a King at the head of his troops and surrounded by the pomp of a throne, but as a fugitive abandoned monarch, broken down by misfortune. I have found protection and refuge in the midst of his camp; I owe him my own life, that of the Queen, and that of my prime Minister; he is acquainted with all the outrages I have experienced, all the violence I have undergone; he has declared to me that he will never recognise you as King. In tearing from me the crown, it is your own which you have broken; your conduct towards me, your letters, which evince your hatred towards France, have put a wall of brass between you and the throne of Spain. I am King by right of descent, my abdication was the result of force and violence. I can admit the validity of no acts resulting from the as-

sembly of armed mobs; every thing should be done for the people, nothing by them. Hitherto I have reigned for the people's good, hereafter I shall still act with the same object; when I am once assured that the religion of Spain, its independence, integrity, and institutions are secured, I shall descend to the grave, imploring pardon for you for 'the bitterness of my last days.' I can agree to no assembly of the Cortes; that is a new idea of the inexperienced persons who surround you."—*Letter, CHARLES IV to FERDINAND, 2d May, 1808.*

Unquestionably it was neither Charles IV nor the Prince of Peace who penned these vigorous lines. It is curious to observe the sentiment, "every thing for the people, nothing by them," in the mouth of the military champion of the Revolution.

(3) Ferdinand in this letter made the just observation, "that the perpetual exclusion of his dynasty from the throne of Spain could not be effected without the consent of all those who either had or might acquire rights to its succession, nor without the formal consent of the Spanish nation assembled in Cortes, in a situation freed from all restraint, and that any resignation now made would be null, from the obvious restraint under which it was executed."—*FERDINAND to CHARLES IV, 4th May, 1808; TORRENO, vol. i. App. No. 9.* Already the opposing parties had changed sides; Napoléon, the hero of the Revolution, would consent to no assembling of the Cortes; Ferdinand, the heir of the despotic house of Bourbon, appealed for support to that national assembly.

(4) *Tor.* i. 152, 153. *Thib.* vi. 365, 369. *Cev.* 50, 51. *Escoiq.* 64, 65.

preserved; that its limits should be unchanged by the Prince whom Napoléon might place on the throne; that the Catholic religion should be maintained, and no reformed religion tolerated—the palace of Compeigne was to be assigned to the King, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, during the lifetime of the former, with a pension of thirty millions of reals. At the same time an annuity of 400,000 francs was provided for each of the royal infants of Spain. The only point in this treaty upon which there was any serious discussion was the matter of the pensions; the surrender of the monarchy was agreed to without hesitation by the imbecile old King and his pusillanimous Minister. Thus had Charles IV the disgrace of terminating his domestic dissensions by the surrender of his throne and the liberties of his people into the hands of a stranger; and the Prince of Peace the infamy of affixing his name, as the last act of his ministerial existence, to a deed which deprived his sovereign and benefactor of his crown, and for ever disinherited his descendants (1).

Secret instructions of Ferdinand to the regency at Madrid. On the same day on which this treaty was signed, a secret deputation reached Ferdinand from the provisional government at Madrid, consisting of Layas, aide-de-camp to the Minister of War, and Castro, Under Secretary of State. They came to demand instructions chiefly on the points—whether they were at liberty to shift their place of deliberation, as they were subjected to the control of the French army in the capital; whether they should declare war against France, and endeavour to prevent the further entrance of troops into the Peninsula; and whether, in the event of his return being prevented, they should assemble the Cortes. Ferdinand replied, that he was deprived of his liberty, and in consequence unable to take any steps in order to save either himself or the monarchy; that he therefore authorized the junta of government to add new members to their number, to remove whoever they thought proper, and to exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that they should stop the entrance of fresh troops, and commence hostilities the moment that he was removed into the interior of France, a step to which he never would consent till forced to it by violence; that the Cortes should be convoked, in the first instance, to take measures for the defence of the kingdom, and then for such ulterior objects as might require consideration. The decrees necessary to carry these instructions into effect were soon after brought to Madrid by an officer destined for distinguished celebrity in future times, DON JOSEPH PALAFOX (2).

The intelligence of the events at Madrid on 2d May compels a resignation of the throne from Ferdinand. From the embarrassment arising from the continued resistance of Ferdinand to make the resignation required of him, Napoléon was at length relieved by the receipt of intelligence of the bloody commotion at Madrid, which at once brought to a crisis the affairs of the Peninsula. He received the news of that calamitous event as he was riding out to Bayonne, at five o'clock in the afternoon of

(1) Tor. i. 404. App. No. 11. Cev. 134, 136.

Charles IV was not destitute of good qualities, but he was a weak incapable Prince, totally unfit to hold the reins of power during the difficult times which followed the French Revolution. He himself gave the following account to Napoléon of his mode of life at their first dinner together at Bayonne. "Every day," said he, "winter as well as summer, I went out to shoot from the morning till noon; I then dined, and returned to the chase, which I continued till sunset. Manuel Godoy then gave me a brief account of what was going on, and I went to bed to recommence the same life on the morrow, if not prevented by some important solemnity." Such had been his habits for twenty years, and those, too, the most critical for the Spanish monarchy. Notwithstanding all this, however, he would have

passed for a respectable prince in ordinary times, and but for the pernicious influence of his wife; for he was gifted with an admirable memory, and quick parts, and considerable powers of occasional application, and had throughout that humanity and love of justice which are the most valuable qualities in a sovereign. But his indolence and negligence of public affairs ruined every thing in the monarchy, by throwing the whole direction of affairs into the hands of the Queen and the Prince of Peace, whose infamous connexion, dissolute habits, and unbounded corruption, both degraded the character and paralysed the resources of the nation.—TOMASSO, i. 155, 156.

(2) Thib. vi. 377, 378. South. i. 322, 323. Cev. 56, 58. Tor. i. 152, 153.

the 5th of May, and immediately returned to his chateau, where he sent for Charles IV, the Queen, Ferdinand, and the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Asturias was assailed by Charles IV and the Queen with such a torrent of abuse, that Cevallos, who was present on the occasion, has declared that he cannot prevail on himself to transcribe it. Napoléon joined in the general vituperation, and the sternness of his manner, and vehemence of his expressions, at once showed that the period had now arrived when submission had become a matter of necessity. He spoke of the outraged honour of the French armies; of the blood of his soldiers, which called aloud for vengeance; of a war of extermination, which he would wage to vindicate his authority (1). He concluded with the ominous words,—“Prince, you must choose betwixt cession and death.” Similar menaces were conveyed by Duroc to the Infants Carlos and Don Antonio, and other members of the royal family. Sensible now that any farther resistance might not only, without any benefit, endanger his own life, but possibly draw after it the destruction of the Royal family,

May 6. Ferdinand resolved upon submission. On the following morning,

May 10. he addressed a letter to his father, in which he announced his intention of unqualified obedience; and four days afterwards a treaty was signed, by which he adhered to the resignation by his father of the Spanish crown, and acquired in return the title of Most Serene Highness, with the palace, park, and farms of Navarre, with fifty thousand arpents of woods connected therewith, and an annuity of 600,000 francs a-year, from the French Treasury. The same rank, with an annuity of 400,000 francs, was allotted to

May 12. the Infants Don Carlos and Antonio. As soon as this treaty was signed, Ferdinand and his brothers were removed to Bourdeaux, where these two princes signed a renunciation of their rights to the throne, and Ferdinand was made to affix his name to a proclamation, in which he counselled submission and peace to the Spanish people. The three royal captives were shortly after, removed to Valençay, the seat of Talleyrand, in the heart of France, where they continued during the remainder of the war. No indemnity whatever was provided for the Queen of Etruria or her son, who, compelled by Napoléon in the outset of these transactions to renounce the crown of Tuscany, had been subsequently amused by the elusory promise of a throne in Lusitania, and was now sent a destitute captive into the interior of France (2).

Napoléon makes Joseph King of Spain, and convokes an Assembly of Notables.

Having now succeeded in his main object of dispossessing the Bourbon family, and obtaining a semblance of legal title from the ejected owners to the Spanish throne, Napoléon was not long of bringing his other arrangements regarding the Peninsula to an issue. The refusal of his brother Louis to accept the throne had

(1) Napoléon on this occasion made it a special subject of reproach to Ferdinand, “that by flattering the opinion of the multitude, and forgetting the sacred respect due to authority, he had lighted the conflagration now ready to devour the Peninsula.” —Foy, iii. 177.

(2) Cev. 51, 52, 133, 140. Escoiq. 64, 65. Thib. vi. 380, 384. Tor. i. 156, 157, 159. Foy, iii. 177.

Napoléon's own account of the Bayonne affair is in all substantial points the same as that above given. “Ferdinand offered, on his own account, to govern entirely at my devotion, as much so as the Prince of Peace had done in the name of Charles IV; and I must admit that if I had fallen into their views, I would have acted much more prudently than I have actually done. When I had them all assembled at Bayonne, I found myself in command of

much more than I could have ventured to hope for, the same occurred there, as in many other events of my life, which have been ascribed to my policy; but in fact were owing to my good fortune. Here I found the Gordian knot before me; I cut it, I proposed to Charles IV and the Queen that they should cede to me their rights to the throne. They at once agreed to it, I had almost said voluntarily; so deeply were their hearts ulcerated towards their son, and so desirous had they and their favourite now become of security and repose. The Prince of Asturias did not make any extraordinary resistance: neither violence nor menaces were employed against him; and if fear decided him, which I well believe was the case, it concerns him alone.” —Las Casas, iv. 216, 217.

induced him to cast his eyes to Joseph, King of Naples, an arrangement which, besides providing a sovereign, who, it was hoped, would prove entirely submissive to the views of the Emperor in that important situation, was attended with the additional advantage of opening a throne for Murat, who, after holding the almost regal state of Lieutenant of the Emperor at Madrid, could hardly be expected to descend to any inferior station. To preserve appearances, however, it was deemed advisable that the semblance of popular elec-

tion should be kept up; and with that view, the moment that the Emperor had obtained the consent of Ferdinand to his resignation, he dispatched instructions to Murat, to obtain a petition from the junta of government and the principal public bodies of Madrid for the conferring of the

throne upon the King of Naples. At the same time, to supply any interim defects of title which might be thought to exist in the Emperor's Lieutenant to act in Spain in civil concerns, a decree was signed by Charles IV on the very day of his renunciation, and transmitted to Madrid, where it ar-

rived three days afterwards, which conferred on Murat the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom with the presidency of the junta of government, which in effect put that important body, now reduced merely to the official ministers, entirely at his disposal. This nomination was accompanied by a proclamation of the old King, drawn by Godoy, in which he counselled his former subjects, "that they had no chance of safety or prosperity for the Spaniards, but in the friendship of the Emperor his ally." This was followed by another, the work of Escoiquiz, from the Prince of Asturias,

from Bourdeaux on the 12th; in which he also advised his countrymen "to remain tranquil, and to look for their happiness only in the wise disposition and power of Napoléon." It may easily be believed how readily Murat exerted himself, to pave the way for that elevation of Joseph which promised so immediately to promote his own advantage. The most energetic measures were immediately adopted to obtain at Madrid declarations in favour of the new dynasty: and the leading authorities, perplexed and bewildered at the unparalleled situation in which they were placed, and the earnest exhortation to submission which they received from their lawful sovereign, were without difficulty won over to the interest of the rising

dynasty. The Junta of government, indeed, at first protested against the abdication at Bayonne, and refused to connect themselves in any way with these proceedings: but they were soon given to understand that their lives would be endangered if they continued to uphold the rebel authority of the Prince of Asturias, and at the same time the most flattering prospects were held out to them if they took the lead in recognising the new and inevitable order of things. These artifices proved successful, and the Junta, satisfied with protesting that they in no way recognised the acts of Charles IV

and Ferdinand, and that the designation of a new monarch should in no ways prejudice their rights or those of their successors, concluded with the resolution that the Emperor's choice should fall on his elder brother the King of Naples. The municipality of Madrid also presented a petition to

the same effect; and Napoléon, satisfied with having thus obtained the colour of public consent to his usurpation, issued a proclamation convoking an assembly of one hundred and fifty Notables to meet at Bayonne on

the 15th June following. Joseph, who had no choice but submission, quitted with regret the peaceful and smiling shores of Campania (1), set

out for his new kingdom, and arrived at Bayonne on the 6th June, where he was magnificently received by Napoléon, and on the same day proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies (1).

Reflections
on the un-
paralleled
chain of
fraud and
perfidy by
which this
was accom-
plished.

Such is a detailed account of the artifices by which Napoléon succeeded in wresting the crowns of Spain and Portugal from their lawful possessors, and placing the first on the head of one of his own brothers, while the second remained at his disposal for the gratification of one of his military lieutenants. Not a shot was fired, not a sword was drawn to effect the vast transfer; the object for which Louis XIV unsuccessfully struggled during fourteen years was gained in six months; present fraud, the terrors of past victory, had done the work of years of conquest. But these extraordinary successes were stained by as great vices; and perhaps in the whole annals of the world, blackened as they are by deeds of wickedness, there is not to be found a more atrocious system of perfidy, fraud, and dissimulation than that by which Napoléon won the kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula. He first marched off the flower of its troops into the north of Germany, and by professions of amity and friendship lulled asleep any hostile suspicions which the cabinet of Madrid might have conceived; and then entered into an agreement with Alexander for the dethronement of its sovereigns, and bought the consent of Russia to that spoliation of the faithful allies of ten years' duration, by surrendering to its ambition the more recent confederates which he had roused into hostility on the banks of the Danube, during the desperate struggle of the last six months. He then concluded a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, in which he purchased the consent of that power to the partition of his ally Portugal, by promising to the court of Madrid a share of its spoils, and to its minister a princely sovereignty carved out of its dominions; and in return for this forbearance solemnly guaranteed all its possessions. Hardly was the ink of this treaty dry, when he directed his armies across the Pyrenees in such force as to evince an intention not merely of appropriating to himself the whole dominions of his old tributary dependent Portugal, but of seizing upon at least the northern provinces of Spain, while the remaining forces of that monarchy were dissipated in the south and north of Portugal in search of elusory acquisitions at the expense of the cabinet of Lisbon. The sentence, at the same time, goes forth at the Tuileries, "the house of Braganza has ceased to reign," and the Royal family at Lisbon are driven into exile to Brazil; while the Queen of Etruria is obliged to resign the throne of Tuscany, on a promise of an indemnity on the northern provinces of Portugal. Scarcely, however, is the resignation elicited under this promise obtained, when that promise, too, is broken; the dispossessed Queen,

Napoléon's
proclamation
to the
Spaniards
25th May.

(1) On this occasion the Emperor addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish people:—"Spaniards! After a long agony, your nation was on the point of perishing: I saw your miseries, and hastened to apply a remedy. Your grandeur, your power, form an integral part of my own. Your princes have ceded to me their rights to the crown of Spain. I have no wish to reign over your provinces, but I am desirous of acquiring eternal titles to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old; my mission is to pour into its veins the blood of youth. I will ameliorate all your institutions, and make you enjoy, if you second my efforts, the blessings of reform, without its collisions, its disorders, its convulsions. I have convoked a general assembly of deputations of

your provinces and cities; I am desirous of ascertaining your wants by personal intercourse; I will then lay aside all the titles I have acquired, and place your glorious crown on the head of my second self, after having secured for you a constitution which may establish the sacred and salutary authority of the sovereign, with the liberties and privileges of the people. Spaniards! Reflect on what your fathers were; on what you now are! The task does not lie in you, but in the constitution by which you have been governed. Conceive the most ardent hopes and confidence in the results of your present situation, for I wish that your latest posterity should preserve the recollection of me and say—be our regenerator of our country."—*THERRASMAN*, vi. 389, 391.

albeit a creation of Napoléon's own, is deprived of her indemnity; the stipulated principality in favour of the Prince of Peace is cast to the winds; and orders were issued to Junot to administer the government of the whole of Portugal in name of the Emperor Napoléon.

His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish Princess.

Meanwhile, the French armies rapidly inundate the northern provinces of the Peninsula; the frontier fortresses are seized, in the midst of profound peace, by a power in alliance with Spain, and which, only four months before, had formally guaranteed the integrity of its dominions; a hundred thousand men overspread the provinces to the north of the Ebro, and approach the capital. These disastrous events excite the public indignation against the ruling monarch and his unworthy favourite; they are overthrown by an urban insurrection, and the Prince of Asturias, by universal consent, is called to the throne. No sooner is he apprised of this event, than Napoléon dispatches Savary to induce the new King to come to Bayonne, under a solemn assurance, both verbally and in writing, that he would at once recognise him, if the affair at Aranjuez was explained; and that in a few minutes every thing would be satisfactorily adjusted. Agitated between terror and hope, Ferdinand, in an evil hour, and when his capital is occupied by French troops, consents to a step which he had scarcely the means of avoiding, and throws himself on the honour of the French monarch, Napoléon, in the interim, sends for Charles IV and the Prince of Peace, and between the terror of his authority and the seductions of his promises, contrives to assemble all the royal family of Spain with their confidential counsellors at Bayonne. No sooner are they arrived than he receives and entertains them in the most hospitable manner, and when they are beginning to indulge the hopes which such flattering conduct was fitted to inspire, suddenly salutes them with the announcement that the House of Bourbon has ceased to reign, and closes this matchless scene of duplicity, fraud, and violence, by extorting, by means of persuasion, menaces, and intimidation, a resignation of the throne from both the father and son, whom he had so recently solemnly bound himself to maintain in their possession! To crown the whole, while alluring, like the serpent, his victims into his power, he is secretly offering their dominions to one of his brothers after another; he is, underground, holding out promises of support both to the old and the new King of Spain, and he has all the while irrevocably resolved upon the dethronement of both, and the supplanting of the House of Bourbon by that of Bonaparte in both the thrones of the Peninsula. He concludes by sending Charles IV and Ferdinand with all their family into state captivity in the interior of France; discarding Godoy without his stipulated principality; cheating the Queen of Etruria out of her promised indemnity; disinheriting at once the regal families of Spain, Portugal, and Etruria, and placing his own brother on the throne of the Peninsula, in virtue of a determination formed, by his own admission, ever since the treaty of Tilsit!

Ultimate consequences of this perfidious conduct to Napoléon and his house.

Was, then, such atrocious conduct as successful in the end as it was in the commencement? and did the dynasty of Napoléon reap in its final results benefits or injury from acquisitions obtained by so black a course of perfidy? Let the answer be given in his own words—"It was that unhappy war in Spain which ruined me.

The results have irrevocably proved that I was in the wrong. There were serious faults in the execution. One of the greatest was that of having attached so much importance to the dethronement of the Bourbons. Charles IV was worn out; I might have given a liberal constitution to the Spanish nation, and charged Ferdinand with its execution. If he put it in force in good faith,

Spain would have prospered, and put itself in harmony with our new institutions; if he failed in the performance of his engagements, he would have met with his dismissal from the Spaniards themselves. You are about to undertake, said Escoiquiz to me, one of the labours of Hercules, where, if you please, nothing but child's play is to be encountered. The unfortunate war in Spain proved a real wound, *the first cause of the misfortunes of France*. If I could have foreseen that that affair would have caused me so much vexation and chagrin, I would never have engaged in it. *But after the first steps taken in the affair, it was impossible for me to recede*. When I saw those imbecilles quarreling and trying to dethrone each other, I thought I might as well take advantage of it to dispossess an inimical family; but I was not the contriver of their disputes. Had I known at the first that the transaction would have given me so much trouble, I would never have attempted it (1)."

The fact thus admitted by Napoléon, and clearly proved by his history, that the Spanish war was the principal cause of his ruin, is one of the most luminous examples which the annals of the world exhibit, of the subjection of human affairs to the direction of an overruling power, which makes the passions and vices of men the instruments of their own punishment. So far as mere worldly policy was concerned, and on the supposition that there were no moral feelings in mankind—feelings which cannot for a length of time be outraged with impunity—there can be no doubt that he judged wisely in attempting, by any means, the extension of his dynasty over the Peninsula. The reasons of state policy which rendered it essential for Louis XIV to face the strength of banded Europe to maintain the family compact in the Peninsula, were still more forcibly applicable to Napoléon, as his dynasty was a revolutionary one, and could not hope to obtain lasting support but from sovereigns who rested on a similar foundation. How then did it happen that a step recommended by so clear a principle of expedience, and attended by the most unhopd-for success in the first instance, should ultimately have been attended with such disaster?—Simply because it was throughout based on injustice; because it violated the moral feelings of

(1) Las Cas. iv. 204, 205. O'Meara, ii. 167.

The assertion here made, and which was frequently repeated by Napoléon, that he was not the author of the family disputes between Charles IV and Ferdinand, but merely stepped in to dispossess them both, was perfectly well founded, and is quite consistent with all the facts stated in the preceding deduction. It is evident also, that such was the fascination produced by his power and talents, that no difficulty was experienced in getting the Royal family of Spain to throw themselves into his hands; nay, that there was rather a race between the father and son which should first arrive at his headquarters to state their case favourably to that supreme arbiter of their fate. That Savary was sent to Madrid and again back to Vittoria to induce Ferdinand to come to Bayonne, was admitted by himself, [De Pradt, 73.] but he evidently had little difficulty in accomplishing his task. But the real reproach against Napoléon, and from which he has never attempted to exculpate himself, is having first agreed with Alexander at Tilisit to dispossess the House of Braganza and Bourbon; then, to lull asleep the latter power, signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, which guaranteed its dominions; then perfidiously seized its fortresses without a shadow of pretext; and finally taken advantage of the family discussions to attract both the old King and his son to Bayonne, where they were compelled to abdicate.

Long as the preceding narrative of the causes which led to the Peninsular war has proved, it will not by the intelligent reader be deemed misapplied, when the vital importance of the facts it contains, both to the issue of the contest and the character of Napoléon is taken into view, the more especially as it has hitherto not met with the attention it deserves from English historians. Colonel Napier, in particular, dismisses the whole subject in a few pages; and blames Napoléon, not for attacking Spain, but chiefly, if not entirely, for not attacking it in the interests of democracy. "There are many reasons," says this energetic and eloquent writer, "why Napoléon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. His great error was, that he looked only to the Court, and treated the people with contempt. Had he taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first, instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator of a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people."—NAPIER, i. 22, 23. In every and fire of military description and ability of scientific disquisition, the gallant colonel is above all praise; but he is far from being equally safe as a guide to political events, or as a judge of the measures of government.

mankind, outraged their national attachments, and roused all classes by the overbearing excitement of the generous emotions into an unreflecting, it may almost be said an instinctive, resistance. In the final success of that resistance, in the memorable retribution which it at last brought on the principal actors in the drama which began with such apparently undeserved success, is to be discerned the clearest proof of the manner in which Providence works out the moral government of the world, and renders the guilt and long-continued success of the wicked, the instruments of their own ultimate and well-deserved punishment. When the Spaniards beheld Napoléon sending their princes into captivity and wresting from them their crown, from themselves their independence; when they saw Murat in triumph drowning the Madrid insurrection in blood, and securely massacring her gallant citizens after the fight was over, they sank and wept in silence, and possibly doubted the reality of the Divine superintendence of human affairs, when such crimes were permitted to bring nothing but increase of power and authority to their perpetrators. But mark the end of these things, and the consequences of these atrocities upon their authors by a series of causes and effects, every one of which now stands forth shining in imperishable light! Napoléon, who then sent an unoffending race of monarchs into captivity, was himself, by its results, driven into a lasting and melancholy exile. France, which then lent its aid to a perfidious and unjust invasion, was itself, from its effects, subjected to a severe and galling subjugation: Murat, who then with impunity massacred the innocent by the mockery of military trial, signed, in the order for their condemnation, the warrant for his own dethronement and execution not seven years afterwards!

The passions of this Revolution the real causes of the miseries both of Europe and France.

In authorizing or committing these enormous state crimes, Napoléon and France were in truth acting in conformity to that moral law of the universe, which dooms outrageous vice, whether in nations or individuals, to prepare, in the efforts which it makes for its present gratification or advancement, the means of its ultimate punishment. Napoléon constantly said, and said truly, that he was not to be blamed for the wars which he undertook; that he was driven on by necessity; that he was always placed in the alternative of farther triumphs or immediate ruin; that he was in truth the head of a military republic, which would admit no pause to its dictator in the career of victory (1). There is no one who attentively considers his career, but must admit the justice of these observations, and absolve him individually, in consequence, from much of that obloquy which the spectacle of the dreadful and desolating wars in which he was so powerful an agent, has naturally produced among mankind. But that just indignation at the profuse and unprofitable effusion of blood, which has been erroneously directed by a large and influential class in France to the single head of Napoléon, should not on that account be supposed to be ill-founded;

(1) "Throughout my whole reign," said Napoléon, "I was the keystone of an edifice entirely new, and resting on the most slender foundations. Its duration depended on the issue of each of my battles. If I had been conquered at Marengo, the disastrous times of 1814 and 1815 would immediately have come on. It was the same at Austerlitz, Jena, and other fields. The vulgar accuse my ambition of all these wars; but they, in truth, arose from the nature of things, and that constant struggle of the past and the present, which placed me continually in the alternative of conquering, under pain of being beaten down. I was never, in truth, master of my own

movements; I was never at my own disposal. At the commencement of my elevation, during the Consulate, my partisans frequently asked me, with the best intentions, whither I was tending, and I constantly answered with perfect sincerity, I did not know. They were astonished, but I said no more than the simple truth. My ambition, I admit, was great, but it was of a frigid nature, and caused by the opinion of the masses. During all my reign, the supreme direction of affairs really lay with the people; in fact, the Imperial Government was a kind of Republic."—*Las Casas*, vi. 41; vii. 125; *O'Meara*, i. 405.

the feeling is just, the object only of it is mistaken ; its true object is that selfish spirit of revolutionary aggrandizement, which merely changed its direction, not its character, under the military dictatorship of the French Emperor : which hesitates at no crimes, pauses at no consequences ; which, unsatiated by the blood and suffering which it had produced in its own country, sought abroad, under his triumphant banners, the means of still greater gratification ; and never ceased to urge on its remorseless career, till the world was filled with its devastation, and the unanimous indignation of mankind was aroused for its punishment.

CHAPTER L.

CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

ARGUMENT.

Memorable Events, of which the Spanish Peninsula has been the theatre—Singular and uniform Character of their Guerilla Warfare—Physical Conformation of the Country which has led to these results—Great Mountain Ranges of Spain and Portugal—Extraordinary Resolution with which, in every age, the Spaniards have defended their cities—Peculiarities in the Civil History of the Peninsula, which have so long rendered its people a divided community—Effect of these circumstances in promoting the means of internal and separate defence—Corruption of the Nobility, and extent to which Entails were carried—State of the Peasantry, statistical Details on that subject—The Church—its Usefulness, Character, and Sway over the People—and great influence on the Spanish contest—Spain was still unexhausted by revolutionary passion—Composition and Character of the French Army at this period—its Discipline, Equipment, and Efficiency—and Numbers—Force and Character of the British army—the amount of its various branches—admirable Spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the People—Character and Qualities of the British Soldiers—important Effect of their Officers being exclusively taken from the higher ranks—severe Discipline and Corporal Punishments which still subsisted—General Foy's graphic contrast of the English and French Soldiers—and of the Officers of their respective armies—Difficulty of keeping any considerable force together in the Interior of the Peninsula—Military Force of Spain at the commencement of the contest—Military Force and Physical Character of Portugal—Amount, Quality, and Disposition of the French Army at this period in Spain—Progress and early Forces of the Spanish Insurrection—frightful Disorders which signalized its commencement in some cities—cruel Massacre with which the Revolution in Valencia began—prudent Measures adopted by the Nobles at Seville—Proceedings of its Junta—Proclamation which it issued against Napoleon—wise Instructions to their Troops—Capture of the French Fleet at Cadiz—Insurrections in Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia, and Arragon—Measures of Napoleon in regard to the Insurrection—Proceedings of the Notables assembled at Bayonne—Proclamation of the Grandees of Spain to their countrymen—Degrading Letter of Escalquiviz and the counsellors of Ferdinand to King Joseph—Constitution of Bayonne given by Napoleon to the Spaniards—Proceedings of Napoleon, Joseph, and the Junta of Notables at Bayonne—Ministry of Joseph—his Journey to, and Arrival and Reception at Madrid—honourable instances of resistance to the general torrent of adulation among the Grandees in his favour—memorable Answer of the Bishop of Orense to his summons to Bayonne—universal Joy with which the news of the Insurrection is received in England—Noble Speech of Mr. Sheridan on the Spanish War in Parliament—Answer of Mr. Canning—Reflections on this debate—English Budget of 1808—Immense Succours sent out to the patriots of the Peninsula by the British Government—Napoleon's first Orders for the suppression of the Insurrection—Success of Bessières over Cuesta in Leon and in Biscay—Operations of Lefebvre in Arragon—First Siege of Saragossa—its failure—Expedition of Moncey against Valencia—its failure—Progress of the Insurrection, and partial Successes of the Patriots in that quarter—Operations of Bessières against Cuesta and Blake—Battle of Rio-Secco and defeat of the Spaniards—March of Dupont into Andalusia, and his early Successes there—Accumulation of Forces around the invaders under Castanos—Battle of Baylen and Surrender of Dupont—its prodigious Results both in Spain and over Europe—Shameful Violation of the capitulation by the Spaniards—Departure of Joseph from Madrid, and concentration of the French troops behind the Ebro—Campaign in Catalonia and siege of Gerona—entry of the Spanish troops into the Capital—Universal Transports in the Peninsula—Affairs of Portugal—Commencement of the Insurrection, and disarming of the Spanish troops there—The English Cabinet resolves on sending succours to that Kingdom—Sir Arthur Wellesley takes the command of the Expedition, and arrives off Mondego Bay—Landing of the British troops, and combat of Rolica—Relative forces on both sides—Battle of Vimiero—Sir A. Wellesley's intentions for following up his success are frustrated by the arrival of Sir H. Burrard and Sir H. Dalrymple, who supersede him in the command—Convention of Cintra—its Expediency at that juncture—views with which it was regarded in France by Napoleon—Senseless Clamour in England on the subject leads to a Court of Enquiry—Its result—Disgraceful revelations which are made at Lisbon of the plunder by all ranks in the French army—British troops advance into Spain under Sir John Moore—Deep Impression which these events make

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Memorable events, of which the Spanish peninsula has been the theatre.

THE Spanish peninsula, in which a frightful war was now commencing, and where the armies of France and England at last found a permanent theatre of combat, has been distinguished from the earliest times by memorable achievements, and is illustrated by the exploits of the greatest captains who have ever left the impress of their actions on the course of human events. The mighty genius of Hannibal there began its career, and under the walls of Saguntum gave the earliest token of that vast capacity which was soon to shake to its foundation the enduring fabric of Roman power; Scipio Africanus here first revived the almost desperate fortunes of the republic, and matured those talents which were destined on a distant shore to overthrow the fortunes of the inveterate enemy of his country; the talents of Pompey, the genius of Cæsar, were exerted on its plains—a severer struggle than that of Pharsalia awaited the founder of the empire on the shores of the Ebro; the desperate contest between Christianity and Mahomedanism raged for centuries amidst its mountains, and from their rocks the wave of Mussulman conquest was first permanently repelled. Nor has the Peninsula been the theatre in modern times of less memorable exploits: the standards of Charlemagne have waved in its passes; the bugles of Roncesvalles have resounded through the world; the chivalry of the Black Prince, the skill of Gonzalvo of Cordova, have been displayed in its defence; the genius of Napoléon, the firmness of Wellington, have been exerted on its plains; and, like their great predecessors in the wars of Rome and Carthage, these two illustrious chiefs rolled the chariot of victory over its surface, and missing each other, severally conquered every other opponent till their mutual renown filled the world, and Europe, in breathless suspense, awaited their conflict on the shore of a distant land.

Uniform and singular character of their Guerrilla warfare. From the earliest times, the inhabitants of the Peninsula have been distinguished by a peculiarity of military character and mode of conducting war which is very remarkable. Inferior to many other nations in the firmness and discipline with which they withstand the shock of battle, they are superior to them all in the readiness with which they rally after defeat, and the invincible tenacity with which they maintain a contest under circumstances of disaster, when any other people would succumb in despair. In vain are their armies defeated and dispersed, are

their fortresses taken, their plains overrun, their capital subdued; singly or in small bodies they renew the conflict; they rally and reunite as rapidly as they disperse; the numerous mountain chains which intersect their country, afford a refuge for their broken bands; their cities make a desperate though insulated defence; and from the wreck of all regular or organized opposition, emerges the redoubtable GUERRILLA warfare. "Proelio victi Carthaginienses," says Livy, "in ultimam Hispaniæ oram, ad oceanum, compulsi erant; disparem autem, quod Hispania, non quam Italia modo, sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat, locorum, hominumque ingeniis. Gens nata instaurandis, reparandisque bellis, brevi replevit exercitum animosque ad tentandum de integro certamen fecit (1)." It is a singular fact, strikingly illustrative of the durable influence of common descent and physical circumstances on national character through all the varieties of time, religion, and political condition, that the system of warfare, thus deemed peculiar to Spain, of all nations in the world, in the days of Scipio and Sertorius, has continued to distinguish its inhabitants, without any interruption, to the present time; that it was pursued without intermission for eight hundred years in their wars with the Moors, formed the leading characteristic of the struggle with Napoléon, and continues at this hour to be the leading feature of the savage contest between the aristocratic and democratic parties which has for so many years bathed the Peninsula in blood.

Physical configuration of the country which has led to these effects. Durable characteristics of this kind attaching for ages to a nation, though its inhabitants have in the course of them become the mixed progeny of many different races of mankind, will invariably be found to arise from some peculiarity in its physical circumstances, which has imprinted a lasting impress on all its successive inhabitants. This is in an especial manner the case with Spain and Portugal. Their territory differs in many important particulars from any in Europe. Physically considered, it belongs as much to Africa as Europe: the same burning sun parches the mountains and dries up the valleys of both; no forests clothe their sides; naked they present their arid fronts to the shivering blasts of the north, and the scorching rays of a tropical sun. Vegetation in general spreads in proportion only as irrigation can be obtained; aided by that powerful auxiliary, the steepest mountain sides of Catalonia and Arragon are cut into terraces and clothed with the most luxuriant vegetation: without it, vast plains in Léon and the Castiles are almost entirely destitute both of cultivation and inhabitants. So extensive in consequence are the desert tracts of Spain, that the country, viewed from the summit of any of the numerous mountain ridges with which its inland provinces are intersected, in general exhibits only a confused group of barren elevated plains and lofty naked peaks, intersected here and there by a few glittering streams flowing in deep valleys, on the margins of which alone are to be seen crops and flocks and the traces of human habitation. The whole country may be considered as a vast mountainous promontory, which stretches from the Pyrenees to the southward, between the Atlantic and Mediterranean sea. On the shores of the ridge to the east and west are plains of admirable fertility, which, at no distant period, have been submerged by the waves of the sea; but in the interior an elevated assemblage of mountain ridges and lofty desert plains is to be found, in the centre of which Madrid is placed, in an upland basin, at a height of eighteen hundred feet above the level of the sea. The great rivers in consequence flow for the most part to the east and west in long courses, and are fed by tribu-

tary streams which meander at the bottom of ravines of surprising depth, shut in often by precipitous banks or very steep declivities. Three great chaussees only, viz. those leading from Madrid to Bayonne by the Somo-Sierra pass, that to Valencia, and to Barcelona, intersect this great desert central region; in every other quarter the roads are little better than mountain paths, uniting together towns built for the most part on the summit of hills, surrounded by walls environed by superb olive woods, but having little intercourse either with each other or the rest of Europe (1).

Great
mountain
ranges of
Spain and
Portugal.

It may readily be imagined what extraordinary advantages a country of such natural strength and character must afford to insulated and defensive warfare. In almost every quarter it is intersected by long, rocky, and almost inaccessible mountain chains, which form a barrier between province and province, almost as complete, not merely to hostile armies, but even the inhabitants of the country, as that interposed by the Alps or the Pyrenees. Branching out from the great chain which separates France from Spain, one vast mountain ridge runs to the westward, forming in its course the Alpine nests and inaccessible retreats of Asturias and Galicia; while another, stretching to the eastward, covers with its various ramifications nearly the whole of Catalonia, and encloses in its bosom the admirable industry and persevering efforts of its hardy cultivators. In the interior of the ridges which descend from the crest of the Pyrenees to the long vale of the Ebro, are formed the beautiful and umbrageous valleys of Navarre and Biscay, where, in mountain fastnesses and amidst chestnut forests, liberty has for six hundred years diffused its blessings, and the prodigy has been exhibited of independent privileges and democratic equality having been preserved untouched, with all their attendant security and general comfort, amidst an otherwise despotic monarchy. Beyond the Ebro, one great mountain range, stretching across from the frontiers of Catalonia to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, forms the almost impassable barrier between the valleys of the Tagus and the Douro, and the provinces of old and new Castile, Leon, and Estremadura: its western extremity has been immortalized in history; it contains the ridge of Busaco, and terminates in the rocks of Torres-Vedras. Another, taking its rise from the high grounds which form the western limit of the plain of Valencia, extends in a south-westerly direction to Cape St.-Vincent in the south of Portugal, and separates in its course the outlines of the Tagus and the Guadiana; a third, also reaching in the same direction across the whole country, forms the boundary between the valleys of the Guadiana and the Guadalquivir, under the name of the Sierra-Morena, divides the province of new Castile from that of Andalusia, and has been immortalized by the wanderings of the hero of Cervantes; while a fourth, detached by itself in the southern extremity of the Peninsula, forms the romantic mountains of Ronda, whose summits, wrapped in perpetual snow, withstand the genial sun which ripens oranges and citrons and all the productions of Africa on their sides. Two great and rich alluvial plains alone are to be found in Spain, the character of whose inhabitants differs from that of all the rest of the peninsula: in the first of which, amidst water-melons, luxuriant harvests, and all the richest gifts of nature, the castanets and evening dances of the Valencians recall the unforeseeing gaiety of tropical regions; while in the second, the indolent habits, fiery character, and impetuous disposition of the Andalusian, attest, amidst myrtle thickets,

(1) Suchet's Mem. i. 42, 49. Nap. i. 52, 53. Laborde's Spain, i. 100, 109. Introd.

the perfume of orange groves, and the charms of a delicious climate, the undecaying influence of Moorish blood and Arabian descent (1).

Spain has never been remarkable for the number or opulence of its towns; Madrid, Cadiz, Valencia, Barcelona, and Bilboa, the largest of which, after the capital, does not contain above eighty thousand inhabitants, alone deserve the name of cities (2). But it has in every age been distinguished beyond any other country recorded in history, by the unconquerable resolution with which their inhabitants have defended their walls, even under circumstances when more prudent courage would have abandoned the contest in despair. The heart of every classical scholar has thrilled at the fate of Numantia, Saguntum, and Astapa, whose heroic defenders preferred perishing with their wives and children in the flames to surrendering to the hated dominion of the stranger, and the same character has descended to their descendants in modern times (3). With invincible resolution Barcelona held out for its rights and privileges, after Europe had adjusted its strife at Utrecht, and England with perfidious policy had abandoned her Peninsular allies to the arms of their enemies; the double siege of Saragossa, the heroic defence of Gerona, the obstinate stand at Roses, have put the warriors of northern Europe to the blush for the facility with which they surrendered fortresses to the invader, incomparably stronger and better provided with arms and garrison; while Cadiz alone of all European towns successfully resisted the utmost efforts of the spoiler, and after a fruitless siege of two years, saw the arms even of Napoleon roll back.

The peculiar political constitution of the Spanish monarchy, and the revolutions which its inhabitants have undergone in the course of ages, have been as favourable to the maintenance of a defensive and isolated internal, as they were prejudicial to the prosecution of a vigorous external warfare by its government. Formed by the amalgamation at various times of many different nations of separate descent, habits, and religion, it has never yet attained the vigour and unity of a homogeneous monarchy. Its inhabitants are severed from each other, not only by desert ridges or rocky sierras, but by original separation of race and inveterate present animosity. The descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Spanish soil are there mingled with the children of the Goth, the Vandal, and the Roman; with the faithlessness of Moorish or the fire of Arabian descent. These different and hostile races have never thoroughly amalgamated with each other; for many centuries they maintained separate and independent governments, and kept up prolonged and bloody warfare with each other; and when at length they all yielded to the arms and fortune of Ferdinand and Isabella, the central government neither acquired the popular infusion, nor the inherent energy, which is necessary to mould out of such discordant materials a vigorous state. The example of Great Britain, where the various and hostile races of the Britons, the Saxons, the Danes, Scots, and Normans have been at length blended into one united and powerful mon-

(1) Malle-Brun, *Art. Espagne*. Humboldt, *Géog. de l'Espagne*, in Laborde, i. 170, 175. Lord Caermarvon's *Spain*, ii. 234, 370.

(2) Madrid contained, in 1808, 190,000 inhabitants.—*Edin. Gazetteer, Art. Madrid*.

(3) Locum in foro destinant, quo pretiosissima rerum suarum congererent, super eum cumulum, conjuges ac liberos considere quum jussissent, ligna circa extruant, fascisque virgultorum conjiciunt. Fodior alia in urbe trucidatio erat, quum turbam

feminarum puerorumque imbollem iacremque eiros sui caderent, et in succensum rogam seminima pleraque injicerent corpora, rivique sanguinis flammam orientem restinguereant; postremo ipsi, corde miseranda suorum fatigati, cum armis medio se incendio iniecerant.—*Liv. xxviii c. 22, 23*. Numantia and Saguntum have become household words over the world, but the heroism of Astapa here narrated, has not received the fame it deserves.

archy, proves that such an amalgamation is possible; that of Ireland, where the Saxon and the Gael are still in fierce and ruinous hostility with each other, that it is one of the most difficult of political problems. Without the freedom of the English constitution, which unites them by the powerful bond of experienced benefits and participated power, or the crushing vigour of the Russian despotism, which holds them close in the bands of rising conquest, it is hardly possible to give to such a mixed race the vigour of homogeneous descent. In Spain this had never been attempted; the Arragonese were jealous of the Catalonians; the Castilians despised the Valencians; the Galicians even were at variance with the Asturians; and the freeborn mountaineers of Navarre and Biscay had their local antipathies; while all the inhabitants of the north regarded as an inferior race the natives of Granada and Andalusia, where Moorish conquest had degraded the character, and Moorish blood contaminated the descent of the people; and where, amidst orange groves, evening serenades, bewitching forms, the whole manly virtues were thought to be fast wearing out under the enervating influence of an African sun.

But while these circumstances were destructive to the external vigour and consideration of the Spanish monarchy, they were, of all others, those best calculated to enable its inhabitants, when deprived of their central government and left to their own guidance, to oppose a formidable resistance to the invader. When deprived of the directions of their sovereign, the provinces of Spain did not feel themselves powerless, nor did they lose hope because it was abandoned by those who were their natural protectors. Society, when resolved into its pristine elements, still found wherewithal to combat; the provinces, when loosened or severed from each other, separately maintained the contest. Electing juntas of government, and enrolling forces on their own account, they looked as little beyond their own limits as the Swiss peasants in former times did beyond the mountain ridges which formed the barriers of their happy valleys. If this singular oblivion of external events and concentration of all their energies on local concerns was destructive in the end to any combined plan of operations, and effectually prevented the national strength from being hurled, in organized and concentrated masses, against the enemy, it was eminently favourable, in the first instance, to the efforts of tumultuary resistance, and led to the assumption of arms, and the continuance of the conflict under circumstances when a well-informed central government would probably have resigned it in despair. Defeats in one quarter did not lead to submission in another; the occupation of the capital, the fortresses, the military lines of communication, was not decisive of the fate of the country; as many victories required to be gained as there were cities to be captured, or provinces subdued, and like the Anglo-Saxons, in the days of the English heptarchy, they fought resolutely in their separate districts, and rose up again in arms when the invader had passed on to fresh theatres of conquest.

Corruption of the nobility, and extent to which entails were carried.

The nobility in Spain, as in all countries where civilisation and wealth have long existed, and the salutary check of popular control has not developed their energy and restrained their corruption, were sunk in the lowest state of selfish degradation. Assembled for the most part in the capital, devoted to the frivolities of fashion or the vices of a court; taught to look for the means of elevation, not in the energy of a virtuous, but the intrigues of a corrupted life, they were alike unfit for civil or military exertion, and alone of all the nation, must, with a few brilliant exceptions, be considered as strangers to the glories of the Peninsular

war. Not more than three or four of the higher grandees were in the army when the war broke out in 1808; and the inferior noblesse, almost all destitute alike of education, vigour, or active habits, took hardly any share in its prosecution. The original evil of entails had spread to a greater extent, and produced more pernicious consequences, in Spain than in any other country of Europe; a few great families engrossed more than half the landed property of the kingdom, which was effectually tied up from alienation, and of course remained in a very indifferent state of cultivation; while the domains of the cities, or corporate bodies, held in mortmain, were so extensive, and for the most part uncultivated, that a large proportion of the arable land in the kingdom was in a state of nature (1).

Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, the elements of great political activity and energetic national conduct existed in the Peninsula. The peasantry were every where an athletic, sober, enduring race; hardy from exercise, abstemious from habit, capable of undergoing incredible fatigue, and of subsisting on fare which to an Englishman would appear absolute starvation. The officers in the Spanish armies during the war, drawn from the ill-educated urban classes, were, for the most part, a most conceited, ignorant, and inefficient body; but the men were almost always excellent, and possessed, not only the moral spirit, but the physical qualities calculated to become the basis of an admirable army. Colonel Napier has recorded his opinion that the Catalonian miquelets or smugglers formed the finest materials for light troops in the world, and the Valencian and Andalusian levies presented a physical appearance greatly exceeding that of both the French and English regular armies. The cause of this remarkable peculiarity is to be found in the independent spirit and general well-being of the peasantry. Notwithstanding all the internal defects of their government and institutions, the shepherds and cultivators of the soil enjoyed a most remarkable degree of prosperity; their dress, their houses, their habits of life, demonstrated the long-established comfort which had for ages prevailed among them; vast tracts, particularly in the mountainous regions of the north, were the property of the cultivators, a state of things of all others the most favourable to social happiness, when accompanied with a tolerable degree of mildness in the practical administration of government; and even in those districts where they were merely tenants of the nobility, the cities, or the church, their condition demonstrated that they were permitted to retain an ample share of the fruits of their toil (2).

(1) Foy, iii. 151, 152. Jovellanos, 164. Laborde, i. 197, 212.

(2) Lord Caermarvon's Spain, ii. 235, 260. Burgoyne's Espagne, i. 267; ii. 384.

Statistical The general comfort of the Spanish details on peasantry, especially in the northern that subject. and mountainous provinces, is easily explained by the number of them who were owners of the soil, coupled with the vigour and efficacy of the provincial immunities and privileges which, in Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Provinces, Asturias, Aragon, and Galicia, effectually restrained the power of the executive, and gave to the inhabitants

of those districts the practical enjoyment of almost complete personal freedom. So extensive were their privileges, so little did government venture to disregard them, that in many cases they were to be rather considered as democratic commonwealths, inserted into that extraordinary assemblage of separate states which formed the Spanish monarchy, than subjects of a despotic government. The classification of the population was as follows, which speaks volumes as to the condition of the people, and the causes of their prolonged resistance to the French invasion :—

Total inhabitants	10,409,879
— of whom were Families engaged in agriculture.	872,000
— Owners of the soil they cultivated.	360,000
— Farmers holding under landlords.	502,000
— Ecclesiastical proprietors.	6 216
— Mendicant friars.	43,149
— Cities, towns, and villages.	25,463
— of whom are free cities or boroughs.	12,071
— — subject to a feudal superior.	9,466
— — to an ecclesiastical superior.	3,926

— See HALLAM, x. 173, 174.

The church.
Its usefulness,
character, and
influence on
the people.

But the peasantry, hardy and undaunted as they were, would have been unable to have combined in any effective league for their common defence, destitute as they, for the most part, were of any support from their natural leaders the owners of the soil, if it had not been for the weight and influence of a body which, in every age, has borne a leading part in the contests of the Peninsula. This was the Church, the lasting and inveterate enemy in every country of revolutionary innovation. The ecclesiastics in Spain were very numerous, amounting, according to the census taken in 1787, to 22,480 parish priests, and 47,710 regular clergy belonging to monasteries or other public religious establishments (1). The influence of this great body was immense. Independent of their spiritual ascendancy in a country more strongly attached than any in Europe to the Romish church, they possessed, as temporal proprietors, an unbounded sway over their flocks. As in all other countries, it had long been felt that the church was the best and most indulgent landlord; the ecclesiastical estates, which were very numerous and extensive, were much better cultivated in general than any in the hands of lay proprietors; and the tenantry held their possessions under them for such moderate rents, and by so secure a tenure, that they had long enjoyed almost the advantages and consideration of actual landholders. Nor was this all; the charity and beneficence of the monks had set on foot, in every part of the country, extensive institutions, through which, more than any others by which they could be affected, the distresses of the poor had been relieved. They partook in a great degree of the character of the *hospice*, particularly in the northern provinces. To the peasant they often served as banking establishments, where none other existed in the province, and as such essentially contributed to agricultural improvement. The friars acted as schoolmasters, advocates, physicians, and apothecaries. Besides feeding and clothing the poor, and visiting the sick, they afforded spiritual consolation. They were considerate landlords and indulgent masters; peace-makers in domestic broils, a prop of support in family misfortune; they provided periodical amusements and festivities for the peasants; advanced them funds if assailed with misfortune; furnished them with seed if their harvest had failed. Most of the convents had *fundaciones* or endowments for professors who taught rhetoric and philosophy, besides keeping schools open for the use of the poor; they also supplied parochial ministers when wanted, and their preachers were considered the best in Spain. Superficial or freethinking travellers, observing that the aged, the sick, and the destitute were always to be found in numbers round the convent gates, supposed that they created the suffering which they were so instrumental in relieving, and in consequence that the church was chargeable with the augmentation of pauperism; forgetting that the poor ever will be assembled together round those establishments where their sufferings are relieved; and that to represent such beneficent institutions as the cause of this distress, is just as absurd as it would be to decry fever hospitals, because their wards are generally filled with typhus patients, or poor laws in Ireland, because a large proportion of its two millions of present destitute inhabitants will hereafter infallibly be found in the neighbourhood of the workhouses where parochial relief is about to be dealt out (2).

Its great
influence in
the Spanish
contest.

It is observed with surprise by General Fox, that in every age the king, the church; and the people have combined together in Spain: an alliance utterly inexplicable on the principles of the

(1) Laborde, iv. 194.

(2) Walton's *Revolutions of Spain*, ii. 374. 375.

French revolutionary school, but susceptible of an easy solution when the benefits which the ecclesiastical bodies conferred both on the crown, in standing between it and the encroachments of the nobility, and the peasantry, in averting from them the evils of poverty, are taken into consideration. The whole course of events during the Peninsular war demonstrated that this influence was established on the most durable foundations; every where the parish priests were the chief promoters of the insurrection; it was their powerful voice which roused the people to resistance; and many of the most renowned leaders of the desultory bands who maintained the contest when the regular forces were destroyed, came from the ecclesiastical ranks. The clergy, both regular and parochial, early perceived the total destruction of their interests which would ensue from the triumph of the French invasion; they recollected the decrees of the Convention against the clergy, and the horrors of the war in la Vendée; and though Napoléon had to a certain extent restored the altar, yet they were well aware that even his powerful hand had been able to do this only in a very ineffectual manner; that religion was tolerated in France, not re-established; and that the indigent curés, who drew a wretched pittance yearly from the public treasury to the north of the Pyrenees, were very different, both in consideration and influence, from the dignified clergy in possession of their own estates, who formerly constituted so important a part of the French monarchy. It was this body, possessed of such influence, and animated with such feelings, who in Spain proved the real leaders of the people; who, in the absence of the government, the nobility, and the army, boldly threw themselves into the breach; and organizing out of the strength and affections of the peasantry the means of prolonged resistance, rendered the Peninsula the charnel-house of the French armies, and the grave of revolutionary power.

Spain was still unexhausted by revolutionary passions. Most of all, Spain was still a virgin soil. Her people were not exhausted by revolutionary passions; they had not learned by bitter experience the vanity of all attempts to regenerate mankind by any other means than the improvement of their moral and religious principles. Though the monarchy was grey in years, the nobility corrupt or selfish, the government feeble and incapable, the nation as a whole was still untainted; the debility of the Bourbon reign had passed over the state without either weakening the force of popular passion, or destroying the fountains of public virtue. The peasants in the mountains, the shepherds in the plains, still inherited, in unmixed descent, the blood of the Cid and Pelajo; still were animated by the spirit which sustained the conflict of seven centuries with the Moorish invader. They were free from that last and worst cause of national corruption, which springs from the people having been themselves admitted to a share of power, participating in its passions, feeling its sweets, profiting by its corruptions; they were exempt from that despair and apathy which results from the experienced impossibility, by changing the class which governs, of eradicating either the vices of the governors, or the sufferings of the governed. Hence an intermixture in the Peninsular revolutionary war of passions the most opposite, and usually ranged in fierce hostility against each other; and hence the long duration and unexampled obstinacy with which it was conducted. While the rural population, at the voice of their pastors, every where took up arms, and rushed with inconsiderate zeal into the conflict, to combat under the banners of the cross for their salvation; the indolent urban multitudes were roused not less by temporal ambition, to league their forces under the national colours; the dissolution of government, the resolution of society into its pristine elements, had

generally thrown political power and the immediate direction of affairs into their hands; revolutionary passion, democratic ambition, were called into activity by the very necessity which had every where thrown the people upon their own resources; the provincial juntas, chosen in the chief towns, soon became so many centres of revolutionary action and popular intrigue; and thus the two most powerful passions which can agitate the human heart, religious enthusiasm and democratic ambition, usually seen in opposite ranks, and destined to fierce collision in that very realm in future times, were for a season, by the pressure of common danger, brought to unite cordially with each other.

Composition
and character
of the
French
army at this
period.

Such was the country which thereafter became the grand theatre of the contest between France and England; and such the eminently favourable battle-field which the unbounded ambition of the French Emperor at length afforded to the British arms. They now descended to the conflict on the *popular* side; they went forth to combat, not merely for the real interests, but the present desires of the people. The forces, indeed, which the contending parties could bring into this great arena were, to appearance at least, very unequal; and even the most sanguine could not contemplate without alarm the enormous preponderance which weighed down the scale on the side of the Emperor Napoléon. He had six hundred thousand French soldiers, including seventy thousand horse, and at least a hundred and fifty thousand of the allied states at his disposal; but the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least part of its formidable character (1). It was the quality, experience, and spirit of his soldiers, which was the real source of their strength. They stood forth to the conflict, strong in the experience of fifteen years of warfare, terrible from the recollection of a hundred victories. The halo of glory which surrounded, the *prestige* of victory which preceded them, was more difficult to withstand than either the charges of their cuirassiers or the ravages of their artillery. It fascinated and subdued the minds of men; spread universally that belief of their invincibility which was the surest means of realizing it; paralysed alike the statesman who arrayed nations, and the generals who marshalled armies, for the combat; and spread even in the bravest hearts the dispiriting belief that the contest was hopeless, and that to sink honourably was all that remained to gallant soldiers. This feeling especially prevailed at this juncture, after the hopes of Europe, strongly elevated by the strife of Eylau, had been dashed to the earth by the wreck of Friedland, and the reserve of Christendom, on whom so many eyes had been turned in breathless anxiety (2), had abandoned the conflict as one apparently striving against the decrees of fate.

Their discipline,
equipment,
and efficiency.

Nor was the actual efficiency of this immense army inferior to its imaginative terrors. Though the wars of Germany and Poland had made frightful chasms in the ranks of the veteran soldiers, yet the officers and non-commissioned officers, the bones and sinews of the army, possessed the immense advantage of tried merit and long experience. Such had been the consumption of human life during the late campaigns, that every

And numbers.

(1) The numbers were as follows, all paid by the French government.

Besides the forces of the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Naples, Holland, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, at least 150,000 disposable more.—See For, I. 52. 83.

Infantry of the line.	380,000
Cavalry.	70,000
Swiss, Germans, Hanoverians, and Irish, in French pay.	32,000
Artillery and engineers.	46,000
Gendarmerie, coast guards, veterans.	22,000

(2) For, I. 52. 53.

conscript who survived a few years was sure of becoming an officer : and while this certainty of promotion to the few survivors kept alive the military spirit of the whole population, it ensured for the direction of the army the inappreciable basis of tried valour and experienced skill. Every military man knows, that if the officers and non-commissioned officers are experienced and brave, it is no difficult matter, even out of the most unpromising materials, to form an effective army; the examples of the Portuguese and Hindoos, under British, and the northern Italians, under French officers, were not required to establish a fact illustrated by the experience of every age from the days of the Romans. This advantage appeared not merely in the field of battle; desperate valour, fortunate accident, can sometimes there supply the wants of experience and organization; but in the long run, in undergoing the fatigues of a campaign, in discharging its multifarious duties, and facing its varied difficulties, the superiority of veteran armies, or even new levies incorporated with a veteran frame, soon becomes conspicuous. The Spaniards never were a match for the French, either in the field or the conduct of a campaign; and although the native courage of the English, even in the outset, uniformly gave them the advantage in pitched battles, yet it was long before they became at all equal to their opponents in the general conduct of a campaign. In marching, throwing up fieldworks, enduring famine, conducting sieges, cooking their victuals, procuring provisions, preserving their spirit during retreat, and abstaining when necessary from intoxication, the English soldiers were for long and painfully inferior to their enemies; and it augments our admiration for the illustrious chief and his able lieutenants who ultimately led them to victory under such disadvantages, that they were compelled, not only to lead, but in a manner to educate their troops in presence of the enemy; and that it was while struggling to maintain their ground against superior bands of a veteran foe, that they imbibed in many respects even the rudiments of the military art (1).

Force and
character of
the British
army.

The English army, however, at this period was far from being in the inefficient state, either with respect to discipline or experience, which was generally supposed on the Continent : and the French

government, which judged from recent events, and were ignorant of the vast efforts in the military department which had been made since the commencement of the war, were equally mistaken as to the force and capacity of the regular forces, and the extent to which a warlike spirit had imbued the nation. The British army in the spring of 1808, consisted of no less than one hundred and eighty thousand men; of whom twenty-six thousand were cavalry : besides nearly eighty thousand of the militia, equal in discipline and equipment to the troops of the line, though not bound to serve beyond the British isles, and two hundred and ninety thousand volunteers, of whom twenty-five thousand were cavalry, in a very considerable state of efficiency (2). Great part of this immense force, without doubt, was absorbed in the

(1) Voy, i. 86, 81. Jom. ii. 36. Hard. x. 157, 158.

(2) The numbers were in July, 1807 :—

(The amount of its various branches.)					
	Regulars.	Militia.		Volunteers.	
Infantry	156,561	77,996	Infantry	254,544	
Cavalry	26,315		Cavalry	25,342	
			Artillery	9,420	
	182,876			289,306	
In all,	Regulars	182,867			
	Militia	77,996			
	Volunteers	289,306			
	In arms	550,163			

defence of the numerous and extensive colonies which formed part of the British dominions; but the official returns proved that a hundred thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, were disposable in the British isles. and in a minute made out by the Duke of York it was proved, that "in 1808, sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign in Spain without detriment to any other service." Of this force, it is not going too far to say that it was all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; and that not only was it equal in a pitched battle to any force of similar amount which could be brought against it, but, if all assembled, was adequate to the encounter of the largest army ever yet collected in a single field under the standards of Napoléon (1)!

Admirable spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the people.

But it was not so much from underrating the numerical strength, as mistaking the spirit which animated the British army, and the degree of interest which its exploits excited in the country, that the French government was led to regard too lightly the chances of success which it possessed in a Continental struggle. With all his information and sagacity, Napoléon here fell into the usual error of judging of the present by the past. The English soldiers had achieved so little during the war, that it was generally supposed they were incapable of doing any thing: their navy had done so much, that it was taken for granted the whole interest and pride of the nation was centred on its triumphs. In the interim, however, the general arming of the people, the excitement produced by the threats of invasion, the profound interest kept alive by the Continental war, the triumphs of Maida and Alexandria, had awakened a most extraordinary degree of military ardour, and diffused no inconsiderable amount of military information throughout the people. The warlike establishments which pervaded the country were admirably calculated to foster this growing enthusiasm, and turn it to the best account in augmenting the numbers and increasing the spirits of the regular army. The militia served as an invaluable nursery for the line: the volunteers, changed soon after into local militia, corresponding very nearly to the German landwehr, provided a never-failing supply of recruits tolerably instructed in the rudiments of discipline for the militia. Numbers of young men of all ranks, caught by the animation, the idleness, or the dress of soldiers, embraced the military profession: thenceforward to the end of the war there was no difficulty whatever experienced in finding adequate supplies of recruits for the army, and filling up all the fearful chasms which war and disease made in its ranks. Thus, while the French were deluded with the idea that the English were altogether contemptible at land, they had already made great progress in the formation of a powerful army, and while they were talking about sea-wolves and maritime skill, the spirit was engendered destined to produce the triumphs of Vittoria and Waterloo (2)!

Character and qualities of the British soldiers.

The vast improvements effected by the Duke of York in the discipline and organization of the army, and the improved military education which the younger officers had now for some years received, had at the same period afforded increased advantages for the successful display of that physical strength and undaunted moral resolution which, in every age, has formed the great characteristic of the British soldiers. This

Of this force of regulars, 81,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry were at home in the British isles, and of course disposable. In the muster-rolls of the English army, sabres and bayonets are alone estimated, which is otherwise in the French and Continental services; a peculiarity which made the real

strength of the English regular army about 200,000 men.—*Parl. Deb.* ix. iii. *App.*

(1) *Parl. Returns*, July 1807. *Parl. Deb.* ix. 34 *App.* and *Napier*, i. 81. *App.* and *Foy*, i. 210.

(2) *Foy*, i. 210, 212, 220, 221. *Hard.* x. 156, 157.

invaluable quality gave them a very great advantage: it is the true basis of a powerful army. Skill, experience, discipline can be superadded by practice, or acquired by exercise; but if this one moral quality be wanting, all such acquisitions will prove of little avail. How inferior soever to their antagonists in experience, or that skill in the varied duties of a campaign which actual service alone can give, the English soldiers, from the very first, had the animating conviction that they were their equals, possibly their superiors, in actual combat; and that all the advantages of their veteran opponents would be at an end if once they engaged in a regular battle. And so it proved even from the outset; and it is inconceivable how soon this one quality of *dogged resolution in the field* came to neutralize all the superiority of acquired skill and veteran discipline. The military is essentially a practical art; its wants and necessities are soon brought home by actual experience and suffering to an army in the field. If it possesses the resolution to fight, and the discipline to obey, a very short time will supply the rest: there is no education so rapid and effectual as that which takes place in presence of an enemy. Of various natural and acquired excellence, it is hard to say whether, in the Peninsular war, the British or French soldiers, after a few years, were the most admirable. In the service of light troops; in undergoing with cheerfulness the fatigues of a campaign; in dexterity at making themselves comfortable under privation; in rapidity of firing, care of their horses by the cavalry, and enthusiastic gallantry at the first onset; the French troops for a long period had the advantage: but when the hostile lines actually met, and the national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers, from the very beginning, successfully asserted their superiority. Splendid in appearance, overflowing with strength, irresistible in a single charge, their cavalry could hardly be said to be equal, at least for general service, or the protracted fatigues of a campaign, to that of Napoléon; a remarkable circumstance, when the great attention bestowed on horses in England is taken into consideration: but their artillery, superior to any in the world in the admirable equipment of the guns and ammunition train, was second to none in the coolness and practice of the gunners; and, in the steadiness and precision of their fire, the constancy which they displayed under danger, their calmness in anger, and the terrible vehemence of their charge with the bayonet, the British infantry was beyond all question the first in Europe (1).

Important effect of their officers being exclusively taken from the higher ranks. In one important particular, the English army was founded upon an entirely different principle from the French. In the latter, the officers formed in no degree a separate class from the soldiers; the equality, which was the object of universal desire at the outset of the Revolution, and the conscription, which reached indiscriminately all ranks in its later stages; forbade alike any such line of demarcation; and not only had all the marshals and generals in the service originally entered on the military career in the ranks, but to such as survived the rapid consumption of life in the imperial wars, promotion was still certain from the humblest station to the highest grades in the army. In the former, again, a line, in practice almost impassable, separated the private soldier from the officer; they were drawn from different classes in society, accustomed to different habits, instructed by a different education, actuated by different desires. To the French conscript, glory, promotion, the prospect of ultimate greatness, were the chief stimulants to exertion: in the English army, though

(1) Foy, i. 226, 227,

"Le soldat Anglais," says General Foy, "pos-

sède la qualité la plus précieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère."—Foy, i. 227.

the influence of such desires was strongly felt by the officers, yet the efforts of the common men were chiefly excited by a different set of motives; and a sense of military duty, the wish to win the respect of his comrades, an instinctive principle of courage, an anxious desire to uphold the renown of his regiment, a firm determination to defend the cause of Old England, and an undoubting faith in the superiority of its arms, constituted the real springs of military exertion. The great majority of the English soldiers felt no desire to be made officers; to become sergeants and corporals was indeed a very general and deserved object of ambition to the meritorious privates, because that elevated them in, without taking them out of, their own sphere in life: but they felt that they would be uncomfortable in the daily society of the commissioned officers, their superiors in birth, habits, and acquirements; and though many, in the course of the war, from the force of extraordinary merit, broke through these restraints, and some discharged, in the most exemplary manner, the duties of the most elevated ranks, who had originally borne a musket on their shoulders, yet in general the situation of privates who had risen to the officers' mess was not so comfortable as to render the change an object of general desire. It may appear paradoxical to assert, but it is nevertheless strictly true, that this feeling of the propriety of each class striving to become respectable in itself, without seeking to overstep its limits, is the natural effect of long-established freedom and order; and is much more nearly allied to the genuine spirit of liberty than the feverish desire of individual elevation, which, throughout all its phases, was the mainspring of the French Revolution. Where each class is respectable and protected in itself, it feels its own importance, and often disdains to seek admission into that next in succession; the universal passion for individual exaltation is the offspring of a state of society where the rights and immunities of the humbler ranks have been habitually, by all persons in power, trampled under foot. The clearest proof of this is to be found in daily experience. The men who, throughout so many ages, have maintained the liberties of England, are not those who were striving perpetually to elevate themselves by a sudden start above their neighbours, but those who, by a life of unobtrusive honest industry, rose to comfort or opulence in their own sphere, without any desire to leave it; and the strength of the state at present is not to be found in the anxious aspirants after aristocratic favour, or the giddy candidates for fashionable distinction, but in the unheeded efforts of that more numerous but unobserved class, which is too proud of its own rank to aspire to any beyond it (1).

Severe discipline.
Corporal punishments which still subsisted.

An iron discipline had given the military force, thus constituted, a degree of firmness and regularity unknown to any other service in Europe. The use of the lash was still frequent: and instances were not uncommon of soldiers, for inconsiderable offences, receiving 500, 800, and even 1000 stripes; but though the friends of humanity beheld with horror this barbarous infliction, so foreign to the spirit of the English constitution, and disused in the French and several Continental armies, yet the experienced observer, who marked the class from which English recruits were almost exclusively drawn, and the impossibility of giving them the prospect of promotion which operated so strongly on French conscripts, hesitated as to the practicability of abolishing this painful but necessary correction; and regarded its disgrace as the price paid by the nation for the economy which denied to the soldiers such a pay as would secure for the ranks of its army a class to whom such inflictions might be unnecessary, or

render expulsion from them a sufficient object of dread; and that constitution, which, by confining commissions in the military service to men of family and property, possessed of a permanent interest in the commonwealth, had obtained the best possible security against its force being applied to the destruction of the public liberties (1). Better fed, clothed, lodged, and paid than any other in Europe, the English soldier had an attention devoted to his wants, both in health and sickness, and experienced an integrity in the administration of every department of the army, which could be attained only in a country where habits of freedom have long co-existed with those of order, and experience had pointed out the mode of effectually checking the abuses which invariably have a tendency to grow up in every branch of the public administration. Pensions, varying according to the period, or the amount of service, secured for the veteran, the maimed, or the wounded, an adequate maintenance for the remainder of life. True, he fought, in the glowing language of Colonel Napier, in the cold shade of aristocracy; true, he could not boast that the rays of imperial favour would be attracted by the helmet of the cuirassier, or the bayonet of the grenadier; but he was sure, from good conduct, of obtaining that respect in his own sphere, and those substantial advantages which were adapted to his situation and his wishes; and experience has abundantly proved that the concentration of government support on those whose only title to power was military distinction, is a sure prelude to unbridled administration, and that if the soldier would no longer fight in the cold shade of aristocracy, the citizen would pine in the hopeless frost of military despotism (2).

(1) Duke of Wellington, *et supra*.

General Foy's graphic contrast of the English and French soldiers. (2) General Foy has left a graphic picture of the different habits of the English and French officers during a campaign in the Peninsular war, of the truth of which every one must, to a certain degree, be convinced. "Behold," says he, "the French battalions, when they arrive at their bivouacs after a long and painful march. No sooner have the drums ceased to beat, than the bivouacs of the soldiers, disposed around the piles of arms, mark out the ground where they are to pass the night. They put off their coats; clothed only in their greatcoats, they run to collect provisions, water, and straw. The fires are lighted; the soup is soon prepared; trees brought from the adjoining woods are rudely carved into supports or beams for the huts. Quickly the simple barracks are raised; the air resounds with the sounds of the hatchet; while the soup is preparing, the young men impatient of their idleness, clean their arms, arrange their knapsacks, clean their valises. The soup is soon ready; if wine is wanting the conversation soon flags, and the noisy multitude is speedily buried in sleep. If, on the other hand, the generous fluid circulates, joyous looks follow the barrels as they are brought on men's backs into the centres of the rings; the veterans recount to the young conscripts the battles in which their regiment has acquired so much renown, and the universal transport when the Emperor, mounted on his white charger and followed by his Mameluke, suddenly appeared among them.

"Turn now to the English camp: you see the soldiers exhausted and motionless, reclining on the ground: are they waiting like the Spahis in the Turkish camp till the slaves prepare their victuals? No! they have made at leisure a very moderate march, and have reached at two in the afternoon the ground they are to occupy for the night. Bread and meat are brought: the sergeant makes the distribution; he tells them where they will find water and straw, and

where the trees which are to be felled will be found: When the logs arrive he shows where each is to be placed: he reprimands the unskilful, and stimulates the lazy. Where is the industrious, enterprising spirit of that nation which has outstripped all others in vigour and intelligence? Out of their own routine the soldiers can do nothing; if once the restraints of discipline are broken, excesses of every kind are indulged in, and intemperance prevails to an excess which would astonish the Cossacks themselves. Nevertheless, do not hazard an attack unless you are well assured of success; the English soldier is not brave at times merely; he is so whenever he has eat well, drunk well, and slept well. Yet their courage, rather instinctive than acquired, has need of solid nutriment; and no thoughts of glory will ever make them forget that they are hungry, or that their shoes are worn out. [Foy. i. 231, 233.]

And of the "Nor is the difference less remarkable in the superior officers. While a French general of division is occupied with his troops, during the leisure moments of a campaign in studying the topography of the country or the disposition of its inhabitants; in attending to the nourishment, drilling, or haranguing of his troops; in endeavouring to persuade the Spanish people to adopt the system of administration, or yield to the political conduct of his country,—the English general opposed to him spends his time between the chase, riding on horseback, and the pleasures of the table. The first, alternately governor, engineer, commissary, has his mind continually on the stretch; his daily occupations lead to an enlargement of his mind, and a continual extension of his sphere of activity. The other, as indifferent to the localities of the country in which he makes war as to the language, disposition, or prejudices of its inhabitants, applies to the commissary to supply provisions; to the quarter-master-general for information concerning the country in which he was to act, and the marches he was to perform; to the adjutant-general for any other supplies of which he

Difficulty of
keeping any
considerable
force to-
gether in
the interior
of the Pen-
insula.

Nor was the inequality of force with which this great struggle was to be conducted, so great in its progress as it appeared in the outset. Napoléon indeed commenced the contest with a hundred and fifteen thousand infantry, and sixteen thousand horse, in the Peninsula (1), and the possession of all the most important strongholds which it contained; and the force permanently maintained over its surface, after the British troops landed, exceeded two hundred and fifty, and rose at times as high as three hundred and fifty thousand men; while there never were so many as fifty thousand British soldiers in the Peninsula, and the actual force under the standards of Wellington seldom exceeded thirty, and was generally for the first three years not above twenty-five, thousand English sabres and bayonets. Still this force formed the nucleus of an army which, with the addition of the Portuguese levies of equal amount, and disciplined and led by British officers, soon became extremely formidable. Its fortunate central position in Portugal, resting on what became, under the tutelary genius of Wellington, an impregnable intrenched position in front of Lisbon, afforded to a commander of talent a favourable opportunity of striking serious blows at the enemy before their dispersed forces could collect from different quarters: if they did so, the insurrection burst forth again in the provinces they had evacuated; if they remained long together, famine, in an inland country so plentifully intersected by arid plains or desert ridges, soon paralysed any considerable offensive operations. The truth of the old saying, "if you make war in Spain with a small army you are beaten, if with a large one starved," was never more strongly evinced than in the Peninsular campaigns; and although Wellington frequently experienced this difficulty in the severest manner, when he advanced into the interior of the country, yet his army, in the general case, from the vicinity to the sea-coast of Portugal or the water-carriage of its principal rivers, was in comparison abundantly supplied with provisions; and though he was in general inferior in number to the enemy, sometimes to a very great degree, when he hazarded a battle, yet the discrepancy in this respect was never so great as the extraordinary difference in the sum total of the regular forces which the two nations had in the field might have led us to expect (2).

Military
force of
Spain at the
commence-
ment of the
contest.

The military establishment of Spain, when the contest commenced at the signal of the French cannon in the streets of Madrid on the 2d May, was far from being considerable. It consisted, in 1807, of 80,000 troops of the line, including 16,000 cavalry, and 50,000 militia; but the ranks were far from being complete, and the total effective force, including the militia, was under a hundred thousand men. From this

may stand in need. Unless when employed in a separate command, he seeks to narrow the sphere of his exertions and responsibility. He leads on his troops in battle with the most admirable courage; but in cantonments his habitual exertions are limited to superintending the police of his troops, seeing that their exercises are duly performed, and transmitting reports to his superiors.—See *For*, i. 231, 235, 256, 257. Notwithstanding his admirable general candour, the French general appears, in this graphic description, to have been somewhat influenced by the prejudices of his country, though the outline of the sketch is undoubtedly correct. But the military is essentially a practical art; and notwithstanding all their riding and hunting, experience soon made the English generals as expert at all the really useful parts of their profession as the more inquisitive and instructed Frenchmen; and they are not the worst soldiers who, without dis-

quieting themselves with the duties or designs of their superiors, are at all times ready with undaunted courage to carry them into effect.

(1) *Viz.* : In Spain :

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Dupont's corps, . . .	24,426	4,636
Mosney's do.	29,341	2,800
Bessières' do.	19,006	1,061
Duhesme's do.	12,724	2,633
Imperial Guard, . . .	6,442	2,300

In Portugal :—

Junot's corps, . . .	24,978	1,771
	116,978	16,801

Besides 44,374 infantry, and 4,635 cavalry, who arrived by the 1st August, 1808, on the above.—*For*, iv. *Table 1, Appendix*.

(2) Napier, i. 47. *Foy*, i. 204.

number were to be deducted sixteen thousand, under Romana in Holstein, six thousand in Tuscany, or on the march thence to the north of Germany, and the garrisons of the Canary and Balearic isles; so that the troops that could be brought into the field did not at the utmost exceed seventy thousand, of whom twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in the Alentejo and Oporto, and the only considerable body of the remainder, about ten thousand strong, was in the lines of St.-Roque, at Gibraltar. The composition of this force was still less formidable than its numerical amount. Enervated by a long Continental peace, the soldiers had lost much of the spirit and discipline of war; the men, enrolled for the most part by voluntary enlistment, and only in case of necessity, and in some of the provinces by conscription, were sober, active, and brave; but the officers were, in most instances, extremely deficient, both in the knowledge and proper feelings of their profession. They were, indeed, for the most part, composed of men of family, a certain proof of descent being necessary to obtaining commissions in two-thirds of the military offices at the disposal of government; but the restriction afforded no security either for extended information or generous sentiments in a country where four hundred thousand hidalgos, too proud to work, too indolent to learn, loitered away an inglorious life, basking in the sun, or lounging in the billiard-rooms or coffeehouses of the great towns. From this ignorant and conceited class the great bulk of the officers of all ranks were taken; not more than three or four of the high nobility held situations in the army when the war broke out. Leading an indolent life in towns, sleeping half the day in uncomfortable barracks, associating indiscriminately with the common soldiers, many of whom were superior in birth and intelligence to themselves, and knowing no enjoyment but idleness, gallantry, and billiards, they were as deficient in the energy and vigour which the Revolution had developed in the French, as in the sentiments of honour and integrity which the habits of a monarchy, tempered by freedom, had nursed in the English army. It was easy to foresee that no reliance could be placed, in a protracted struggle, on this debilitated force; yet such is the importance of discipline and military organization, even in their most defective form, in warlike operations, that the only great success achieved in the field by the Spaniards during the whole war was owing to its exertions (1).

Military force and physical character of Portugal. Though Portugal had a population of somewhat above three millions, instead of the twelve millions which were contained in Spain, yet it possessed in itself the elements of a more efficient military force than its powerful neighbour. The invaluable institution of *ordenanzas*, or local militia, had survived the usurpation of Spain; and during twenty-seven campaigns which followed the restoration of the independence of the country in 1640, it had rendered more important services to the state than the regular army. By the Portuguese law, every person is legally obliged to join the battalions arrayed in defence of the country, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty years; these battalions consist of 250 men each, under the command of the chief landed proprietors of the district; and such is the native strength of a country so defended, that, with a very little aid from England, it enabled the Portuguese for two centuries to maintain their independence. The physical peculiarities of the country rendered it singularly well adapted for the active operations of an irregular force of this description. Intersected in many directions, but especially to the north of the Tagus, by lofty sierras, terminating in sharp inaccessible cliffs, which rise, even in that

favoured latitude, almost into the region of eternal snow; destitute for the most part of roads, and such as do exist perpetually crossing rivers without bridges, or ravines affording the most favourable positions for a defensive army; covered with Moorish towers or castles perched on the summits of rocks, or villages in general surrounded with defensible walls, inhabited by a bold, active, and independent peasantry, long habituated to the use of arms, and backed by impregnable mountain ridges washed by the sea, Portugal presented the most advantageous fulcrum which Europe could afford whereon to rest the military efforts of England. But these advantages were all dependent on the physical situation and natural character of the inhabitants, or the consequences of their former and more glorious epochs; for at the period when the Peninsular war broke out, no country could be in a more debilitated state, as far as concerns either political vigour or military efficiency. Corruption pervaded every department of the public service, and to such an extent as to be apparently irremediable; the army, ill fed, worse paid, and overrun by a swarm of titled locusts who devoured the pay of the soldier for doing nothing, was both an unpopular and inefficient service. Forty thousand men, including eight thousand cavalry, of whom the troops of the line nominally consisted, might have furnished an excellent base whereon, with the addition of the militia and ordenanzas, to construct a powerful military establishment; but such were the abuses with which it was infested, and the ignorance of the officers in command, that hardly any reliance could be placed on this force; and it was not till they were recast in the mould of British integrity, and led by the intrepidity of British officers, that the Portuguese arms reappeared with their ancient lustre on the theatre of Europe (1).

Amount, quality, and disposition of the French army at this period in Spain. In the disposition of his forces when the contest commenced, Napoleon had principally in view to overawe and secure the metropolis, conceiving that Madrid was like Paris or Vienna, and that there was little chance of the country holding out for any length of time against the power in command of the capital. The Imperial Guards, with the corps of Moncey and Dupont, were assembled in that city or its immediate neighbourhood; and as this concentration of above fifty thousand men in the heart of the kingdom exposed the communication with the Pyrenees to danger, the Emperor was indefatigable in his endeavours to form a powerful corps of reserve at Burgos and Vittoria, under Marshal Bessières; and with such success were his efforts attended, that by the beginning of June this able officer had twenty-three thousand men under his standards. At the same period the troops under Duhesme, in the fortresses of Barcelona and Figueras in Catalonia, was above fifteen thousand men, sufficient, it was hoped, to overawe the discontented in that province. Thus, after making every allowance for the detachments necessary to maintain the capital and frontier fortresses, and keep up the communications, fifty thousand men, including eighty guns, were ready, in the north and centre of Spain, to commence offensive operations; a force amply sufficient, if concentrated, to crush any attempt at resistance which could have been made in the Peninsula. But the composition of these troops was very unequal; and though the Imperial Guard and some of the veteran divisions in the capital were in the finest state of discipline and efficiency, yet this was by no means the case with the whole army; and though all partook of the admirable organization of the French service, yet the ranks were for the most part filled up with raw conscripts, hardly yet instructed in the rudiments of the military art. Had it not been for the excellence of the ske-

(1) Foy, ii. l. 88. Napier, i. 27.

letons on which they were formed, and the officers by whom they were directed, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would not have been very considerable. They were very different from the soldiers of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland; the enormous consumption of life in those bloody campaigns had almost destroyed the incomparable army which, disciplined on the heights of Boulogne, had so long chained victory to the imperial eagles (1).

Such was the situation of the French army when the insurrection at once broke out in every part of the Peninsula. It burst forth with such force and unanimity in all the provinces, that it could not have been more simultaneous if an electric shock had at once struck the whole population. With the intelligence of the commotion and massacre at Madrid, a convulsive thrill ran through every fibre of Spain; the sense of their wrongs, the humiliation of their situation, the thirst for vengeance, burst at once upon the people, and one universal cry to arms was heard from one end of the kingdom to the other. Every where the peasantry met together in tumultuous crowds; from town to town, from village to village, from hamlet to hamlet, the news flew with incredible rapidity; and as the French troops, though in possession of the capital and frontier fortresses, were by no means scattered over the country, the proceedings of the insurgents hardly any where met with molestation. The fever was universal: the young and the old, the feeble and the strong, the shepherds of the mountains and the cultivators of the plains, the citizens of the towns and the peasantry of the country, all joined in the general transport. Arms were quickly sent for and obtained from the nearest depots in the district; officers and colonels of battalions elected; provisional juntas of government formed in the chief towns, to direct the affairs of the provinces; and in the absence of all central authority, local governments soon sprang up in every part of the kingdom. Spain awoke from the slumber of centuries, and started at once to her feet with the vigour and resolution of an armed man. Passing over in disdain the degradation or insignificance of the Bourbon dynasty, the people came forth fresh for the combat, glowing with the recollections of the Cid and Pelajo, and the long struggle with the Moors, and the heroic days of the monarchy. Nor was this extraordinary and unanimous burst of feeling lost in mere empty ebullition; resolving, with a facility peculiar to themselves, into the pristine elements of the monarchy, the different provinces, with unparalleled rapidity, formed separate and independent juntas of government, which early gave a systematic direction to their efforts, and effected the formation of numerous and enthusiastic legions for their defence. It was easy to foresee how prejudicial to any combined or efficient general operations this unavoidable partition of the directing power into so many separate and independent assemblies must in the end necessarily prove; but, in the first instance, it tended strongly to promote the progress of the insurrection, by establishing in every province a centre of insulated, detached, and often ill-advised, but still vigorous operations. Before the middle of June numerous bodies were raised, armed, and to a certain degree disciplined in all the provinces; and a hundred and fifty thousand men were ready to support the regular army. Even the presence of the French garrisons in the capital and the frontier fortresses, could not repress the general effervescence. Almost all the regular soldiers in Madrid escaped, and joined the insurgent bands of New Castile; and even under

(1) *Napoléon's Notes*, App. No. 3. *Napier*, vol. i. Thiebault, 64, 72. *Napier*, i. 47. *Duhamel's Guerre en Catalogne*, 17, 21.

the guns of their strong castles of Montjuic and St. Juan de Fernando alarming symptoms of disaffection appeared in Barcelona and Giguera, and their Spanish garrisons almost all made their escape to the enemy (1).

Frightful disorders which signalized the commencement of the insurrection in some cities.

In the northern provinces, especially Catalonia, Asturias, Léon, and Galicia, the insurrection took place, and the provincial juntas were established in a comparatively regular manner, without any of the usual frightful ebullitions of popular passion; but it was far otherwise in the cities of the south and east of Spain. The usual vehemence and intemperance of the unbridled populace of great towns was there increased by the fiery intermixture of Moorish blood. Frightful atrocities were committed. At Badajoz, the governor, who endeavoured to restrain the furious multitude which surrounded his house clamouring for arms, was dragged out and murdered: numbers were massacred, on the supposition of being agents or partizans of the French, at Carthage, Granada, Carolina, Cadiz, and other places: and at Cadiz a fearful altercation took place between the governor, Solano, who refused to commence the hostilities which were required of him against the French squadron of five ships of the line, which had lain in the harbour since the battle of Trafalgar, and the ardent populace, who clamoured for an immediate attack. Independently of a secret leaning to the French interest, he naturally hesitated, as an officer of prudence and honour, at taking the decisive step of attacking, without any previous declaration of war or authority from the executive power, a squadron of an allied state which had taken refuge in Cadiz during the hostilities with Great Britain; and he openly expressed an apprehension that, during these dissensions, the English would break in, and destroy the fleet of both contending parties. Finding that the popular effervescence was becoming too strong to be openly resisted, he endeavoured to temporize, called a council of war, and gave symptoms of submission to the public wish; but the populace, May 26.

distrusting his sincerity, broke into his hotel, and chased him into the house of Mr. Strange, an English merchant, where he was discovered by a blood-thirsty set of assassins, who dragged him from his place of concealment, notwithstanding the courageous efforts of Mrs. Strange to save his life, and massacred him while on the road towards the gallows. He met his fate with dignity and composure, bidding his heroic supporter, Mrs. Strange, farewell till eternity. Don Thomas Morla, the second in command, was next day nominated to the government of Cadiz by popular acclamation, and immediately entered on the duties of his important office (2).

At Valencia the first burst of popular indignation was accompanied with still more frightful atrocities. Three hundred French merchants or traders had long been established in that city, and when the insurrection broke out there in the end of May, they all, as a measure of precaution, took refuge in, or were sent to the citadel, where they were supposed to be safe from any violence that might arise. An ardent, resolute, and able Franciscan monk, Juan Rico, early acquired by his powers of public speaking the lead in the movement, but the junta elected for the government was composed, as in most other instances, of a mixture of persons of noble and plebeian origin. The people, however, early conceived a jealousy May 29.

of their nobles; and to such a height did that feeling arrive, that the commander of the troops, Don Fernando Saavedra, was massacred before the eyes of the Conde Cervellon, a nobleman of the popular side, to whose palace

(1) Tor. i. 173, 175. South. i. 335, 337. Du-
hesme, 11, 12. Foy, iv. 32, 33. Lond. i. 80, 81.
Napier, i. 55.

(2) South. i. 341, 350. Nell, i. 134, 143. Tor. i.
209, 214. Foy, i. 201, 208.

he had fled for safety. This deed of blood was but the prelude to still greater atrocities, and the popular appetite for slaughter being once aroused, the multitude fell, as usual in such circumstances, under the direction of the most worthless and sanguinary leaders. In Valencia there appeared at this period one of those infamous characters who degrade the human race by their cruel deeds, and who is worthy of a place in history beside Robespierre, Collot-d'Herbois, and the other political fanatics whose atrocities have for ever stained the annals of the French Revolution. P. Balthasar Calvo, a canon of Madrid,

June 1. denounced the fugitives in the citadel to the mob as being in correspondence with Murat for the purpose of betraying that stronghold to the French troops. As invariably ensues, in such moments of excitement, strong assertions passed for proofs with the multitude, and no difficulty was experienced in finding persons to undertake the most sanguinary designs. A general massacre of the unfortunate French was resolved on, and its

June 5. execution fixed for the 5th June. Mingling perfidy with cruelty, Calvo, on the evening of that day, repaired to the citadel, and told the trembling victims, who already had conceived, from vague rumours, apprehensions of their fate, that their destruction was resolved on, and that their only remaining chance of safety was to avail themselves of the means of escape which, from an impulse of Christian charity, he had prepared for them. Trusting to these perfidious assurances, the unhappy victims agreed to his proposal, and two hundred of them set forth by the wicket through the walls, which, according to his promise, was left open for them. No sooner had this flight begun, than Calvo, with a band of assassins, hastened to the spot, and spreading the cry that the French were escaping, so worked upon the passions of the populace assembled as to induce them to join his murderers, and they were all massacred on the spot. Wearied with slaughter, and yielding to the solicitations of some benevolent ecclesiastics, who earnestly besought them to desist, the assassins at length agreed to spare those who still survived in the citadel; but no sooner did Calvo hear of this returning feeling of humanity than he hastened to the spot, and conducted the remaining prisoners outside the walls to a ruined tower called the Tour de Cuarte. There he spread a false report that papers had been found upon them, proving a design to deliver up the citadel to the French, and the mob, again infuriated, fell upon their victims, and dispatched them without mercy. Above three hundred French citizens, wholly innocent of the misdeeds of their Emperor, perished on that dreadful night; the junta were overawed; the magistrates of the city, elected by popular suffrage, powerless, as might have been expected, in repressing their excesses; and Calvo, drunk with blood, not only dispatched his orders from the citadel during the whole massacre like a sovereign prince, but in the morning was named a member of the junta, at the very moment that Rico was concerting measures for his apprehension, and took his seat with his clothes yet drenched with gore, at the council-board of government! It affords some consolation to the friends of virtue to know that the triumph of this miscreant was not of long duration. Excited almost to insanity by his execrable success, he openly aspired to supreme power, and had already given orders for the apprehension of the other members of the government, when a sense of their common danger made them unite, like the Convention on the 9th Thermidor, against the tyrant. He was suddenly arrested and sent to Minorca, before the mob, who certainly would have rescued him and massacred the junta, were aware of his seizure. There he was strangled in prison, and the government having regained their authority by this vigorous act, two hundred of his associates underwent the

same fate; a severe but necessary deed of public justice, which at least rescued the nation generally from the disgrace of these atrocious deeds, and indicating a very different standard of public morality from that which prevailed in France during its Revolution, where not only were such crimes almost invariably committed with impunity, but their perpetrators elevated to the highest situations in the state (1).

Prudent
measures
adopted by
the nobles
at Seville.
Proceedings
of its junta.

These deplorable disorders sufficiently demonstrated that even the best of causes could not obviate the dangers of popular insurrection; and that, unless the higher orders and holders of property early and courageously exert themselves to obtain its direction, a revolutionary movement, even when called forth by the national defence, speedily falls under the guidance of the most depraved of the people. But by adopting this prudent and patriotic course, the higher classes at Seville succeeded not only in preserving their own city from military atrocities, but acquired an ascendancy which was attended with the greatest public benefit, and gave their junta almost the general management of the affairs of Spain. There, as elsewhere in the south, the public effervescence began with murder, and the Count d'Aguila, one of the chief magistrates and most enlightened citizens, who became the innocent object of their suspicion, fell a

May 25. victim to the ungovernable passions of the populace, who, when too late, lamented the irreparable crime they had committed. Speedily, how-

May 27. ever, the junta was elected; and, happily, though all ranks were represented, a preponderance of votes in the twenty-three members of which it was composed, were in the hands of the nobility. The wisdom of the choice which had been made, soon appeared in the measures which were adopted; immediately they dispatched couriers to Cadiz and Algeziras to secure the co-operation of the naval and military forces who were there assembled; and by the aid of CASTANOS, the commander of the former, who was at the head of the troops before Gibraltar in the camp of St.-Roch, and who had already entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, the entire co-operation of the army was secured. A violent demagogue, named Tap-y-Nunez, who had acquired a great sway over the populace, and who required that the nobility should be expelled from the junta, was arrested and sent to Cadiz; and this necessary act of vigour confirmed the authority of the provisional government. At its head was Don Francisco Saavedra, who had formerly been minister of finance, and P. Gil de Sevilla, who had both been sufferers under Godoy's administration; and the combined prudence and energy of their measures formed a striking contrast to the conceit, declamation, and imbecility which, in many other quarters of the Peninsula, afterwards rendered nugatory all the enthusiasm of the people. The regular troops were immediately directed towards the Sierra Morena to secure the passes; a general levy of all persons between the years of 18 and 45 was ordered; subsidiary juntas formed in all the towns of

(1) Tor. i. 236, 244. Foy, iii. 244, 247. South. i. 363, 370.

Only one prisoner escaped this hideous massacre. Chance had selected for his murderer a man whom he had frequently relieved in prison; the wretch recognised his benefactor, and though he twice raised his dagger to strike him, yet twice a sense of pity arrested his uplifted arm, and at length he suffered him to escape, in the obscurity of the night, among the populace. An extraordinary instance of presence of mind occurred in the daughter of the Count de Cervellon. The people, distrustful of their leaders, had insisted that the mail from Madrid

should be brought to the Count, and the letter it contained publicly read; hardly was it opened when one from the *Auerdo Real* was discovered, to Murat, exculpating himself from the share he had taken in the insurrection, and demanding troops. The courageous young lady, who was present, instantly seized the letter, and tore it in pieces in presence of the multitude, saying it related to her own private affairs; thereby saving the whole members of the junta from immediate death, though at the imminent hazard of her own life.—See SOUTHEY, i. 367, and TOWNS, i. 234, 235.

Andalusia; the great foundry of cannon at Seville, the only one in the south of Spain, put into full activity, and arms and clothing manufactured; war

June 6. declared in a formal manner against France, and a manifesto issued, which not only eloquently defended the national cause, but contained the most admirable instructions as to the mode of successfully combating the formidable enemy with whom they had to contend (1). This declaration from so great a city, containing 90,000 inhabitants, and possessing all the nobility of the south of Spain within its walls, was of the utmost consequence, and gave, both in reality and in the eyes of Europe, a degree of consistence to the insurrection which it could never otherwise have obtained (2).

Capture of the French fleet at Cadiz, June 14. The first important blow struck at the French was delivered at Cadiz. The fleet there, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, early excited the jealousy of the inhabitants, to whom the French flag had become an object of perfect abhorrence; while Lord Collingwood, at the head of the English fleet; which lay off the harbour, effectually prevented their departure. To withdraw as far as possible from the danger, Rosilly, the French admiral, warped his ships in the canal of Caracca to such a distance as to be beyond the reach both of the fire of the castles and the fleet; and at the same time endeavoured, by negotiating, to gain time for the

(1) Foy, iii. 201, 203. South, i. 342, 346. Tor. x. 204, 207, 215. Espanol. i. 13.

Proclamation of the Junta of Se. of Spain against France. it was not vile against Napoleon. — "The King, to whom we all swore allegiance with emotions of joy unprecedented in history, has been decoyed from us: the fundamental laws of our monarchy have been trampled under foot: our property, customs, religion, laws, wives, and children, are threatened with destruction—and a foreign power has done this: done it too, not by force of arms, but by deceit and treachery; by converting the very persons who call themselves the heads of our government into instruments of these atrocious acts. It therefore became indispensable to break our shackles; and to demonstrate that noble courage with which in all former ages the Spanish people have defended their monarch, their laws, their honour, their religion. The people of Seville have assembled, and, through the medium of all their magistrates and constituted authorities, and the most respectable individuals of every rank, formed this Supreme Council of Government. We accept the heroic trust; we swear to discharge it; and we reckon on the strength and energy of the whole nation. We have again proclaimed Ferdinand VII; again sworn allegiance to him; sworn to die in his defence: this was the signal of our union, and it will prove the forerunner of happiness and glory to Spain.

"The abdication, extorted by such detestable artifices from Ferdinand, was void, from want of authority in him who made it. The monarchy was not his to bestow, nor is Spain composed of animals subject to the absolute control of their owners. His title in the throne was founded on his royal descent and the fundamental laws of the realm. His resignation is void, from the state of compulsion in which it was made, from the want of consent in the nation to whom it related, from the want of concurrence in the foreign princes, the next heirs in succession to the throne. The French Emperor summoned a few deputies, devoted to himself, to deliberate in a foreign country, and surrounded by foreign bayonets, on the most sacred concerns of the nation; while he publicly declared a respectful letter, written to him by Ferdinand VII when Prince of Asturias, was a criminal act, injurious to the

rights of the sovereign! He has resorted to every other means to deceive us; he has distributed, with boundless profusion, libels to corrupt public opinion, in which, under the mask of respect for the laws and our holy religion, he covertly insults both. He assures us that the Supreme Postiff sanctions his proceedings, while it is notorious that he has despoiled him of his dominions, and forced him to dismiss his cardinals, to prevent him from conducting the government of the church according to its fundamental constitution. Every consideration calls on us to unite and frustrate views so atrocious. No revolution exists in Spain; our sole object is to defend all we hold most sacred against the invader who would treacherously despoil us of our religion, our monarch, our laws. Let us, therefore, sacrifice every thing in a cause so just; and, if we are to lose all, let us lose it combating like brave men. Let all, therefore, unite; the wisest and ablest, in refuting the falsehoods propagated by the enemy; the church, in imploring the assistance of the God of hosts; the young and active, in marching against the enemy. The Almighty will vouchsafe his protection to so just a cause; Europe will applaud our efforts, and hasten to our assistance; Italy, Germany, the North, suffering under the despotism of France, will eagerly avail themselves of the example set by Spain to shake off the yoke, and recover their liberty, their laws, their independence, of which they have been robbed by that nation."

Prudent Instructions to the troops. — "Special and prudent instructions were given to the troops at the same time given for the conduct of the war. "All general actions are to be avoided as perfectly hopeless and highly dangerous: a war of partisans is what suits both our national character and physical circumstances. Each province should have its junta, its generals, its local government, but there should be three generals-in-chief; one for Andalusia, Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one for Galicia, Leon, the Castiles, Asturias; one for Valencia, Arragon, Catalonia. France has never domineered over us, nor set foot with impunity in our territory. We have often mastered her, not by deceit, but force of arms; we have made her kings prisoners, and the nation tremble. We are the same Spaniards, and France and Europe and the world shall see we have not degenerated from our ancestors."—*Proclamation of the Junta of Seville, June 6, 1808; Southey, i. 369, 393.*

arrival of the succours under Dupont, which he was aware were rapidly approaching through La Mancha and the Sierra Morena. Equally sensible, however, with his skilful opponent, of the importance of time in the operation, the Spanish general Morla insisted upon an immediate surrender, and constructed batteries in such places as to command the French ships even in their new stations. Lord Collingwood, who, with the English fleet in the bay, was an impatient spectator of these hostile preparations, offered the assistance of the British squadron to ensure the reduction of the enemy; but the offer was courteously declined, from a wish, no doubt, that England might have no ground for any claim to the prizes which were expected. At length, on the 9th June, a sufficient number of guns being mounted, a heavy fire was opened upon the French ships, which being in a situation where they could not make any reply, soon produced a sensible effect, and led to a negotiation

June 24. which terminated in the unconditional surrender of the whole French fleet five days afterwards. Thus was the last remnant of that proud armament, which was intended to convey the invincible legions of Napoleon to the British shores, finally reft from the arms of France, and that, too, by the forces of the very allies who were then ranged by their side for our subjugation (1).

Insurrection
in Asturias,
Galicia,
Catalonia
and Arra-
gon.

In the northern provinces the insurrection spread with much fewer circumstances of atrocity, but an almost equal degree of enthusiasm. Excepting Barcelona, Figueras, St.-Sebastians, and a few other places where the presence of the French garrisons over-

awed the people, they every where rose in arms against their oppressors. A
May 24. junta for the Asturias was formed before the end of May at Oviedo, the capital of Asturias; the first which was organized in Spain, and which thus gave to that province a second time the honour of having taken the lead in the deliverance of the Peninsula. The first step of this body was to dispatch deputies to England, soliciting arms, ammunition, and money, whose arrival produced an extraordinary impression, as will immediately be shown, in the British isles. The Junta of Galicia, secure behind their almost inaccessible mountains, took the most vigorous measures to organize the insurrection;

June 29. and not only arrayed all the regular soldiers at Ferrol and Corunna under its standard, but summoned the Spanish troops, ten thousand strong, to join them without delay; a summons which was immediately obeyed by the whole body, who set out for Galicia by the route of Traz os Montes, and thus laid the foundation of a powerful force on the flank and rear of the invader's communications. A junta was formed at Lerida, which assumed the general direction of the affairs of Catalonia, and soon arrayed thirty thousand hardy mountaineers under the national colours; while, nothing daunted by the proximity to France, and the alarming vicinity of powerful French corps,

June 2. the Arragonese proclaimed Ferdinand VII at Saragossa; and after choosing the young and gallant Palafox for their commander, who had attended Ferdinand to Bayonne, and escaped from that fortress, issued a proclamation, in which they declared their resolution, should the royal family be detained in captivity or destroyed by Napoleon, of exercising their right of election in favour of the Archduke Charles, as grandson of Charles III and one of the Imperial branch of the Spanish family (2).

Measures of
Napoleon in
regard to
the insur-
rection.

From the outset Napoleon was fully impressed with the importance and danger of this contest, and in an especial manner alive to the vital consequence of preserving entire the communications

(1) Tor. i. 217, 218. Foy, iii. 213, 214. Collingwood, ii. 43.

(2) South. i. 337, 341, 372, 378. Foy, iii. 198, 192. Tor. i. 181, 195, 245, 250. Napier, i. 57.

of the army, which had been pushed forward into the very heart of the kingdom, with the French frontier. Murat, after the catastrophe of 2d May, had been taken ill and withdrawn from Madrid, and was on his route to take possession of the throne destined for him on the shores of Naples; and he had been succeeded in the general direction of affairs at Madrid by Savary. Napoleon, on his departure from Bayonne, spoke to him in such a way as sufficiently demonstrated his growing anxiety for the issue of the contest, as well as the sagacity with which he had already discerned in what way it was most likely to be brought to a successful issue (1). Reinforcements were poured into Spain with all possible expedition; Burgos, Vittoria, and all the principal towns along the great road to Madrid from Bayonne, were strongly occupied; General Dupont, with his whole corps, was moved from La Mancha towards the Sierra Morena and Andalusia, in order to overawe Seville and Cordova, and, if possible, disengage the French squadron at Cadiz; and Marshal Moncey detached into Valencia, with instructions to put down, at all hazards, the violent and blood-thirsty revolution which had burst forth in that province (2).

Proceedings
of the Notables
assembled at Bay-
onne,
June 15.

But while making every preparation for military operations, the French Emperor, at the same time, actively pursued those civil changes at Bayonne, to which, even more than the terror of his arms, he trusted for subjugating the minds of men in the Spanish

Peninsula. The Assembly of Notables met at that fortress on the 15th June, agreeably to the summons which they had received; and they comprised the principal nobility and a large proportion of the leading characters in Spain. Having been selected by the junta of government at Madrid, without the form even of any election by the people, they were entirely in the French interest, and the mere creatures of the Emperor's will. Their proceedings formed a singular and instructive contrast to the generous and fearless bursts of indignant hostility with which the resignations at Bayonne had been received by the middling and lower orders through the whole of Spain. Even before the Assembly had formally met, such of them as had arrived at Bayonne published an address to their countrymen, in which they indulged in the usual vein of flattery to the astonishing abilities and power of the august Emperor, and strongly advised them to accept his brother for their sovereign (3). The levees of Joseph were attended by all the chief

(1) "The essential point," said he, "at this moment, is to occupy as many places as possible, in order to have the means of diffusing the principles which we wish to inculcate upon the people; but to avoid the dangers of such a dispersion of force, you must be wise, moderate, and observe the strictest discipline. For God's sake, permit no pillage. I have heard nothing of the line which Castanos, who commands at the camp of St-Roch, will take; Murat has promised much on that head, but you know what reliance is to be placed on his assurances. Neglect nothing which can secure the rapidity and exactness of your communications; that is the cardinal point, and spare nothing which can secure you good information. Above all, take care to avoid any misfortune; its consequences would be incalculable."—Savary, iii. 247, 251.

(2) Sav. iii. 247, 249. Nap. i. 59.

Proclamation (3) "An irresistible sense of duty, an object as sacred as it is important, has made us quit our homes, and led us to the invincible Emperor of the French. We admit it; the sight of his glory, of his power, was fitted to dazzle us; but we arrived here already determined to address to him our reiterated supplications for the prosperity of a

monarchy of which the fate is inseparably united with our own. But judge of our surprise, when we were received by his imperial and royal Majesty with a degree of kindness and humanity not less admirable than his power. He has no other desire but that of our preservation and happiness. If he gives us a sovereign to govern us, it is his august brother Joseph, whose virtues are the admiration of his subjects. If he is engaged in modifying and correcting our institutions, it is in order that we may live in peace and happiness. If he is desirous that our finances should receive a new organization, it is in order to render our navy and army powerful and formidable to our enemies. Spaniards! worthy of a better lot, avoid the terrible anarchy which threatens you. What benefit can you derive from the troubles fomented by malevolence or folly? Anarchy is the greatest curse which God can inflict upon mankind; during its reign unbridled license sacks, destroys, burns every thing: worthy citizens, men of property, are invariably the first victims, and an abyss of horror follows its triumphs."—*Proclamation of the Grandees of Spain to their countrymen, dated Bayonne, 8th June, 1808; NELLEATO, ii. 214, No. 70.*

grandees of Spain ; every day appeared to add to the strength of the party who were inclined to support his elevation to the throne. All the principal counsellors of Ferdinand, Cevallos, Escoiquiz, and others, not only took the oath of allegiance to the new monarch, but petitioned to be allowed to retain their honours and employments under the new dynasty (1). The Spanish corps in Holstein took the oath of allegiance to Joseph ; but under a reserva-

June 17. tion that his appointment was ratified by a free Cortes, convened in Spain according to the fundamental customs of the monarchy. A procla-

June 20. mation was addressed by the new King, in which he accepted the cession of the crown of Spain, made to him by his august brother Napoléon I, and appointed Murat his Lieutenant-general. The consent of Russia was already secured to all the changes in the Peninsula ; and, in order to reconcile

June 24. the other courts in Europe to them, an elaborate circular note was addressed to all their cabinets, in which it was announced that "the occupation of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, the regeneration of these fine nations, the creation of the fleets of Cadiz and the Tagus, would be a mortal stroke to the power of England, and put the finishing hand to the triumph of the maritime system, in which all the Continental powers were so warmly interested." Finally, on the 13th June, ninety-two deputies, out of the one hundred and fifty summoned, assembled at Bayonne, and formally accepted the constitution prepared for them by the Emperor Napoléon (2).

Constitution
of Bayonne
given by
Napoléon to
the Span-
iards.

By this constitution it was provided that the crown was to be vested in Joseph and his heirs-male ; whom failing, the Emperor and his heirs-male ; and in default of both, to the other brothers of the imperial family, in their order of seniority, but under the condition that the crown was not to be united on the same head with another. The legislature consisted of a senate of eighty members, nominated by the King ; a cortes, consisting of one hundred and seventy-two members, arranged in the following proportions and order :—twenty-five archbishops and bishops, and twenty-five grandees on the first bench ; sixty-two deputies of the provinces of Spain and the Indies ; thirty of the principal towns ; fifteen of the merchants and manufacturers ; and fifteen of the arts and sciences. The first fifty, composing the peers, were appointed by the King, but could not be displaced by him ; the second class were elected by the provinces and municipalities ; the third was appointed by the King out of lists presented to him by the tribunals and chambers of commerce, and the universities. The deliberations of the Cortes were not to be public ; none of their proceedings were to be published, under the penalties of high treason ; the finances and expenditure were to be settled by them at one sitting for three years ; the colonies were constantly to have a deputation of twenty-two persons at the seat of government to superintend their interests ; all exclusive exemptions from taxation were abolished ; entails permitted only to the amount of 20,000 piastres, and with the consent of the King ; an alliance offensive and defen-

Degrading
letter of
Escoiquiz
and Ferdi-
nand's coun-
sellors to
Joseph.

(1) "The subscribers have given the strongest proofs of their fidelity to the former government ; they trust it will be considered as the surest pledge of their sincerity of the oath which they now take of obedience to the new constitution of their country, and fidelity to the King of Spain, Joseph I. The generosity of your Catholic Majesty, your goodness and humanity, induce us to hope that, considering the need which these princes have of a continuation of their services in the situations which they respectively held under the old dynasty, the magnanimity of your

august Majesty will induce you to continue them in the enjoyments of the estates and offices which they formerly held. Assured thus of the continuance of the prais which they have hitherto enjoyed, they will ever prove faithful subjects to your Majesty, and true Spaniards, ready to obey blindly even the smallest wish which your Majesty may express."
Signed, SAN CARLOS, JUAN ESCOQUIZ, MARQUESS ATREAZAR, and others, 22d June, 1808.—*Illustrations*, i. 250, 251.

(2) Thib. vi. 395, 401, South. i. 400, 409. *ibid.* ii. 214, 224, 226.

sive was concluded with France, and a promise held out of the establishment of the liberty of the press within two years after the commencement of the new constitution (1).

Proceedings of Napoleon, Joseph, and the Junta of Notables at Bayonne, July 26. Every thing was conducted by the Junta of Notables at Bayonne to the entire satisfaction of Napoléon. The grandees of Spain rivalled his own senate in graceful adulation of his achievements, in obsequious submission to his will. When the constitution was read to them, it was received with transport, and adopted by acclamation; thunders of applause shook the hall when the new King made his appearance

July 7. in his royal robes; when he retired, two medals were unanimously voted to record the memorable acts of Bayonne; and the Assembly, in a body, hastened to the Emperor to lay at his feet the homage of their gratitude for the unparalleled services which he had rendered to their country. There was in the flattery of the Spanish nobles a mixture of studied servility with Oriental grandiloquence, which was novel and agreeable to a sovereign who had exhausted all the arts of European adulation (2). Two days after, the

July 9. new King set out for the capital of his dominions; he was accompanied as far as the frontier by his imperial brother in a splendid cortège of an hundred carriages, and crossed the Bidassoa amidst the roar of artillery

July 20. and all the pomp of more than regal magnificence. On the 20th, Napoléon himself set out from Bayonne, having first given such instructions to Savary as he deemed sufficient to bring the insurrection, which had now broken out on all sides, to a successful issue; and returned by Pau, where he visited the birthplace of Henry IV, Bordeaux, la Vendée, the mouth of the Loire, Nantes, and Tours, to St.-Cloud, which he reached in the middle of

Aug. 14. August. Meanwhile, Ferdinand VII, resigning himself to his chains, wrote to the Emperor from Valençay, thanking him for his condescension,

July 26. and requesting permission to meet him on his route to lay his homage at his feet (3), which was not granted; and Charles IV, after testifying

July 5. his entire satisfaction with the palace, parks, and country around Compeigne, requested permission, on account of his health, to pass the winter

Aug. 2. in a warmer climate, which was graciously accorded, and in the autumn he moved to Marseilles, where he lingered out in ease and obscurity the remainder of his inglorious life (4).

The ministry appointed by Joseph, before his departure from Bayonne, was mainly taken from the counsellors of the Prince of Asturias; and this selection, joined to their ready acceptance of their new dignities, throws a

(1) See constitution of Bayonne, *Thib.* vi. 402, 403; and *Tor.* i. 292, 295.

(2) "Sire!" said M. Azanza, the President of the Notables, "the Junta of Spain has accomplished the glorious task for which your Majesty convened it in this city. It has accepted, with as much eagerness as freedom, the great charter which fixes upon a sure foundation the happiness of Spain. Happily for our country, an overruling Providence has employed your irresistible hand to snatch it from the abyss into which it was about to be precipitated. It is well that it was irremissible; for an inexplicable blindness has caused those who ought most to rejoice at this benefit to misapprehend it. But all Spain, sire I will open its eyes. It will see that it required a total regeneration, and that from your Majesty alone it could obtain it. Public evil was at its height; the agents of a feeble government devoured the public patrimony, or extended unceasingly the limits of arbitrary power: the finances were a chaos; the public debt an abyss; the period of total dissolution was approaching. To what other power

but that of your imperial and royal Majesty could it be reserved, not merely to arrest the evil, but entirely to remove it? Such are the wonders, sire, which you have wrought in a few days, and which fill the world with astonishment."—*SOURDIS*, i. 436, 437.

(3) "My uncle and brother have been equally charmed with myself at the announcement of the arrival of your imperial and royal Majesty at Pau, which brings us nearer your presence; and since, whatever route you choose, you must pass near this, we should regard it as a very great satisfaction if your imperial and royal Majesty would permit us to meet you, and renew in person those homages of sincere attachment and respect which we all feel, if it is not inconvenient."—*FERNANDO VII to Napoléon*, 26th July, 1808; *MULLATO*, ii. 282. Napoléon, however, declined the honour, and never saw Ferdinand or any of his family more.

(4) See the Letter in *Nell.* ii. 262. *Thib.* vi. 406, 408. *Tor.* i. 294, 295.

New Ministry of Joseph, and his journey to, and arrival and reception at Madrid.

deep shade of doubt over the fidelity with which they had served that unhappy prince during his brief but eventful possession of the throne. Don Luis de Urquijo was made Secretary of State; Don Pedro Cevallos, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Don Sebastian de Pinuela, and Don Gonzalo O'Ferril, Ministers of Justice and at War; Don Miguel Azanza obtained the Colonies, and Mazaredo the Marine. Even Escalquiv wrote to Joseph, protesting his devotion to him, and declaring that he and the rest of Ferdinand's household "were willing to obey his will blindly,

June 22, 1808. down to the minutest particulars." The Duke del Infantado was appointed to the command of the Spanish; and the Prince of Castel-Franco to that of the Walloon Guards. Joseph entered Spain surrounded with the

July 20. highest grandeos and most illustrious titles of Spain. He reached Madrid on the 20th, having lingered for several days at Burgos and Vittoria, and received there the oaths of allegiance from the Council of State, the Council of the Indies, and that of the Finances. His reception in the capital was melancholy in the extreme; orders had been given that the houses of the inhabitants should be decked out to receive their new sovereign, but very few obeyed the injunction. A crowd assembled to see the brilliant cortege and splendid guards which accompanied the King, but no cheers or applause were heard. Every countenance bore a mournful expression; hardly any ladies appeared at the windows, notwithstanding the passionate fondness of the Spanish women for such displays. The bells of all the churches rang together, but they resembled rather the dismal toll at the interment of the dead, than the merry chime which announces a joyful event to the living (1).

Honourable instances of resistance to the general torrent of adulation among the grandeos in his favour.

To the honour of Spain and of human nature it must be stated, that in the midst of this humiliating scene of aristocratic baseness, some sparks of an independent spirit were elicited, and some men in high station asserted the ancient honour of the Spanish character. When the Duke del Infantado, at the head of the grandeos of the monarchy, delivered their address to the new sovereign, he concluded it with these words: "The laws of Spain do not permit us to go farther at present. We await the decision of the nation, which can alone authorize us to give a freer vent to our sentiments." No words can convey an idea of the anger of Napoleon at this unexpected reservation. Instantly approaching the Duke, he said, "As you are a gentleman, you should conduct yourself as such; and instead of disputing here on the words of an oath, which you will doubtless violate as soon as you have an opportunity, you would do better to withdraw at once, put yourself at the head of your party, and combat there openly and honourably. But you may rest assured, that if you take an oath here, and afterwards fail in its performance, before eight days you shall be shot." This violent apostrophe intimidated the Duke; the address was corrected, and delivered as above mentioned, by Azanza; but the Duke retained his opinions, and ere long appeared in the ranks of his country. The Council of Castile prefaced their address by the fulsome expression,—"Your Majesty is one of a family destined by Heaven to reign over mankind;" but they eluded, by alleging want of authority, the simple and unqualified taking of the oath of allegiance. Jovellanos, who had been liberated by the resignation of Charles IV and the fall of Godoy from his long captivity in the dungeons of Minorca, was offered by Joseph the portfolio of the Minister of the Interior; but the lengthened sufferings of that incorruptible patriot, under an oppressive government, could not blind him to the injustice now at-

tempted by his deliverers, and he declared his resolution to abide by the fortunes of his suffering countrymen rather than accept wealth and greatness from their oppressors (1). The Bishop of Orense, when nominated as one of the junta to proceed to Bayonne by the regency of Madrid (2), returned an answer declining the honour in such independent and elevated terms as must for ever command the respect of the generous among mankind (3).

Universal joy with which the news of the insurrection is received in England. Future ages will find it difficult to credit the enthusiasm and transport with which the tidings of the insurrection in Spain were received in the British islands. The earliest accounts were brought by the Asturian deputies, who reached London in the first week of June; and their reports were speedily confirmed and extended by the accounts from Corunna, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Never was public joy more universal. As the intelligence successively arrived of province after province having risen in indignant fury against the invader, and boldly hoisted the flag of defiance to his legions, the general rapture knew no bounds. It was evident now, even to the most ordinary capacity, that the revolutionary ambition of France had brought it into violent collision with the patriotic and religious feelings of a high-spirited and virgin people. "Never," says Southey, "since the glorious morning of the French Revolution, before one bloody cloud had risen to overcast the deceitful promise of its beauty, had the heart of England been affected by so generous and universal a joy." All classes joined in it; all degrees of intellect were swept away by the flood. The aristocratic party, who had so long struggled, with almost hopeless constancy, against the ever advancing wave of revolutionary ambition, rejoiced that it had at last broke on a rugged shore; and that, in the insolence of apparently unbounded power, it had finally proceeded to such extremities as had roused the impassioned resistance of a gallant people. The lovers of freedom hailed the Peninsular contest as the commencement of the first real effort of THE PEOPLE in the war. Former contests had lain between cabinets and armies on the one side, and democratic zeal ripened into military prowess, on the other; but now the case was changed; it was no longer a struggle for the power of kings or the privileges of nobles; the energy of the multitude was roused into action, the spirit of liberty was enlisted in the cause; the mighty lever which had shaken all the thrones of Europe had now, by the imprudence of him who wielded it, fallen into the hands of the enemy; it would

(1) "I am resolved," said he, in reply to the reiterated instances of Joseph and his Ministers, "to decline the place in the administration which you offer me; and I am convinced that you will strive in vain to overcome the resistance, by means of exhortations, of a people so brave and resolute to recover their liberties. Even if the cause of my country were so desperate as you suppose it, it will never cease to be that of honour and loyalty, and which every good Spaniard should embrace at any hazard."—TOLEDO, i. 299.

(2) Tor. i. 281, 299, 413. *Pièces Just.*

Memorable answer of the prelate, in his letter to the junta at the Bishop of Madrid, "now sees in the French of Orense to Emperor the oppressor of its princes his summons to Bayonne. the oppressor of its princes to Bayonne. and its own tyrant; it feels itself enslaved, while it is told of its happiness; and these chains it owes even less to perfidy than the presence of an army which it admitted to its strongholds when in terms of perfect amity. The nation is without a king, and knows not which way to turn. The abdication of its sovereign, and the appointment of Murat as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, all took place in France amidst foreign armies, and under the eyes of an Emperor who

conceived he was bestowing prosperity on Spain by placing on her throne a prince of his own family. The supreme junta has against it a thousand rumours, besides its armed president, and the troops which surround it; all which forbid its acts from being regarded as those of a free assembly. The same may be said of the councils and tribunals of justice. What a chaos of confusion, of misfortune to Spain! and will these misfortunes be avoided by an assembly held without the kingdom, convened in a situation where its deliberations can never be regarded as free? And if, to the tumultuous movements which menace the interior of the kingdom, we add the pretensions and probable pretensions of princes and powers abroad, and the probable intervention of a foreign armed force in the contests of which the Peninsula will soon be the theatre, what can be imagined more frightful, or more worthy of pity? Cannot the love and solicitude of the Emperor find some other mode of manifesting itself, than by such measures as will lead to its ruin rather than its cure?—Answer of PABLO, Bishop of ORENSE, to the Junta of Government at Madrid, which had named him as representative at Bayonne, May 29, 1808; TOLEDO, i. 413, 414; *Pièces Just.*

cast down the fabric of imperial as it had done that of regal power. With honest zeal and fervent sympathy, the great body of the British people united heart and soul with the gallant nation who, with generous, perhaps imprudent, enthusiasm, had rushed into the contest for their country's independence, and loudly called on the government to take their station by their side, and stake all upon the issue of so heart-stirring a conflict; while the few sagacious and well-informed observers, whom the general transport permitted to take a cool survey of the probable issue of the contest, observed with satisfaction, that the ambition of the French Emperor had at length offered a sea-girt and mountainous region for a battle-field, where the numerical inferiority of the British armies would expose them to less disadvantage than in any other theatre of European warfare (1).

Noble
speech of
Mr. Sheridan
on the
Spanish war
in Parlia-
ment.
June 15.

The first notice taken of these animating events in the British Parliament was on the 15th June, when the subject was introduced in a splendid speech by Mr. Sheridan, which merely embodied, in glowing language, the feelings which then, with unprecedented unanimity, agitated the British heart. "Never before," he exclaimed, "has so happy an opportunity existed for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. Hitherto Bonaparte has run a victorious race, because he has contended with princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom, or people without patriotism; he had yet to learn what it was to combat a people who were animated with one spirit against him. Now is the time to stand up boldly and fairly for the deliverance of Europe; and if the ministry will co-operate effectually with the Spanish patriots, they shall receive from me as cordial a support as if the man whom I most loved (2) were restored to life. Will not the animation of the Spanish mind be excited by the knowledge that their cause is espoused, not by the Ministers merely, but the Parliament and the people of England? If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be roused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation? Never was any thing so brave, so noble, so generous, as the conduct of the Spaniards, never was there a more important crisis than that which their patriotism has thus occasioned to the state of Europe. Instead of striking at the core of the evil, the Administrations of this country have hitherto gone nibbling merely at the rind; filching sugar islands, but neglecting all that was dignified and consonant to the real interests of the country. Now, therefore, is the moment to let the world know that we are resolved to stand up, firmly and fairly, for the salvation of Europe. Let us then co-operate with the Spaniards, but co-operate in an effectual and energetic way; and if we find that they are really resolved to engage heart and soul in the enterprise, advance with them in a magnanimous way and with an undaunted step for the liberation of mankind. Formerly, the contest in la Vendée afforded the fairest chance of effecting the deliverance of Europe; but that favourable chance was neglected by this country. What was then neglected is now looked up to with sanguine expectation; the only hope now is, that Spain may prove another la Vendée. Above all, let us mix no little interests with this mighty contest; let us discard or forget British objects, and conduct the war on the great principles of generous support and active co-operation (3).

(1) South. i. 443, 444. Ann. Reg. 1808, 193, 195.

(2) Mr. Fox.
(3) Parl. Deb. xi. 226, 229.

Reply of
Mr. Secretary
Canning.

These generous sentiments, worthy of the real friends of freedom and the leaders of the liberal party in its last asylum, found a responsive echo in the members of Administration. Mr. Secretary Canning replied, — “ His Majesty’s Ministers see, with as deep and lively an interest as my right honourable friend, the noble struggle which the Spanish nation are now making, to resist the unexampled atrocity of France, and preserve the independence of their country; and there exists the strongest disposition on the part of the British government, to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. In endeavouring to afford this aid, it will never occur to us to consider that a state of war exists between this country and Spain. Whenever any nation in Europe starts up with a determination to oppose a power, which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is alike the common enemy of all other people, that nation, whatever its former relation may be, becomes, *ipso facto*, the ally of Great Britain. In directing the aid which may be required, government will be guided by three principles—to direct the united efforts of both countries against the common foe—to direct them in such a way as shall be most beneficial to our new ally—and to such objects as may be most conducive to British interests. But of these objects the last will be out of all question, compared with the other two. I mention British objects, chiefly for the purpose of disclaiming them as any material part of the considerations which influence the British government. No interest can be so purely British as Spanish success; no conquest so advantageous to England as conquering from France the complete integrity of the Spanish dominions in every quarter of the globe (1).”

Reflections
on this de-
bate.

This debate marks, in more ways than one, an important era in the war, and indicates a remarkable change in the sentiments with which it was regarded by a large portion of the liberal party in the British dominions. There were no longer any apologies for Napoléon, or the principles of the Revolution; no deprecation of any attempt to resist the power of France, as in the earlier periods of the war. The eloquent declamations of Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine in favour of the great republic—their sophistical excuses for the grasping ambition in which its fervour had terminated—had expired. Experience and suffering, danger and difficulty, had, in a great degree, subdued even political passion, the strongest feeling, save religious, which can agitate mankind. Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Windham, from the *Opposition* benches, earnestly called on the government to engage deeply in the war; they loudly and justly condemned the selfish policy and Lilliputian expeditions of the aristocratic government in its earlier years, and demanded, in the name of public freedom, that England should at last take her appropriate place in the van of the conflict, and, disregarding all selfish or exclusively national objects, stand forth with all her might for the deliverance of mankind. In such sentiments from such men, none but the vulgar and superficial could see any inconsistency with their former opinions; whatever others might do, it was not to be supposed that the highest intellects and most generous hearts in the empire were to gaze all day at the east in hopes of still seeing the sun there. Resistance to French despotism and invasion was not only not inconsistent with, but necessarily flowed from, the real principles of the ardent philanthropists who had formerly opposed the overshadowing what they then deemed the brilliant dawn of the French Revolution; but it had the appearance of change to the numerous class who judge by words instead of things, and are attached, not to abstract principles, but

actual parties; and, therefore, the enunciation of such sentiments by any of the Whig leaders not only was an honourable instance of moral courage, but evinced a remarkable change in the general feeling of their party. Not less clearly was the disclamation of interested views or British objects by the ministerial chiefs, an indication of the arrival of that period in the contest, when the generous passions were at length aroused, and the fervent warmth of popular feeling had melted or overcome that frigid attention to interested objects, which, not less than their tenacity and perseverance, is the uniform characteristic of aristocratic governments among mankind.

English
Budget for
1808.

Animated by such powerful support, from the quarter where it was least expected, to enter vigorously into the contest, the English government made the most liberal provision for its prosecution. The supplies voted for the war-charges amounted to the enormous sum of L.48,300,000; to meet which, ways and means, to the value of L.48,400,000, were voted by Parliament; and the total income of the year 1808, including the ordinary and permanent revenue, was L.86,780,000, and the expenditure L.84,797,000. The loan was L.10,102,000 for England, and L.2,000,000 for Ireland, and the new taxes imposed only L.300,000; the Chancellor of the Exchequer having adhered, in a great measure, to the system approved of by both sides of the House in the finance debates of the preceding year, of providing for the increased charges of the year and the interest of the loans, in part at least, by an impignoration, in time of peace, of the war taxes. A April 14. subsidy of L.4,100,000 was provided for the King of Sweden. But these sums, great as they are, convey no adequate idea of the expenditure of this eventful year; the budget was arranged in April, before the Spanish contest had arisen; and for the vast expenses with which it was attended, and which, not having been foreseen, had not been provided for, there was no resource but a liberal issue of Exchequer bills, which fell as an oppressive burden upon future years (1).

(1) Parl. Deb. xi. 14, 21, and App. No. I. Ann. Reg. 1808, 103, 105. Marshall's Tables. Statement, No. 1.

The Budget was as follows:—

<i>War Income.</i>	
Malt and Pension duties,	L. 3,000,000
Bank advances,	3,500,000
Surplus of consolidated fund,	4,223,876
Surplus income of 1807,	2,253,111
War taxes,	20,000,000
Lottery,	300,000
Exchequer bills,	4,500,000
Do. for East India Company,	1,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on 1809,	1,161,100
Loan (*),	8,000,000
War income,	L.48,441,087

Permanent Income, viz.

Customs,	L. 7,462,380
Excise,	17,896,145
Stamps,	4,458,735
Land and assessed taxes,	7,073,530
Post-Office,	1,277,538
Pension tax,	62,885
Do.,	71,353
Hackney coaches,	26,455
Hawkers and pedlars,	10,325
Total permanent,	L.38,339,146
Add War,	48,441,087
Grand Total,	86,780,233

War Expenditure.

Navy,	L 17,496,917
Army,	19,428,180
Ordnance,	4,534,571
Miscellaneous,	1,750,000
East India Company,	1,500,000
Swedish subsidy,	1,100,000
Vote of credit,	2,900,000

War expenditure, L.48,319,467

Permanent Expenditure, viz.

Interest of public debt,	L 20,771,871
And charges,	210,519
Sinking Fund,	10,106,608
Interest of Exchequer bills,	1,616,562
Civil lists,	1,633,677
Civil Government of Scotland,	85,420
Miscellaneous charges,	797,262

Total Permanent, L.35,298,997

Add War, 48,319,467

Grand Total, L.83,618,464

The increased expenditure arising from the Spanish war, which was not foreseen in the budget, raised the charges to L.84,797,000.—See *Parl. Deb.* xi. 1—15; *Parl. Papers and Ann. Reg.* 1808, 103—105.

(*) It was afterwards by the vote of credit extended to L.10,100,000.

Immense
extent of
the supplies
which were
sent out to
Spain from
Great Bri-
tain.

The supplies of all sorts sent out during this year to the Spanish patriots, though in great part misapplied or wasted, were on a princely scale of liberality, and worthy of the exalted station which, by consent of all parties, England now took at the head of the alliance. In every province of the Peninsula juntas were established, and to all British envoys were sent, who made as minute enquiries into the wants and capabilities of the district as the circumstances would admit, and received ample powers from government to afford such aid, either in money, arms, clothing, or warlike stores, as they deemed it expedient to demand. Supplies of all sorts were, in consequence of these requisitions, sent to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Valencia, Malaga, and other places, with a profusion which astonished the inhabitants, and gave them at least ample means to fit themselves out for the contest in which they were engaged. It may readily be conceived, that amidst the enthusiasm and animation of the insurgent provinces, and the universal transport with which the British envoys were received, abundance of room was afforded for misrepresentation or delusion; that the accounts transmitted to government must, in many cases, have been inaccurate; and that, amidst the extraordinary profusion with which supplies of all sorts were poured into the country, there were many opportunities afforded to the native authorities of fraud or embezzlement, of which, amidst the general confusion, they were not slow of availing themselves. In truth, lamentable experience afterwards demonstrated that great part of these magnificent supplies was misapplied or neglected; the money being squandered or secreted, the stores sold or wasted, the arms piled and forgotten in magazines, when the patriots in the field were in want of the most necessary part of military equipment. Still with all these evils, inseparable probably from the condition of a country thus driven into a dreadful contest in the absence of any regular government, and unavoidably thrown under the direction of local and recently elected authorities, alike destitute of the knowledge, unacquainted with the arrangements, and relieved from the responsibility requisite for the faithful discharge of official duty, the prodigal bounty of England was attended with the most important effects upon the progress of the strife. It removed at once the imputation of cautious and prudential policy which the incessant declamations of the French writers, during the former periods of the war, joined to the feeble temporizing measures of preceding cabinets, had so strongly affixed to the British name; it demonstrated the sincerity and energy of a cabinet which thus, with unprecedented profusion, spread abroad in every quarter the means of resistance; and inspired boundless confidence in the resources of a power which, great at all times, seemed capable of gigantic expansion at the decisive moment, and appeared rather to have increased than diminished from a contest of fifteen years' duration (1).

(1) *Tor.* i. 301, 307. *Ann. Reg.* 1808, 1809. *Hard.* x. 191, 193, 236. *Lond.* i. 102.

The following is a statement of the sums of money and warlike stores sent by Great Britain to the Peninsula, from the beginning of the contest in June, 1808, to the commencement of 1809:—

Subsidies in money,	L. 3,100,000
Pieces of cannon,	98
Cannon balls,	31,000
Mortars,	38
Mortar charges,	7,200
Cannonades,	80
Muskets,	200,177
Carabines,	220

Sabres,	61,300
Pikes,	79,000
Cartridges,	23,477,000
Leadens balls,	6,000,000
Barrels of powder,	15,400
Haversacks,	34,000
Cartridge-boxes,	240,000
Infantry accoutrements,	39,000
Tents,	40,000
Field equipages,	10,000
Ells of Linen,	113,000
Cloth,	125,000
Cotton,	82,000
Cloaks,	50,000
Coats and trousers,	92,000

Military
measures
adopted by
Napoleon
against the
insurrec-
tion.

No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the general progress and formidable character of the insurrection, that a serious contest awaited him, than he set about, with all his usual caution and ability, preparing the means of overcoming its difficulties. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with five thousand foot and eight hundred horse, against Saragossa, and to move his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, Asturias, and old Castile. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia, which it was hoped would enable him to make head against the enemy in that quarter; a reserve was organized, under General Drouot, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre, which, besides nourishing Bessières with continual additions of force, established five thousand men in the openings of the valleys towards the castle of Jaca, which was in possession of the enemy; another reserve was established in Perpignan, and detachments were stationed in the eastern passes of the mountains. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuenca, so as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa, and subsequently threatened the former city; while Dupont, with two divisions of his corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova and Seville; the remainder of his corps and of that of Moncey being stationed in reserve in La Mancha to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance. With so much foresight and caution did this great commander distribute his forces, even against an insurgent peasantry, and an enemy at that period deemed wholly unable to withstand the shock of his veteran legions (1).

Successful
operations
of Bessières
and Frere in
Old Castile
and Leon,
against the
insurgents.

The first military operations of any importance were those of Marshal Bessières in Biscay and Old Castile. That able officer was at Burgos with twelve thousand men, when the insurrection broke out with great violence in all directions around him; and he received advices that a body of five thousand armed men had got possession of the important depot of artillery at Segovia, and another assemblage of equal force was arming itself from the royal manufactory of arms at Palencia, while General Cuesta, the captain-general of the province, with a few regiments of regular troops and a strong body of undisciplined peasantry, had taken post at Cabicon on the Pisuerga. These positions appeared to Savary, who was now the chief in command at Madrid, so alarming, that he detached General Frere with his division, forming part of Dupont's corps, in June 6.

all haste to Segovia, where he routed the peasantry, and made himself master of all the artillery they had taken from the arsenal, amounting to thirty pieces. Meanwhile, Bessières divided his disposable force into several movable columns, which issuing from Burgos as a centre, traversed the country in all directions, every where defeating and disarming the insurgents, and June 6. reinstating the French authorities whom they had dispossessed. One of these divisions, under Verdier, routed the enemy at Logrono, and

Shirts,	35,000
Cotton pieces,	22,000
Pairs of shoes,	96,000
Soles of Shoes,	15,000
Canteens,	50,000
Hats and bonnets,	16,000

In addition to these immense national supplies, private subscriptions were entered into in the chief towns of the empire, and large sums collected and remitted from the British Islands to the Spanish patriots.—*Annual Register*, 1808, 1809.

(1) Napoleon's Orders. Napier, i. App. No. 2. Ibid. i. 60. Foy, iii. 265, 268.

with inhuman and unjustifiable cruelty put all their leaders to death; another, under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry at Torquemada, burned the town, pursued them with merciless severity, and entered Palencia on the day following; while a third, under Merle, uniting with Lasalle, made straight for Cuesta at Cabicon, who accepted battle, but was speedily

overthrown, and his whole new levies dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, and several thousand muskets, which were thrown away in the pursuit. By these successes the whole level country in the upper part of the valley of the Douro was overawed and reduced to submission. Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and all the principal towns, which had revolted, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph; and the terrible French dragoons, dispersing through the smaller towns and villages, diffused such universal consternation, that all the flat country in this quarter submitted to King Joseph and the French; requisitions and taxes were levied without difficulty throughout the whole remainder of the campaign. General Merle continuing his success, marched northward against the

province of Santander in Asturias, forced the rugged passes of Lantuerio and Venta d'Escude, and descending the northern side of the ridge of Santander, in concert with a portion of the reserve, which the Emperor dispatched to his assistance, made themselves masters of that town, and forced the intrepid bishop, with his warlike followers, to take refuge in the inaccessible fastnesses of the neighbouring mountains (1).

While Leon and Castile were the theatre of these early and important successes, the province of Arragon, though almost entirely destitute of regular forces, was successful, after sustaining several bloody reverses, in maintaining a more prolonged resistance to the enemy. By indefatigable exertions, Palafox and the energetic junta of Saragossa had succeeded in arming and communicating the rudiments of discipline to a tumultuous assembly of ten thousand infantry and two hundred horse, with which, and eight pieces of artillery, his brother, the Marquis Lazan, ventured to march out of the city and await Lefebvre in a favourable position behind the Huecha. But though the French were not more than half the number of the enemy, they were, from the want of discipline in their opponents, and their own great superiority in cavalry, much more than a match for them.

The peasants withstood, without flinching, several attacks in front; but a vigorous charge in flank threw them into disorder, and a gallant attack by the Polish lancers completed their route. Notwithstanding this defeat, the Arragonese who had escaped, having received reinforcements, again stood

firm on the following day at Gallur, still nearer Saragossa, and were again overthrown. Upon this Palafox himself marched out of the capital, at the head of five thousand undisciplined burghers and peasants, and moved to reinforce the wreck of the former army at Alagon; an advantageous position, four leagues from the capital of the province, on the banks of the Jalón, near its confluence with the Ebro, where the whole took post. But the

undisciplined crowd, discouraged by the preceding defeats, was now in no condition to make head against the French legions. The burghers, at the first sight of the enemy, broke and fled; and though Palafox, with a few pieces of artillery and three companies of regular troops, contrived for long to defend the entrance of the town, they too were at last compelled to yield, and retire in disorder into SARAGOSSA; and the French troops appeared before the heroic city. In the first tumult of alarm the gates were feebly de-

fended, and a battalion of French penetrated by the Corso as far as Santa Engracia; but being unsupported, it was compelled to retire, and the inhabitants, elated with this trifling advantage, crowded to the walls and prepared seriously for their defence (1).

Description
of Saragossa.

Saragossa, which has now, like Numantia and Saguntum, become immortal in the rolls of fame, is situated on the right bank of the Ebro, in the midst of a fertile plain abounding in olive groves, vineyards, gardens, and all the marks of long-continued civilisation. It contained at that period 53,000 inhabitants, though the sword and pestilence consequent on the two memorable sieges which it underwent, have since considerably reduced its numbers. The immediate vicinity is flat, and in some places marshy; on the southern or right bank of the river it is bounded by the little course of the Huerba, the bed of which has been converted into a canal, while on the northern, the clearer stream of the Gallego, descending from the Pyrenean summits, falls at right angles into the Ebro. On the southern side, and at the distance of a quarter of a league, rises Mont Torrero, on the side of which is conducted the canal of Arragon, a noble work, forming a water communication, without a single lock, from Tudela to Saragossa, commenced by the Emperor Charles V. This hill commands all the plain on the left bank, and overlooks the town; several warehouses and edifices, constructed for the commerce of the canal, were intrenched and occupied by twelve hundred men. The city itself, surrounded by a low brick wall, not above ten or twelve feet in height, and three in thickness, interrupted in many places by houses and convents which were built in its line, and pierced by eight gates, with no outworks, could scarcely be said to be fortified. Very few guns were on the ramparts in a state fit for service; but the houses were strongly built, partly of stone, partly of brick, and in general two stories in height, with each story vaulted in the roof, so as to render them nearly proof against fire; and the massy piles of the convents, rising like castles in many quarters, afforded strong positions, if the walls were forced, to a desperate and inflamed population. Few regular generals would have thought of making a stand in such a city; but Florus has recorded that Numantia had neither walls nor towers when it resisted so long and heroically the Roman legions; and Colmenar had said, nearly a century before, with a prophetic spirit, "Saragossa is without defences; but the valour of its inhabitants supplies the want of ramparts (2)."

The resolution to defend Saragossa cannot with justice be ascribed to the honour of any single individual, as the glory belongs to the whole population, all of whom, in the first movements of confusion and excitement, had a share in the generous resolution. When Palafox retired after his repeated

defeats into the town, he either despaired of being able to defend it, or deemed it necessary to collect reinforcements for a prolonged resistance from other quarters, and accordingly set out with a small body of regular troops for the northern bank of the river, leaving the armed population nearly unsupported to defend the walls. This measure was well adapted to increase the ultimate means of resistance which might be brought to bear upon the invader, if the town, when left to its own resources, could make head against the enemy; but it exposed it to imminent hazard of being taken, if, in the first moments of alarm consequent on the removal of the captain-general and regular forces, the besiegers should vigorously prosecute their operations.

This accordingly happened. On the day after the repulse of his first

(1) Foy, iii. 291, 292. Tor. i. 307, 308. South. i. 457.

(2) Tor. ii. 1, 4. Foy, iii. 293, 294. Nap. i. 65. 66. Cavallero, *Siege de Saragossa*, 29, 33.

attack, Lefebvre presented himself in greater force before the gates, and commenced an immediate assault. But the people, though without leaders, with surprising energy prepared to repulse it. In the first moment of assault, indeed, a column of the enemy penetrated to the street Santa Engracia; the people, though violently excited, were without leaders or concert, and a few additional battalions would have made the enemy masters of Saragossa. But at this critical moment a desultory fire from some peasants and disbanded soldiers arrested his advance, and the inhabitants, regaining hope from the hesitation of the assailants, exerted themselves with such vigour, that the enemy again retired beyond the gates. Instantly the whole population were in activity; men, women, and children flew to the ramparts; cannons were dragged to the gates; loopholes struck out in the walls; fascines and gabions constructed with astonishing celerity, and in less than twenty-four hours the city was secure from a *coup de main* (1).

Operations
of Palafox
to relieve
the city.
He is de-
feated, and
re-enters it.

The loss sustained by Lefebvre in these unsuccessful assaults was very severe, and sufficient to convince him that operations in form would be requisite before the town could be reduced. He withdrew to a little distance, therefore, from the walls, and sent for heavy

artillery from Pampeluna and Bayonne, with a view to the commencement of a regular siege. Meanwhile, Palafox, who had issued into the plain on the left bank of the Ebro, moved to Pina, where he crossed the river and advanced to Belchite, where he joined the Baron Versage, who had assembled four thousand new levies; and uniting every where the volunteers whom he found

in the villages, gained, by a circuitous route, the river Xalon, in the rear of the French army, with seven thousand infantry, an hundred horse, and four pieces of cannon. Some of his officers, seeing so respectable a force collected together, deemed it imprudent to hazard it by attempting the relief of Saragossa, and proposed that they should retire to Valencia. Palafox assembled the troops the moment that he heard of this proposal, and, after describing in energetic colours the glorious task which awaited them of delivering their country, offered to give passports to all those who wished to leave the army. Such was the ascendancy of his intrepid spirit that not one person left the ranks (2). Taking advantage of the enthusiasm excited by this unanimous determination, the Spanish general led them against the enemy, but before they could reach him night had fallen. They took up their quarters accordingly at Epila, where they were unexpectedly assailed, after dark, by Lefebvre with five thousand men. The Spanish levies, surprised and unable to form their ranks during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, were easily

dispersed; although a few fought with such obstinacy that they only effected their retreat to Calatayud the following morning. Despairing from the issue of this conflict, of being able to keep the field (3), Palafox became sensible that Saragossa must be defended within its own walls, and, making a long circuit, he at length re-entered the city on the 2d July.

(1) Cavallero, 46, 47. Tor. i. 6, 7. Napier, ii. 66, 67.

(2) Colonel Napier, who is never favourable to aristocratic leaders, says, that "Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably owed by Tio Jorge (an urban chief of humble origin), expressed his determination to fight," but he "did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, as he must have fled early and reached Calatayud in the night, though many of the troops arrived there unbroken next morning." Neither the words in Italics, nor any corresponding words, are to be found in Cavallero, whom he quotes as his authority, nor in any Spanish historian with whom I am acquainted. Torneo,

though an avowed Liberal, after recounting Palafox's speech on this occasion, says, "such is the power which the inflexible resolution of a chief exercises in critical circumstances." There is not the least reason to suspect the distinguished English author of intentional misrepresentation, but the insinuations here made are vital to the character of Palafox; and as there is no ground for them, at least in the author quoted by him, it is desirable that the authorities on which they are made should be given in the next edition of that able work.—See CAVALLERO, *Siege de Saragossa*, 49; TORNEO, ii. 11; and NAPIER, i. 67.

(3) Tor. i. 11, 12. Cav. 49, 50. Nap. i. 67, 68.

First operation
of the
siege.

Meanwhile, the besieging force, having received heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pampeluna, were vigorously prosecuting their operations, which were in the first instance chiefly directed against Monte Torrero, on the left bank of the river. Destitute at this critical moment of any noble leaders, the people of Saragossa did not at the same time sink under their difficulties. Calvo de Rosas, to whom the command had been devolved in his absence by Palafox, was a man whose calm resolution was equal to the emergency; and he was energetically supported by a plebeian chief, Tio Martin, to whom with Tie Jorge, of similar rank, the real glory of resolving on defence, in circumstances all but desperate, is due. Encouraged

June 25. by the intrepid conduct of their chiefs, the people assembled in the public square, and with the magistrates, officers, and troops of the garrison, voluntarily took an oath "to shed the last drop of their blood for the defence of their religion, their king, and their hearths." They had need of all their resolution, for the means of attack against them were multiplying in a fearful progression. Verdier, whose talents had been fatally felt by the Prussians and Russians in the Polish campaign, was appointed to the command of the siege; the troops under his command were strongly reinforced, and Lefebvre detached to act under the orders of Bessieres against the insurgents in Leon.

June 26. At the end of June, the besieging force being augmented to twelve thousand men, and the battering train having arrived, an attack was made on the convent of St. Joseph, situated outside of the walls, which at first failed, though the besieged had no other defence than loopholes struck out in the rampart; but being resumed with greater force, the defences were carried, and the brave garrison, after obstinately defending the church, refectory, and

June 27. cells, set fire to the edifice, and retreated to the city. Monte Torrero was the next object of attack, while a tremendous fire, kept up with uncommon vigour on other parts of the town, diverted the attention of the besieged from the quarter where the real attack was to be made. The commander, despairing of success with the undisciplined crowd under his command, and not aware of the difference between fighting with such troops behind walls and in the open field, evacuated that important post; for which, though perhaps inevitable, he was remitted to a council of war, condemned and executed (1).

Progress of
the besieging
force.

Having gained this vantage-ground, Verdier commenced a vigorous bombardment of the city, and battered its feeble walls furiously from the advantageous position which had so unexpectedly fallen into his power; and amidst the terror and confusion thus excited, made repeated attacks on the gates of El Carmen and Portillo; but such was the ardour and tenacity of the defence, and the severity of the fire kept up from the windows, walls, and roofs of houses, that he was on every occasion repulsed, after desperate struggles, with severe loss. These repeated failures convinced Verdier of the necessity of making approaches in form, and completing the investment of the city, which still received constant supplies of men and provisions from the surrounding province. With this view he threw a bridge of boats over the Ebro, and having thus opened a communication with the left bank, the communication of the besieged with the country, though not entirely cut off, was, after hard fighting, for many days restrained within very

July 17.

narrow limits. Before this could be effected, however, the patriots received a reinforcement from the regiment of Estremadura eight hundred strong, with the aid of which they made a desperate sally with two thousand

men to retake the Monte Torrero; but though the assailants fought with the utmost vehemence, they were unable to prevail against the disciplined valour of the French, and were repulsed with very heavy loss, including that of their commander. After this disaster they were necessarily confined to their walls; Aug. 8. and the French approaches having been at length completed, the breaching batteries opened against the quarters of St.-Engracia and Aljafirja, and a terrible bombardment having at the same time been kept up, a powder-magazine blew up with terrific devastation in the public walk of the Cosso. The slender wall being soon laid in ruins, the town was summoned to surrender; but Palafox having rejected the offer, preparations were made for an assault (1).

Final
assault of
the town.

The storm took place on the 4th August. Palafox at an early hour stationed himself on the breach, and even when the forlorn hope was approaching, refused all terms of capitulation. The combat at the ruined rampart was long and bloody; but after a violent struggle, the French penetrated into the town, and made themselves masters of the street of Santa Engracia. Deeming themselves now in possession of Saragossa, their numerous battalions poured through the deserted breach, overspread the ramparts on either side, while a close column pushed on, with fixed bayonets and loud cheers, from Santa Engracia to the street of Cosso. But a desperate resistance there awaited them. Despite all the efforts of the citizens, they penetrated to the centre of the street, planted the tricolor flag on the church of the Cross near its middle, and pierced into the convent of S.-Francisco on its left, and the lunatic asylum on its right, whence the insane inmates, taking advantage of the confusion, issued forth, and mingled, with frightful cries, shouts, and grimaces, among the combatants. To add to the consternation, another powder magazine blew up in the thickest of the fight, and the burning fragments falling in all directions, set the city on fire in many different quarters. But notwithstanding all these horrors, the Spaniards maintained the conflict; an incessant fire issued from the windows and roofs of the houses; several detached bodies of the enemy, which penetrated into the adjoining streets, were repulsed; a column got entangled in a long crooked street, the Arco de Cineja, and was driven back into the Cosso with great slaughter; Palafox, Calvo, Tio Jorge, and St.-Martin, vied with each other in heroism; and when night separated the combatants, the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso and the citizens of the other (2).

Continued
contest in
the streets,
and raising
of the siege.

The successful resistance thus made to the enemy after they had penetrated into the city, and the defences of the place, in a military point of view, had been overcome, showed the Saragossans with what prospects they might maintain the conflict even from house to house; but their gallant leader was not without apprehensions that their ammunition might fail, or their defenders be ruinously reduced during so prolonged a struggle; and, therefore, no sooner had the first triumph of the enemy been arrested, than he hastened out of the town to accelerate the arrival of the reinforcements which he knew were approaching, and exerted himself with so much vigour during the succeeding days, that on the morning of the 8th he succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, and entered the city at the head of three thousand men and a large convoy of ammunition and provisions. It may easily be imagined with what trans-

(1) Cav. 51, 55. Tor. ii. 21, 25. Foy, iii. 298, 300. Nap. i. 68, 69.

(2) Cav. 56, 59. Tor. ii. 25, 29. Nap. i. 70.

ports they were received, for, in the interim, the citizens had had a desperate conflict to maintain, from which they never enjoyed one moment's respite. From street to street, from house to house, from room to room, the fight was kept up with incredible obstinacy on both sides; every post became the theatre of bloody strife, to which company after company, column after column, regiment after regiment, were successively brought up; while the fire of musketry, the roar of artillery, the flight of bombs, the glare of conflagration, and the cries of the combatants, continued without intermission night and day. But all the efforts of the besiegers were in vain: animated almost to frenzy by the long duration and heart-stirring interest of the conflict, all classes vied with each other in heroic constancy; the priests were to be seen at the posts of danger, encouraging the soldiers, and administering consolation to the wounded and the dying; the women and children carried water incessantly to the quarters on fire, attended the wounded, interred the dead; many even forgot the timidity of their sex, and took the places of their slain husbands or brothers at the cannon side; the citizens relieved each other night and day at the mortal and perpetual struggle with the enemy. Such was the vigour of the resistance, that from the 4th to the 14th August the besiegers made themselves masters only of four houses; one in front of the Treasury was only won after an incessant combat of six day's duration. After the arrival of the reinforcements under Palafox, the conflict was no longer equal; symptoms of discouragement were manifest in the enemy; sinister rumours circulated on both sides, of a great disaster in the south; and they were gradually losing ground, even in those quarters of which they had obtained possession during the first burst of the assault. Still the fire of artillery continued, and was particularly violent during the night of the 14th August; but at daybreak on the following morning it suddenly ceased, and the besieged, when the sun rose, beheld with astonishment the enemy at some distance, in full retreat, traversing the plain towards Pampeluna. The victory was complete: the heavy cannon and siege stores were all abandoned or thrown into the canal; and the inhabitants, with enthusiastic shouts of transport, concluded, amidst cries of "Long live our Lady of the Pillar," the ceremony of the *Fête-Dieu*, which had been interrupted by the commencement of the siege on the 16th June (1).

Operations of Moncey in Valencia. In truth, while this sanguinary conflict was raging in Saragossa, disasters of the most serious nature had been experienced by the French in the south and east of Spain. Moncey, who had set out from June 5.

Madrid early in June, with eight thousand men, to suppress the insurrection in Valencia and cut off the communication between that city and Saragossa, reached Cuenca on the 11th, where he remained inactive for several days. Resuming at length his march on the 16th, he advanced by Pesquera towards Valencia: but as he penetrated farther into the country, the universal desertion of the towns and villages, and evident traces of armed men on his line of march, gave gloomy presages of an approaching storm. In the first instance, however, these indications proved fallacious. Some Swiss companies, with a body of armed peasants and four pieces of cannon, had, indeed, taken post to defend the strong and important pass of the bridge of Pajazo, on the river Cabriel; but the new levies dispersed on the first appearance of the enemy, and the greater part of the Swiss troops joined the invaders; so that the bridge was gained without any difficulty. Encouraged by this success, Moncey wrote to General Chabran, who was

ordered to co-operate with him from the side of Catalonia, appointing a rendezvous on the 28th, under the walls of Valencia; and, advancing forward, approached the rocky ridge of calcareous mountains called Cabrillas, which forms the western boundary of the kingdom of Valencia. A single road traversed, by a rapid and laborious ascent, this rugged barrier; and as the adjoining heights were impassable for cavalry, a more advantageous position for resisting the enemy could not have been desired. The summits of the rocks which bordered the defile on either side, were covered with armed peasants to the number of six thousand; and four pieces of artillery, supported by a regiment of regular troops, and a troop of horse, guarded the main road. All these obstacles, however, were speedily overcome: while the cavalry and artillery engaged the attention of the enemy in front, General Harisppe turned their flank, and by a rapid attack over almost inaccessible rocks, threw them into confusion, dispersed the new levies, and captured all the ammunition, baggage, and artillery. Nothing now existed to retard the advance of the invaders; the summit of the ridge was soon gained, from which the French soldiers, wearied with the arid mountains and waterless plains of Castile (1), beheld, with the delight of the Israelites of old, the green plains and irrigated meadows and level richness of the promised land, and three days afterwards they appeared before the walls of Valencia.

Description of Valencia, and preparations for its defence.

Situated on the right of the Guadalaviar or Turia, and in the vicinity of the sea, Valencia is one of the most delightful cities which is to be found in Europe. It contains a hundred thousand inhabitants; but of that number more than one-half inhabit the enchanting suburban villas which lie without the walls. These consist of an old rampart of unhewn stones, rudely put together, including within their circuit a decayed citadel. In a military point of view, therefore, it could hardly be regarded as a place of defence; but the spirit and circumstances of the inhabitants rendered the slightest rampart a tower of strength. The enthusiasm of the people ran high; their hatred of the invaders was inextinguishable; and the crimes they had committed were too serious to give them any rational hope of safety but in the most determined resistance. It is a melancholy but certain fact, that in revolutionary movements, as in all others where passion is the prime mover, the most enduring and often successful efforts result from the consciousness of such enormities as leave no hope but in obstinate hostility—*una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem*. The junta had ably and energetically directed the public activity; engineers had marked out intrenchments and planted batteries to protect the principal gates of the city; a fortified camp had been constructed at a league from the walls; and the inhabitants, without distinction of age, rank, or sex, had laboured night and day for several weeks past, to complete the works on which their common safety depended. Within the gates preparations had been made for the most vigorous resistance; trenches had been cut, and barriers constructed across the principal streets; chariots and carts overturned so as to impede the advance of the assailants; the windows were filled with mattresses, and the doors barricaded; while a plentiful array of fire-arms, stones, and boiling oil, was prepared on the flat tops of the houses to rain down death on the enemy (2).

Attack on the city. Its repulse.

The wreck of the troops and armed peasants who had combated at the Cabrillas, took refuge in the intrenched camp at Cuarte,

(1) Nap. i. 92, 93. Tor. i. 326, 329. Foy, iii. 250.

(2) Tor. 329, 330. Foy, iii. 253, 255. Nap. i. 93.

without the walls, where they occupied in force the sides of the canal which unites the waters of the Guadalquivir to those of the Fera. In that position
June 27. they were attacked early on the morning of the 27th, and, after three hours' firing, driven back to the batteries and intrenchments in front of the gates. There, however, a more determined stand was made; and Moncey, desirous of bringing up his whole forces and artillery, deferred the attack on the city itself till the following day. Hardly an eye was closed in Valencia during the succeeding night; all ranks, and both sexes, laboured incessantly to complete the preparations of defence; and so great was the universal activity, that when the rays of the morning sun appeared above the blue expanse of the Mediterranean, it was hardly possible for the assailants
June 28. to hope for success but from the pusillanimity of the defenders.

Moncey disposed his field-pieces in the most favourable situations to reply to the heavy artillery on the ramparts and outworks; and having driven the enemy through the suburbs, commenced the assault. Such, however, was the vigour of the defence, that very little success was gained: the light artillery of the French was soon overpowered by the heavy cannon on the walls; a murderous fire of grape was kept up from the top of the rampart and the intrenchments round the entrances of the city; while the new levies, wholly unable to withstand the shock of their veteran opponents in the open field, contended on terms of comparative equality in the houses and behind the walls or enclosures adjoining the gates. The enthusiasm within increased as the fire approached their dwellings; the priests traversed the streets with the cross in their hands, exhorting the people to continue the contest; the women brought up ammunition to the combatants; and when the grape-shot began to fail, the ladies of rank instantly furnished an ample supply of missiles to charge the guns. A city so defended was beyond the reach of a *coup de main*: the French troops rapidly melted away under the dropping fire with which they were assailed from many different quarters; and in the evening Moncey drew off to Cuarte, having lost two thousand men in this fruitless attack (4).

Progress of the insurrection, and partial successes of the patriots in that quarter. The spirit of the Valencians was roused to the very highest pitch by this glorious result; and in the first burst of their triumph they confidently expected that the Conde Cervallon, who commanded a corps six thousand strong, consisting chiefly of armed peasants on the banks of the Xucar, would fall upon the enemy in his retreat and complete his destruction. But while these flattering illusions were filling the city with transport, Cervallon himself narrowly escaped destruction. Attacked by Moncey in his retreat, he was surprised with one-half of his corps on one side of the river, and the remainder on the other; the part first assailed made a feeble resistance; in the confusion of the rout, the French made themselves masters of a bridge, and rapidly passing over, soon completed the defeat of the portion on the other side. Two days after, three thousand, who had escaped from the first disaster, were attacked and dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, near Almanza, the celebrated theatre of the victory of the French over the allies in the Succession War. But these advantages, though considerable, gained by a retreating army in the course of its flight, were no counterpoise to the disaster experienced before Valencia; the whole province was up in arms at the glorious tidings; the communication both with Catalonia and Madrid was cut off; Cuenca was besieged by a body of seven thousand pea-

July 1. July 3.

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July 1. santa, who overpowered the detachment left in that town; and though the victors were themselves assailed two days after and dispersed with great slaughter by Caulaincourt, whom Savary dispatched from Madrid

July 2. with a powerful body of horse to restore the communication with Moncey in that quarter, yet the object of the advance towards Valencia was totally lost; and the French general, finding that Frère, with his division, on whose aid he had calculated in a renewed attack which he was preparing against that city, had been recalled to Madrid by orders of Savary, who was alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake towards the Guadarrama pass, gave up the expedition in despair, and returned by Ocana to the capital (1).

The ultimate failure of the expedition of Moncey towards Valencia was occasioned by the terror excited in the capital of the threatening advance of Cuesta and Blake, with their united forces, upon the French line of communication between Madrid and the Bayonne frontier. There, it was evident, was the vital point of the contest; there a disaster would instantly be attended with fatal consequences; secured in that quarter, the failure of less considerable expeditions emanating from the capital was of comparatively little importance. Napoleon, who was strongly impressed with these views, had used the utmost efforts to reinforce Bessières, to whom the defence of the line through Old Castile was intrusted; and after providing for the occupation of the various points in which he had so early and successfully suppressed the insurrection, he could concentrate twenty thousand men to act against the enemy, who were approaching from the Galician mountains. But meantime the enemy had not been idle. Filanighieri, Captain-General of Galicia, had, with the aid of the bountiful supplies of England, succeeded in organizing twenty-five thousand men—including the soldiers who had come to Corunna from Oporto, originally part of Junot's expedition, and the garrisons of that place and Ferrel, with a considerable train of artillery—and taken post in the mountains ten miles in the rear of Astorga. The situation of this corps, threatening the line of communication between Bayonne and Madrid, was such as to excite the utmost disquietude in the breast of Napoleon; and he sedulously impressed upon Savary that it was there that the decisive blow was to be struck (2). That general, however, was not so well aware as his imperial master where the vital point was to be found; and instead of reinforcing Bessières with all his disposable forces, he dispatched Frère with his division on the track of Moncey, to endeavour to reopen the communication with that marshal, which the intervening insur-

Opposition
of Bessières
against
Blake and
Cuesta in
Leon.

rection had entirely cut off; and sent on Vedel and Gobert, with their respective divisions, to reinforce Dupont, who had by this time crossed the Sierra Morena, and was far advanced in his progress through Andalusia. Impressed, in a short time afterwards, with the increasing danger to his communications which arose from the junction of the Galician army near Astorga with that which still kept its ground in Leon under Cuesta, he hastily countermanded these orders; recalled Frère to Madrid; ordered Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont himself, to remeasure their steps, and held himself in readiness to march from the capital with all the disposable troops he could collect, to reinforce Bessières on the line of the great northern communica-

(1) *Nap. i. 97, 98. For. iii. 336, 243. Voy. iii. 269, 262, and iv. 40, 44.*

(2) "A stroke delivered by Bessières," said he, "would paralyze all Spain. What signifies now Valencia and Andalusia? The only way really to strengthen Dupont is to reinforce Bessières. There is not a citizen of Madrid, not a peasant in the re-

motest valleys of Spain, who does not feel that the fate of the campaign is exclusively in the hands of Marshal Bessières. What a misfortune, then, that in so important an affair we should lose a chance, how inconsiderable soever, of success."—*Napoleon to Savary, July 12, 1808; For. iv. 45, 46, and Narvaiz, i. Appendix, No. 1.*

tion. These dispositions, as usual with alterations made in general designs on the spur of the moment, and in presence of the enemy, were essentially erroneous; the decisive point should have been looked to at first; the subsequent vacillation was too late to strengthen Bessières, but was calculated essentially to weaken Dupont, whom it went to deprive, in imminent danger, of one of his best divisions. As such they excited the greatest displeasure in Napoléon, who gave vent to it in an able and acrimonious despatch (which throws great light on the state of the campaign at this period), and never afterwards in military transactions intrusted Savary with any important command (1). But meanwhile the danger had blown over in the north; Bessières, though unsupported, had not only made head against Cuesta and Blake, but defeated them; and a great victory in the plains of León had opened to Joseph the gates of Madrid.

Movements
preparatory
to a battle
on both
sides.

Blake, with the army of Galicia, having effected a junction with the remains of Cuesta's troops which had escaped the route of Palencia, their united forces having left a division at Boecente to protect their stores, advanced into the plains of León to give battle to Bessières. This plan could not but appear rash, considering the veteran character of the French troops, their superiority in cavalry, and the undisciplined crowd of which a large part of the Spanish levies was composed. It was undertaken solely on the responsibility of Cuesta, who had assumed the chief command, and against the strongest remonstrances of Blake, who urged that by falling back to the frontiers of Galicia, where the French general could never pretend to follow them, they would gain time to discipline and equip their troops, and would soon be enabled to advance again at the head of forty thousand effective men. This sage counsel was rejected. Cuesta, who was a brave but inexperienced veteran, equally headstrong and obstinate, insisted upon an immediate action; and finding that Blake still declined to obey, he addressed himself to the junta of Galicia, who, yielding to popular clamour, seconded his orders, and directed Blake forthwith to advance and give battle. Having now no alternative but submission, Blake did the utmost in his power, during the short interval which remained, to put his

(1) Sav. iii. 246, 252. Tor. ii. 344, 345. Foy, iv. 40, 47. Nap. i. 101, 102.

"The French affairs in Spain," said Napoléon, "would be in an excellent state if Gohert's division had marched upon Valladolid to support Bessières, and Frere's division had occupied San Clemente, alike ready to reinforce Monecy or Dupont as circumstances might require. Instead of this, Gohert having been directed upon Dupont, and Frere being with Monecy, harassed and weakened by marches and counter-marches, our situation has been sensibly injured. It is a great mistake not to have occupied the citadel of Segovia; of all positions in that quarter it is the most dangerous to the French army, as, situated between two roads, it intercepts both communications. If Dupont should experience a check, it is of no consequence; the only effect of it would be to leave him to repossess the mountains; but a stroke delivered to Marshal Bessières would tell on the heart of the army, which would give it a locked-jaw, and speedily be felt in all its extremities. It is on this account that it is so unfortunate that the prescribed orders have not been specifically obeyed. The army of Bessières should have had at least 8000 men more than it has, in order to remove all chance of a disaster in that quarter. The affair of Valencia was a matter of no importance; Monecy was alone adequate to it; it was absurd to think of reinforcing him. If he could not take that

town with the forces he had, he could not have done so with 20,000 more; in that view it would become an affair of artillery. You cannot take by a stroke on the neck a town with 80,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, who have barricaded the streets and fortified the houses. Frere, therefore, could have added nothing to the means of strategy against Valencia, while the abstraction of his division seriously weakened Dupont. Moreover, if the latter general was to be succoured, it would have been better to have sent him a single regiment direct, than three by so circuitous a route as that by which Frere was ordered to march. In civil wars it is the important points which must be defended, and no attempt made to go every where. The grand object of all the armies should be to preserve Madrid; it is there that every thing is to be lost or won. Madrid cannot be seriously menaced but by the army of Galicia; for Bessières has not adequate forces to ensure its defeat. It may be threatened by the army of Andalusia, but hardly endangered; for, in proportion as Dupont falls back, he is reinforced, and with their 20,000 men he and Vedel should at least be able to keep the enemy in check in that quarter. Notes addressed to SAVARY on the affairs of Spain by NAPOLEON, 13th July, 1808; taken at the battle of Vittoria, in King Joseph's Portfolio; Narva, Appendix, No. 1.

July. 13. troops into good condition; and on the 13th July, Cuesta moved forward with the united forces, amounting to twenty-five thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of cannon, to Rio Seco. Bessières' force was upon the whole less numerous, amounting only to fifteen thousand men, and twenty-five guns; but of these nearly two thousand were admirable horsemen, and the composition of the whole was such as more than to counter-balance the inferiority in point of numbers (1).

Battle of
Rio Seco,
and defeat
of the
Spaniards,
July. 14.

The dispositions of Cuesta for the battle were as faulty as the resolution to hazard it was ill advised. Contrary alike to the rules of the military art, and the dictates of common sense on the subject, he drew up his troops in two lines, at the distance of nearly a mile and a half from each other. The first, ten thousand strong, under Blake, with fifteen pieces of cannon, was stationed on a plateau in advance, of rugged and difficult access; the second, fifteen hundred toises (9000 feet) in the rear, led by Cuesta in person, consisted of fifteen thousand men, almost all regular soldiers, and fifteen guns. The few cavalry they had were with the first line. Bessières, perceiving at once the advantage which this extraordinary disposition offered to an enterprising attack, prepared to avail himself to the utmost of it, by throwing the bulk of his forces into the wide chasm between the two lines, so as to overwhelm the first before the second could come up to its assistance. Penetrating rapidly into the open space between the two parts of the army, he attacked Blake both in flank and rear with such vigour, that in an instant his lines were broken, his artillery taken, his men dispersed. As soon as he saw the rout of his first line, Cuesta moved forward with the second to the attack, and succeeded in reaching the enemy before the disorder consequent on their rapid success and pursuit had been repaired. The consequences had wellnigh proved fatal to the victors. Cuesta's right wing, advancing swiftly and steadily forward in good order, overthrew several French battalions which had not fully recovered their ranks, and captured four guns. This disaster, like that experienced by Zach's grenadiers at Marengo, might, with a less skilful commander or less steady troops, have turned the fortune of the day; for the example of disorder is contagious, and the confusion was already spreading into the French centre, when Bessières, with the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, twelve hundred strong, charged the Spanish right in flank, which had become exposed by the rapidity of its advance, with great vigour; and Merle's division returning from the pursuit of Blake, renewed the combat in front. A short but sanguinary struggle ensued; the Spanish infantry fought bravely, and for a few minutes the fate of the battle hung by a thread; but at length they were broken, and the loud shouts of victory, which had been raised in the Castilian ranks, passed to the French side. After this it was no longer a battle, but a massacre and rout; the Spaniards broke and dispersed on all sides, leaving eighteen guns and their whole ammunition, besides two thousand prisoners, in the hands of the enemy. Three thousand had fallen on the field, while the loss of the victors did not exceed twelve hundred men. The town of Rio Seco, taken in the pursuit, was sacked and plundered with merciless severity, and all the nuns in the convents were subjected to the brutal violence of the soldiery. Few days have been more disastrous to Spain; for, worse than the loss of artillery and prisoners, it destroyed all confidence in the ability of their troops to withstand the enemy in the field; while to Napoleon it was the source of unbounded, and, as it turned out, undeserved

exultation. "It is Villa Viciosa" (Almanza), he exclaimed, when the joyful intelligence arrived at Bayonne; "Bessières has placed Joseph on the throne of Spain (4);" and deeming the war over, he left that fortress, and pursued his journey by Bordeaux for the French capital; while Joseph, relieved now of all anxiety in regard to his communications, pursued his journey to Madrid, where he arrived, as already mentioned, on the 21st July.

Further preparations of Napoleon for this war. Napoléon was premature in this judgment: Rio Seco placed Joseph on the throne of Madrid; but it neither finished the war, nor maintained him there. He did not, however, on that account suspend his military preparations: nine thousand Poles, who had entered the service of France, were directed, with four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry from the grand army in Germany, towards the Pyrenees. All the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy received orders to send a regiment each in the same direction: the guards of Joseph followed him to Spain from Naples. Tuscany and the kingdom of Italy were commanded to send their contingents to reinforce Duhesme in Catalonia. Reinforcements to the amount of forty thousand men were thus provided for, which all arrived in Spain during the three following months, but too late to arrest the progress of disaster. While both the French Emperor and his royal brother were indulging in the sanguine hope that all was terminated, a dreadful disaster had occurred in Andalusia, and a blow been struck on the banks of the Guadalquivir which resounded from one end of Europe to the other (2).

March of Dupont into Andalusia, and his early successes there.

Dupont, who was at Toledo when the insurrection broke out in all parts of Spain, received, on the 24th May, an order from Murat, then Lieutenant-General of Spain, to move upon Cadiz, by the route of the Sierra Morena, Cordova, and Seville. He was to be joined in Andalusia by four thousand men and ten guns drawn from the army of Portugal. He immediately set out, and experienced no resistance while traversing the open plains of La Mancha; and in the Sierra Morena found the villages indeed deserted, but no enemy to dispute his progress. At Andujar, however, where he arrived on the 2d June, he received information of the real state of matters in that province,—that Seville, Cadiz, and all the principal towns were ruled by juntas, which had declared war against France; that the army at St.-Roque had joined the patriot cause, and that the peasants by tens of thousands were flocking into the burghs to enrol themselves under the national banners. Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Madrid for reinforcements, and after establishing an hospital at Andujar and taking measures of precaution to secure his rear, set out four days afterwards, and continued his march towards Cordova, still following the left bank of the Guadalquivir. This road, however, after running eight-and-twenty leagues on that bank of the river, crosses it at Vinta de Alcala by a long bridge of nineteen arches, strongly constructed of black marble. It was at its extremity that the Spaniards awaited the enemy. The end of the bridge on the left bank was fortified by a *tête-de-pont*, twelve guns were mounted on the right bank to enfilade the approach to it, and three thousand regular troops, supported by ten thousand armed peasants, waited in Alco-

(1) South. i. 480, 481. Foy. iii. 310, 313. Tor. ii. 352, 354. Nap. i. 107.

In allusion to the battle at Villa Viciosa, where Philip V and the Duke de Vendôme gained a complete victory over the allies, which decided the Succession War in favour of the house of Bourbon. But the comparison was the reverse of the truth; for at Villa Viciosa, Philip and the Spaniards com-

bated for Spain against foreign armies; and the affair was decisive, for the whole military force of both sides was collected in one field; whereas at Rio Seco, the general of an intrusive king sought to beat down the native troops of Castile, and a fragment only of the military strength of either side was engaged.—See Foy, iv. 47.

(2) Foy, iv. 48, 49.

lea to dispute the passage; while the heights on the left bank, in the rear of the French, were occupied by a cloud of insurgents ready to fall on them behind as soon as they were actively engaged with the more regular force in front. The French general, seeing such preparations made for his reception, delayed the attack till the following morning, and meanwhile made his dispositions against the numerous enemies by whom he was surrounded. This was no difficult matter: a very small part only of the Spanish force was ad-

June 7. quate to the encounter of regular soldiers. At daybreak on the following morning, General Fresia, with a battalion of infantry and a large body of cavalry, attacked the peasants on the left bank, and by a few charges dispersed them: at the same time a column with ease broke into the *tête-de-pont*, the works of which were not yet finished, and rapidly charging across the bridge, of which the arches had not been cut, routed the Spanish troops at Alcolea on the opposite side with such loss that all their artillery was taken, and Echevarria, the commander, despairing of defending Cordova, fled with such precipitance, that before night he reached Ecija, twelve leagues from the field of battle (1).

Abandoned to their own resources and destitute of any leaders for their guidance, the magistrates having all fled on the first alarm, the inhabitants of Cordova before which the French presented themselves the same day, were in no condition to resist the invaders. The gates nevertheless were shut, and the old towers which flanked their approaches filled with armed men, by whom, as the cannon of the enemy approached, a feeble fire was kept up. A parleying for surrender, however, took place, and the conferences were going on, when, under pretence of a few random shots from some windows, the guns were discharged at the gates, which were instantly burst open; the troops rushed into the town, where hardly any resistance was made, but which notwithstanding underwent all the horrors of a place carried by assault. A scene of indescribable horror ensued, fraught with acute but passing suffering to the Spaniards, with lasting disgrace to the French. An universal pillage took place. Every public establishment was sacked, every private house plundered. Armed and unarmed men were slaughtered indiscriminately; women ravished; the churches plundered; even the venerable cathedral, originally the much-loved mosque of the Ommiade Caliphs, which had survived the devastations of the first Christian conquest, six hundred years before, was stripped of its riches and ornaments, and defiled by the vilest debauchery. Nor was this merely the unbridled licence of subaltern insubordination; the general-in-chief and superior officers themselves set the first example of a rapacity as pernicious as it was disgraceful; and from the plunder of the Treasury and Office of Consolidation, Dupont contrived to realize above 10,000,000 reals, or L.197,000 sterling. Not content with this hideous devastation, the French general, when the sack had ceased, overwhelmed the city by an enormous contribution. It is some consolation, amidst so frightful a display of military license and unbridled cupidity, that a righteous retribution speedily overtook its perpetrators; that it was the load of their public and private plunder which shortly after retarded their retreat along the banks of the Guadalquivir; and that it was anxiety to preserve their ill-gotten spoil which paralysed their arms in the field, and brought an unheard-of disgrace on the French standards (2).

(1) Foy, iii. 224, 230. Nap. i. 112, 113. Tor. i. 320, 321.

(2) Foy, iii. 229, 231. Tor. i. 321, 323. Nap. i. 113. South. i. 475, 476. Lond. i. 87.

Colonel Napier says (i. 114, 1st Edit.), "As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage, and Dupont

Accumulation of forces round the invaders under Castanos.

Dupont remained several days at Cordova, but learning that the insurrection had spread and was gathering strength in all directions, and finding his communications with Madrid intercepted by the patriot bands in his rear, he deemed it imprudent to make any farther advance in the direction of Seville. Meanwhile the insurgents closed around and hemmed him in on every side. The armed peasants of Jaen and its vicinity crossed the Guadalquivir, and overwhelmed the detachment left at Andujar in charge of the sick there, and with savage cruelty, in revenge for the sack of Cordova, put them all to death; the smugglers of the Sierra Morena, relinquishing their illicit traffic for a more heart-stirring conflict, issued from their gloomy retreats, and beset all the passes of their inaccessible mountains. Even the peasants of La Mancha had caught the flame; the magazines of Mudela had fallen into their power; the sick at Manzanares had been put to the sword; the roads were so beset that even considerable detachments in his rear were captured or defeated; General Roize, with a body of four hundred convalescents, was defeated in the open plains of La Mancha; and after having joined five hundred light horse under General Belair, the united force was deemed inadequate to forcing the passes of the Sierra Morena, and fell back towards Toledo. These accumulating disasters, which were greatly magnified by popular rumour, and the impossibility of getting any correct detail of the facts from the general intercepting of the communications, produced such an impression on Dupont, that he deemed it hopeless to attempt any farther advance into Andalusia; a resolution which proved the salvation of that province, and in the end, of Spain; for such was the state of anarchy and irresolution which prevailed among the troops intrusted with its defence, that had he advanced boldly forward and followed up his successes at Alcolea and Cordova with the requisite vigour, Seville would at once have fallen into his power, and the insurrection in that quarter been entirely crushed. Castanos, indeed, was at the head of eight thousand regular troops, drawn from the camp at St.-Roque, and an enthusiastic but undisciplined body of thirty thousand armed peasants assembled at Utrera; but the latter part of his force was incapable of any operations that could be relied on in the field; and such was the consternation occasioned, in the first instance, by the success of the French irruption, that the general-in-chief was desirous of retiring to Cadiz, and making its impregnable fortifications the citadel of an intrenched camp, where the new levies might acquire some degree of consistency, and the support of ten or twelve thousand British troops might, in case of necessity, be obtained. The authority of Castanos was merely nominal; Morla, governor of Cadiz, was his enemy,

July 20.

fixed his head-quarters there." It would be well if he would specify the authority on which this assertion is made, as it is directly contrary to the united testimony of even the most liberal French and Spanish historians. Foy says, with his usual admirable candour, "To some musket-shots, discharged almost by accident from the windows, the French answered by a continued discharge, and speedily burst open the gates. Men without arms, without the means of resistance, were slaughtered in the streets; the houses, the churches, even the celebrated mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral, were alike sacked. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the greatest kings which Spain ever beheld, saw scenes of horror renewed such as it had not witnessed since the city was taken in 1236 by Ferdinand King of Castile. These terrible scenes had no excuse in the losses sustained by the conqueror; for the attack of the town had not cost

them ten men; and the total success of the day had only cost them thirty killed and eighty wounded." Torenio, though a decided liberal Spanish historian, observes:—"Rushing into the town, the French proceeded, killing or wounding all those whom they met on their roads; they sacked the houses, the temples, even the humblest dwellings of the poor. The ancient and celebrated cathedral became the prey of the insatiable and destructive rapacity of the stranger. The massacre was great—the quantity of precious spoil collected immense. From the single depots of the Treasury and the Consolidation, Dupont extracted 10,000,000 reals, besides the sums extracted from public and private places of deposit. It was thus that a population was delivered up to plunder which had neither made nor attempted the slightest resistance."—*See Foy, iii.* 230, 231; and Torenio, 322.

and the junta of Seville issued orders independent of either ; so that the former general, despairing of success, had actually, under pretence of providing for the security of Cadiz, embarked his heavy artillery for that fortress. From this disgrace, however, the Spaniards were relieved by the hesitation of the enemy ; a pause in an invading army is dangerous at all times, but especially so when an insurrection is to be put down by the moral influence of its advance ; and the hesitation of Dupont at Cordova proved his ruin. He remained ten days inactive there, during which the whole effect of his victory was lost ; confidence returned to the enemy from the hourly increase of their force and the evident apprehensions of the French general : and at length some intercepted despatches to Savary were found to contain so doleful an account of his situation, that not only were all thoughts of retiring further laid aside, but it was resolved immediately to advance, and surround the enemy in the city which he had conquered (1).

Retreat of
Dupont to
Andujar
and Baylen.

The fears of Dupont, however, prevented Cordova from a second time becoming the theatre of military license. Detachments of peasants had occupied all the passes in the Sierra Morena : troops, including some regulars, were accumulating in the direction of Granada, with the design of seizing Carolina and intercepting his retreat to La Mancha. Fame had magnified the amount of the forces descending into the plains of Leon, under Cuesta and Blake ; and rumours had got abroad that Savary was fortifying himself in the Retiro. Unable to withstand the sinister presentiments consequent on such an accumulation of adverse incidents, the French general resolved to fall back ; and accordingly broke up from Cordova on the

June 16.

16th June, and three days afterwards reached Andujar without

June 19.

having experienced any molestation. A strong detachment was immediately sent off to Jaen, which defeated the insurgents, and took a severe but not undeserved vengeance on the inhabitants for their barbarity to the sick at Andujar, by sacking and burning the town (2). The supplies, however, which Dupont expected from this excursion were not obtained ; for every article of provision which the town contained was consumed in the conflagration. Both sides after this continued inactive for above three weeks, during which the sick in the French hospital, as usual with a retreating army, rapidly augmented ; while the Spanish forces, under Castanos, which now approached, increased so much, by reinforcements from all quarters, that that general could now muster above twenty thousand regular infantry and two thousand horse, besides a motley crowd of thirty thousand armed peasants under his command. During the same period, however, powerful reinforcements reached the French general ; for Gobert, with his division, whose absence from Leon Napoléon had so bitterly lamented, joined Vedel at BAYLEN on the 15th July, and a brigade was pushed on under Leger Belair to open up the communication with the main body at Andujar (3), while the Spanish generals, now deeming the escape of the French impossible, were taking measures for enveloping the whole and forcing them to surrender.

Spanish
plan of at-
tack, and
preparatory
movements
on both
sides.

Meanwhile the long delay afforded by the inactivity of Dupont had been turned to the best account by Castanos. In the interim he contrived to give a certain degree of consistence to his numerous but tumultuous array of peasants, while the disembarkation of

(1) Nap. i. 114, 115. Foy, iii. 234, 236. Tor. ii. 326. Nap. i. App. No. 13.

(2) That severity, however deplorable, was perhaps rendered necessary, and therefore justified, by the massacre of the sick at Andujar ; but in the prosecution of their orders the French soldiers proceeded to excesses as wanton as they were savage ; mas-

sacring old men, and infants at the breast, and exercising the last acts of cruelty on some sick friars of St. Dominic and St. Augustine who could not escape from the town.—TOMLINSON, i. 328.

(3) Nap. i. 117, 120. Foy, iv. 49, 52. Tor. i. 326, 360.

General Spencer with five thousand English troops, chiefly from Gibraltar, at Port St.-Mary's, near Cadiz, inspired general confidence by securing a rallying point in case of disaster. At length the regular troops from Granada, St.-Roque, Cadiz, and other quarters having all assembled, to the number of eight-and-twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, a combined plan of attack was agreed on. The army was arranged in three divisions; the first, under Reding, a Swiss general of distinction, brother to the intrepid patriot

July 11. of the same name (1), received orders to cross the Guadalquivir at Mengibar, and move to Baylen, in the rear of Andujar, where Dupont still was, and between that town and the Sierra Morena; the second, under Coupigny, was to pass the same river at Villa-Nueva and support Reding; while Castanos, with the third and the reserve, was to press the enemy in front, and a body of irregular troops, under Don Juan de la Cruz, passing by the bridge of Marmolejo, to harass his right flank. A glance at any good map of the country will at once show that the effect of these dispositions, which were ably combined, was to throw a preponderating force in the rear of Dupont directly on his line of communications, and either separate the division under his immediate command from those of Gobert and Vedel, or interpose between them both and the road to Madrid. They were promptly and vigorously carried into execution; Castanos, with the troops under his immediate command, approached to within a league of Andujar, and so alarmed Dupont that he

July 14. sent to Vedel for assistance, who came with his whole division, except thirteen hundred men left to guard the ford of Mengibar. This small body

July 16. was there attacked, two days after, by Reding with eight thousand men, defeated, and the passage of the river forced; Gobert, advancing from Baylen to support the broken detachment, received a ball in the forehead, and fell dead on the spot. The French in dismay retreated to Baylen; the Spaniards, seeing themselves interposed in this manner between Gobert and Vedel, with forces little superior to either, taken singly, also retired in the night across the ford to the other bank of the river. But this bold irruption into the middle of their line of march, and the disaster of Gobert, spread dismay through the army; a loud cannonade heard the whole day from the side of Andujar, where Castanos was engaging the attention of Dupont, induced the belief that they were beset on all sides, and the accounts which reached both armies in the evening of the disaster experienced before Valencia, increased the confidence of the Spaniards as much as it depressed the feelings of the French soldiers (2).

Singular manner in which these armies became inter-laced.

In the whole French army there was not a general of division who bore a higher character than Dupont; and when he set out for Andalusia, in command of so considerable a force, it was universally believed that he would find his marshal's baton at Cadiz. In 1801, he had distinguished himself, under Brune, in the winter campaign with the Austrians on the Italian plains: in 1803, his gallant conduct had eminently contributed to the glorious triumph at Ulm; in 1807, he had been not less conspicuous in the Polish war at Eylau and Friedland. His courage was unquestionable; his talents of no ordinary kind. But it is one thing to possess the spirit and intrepidity which make a good general of division or colonel of

(1) *Ante*, iii. 268.

(2) *Tor.* i. 360, 363. *Foy*, iv. 59, 66. *Jom.* iii. 60, 61. *Nap.* i. 120, 121.

A singular coincidence occurred in relation to the place and day of the action in which General Gobert lost his life. On the same day (16th July) nearly six hundred years before (16th July, 1212,) there had been gained at the same place the great

battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, by Alfonso XI over the Mussulman host of Spain and Africa, two hundred thousand strong. Gobert fell on the field still called the *field of massacre*, from the carnage made of the Moors on that memorable occasion; the greatest victory after that of Tours ever gained by the Christians over the soldiers of the Crescent. — *TORRERO*, i. 363.

grenadiers; it is another and a very different thing to be endowed with the moral resolution which is requisite to withstand disaster, and act with the decision and energy indispensable in a general-in-chief. In the situation in which he was now placed there was but one course to adopt, and that was, to mass all his forces together, and bear down in a single column upon the enemy, so as to reopen his communications, and secure, at all hazards, his retreat; and twenty thousand French soldiers assembled together were adequate to bursting through at a single point all the troops of Spain.

July 17. Instead of this he divided his force, and thereby exposed it to destruction. Vedel received orders to lead back to Baylen his own division and that of Gobert, while the general-in-chief himself continued fronting Castanos at Andujar. But meanwhile Generals Dupont and Leger Belair, who had been left at Baylen, were so much disquieted by the forces under Reding and Coupigny, which had now united together, and threatened them with an attack, that they retired towards Carolina, on the road to the Sierra Morena; and Vedel, finding, on his arrival at Baylen, that it was entirely evacuated by the French troops, followed them to the same place, with the design of securing the passes of the mountains in their rear. By this fatal movement

July 18. the two divisions of the French army were irrevocably separated, and Reding and Coupigny, finding no enemy to oppose them, entered in great force into Baylen and established themselves there. Thus the two hostile armies became interlaced in the most extraordinary manner; Castanos having Dupont between him and Reding, and Reding being interposed between the French general and his lieutenant, Vedel (1).

Battle of Baylen, July 19. In such a situation a decisive advantage to one or other party is at hand; and it generally falls to the commander who boldly takes the initiative, and brings his combined forces to bear on the isolated corps of his opponent. Dupont, sensible of his danger, broke up from Andujar late on the evening of the 18th, and marched towards Baylen, on his direct line of retreat; while Reding and Coupigny, finding themselves relieved of all fears from Vedel and Dufour, who had moved to Carolina, in the entrance of the mountains, turned their faces to the southward, and early on the following morning marched towards Andujar, with the design of co-operating with Castanos in the destruction of Dupont. Hearing, soon after their departure, of his approach towards them, they took post in a strong position, intersected with ravines and covered by olive woods, in front of Baylen; and soon the French outposts appeared in sight. Their forces, widely scattered and coming up in disorder, resembled rather a detachment guarding an immense convoy than a corps equipped for field operations; so heavily were they laden by five hundred baggage waggons, which conveyed along the artillery, ammunition stores, and ill-gotten plunder of Cordova. Great was the dismay of the French troops when, in the obscurity of the morning, an hour before sunrise, they suddenly came upon the Spanish array right in their front, occupying this advantageous position; but there was no time for deliberation, for Castanos, having heard of their departure from Andujar, had shortly after entered that town, and passing through it with the bulk of his forces, was already threatening their rear. Dupont immediately made his dispositions for forcing his way, sword in hand, through the barrier of steel which opposed his progress; and had his troops been concentrated, there can be little doubt that he would have succeeded in doing so, and either thrown Reding back towards Vedel, or opened up his own communication with that general. But at this decisive

moment the sack of Cordova proved their ruin. The troops were scattered along a line of march of three leagues in length, encumbered with innumerable waggons; the best were in rear to guard the precious convoy from the attacks of Castanos. Hastily assembling such troops as he could collect in front, Dupont, with three thousand men, commenced an attack, when the day broke, at four in the morning; but his troops, fatigued by a long night march, and discouraged by the unexpected and dangerous enemy which obstructed their advance, could make no impression on the Swiss regiments and Walloon guards, the flower of the Spanish army, which there awaited their approach. After a gallant struggle, in which they sustained a severe loss, they were driven back, and lost not only some guns which in the commencement of the action they had taken from the enemy, but even their own. As brigade after brigade successively came up to the front; they were brought forward to the attack, but with no better success; the French troops, wearied by a night march, choked with dust, disordered by the encumbrance of baggage-waggons, overwhelmed by the burning sun of Andalusia in the dog-days, were no match for the steady Swiss and Walloon Guards, who had rested all night, cool under the shade, in a strong position, or even the new levies to whom Reding had imparted his own invincible spirit; and their guns, which came up one by one, in haste and confusion, and never equalled those which the enemy had in-battery, were speedily dismounted by the superior force and unerring aim of the Spanish artillery. Two thousand men had already fallen on the side of the invaders, while scarce a tenth of the number were disabled on that of their enemies; heat and thirst overwhelmed even the bravest soldiers, and that fatal dejection, the forerunner of disaster, was rapidly spreading among the young conscripts, when two Swiss regiments, which had hitherto bravely maintained the combat on the right, came to a parley with their brethren in the Spanish lines, and passed over to the side of Reding. At the same time a loud cannonade was heard from behind; and disordered fugitives, breathless from running, and almost melting with heat, burst through the ranks, and announced that a large body of the Spaniards, under La Pena, the advanced guard of Castanos, was already menacing the rear. Despairing now of extricating himself from his difficulties, ignorant of the situation of Vedel or Dufour, and deeming a capitulation the only way to preserve the army from destruction, Dupont sent to Reding to propose a suspension of arms, which was at once agreed to (1).

Tardy
arrival of
Vedel, who
shares in
the dis-
grace.

While Dupont, with the corps under his immediate command, not ten thousand strong, was thus maintaining a painful and hopeless struggle with the concentrated masses of the Spaniards, more than double their amount, the remainder of his army, of equal force, under Vedel and Dufour, was occupied to no purpose at a distance from the scene of action. The whole of the 18th was spent by these generals at Carolina in allowing the soldiers to repose, and repairing the losses of the artillery; but as the enemy, whom they expected to find at the entrance of the passes, had disappeared, and a loud cannonade was heard the following morning on the side of Baylen, they rightly judged that it was there that the decisive point was to be found, and set out in that direction. The distance from Carolina to Baylen was only eight miles; that from Andujar to the same place was sixteen; by a little activity, therefore, Vedel might have reached the rear of Reding sooner than Castanos could that of Dupont, and then the fate which the Spanish generals designed for the French troops might

have overtaken themselves. When he arrived at Guaroman, however, nearly halfway, the troops were so much exhausted by the heat, that Vedel, though he heard the cannonade, now only five miles distant, hourly increasing, had the weakness to allow them some hours of repose. This halt proved decisive; while it continued, Dupont's troops, whom he might with ease have reached in two hours, were reduced to desperation. At noon it suddenly ceased, and the soldiers flattered themselves that the danger had passed; it was the suspension of arms, which was about to bring unheard-of disgrace upon them all. When they resumed their march, at two in the afternoon, they soon came upon the rear of Reding, and discrediting the statement of an armistice, which was immediately made to them, commenced an attack, made prisoners a battalion of Irish in the service of Spain, captured some guns, dispersed some of the new levies which defended them, and were within a league of their comrades in distress, when an officer from Dupont arrived with the mournful intelligence that an armistice had been agreed to, and that they had no alternative but submission. It was all over, the halt of a few hours at Guaroman had ruined the expedition: twenty thousand men were about to lay down their arms; Europe was to be electrified; the empire of Napoléon shaken to its foundation. Such is the importance of time in war (1).

Dupont, in the first instance, proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole French troops were to be allowed to retire, with their artillery and baggage, out of Andalusia; and Castanos was at first inclined to have acceded to the proposal, deeming it an immense advantage to clear that province of the enemy, and gain time in this way for completing their preparations. But at this critical moment the despatches were intercepted and brought to headquarters, which announced the approach of Cuesta to the capital, and recalled Dupont to contribute to its defence. A convention would no longer be listened to; an absolute surrender of arms was required, under condition only of being sent to France by sea. After many fruitless efforts to avoid so hard a fate, this was agreed to by Dupont: but he insinuated to Vedel that he might endeavour to extricate himself from his toils. That general accordingly retired to Carolina: but the Spaniards threatened to put Dupont and his whole division to the sword if this movement was not stopped and Vedel included in the capitulation. Intimidated by these menaces, orders to this effect were dispatched by Dupont: and so completely were the spirits of the French officers broken, that, out of twenty-four whom Vedel assembled to deliberate on the course they should pursue at this crisis, only four, including that general himself, voted for disregarding the capitulation, and continuing their retreat, which was now open, to la Mancha. Nay, to such an extent did the panic extend, that a Spanish detachment crossed the mountains and made prisoners, upon the strength of the capitulation at Baylen, all the French dépôts and insulated bodies as far as Toledo, which, with those who laid down their arms on the field, swelled the captives to twenty-one thousand. Two thousand had fallen in the battle; a thousand in the previous operations, or from the effect of sickness: twenty four thousand men were lost to France (2)!

Immense
anxiety
which it
produces in
Spain and
over Eu-
rope.

Language can convey to future ages no adequate idea of the impression which this extraordinary event produced in Europe. Nothing since the opening of the revolutionary war had at all approached to it in importance. Hitherto the career of the French

(1) Tor. i. 367, 368. Foy, iv. 85, 91. Nap. i. 122, 124. Jom. ii. 62, 63

(2) Nap. i. 123, 124. Foy, iv. 97, 106. Tor. i. 370, 372. Jom. ii. 63, 64.

armies had been one of almost unbroken success; and even though the talents of the Archduke Charles and the firmness of the Russians had for a time arrested the torrent, yet it had been suspended only to break out shortly after with accumulated force, and sweep away every obstacle which courage, combination, or genius could oppose to its progress. Even at their lowest point of depression, disgrace had never sullied the Republican ranks; victorious or vanquished, they had ever commanded the respect of their enemies; no large bodies had laid down their arms; their retreat had ever been that of brave and honourable men. Now, however, a disaster, unheard-of in Europe since the battle of Pavia, had overtaken their standards—twenty thousand men had surrendered—the imperial eagles had found in Andalusia the Caudine forks. Fame and incorrect information gave greater importance to this triumph than even its intrinsic magnitude deserved; it was unknown or overlooked that it was by a skilful series of military movements on the one side, and an extraordinary combination of errors on the other, that Dupont had been brought to such hazardous straits; by the firmness of the Swiss and Walloon Guards, the precision in fire of the Spanish artillery, and the inexperience of his own troops, that he had been compelled to surrender. It was generally imagined, that the French veterans had laid down their arms to the Spanish peasants; it was unknown or forgotten that the victory was really gained by experienced soldiers; and the imaginations of men, both in the Peninsula and over all Europe, were set on fire by the belief that a new era had dawned upon mankind; that the superiority of disciplined troops and regular armies was at an end; and that popular enthusiasm and general zeal were all that were necessary to secure the victory even over the greatest and most formidable veteran armies. How widely this belief spread, how generally it was acted upon, and what oceans of blood it caused to be spilt in vain in Spain itself, will amply appear in the sequel of this history: and probably, by inspiring the people of that country with an overweening idea of their own strength, and of the capability of raw levies to contend with regular forces, it contributed, in no small degree, to that almost unbroken train of disasters in the field which their armies, when unsupported by the British, subsequently experienced during the remainder of the war. But in the first instance it produced a prodigious and most important burst of exultation and enthusiasm; it determined the conduct of a great proportion of the grandees and nobles of Spain, who had in the first instance adhered to the usurper, but now, with the Dukes del Infantado and del Parque, Cevallos and Penuela, rejoined the ranks of their countrymen; and by throwing the capital and chief towns of the kingdom, with the exception of the frontier fortresses, into the hands of the insurgents, gave the struggle, in the eyes of all Europe, as well as of the people themselves, the character of a national contest. Nor was the effect less momentous over the whole Continent, by affording a convincing proof that the French, at least, were not invincible, and opening the eyes of all governments to the immense addition which the military force, on which they had hitherto exclusively relied, might receive from the ardour and enthusiasm of the people (1).

Opinions of Napoleon on this capitulation. Napoleon was at Bordeaux when the account of the capitulation reached him. Never, since the disaster at Trafalgar, had he been so completely overwhelmed: for a time he could not speak; the excess of his depression excited the alarm of his ministers. "Is your majesty unwell?" said the minister for foreign affairs, Maret. "No." "Has Austria

declared war?" "Would to God that were all!" "What then has happened?" The Emperor recounted the humiliating details of the capitulation, and added, "That an army should be beaten is nothing; it is the daily fate of war, and is easily repaired. But that an army should submit to a dishonourable capitulation, is a stain on the glory of our arms which can never be effaced. Wounds inflicted on honour are incurable. The moral effect of this catastrophe will be terrible. What! they have had the infamy to consent that the haversacks of our soldiers should be searched like those of robbers! Could I have ever expected that of General Dupont, a man whom I loved, and was rearing up to become a marshal? They say he had no other way to prevent the destruction of the army, to save the lives of the soldiers! Better, far better, to have perished with arms in their hands—that not one should have escaped. Their death would have been glorious; we would have avenged them. You can always supply the place of soldiers; honour alone, when once lost, can never be regained (1)."

Shameful violation of the capitulation by the Spaniards. If the capitulation itself was dishonourable to the French arms, the subsequent violation of it by the Spaniards was still more disgraceful to the victors, and remains a dark stain on the Castilian good faith. From the moment that the long file of prisoners began their march towards Cadiz as the place of their embarkation, it was felt to be extremely difficult to restrain the indignation of the people, who loudly complained that so large a body of men, for the most part stained by robbery or murder, committed in Spain, should be forwarded to France, apparently for no other purpose but that they might be again let loose in the Peninsula to commit similar devastations. Alarmed at the increase and serious character of the ferment, the Junta of Seville consulted Castanos and Morla, the governor of Cadiz, in the course which they should adopt. The first, with the honour and good faith of a gallant soldier, in opposition to the public clamour, insisted that the capitulation should be religiously observed; the latter, forgetting every other consideration in the desire to gain a temporary popularity with the multitude, contended that no treaty could be binding with men who had committed such enormities on the Spanish soil as the French prisoners; that to let them return to France, loaded with the spoil of Cordova, torn from the wretched inhabitants in open violation of the laws of war, would be a palpable act of insanity; and that, having once got them in their power, the only sensible course was to retain them till the war was over. These specious but sophistical arguments, unworthy of a Spanish officer, found a responsive echo in the breast of the infuriated multitude; the public effervescence increased as they advanced in their march; in consequence of the discovery of precious spoils in the knapsacks of some of the soldiers at Lebrixa, a tumult ensued between the peasantry and the prisoners, which cost many lives to the latter; the sacred vases of Cordova and Jean were loudly demanded; and at Port St.-Mary's the accidental circumstance of one of these holy cups falling from the haversack of a soldier gave rise to such a tumult, that a general search of the baggage could no longer be prevented. These disorders were, perhaps, unavoidable in the circumstances in which the Spanish government of the province was situated, and the unexampled treachery with which they had been assailed by the French; but for the subsequent violation of the capitulation no sort of apology can be found. Desirous of maintaining their popularity, the junta of Seville acceded to the opinion of Morla, in which they in vain endeavoured to get Lord Coilingwood

and Sir Hew Dalrymple to concur; instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, that very few remained at the conclusion of the war (1). Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France; but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept it lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained in one hulk, who over-powered their guards during the night and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen three years afterwards, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country (2). This frightful act of injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful; it gave the French, in their turn, too fair a ground for inveighing against the perfidy of their enemies, exasperated the feelings of their armies, who had first entered into this contest with lukewarm dispositions or undisguised aversion, and repeatedly afterwards stimulated them to desperate and sanguinary resistance, under circumstances when, with a more trustworthy enemy, they would have entered into terms of accommodation (3).

Departure
of Joseph
from his
ditch, and
concentration
of the
French
troops be-
hind the
Ebro.

The fatal news of the capitulation of Baylen arrived at Madrid on the 29th July, and diffused universal consternation among the adherents of Joseph. A council of war was immediately summoned by Savary; and opinions were much divided on the course which should be pursued. Moncey proposed that Bessières' division should be recalled, and that with their united forces they should take a position in front of the capital, and defend it to the last extremity. But Savary, to whom the situation which he held as Lieutenant-General of the King, as well as the known confidence which he enjoyed with the Emperor, gave a preponderating voice in the deliberations, strongly urged the necessity of retiring to the northward, and taking counsel from circumstances, as to the point to which it should be prolonged. On the 30th July the intrusive King commenced his retreat: the hospitals had previously been

(1) Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer to the junta of Seville, when his opinion was asked on this subject, is worthy of a place in history. "It is quite clear, that the capitulation is binding on the contracting parties, so far as they have the means of carrying it into execution. The laws of honour, not considerations of expediency, should ever govern soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; the surrender of General Vedel could only be supposed to have arisen from the confidence which he placed in the honour which characterised the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, especially one newly formed, is public property, which ought not to be lightly squandered. The matter, therefore, is clear on considerations of honour and justice: even viewed in the light of expedience, it is far from being beyond dispute." Lord Collingwood, when applied to, answered, "that if the Spanish government had not adequate seamen to man transport-vessels for conveying the troops, he would order British seamen to fit out their merchant-vessels for that purpose: that the capitulation must be observed so far as possible; if the conditions were impossible, they annulled themselves."—SOUTHBY, i. 502, 504; Collingwood's *Memoirs*, ii. 427, 428.

(2) Foy, iv. 107, 109. Tor. i. 375, 377. Nap. i. 125, 127. South. i. 502, 510. Collingwood, ii. 124.

(3) The fate of the generals and officers who were returned to France from Cadiz, was hardly less deplorable than that of their comrades who lin-

gered away in prolonged toments on board the Spanish hulks. Dupont and all the generals were immediately arrested and sent to prison, where they lingered, without either trial or investigation, for many years afterwards. General Marescot, who, though in a subaltern rank, had taken a certain part in the negotiation, loudly, but in vain, demanded to be brought to a court-martial. Neither he nor Dupont, nor any of the superior officers connected with the capitulation of Baylen, were ever more heard of till after the fall of Napoleon in Feb. 17, 1812. 1814. In 1812, a court of enquiry sat on the generals, and condemned them all; but public opinion was far from supporting their decision. May 1.

Shortly after (1st May, 1812), an imperial decree forbade, on pain of death, any capitulation in the field which should amount to a laying down of arms. Such was Napoleon's irritation on every thing connected with this convention, that when he afterwards saw General Legrande, who, as chief of the staff to Dupont, had officially affixed his signature to the treaty, he was seized with a trembling from head to foot, and his indignation exhaled in these words:—"How, general! did your hand not wither when you signed that infamous capitulation?" He never afterwards heard Baylen alluded to without evincing such indignation as showed how deeply it had wounded his mind.—Foy, iv. 110, 113.

evacuated for Bayonne: the heavy artillery, which could not be brought away, amounting to eighty pieces, were spiked; but the retiring monarch and his military satellites carried off with them all the jewels and precious articles from the palaces they had so recently occupied. They retired by the great road to Burgos, where headquarters were established on the 9th August; the rearguard collecting as it went along all the garrisons of the towns and castles which had been occupied by the French troops to the south of the Ebro. They experienced no molestation from the Spaniards during their retreat; notwithstanding which, all the villages and hamlets through which they passed were given up to pillage, and a great number burnt to the ground. Soon after Joseph arrived at Burgos, Bessières arrived with his corps, and Verdier came up with the force which had been engaged in the siege of Saragossa, so that, including Moncey's corps and the troops brought up from Madrid, above fifty thousand veteran troops could, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, be collected for the defence of the Ebro (1).

While this decisive stroke was struck in the south of Spain, the contest had already assumed a sanguinary character; the success had been more chequered in the Catalonian mountains; and the British army, under the guidance of WELLINGTON, had chased the French eagles from the rock of Lisbon.

Campaign in Catalonia. Napoléon, who was by no means aware of the almost insurmountable obstacles which the tenacious spirit and rugged mountains of Catalonia were to oppose to his arms, had directed Duhesme to lend a helping hand to Lefebvre Desnouettes in the siege of Saragossa. In order to accomplish this object, that general, early in June, fitted out two corps: the first, four thousand five hundred strong, under the orders of General Chabran, was dispatched towards the south, with instructions to make itself master of Tortosa and Tarragona, and then proceed on and co-operate with Marshal Moncey in the attack on Valencia: while the second, under General Schwartz, consisting of three thousand eight hundred men, after punishing Manresa, destroying the powder-mills there, and levying a heavy contribution on its inhabitants, was to push on to Lerida, and after securing that important fortress, lend a hand to Lefebvre before the walls of Saragossa. These columns.

June 4. quitted Barcelona early in June, and directed their march to their respective points of destination; but both experienced defeat. The tocsin was ringing in all the hills; the villages were deserted; the woods and higher parts of the mountains, the rugged passes and inaccessible thickets, formed so many rallying points to the courageous Somatenes (2). Schwartz, indeed, in

(1) Foy, 117, 124. Thib. vi. 442, 443. Sav. iii. 275, 277.

Savary was blamed by Napoléon for this retreat to the Ebro, and he alleged that the line of the Douro might have been maintained, and the operations against Saragossa in consequence not interrupted. In justice to the French general, however, it must be observed, that his situation in the capital after the surrender of Dupont, had become extremely critical; and that the losses which the troops at the capital had undergone, were such as to preclude the hope of a successful stand being made against the united Spanish armies which might advance from the south. Shortly after his arrival at Madrid he had written in these luminous July, 1808. and explicit terms to the Emperor, in a despatch which throws great light on the state of the contest at that period.—"It is no longer a mere affair in which, by punishing the leaders, a revolt may be suppressed. If the arrival of the King does not pacify the country, we shall have a regular war on our hands with the troops of the line, and one of extermination with the peasantry. The system of

sending movable columns over the provinces, is likely to induce partial checks which will lead to the spreading of the insurrection. It is indispensable that your Majesty should consider seriously of the means of carrying on the war. We lose four hundred men a-month in the hospitals alone; our army can in no respect be compared to that which occupies Germany. Every thing has been calculated according to the turn which it was expected affairs would assume, not that they have actually taken. Many battalions have not four officers; the whole cavalry is fit for the hospital together. The crowds of young and presumptuous men who crowd the army, contribute rather to embarrassment than any thing else. There is an incalculable difference between such Coxcombs and a steady veteran sergeant or officer."—SAVARY TO NAPOLEON; Foy, iv. 31, 35.

(2) The *Somatenes* are the *ley-en-muse*, which, by an ancient law of Catalonia, are bound to turn out and defend their parishes whenever the *Somaten* or alarm-bell is heard from the churches.—TO ARRO, i. 309.

his march towards Saragossa, forced the celebrated pass of Bruch, though beset with armed men; but advancing a little further, he fell into a disaster at Casa Mansana: the villagers assailed the invaders with showers of stones, balls, and even boiling water from the roofs of the houses: the peasants, who had fled in disorder a few minutes before through the streets, returned to the charge: threatened on all sides, Schwartz resolved to retreat, which he effected at first in good order; but his advanced guard having attempted to force the passage of the town of Esparraguera, which lay on his

road, during the night, was repulsed with loss, and his troops, thrown into disorder by that nocturnal check, were never able to regain their proper array till they found refuge, two days after, under the cannon of Barcelona. Chabran, whose route lay through a less mountainous district, reached Tarragona in safety on the 7th, and got possession of that important town without opposition: but Duhesme was so much alarmed by the repulse of Schwartz, that he hastily recalled him to Barcelona: and so dangerous is it to make a retrograde movement while engaged with an insurrection, that a very severe resistance was experienced in the retreat at places where not a shot had been fired during the advance. Irritated by this opposition and the sanguinary excesses of the peasants, the French set fire to Villa-Franca as they retired; and Duhesme having sent Count Theodore Lecchi with the Italian division and Schwartz's troops to his assistance, the united columns again

approached the pass of Bruch: but finding the Somatenes posted on its rugged cliffs in even greater strength than before, they fell back, after a bloody skirmish, and regained the shelter of Barcelona, pursued up to the very gates by the dropping fire and taunting scoffs of their gallant though rustic opponents (1).

Universal spread of the insurrection. Attack on Gerona.

These defeats produced the greater sensation, both among the French and Spaniards, that they were gained, not by regular troops, but a tumultuary array of peasants, wholly undisciplined, and most of whom had then for the first time been engaged either in military service or exercise. They occasioned in consequence an universal insurrection in Catalonia; the cities, equally as the mountains, caught the flame; the burghers of Lerida, Tortona, Tarragona, Gerona, and all the towns in the province not garrisoned by French troops, closed their gates, manned their ramparts, and elected juntas to direct measures of defence; while the mountain districts, which embraced four-fifths of the province, obeyed the animating call of the Somaten, and, under the guidance of their parish priests, organized a desperate Vendéen warfare. Forty regiments, of a thousand men each, were ordered to be raised for active operations of these formidable mountaineers; regular officers were, for the most part, obtained to direct their organization, and the ranks were in a short time complete, and, for the service of light troops, of a very efficient description. An equal force was directed to be prepared as a reserve, in case their mountain fastnesses should be threatened by the enemy. The peculiar nature of these extensive and thickly-peopled hill districts, as well as the character and resolution of their inhabitants; their rugged precipices, wood-clad steepes, and terraced slopes; their villages, perched like eyries on the summit of cliffs, and numerous forts and castles, each susceptible of a separate defence; their bold and energetic inhabitants, consisting of lawless smugglers or hardly peasants, long habi-

(1) Tor. i. 809, 815. Nap. i. 75, 77. Foy, iv. 143, 151. Duhesme, 18, 19.

The inhabitants of Bruch, to commemorate their victory, erected a stone in the pass, with this poem—

pous though Iacomo inscription:—"Victores Merengo, Austerlitz, et Jena, hic victi fuerunt diebus vi. et xiv. Junii, anno 1808."—Foy, iv. 154.

tated to the enjoyment of almost unbounded practical freedom, rendered this warfare one of a peculiarly hazardous and laborious description (1). Aware of the necessity of striking a decisive blow in the present critical state of affairs of the province, Duhesme conceived that a sudden *coup-de-main* against GERONA, which lies on the direct road to France, would both re-establish his communications, which the insurrections in all directions had

June 16. totally intercepted, and strike a general terror into the enemy. Two days after the return of the former ill-fated expedition, accordingly, he set out in the direction of that town, with six thousand of his best troops, taking the coast-road to avoid the fortress of Hostalrich, which was in the hands of the

June 17. enemy, and after cutting his way with great slaughter through a large body of Somatenes who endeavoured to obstruct his progress, appeared

June 20. on the 20th before the walls of Gerona. Little preparation had been made to repel an assault; but the gates were closed, and the inhabitants, in great numbers, were on the walls prepared to defend their hearths. Having at length got his scaling ladders ready, and diverted the attention of the besieged by a skirmish with the Somatenes on the plain at a distance from the ramparts, the assaulting columns suddenly approached the walls at five in the afternoon. Though they got very near without being perceived, and a few brave men reached the summit, they were repulsed in two successive attacks with great slaughter; and Duhesme, having in vain tried the effect of a negotiation to induce a surrender, returned, by forced marches, to Barcelona, harassed at every step by the Somatenes, who descending in great strength from the hills, inflicted a severe loss on his retreating columns (2).

After this defeat, the whole plain round Barcelona, called the *Siege of Gerona.* Llobregat, was filled with the enemy's troops; and General Duhesme, enraged at finding himself thus beset in the capital of the province, marched out against them, a week afterwards, and defeated a large body of

June 20. the peasantry at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, capturing all their artillery. Rallying, however, at their old fastnesses of Bruch and Igualado, they again, when the French retired, returned to the Llobregat, and not only shut up the enemy within the ramparts of Barcelona, but established a communication with the insurgents in the interior, along the sea-coast, from the Pyrenean frontier to the mouth of the Ebro, which all became the theatre of

insurrection. *Expeditions against Rosas and Gerona.* Napoléon, to whom the prolongation of the war in so many different quarters of Spain had become a subject of great uneasiness, no sooner received intelligence of these untoward events than he directed Duhesme to issue from Barcelona, relieve Figueras, where four hundred French were closely blockaded by the insurgent peasantry, and afterwards carry by assault both Rosas and Gerona. General Reille,

July 1. whom he sent forward with a large convoy guarded by five thousand men, defeated the Somatenes before Figueras, and raised the blockade of that fortress; but when, encouraged by this success, he attempted a *coup-de-main* against Rosas, he sustained a repulse; and finding himself

July 17. (1) Though locally situated in an unlimited monarchy, the province of Catalonia, like those of Navarre and Biscay, has long enjoyed such extensive civil privileges as savour rather of democratic equality than despotic authority. Its social state differs altogether from that of Arragon, though it was so long united under the same sceptre. Nowhere, except in this mountain republic, is there so ardent a thirst after political freedom, or so large an enjoyment, at least in the mountainous districts, of its practical blessings. The inhabitants nourish the most profound hatred at the French, whom they

accuse of having excited their fathers to revolt against the government of Madrid, and abandoned, when the contest was no longer conducive to their interests. In the long and opulent district which runs along the seashore, and contains the flourishing seaports of Tarragona, Rosas, and Barcelona, commercial interests prevail; and the alliance and consequent trade with England was as much the object of desire as the withering union with France had been a subject of aversion.—Foy, iv. 137, 138.

(2) Nap. i. 77, 80. Foy, iv. 151, 150. Tor. i. 315, 317.

daily more closely straitened by the insurgents, was obliged to retire with considerable loss towards Gerona. About the same time the Spanish affairs in the whole province acquired a degree of consistency to which they had never previously attained, by the conclusion of a treaty between Lord Col-
 July 22. lingwood and the Marquis Palacios, governor of the Balearic Isles, in virtue of which the whole disposable force in those islands was conveyed to the Catalonian shores, and thirteen hundred good troops were directed towards Gerona, while Palacios himself, with four thousand five hundred, and thirty-seven pieces of cannon, landed at Tarragona, where their presence excited a most extraordinary degree of enthusiasm (1).

Unsuccess-
 ful siege of
 Gerona.

Meanwhile Duhesme, with the main body of his forces, six thou-
 and strong, a considerable train of heavy artillery, and every thing requisite for a siege, set out from Barcelona and took the road for Gerona; but he was long delayed on the road, which runs close to the sea-shore, by the fire of an English frigate under the command of Lord Cochrane, which sent a shower of balls among his columns whenever they came within range, on the one side; and the desultory but incessant attacks of the Somatenes on the other. At length, after encountering great difficulties and experiencing a heavy loss, he succeeded in forcing his way, by the hill-road, to Hostalrich, which he summoned in vain to surrender: and leaving a few troops only to observe its garrison, he, by infinite skill and no small good fortune, avoided
 July 24. the guns of that fortress, and proceeded on to Gerona, under the walls of which he effected a junction with Reille's troops, who had come up from Rosas. Their united strength being now, notwithstanding all their losses, above nine thousand men, operations in form were commenced against
 July 22. the place. Before this could be done, however, the succours from Majorca had been thrown into the town; and as the besiegers were themselves cut off from all communication, both with their reserve magazines at Barcelona and the frontier of France, by the incessant activity of the peasantry, who lay in wait for and frequently intercepted the convoys, the
 Aug. 13. works advanced very slowly. On the 15th August, however, the breach of Fort Montjuic was declared practicable, and an assault was about to commence, when the besiegers were themselves assailed by a confused but formidable body, ten thousand strong, which appeared in their rear. This consisted, one-half of regular troops, which the Count Caldagues had brought up from Tarragona, the other of Somatenes and Miquelets, with which he had augmented his force during its march along the coast of Catalonia. Count Theodore Lecchi, who was left in charge of Barcelona, was in no condition to oppose their passage almost within range of the guns of the fortress; for the troops he commanded, hardly four thousand strong, were barely adequate to guard its extensive works, and the Miquelets, stationed on the heights which overhang the city, had carried their audacity to such a pitch, as not only to keep up a constant fire on the French sentinels, but even make signals to the disturbed multitude in the streets to revolt. When this powerful force approached Gerona, the besieged made a general sally on the French lines, and with such vigour, that they penetrated into the batteries through the embrasures of the guns, spiked the heavy cannon, and set fire to the works; while Duhesme with the great body of the besiegers' force was sufficiently engaged in observing the enemy which threatened them from the outside. Finding it totally impossible to continue the siege, Duhesme broke up in the

(1) *Tor.* i. 38, 39. *Nap.* i. 82, 83. *Foy.* iv. 169, 172. *St.-Cyr, Guerre de la Catal.* 14, 17. *Castanos.* i. 32, 34.

night, and, dividing his force into two columns, took the road for Barcelona. But here fresh difficulties awaited him: two English frigates, under the able direction of Lord Cochrane, cannonaded and raked the road by the sea-coast; overhanging cliffs prevented them from getting out of the destructive range; while the route by the mountains in the interior, besides being closed by the cannon of Hostalrich, was in many places steep and intersected by ravines, and beset by armed peasants, who from the rocks and woods above, kept up a destructive fire upon the troops beneath (1). In these circumstances the French general did not hesitate to sacrifice his artillery and stores; and thus lightened, he succeeded in fighting his way back; by mountain-paths on the summit of the cliffs which overhang the sea, amidst a constant fire, to Barcelona. In this disastrous expedition above two thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery, besides extensive stores, were lost; and at its conclusion the French possessed nothing in Catalonia but the fortress of Barcelona and the citadel of Figueras.

Unbounded transports in the Peninsula. Entry of the Spanish troops into the capital. Unbounded was the joy which these extraordinary successes in every part of Spain excited among its inhabitants. The variety of quarters in which they had arisen augmented their moral effect: it was supposed that popular energy was irresistible, when it had triumphed over its enemies at once in Andalusia and Arragon Valencia, and Catalonia. Abandoning themselves to a pleasing and allowable, though short-lived illusion, the Spaniards generally believed that the war was at an end; that the Castilian soil was finally delivered from its invaders; and that, relieved of all disquietude as to the defence of their own country, the only question was, when they should unite their victorious arms to those of the English, and carry the torrent of invasion across the Pyrenees into the French plains. These enthusiastic feelings rose to a perfect climax when the Spanish army from Andalusia entered the capital, in great pomp, with Castanos at their head, under a majestic triumphal arch, erected by the citizens Aug. 25. to do honour to their arrival; and the whole of Spain, now delivered from the enemy, with the exception of the small portion occupied by the French army in Navarre and on the Ebro, joined in one universal chorus of national exultation and hatred of the invaders. The press joined its influence to the same excitement; newspapers, warmly advocating the patriotic cause, were established at Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, and the other chief towns of Spain, and by their vehement declamation added to the general enthusiasm, as much as by their extravagant boasting they weakened the sense of the necessity of present exertion, and thus diminished the chance of bringing the contest in the end to a successful issue. But in the midst of the universal exultation, it was observed with regret, that few vigorous or efficient measures were adopted by the many separate and independent juntas to prosecute the war against the enemy; a feeling increased by the calamitous issue of the revolt of Bilbao, which had taken up arms upon receipt of the glorious news from Andalusia. The inhabitants, in the first instance, had succeeded in expelling the French garrison; but being unsupported by Aug. 10. any aid from Asturias or Galicia, the place was quickly recaptured, with great slaughter, by the French division of Merle. This was done by the express commands of Joseph Bonaparte, to whom this dangerous movement, in a town of such magnitude, so near his line of communications with France, had been the subject of no small disquietude; and who boasted in

(1) Cabanes, ii. 62, 81. Foy, iv. 172, 193. Tor. i. 37, 40. Nap. i. 85, 86. St.-Cyr, 40, 47. Dubouche, 28, 39.

his despatches, that "the fire of the insurrection at Bilbao had been extinguished in the blood of twelve hundred men (1)."

Meanwhile, events of a still more glorious and decisive character had liberated the kingdom of Portugal from its oppressors.

Affairs of Portugal, and disarming of the Spanish troops in that country. In every phase of modern history it has been observed that Portugal has, sooner or later, followed the course of changes which public feeling had established in Spain; and it was hardly to be expected that so great and heart-stirring an event as the insurrection of Castilian independence, was not to find a responsive echo in a kingdom so closely neighbouring, and equally suffering under the evils of Gallic oppression. At a very early period, accordingly, symptoms of an alarming effervescence manifested themselves in Portugal, and Napoleon, appreciating more justly than Junot the probable course of events in that kingdom, strongly enjoined him to abandon the pompous proclamations in which he was endeavouring to win the affections of the people, and in good earnest prepare for military operations (2). Not anticipating, however, any immediate hostilities, he ordered him to detach four thousand men to support Bessières in Leon, and three thousand to co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia. But these detachments were rendered impossible by the pressure of events in Portugal itself. No sooner did the intelligence of the massacre at Madrid on the 2d May, and the insurrection in Galicia reach Oporto, than the Spanish troops there, ten thousand strong, dispossessed the French authorities, and marched off in a body towards Galicia, from whence, as

June 5. already mentioned, they were forwarded to Leon in time to share in the disaster of Rio Seco. The inhabitants, in the first moment of enthusiasm, installed insurrectionary authorities in room of the French ones, who had been dispossessed; but after the departure of the Spanish troops they became alarmed at their own boldness, and hastened to reinstate the tricolor-flag, and to renew their protestation of fidelity to the French general at Lisbon.

June 9. The moment, however, that he was apprised of the events at Oporto, Junot made preparations to effect the disarming of the Spanish troops in the capital; and with such secrecy and decision were his measures taken, that before they were well aware of the danger impending over them, they were all surrounded by greatly superior masses of French troops, and compelled to surrender. By this able stroke nearly five thousand Spanish troops were made prisoners, who might have been highly prejudicial to the French arms, if they had succeeded in withdrawing and forming the nucleus of an insurrection in the interior of the country (3).

Progress of the insurrection. The flame, however, excited by the glorious intelligence of popular success, which daily came pouring in from all parts of Spain, could not so easily be suppressed. The students at Coimbra were among the first to take up arms; the mountaineers of Tras-los-Montes speedily followed the example; the tocsins were heard in their lovely hills, arms and torches gleamed in their vine-clad vales; Algarves was speedily in open re-

(1) South, ii. 287, 288. Tor. ii. 82, 85. Nap. i. 287, 288.

(2) "What is the use," said he, "of promising to the Portuguese what you will never have the means of fulfilling. Nothing is more praise-worthy, without doubt, than to gain the affections of the people; but it should never be forgotten, that the primary object of a general should be the safety of his soldiers. Instantly disarm the Portuguese; watch over the soldiers who have been sent to their homes, in order that their chiefs may not form so many centres of insurrection in the interior. Keep your

eye on the Spanish troops: secure the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and populous a city; its population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it; place them in barracks on the sea-coast. Keep them in breach—well disciplined, massed, and instructed, in order to be in a condition to combat the English army, which, sooner or later, will disembark on the coast of Portugal."—*Narration to Junot, May 26, 1808.*

—Fox, iv. 188, 189.

(3) Lond. i. 117, 119. South, ii. 41, 47. Rev. 89, 100. Fey, iv. 202, 210.

volt; Alentejo was known to be ripe for insurrection, and, at the summons of Colonel Lopez de Souza, soon after took up arms. Encouraged by this revolt in their neighbourhood, the inhabitants of Oporto a second time hoisted

June 9. the standard of independence. A junta was speedily formed in that opulent city, which shared the supreme direction of affairs with the bishop, who early signalized himself by his zeal in the patriot cause. The insurrection in the province of Entre Douro e Minho appeared so formidable, that Junot directed General Loison with a strong division to proceed against it from Almeida; but though he at first obtained some success, yet, as he advanced into the mountains, his communications were so completely cut off, and the insurrection appeared so formidable on all sides, that he was obliged to return to Lisbon by Celorico and Guarda, at which places he routed the peasantry with great slaughter (1). In the south, the patriots gained considerable successes against the French detachments, which endeavoured to penetrate into the Alentejo; in the north-east, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Tezers; in the east, the revolt at Beija was only extinguished by a bloody nocturnal assault of the town, after a rapid march

June 9. by a French brigade (2). Surrounded in this manner with embarrassments, Junot, after holding a council of war, the invariable sign of experienced difficulty, again despatched Loison with four thousand men to Abrantes; in his progress he had several severe actions with the Portuguese peasants, who were dispersed with great slaughter, but who evinced, by their courage in disaster, what materials were to be found among them for a formidable resistance in future times; and he returned to Lisbon, having irritated the insurrection more by his cruelty than he had overawed it by his success. His recall to the capital was rendered necessary by the progress of the insurrection in the Alentejo, which had elected a junta, and established a sort of

July 25. provisional government at Evora. Resolved to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, where the proximity of English succours from Gibraltar rendered it peculiarly formidable, Junot fitted out a more powerful expedition, consisting of seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred horse with eight guns, which was sent forth under the command of the sanguinary Loison.

July 29. After dispersing several armed assemblages which strove in vain to obstruct his progress, this General came up with the main body of the insurgents posted in front of Evora. Ten thousand Portuguese peasants, and four thousand Spanish troops, who had advanced to support them from Badajoz, were there assembled, with twelve pieces of cannon. They were wholly unable, however, to withstand the shock of the French legions; at the first onset, the undisciplined peasantry fled from the terrible charge of their dragoons. The Spanish auxiliaries, seeing themselves left alone with the whole weight of the action on their hands, retired in haste, and were speedily thrown into disorder; and in the general confusion, the victorious troops entered the town, where a feeble resistance only was attempted, but an indiscriminate massacre immediately commenced. Neither age nor sex were spared: armed and unarmed were inhumanly put to the sword: it is the

(1) "In this expedition," says Thiebault, "we lost 60 men killed and 140 wounded: of the insurgents at least 4000 were killed or wounded on the different fields of battle."—THIEBAULT, 155.

(2) The French general, Thiebault, boasts of this as a great exploit. "Twelve hundred Portuguese were put to death in the conflict; no quarter was shown to any one with arms in his hands. The town was afterwards set on fire and plundered; and the worst military excesses committed on the wretched

inhabitants. Kellermann shortly afterwards said, in a proclamation to the people of Alentejo:—'Beija had revolted; Beija is no more. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the sword; its houses delivered up to pillage and the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and with a senseless hatred take up arms against us.'—THIEBAULT, 155, 156; SOUTHEY, i. 105.

boast of the French historians, that while "they lost only two hundred and ninety, eight thousand were slain or wounded on the part of the insurgents (1)." Never, while Portuguese blood flows in the human veins, will the remembrance of that dreadful day be forgotten : never will the French be any other than an object of execration to the descendants of those who perished in that inhuman massacre (2). But the cup of human suffering was full : the hour of retribution was fast approaching ; and Loison was awakened from his fancied dream of security, and the farther prosecution of his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, by intelligence that a BRITISH ARMY HAD APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF PORTUGAL.

The English cabinet resolve on sending succours to Portugal.

Ever since the insurrection in the Peninsula had assumed a serious aspect, the English government had resolved upon sending out powerful military succours to its assistance, and at length bringing the strength of the two nations to a fair contest with land forces. Fortunately a body of about ten thousand men were already assembled at Cork ; having been collected there, by the preceding Administration, for the purpose of an expedition against South America ;—a proposed diversion of force, at a time when every sabre and bayonet was required in European warfare, which appears almost inconceivable ; unless, as Colonel Napier sarcastically observes, it was projected in imitation of the Romans, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at their gates (3). The command of the expedition was given to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, whose great capacity had been evinced in the glorious fields of Indian warfare, and more recently in the easier conquest of the Danish militia ; and General Miranda, the able adventurer, who had so long been concerned in projects for the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country, was given to understand that no countenance could now be shown by the British government to any such designs. Two smaller divisions were soon afterwards prepared, and set sail from Ramsgate and Margate ; and orders were sent to Sir John Moore, who, with twelve thousand men, had been sent to Gottenburg to aid the King of Sweden in his heroic defence of his kingdom against Russia,—an offer which that gallant monarch declined to accept (4),—to return forthwith to England, to form a farther reinforcement of the armies in the Peninsula. Though the direction of the Cork expedition, however, was intrusted to Sir Arthur, yet a senior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, was appointed to supersede him in the command shortly after he landed in Portugal ; who again was to retain the supreme direction only until Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar. Thus, in the most momentous period of the campaign, that in which the British troops were first to be engaged with the enemy, and when they were exposed to all the difficulty incident to a first landing on a hostile shore, they were to be intrusted successively to the command of three different generals ; an arrangement as characteristic of the happy ignorance of military affairs which at that period prevailed in the British government, as the cheerful acquiescence of their first commander in the appointment of any officer, how unknown soever to Fame, over his head, was of the single-hearted feeling and patriotic devotion which, in every age, has been found to be the accompaniment of real greatness (5).

(1) Thiebault, 165.

(2) Thiebault, 131, 175. Nap. i. 161, 165. South. ii. 72, 155. Nevil, iv. i. 205. Foy, iv. 246, 272.

(3) Nap. i. 480.

(4) The particulars of this expedition, and the causes of the disagreement with the Swedish mo-

narch, will be found below, Chap. LIV which treats of the war between Turkey, Sweden, and Russia.

(5) Well. Disp. by Gurwood ; iv. 1, 3, 21, 22, 43. When Sir A. Wellesley received the command of the expedition at Cork, government gave him no reason to believe that he was to be superseded in

Sir A. Wellesley takes the command of the expedition, and arrives off Mondego Bay.

The expedition, under the command of Sir Arthur, sailed from Cork on the 12th July, but the general himself preceded them in a fast-sailing frigate, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. He immediately entered into communication with the Junta of Galicia, from whom he received the distressing intelligence of the defeat at Rio Seco; and also was made acquainted with the desire of the Spaniards in that quarter to receive no succours, except in arms, stores, and money, from England; a resolution which it is hard to say, after such a disaster, savoured more of magnanimous resolution or presumptuous confidence (1). He found the opinion of all classes so unanimous in hatred of the French, "that no one dared to show that he was a friend to them." Having supplied the Junta, therefore, with L.200,000 in money, and assured them of the speedy arrival of extensive military stores, which in a great measure elevated their spirits after their late misfortunes, he proceeded to the southward to secure the main objects of the expedition, which were, in the first instance, an attack upon the Tagus; and afterwards, the detachment of such a force to the southward as might effectually secure Cadiz from any attack from the French under Dupont. As the whole force of the expedition, when joined by the reinforcements from England, the corps of Sir John Moore, and that under General Spencer, which was off Cadiz, was estimated by government at thirty thousand men, it was thought that ample means existed to achieve both these objects; and as the primary condition of all successful military efforts, by a transmarine power, is the securing strong seaports as a base for the army, and a point of refuge in case of disaster, it is evident that the attainment of one or both of these objects was an indispensable preliminary to future operations. It was fortunate, however, that subsequent events rendered the dispersion of the English force, and the formation of a double base of operations unnecessary; and that the British army was thereby concentrated in Portugal, where it had a strong country to defend, a docile population to work upon, and a central position in the flank of the French armies in Spain to maintain (2).

Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Oporto on the 26th, and proceeded on with the expedition to Mondego Bay, where he arrived on the 30th July. Having there received intelligence of the surrender of Dupont, he deemed all operations in Andalusia unnecessary, and having sent

the supreme direction of it. The first intimation he obtained of that intention was by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, dated 15th July, 1808, which was received by him when at sea, off Mondego Bay. Many officers, who had held the situations and achieved the victories which he had in India, would have at once resigned the command in which he was now reduced to so subordinate a station; but Sir Arthur acted otherwise. In answer to Lord Castlereagh, he said—"Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the future command of the army. All that I can say on the subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to insure its success; and you may depend on it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success. The government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, either here or elsewhere." When asked by an intimate friend, after his return, how he who had commanded armies of 40,000 men, received the Order of the Bath, and the thanks of Parliament, could thus submit to be reduced to the rank of a brigadier of infantry, he replied—"For this reason—I was aimak-wallah, as we say in the

East; I have ate of the King's salt; and therefore I consider it my duty to serve with zeal and promptitude when or wherever the King or his Government may think proper to employ me." Nor was this disinterested and high-minded patriotism and sense of duty without its final reward; inferior men would probably have thrown up the command, and rested on the laurels of Seringapatam and Assaye; but Wellington pursued the path of duty under every slight, and he lived to strike down Napoleon on the field of Waterloo.—See *Geawood's Despatches*, August 1, 1808, vol. iv. 43; and *Blackwood's Magazine*, xli. 714.

(1) "Notwithstanding the recent defeat of the Galician army, the junta here have not expressed any wish to receive the assistance of British troops; and they again repeated, this morning, that they could put any number of men into the field if they were provided with arms and money; and I think this disinclination to receive the assistance of British troops, is founded in a great degree on the objection to give the command of their troops to British officers."—WELLINGTON TO LORD CASTLERAUGH, Corunna, July 21, 1808; *Geawood*, iv. 27.

(2) *Geaw.* iv. 20, 33. *Loud.* i. 114, 116. *Nap.* i. 187.

orders to General Spencer to come round from the bay of Cadiz and join him, he determined upon an immediate landing; a bold and decisive resolution, considering that his own force did not exceed ten thousand men, and Junot had fifteen thousand at Lisbon (1). He accordingly issued a proclamation to the people of Portugal, eminently descriptive of the principles of that glorious struggle which was now about to commence (2), and which his own talents and constancy, and the resolution of the three nations, now banded together, ultimately brought to so glorious a termination. At first, Sir Arthur thought of landing on the small peninsula of Peniche, about seventy miles to the north of the Rock of Lisbon, but though the anchorage was safe and practicable, it was commanded by the guns of the fort at its extremity, which was still in the hands of the enemy. He, therefore, by the advice of Sir Charles Cotton, selected in preference Mondego Bay, where the whole fleet was assembled on the 31st July. On the following morning the disembarkation com-

Aug. 1. menced; and notwithstanding the obstacles arising from a strong west wind and heavy surf, which occasioned the swamping of several boats

Aug. 2. and the loss of many lives, it was completed by the 5th, at which time General Spencer with his division came up, and was immediately put on shore. He had not received Sir Arthur's orders to join; but with great presence of mind and the true military spirit, the moment he heard of Dupont's surrender, he made sail for the Tagus, from whence he was sent forward by Sir Charles Cotton to the general point of disembarkation. On the

Aug. 3. evening of the 8th the united forces, thirteen thousand strong, bivouacked on the beach, and on the following morning the advanced guard moved forward, and commenced that memorable march, which, though deeply chequered with disaster, was destined to be never finally arrested till the British cavalry passed in triumph from Bayonne to Calais (3).

March of
the British
troops to
Rellca.

The troops took the field in the highest spirits, and the most perfect state of discipline and equipment, confident in their leader, and not less confident in themselves; for even at this early period of the war it was the habit of the British soldiers, the habit bequeathed by centuries of glory, to admit of no doubt as to the issue of a combat. The Portuguese generals, who had six thousand men, were at first most extravagant in their demands, and would only consent to join the English upon condition that their troops should all be maintained from the British commissariat; a proposition so utterly unreasonable when made by the natives of the country to their allies, just landed from their ships, that it thus early evinced, what the future progress of the war so clearly demonstrated, that jealousy of foreign co-operation, and aversion to foreign command, were nearly as strongly imprinted on their minds as hatred at the invaders. At length they consented to let General Freire, with one brigade of infantry, fourteen hundred strong, and two hundred and fifty horse, remain with Sir Arthur; but the main body was positively prohibited to advance beyond Leira on the road to Lisbon.

(1) The exact number was 9280 sabres and bayonets—about 10,000 men, including subalterns and officers. Spencer's corps was 4793 strong—about 5000 men.—GURWOOD, iv. 26.

(2) "The English soldiers who land upon your shores do so with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honour. The glorious struggle in which you are engaged, is for all that is dear to man: the protection of your wives and children, the restoration of your lawful prince, the independence, nay, the existence of your kingdom, the preservation of your holy religion—objects like these can only be attained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy. The noble struggle against the tyranny

and usurpation of France, will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, and England; and in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of his Britannic Majesty are the same as those by which you yourselves are animated."—A. WILKINSON'S *Letter*. It is seldom that a proclamation in the outset of a struggle, so faithfully represents the real objects at issue in it; still seldomer that it so prophetically and truly describes its ultimate result after many and long continued disasters.—See GURWOOD, iv. 46.

(3) GURWOOD, iv. 66, 67. Nap. I. 190, 191. Lond. 124, 125.

The truth was, that they entertained a secret dread of the French troops, and deeming the English totally inadequate to contend with them, they were unwilling to commit themselves by their side to a decisive affair. This defection of the native troops threw a chill over the English army, not from any doubt as to its ability to contend single-handed with the forces of Junot, but from the apprehensions which it inspired regarding the sincerity of their allies' professions of zeal against the common enemy. Sir Arthur, notwithstanding, continued his advance, and was received every where by the people with rapturous enthusiasm. His route lay by Alcobaca to Caldas, Aug. 15. which latter place he reached on the evening of the 15th; Laborde, who commanded a division of five thousand French, which Junot on the first alarm had sent down to the coast, retiring as he advanced. A trifling unsuccessful skirmish occurred on the same day at Obidos, in which a few men were killed and wounded on both sides: memorable as the first **BRITISH SOLDIERS** who fell in the Peninsular war (1).

Combat of Rolica. Meanwhile Junot despatched orders in all directions to call in his detached columns, and concentrate all his forces for the protection of Lisbon; and Laborde, to give him time to complete his arrangements, resolved to stand firm at **ROLICA**, a little village situated at the southern extremity of a large oblong valley, running nearly north and south in the bosom of the Monte Junta, in the centre of which the little village and Moorish tower of Obidos are situated. His force, five thousand strong, including five hundred horse and five guns, was stationed on a small elevated plateau in front of Rolica, at the upper end of the valley; and the hills on either side which shut it in were occupied by detachments, who, from amidst the rocky thickets and close underwood of myrtles and gumcistus with which they were covered, threatened to keep up a heavy fire on the assailants. Sir Arthur divided his force into three columns: the right, consisting of the Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse under Colonel Trant, was directed to turn the mountains in the rear; while the centre, under Sir Arthur in person, attacked the plateau in front; and the left, under General Ferguson, was ordered to ascend the hills abreast of Obidos, and menace the French right by turning it in the mountains. As the centre advanced, preceded by nine guns, the corps on the right and left moved simultaneously forward in the hills, and the aspect of the body in the plain, nine thousand strong, moving majestically forward at a slow pace, in the finest order, and constantly closing again, after the array had been broken by trees or houses in the line of its advance, strongly impressed the French soldiers, most of whom, like the British, were that day to make their first essay in real warfare against an antagonist worthy of their arms. No sooner, however, was Laborde made aware of the risk he ran, if he remained in his present situation, of being outflanked on either side, than he fell swiftly back, in admirable order, and took up a second position much stronger than the former, in a little plain projecting into the valley higher up in the gorge of the pass, and shut in by close rocky thickets on either side. Thither he was rapidly pursued by the British, the right, centre, and left still moving in the same order. Never, in the whole progress of the Peninsular campaigns, did war appear in a more picturesque and animating form than in the first engagement of the British soldiers. The loud shouts of the advancing columns, re-echoed by the surrounding hills, and answered by as confident cheers from the enemy; the sharp rattle of the musketry among the woods, which marked the advance of the assailants as they drove before them

the French light troops; the curling wreaths of smoke which rose above the foliage, and were wafted by the morning air up the sides of the mountains, amidst the rays of a resplendent sun, formed a scene which resembled rather the mimic warfare of the opera stage, than the opening of the most desperate and sanguinary strife recorded in modern times. Such was the impetuosity of the attack, that the leading troops of the centre column, particularly the 29th regiment, forced their way through the gorge, and alone sustained the brunt of the enemy's fire, before any of their comrades could come up to their assistance. But the severity of the concentric discharges, not merely from the line in front, but the woods on either flank, was so great, that this gallant regiment, on first emerging into the little plain, wavered and broke, and their noble colonel, Lake, as he waved his hat to lead them back to the charge, was killed. At that critical moment, however, the 5th and 9th came up, the 29th rallied, and the whole rushed forward with irresistible impetuosity upon the enemy. The French were obliged to give ground; the position was carried before it was menaced by the flank columns getting into its rear. Even then the enemy retired slowly, and in compact order, keeping up a continued fire from the rearguard, and exhibiting, equally with the advance of the assailants, the finest specimen of discipline and steadiness amidst all the confusion incident to a retreat over broken ground and through entangled thickets. In this brilliant affair the British lost five hundred men killed and wounded; the French six hundred, and three pieces of cannon: and as the former, though nearly triple the enemy upon the whole, were necessarily, from the narrow and rugged character of the ground, inferior, in the first instance at least, at all the points of attack, it was hard to say to which of these two gallant nations the palm of courage and skill in this their first encounter in the Peninsula was to be awarded (1).

On the following morning orders were, in the first instance, issued for the continuance of the pursuit, and it was universally believed in the army that the enemy would be pursued, at the point of the bayonet, to the Rock of Lisbon; but at noon accounts arrived at headquarters of the arrival of Generals Anstruther and Ackland, with their respective brigades from England, off the coast; and, at the same time, that Junot had marched with all his disposable force out of Lisbon to bring matters to the issue of a decisive battle. Orders were, therefore, given to suspend the pursuit, and the line of march was directed by Lourinham to Vimero, where headquarters were established on the 19th, in order to be near the seacoast to take advantage of the reinforcements which were at hand. On the other hand, Junot, having by great exertion collected all his disposable force, and formed a junction at Torres Vedras with the retiring divisions of La-borde, found himself at the head of only fourteen thousand men—including, however, twelve hundred horse and six-and-twenty pieces of cannon; so

(1) Foy, iv. 304, 315. Thieb. 174, 182. Garw. iv. 81, 84. Nap. i. 202, 205. Lond. i. 130, 137.

In this, as in all the other actions of the war, the estimate of the numbers engaged is taken from a medium of the accounts on both sides; keeping in view the credit due to the different narratives, and the maxim, *testimonia ponderanda sunt potius quam numeranda*. In this affair Sir Arthur estimates the French at 6000 men, Thiebault at 1900, Foy at 2500, Torrens at 5000, Thibaudau at 3500.—See THIB. 179; GARW. iv. 81; FOY, iv. 314; TOA. ii. 46; TANA. vi. 465. With the utmost wish to maintain an impartial view, and the greatest anxiety to avoid the influence of undue national partiality, it is impos-

sible to study the French accounts of the actions in the Peninsular war, and particularly the numbers engaged and lost on the opposite sides, without feeling as great distrust of the fidelity of their facts as admiration for the brilliancy of their descriptions and the talent of their observations; and arriving at the conclusion, that the two rival races of modern Europe have here, as elsewhere, preserved their never-failing characteristics; and that, if the palm for the eagle-eye and the scientific reflection is frequently to be awarded to the writers of the *Codic*, the credit due to honest and trustworthy narrative is in general due to the historians of the Gothic race.

heavily had the necessity of occupying many different points in a hostile country, weighed upon and divided the twenty-five thousand which still remained at his disposal. On the 19th, General Anstruther's brigade was landed, and on the 20th, General Ackland's; and these reinforcements raised the English army to sixteen thousand fighting men, besides Trant's Portuguese, and two regiments which were with Sir Charles Cotton off the Tagus. It had, however, only eighteen guns and a hundred and eighty horse British, and two hundred Portuguese horse, so that the superiority of infantry was nearly counterbalanced by the advantage of the enemy in the other arms of war. Accurately informed of the nature of the country through which he was to advance, Sir Arthur proposed, on the 21st, to turn the strong position of Torres Vedras, and gain Mafra with a powerful advanced guard, while the main body was to move forward, and seize the adjoining heights, so as to intercept the French line of retreat by Montachique to Lisbon. But Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Arthur's superior in command, who had now arrived off the coast, forbade any such hazardous operation, as endangering unnecessarily part of the army, when the force already in hand, and still more the powerful reinforcement approaching under Sir John Moore, rendered ultimate success a matter of certainty without incurring any such risk. The troops, therefore, were concentrated at Vimiero, and every arrangement made for a decisive battle on the morrow; while Junot, having mustered every man he could collect at Torres Vedras, set out, soon after nightfall, and advanced, through tedious and difficult defiles, to within a league and a half of the British outposts, where he arrived by seven o'clock on the following morning (1).

The ground occupied by the British in front of Vimiero, though not clearly defined as a military position, was yet of considerable strength. The village of that name stands in a beautiful valley, running in a north-westerly direction from the interior towards the Atlantic, with the clear stream of the Maceira glittering over a pebbly bottom in its bosom, at the distance of about three miles from the sea. Hills rise on either side, especially on the northern, where a range of abrupt heights overhang the little plain. Over the summit of these runs the great road from Lisbon, through the hamlets of Fontaniel and Ventoza to Lourinham; while on the south-east is a sort of high table-land, covered in the ravines with myrtle, in the open part bare, over which the approach on the side of Torres Vedras passes. A still

(1) Gurw. iv. 89, 93. Sir A. Wellesley's Evid. Ibid. iv. 181. Lond. i. 137, 142. Nap. i. 207, 209. Foy, iv. 319, 323. Thib. 183, 195.

The road by which Sir Arthur proposed to have advanced from Vimiero to Mafra was near the seacoast; that by which Junot actually came up from Torres Vedras to Vimiero was further in the interior, but nearly parallel to the former. If, therefore, the design of the English general had been followed out, it would have brought the two armies into a position similar to the French and Prussian at Jena; they would have mutually turned and crossed each other in their march, and when they came to blows, Junot would have fought with his back to Oporto and his face to Lisbon, and Wellington with his back to Lisbon and his face to Oporto. But there would have been this essential distinction between the situation of the two armies, after having thus mutually passed each other; that Junot, cut off from all his reserves and supplies at Lisbon, would have been driven, in case of disaster, to a ruinous retreat through the insurgent and hostile mountains of the north of Portugal; whereas Wellington, backed by the sea, and having his fleet, containing powerful reinforcements, to fall back upon, would have fought in the most advantageous position. There can be

little doubt that, in these circumstances, defeat to Junot would have been attended with decisive consequences, and that Wellington was pursuing the plan of an able commander in throwing himself in this manner upon his enemy's line of communication without compromising his own; the great object and most decisive stroke which can be dealt out in war. At the same time it is not surprising that Sir Harry Burrard, who came in on the broadside of the affair, and could not be supposed to appreciate so clearly as the commander actually engaged, the vital importance of not delaying an hour the proposed night-march between the sea and the hills, should have declined to plunge at once into so perilous an operation. His real error consisted in interfering at all with an important and delicate military operation, at the time when it was on the eve of execution by an able and experienced general; and the chief fault lay with the government in subjecting the army, at such a critical time, to the successive command of three different generals, who could not be supposed properly to enter into, or thoroughly understand, the operations in the course of execution at the time when they successively assumed the direction.

loftier mass of heights overlook these in the rear, and lie between them and the sea. On this rugged ground the British army lay in bivouac on the night of the 20th, the village of Vimiero being occupied by a strong detachment, and a few pickets stationed on the heights towards Lourinham, to give warning of the arrival of the enemy. The first information of their approach was obtained at midnight, when a horseman in haste rode up to Sir Arthur with the account that Junot's whole army, said to be twenty thousand strong, was approaching. Shortly before sunrise a cloud of dust was seen to arise in the direction of the road leading from Torres Vedras to Lourinham—columns after columns were soon after discerned through the morning dawn, to cross the sky-line of the opposite eminences, and it was evident that the French were bearing down in great force on the British left. After they descended from the heights on the opposite side, however, the direction of their march could no longer be distinctly perceived, and the advanced guards were upon the English videttes almost as soon as they were perceived. But Sir Arthur, concluding from the line of the road on which they were marching, that the left was the principal object of attack, had meanwhile ordered four brigades successively to cross the valley from the heights on the south to those on the north of the stream; and before the action began, the left was secure. Observing the rapid concentration of troops on the English left the French accumulated their forces on their own right. General Laborde commanded a column, six thousand strong, which advanced against the centre; while Brannier, with his division of five thousand, moved against the left of the British; and the reserve under Kellerman, with the cavalry led by Margaron, in all about three thousand men, was ready to support any point where their aid might be required. Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, and Bower, commanded the English left. Ackland united the left to the centre, which, strongly grouped together in the valley in front of Vimiero, was formed of the brigades of Anstruther and Fane (1); while, on the right, Hill's brigade, in a massy column, rested on the summit of the heights, which formed the southern boundary of the valley.

Battle of
Vimiero,
Aug. 21.

The action began with the head of Laborde's column, which, advancing with the utmost impetuosity against the British centre, first came in contact with the 50th regiment. Its light troops were driven in with great vigour, and the French mounted the hill to the north-east of Vimiero with loud cries and all the confidence of victory; but when they reached the summit, they were shattered by a well-directed fire from the artillery, disposed along the front of the English line on the edge of the steep; and their troops astonished by the effect of the shrapnel shells, then first used against them, which, after striking down by a point-blank discharge whole files of soldiers in front, exploded with all the devastation of bombs in the rear. While yet breathless with their ascent, they received a discharge within pistol-shot from the 50th, and were immediately charged with the bayonet with such vigour, that ere the rush took place they broke and fled (2). At the

(1) Lond. i. 140, 142. Nap. i. 208, 212. Foy, iv. 324, 333. Thib. 192, 194. Gurw. iv. 93, 94.

(2) Colonel Walker, of the 50th regiment, finding his battalion, which had only 700 bayonets in the field, unable, by a direct resistance in front, to withstand the assault of above two thousand men in column, whom Laborde led on, most skillfully drew it up obliquely to their advance, with the left, against which they were directed, thrown back. The effect of this was to expose the flank as well as front of the French column to the British fire, almost every shot of which told on their crowded ranks, while a small

number only would return the discharge, and the numerous ranks in rear were perfectly useless. When the order to charge was given, the British regiment in line came down in compact order on the French column, partly in front and partly in flank, and in the attempt to deploy and form line to withstand the levelled steel, they almost unavoidably broke and fled. This method of resisting the French attack in column was very frequently afterwards employed by Wellington, and always with the same success. It can hardly fail of proving so, if the part of the line menaced by the head of the

same time Fane's brigade repulsed, with equal success, an attack on the village of Vimiero in the centre, and, after a desperate contest, seven pieces of cannon were taken in that quarter; while the few horsemen with the army who were there stationed broke forth among the retreating lines with great execution; but pursuing their advantage too far, they were assailed when in disorder by the superior troops of the French cavalry, and almost cut to pieces. While these successes were achieved in the centre, a most severe conflict was going on in the hills to the left, where the road to Lourinham ascends the steep heights to the north of Vimiere. Brennier and Solignac commanded in that quarter; and as Junot perceived that their attack did not at once prove successful, they were supported in the end by the whole reserve of infantry, under Kellerman. The French, under Solignac, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came on with the utmost impetuosity, and first encountered Ferguson's brigade on the summit of the ridge. Several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged between these dauntless antagonists with extraordinary execution on both sides, as the fire-arms, almost within pistol-shot, told with murderous effect on the dense array of either line; but at length the three English regiments, which had hitherto singly maintained the combat (36th, 40th, and 71st), being supported by three others, levelled their bayonets, and rushing forward with irresistible impetuosity, drove the French line headlong down the steep, with the loss of all their artillery. So dreadful was the execution of the bayonet on this occasion, that the whole front line of one of the French regiments went down like grass before the scythe, and three hundred men lay dead as they had stood in their ranks. Brennier's, however, still remained, as well as the reserve under Kellerman—the flower of the French army—and with these choice troops Junot made a gallant attempt to regain the day. Forming his men under the cover of the rocks and woods which concealed them from the enemy, Brennier, with his columns in admirable order, came suddenly upon the victorious British as they were lying on the ground, in loose array in the valley, reposing after their success, and, suddenly charging, drove them back, and retook the guns; but his triumph was but momentary; the surprised troops rallied upon the heights in their rear, to which they had been driven, and, facing about, poured in a destructive volley upon their pursuers; and immediately charging with a loud shout, not only again captured the artillery, but made Brennier himself prisoner, and drove the enemy a second time in utter confusion down the hill. So complete was the rout, that Solignac's brigade was driven off the ground in a different direction from Brennier's; the former general was desperately wounded, and his troops would all have been made prisoners, had not an unexpected order from Sir Harry Burrard obliged Ferguson to halt in the midst of his success. The broken French upon this rallied and reunited, and the whole fell back to the heights on the opposite side of the valley, considerably to the north of the ground from which they had commenced their attack in the morning—leaving in the hands of the victors thirteen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and four hundred prisoners, besides two thousand who had fallen on the field. The English

column can be relied on to withstand the shock till the fire of the other parts on the flank of the column has produced the desired effect; but unless this is the case, the column will break the line, and deploying against the oblique line, now itself taken in flank, soon drive it off the field. Of all the European troops, the British are the only ones by whom this hazardous, but, if successful, decisive mode of

resisting the attack in column was habitually practised. General Loison, who witnessed this able movement, desired, after the Convention of Cintra, to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and, with true military frankness, congratulated him on the steadiness and talent with which he had, with a battalion in line, withstood the formidable attack of the French column.—See *Scorr's Napoleon*, vi. 235.

had to lament the loss of nearly eight hundred men in killed and wounded (1).

Sir A. Wellesley proposes to follow up the victory but is prevented by Sir Harry Burrard.

Like the allied sovereigns at Austerlitz, Junot had made his attack by a flank march directed in echelon athwart the front, against the left of the British in position; and his disaster, like theirs, was in a great measure owing to that cause, which brought his different columns not simultaneously, but at successive periods into action. Sir Arthur Wellesley had as decisive success in his power as Napoléon, at the close of the day; for not only had the three brigades under Hill on the right and the Portuguese never fired a shot, but two other brigades had suffered very little; the whole army was in excellent order and the most enthusiastic spirits; the shouts of victory, the triumphant clang of trumpets, was heard along their whole line; and from the direction which the broken French had taken after their defeat; they were entirely cut off from the retreat to Lisbon; while the British, who had repulsed their oblique attack, and driven them off in a north-easterly direction, were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. This situation of things promised the greatest results to immediate activity; Sir Arthur was fully aware of the vast advantages thus placed within his grasp, and prepared, by immediate and decisive operations, instantly to turn them to the best account. He proposed with the five brigades on the left, about nine thousand men, and the Portuguese, five thousand more, to follow up his success against the retreating columns of the enemy, now blended together in great confusion on the opposite heights, and drive them as far as possible back in a north-easterly direction over the Sierra da Baragueda, away from the capital; while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, six thousand strong, should make straight for the defile of Torres Vedras, which lay open to the south, and thence push on to Montachique, and cut off all retreat by the French to the capital. Considering that Junot had lost two-thirds of his artillery, and great part of his reserve park of ammunition, there can be no doubt that this operation would have proved successful, and that not only would Lisbon have fallen an easy prey to the victors, but Junot himself, driven to an eccentric and disastrous retreat through an insurgent and mountainous country almost destitute of roads, would have been too happy to find shelter under the cannon of Almeida with half his force. Orders to that effect were already given, the army was preparing to execute them, when the assumption of the command by Sir Harry Burrard at once stopt short the career of victory. That officer, who had arrived on the field with his staff early in the day, had, with generous forbearance, declined to take the command from Sir Arthur during the battle; but after it was over, considering the responsibility of ulterior operations as resting on himself, he gave orders to halt at all points, and remain in position at Vimiero till the expected reinforcements under Sir John Moore joined the army. Sir Arthur, in the strongest terms and with military frankness, represented to his superior general, on the field of battle, the inestimable importance of instantly following up the beaten enemy, driving him still further to the north-east, and interposing between his disordered columns and the strong defiles of Torres Vedras, the real gates of the capital. But all was in vain. Sir Harry Burrard, though a respectable and gallant veteran, had none of the vigour or daring requisite for decisive success; he belonged to the old school, by whom one battle was considered sufficient work for one week, and deemed it im-

(1) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. *Curw.* iv. 93, 330, 339. *Thib.* 195, 204. *Jom.* iii. 71, 73. *Scott.* 96. *Nap. i.* 212, 216. *Lond. i.* 142, 144. *Foy, iv.* vi. 234, 235.

prudent, when the artillery-horses were fatigued and the cavalry destroyed, to hazard any thing by a further advance, the more especially as ultimate success without any risk was certainly to be looked for upon the arrival of Sir John Moore's division. He persisted, accordingly, in his resolution not to move from his ground: the precious moments never to be regained were lost; the disordered French, seeing with astonishment that they were not pursued, re-entered their ranks. Junot that very night, by a forced and circuitous march, regained the defiles of Torres Vedras, and secured his retreat to the capital; while Sir Arthur, seeing the opportunity was lost, and concealing the bitterness of his disappointment under an affected gaiety, said to the officers of his staff, "Gentlemen, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot red-legged partridges (1)."

Sir Harry Burrard's tenure of the supreme direction of affairs was of short duration. Early on the morning of the 22d, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar, and immediately landed and assumed the command; so that within thirty hours a pitched battle had been fought, a decisive operation rejected, and three successive commanders called to the direction of the army. After consulting with Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, and getting the best information he could, he resolved to advance on the 23d against Junot, now in position at Torres Vedras, and orders to that effect had already been issued, when information was brought that a French flag of truce had reached the outposts. It proved to be General Kellerman, with a proposal from Junot for a suspension of arms, with a view to the evacuation of Portugal (2).

Convention
of Cintra.
Aug. 23.

Reasons
which led to
an armistice
on both
sides.

In truth, the situation of Junot since the battle of Vimiero had been such, that he had no longer any alternative to adopt. Early on the morning of the 22d, a council of war was held at Torres Vedras; and the proverb almost invariably holds good, that such a council never fights. The French generals were aware that a powerful reinforcement, under Sir John Moore, was on the eve of landing; that a city containing three hundred thousand agitated and hostile citizens was in the rear; that the forts and points of defence which it contained were hardly tenable against an army of thirty thousand English troops, and that, to attempt a retreat through Portugal, intersected as it is by mountain torrents and almost inaccessible ridges, in the face of an insurgent population, and pursued by a victorious army, could not fail to be attended with the greatest disasters. In these circumstances, it was unanimously agreed, that enough had been done for the honour of the Imperial arms, and that to endeavour to obtain, by negotiation, a convention which might restore the army to the French soil, and ultimately to renewed operations in the north of Spain, was the most prudent course which could be adopted. General Kellerman was selected for this delicate mission, and it could not have been intrusted to abler or more skilful hands. Enjoying a European reputation, not less from the glory of his father (3), the hero of Valmy, than his own inappreciable achievements on the field of Marengo (4), he was at the same time possessed of all the tact and finesse in which the French diplomatists excel all those of Europe, with the exception

(1) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. Gurw. iv. 99, and Evid. Ibid. iv. 207, 208. Lord Burghersb's Evidence. Ibid. iv. 214. Loud. i. 145, 146. Nap. i. 216, 217.

Lord Burghersb, in his evidence before the court of enquiry, declared,—"I recollect, that on the evening of 21st, August, Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard to advance, giving as a reason that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras

than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon, and that in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon."—Evidence, Court of Enquiry.—Gurwood, iv. 214.

(2) Gurw. iv. 104. Nap. i. 220, Foy, iv. 310.

(3) Ant. i. 311.

(4) Ant. iv. 187.

of those of Russia. Perceiving from some hints dropped in conversation by the English general, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and his brother officers, who were not aware that he understood their language, that they were far from possessing the confidence of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the results to be expected from immediate and decisive operations, he began by representing, in the most favourable colours, the strength of the French army and the magnitude of its resources, especially from the aid of the sailors and artillery of the Russian fleet, as well as the resolution of its commander, whom he described as determined to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon rather than submit to any conditions derogatory to the honour of the Imperial arms. Having thus effected his object, of producing a favourable impression of the protracted and doubtful nature of the contest which awaited them if hostilities were persisted in, he gradually opened the real object of his mission, which was the conclusion of an armistice preparatory to a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. The terms proposed were, that the French army should not be considered as prisoners of war, but be sent back to France by sea, with their artillery, arms, and baggage; that their partisans in the country should not be disquieted on account of their political opinions, but, so far as they desired it, be permitted to withdraw with their effects; and that the Russian fleet should remain in Lisbon as in a neutral harbour. The two first conditions Aug. 22. were accepted without any difficulty by all the English generals; but Sir Arthur Wellesley strenuously opposed the last, and it was at length agreed to refer it to the decision of Sir Charles Cotton, who positively refused to agree to it. Foiled in this attempt to extricate the Russian fleet from their awkward situation, the French general was obliged to leave them to their fate, and a separate convention was some days afterwards concluded with Admiral Siniavin, the Russian commander, in virtue of which the whole fleet was to be conducted to England and retained in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace, and the officers and crews be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government, without any restriction as to their future service (1).

Senseless clamour in England on the subject leads to a Court of Enquiry. Its result.

Posterity will scarcely be able to credit the universal burst of indignation with which this convention was received, both in the Peninsular nations and the British islands. Totally incapable of appreciating the real importance of the acquisition of Portugal at one blow on the future progress of the war, the inhabitants of all these countries united in condemning a treaty which was thought to step between them and the glory which they had earned, or the vengeance which was their due. The Portuguese, though they had been in no hurry to confront the invader in the field, and were strangers to the glories of Rolica and

(1) Nap. i. 220, 229. Gurw. iv. 105, 116, 117. Foy, iv. 343, 345. Lond. i. 152, 160. Thieb. 204, 209.

The Convention of Cintra excited such a clamour at the time, both in the British and Peninsular nations, that a short summary of its leading provisions is indispensable. It was provided that the French should evacuate the forts of Lisbon and the whole kingdom of Portugal, and be conveyed to France, with their artillery and sixty rounds a gun, but with liberty to serve again; all other artillery, arms, and ammunition to be delivered up to the British army and navy; the French army to carry with them all their equipments, the cavalry their horses, and the individuals their property; the sick and wounded to be intrusted to the care of the British government, and returned to France when con-

valascent; the fortresses of Alvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmela shall be delivered up as soon as British detachments can be sent forward to take possession of them; all subjects of France shall be protected who are domiciliated in Portugal; all their property of every description to be guaranteed to the French citizens in Portugal; no inhabitants of that country to be disquieted on account of their political conduct or opinions; the Spanish troops in the custody of the French armies to be liberated. By the supplementary convention in regard to the Russian fleet, it was stipulated that it should be conveyed to Great Britain, to remain in deposit with all its stores till six months after the conclusion of a general peace; and the officers and men meanwhile to be returned to Russia without any restriction as to their future service.—See Gurwaa, iv. 113, 117.

Vimiera, were yet loud in their complaints of the capitulation which had been granted; and bitterly inveighed against the clauses which, under the specious veil of protecting private property, in effect gave the public robbers the means of securely carrying off the stores of private and ecclesiastical plunder which they had amassed. The Spaniards re-echoed the same sentiments, and with some appearance of reason; contrasted the unconditional surrender of Dupont's corps at Baylen with the unhappy convention which tended only to remove the French army from a situation where it was detached from the remainder of the imperial forces, and ran the most imminent hazard of being made prisoners of war, to one where it might be more advantageously and securely employed in forming the right wing of the army with which the invasion of the Peninsula was again to be attempted. Roused to the very highest pitch of enthusiasm by the early and decisive successes which had attended their arms—panting for their full share of the glories which had been won—and nothing doubting that an unconditional surrender would immediately follow, and that they should soon see a Marshal of France and twenty thousand men arrive as prisoners of war at Spithead, the British people abandoned themselves to unbounded vexation when the capitulation was announced which was to convey them without that last disgrace being incurred, to swell the invader's ranks at Rochefort and l'Orient. In vain were the Park and Tower guns fired on this as on other triumphs of our arms; the public voice refused to join in the acclamation; the press, both in the metropolis and the provinces, loudly condemned the convention as more disgraceful than even those of the Helder and Closter Seven, where the British troops had been constrained to sue for terms of accommodation; many of the public journals refused to stain their pages by the obnoxious articles, others appeared with their columns in mourning, as in a season of national calamity; public meetings were assembled in most parts of England, to express the general indignation, and call for the punishment of the guilty parties; and to such a length did the outcry proceed, that it was deemed indispensable to appoint a Court of Enquiry, consisting of highly respectable, though somewhat antiquated officers, who, after a full investigation, arrived at the conclusion that, considering the extraordinary manner in which three successive commanders had been invested with the direction of the army after the battle of Vimiero, it was not surprising that that victory had not been more vigorously followed up—that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals—and that, in the whole circumstances of the case, no further proceedings were necessary. The general odium attached to Sir Hew Dalrymple, as the senior officer in command at the time the convention was signed, though it was evident that the chief fault in the case, if there was fault at all, lay with Sir Harry Burrard as the commander-in-chief when the decisive march to Torres Vedras was declined. Such was the general discontent, that neither of these two generals, notwithstanding the acquittal of the court-martial, were again employed in any considerable command in the British army; and it required all the family influence and early celebrity of the hero of Assaye and Vimiero to save the future conqueror of Napoléon from being cut short in the threshold of his career, for no fault whatever of his own, by the very people upon whom he had conferred an inestimable benefit (1).

(1) Court of Enquiry. *Gurw.* iv. 235, 239. *South.* ii. 272, 276. *London.* i. 157, 165. *Tor.* ii. 57, 58.

At the meeting of Parliament, the public thanks of both Houses were voted to Sir Arthur Wellesley

for the battle of Vimiero. But he had a narrow escape, notwithstanding all his glory, from the obloquy consequent on the Convention of Cintra.—See *Gazwood*, iv. 239, 241.

its expedi-
ence at that
juncture.

The English people in general arrive in the end at more sober and rational opinions on political subjects than any other of whom history has preserved a record; but they are prone, in the first instance, in a most extraordinary degree, to common delusions or frenzies, which almost amount to national insanity. The cruel injustice with which they persecuted Sir Robert Calder for having gained a victory, perhaps the most momentous in its ultimate consequences, and most vital to the safety of the country of any recorded in the British annals (1), is an instance of the first—the universal and senseless clamour raised about the Convention of Cintra, an example of the second. There cannot be a doubt, not only of its expedience at the juncture when it was concluded, but of its having been the means of acquiring the basis on which the whole future successes of the British arms were rested. Having missed, perhaps through an excess of caution, the opportunity of following up, according to Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice, the brilliant success of Vimiero on the evening of the battle, nothing remained but to close with the highly advantageous offer, which at once liberated Portugal from its oppressors and established the best possible base for future operations. The sea, sterile and unproductive if in the rear of the forces of any other power, is the source of strength and vigour to the British armies; to them every tide is fraught with plenty, every wind wafts the sinews of war on its gales. Thenceforward Lisbon became the great *place d'armes* to the English army; the stronghold of defence in periods of disaster, the reservoir from whence all the muniments of war were drawn in prosperous times. To have missed the opportunity of at once, and in the outside of the campaign, acquiring such a base for future operations, for the vain glory of possibly compelling a French corps and marshal, after a bloody siege of several months' duration, to lay down their arms in Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida, would have been sacrificing the solid advantages of war for its empty honours. The restoration of twenty thousand defeated and dispirited soldiers to the standards of the enemy, was a matter of no sort of consequence to a sovereign who had seven hundred thousand disciplined men at his command; the loss of a whole kingdom, of a chain of strong fortresses, of an admirable harbour, of ten sail of the line to his ally, of the *prestige* of victory to himself, was a calamity of a very different description. Napoléon showed clearly in what light he viewed the acquisition of such advantages to the French arms, when, in the outset of his career, he stipulated only, in return for his glorious successes in the Maritime Alps, the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses from the cabinet of Turin (2); and when, after the triumph of Marengo, he at once allowed the Austrian army, cut off from the hereditary states and thrown back on Genoa, to retire unmolested to the Minicio, provided only they ceded Alexandria, Tortona, and the other strongholds in the west of Lombardy, as the reward of victory (3). On the present occasion he felt quite as strongly the vast importance of the fortified bases for future operations, so advantageously situated on the edge of the sea, and on the flank of the peninsular plains, which had thus, in the very outset of their career, been wrested from him by the British arms; had the advantage been gained by himself, he would have made Europe ring from side to side with the triumph which had been achieved. As it was, he manifested the utmost displeasure at the generals who were engaged in the Convention of Cintra; and Junot, in particular, never afterwards regained his confidence or esteem. "I was about," said

(1) *Ante*, v. 159.(2) *Ante*, ii. 19.(3) *Ante*, iv. 170.

he, "to send Junot to a council of war; but happily the English got the start of me by sending their generals to one, and thus saved me from the pain of punishing an old friend (1)."

Disgraceful
revelations
which are
made at Lis-
bon of the
plunder by
all ranks in
the French
army.
Sept. 5.

Many causes conspired to make the execution of the Convention of Cintra a matter of great difficulty to all the contracting parties.

The French troops, from the time it was concluded, were constantly kept together in masses, encamped on the heights and forts, with cannon directed down the principal streets which led to their bivouacks. Notwithstanding these formidable preparations, and the proximity of the British forces, who, early in September, approached close to Lisbon, it was found to be impossible to prevent the indignation of the populace from finding vent in detached acts of aggression; crowds of infuriated peasants incessantly thronged into the city, decorated with ribbons, vociferating shouts of triumph, and bearing on their hats the favourite motto, "Death to the French," and at night the discharge of fire-arms or explosion of petards were heard on all sides, occasioned by skirmishes between the enraged populace and the French advanced posts. Loison, whose unnecessary cruelty had rendered him in an especial manner the object of universal hatred, was menaced by a serious attack; while other generals, especially Travet, who had executed their orders with humanity, were not only unmolested, but traversed the streets alone in perfect safety; a fact, as Colonel Napier justly observes (2), extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive as to the misconduct of the obnoxious officers. But these difficulties, great as they were, soon sunk into insignificance when compared with those which arose from the discoveries made, in the course of the preparations for the embarkation, of the extent to which public and private plunder had been carried by the French army. Sir John Hope, who had been appointed governor of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th September, and by his firm and vigorous conduct soon reduced the unruly multitude to some degree of order; but the complaints which daily arose as to the enormous quantity of plunder which the French were about to carry off under pretence of its being their private property, continually increased, and became the occasion of much more serious embarrassment. The museum, the treasury, the public libraries, the church plate, the arsenals of the state, equally with the houses of individuals, had been indiscriminately ransacked; most of the valuable articles left in the royal palace by the flying regent were packed up and ready for embarkation; all

(1) Thib. vi. 472. D'Abr. xii. 64, 102.

"He," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "to whom the whole life of Junot was devoted, alone viewed in a false light the Convention of Cintra. Every thing which was not a triumph he regarded as a defeat; and, like Augustus, he never ceased to demand his legions from all those who had not succeeded in conducting his young conscripts, hardly emerged from boyhood, to victory."—D'ABRANTES, xii. 64, 102.

The Duke of Wellington's opinion on the expedience of the Convention of Cintra was equally clearly expressed. "If we had not negotiated," said he, "we could not have advanced before the 20th, as Sir John Moore's corps was not ready till that day. The French would by that time have fortified their positions near Lisbon, which, it is probable, we could not have been in a situation to attack till the end of the first week in September. Then, taking the chance of the bad weather depriving us of the communication with the fleet of transports and victuals, and delaying and rendering more difficult and precarious our land operations, which after all

could not have been effectual to cut off the retreat of the French across the Tagus into Alentejo, I was clearly of opinion, that the best thing to do was to consent to a convention, and allow them to evacuate Portugal. The details of the convention, and the agreement to suspend hostilities is a different matter; to both of them I have very serious objections. I do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to do; but if I were in his situation, I would be in Madrid with 20,000 men in less than a month from this time.—SIR A. WELLINGTON to CHARLES STUART, Esq., 1st September, 1808; GUARWOOD, iv. 121. Here is the clearest evidence of the advantageous results of obtaining so early in the campaign the great fortified base of Portugal for the British operations. Sir Arthur in a month proposed to have had twenty thousand men in Madrid! He is a bold man, who, on such a subject, dissent from the concurring opinion of Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington.

(2) Nap. i. 231.

the money in the public offices was laid hold of; even the sums lying in the *Deposito Publico*, a bank where they were placed to await the decision of the courts of law on matters of litigation, were appropriated by these insatiable hands. Junot even demanded five vessels to take away his personal effects. Matters at length rose to such a height that the British commanders felt themselves called upon to interfere; and the commissioners, to whom the execution of the convention had been intrusted, with much difficulty, and after the most violent altercation, succeeded in putting a stop to the disgraceful spoliation. These high functionaries, General Beresford and Lord Proby, acted with such firmness, that not only was the progress of the plunder arrested, and much which had been seized from the public offices

Sept. 12. restored, but a general order was extorted from the French commander, enjoining the immediate restitution of all the property which had been taken from public or private establishments within twenty-four hours. Yet so inveterate was the habit of plunder in all ranks of the French army, from the highest to the lowest, that within a few hours after this order was issued, Colonel Delambis, Junot's chief aide-de-camp, carried off the Prince Regent's horses—a valuable collection of private pictures was seized on by Junot himself—and two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex were appropriated, which were only got back by the threat of detaining the general himself as a hostage. At length, however, after vehement discussion and a complete revelation of that extraordinary system of public and private plunder which had been so long and disgracefully the characteristic of the French army, the greater part of this ill-gotten spoil was wrested from the

Sept. 15. invaders. On the 15th the first division of the fleet sailed from the

Sept. 30. Tagus; by the 30th the whole were embarked; shortly after Elvas and Almeida were given up in terms of the capitulation; and before the middle of October not a French soldier remained on the soil of Portugal. Twenty-two thousand men were disembarked on the coasts of France; thirty thousand had been placed, from first to last, by Napoléon under the orders of Junot; the remainder had perished of fatigue, disease, fallen in the field, or voluntarily enlisted in the British army. The convention, though loudly disapproved of by the British people, was, on the admission of the French themselves, carried into execution with scrupulous good faith by the British government (1).

British
troops ad-
vance into
Spain under
Sir John
Moore.

The subordinate arrangements consequent on the decisive events which had in this manner liberated Portugal, were soon concluded. Such was the violence of the groundless clamour which arose in England, on the subject of the convention, that all the Generals engaged in it, Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, were obliged to return to Great Britain; where, as already mentioned, their conduct in relation to it became the subject of deliberation to a court of enquiry, which, after a long and impartial investigation, returned a report, distinguished by little ability, and which in substance found that no blame could be attached to any of these officers. Meanwhile, the army, deprived in this way for a time of the assistance of the brave leader who had, in so glorious a manner, led it to victory, was placed under the command of SIR JOHN MOORE, an officer whose gallant conduct in Egypt, as well as admirable skill in the training and disciplining of his troops, had already rendered him distinguished

(1) Nap. i. 231, 234. South, i. 240, 249. Nevis, ii. 230, 249. Foy, iv. 356, 364. Thieb. 239.

"That same public opinion, under the influence of a free constitution, which condemned the Con-

vention of Cintra, enjoined to its government its faithful execution. In so far as depended on the English government, the convention was executed with honourable fidelity.—Foy, iv. 356.

among all his brethren in arms. His division had landed and joined the other troops at Lisbon; while another corps, fifteen thousand strong, under the orders of Sir David Baird, whose gallantry and firmness had been conspicuous at the storming of Seringapatam, was assembled in the British islands, and was destined to land at Corunna, descend through Galicia, and co-operate with those which had advanced from Portugal, in the plains of Leon. The two together, it was hoped, would amount to nearly forty thousand men, even after providing in an adequate manner for the security of Portugal, and the magazines and depots in the rear; a force which appeared, and doubtless was, if tolerably supported by its Peninsular allies, capable of achieving great things for the deliverance of Europe. Meanwhile, the Spanish troops, nearly five thousand strong, which had been liberated at Lisbon, were equipped anew at the expense of the British government, and despatched by sea to Catalonia, from whence the most pressing representations had been sent of the necessity of regular troops to aid the efforts and improve the discipline of the

Sept. 25. numerous peasants in arms in the province; the Russian fleet, in conformity with the treaty, was conducted to the British harbours; a central junta was formed at Lisbon, to administer the affairs of the kingdom in the absence of the Prince Regent; and the preparations for the campaign being
Oct. 12. at length completed, the British troops began their march from the Portuguese capital, for the seat of war at the foot of the Pyrenees (1).

Appointment of the Central Junta at Madrid. The decisive influence of the recent successes and central position of the English army, in possession of the capital and principal strongholds of the country, rendered the appointment of a Central Junta, and the defeat of the local intrigues every where set on foot in order to obtain a preponderating voice for particular men in its councils, a comparatively easy task in Portugal. But the case was very different in Spain, where jealousy of foreign interference had already risen to a most extravagant height; where the people entertained a most exaggerated idea of their own strength and resources; and many different provincial governments, elected under the pressure of necessity in different parts of the country, had opposite and jarring pretensions to advance for the supreme direction of affairs. Much division, and many dangerous jealousies, were rapidly rising upon this subject, when the junta of Seville, whose prudence and success, as well as the consideration due to the great cities and opulent province which they represented, had already invested with a sort of lead in the affairs of the Peninsula, had the good fortune to bring forward a project, which, from its equity and expedience, soon commanded universal assent. This was, that the

Aug. 2. different supreme juntas, each on the same day, should elect two deputies, who should, when united together, form the central government, to which all the local authorities were to be subject;—that the local juntas should nevertheless continue their functions, in obedience to the commands of the supreme junta; and that the seat of government should be some town in La Mancha, equally convenient for all the deputies. This proposal having met with general concurrence, the different provincial juntas elected their respective representatives for the central government, which was installed

Sept. 25. with extraordinary pomp at Aranjuez in the end of September, and immediately commenced its sittings. At first it consisted of twenty-four members, but their ranks were soon augmented, by the number of provinces which claimed the right of sending representatives, to thirty-five: an unhappy medium, too small for a legislative assembly, too large for an executive

cabinet. Though it numbered several eminent men and incorruptible patriots among its members, particularly Count Florida Blanca, who, though in the eightieth year of his age, preserved undecayed the vigour of intellect and cautious policy which had distinguished his long administration, and Jovellanos, in whom the severities of a tedious captivity had still left unextinguished the light of an elevated understanding and the warmth of an unsuspecting heart; yet it was easy to foresee, what subsequent events too mournfully verified, that it was not composed of the elements calculated either to communicate vigour and decision to the national councils, or impress foreign nations with a favourable idea of its probable stability. Formed for the most part of persons who were totally unknown, at least to public life, before the commencement of the revolution, and many of whom had been elevated to greatness solely by its convulsions, it was early distinguished by that overweening jealousy of their own importance, which in all men is the accompaniment of newly, and still more of undeservedly acquired, power, and torn with intestine intrigues, when the utmost possible unanimity and vigour were required to enable them to make head against the formidable tempest which was arising against them, under the guidance of the Emperor Napoleon (1).

Miserable condition of the central government, and armies on the Ebro.

The Central Junta displayed a becoming vigour in asserting the inviolability of their privileges against Cuesta, who had arrested one of its members; but they were far from evincing equal energy in the more important duty of providing for the wants of the military force which was to maintain the conflict. So completely had the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of the Spaniards, that they never once contemplated the possibility of defeat; and all their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees, and intended to meet the contingencies which might then occur. Nothing was foreseen or provided for in case of disaster; there were no magazines or reserve stores accumulated in the rear, no positions fortified, no fortresses armed; there was no money in the treasury, no funds in the military chests of the generals; the soldiers were naked, destitute of shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions; the cavalry dismounted; the artillery in the most wretched condition; even the magnificent supplies which the generosity of England had thrown with such profuse bounty into the Peninsula, were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the proper objects of their destination. Corruption in its worst form pervaded every department of the state; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores, the superior, in many instances, made free with the military chest; in the midst of the general misrule, the Central Junta, amongst eloquent and pompous declamations, could find no more worthy object of their practical deliberations than discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the ample salaries which they assigned to themselves, the dress they were to wear, and the form of the medals which were to be suspended round their necks. In the midst of this general scene of cupidity, imbecility, and vanity, nothing efficient was done, either for the service of the armies, or the defence of the state. This deplorable result is not to be ascribed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the character of the members of the Central Junta, or the leaders at the head of the troops; it arose from the nature of things, the overthrow of all regular government in Spain, and the jarring and conflicting interests of the popular assemblages by which its place had been supplied. Democratic energy

is a powerful auxiliary, and when directed or made use of, in the first instance, by aristocratic foresight, it often produces the most important results : but its vigour speedily exhausts itself if not sustained by the lasting compulsion of terror or force; and the despotic tyranny of a Committee of Public Safety, is not less necessary to give success to its external operations than restore credit or usefulness to its internal administration (1).

Escape of the Marquis Romana's corps from Jutland, and its forwarding to Spain. In the north of Europe, however, decisive steps were adopted by the British government, which had the happiest results, and succeeded in restoring ten thousand of the veteran soldiers, whom the prudent foresight and anticipating perfidy of Napoléon had so early removed from the Peninsula, to the Spanish standards. It has been already mentioned, that so early as spring 1807, the French Emperor had made it the price of his reconciliation with Spain, after the premature proclamation of the Prince of Peace in the October preceding, that they should furnish sixteen thousand men to aid in the contest in the north of Europe, and that the corps of the Marquis of Romana was in consequence forwarded to the shores of the Baltic (2). Soon after the commencement of hostilities in the Peninsula, Castanos, who had entered into very cordial and confidential communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, then chief in command at Gibraltar, strongly represented to that officer the great importance of conveying to the Spanish corps, then in Jutland, secret information as to the real state of affairs, which was likely to lead at once to their declaring for the cause of their country. In consequence of this advice, the English government made various attempts to communicate with the Spanish forces, but they were at first frustrated by the vigilant eye which the French kept on their doubtful allies. At length, however, by the address of a Catholic priest named Robertson, the dangerous communication was effected, and Romana was informed, in a secret conference held in Lahn, of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula—the victory in Andalusia, the repulse from Saragossa, the capitulation of Junot, the flight from Madrid (3). Violently agitated at this heart-stirring intelligence, the noble Spaniard did not for a moment hesitate as to the course which he should adopt. Robertson was immediately sent back with a request that a British naval force might be forwarded to convey away his troops, and that, if possible, the assistance of Sir John Moore and the English troops at Gottenburg might be granted in aid of the undertaking. The latter part of the request could not be complied with, as Sir John Moore, with the British troops, had already sailed for England; but Admiral Keats, with the fleet stationed in those seas, drew near to the coast of Jutland, and suddenly appeared off Nyborg in the island of Aug. 9. Funen. Romana having seized all the Danish craft he could collect, pushed across the arm of the sea which separated the mainland from

(1) *Tor.* ii. 95, 102. *Lond.* i. 200, 203. *Nap.* i. 310, 311. *South.* ii. 298, 307, 315.

(2) *Ante.* vi. 211.

(3) —Robertson was despatched in a boat from Heligoland, of which the English had recently taken possession, to the coast of Jutland; but the principal difficulty was to furnish him with a secret sign of intelligence which, beyond the reach of any other's observation, might at once convince Romana of the reality and importance of his mission. This was at last fallen upon in a very singular way. Ro-

mana, who was an accomplished scholar, had been formerly intimate with Mr. Frere when ambassador in Spain; and one day, having called when he was reading the *Coste* of the *Cid*, the English ambassador suggested a conjectural emendation of one of the lines (*). Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed emendation; and this line so amended was made the passport which Robertson was to make use of, which at once proved successful.—*See* *Sourc.* ii. 337.

(*) *Aun ven el hora que vos Marzaca dos tanto.*
Mr. Frere proposed to read *Mercedes*.

that island, and with the assistance of Keats, made himself master of the Port and Castle of Nyborg. From thence he traversed another strait to Langland, where all the troops he could collect were assembled together, and publicly informed of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula, and which went to sever them from the connexion they had so long maintained with their brethren in arms. Kneeling around their standards, wrought to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the intelligence they had received, with hands uplifted to heaven, and tears streaming from their eyes, they unanimously swore to remain faithful to their country, and brave all the anger of the Emperor *Napoléon*, in the attempt to aid its fortunes. Such was the universal zeal which animated them, that one of the regiments which lay at Ebeltoft having received the intelligence at ten in the evening, immediately started, and marching all night and the greater part of the next day, reached their comrades at the point of embarkation in time to get off,

Aug. 13. after having marched fifty miles in twenty-one hours. Nine thousand five hundred were brought away, and after touching at Gottenburg were forwarded in transports by the English government to the coasts of Galicia, where they were disembarked amidst shouts of joy before the middle of September, in time to share in the dangers which the efforts of *Napoléon* were preparing for their country. The remainder being stationed in the middle of Jutland, could not be rescued, and were made prisoners by the French troops; and as the horses of two of the regiments of cavalry which embarked could not be provided for in the English ships, they were abandoned on the beach by the horsemen whom they had transported so far from their native plains. These noble animals, eleven hundred in number, of the true Andalusian breed, all of which were un mutilated, seemed to share in the passions which agitated their masters, and no sooner were they liberated on the sands from control, than forming into squadrons, they charged violently with loud cries against each other, and when the British fleet hove out of sight, they could still be discerned by telescopes, fighting with each other on the beach, surrounded by the dead and the dying, with all the fury of human passions (1).

Deep impression which these events make on the mind of *Napoléon*. This long and unprecedented train of disasters made the deepest impression on the foreseeing and prophetic mind of *Napoléon*. It was not the mere loss of soldiers, fortresses, or territory which affected him; these, to a sovereign possessed of such almost boundless resources, were of little importance and could easily be supplied. It was their moral influence which he dreaded; it was the shake given to the opinions of men which devoured him with anxiety. No one knew better, or has expressed more clearly and emphatically, that his empire was founded entirely on opinion; that it was the minds of men whom his own victories and those of the revolution had really subdued; and that great as their triumphs had really been, it was the imaginative idea of their invincibility which constituted the secret charm which had fascinated and subdued the world. Now, however, the spell appeared to be broken; the veil was drawn aside, the charm dissolved. This had been done, too, by hands whose weakness and inexperience augmented the severity of the blow. Armies had surrendered, kingdoms been evacuated, capitals abandoned; in Andalusia the French legions had found the Caudine forks; in Portugal, experienced the fate of

(1) *Tor.* ii. 68, 70. *South.* ii. 336, 351. *Nap.* i. 337, 338.

The singular anecdote as to the horses, which were all of the highest breed, and in the finest

condition, is related by *Southey* on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself, as well as in a contemporary journal, *Plain Englishman*, i. 294, on the same high testimony.—*Scouray*, ii. 346.

Gloster Seven. These disasters had been inflicted not by the sternness of Russia or the discipline of Austria; not by the skill of civilisation or the perfection of art, but by the simple enthusiasm of an insurgent people; by bands at which the French legions had with reason scoffed; by these island warriors whose descent on the continent his tutored journals had hailed as the dawn of yet brighter glories to the French arms (1). Such misfortunes, coming from such quarters, appeared with reason to be doubly calamitous; his proclamations, instead of the heralds of victory, had become the precursors of defeat; and he anticipated in their ultimate effect, not merely the possible expulsion of his arms from the Peninsula, but the general resurrection of Europe from his authority (2).

Armaments of Austria, and negotiations with that power and the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy. Already this effect had in some degree appeared.—Austria, by a decree of 9th June, had directed the formation of a landwehr, or local militia, in all the provinces of her still vast dominions. The Archduke Charles, at the head of the war department, had infused an unheard-of activity into all branches of the army; and three hundred thousand provincial troops, already in the course of formation, promised to add an invaluable reserve to the regular forces. Pressed by Napoléon to give some account of such formidable preparations, Count Metternich, the Imperial ambassador at Paris, alleged the specious excuse that the cabinet of Vienna was only imitating the conduct of its powerful neighbours; and that when Bavaria had not merely adopted the system of the French conscription, but organized national guards, which raised its disposable force to a hundred thousand men, it became indispensable to take corresponding measures of security in the hereditary states. The reason assigned was plausible; but it failed to impose upon the French Emperor, who forthwith directed the princes of the Rhenish confederacy to call out and encamp their respective contingents, and shortly after adopted the most energetic measures for the augmentation of the military strength of the empire (3).

His preparations to meet the dangers, and great levy of men by the French government, Sept. 10. By a senatus consultum of the 10th September, the senate of France placed at the disposal of the French Emperor eighty thousand conscripts, taken from those coming to the legal age (18 to 19), in the years 1806-7-8 and 9, and eighty thousand additional from those of 1810, which last were, in an especial manner, destined to the defence of the coasts and frontiers of the empire. So far had the demands of the French Emperor already exceeded the growth of the human race, and the boundless consumption of mankind in the revolutionary wars outstripped even the prolific powers of nature! The adulatory expressions with which this frightful demand was acquiesced in by the senate, was not less characteristic than its anticipating the resources of future years, of the iron tyranny as well as fawning servility which distinguished the government of the empire. "How," said Lacépède, their president, "would the shades of Louis XIV, of Francis I, of the great Henry, be consoled by the generous resolutions taken by Napoléon! The French hasten to respond to his sacred voice! He requires a new proof of their affection; they hasten with generous ardour to furnish it to him. The wish of the French people,

(1) "Nothing," said the President of the Senate, in his public speech, "can be more agreeable to the French and to the Continent, than to see the English at length throw off the mask and descend into the lists to meet our warriors. Would to God that eighty or a hundred thousand English would present themselves before us in an open field! The

Continent has in every age been their tomb." Fifteen days afterwards the Convention of Cintra was published!—See *Moniteur*, 22d Sept. 1808.

(2) *Thib.* vii. i. 14. *Month.* vi. 350. *South.* ii. 359, 360. *Journ.* ii. 79, 81.

(3) *Journ.* ii. 80. *Pict.* i. 64, 72.

people, sire! is the same as that of your Majesty; the war of Spain *is politic, it is just, it is necessary; it will be victorious.* May the English send their whole armies to combat in the Peninsula; they will furnish only feeble glories to our arms, and fresh disgrace to themselves." Such was the roseate hue under which the titled and richly endowed senators of France represented the hideous spectacle of a hundred and fifty thousand human beings being torn from their homes to meet certain destruction; in the prosecution of the most perfidious and unjust aggression recorded in history; and such the triumphs which they anticipated for their arms, when Providence was preparing for them the catastrophes of Salamanca and Vittoria (1).

Subsidiary
treaty with
Prussia,
Sept. 8.

At the same time, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with Prussia, calculated to relieve, in some degree, that unhappy power from the chains which had fettered it since the battle of Jena. Napoléon, vanquished by necessity, and standing in need of a hundred thousand soldiers of the grand army for the Peninsular war, was driven to more moderate sentiments. It was stipulated that, for the space of ten years, the Prussian army should not exceed forty thousand men; that Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin should be garrisoned by French troops till the entire payment of arrears of contributions of every description; that their garrisons, four thousand strong each, should be maintained and paid solely at the expense of Prussia; that seven military roads, for the use of France and her allies, should traverse the Prussian dominions; and that the arrears of the war contributions should be reduced to 140,000,000 francs, or L.3,600,000 sterling; but that, at the expiration of forty days after these sums were provided for, the French troops should, with the exception of these fortresses, evacuate the Prussian dominions (2). To Prussia this evacuation was a source of unspeakable relief, and notwithstanding that the restriction on the army was both humiliating and hurtful, yet the cabinet of Frederick William had no alternative but submission: although, by the skilful change of the soldiers called out into actual service, they eluded the most galling part of the obligation, and prepared the means of political resurrection in future times (3).

Interview
at Erfurth
with Alex-
ander.

Napoléon, however, was well aware that, even after these treaties and precautions, he was still exposed to great danger from the renewed hostility of the German States in his rear, while engaged with the armies of England and Spain in front in the Peninsula, if he was not well secured in the alliance with Russia, and that it was in the breast of Alexander that the true security for the peace of the Continent beyond the Rhine was to be found. This was more especially the case, as the losses and serious aspect of the Spanish war had already rendered it necessary to withdraw a large part of the grand army from the north of Germany; and before winter, not more than a hundred thousand French soldiers would remain to assert the French supremacy in the centre of Europe. Impressed with these ideas, the French Emperor used his utmost efforts to prevail on the Czar to meet him at a town in the north of Germany, where the destinies of the world might be arranged; and such was the ascendant which he had gained over his mind during the negotiations at Tilsit, and such the attractions of the new objects of ambition in Finland and on the Danube, which he had had the address to present to his ambition, that Alexander completely fell into his views. Erfurth was the town selected for this purpose, and there a conference was held between the two potentates, almost rivalling that of Tilsit in

(1) Montg. vi. 350. Jom. li. 92, 93.
(2) *Ante*, vi. 216.

interest and importance. On his route for Germany, the Emperor met large bodies of the grand army on their road from the Rhine to the Pyrenean frontier; he addressed them in one of those nervous proclamations which ever bear so strong an impress of his genius, but which, long the heralds of his victories, began now to afford a curious contrast to the disasters he was destined to undergo (1). The troops traversed France in the highest spirits, animated by the Emperor's address, magnificently feasted by the municipalities, beneath triumphal arches, and amidst songs of congratulation from their fellow-citizens. Vain illusion! They were marching only to the scene of protracted agony; to whiten by their bones the fields of Spain; to a lengthened conflict, which, ushered in at first by brilliant victories, was destined in the end to thin their ranks by its carnage, and overwhelm their honour by its disasters (2).

Its secret
object, and
tenor of the
conferences
held there.

The Emperor Alexander set out before Napoléon, and on his way paid a melancholy visit to the King and Queen of Prussia at Königsburg. Proceeding on his route, he rapidly traversed the Prussian States, received with marked gratification the honours paid to him by the French troops; took Marshal Lannes with him in his own carriage, and expressed publicly to the French officers the satisfaction which he felt "at finding himself among such brave men, such renowned warriors." Proceeding in this manner, and received every where with the utmost distinction by the French authorities, he arrived at Weimar late on the evening of the 26th, Sept. 25. and found every thing prepared for his reception by his brother the Grand Duke Constantine, and the French ambassador Caulincourt, who had arrived two days before. Meanwhile Napoléon, in more than regal state, was leisurely advancing from Paris, surrounded by the sovereigns, princes, and ministers of Germany, enjoying the first satisfaction of exhibiting the Russian Autocrat awaiting his arrival in an inconsiderable town of Germany, above five hundred miles distant from the nearest point of his dominions. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 27th, he made his public entry into Erfurth, and after reviewing the troops, proceeded on horseback to meet Alexander, who had left Weimar at the same hour to approach his august ally. The two sovereigns met on the highway, between the village of Ottsted and Nora, near a remarkable pear-tree which is still to be seen on the road-side. Alexander immediately descended from his carriage; Napoléon alighted from his horse, and the two monarchs embraced with the strongest marks of mutual esteem. The French Emperor was decorated with the order of St.-Andrew of Russia, the Russian bore the grand badge of the legion of honour on his bosom. Magnificent presents were interchanged on both parts; side by side the two Emperors rode into Weimar, amidst the roar of artillery, the cheers of multitudes, and the thundering acclamations of ten thousand soldiers. When they arrived at the hotel of the Czar the monarchs again embraced, and ascended the stairs arm in arm. Napoléon requested Alexander to give him the watchword of the day; he complied, and it was "Erfurth and confidence." The

(1) Soldiers! after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have traversed Germany by forced marches. I now make you traverse France without giving you a moment's repose. Soldiers! I have need of you. The hideous presence of the leopard (the arms of England) defiles the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let it fly dismayed at your aspect! Let us carry our arms to the Columns of Hercules; there also we have outrages to avenge.—Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of all modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of the Roman legions, which in

the same campaign frequently triumphed on the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and on the Tagus? A long peace, a durable tract of prosperity, shall be the reward of your labours. A true Frenchman should never taste of repose till the seas are enfranchised from their oppressors.—Soldiers! all that you have already done, all that you will yet do for the happiness of the French people, will be eternally engraved on my heart."—THIERIAUX, vii. 50.

(2) Thib. vii. 49, 51. Montg. vi. 352. Jour. ii. 84, 85.

two monarchs dined together, and in the evening a general illumination evinced the intoxicating joy of the inhabitants (4).

Fêtes and
spectacles
at Erfurt.

No adequate idea can be formed of the greatness of Napoleon's power, or the almost irresistible sway which he had acquired, in northern and central Europe, but by those who had witnessed the pomp and deference with which he was surrounded at Tilsit and Erfurt, and, four years afterwards, at Dresden. Environed by a brilliant *cortège* of marshals, generals, diplomatists, and staff-officers, he was at the same time the object of obsequious attention to a crowd of princes and inferior potentates, who depended on his breath for their political existence or nominal independence. All the beauty, rank, and distinction of Germany were assembled; seventy princes or independent sovereigns were in attendance; and literally it might be said, that the monarchs of Europe watched for a favourable sign from the mighty conqueror's chamberlains. The two Emperors spent the forenoon together, conversing on the public affairs of Europe, and the separate plans of administration for their vast dominions; they then rode out in company to review or inspection of their respective troops, dined alternately with each other, and in the evening went to the same box at the theatre. A brilliant band of the most distinguished French performers had come from Paris to grace the conference, and during a fortnight, the theatre of Erfurt, resplendent with illustrious men and beautiful women, beheld the masterpieces of Racine and Corneille performed by the talents of Talma, Saint-Prix, Mesdemoiselles Duchesnois and Bourgois, besides a host of inferior performers (2). On the 6th October the whole court proceeded to Weimar, where they were magnificently entertained by the Grand Duke of that place, and Napoleon enjoyed the satisfaction of conversing with Goethe, Wieland, and the other illustrious men who have thrown an imperishable lustre over German literature. On the 7th, the whole party visited the field of Jena. An elegant temple had been constructed by the Grand Duke on the highest summit of the Landgrafenberg, the scene of Napoleon's frigid bivouac two years before, on the night before the battle (3); and a little lower down were a number of tents,

(1) Thib. vii. 61. Mont. iv. 235.

(2) The attentions of Alexander and Napoleon to each other at Erfurt, though delicate, were got up with so much anxiety as to impress the spectators with the impression that the intimacy of Tilsit had somewhat declined, and that a feeling, of which they were on every occasion so very solicitous to give public demonstration, could not in reality have a very deep foundation. On one occasion Alexander expressed great admiration for a singularly beautiful dressing-case, and breakfast set of porcelain and gold, in Napoleon's sleeping apartment; they were sent to him as a present on the same evening. At the representation of *Oedipe* on October 3, when the line was repeated,—

“L'amitié d'un grand homme est un bienfait des Dieux.”

Alexander turned to Napoleon, and presented to him his hand. A few days after, the Czar, when preparing to go into the *salle-à-manger* to dinner, perceived that he had forgotten his sword. Napoleon immediately unbuckled his own, and presented it to him.—“I accept it as a mark of your friendship,” replied Alexander. “Your Majesty may be well assured I shall never draw it against you.” In the midst of all his grandeur, Napoleon had sufficient greatness of soul and true discernment to attempt no concealment of his origin. At dinner one day the conversation turned on the Golden Bull, and the prime of Germany insisted that it had been published in 1409.—“I beg your pardon,” observed Napoleon; “*If I was a second Utena-*

nent of artillery, I was three years at Valmont, and there I had the good fortune to lodge with a learned person, in whose library I learned that and many other valuable details. Nature has given me a memory singularly tenacious of figures.” Mesdemoiselle Bourgois, whose personal charms were equal to her talents as an actress, attracted the particular notice of the Emperor Alexander; and he enquired of Napoleon if there would be any inconvenience in his forming her personal acquaintance. “None whatever,” replied Napoleon, “except that it would be a certain mode of making you thoroughly known to all Paris. The day after to-morrow, at the post hour, the most minute particulars of your visits to her will be dispatched; and soon there will not be a stately in Paris who will not be in a situation to testify your person from head to foot.” This hint had the effect of cooling the rising passion of the Russian Emperor, who, with all his admiration for the fair sex, had an extreme apprehension of such a species of notoriety. It was at Erfurt that Napoleon made the memorable observation to Talma on his erroneous view of the character of Nero, in the Britannicus of Racine: that the poet had not represented him as such in the commencement of his career; and that it was not till love, his ruling passion at the moment, was thwarted, that he became violent, cruel, and tyrannical.—See LAS CASAS, iv. 232; and THIERIAUX, vii. 61, 65, 71.—Digitized by Google

(1) *Ante*, v. 300.

of sumptuous construction, where the Emperor and his *cortège* of kings were entertained, and from whence he pointed out to Alexander the line of the different movements, which, on that memorable spot, had led to the overthrow of his most cherished projects. At length, after seventeen days spent together in the closest intimacy, the two Emperors, on the 14th October, the anniversary of the battle of Jena, rode out together to the spot where they had met on the 27th September; they there alighted from their horses, and walked side by side for a few minutes in close conversation, and then embracing, bade each other a final adieu. Alexander returned rapidly towards Poland; Napoléon remeasured his steps slowly and pensively towards Erfurth. They never met again in this world (1).

Though Austria was not admitted as a party to the conference at Erfurth, Baron Vincent, envoy of the cabinet of Vienna, came with a letter from the Emperor Francis on the subject of the armaments on either side in southern Germany; and a joint memorial was presented by the Emperors of France and Russia, proposing a termination of hostilities to the government of Great Britain. But these important state papers will more fitly come under consideration in the succeeding chapters, which treat specifically of the affairs of Austria and England at this momentous crisis of their history (2).

Secret views
of both parties
at the
conference.

But it was neither to amuse themselves with reviews and theatrical representations, nor to make proposals to Austria and England, which they were well aware could not be listened to, that the two Emperors had come so far and remained together so long. It was with no view to peace, but, on the contrary, with a clear prophetic anticipation of an approaching multiplication of hostilities, that the conference at Erfurth took place. Napoléon clearly perceived that Austria was about to take advantage of his immersion in the Peninsular war, and of the extraordinary preparations which England was making for a continental campaign, to renew the contest in Germany, and it was to Russia alone that he could look for a sure guarantee of the peace of the North of Europe during the arduous crisis which was approaching. Albeit internally convinced of the necessity of a fearful contest in the end with the power of France, Alexander was not less sensible of the importance of gaining time for the preparations for it; and, strongly impressed with the conviction that the peculiar and national interests of Russia, were in the mean time chiefly to be promoted by remaining firm in the French alliance, and that when the evil day did come, the best preparation for it would be found in the augmentation of the strength of the empire in Finland and on the Danube, which was likely to follow an adherence to his present engagements. Thus, while both these great potentates were lavishing professions of friendship and regard on each other, they were in reality nursing the feelings destined to lead to inextinguishable hostility in their hearts; Napoléon returned, almost blinded by Russian flattery, to Paris, to prepare, in the subjugation of the Peninsula, the means of arranging the countless host which he was afterwards to lead to the Kremlin; and Alexander, loaded with French presents, remeasured his steps to Muscovy to organize the force, destined, after adding Finland and the Principalities on the Danube to his dominions, to hurl back to the Seine the tide of Gallic invasion (3).

(1) Thib. vii. 61, 76. Montg. vi. 353, 354. Las Cas. iv. 232. Hard. x. 239.

In one of their conversations Alexander strongly represented to the French Emperor the resistance which he experienced in his senate from the aristocratic chiefs, in his projects for the public good. "Believe me," said Napoléon, "how large soever a

throne may be, it will always be found too small for two masters."—MONTAIGLARD, vi. 354.

(2) See below, Chaps. lii. and liii.

(3) Thib. vii. 76, 78. Montourlin, i. 32, 33, 45. Jom. iii. 86.

"The Emperor Alexander," says Montourlin, "felt that the alliance concluded at Tilist and

Tenor of the
conferences
held there.

The conferences of Erfurth were not reduced, like those of Tilsit, to formal or secret treaties; at least, if such were signed, they have not yet transpired from any of the European archives. But they were not, on that account, the less important, or the less calculated to determine, for a course of years, the fate of the continental monarchies. In the verbal conversations which took place, the great object of the two potentates was to obtain the consent of each other to their respective projects of aggrandizement, at the expense of the lesser states in their vicinity; and their mutual interests or necessities rendered this an easy task. Alexander gave his sanction to the invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the placing of Princes of the Bonaparte Dynasty on the thrones of the Peninsula, as well as to the establishment of Murat in the kingdom of Naples, and the annexation of Tuscany to the French empire. The effects of this consent soon appeared, in the accrediting of Russian ambassadors to the courts of these infant sovereigns. On the other hand, Napoléon consented to the uniting of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to the already vast dominions of the Czar, admitted his relation and future brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Oldenberg, into the Confederation of the Rhine, gave satisfactory explanations in regard to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and held out to the Emperor of the East the prospects of obtaining aid from France in the attempt to stretch his mighty arms over the Asiatic continent, and give a deadly wound to the power of England on the plains of Hindostan. In return for so many concessions, he procured from Alexander a promise to aid France with a considerable force in the event of a war with Austria; and conceded to his earnest entreaties a considerable relaxation of the oppressive burdens under which Prussia had so long groaned. The arrear of contributions, fixed at 140,000,000 francs, by the treaty of 8th September (1), was reduced to 125,000,000; and a more important relaxation took place in the form of payment, by which, in consideration of 50,000,000 of francs received by Daru on the 8th November and 70,000,000 more, for which promissory-notes were granted, the royal revenues were to be restored to the Prussian authorities; and the French troops, which were urgently required in the Peninsula, were, with the exception of the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, entirely to evacuate the Prussian dominions. Thus had Napoléon the address to make his disasters in Spain, which imperatively required the removal of the French troops from the North of Germany, the means of gratifying Alexander by an apparent concession to his wishes, and diminishing the irritation of Prussia, which, in the event of hostilities with Austria, might prove, even after all its disasters, a formidable enemy in his rear. Two other more delicate subjects of discussion were, after being touched on, averted rather than settled, by the diplomatic skill of the two Emperors, and left the seed of inextinguishable future jealousy in their minds. The first was a proposal by Napoléon, who already had resolved to divorce Joséphine, for the hand of the Grand Duchess Catharine Paulowna, the favourite sister of the Emperor; a proposal which the astute Russian evaded by referring the matter not to the reigning

came to Erfurth, as soon as it ceased to be conformable to the interests of Napoléon, would come to an end; and that the grand crisis was approaching which was destined either to consolidate the universal empire which the French Emperor was endeavouring to establish on the Continent, or to break the chains which retained so many Continental states under his rule. Determined never to submit to any condition inconsistent with the honour of his crown, the Emperor of Russia re-

garded the rupture as near and unavoidable, and thenceforward applied himself silently to organize the immense resources of his states, to resist the danger which was approaching; a danger which promised to be the more terrible, that Russia would have to sustain it, to all appearance alone, against the accumulated forces of the greater part of Europe."—BOGROVSKY, i. 45.

(1) *Ante*, vi. p. 376.

Empress, whose ambition its brilliancy might have dazzled; but the Empress-Dowager, whose firmness of character was proof against the seduction, and who hastened to terminate the dangerous negotiation by alleging religious scruples, and shortly after marrying her daughter to Prince Oldenberg. The second was, the amicable but resolute contest for the possession of Constantinople. Napoléon, as he himself has told us (1), could not bring his mind to cede to his rival the Queen of the East: Alexander, with justice, regarded it as the outlet to his southern dominions—the back-door of his empire, and was earnest that its key should be placed in his hand. Fearful of interrupting their present harmony by any such irreconcilable theme of discord, the subject was, by common consent, laid aside: the city of Constantine was suffered to remain in the hands of the Turks, who, in every other respect, were abandoned to Muscovite ambition; but the tender point had been touched—the chord which jarred in the hearts of each struck; and the inestimable prize formed the secret subject of hostility, which, as much as jealousy of English power, afterwards led the French legions to Borodino and the Kremlin (2).

Nov 5, 1806. Immediately after the conference at Erfurth, a formal treaty was concluded with Prussia, by which the alleviations to her miseries provided for by the arbiters of Europe were reduced to writing: and in a short time the evacuation of the Prussian States, with the exception of the three retained fortresses, took place. Restored by this removal, and the recovery of the right of collecting his revenue, in a certain degree to his rank of an independent sovereign, Frederick William, in company with his beautiful Queen, returned to the capital, and made his public entry into Berlin amidst the transports and tears of his subjects (3).

Dec. 3. The secret objects of the conference at Erfurth soon developed themselves. Murat was declared by Napoléon King of Naples and takes possession of Sicily; and leaving the theatre of his sanguinary measures and rash hostility in the Peninsula, hastened to take possession of his newly acquired dominions. He was received with universal joy by the inconstant people, who seemed equally delighted with any sovereign sent to them by the great northern conqueror. His entry into Naples was as great a scene of triumph, felicitations, and enthusiasm, as that of Joseph had been. Shortly afterwards, however, he gave proof of the vigour which was at least to attend his military operations, by a successful expedition against the island of Capri, which the English had held for three years, but now yielded, with a small garrison under Sir Hudson Lowe, which capitulated and was sent back to England, to a vigorous and well-conceived attack from the French forces (4).

Napoléon returns to Paris. Secured by the conferences at Erfurth from all danger in his rear, Napoléon speedily returned to Paris; and after presiding over the opening of the Legislative Assembly, then resolved, with his wonted vigour, to set out for the Pyrenees, determined by a sudden attack to disperse the Spanish armaments and capture Madrid, before either the English auxiliaries could acquire a solid foundation in the Peninsula, or Austria could gain time to put in motion the extensive armaments she was preparing on the Danube. Leaving Paris in the end of October, he arrived at Bayonne

(1) "We talked," says Napoléon, "of the affairs of Turkey at Erfurth. Alexander was very desirous that I should consent to his obtaining possession of Constantinople, but I could never bring my mind to consent to it. It is the finest harbour in the world, is placed in the finest situation, and is itself

worth a kingdom."—LAS CASAS, iv. 231, and O'MEARA, i. 382.

(2) Thib. vii. 76, 78. Hard. x. 239, 245. Mont. i. 34, 35. Jom. iii. 66. Las Cas. iv. 232, 233. O'Meara, i. 382.

(3) Montg. vi. 365. Martens, Sup. v. 106.

(4) Thib. vii. 149. Bot. iv. 237, 239.

Nov. 1. on the 3d November, and immediately disposed his forces for active operations (1).

The effect of the vigorous exertions which he had made to strengthen his armies in that quarter, was now beginning to display itself. The fifty thousand soldiers who, in the middle of August, were concentrated on the Ebro, dejected by disaster, dispirited by defeat, had now swelled by the end of September, as if by enchantment, to ninety thousand men, present under arms on the Ebro, besides twenty thousand under St.-Cyr, in Catalonia. This body, already so formidable, subsequently received vast accessions of force from the troops arriving from Germany, especially the Imperial Guard, and the corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, all of which were veterans from the Grand Army, confident in themselves, and inured to victory. During the whole of October, the road from Bayonne to Vittoria was crowded with horsemen and carriages; through every opening in the Pyrenees, foot-soldiers were pouring in endless multitudes to reinforce the grand muster in Navarre. Conformably to his general custom, Napoléon divided the whole army into eight corps, commanded by so many marshals, whose names, already rendered immortal in the rolls of fame, seemed a sure presage to victory (2). Their united force, when the Emperor took the field in the beginning of November, was not less than three hundred thousand men, of whom at least forty thousand were cavalry; and, after deducting the troops in Catalonia, and those which required to be maintained in garrison in the northern fortresses, and the sick and absent, at least a hundred and eighty thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Ebro. But the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least formidable part of its character. It was its incomparable discipline, spirit, and equipment, the skill and vigour of its officers, the docility and experience of its soldiers, the central and impregnable position which it occupied among the mountains of Navarre, and the unity of design which it was well known would soon be communicated to its operations by the consummate talents of Napoléon, which constituted its real strength and rendered the friends of freedom in Europe justly fearful of the collision of such a host with the divided and inexperienced armies of the Spanish provinces (3).

These armies, though very numerous on paper, and in considerable strength in the field, were far from being in a situation, either from discipline, equipment, or position, to make head against so formidable an enemy. The Spanish troops were divided into three armies; that of the right, under Palafox, consisting of eighteen thousand infantry, and five hundred horse, occupied the country between Saragossa and Sangüessa,

(1) Thib. vii. 150, 153.

(2) First corps, Victor, Duke of Belluno,	33,000
Second do., Bessières, Duke of Istria, afterwards Soult, Duke of Dalmatia,	33,054
Third do., Moncey, Duke of Corsigliano,	37,000
Fourth do., Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzig,	25,000
Fifth do., Mortier, Duke of Treviso,	26,713
Sixth do., Ney, Duke of Elchingen,	36,000
Seventh do., General St.-Cyr in Catalonia,	42,107
Eighth do., Junot, Duke of Abrantes,	25,700
Reserve, Napoléon in person,	42,302
On march from France,	14,000

319,000

(3) Tor. ii. 119. Nap. i. 361, 362, 377. South. ii. 386, 387. Thib. vii. 152.

Before assuming the command of the army, Napoléon had said, in his opening address to the Legislative Body at Paris, "In a few days I shall set out to place myself at the head of my army, and

with the aid of God, crown at Madrid the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!" — *Discourse*, 25th October, 1808. *Moniteur*, 26th October, 1808; and *Thib.* vii. 86; and *Imperial Muster-rolls*, *Narras*, i. 88, *Appendix*.

and was composed almost entirely of Arragonese : the centre, under Castanos, which boasted of the victors of Baylen in its ranks, was twenty-eight thousand strong, included thirteen hundred horse, and had thirty-six pieces of cannon ; it lay at Tarazona and Agreda, right opposite to the French position ; the left, under Blake, thirty thousand in number, almost entirely Galicians, but with hardly any cavalry, and only twenty-six guns, was stationed on the rocky mountains near Reynosa, from whence the Ebro takes its rise. Thus, seventy-four thousand infantry, and two thousand horse, with eighty-six guns, were all that the Spaniards could rely upon for immediate operations on the Ebro ; for although considerable reserves were collecting in the rear (1), yet they were too far from the scene of action, and their discipline and equipment not in a sufficient state of forwardness to permit of their either arriving in time at the theatre of conflict, or taking any useful part in it, if they were there. Seventy thousand Spanish infantry and two thousand Spanish cavalry, could never be considered a match for a hundred and fifty thousand French foot, and thirty thousand horse, even under the most favourable circumstances : least of all could they be relied on, when the French occupied a central position, defended by almost inaccessible mountains, and were guided by one commander of consummate abilities ; while their undisciplined antagonists, scattered over a circumference two hundred miles in length, and separated from each other by deep ravines, rapid rivers, and impassable ridges, were under the command of different and independent generals, jealous of each other, and gifted with comparatively moderate military talents (2).

March, position, and strength of the British army.
Oct. 13.

The British forces, it is true, under Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, were rapidly approaching the scene of action ; but their distance, notwithstanding all their efforts, was still such as to preclude the hope of their being in a situation to render any effectual assistance. Sir John Moore's forces, which set out on their march from Lisbon, as already mentioned, in the middle of October, had broken, for the sake of procuring better roads for the artillery and waggon-train, into two columns ; and while the main body, under Sir John in person, followed the direct road by Abrantes, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, a lesser division, but with the reserve and most of the guns, took the more circuitous route by

Nov. 8. Elvas, Badajoz, Talavera, and Madrid. It was not, however, till the

8th November, that this heavily encumbered corps reached the Spanish capital, and on the 27th of the same month that it crossed the Guadarrama mountains, before which time the fate of all the Spanish armies on the Ebro was sealed. Meanwhile, Sir John Moore was farther advanced ; for,

Nov. 11. on the 11th, he crossed the Spanish frontier, and, on the 18th, had collected the bulk of his forces at Salamanca ; but Sir David Baird, who had

Oct. 13. landed at Corunna on the 13th October, had only, by great exertion, succeeded in reaching Astorga in Leon, four days' march from Salamanca, on the 20th November. Thus, the British army, not in all more than thirty thousand strong, was split into three divisions severally stationed at

(1) These reserves were stated to be as follows ; but they were all distant from the scene of action, and had, for the most part, hardly acquired the rudiments of the military art.

Castilians at Segovia, about 150 miles in the rear,	12,000
Estremadurans at Talavera,	13,000
Andalusians in La Mancha,	14,000
Asturians in reserve at Llanes,	18,000

Total, 57,000

the Escorial, Salamanca, and Astorga, distant eighty or a hundred miles from each other, and without any common base or line of operations; and the Spaniards, a hundred miles farther in advance, were also divided into three armies, separated by still greater distances from each other, while Napoléon lay with a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops clustered round the basin of Vittoria. It was easy to see that the Allies, exhibiting in this respect a melancholy contrast to their antagonists, were but novices in the art of war, and signally ignorant of the importance of time in its combinations; and that the English in particular, inheriting too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, were, like Athelstane the Unready, still unprepared to strike till the moment for decisive operations had passed (1).

Movements
on the
French left
before the
arrival of
Napoléon.

Napoléon, who was well aware of the importance of striking a decisive blow in the outset, and dispersing the Spanish armies in his front before the warlike and disciplined reserve of the English troops could arrive at the scene of action, lost no time, after his arrival on the Bidassoa, in pressing forward the most active operations. Some inconsiderable actions had, before his arrival, taken place on the left, where Blake had, since the 18th September, been engaged in an offensive movement, from which no material results had ensued. Prior to this the French had evacuated Burgos and Tudela, and extended themselves towards Bilbao, which they still held, much against the will of Napoléon, who strongly censured such a proceeding, as gaining nothing in strength of position, and losing much in moral influence (2). Blake broke up from Reynosa on the 18th

(1) South. ii. 470. Nap. i. 425, 431. Lond. i. 181, 199.

These observations apply to those having the general direction of the Allied campaign, and especially the English government, who, at this period, were far from being adequately impressed with the vital importance of time in war. Their instructions for the campaign were dated so late as October 6. Both the gallant generals intrusted with the direction of the English army, pressed forward with all imaginable expedition after they received them; and Sir John Moore in particular, as it will appear in the sequel, with mournful resolution, commenced an important advance, under circumstances, to all but a soldier of honour, utterly desperate. It was impossible for him to commence operations before the junction with Sir David Baird, which did not take place till the end of November. But still, in all concerned, there was at this period an evident want of the vigour and expedition requisite for success in war. Napoléon would never have permitted the main English army to have lingered inactive at Lisbon from the end of August, when the Convention at Cintra was concluded, till the middle of October, when the march for Spain commenced, nor delayed the British expedition under Sir David Baird till it reached the Spanish shores for the first time on the 18th of that month. But these were the faults of government. The greatest error, in a military point of view, of Sir John Moore, was separating the artillery from the infantry and cavalry in the advance into Spain. For this oblivion of the first rule of military movements, viz. to station each portion of the army so that its different arms may, in case of need, support and aid each other, it is hardly possible to find any excuse. It is difficult to conceive how the direct road by Almeida could at that period have been impassable for artillery and waggon, when it had so recently before been traversed by Junot, with all his army, and was ever after the great line of military communication which the Duke of Wellington made use of from the capital to the frontier; and, at any rate, if the passage at that

period was impracticable for the guns, that might have been a good reason for sending the whole army round by Elvas, but it could be none for separating it into two parts, covered by two hundred miles from each other, and exposing either to the chance of destruction, when the other was not at hand to lend it any support. Colonel Napier, much to his credit, admits that this separation violated a great military principle, though he endeavours to defend it in that particular case as unattended with danger. It will appear in the sequel, that the greatest commanders sometimes unnecessarily fall into a similar forgetfulness; and that the casting the English infantry apart from the cavalry and artillery on the Flemish frontier, and within the reach of the enemy's attack, in 1815, had wellnigh induced a serious disaster at Quatre-Bras.—See NAPIER, i. 334, and *Infra*, vol. viii., voce *Waterloo*.

(2) "The line of the Ebro," says Napoléon, "was actually taken; it must be kept. To advance from that river without an object, would create indecision; but why evacuate Burgos—why abandon Tudela? Both were of importance, both politically and morally; the latter as commanding a stone bridge and the canal of San Juan; the former as the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. If occupied in force, it would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, even Madrid itself. If the enemy occupies Burgos, Logroño, and Tudela, the French army will be in a painful situation." It is remarkable how early the experienced eye of the French Emperor, at the distance of three hundred leagues from the scene of action, discerned the military importance of Burgos—a town then unknown to military fame; but the value of which was afterwards so strongly felt by the Duke of Wellington, that he strained every nerve, and exposed himself to imminent risk in the close of the brilliant campaign of 1812, in the unsuccessful attempt to effect its reduction.—*Vide Note, Sur les Affaires d'Espagne, August 1808, taken at Vittoria*—NAPOLÉON, *App.* No. iv. p. 18.

September with thirty thousand Galicians, and advanced to Santander. The
 Sept. 18. effect of this movement was to make the French concentrate their
 Sept. 23. forces in the basin of Vittoria; and Blake attacked Bilboa with
 fifteen thousand men, which fell the day after it was invested; while the
 French withdrew up the valley of Durango, and all the lateral valleys in its
 vicinity, to the higher parts of the mountains of Navarre. But though these
 operations were at first successful, yet the natural effects of the presumption
 and want of foresight of the Spanish government and generals, soon de-
 veloped itself. Blake had engaged in this laborious and dangerous mountain
 warfare without magazine stores, or any base of operations, and with only
 seventy rounds of ammunition for each gun. His men, when the winter was
 approaching and the snow beginning to fall, were without great-coats, and
 many without shoes. The bulk of his forces, grouped around Burgos, exposed
 his right flank to successful attack (1).

Check of Castanos at Logroño.
 Oct. 27. A combined attack had been arranged between the Spanish gene-
 rals along the whole circumference which they occupied upon the
 central mountain position of the French army. But such a complicated
 movement, difficult and hazardous even with the best disciplined
 troops, when acting along such an extensive and rugged line of country, was
 altogether hopeless with the disorderly and ill-appointed bands of the Pen-
 insular patriots. An attack by Castanos, with the Andalusian army, upon the
 French posts on the Ebro around Logroño, though at the first attended with
 some success, at length terminated in disaster; and the Spanish division of
 Pignatelli was driven back with the loss of all its artillery, and immediately
 dispersed. Discouraged by this check, Castanos fell back to Calahorra; and
 dissensions, threatening very serious consequences, broke out between that
 general and Palafox, who retired with the Arragonese levies towards Sara-
 gossa. Meanwhile Blake, whose forces, from the junction of the troops under
 Romana, which had come up from Corunna, and the Asturians, with whom
 he was in communication near Santander, were increased to nearly fifty
 thousand men, commenced a forward movement on the French left in the
 Biscayan provinces, and stretching himself out by the sea-coast, and up the
 valley of Durango, threatened to interpose between the advanced divisions
 of Lefebvre and Ney's corps, which lay most exposed, and their communi-
 cation with the French frontier on the Bidassoa (2).

Defeat of Blake at Toros.
 Oct. 31. This offensive movement was well conceived, and if conducted
 and followed up with the requisite vigour, might have led to great
 results. As it was, however, his forces were so scattered, that though
 thirty-six thousand were under his immediate orders, only seventeen thou-
 sand were collected by Blake in front of the enemy, without any artillery, in
 the valley of Durango; the remainder being stretched inactive along the
 sea-coast, or separated from the main body by impassable mountain ridges.
 Alarmed, however, by the probable consequence of an interposition of such a
 force between the bulk of his troops and their communications with Bayonne
 and St.-Sebastians, Lefebvre resolved to make a general attack upon the
 enemy, and drive them back to the neighbourhood of Bilboa. Descending from
 the heights of Durango under cover of a thick fog, he suddenly attacked the
 Oct. 31. Spanish army at daybreak on the 31st October, with such vigour,
 that the divisions in front were thrown back on those in the rear, and the
 whole driven in utter confusion to Bilboa, from whence they continued their

(1) Nap. i. 348, 349. South. i. 387, 389. Tor. ii.
 104, 105.

(2) Tor. ii. 110, 113. Nap. i. 366.

retreat in the night to Balmaseda, in the direction of the Asturias. Lefebvre followed him up next day; but Blake having assembled his troops, turned upon his pursuers, and after some sharp partial engagements, the French retired to Bilbao, of which they were allowed to retain undisturbed possession (1).

Position of
the French
and Spanish
armies on
Napoleon's
arrival.

Matters were in this state in Navarre and Biscay, when Napoleon arrived at Vittoria, and instantly, as if by an electric shock, communicated his own unequalled energy to the operations of the army. Disapproving of Lefebvre's unsupported attack upon Blake, which promised merely to force him back from the scene of action, without effecting those decisive results which his presence both usually occasioned and at present required, he immediately gave orders for the most vigorous operations. The position of the allied armies promised the greatest results to immediate attack. Blake, with twenty-five thousand defeated and starving mountaineers, was near Espinosa in Biscay; the Conde de Belvidere, with the Estremaduran levies, twelve thousand strong, was in Burgos; Castanos and Palafox, little dreaming of the danger which was approaching, were preparing to advance again towards Logrono, and confidently expected to drive the invaders over the Pyrenees; while the English forces, slowly converging towards the scene of action, were still scattered, from Corunna to Madrid, over the half of Spain. Napoleon, on the other hand, had a hundred thousand excellent troops ready for immediate operations, in a circumference of twenty miles round his headquarters at Vittoria, besides nearly an equal force at a greater distance in Biscay and Navarre (2).

Defeat of
Blake at
Reynosa
and Espi-
nosa.
Nov. 10.

The plans of the French Emperor were immediately formed. Blake, whose eyes were at length opened to the perilous situation in which he was placed, so far in advance, and destitute of all communication with the other Spanish armies, had retired to Espinosa, where he had concentrated nearly all his troops, including those which had come with Romana from the Baltic, in a very strong position; while his reserves and park of artillery were stationed in the rear at Reynosa. He had now rejoined his artillery, and had collected twenty-five thousand men; but his troops, half naked and in great part without shoes, were shivering from the inclemency of the weather, and exhausted by incessant marching and counter-marching, often without food, for fourteen days. In this state they were attacked on the forenoon of the 10th, by Marshal Victor, with twenty-five thousand men, while Lefebvre, with fifteen thousand, marched upon the Spanish line of retreat. Romana's infantry, posted in a wood on the right, made a gallant resistance, and not only was the action prolonged till night-fall, without any disadvantage, by those gallant veterans, but the Spanish centre, who were protected by the fire of a battery well posted, to which the French had no guns to oppose, had gained ground upon the enemy. Next morning, however, the result was very different. Victor, who had changed his columns of attack during the night, renewed the action at daybreak, and

Nov. 11. directed their efforts against the left, where the Asturian levies were posted. These gallant mountaineers, though almost starving, and but recently embodied, stood their ground bravely as long as their chiefs, Quiros, Acevedo, and Valdes, remained to head them; but the French, perceiving the influence which they exercised over the minds of their followers, sent forward some sharpshooters under cover of the rocks and thickets in front of the position, who speedily killed the first and severely wounded the two lat-

(1) Tor. ii. 120, 123, Nap. i. 379, 381.

(2) Nap. i. 385, 387. Tor. ii. 124, 125.

ter. Disheartened by this loss, the Asturians broke and fled. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to support them, but instead of doing so, they were themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of fugitives, and swept along; in a short time the whole army disbanded, and rushed in the wildest disorder towards the river Trucha, which encircles the rear of the position (1). Great numbers perished in the stream, which was deeply swola with the rains of winter; those who reached the fords dispersed, and made the best of their way into their own provinces, carrying dismay into all parts of Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, where Romana afterwards contrived to rally ten thousand men. With difficulty Blake collected seven thousand men, with whom he fell back to Reynosa, where he endeavoured to make a stand, with the aid of his reserve artillery which was still stationed there: but this ineffectual attempt only rendered his defeat in the end more complete. Soult who, as well as Lefebvre, was now upon his traces, dispatched a large body of troops on the 10th, to cut him off from his retreat towards Leon; and upon the 13th he was

Nov. 11. attacked by the advanced guard of the former marshal, who displayed even more than his wonted vigour on the occasion, completely routed; with the loss of his whole artillery and ammunition, and driven, with a few thousand miserable and spectre-looking followers, into the heart of the Asturian mountains. Meanwhile, Bilbao, Santander, and the whole line of the intermediate sea-coast, with great stores landed at the latter port by the British, fell into the hands of the enemy (2).

Battle of
Burgos, and
defeat of the
Spanish
centre,
Nov. 30.

While these decisive blows in a manner annihilated the Spanish right, an equally important stroke was delivered by Soult, who had taken the command of the second corps, against the centre. It consisted of the army of Estremadura, under the Count de Belvidere, with which were united some of the bravest regular troops in Spain; in particular, the Spanish and Walloon guards, some of the best appointed regiments of the line, and the Royal Carabineers; and the whole were completely equipped and clothed by the English government. It made, however, even less resistance than the undisciplined levies of Asturias and Galicia. The Spanish soldiers, eighteen thousand strong, of whom eleven thousand were regulars, were posted at Gamonal, in front of Burgos, with twenty pieces of cannon disposed along their front; the right occupied a wood, the left the walled park of Villamer. The action commenced by General Lasalle, with the French horse, driving in the Spanish right, and threatening its flank, while Mouton, with a division of veterans, charged rapidly through the trees, and assailed their front; Bonnet followed closely with another division immediately in his rear; but such was the vigour and effect of Mouton's attack, that the enemy broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, pursued all the way by Bessièrès' heavy dragoons, who did dreadful execution among the fugitives, and took all the guns which had been saved from the first attack. Don Juan de Henestrosa, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, to cover the retreat, charged this dreadful body of horse with more gallantry than success; his dragoons, led by youths of the best families in Spain, were unable to withstand the shock of the French cuirassiers, and shared in the general rout. Two thousand Spaniards fell on the field, or in the pursuit; all the artillery, consisting of twenty guns, with eight hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors; all the ammunition and stores of the army were taken in

(1) Great part of the disasters of this defeat were owing to the injudicious selection of a position for battle, with a river in the rear—another example,

like that of the Russians at Friedland, of one of the most fatal errors which a general can commit.

(2) *Tor. ii.* 126, 135. *Nap. i.* 301, 302. *Jom. ii.* 97, 98. *South. ii.* 389, 393.

Burgos, which was given up to pillage, and the dispersion of the defeated troops, was complete (1).

Movement
against Cas-
tanos and
Palafox.

Burgos now became the centre of the Emperor's operations; headquarters were established there on the 12th, and ten thousand light troops were despatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. Such was the consternation produced by their advance, that they traversed the open fields in every direction, without experiencing the slightest opposition; they swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benuvente, Toro, and Tordesillas, spreading every where the triumphant proclamations of the Emperor, and boasting that, notwithstanding their utmost exertion, the French horsemen could not overtake the English army, which, abandoning its allies without striking a blow, was flying in disgrace to its ships. But while, by these incursions, the attention of the enemy was drawn to the side of Salamanca, the eyes of Napoleon were, in reality, turned in a different quarter; and it was against Castanos and Palafox that the weight of his forces was directed. The position of the French army seemed to expose them to certain destruction; for Ney's corps, which had been destined to act against the army of Estremadura at Burgos, being rendered disposable by its sudden destruction, was in a situation to make a circuit round their position, and cut them off from the line of retreat to New Castile and Madrid. That brave marshal accordingly, reinforced by a division from the reserve, was directed to move from Aranda by Soria to Agreda, which was directly in their rear; while Lannes was despatched from Burgos, with two divisions of infantry and one of heavy cavalry from the reserve, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps, and attack them in front (2). Meanwhile, Castanos, finding himself separated both from Belvidere and Blake's armies, with the destruction of which he was unacquainted, had adopted the extraordinary plan of forcing a passage through the French forces in his front, and marching by Concha-de-Hara and Soria to Burgos, where

Nov. 21.

he was to annihilate the Emperor's reserves and rearguard, and thence pass on to Vittoria to co-operate with Blake in the destruction of the two corps in Biscay (3).

Battle of
Tudela, and
route of the
Spanish
right.

In the midst of these extravagant projects, the hand of fate was upon him. Marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, entered Soria on the 21st, upon which Castanos retreated towards Tudela, which he reached on the evening of the 22d. There his army formed a junction with that of Arragon under Palafox, and their united forces amounted to thirty-nine thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, with forty guns. The generals of the armies of Andalusia and Arragon could not concur in any plan of common operations: Palafox contending strongly for the defence of Arragon, Castanos for the more prudent plan of retiring before the enemy. Nothing was as yet decided between these conflicting opinions, when it was announced from the outposts that the enemy were already upon them. In haste, the troops were drawn up nearly on the ground which they occupied at the moment, which was along a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly six miles long, stretching from Tudela to Tarazona. The Arragonese, with Palafox, were on the right, leaning on Tudela; the Valencians and Castilians

(1) Nap. i. 389, 390. Jom. ii. 96. Tor. ii. 131, 132. South. ii. 395, 396.

(2) In crossing a mountain range near Tolosa, the horse of Marshal Lannes fell with him, and he sustained several severe and dangerous bruises. He was cured in a very singular manner by being

wrapped in a warm skin of a newly slain sheep, and was able in two days to resume the command of the army.—LARRY, *Mémoires et Camp.* iv. 237.

(3) Thib. vii. 160, 161. Tor. ii. 133, 139. Nap. i. 395, 401.

loosely scattered in the centre; the veterans of Andalusia, proud of the laurels of Baylen, on the left, stretching to Tarazona, which they occupied with three divisions, the flower of the army. Lannes, who commanded the French, and had concentrated thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, instantly perceived the weakness of the enemy's line, and prepared to pierce the long and feebly guarded front in the centre, where it was weakest, and composed of the most inexperienced troops, so as to separate altogether the army of Arragon from that of Andalusia. This well-conceived plan proved entirely successful. General Maurice Mathieu, with a strong body of infantry, and the whole cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, attacked the Valencians and Castilians in the centre with great vigour, and soon compelled them to give ground; but they were in their turn charged by the Spanish guards, whom Castanos despatched to their assistance from the left, who threw the assailants into confusion; and the Spanish line in that quarter was gaining ground, when they were taken in flank by General Morlet, who had beaten back the Arragonese on the right, and now turned fiercely upon the enemy's centre. Aided by such powerful auxiliaries, Maurice Mathieu and Lefebvre Desnouettes regained the advantage, and, in their turn, drove back and threw into confusion the Valencians and Castilians, who had got into disorder by the length of the combat. The centre was speedily routed, and Lefebvre, charging the right with vigour, drove them entirely off the field in confusion towards Saragossa. Meanwhile la Pena, with the victors of Baylen on the extreme left, had routed the French under la Grange, to whom he was opposed; but when following up their success in some disorder, and already confident of victory, the victors were suddenly met by a solid mass of infantry which diverged from the victorious centre of the enemy, and broken; the other divisions of the army of Andalusia, three in number, and embracing twelve thousand soldiers, took no part in the action. They commenced their retreat, however, in good order, when it was evident the battle was lost; but some of the advanced troops of Ney's corps having appeared in their rear, from the side of Soria, and a powder-wagon exploded by accident, the retreat became disorderly, and it was with some difficulty the guns were brought off. As it was, the separation of the Spanish armies was complete; fifteen thousand men, Arragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, had taken refuge in Saragossa, without either guns or ammunition-waggons. Twenty thousand, under Castanos, with all their artillery, fell back, comparatively in good order, to Catalayud, and were immediately ordered up by the Central Junta to Madrid, to defend the capital. Five thousand were killed and wounded, or made prisoners on the field; the remainder, with twenty guns, dispersed in the pursuit, and were never more heard of. But if Napoléon's directions had been implicitly followed by Ney, who arrived at Soria on the 22d, and if, instead of remaining in that town, as he did, inactive for two days, he had advanced in the direction of Catalayud, he would have fallen perpendicularly on the retreating columns of Castanos, and totally destroyed them. This failure, on the part of Ney, excited great displeasure in Napoléon (who had with reason calculated upon much greater results from the battle), and was attended with important consequences on the future fortunes of the war (1).

(1) Jom. ii. 99, 100. Tor. ii. 138, 142. Nap. i. 401, 406. Soult. ii. 390, 401.

Colonel Napier says, "Palafox, with the right wing and centre, fled to Saragossa with such speed, that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening." It would be desirable that

the authority on which this serious charge is made against Palafox should be given, as no foundation appears for it in the military authorities with which I am acquainted. Jomini says merely that after the battle "Palafox took the road to Saragossa;" Torreno that, "Don Joseph Palafox in the morning

Disorderly and eccentric retreat of the Spanish armies from the Ebro.

The battles of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela, were not only totally destructive of the Spanish armies in the north, but they rendered, by the dispersion of their forces with which they were attended, the approach to the capital a matter of ease to the French Emperor. Blake's troops, of which Romana had now assumed the command, had almost all dispersed, some into Asturias, others into Leon; and it was with the utmost difficulty that that gallant commander had rallied ten thousand of the starving fugitives, without either artillery, ammunition, or stores, in the rugged mountains from which the Ebro takes its rise; the remnant of the army of Estremadura, routed at Burgos, had fallen back, in the utmost confusion, towards the Guadarrama mountains; while Castanos with the army of Andalusia, was driven off in a south-easterly direction to Catalayud, in the road to Valencia; and Palafox, with the levies of Arragon and Castile, had sought a refuge behind the walls of Saragossa. Thus, the Spanish armies were not only individually and grievously weakened by the losses they had sustained, but so disjointed and severed, as to be incapable of acting in concert, or affording any support to each other: while Napoleon, at the head of a hundred thousand men, occupied a central position in the heart of them all, and was master of the great road leading direct to the capital (1).

Rapid and concentrated advance of the French armies to Madrid.

It was in such circumstances that the genius of that great general appeared most conspicuous, which never shone with such lustre as in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. Abandoning the remains of Blake's army to Soult's, and the care of watching the English troops to Lefebvre's corps, and directing Lannes to observe Saragossa and the discomfited but warlike multitude which it contained, while Ney was to press incessantly on Castanos, and drive him off, as far as possible, in an easterly direction, the Emperor himself, with the Imperial Guards, Victor's corps, and the reserve, at least sixty thousand strong, advanced towards Madrid. So skilfully were these various movements combined, that while each corps had the following up and destroying of its own peculiar antagonist in an especial manner intrusted to its care, the whole combined to protect and support the advance of the main body to the capital; Lefebvre protecting its right flank, Ney its left, while Lannes and Soult secured and protected the rear, at the same time that they disposed of the remnants of the Arragonese and Galician armies (2).

Forcing of the Somo-sierra pass.

Departing from Aranda de Douro on the 28th, the Emperor arrived at the foot of the Somo-sierra on the morning of the 30th. Some field-works, hastily constructed at the summit of the pass, were garrisoned by a disorderly crowd, composed of the reserve of the divisions of Andalusia, which had been sent forward from Madrid, with which were united the remains of the army of Estremadura, in all about twelve thousand men, with sixteen pieces of cannon, under the command of General St. Juan. The guns swept the road along the whole ascent, which was long and very steep; and as it was impossible that the toilsome acclivity could be surmounted by the troops except during a considerable time, a very serious loss was anticipated by the assailants. Preceded, however, by a cloud of sharpshooters, which covered the mountains on either side, a column of three regiments ascended the causeway, while as many assailed the position on its right, and a like number on its left. The fire, however, of the artillery on the summit was very

(*dès le matin*) resumed the route to Saragossa." Neither say any thing about any of the Arragonese or Palafox himself having either fled to Saragossa, or arrived there that night.—See NAPIER, i. 408, 1st Ed.; TORRES, ii. 141; JOMINI, iii. 100.

(1) Nap. i. 408, 409. Jom. ii. 102. Tor. ii. 141.
(2) Nap. i. 407. Jom. i. 101, 102. Tor. ii. 141.

violent, to which it was difficult to reply, as a thick fog, intermingled with smoke, hung over their line on the higher part of the ridge, on entering into which the French found themselves torn by a descending shower of balls from an enemy whom they could not discern. The head of the column on the causeway was already arrested, and hesitation, as always ensues in such an event, was beginning to spread in the rear, when Napoléon, having rode to the bottom of the pass, at once ordered the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the guard, under General Montbrun, to charge. Advancing up the steep ascent at a rapid pace, these brave men opened a way for themselves through the columns of infantry with which it was encumbered, and attacked the battery; the first squadrons, shattered by a terrible discharge, reeled and fell back, but the next, galloping forward before the guns could be reloaded, dashed among the artillerymen, and carried the pass. Meanwhile the Spanish infantry, stationed on either flank, retired, after discharging their muskets at the swarms of tirailleurs by whom they were assailed, and the whole body falling into confusion, soon fled in disorder to Segovia, where a small number only could be rallied by the efforts of their gallant leader, San Juan, who cut his way, sword in hand, through a body of Polish lancers, by whom he was enveloped (1).

Capture of
the Retiro,
and prodi-
gious agita-
tion at
Madrid.

Great was the dismay in the Spanish capital when the alarming intelligence arrived, early on the morning of the 1st December, that the Somo-sierra pass had been forced, and that Napoléon with his terrible legions was advancing with rapid strides against its defence-

less walls. The central Junta at Aranjuez, at the same time, heard of the disaster, and instantly fixing on Badajoz as their point of union, they set out with all imaginable haste for Talavera de la Reyna in different parties and by different roads, and were fortunate enough to arrive at their place of destination without accident. Meanwhile, the general government of Madrid was intrusted to a provisional junta, of which the Duke del Infantado was head, while the direction of its military defence was in the hands of Don Thomas de Morla, who had early taken a lead in the Cadiz insurrection, but whose subsequent violation of faith to the prisoners taken at Baylen, augured ill for the integrity with which he would discharge the arduous duties now intrusted to his care. The regular troops in the city consisted only of three hundred regular soldiers, with two battalions and a single squadron newly levied. Nevertheless, vigorous preparations were made for defence; eight thousand muskets, and a still greater number of pikes, were hastily distributed from the arsenal to the people; heavy cannon were planted on the Retiro and principal streets; the pavement was torn up, barricades constructed, and the most enthusiastic spirit pervaded the multitude. Ammunition was served out in abundance; but some of the cartridges were discovered to be filled with black sand instead of gunpowder—a discovery which, in the excited state of the inhabitants, proved fatal to the Marquis Perales, who was at the head of that department. He had formerly been the idol of the people; but with their usual inconstancy, upon the first discovery of this fraud, originating probably in the cupidity of some inferior agent, a furious mob assailed his house, dragged him into the street, and there murdered him. On the

Dec. 2. morning of the 2d, the advanced guards of the French arrived on the heights to the north of Madrid; and the emperor, who was extremely desirous of gaining possession of the capital on the anniversary of his coronation, and of the battle of Austerlitz, immediately summoned it to surrender;

but the proposal was indignantly rejected. On the same day the Duke del Infantado was fortunate enough to make his escape, under cover of a thick fog, and directed his steps to Guadalupe, to join the army of Castanos, which had retreated in that direction. During the night the French infantry arrived

Dec. 3. in great strength around the capital, and on the following morning a thick fog overspread both the agitated multitude within, and the host without by which it was menaced. By degrees, however, the mist was dispelled by the ascending rays of the sun, and the Emperor directed his columns of attack against the Retiro, the heights of which completely commanded the city. A battery of thirty guns soon made a practicable breach in its weak defence, and a French division advancing to the assault, speedily rushed in and made themselves masters of that important post (1).

Fall of that capital. The agitation in Madrid now became excessive; twenty thousand armed men were within its walls, but almost entirely disorganized; agitated by furious passions, burning with individual ardour, but destitute of the organization and discipline necessary for success against the formidable enemy by whom they were now assailed. The city presented the most frightful scene of disorder; exasperated crowds filled the streets; strong barricades were erected in various quarters, the bells of two hundred churches rang together; a confused murmur, like the sound of a mighty cataract, was heard incessantly, even during the night, which was audible at the distance of miles from the capital; while in the French lines all was silent and orderly, and the step only of the passing sentinel broke the stillness;—a striking image of the difference between the disorderly passions which agitate the populace, without being directed by superior intelligence to any useful end, and the experienced discipline which restrains an ardour not less powerful, till the moment for letting it loose with decisive effect has arrived. But the possession of the Retiro, in a military point of view, is possession of Madrid; bombs from its heights can reach the furthest points of the city. Sensible of the impossibility of maintaining the defence, the Spanish authorities were deliberating on the expedience of proposing terms of capitulation, when a flag of truce arrived from Berthier, threatening the utmost severity of military execution if the white flag was not hoisted within two hours. Morla and Ivriarte were, upon that, despatched to the head-quarters of the Emperor, to negotiate the terms of surrender. He received the former with unusual sternness, and in just but cutting terms reproached him with his violation of good faith towards the unhappy prisoners taken at Baylen (2). "Injustice and bad faith," said

(1) Tor. ii. 149, 152. Nap. i. 411, 415. South, ii. 410, 414. Jom. ii. 103.

(2)——— When Morla appeared before him, Napoleon addressed Morla in these words:—"You in vain seek to shelter yourself under the name of the people; if you cannot now appease them, it is because you have formerly excited and misled them by your falsehoods; return to Madrid, assemble the clergy, the magistrates, the principal inhabitants; tell them, that if by to-morrow morning at six o'clock the town has not surrendered, it will cease to exist. I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have massacred the unhappy French prisoners who fell into your hands; within these few days you have suffered two servants of the Russian ambassador to be dragged into the streets and murdered, because they were born in France. The unskillfulness and cowardice of a general had

placed in your hands troops who had capitulated on the field of battle, and the capitulation was violated. What sort of a letter did you, M. Morla, write to the general who subscribed that capitulation? (*) It well became you to speak of pillage, you who in Roncesvalles had carried off women, and divided them like booty among your soldiers. What right, besides, had you to hold such language? The capitulation expressly forbade it. What have the English done, who are far from picking themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations? they complained of the convention of Cintra, but nevertheless carried it into execution. To violate military conventions is to renounce civilisation and put ourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. How can you now venture to demand a capitulation, you who have violated that of Baylen? See how injustices and bad faith ever recoil upon

(*) Alluding to Morla's letter to Dupoix of 20th August, 1808, in which he sought to vindicate the violation of the capitulation by the plunder of the French soldiers.

he, "ever in the end recoil upon those who practise them." Prophetic words! of the truth and universal application of which Napoleon himself, on the rock of St.-Helena, afterwards afforded a memorable example. Filled with consternation at the perilous predicament in which he was individually placed, from the well-founded resentment of the Emperor, and inspired with a sense of the necessity of appeasing the wrath of the conqueror by an immediate surrender, Morla returned to the city, and easily persuaded the majority of the junta that submission had become a matter of necessity.

Dec. 4.

A few gallant men, with the Marquis Castellas and Viscount de Gaete, disdaining to surrender, withdrew from the city during the night, and took the road for Estremadura. At daybreak the capitulation was signed, and by ten o'clock the principal points of the city were in the possession of the French troops (1).

Napoleon's
measures for
the tranquillizing
of
Spain.

Napoleon did not himself enter Madrid, but established his headquarters at Chamartin, in the neighbourhood of the capital, where he received the submission of the authorities, and fulminated his anathemas against the functionaries who had resisted or swerved from his government. In a short time every thing wore the appearance of peace; the theatres were re-opened; the shopkeepers displayed their tempting wares, secure in the discipline of the conquerors; the Prado and public walks were crowded with spectators. Numerous deputations, embracing some of the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants of Madrid, waited on the Emperor, and renewed their protestations of fidelity to his brother Joseph, who was established at the Royal Palace of Pardo: it then appeared how completely and fatally the corruptions and enjoyments of opulence and civilized life disqualify men from acting an heroic part in defence of their country (2). Measures of great severity were adopted against all the constituted authorities who, after having recognised Joseph as King of Spain, had joined the popular party. The Marquis des Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had to the last prolonged the conflict after the capitulation had paralysed all general resistance, and was taken fighting bravely, when endeavouring to cut his way through at the gate of Fuencarral, was ordered to be shot. He owed his life to the intercession of his daughter, who threw herself at the Emperor's feet, and obtained from his clemency a commutation of the sentence. All the members of the Council of Castile who had declared that they had sworn allegiance to Joseph, under Jesuitical mental reservations, were dismissed, and ordered to be detained prisoners in their own houses. Nor were general measures awaiting, calculated to reconcile the nation to the sway of the

Dec. 4.

intrusive monarch. By a solemn decree, the Inquisition was abolished, and all its funds directed to be applied towards the reduction of the public debt; feudal rights were suppressed; all personal restrictions and privileges declared at an end; the number of convents throughout the kingdom

those who commit them. I had a fleet at Cadiz; it had come there as to an ally's harbour; and you directed against it the mortars of the town which you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks, but I preferred allowing it to escape on board the English vessels, and precipitating it from the rocks of Espinosa to disarming it. I would rather have seven thousand additional enemies to combat than be wanting in good faith. Return to Madrid, I give you till to-morrow at ten; return then if you are the bearer of submission; if not, you and your troops shall be all put to the sword." —*TRIBAUDAN*, vii. 165, 166. There can be no doubt that consciousness of his former breach of

faith now paralysed Morla, and impelled him into a second act of pusillanimity, if not treachery, to his own countrymen: so true it is, in Napoleon's words, that "*injustice and bad faith ever recoil in the end upon those who commit them.*" Morla lingered out a few years, abhorred and shunned by all; he died as he had lived, devoured by remorse and sunk in misery. —*See TOUSSAIGNE*, ii. 155.

(1) *Tor.* ii. 152, 155. *Thib.* vii. 163, 165. *Nap.* i. 418, 415. *South.* ii. 414, 417.

(2) Their number amounted to above *twelve hundred*, comprehending the most eminent and wealthy individuals of all classes in the metropolis. — *JOMINI*, iii. 105.

was at once reduced a third, and their inmates turned adrift, while all novices were permitted to leave their places of seclusion. One-half of the proceeds of the estates of the suppressed convents was to be applied to the public debt, the other to the relief of the cities and towns which had suffered from the French invasion; and all the barriers between province and province, which had so long impeded the internal commerce of the kingdom, were declared at an end. A few days after, the Emperor fulminated a bulletin against the English government, which deserves to be recorded, from the singular contrast which its predictions exhibited to the future march of events with which his own destinies were so deeply implicated (1).

Positions of
the French
corps in the
end of De-
cember.

Nor was the Emperor less actively employed during the fortnight that he remained at Madrid, in dispersing his armies so as to spread them over the greatest possible space, and complete in all the provinces that thorough conquest which had already been effected in the capital. Ney's corps, which had been brought up from Sevia, was stationed at Madrid, under his own immediate control, with the guards and reserve; Victor was advanced to Toledo, which, notwithstanding its expressed determination to hold out to the uttermost, opened its gates on the first summons, while his light cavalry scoured the plains of La Mancha, carrying devastation and terror to the foot of the Sierra Moreno; Lefebvre advanced to Talavera, on the great road for Badajoz and Elvas; Soult was reposing on the banks of the Carrion, preparing to follow the broken remains of Romana's army into the fastnesses of Galicia; Junot's corps was broken up, and the divisions composing it incorporated with Soult's troops; Moncey was ordered up to Madrid for an expedition against Valencia; while Mortier was directed to advance to support his corps, which was occupied with the siege of Saragossa. Thus the Emperor, from his central position at Madrid, was preparing expeditions to subdue the insurrection at once in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, Valencia, and Arragon; following out these measures on his favourite maxim, which had been acted upon with such fatal effect against the Prussians after the battle of Jena, that the true secret of war is to concentrate when a decisive blow is to be struck, but to disperse when the broken remains of the enemy are to be pursued, and the moral effect of victory is to be magnified by the numerous minor successes by which it is followed.

Vast as such a plan of operations undoubtedly was, it was not disproportioned to the resources of the Emperor; for the Imperial muster-rolls, on October 10th, showed in the Peninsula the enormous number of three hundred and thirty thousand men and sixty thousand horses, of whom no less than two hundred and fifty thousand were present with the eagles and with their regiments, and the losses since sustained had been more than counter-balanced by the reinforcements received; so that, after making every allow-

(1) Thib. vii. 168, 170. Tor. ii. 156, 158. South. ii. 419, 420.

— "As to the English armies, I will chase them from the Peninsula. Saragossa, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced to subjection, either by persuasion or force of arms; there is no longer any obstacle which can long retard the execution of my wishes. The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe; the divisions in the Royal family have been fomented by the English. It was not the old King Charles or his favourite whom the Duke del Infantado, the instrument of England, wished to overturn from the throne; his papers recently taken prove what the real object was; it was British preponderance which they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which could have led to no other result but a war without end, and the shedding of oceans of

blood. No power influenced by England can exist on the Continent; if there are any which desire it, their wish is insensate, and will, sooner or later, cause their ruin. If you swear allegiance to my brother with sincerity and truth, without equivocation or mental reservation, I will relinquish all the rights which conquest have now afforded me, and make it my first object to conduct myself towards you as a faithful friend. The present generation may differ in opinion; too many passions have been brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their regenerator; they will place among their memorable days that in which I appeared among them, and from those days will date the future prosperity of Spain."—Napoleon's Proclamation to the Spaniards, Dec. 7, 1808; JOURNAL, iii. 103, 110.

ance for the troops requisite for garrisons and communications, at least a hundred and sixty thousand were disposable for active operations, or above thirty thousand men could be directed against each of the provinces menaced with an attack (4). The disorganized condition of the Spanish armies, the deplorable state of destitution to which they were reduced, the vast distance which separated them from each other, and the want of any efficient central government to combine their operations, rendered it too probable that this vigorous and unrelenting system of conquest would be attended with the desired effect, and that the national resistance of the Spaniards would, in the first moments of consternation consequent on their disasters (2), be speedily suppressed in all the provinces; when the career of victory was arrested from a quarter whence it was least expected, and by an enemy who had been hitherto almost forgotten, from the mistaken view which the Emperor entertained of his prowess.

Bold advance of Sir John Moore. While these disasters were accumulating on the Spanish monarchy, the English army, unobserved and unassailed, had at length been concentrating its forces. Baird had come up from Corunna, Hope from the Escorial, and Sir John Moore found himself at the head of nearly thirty thousand men, of whom above two thousand were cavalry in admirable condition, and sixty pieces of cannon (3). The English general was for long extremely perplexed what to do, in consequence of the imperfect information which he received, and the contradictory nature of the remonstrances addressed to him by Mr. Frere, the British ambassador at Madrid, who strongly urged an immediate advance to the capital, and the evidence which the progress of events around him was daily affording of the utter incapacity of the Spanish armies to contend with the formidable legions of Napoléon. At one time, the intelligence of the successive rout of all the Spanish armies appeared so alarming, that orders were given to the troops to retreat, and Sir David Baird's heavy baggage, which was coming up from Nov. 29.

Lugo to Astorga commenced a retrograde movement to the latter place. This determination excited the utmost dissatisfaction in the troops; officers and men loudly and openly murmured against such a resolution, and declared it would be better to sacrifice half the army than retire from so fair a field without striking a blow for the allies who had staked their all in the common cause. The gallant spirit of the general himself secretly recoiled from the mournful resolution, which nothing had made him adopt but an imperious sense of duty to the troops intrusted to his care, the gloomy forebodings consequent on the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and the defeat and dispersion of all the Spanish forces by whom it had been attempted

(1) Imperial Muster-Rolls, Nap. i. app. 28.

Eight corps, as in p. 382.	319,690
Of whom were present under arms,	247,834
Horses,	56,567
Detached,	32,536
In hospital,	87,419

—See *Imperial Muster-rolls*; NAPIER, i. p. 88, App.

(2) Nap. i. 421, 422. *Jom.* iii. 104. *Tor.* ii. 166, 172.

(3) The British army, however, had its full proportion of that usual drawback upon all armies, the difference between the actual numbers appearing on the muster-rolls, and the efficient force that could really be brought into the field. The following is the state of the British army from the Adjutant-General's statement, 19th December, 1808:

Fitted for duty.	In Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry. 2,278	182	794	3,254
Infantry. 22,227	3,786	893	26,871
Artillery. 1,358	67		1,455
25,858	4,035	1,687	31,580

2275 were left in Portugal, or were on the march between Lugo and Villa-Franca, and must be deducted from this number.—See NAPIER, i. 83, App.

to arrest his progress. These feelings, both in the general and the soldiers, were wrought up to the highest degree, when intelligence was received shortly after the advance of the French to Madrid, of the enthusiastic preparations made for the defence of the capital, and the determination of the inhabitants to bury themselves under its ruins rather than submit to the invader. Giving vent joyfully to the native courage of his disposition, as well

Dec. 8. as the loudly expressed wishes of the army, Sir John Moore now sent orders to Sir David Baird to suspend his retreat, and, to the infinite joy of the troops, directions were given, indicating a disposition to advance.

Dec. 9. These preparations were not relaxed, although Colonel Graham, the future hero of Barrosa, returned on the 9th with the disheartening intelligence of the capture of the Retiro, and perilous situation of Madrid; the British general knew that his countrymen looked to him for some great exploit, and, though fully aware of the danger of such a step, he resolved to throw himself upon the enemy's communication, and menace Soult, who lay exposed to his blows, with fifteen thousand men, in unsuspecting security

Dec. 11. in the valley of the Carrion. The gallant resolution was no sooner taken than it was acted upon; two days after, the British army completely concentrated, commenced its advance, and Moore, with twenty-five thousand men around his banners, ventured to essay it against Napoléon, who had two hundred thousand under his command (1).

To Sahagun, on the French line of communication.

The forward march of the English forces, however, was combined as prudence, and, indeed, necessity, dictated, with preparations for a retreat; and as it was uncertain which line would be adopted, magazines were formed both on the great road to Lisbon and at Benavente, Astorga, and Lugo in the direction of Galicia. On the 13th, headquarters reached Alaejos, and the advanced posts of cavalry extended to Rueda and Toro, at the former of which places they surprised a French post, and made eighty prisoners. Great was the astonishment of these haughty conquerors at finding themselves thus assailed by an enemy whom the boastful proclamations of the Emperor had led them to believe was in full retreat for his ships.

Dec. 14. At first, Sir John's march was directed towards Valladolid, in order to facilitate the junction with Baird's corps; but an intercepted despatch from Napoléon on the 14th having made him acquainted with the fall of Madrid, and the unsuspecting security in which Soult's corps lay in the valley of the Carrion, the columns were moved towards Toro and Benavente, and Valderas was assigned as the point of junction for the two armies. At Toro,

Dec. 16. where headquarters were on the 16th, information was received that Romana, who had been informed of the movement and invited to co-operate in it, instead of doing so, was, in consequence of the retrograde movement of Sir David Baird a few days before, in full retreat towards the Galician mountains; the truth was, his troops, from hunger, fatigue, and misery, had dwindled away to eight thousand ragged and disheartened fugitives, totally unfit to take the field with regular forces, and whom he was even ashamed to array by their side. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the English

Dec. 20. forces continued to advance; on the 20th, the junction between Sir David Baird and Sir John Moore was fully effected at Moyorga; and on the

Dec. 21. 21st, the united forces were established at Sahagun, near which town Lord Paget, afterwards Marquis of Anglesea, at the head of the 10th and the 15th hussars, not above four hundred strong, fell in with, and after a short but brilliant action, totally defeated a body of seven hundred French

cavalry, making two colonels and one hundred and sixty men prisoners in twenty minutes. Soult, now seriously alarmed, hastily called in his detachments from all quarters, and with some difficulty concentrated eighteen thousand men on the banks of the Carrión, and between that and Saldana, where Moore was making preparations for attacking him on the 23d (1).

It instantly paralysed their further advance to the south. Never was more completely evinced than on this occasion, the prophetic sagacity of the saying of Napoléon seven months before, that a victory by the allies on the plains of Leon would give a locked-jaw to every French army in Spain. No sooner was the advance of Sir John Moore known at Madrid, than it instantly paralysed the movements of the whole French armies in the south of Spain. Napoléon immediately dispatched orders in all directions to suspend the expeditions into the different provinces which were in preparation. Milhaud's and Lasalle's cuirassiers were arrested at Talavera; Victor's advanced guards were recalled from La Mancha; the expedition against Valencia was abandoned, the preparations against Saragoessa suspended; and fifty thousand men, under the Emperor in person, including the Imperial Guards, the whole of Ney's corps, and great part of the reserve, the flower of the army, were, at a few hours' notice, suddenly marched off in the direction of Somo-Sierra (2).

Dec. 22. Rapid march of Napoléon with an overwhelming force towards the English troops. On the evening of the 22d, they were at the foot of the Guadarrama Pass, but a violent hurricane of wind and snow enveloped the higher parts of the mountains, where the thermometer was at 10° of cold (3); and the general in command of the advanced guard, after twelve hours of fruitless toil, reported that the passage was impracticable. The conqueror of the St.-Bernard, however, was not so easily

Dec. 23. to be arrested. Napoléon in person hastened to the advanced posts, and ordered the march to be continued without interruption, himself setting the example by pressing forward with the leading files on foot. The example animated the men to fresh exertions; amidst storms of snow and sleet, which in the higher parts of the passage were truly frightful, the columns pressed

Dec. 25. on with ceaseless activity, and after two days of incessant labour, the difficulties were surmounted, and the whole were collected on the northern side of the mountains, in the valley of the Douro. Urging on his troops with indefatigable activity, and riding even at that inclement season with the advanced posts in person, the Emperor soon arrived at the scene of action;

Dec. 26. on the 26th, headquarters were at Tordesillas, the cavalry were at Valladolid, and Ney's corps at Rio Seco. Fully anticipating the immediate destruction of the English army, from the immense force now brought to bear against them, Napoléon on the same day wrote to Soult:—"The advanced posts of the cavalry are already at Benavente; if the English remain another day in their position they are undone; should they attack you with all their forces, retire a day's march to the rear; the further they advance the better for us; if they retreat pursue them closely (4)."

They retreat on the line of Galicia. The march of Ney by Zamora and Rio Seco towards Benavente was so direct, that he early intercepted the British from their communication with Portugal; and if he could have reached the latter town before Sir John Moore, he would have cut him off from the line of retreat to Galicia also, and rendered the situation of the army all but desperate. This catastrophe, however, was prevented by the prudent foresight of the English commander, who, having received vague but alarming accounts of the march of a large

(1) *Tor. ii.* 178, 187. *Nap. i.* 450, 461. *Lond. i.* 212, 243.

(2) *Jom. ii.* 113. *Tor. ii.* 187. *Nap. i.* 461.

(3) About 14° of Fahrenheit above zero.

(4) *Thib. vii.* 174, 175. *Tor. ii.* 187, 189. *Nap. i.* 461, 462. *Jom. ii.* 113, 114.

French army from the south, suspended his advance on the 23d, and on the 24th commenced his retreat towards Galicia, to the infinite mortification of the soldiers, who were in the highest state of vigour and spirits, and in whom an unbroken series of brilliant successes at the outposts had produced an unbounded confidence in their own prowess, likely, if not met by overwhelming odds, to have led to the most important and glorious results. On the 26th, Dec. 26.

Baird's troops passed the Esla on their retreat, while Moore, who was with the rearguard to protect the passage of the stores and baggage over the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo, was threatened by a large body of Ney's horsemen. Lord Paget, however, with two squadrons of the 10th, charged and overthrew them, making a hundred prisoners, besides numbers killed and wounded. Indeed, the superiority of the English horse had become so apparent, that they set all odds at defiance, never hesitated to attack the enemy's cavalry, though threefold in number, and had already made five hundred prisoners, during the few days they had been engaged in active operations (1).

By this timely retreat, Sir John Moore reached Benavente before the enemy; and the hazardous operation of crossing the Esla, then a roaring torrent swollen by melting snow, and over planks laid across the broken arches of the bridge of Castro, in the dark, was successfully performed by General Craufurd with the rearguard. The army remained two days at that place, reposing from its fatigues, under the shelter of its magnificent baronial castle, almost unequalled in Europe for extent and grandeur (2). Discipline, however, had already become seriously relaxed during the retreat, though only of three days' duration, from Sahagun; the spirit of the men had been surprisingly depressed by the thoughts of retreating before the enemy; the officers had, in a great degree, lost their authority, and disorders equally fatal to the army and inhabitants had already commenced. But these evils were accumulating only in the front part of the column, which was suffering merely under the fatigues of the march and the severity of the weather; no decline of spirit or enterprise was perceptible in the rearguard, which was in presence of the enemy. Piquets of cavalry had been left to guard the fords of the Esla; and, on the 28th, a body

(1) Lond. i. 247, 253. Map. i. 462, 464. Tor. i. 185, 189.

(2) This splendid relic of feudal grandeur is thus described by an eloquent eye-witness, whose pictures, equally vivid in travels as history, have given to prose all the colours of poetry. "The Castle of Benavente is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; nothing in England approaches to it in magnificence. Berkeley, Raby, even Warwick, are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open alcoves where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns, and tessellated floors; niches all over, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke of Osuna, and the splendour of old times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this single circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls; they proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them; the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation. Every thing combustible was seized; fires were lighted against the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps of the greatest Spanish masters,

were heaped together as fuel. Fortunately the archives of the family escaped."—*Sourdis*, i. 46th.

In the midst of this disgraceful scene of unbridled licence and military devastation, there is one trait of heroic presence of mind, which in some degree redeems the character of the British soldier. Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an immense convent built round a square; the horses of the cavalry and artillery, scarcely less numerous, were in the corridor below, so closely jammed together, that no one could pass between them, and there was but one entrance. Two officers, returning at night from the bridge of Castro, being desirous of finding shelter for their men, entered the gate of this convent, and perceived with horror that a large window-shutter was on fire, and the flames were spreading to the rafters above, from whence a single spark falling on the straw under the horses would ignite the whole, and six thousand men and horses would inevitably perish. Without saying a word, one of them (Captain Lloyd of the 48d) made a sign to his companions to keep silence, and springing on the nearest horse, ran along the backs of the others till he reached the flaming shutter, which by great efforts he tore from its hinges and flung into the court-yard without giving any alarm; which, in such circumstances, would have been hardly less destructive than the flames.—*See Life of a Sergeant*, p. 143; and *Navies*, i. 467.

of six hundred horsemen of the Imperial Guard crossed over, and began to drive in the rearguard, stationed in that quarter to repel their incursions. Instantly, these gallant horsemen made ready to oppose them, and though only two hundred in number, repeatedly faced about, and by successive charges, under Colonel Otway, retarded the advance of the enemy till assistance was at hand. At length the enemy having been drawn sufficiently far into the plain, the 10th, who were formed, concealed by some houses, suddenly appeared, and advanced to the assistance of their brave comrades. At the joyful sight of the well-known plumes, the retiring horsemen wheeled about, a loud cheer was given, and the whole bore down at full speed upon the enemy. The Imperial Guard, the flower of the French army wreathed with the trophies of Austerlitz (1), were in an instant broken and driven over the Esca, with the loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and seventy prisoners, among whom was their commander, General Lefebvre Desnouettes (2).

Return of
the Emperor
to Paris.

The destruction of the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo was so thoroughly effected that it delayed for two days the advance of the French, who could not cross the stream at other points from its swollen state; but at length, the arches having been restored, Bessières crossed on the 30th, with nine thousand horsemen, and reached Benavente, which had been evacuated by the English on the same day. At the same time, the bridge of Mansilla, guarded by Romana's troops, was forced by a charge of cavalry, and Soult passing over, overspread the plains of Leon with his troops, and captured the town of the same name, with great stores belonging to the Spanish government. The whole army, consisting of the guards, reserve, Soult and Ney's corps, seventy thousand strong, including ten thousand horse, and a hundred pieces of cannon, were, on the 1st January, united by the Emperor at Astorga. The union of so great a force in that remote part of the Peninsula, was both the highest compliment that could be paid by that great general to the prowess of the English army, and the important stroke delivered by its commander, and the strongest proof of the vigour and celerity with which, by long experience and admirable arrangements, the movements of the French troops could be effected. In ten days Napoléon had not only transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga, a distance of two hundred miles, but crossed the Guadarrama range when enveloped in a frightful snow-storm, and the torrent of the Esca when swollen by wintry rains; in each of which operations more than a day's march had been lost, so that the advanced posts of his army at least had marched the astonishing number of twenty-five miles a-day when actually in motion, in the depth of winter; an instance of exertion almost unparalleled in modern times (3). But they were there left by Napoléon. On the road between Benavente and Astorga, when riding in pursuit at the gallop with the advanced posts, he was overtaken by a courier with despatches; he instantly dismounted, ordered a bivouac-fire to be lighted by the roadside, and seating himself beside it on the ground, was soon so lost in thought as to be insensible to the snow which fell in thick flakes around him. He had ample subject for meditation: they

(1) *Ante*, v. 481.

(2) *Lond.* i. 253, 256. *Nap.* i. 467, 468. *Tor.* i. 189, 190. *Larrey*, iii. 127.

(3) It has been greatly exceeded, however, in the same country in later times, though by a much smaller force. In December 1836, the Spanish general Gomez marched from the lines of St.-Roque in front of Gibraltar to Tudela on the Ebro: he left St.-Roque on the 24th November, and reached the Ebro on the 17th December, having repeatedly

fought, and been driven to circuitous roads to avoid the enemy on the way. The distance was above 500 miles, performed in twenty-five days. There is no such instance of sustained effort in modern times. Septimius Severus marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of 800 miles, in forty days, or twenty miles a-day; but he had the glittering prospect of the empire to animate his exertions. —See *Ann. Reg.* 1836, 379, 380, and *Gibbon*, ch. iv.

contained authentic intelligence of the accession of Austria to the European confederacy, and the rapid preparation which her armies were making for taking the field. On the spot, he wrote an order for calling into immediate activity the second levy of 80,000 conscripts authorized by the *senatus consultum* of 10th October preceding; and proceeding slowly and pensively on to Astorga, remained there for two days, writing innumerable despatches, and regulating at once the pursuit of the English army, the internal affairs of Spain, the organization of the forces of the Rhenish confederacy, and the development of the gigantic strength of France for the German war. On Jan. 2.

the 3d he returned to Valladolid, where he remained three days, still indefatigably engaged in writing despatches, and then returned, with extraordinary celerity, by Burgos (1) and Bayonne, to Paris, where he arrived on the 23d. He took back his guards, but sent on Soult and Ney with two divisions of the reserve, in all about sixty thousand men, to continue the pursuit of the English (2), who were falling back by rapid marches, and in great disorder, towards the Galician mountains.

Sir John
Moore re-
tires to
Lugo.

The withdrawing of the Emperor, however, made no change in the vigour with which the pursuit of the English army was continued.

Soult, who immediately pressed upon their retiring columns, had twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry under his command; and though the British army was still nearly twenty thousand strong (3), yet the inclemency of the weather and rapidity of the retreat, had, in a great degree, relaxed the bonds of discipline, and diminished the moral strength of the troops. The rearguard, indeed, still with unabated resolution repelled the attacks of the enemy; but the other troops, who had not the excitement of combat, often sank under the rigour of the season, or yielded to the temptations of intemperance, which the extensive stores of wine along their line of march too readily afforded. The native and ineradicable vice of northern climates, drunkenness, here appeared in frightful colours; the great wine-vaults of Bembibre proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy; and when the gallant rearguard, which preserved its ranks unbroken, closed up the array, they had to force their way through a motley crowd of English and Spanish soldiers, stragglers and marauders, who reeled out of the houses in disgusting crowds, or lay stretched on the roadside an easy prey to the enemy's cavalry, which thundered in close pursuit. The condition of the army daily became more deplorable: the frost had been succeeded by a thaw; rain and sleet fell in torrents; the roads were almost broken up; the horses foundered at every step; the few artillery-waggons which had hitherto kept up, fell one by one to the rear, and being immediately blown up to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, gave melancholy token, by the sound of their explosions, of the work of destruction which was going on. The mountain-passes through which the retreat was conducted, presented, indeed, positions at every step in which a few regiments might have arrested, on that single road, an army; but it was unhappily thought there was no use

(1) On leaving Valladolid he rode to Burgos, a distance of *thirty-five French leagues*, in five hours! This rapidity would appear incredible, were it not for the circumstance that the Emperor here had his saddle-horses arranged by divisions of nine each at every three or four leagues along the road, so that every eight or ten miles he found fresh relays of his own horses, which were in admirable condition. This was his usual practice wherever there appeared the least chance of his riding on horseback during his journeys. The remainder of the road to Paris

he travelled in his carriage.—See *Traité de l'art de la guerre*, vii. 184.

(2) Nap. i. 469, 473. Tor. ii. 129, 135. Lond. i. 256, 259. Thib. vii. 176, 185. Pellet, *Guerre de 1809*, i. 47, 48.

(3) Three thousand men, chiefly light troops, had been detached from the main body to Vigo, to facilitate the embarkation on which the English commander was already determined.—Napier, i. 473.

in contesting them, as the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and the advancing columns of Ney's corps, were supposed to enable the pursuers speedily to turn them on either flank; and it is well known to all really acquainted with war, that a mountainous region, in appearance the most defensible, is in reality often the most indefensible of all districts, against a superior and enterprising enemy, led by a skilful general. Sir John Moore was constantly with the rearguard, doing his utmost to arrest the disorders

Jan. 5. and protect the retiring columns; and at Villa Franca a sharp skirmish ensued with the rearguard, in which, though the French cavalry were at first successful, they were ultimately repulsed by a heavy fire from the British light troops, with the loss of several hundred men, including General Colbert, who fell while gallantly leading on the vanguard. In other quarters, however, the same discipline was not preserved; disorders went on accumulating with frightful rapidity along the whole line, and such was the general wreck of presence of mind or foresight, that at Nogales the military-chest of the army, containing L.25,000 in dollars, having stuck fast in the mud, the treasure was rolled in the casks in which it was contained over a precipitous descent, and became the prey of the peasantry, who picked it up at the bottom. All order or subordination was now at an end; the soldiers, exhausted by fatigue, or depressed by suffering, sank down by hundreds on the wayside, and breathed their last, some with prayers, others with curses on their lips; and the army, in frightful disorder, at length reached Lugo, late on the evening of the 6th January (1).

And offers battle, which is declined. Here, however, Sir John Moore halted, and in a proclamation issued next day, severely rebuked the insubordination of the troops, and announced his intention of halting to give battle to the enemy. The army, accordingly, was drawn up in a strong position, extending along a ridge of low hills, flanked on either side by precipitous rocks, from the mountains to the bed of the Minho; and it then speedily appeared that the preceding disorders of the march had at least not been owing to want

Jan. 7. of courage. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the disorder ceased; joyfully the men fell into their places, the stragglers came up from the rear; arms were cleaned, faces brightened, confidence was restored; and before the morning of the 8th, nineteen thousand men stood in battle array, impatiently awaiting the attack of the enemy. Soult, however, declined the combat, though on that day he had seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery in line; and Moore, having gained his object of recruiting his troops, and having little food remaining in the stores of Lugo, broke up in the following night and retired towards Corunna (2).

Continues the retreat to Corunna. Hardships undergone by the troops. The night was cold and tempestuous; a severe storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, burst upon the troops; and in the confusion of a nocturnal retreat, two divisions lost their way, and complete disorganization ensued, insomuch that a large part of the army became little better than a mass of stragglers, who were only prevented from becoming the prey of the pursuers by none of his cavalry fortunately appearing in sight. Order having, at daylight, been in some degree restored, Sir John Moore collected the army into a solid mass, and the retreat to Corunna was effected without further molestation from the enemy, the night-march from Lugo having gained to the British twelve hours' start of the pursuers, which they were never afterwards able to regain; but notwithstanding

(1) Tor. ii. 194, 198. Nap. i. 473, 481. Lond. i. 260, 267. South. ii. 504, 514.

(2) Nap. i. 485, 486. Tor. ii. 195, 196. Lond. i. 270, 276.

this, it was nearly as disorderly and harassing as the preceding part had been.

Jan. 11. As the troops successively arrived at the heights from whence the sea was visible, and Corunna, with its white citadel and towers, rose upon the view, all eyes were anxiously directed to the bay, in hopes that the joyful sight of a friendly fleet of transports might be seen; but the wide expanse was deserted, and a few coasters and fishing-boats alone were visible on the dreary main. Deeply did every one

then lament that a battle had not been fought long before; and as the officers cast their eyes on the low sand-hills in front of the ramparts of the town, on which they well knew the contest for their embarkation must be sustained, they thought with poignant regret of the innumerable positions, a hundred times stronger, which might have been taken up in the course of the retreat for the encounter. Now, however, there was no alternative; the sea was in their front, the enemy in their rear; fight they must to secure the means of embarkation; be the positions favourable or unfavourable. The brigades, as they successively arrived, were passed on into the town, and all the means which circumstances would admit of taken to strengthen the land defences,

Jan. 12. which, though regular, were very weak; the inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joining in the toil, though they well knew, from the preparations which were going forward, that an embarkation was intended. On the

Jan. 13. day following, two powder magazines, at a short distance without the walls, containing four thousand barrels of powder, the gift of England, were blown up with an explosion so terrific, that nothing in the whole course of the war approached to it. The coast resembled the sudden explosion of a volcano; the city was shaken to its foundations, the rocks torn from their bases, the sea was tossed as in a tempest, the earth shook for leagues around; while slowly arose in the air a huge black cloud, shooting forth dazzling sparks, from whence, at a great height, stones burst forth with a prodigious sound, and fell with a sharp rattle in all directions. A stillness yet more awful ensued, broken only by the hoarse and sullen lashing of the still agitated

Jan. 14. waves on the shore (1). On the following day, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after stood into the bay; preparations were immediately made for the embarkation of the sick and wounded; the cavalry horses were almost all destroyed, and the greater part of the artillery, consisting of fifty-two pieces, put on board; eight British and four Spanish being only reserved for immediate use. Notwithstanding all the sufferings of the retreat, not one gun had been taken by the enemy. Meanwhile, the bulk of the army, still fourteen thousand strong, was drawn up with great care by Sir John Moore, on a range of heights, or rather of swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre around the village of Elvina, at the distance of rather more than a mile from Corunna. Hope's division was on the left, its flank covered by the muddy stream of the Mero, commanding the road to Lugo; Baird's next, directly behind Elvina; then the rifles and Fraser's division, which watched the coast-road to St.-Jago, and was prepared to support any menaced point; General Paget, half a mile in the rear, with the reserve, at the village of Airis. The French, fully twenty thousand strong, were posted on a higher semicircular ridge, sweeping round the lesser one occupied by the British at the distance of about a mile; Laborde's division was on the

(1) It is from Colonel Napier, an eye-witness, that this eloquent description is taken. Whoever has had the good fortune to see that most sublime of spectacles, an eruption of Vesuvius, will have no difficulty in giving implicit credit to the graphic

truth of the picture. The author witnessed one twenty years ago; and the act of transcribing these lines recalls, in all its vividness, the thrilling recollection of the matchless scene.

right, Merle's in the centre, Mermet's on the left; their light field-pieces were distributed along the front of the line; the dragoons, under Labrousse, Lorge, and Franceschi, to which the English had nothing to oppose, clustered to the left of the infantry, and menaced the British right flank, while a great battery of twelve heavy guns, advantageously posted on a steep eminence between their foot and horse, not twelve hundred yards from Baird's division, was prepared to carry devastation along the whole line (1).

Battle of
Corunna.
Jan. 16.

From the inactivity of the French army during the two preceding days, Sir John Moore had been led to imagine that they had no serious intention of disquieting his retreat, and preparations, on the 16th, were making for withdrawing the troops into the town as soon as the darkness would admit of its being done without observation; when, about noon, a general movement was seen along their whole line, and soon after, at two o'clock, their infantry, in four massy columns, was observed to be descending from the heights which they occupied, and advancing with a swift step towards the English position. Perceiving that the hour he had so long and so passionately wished for was at hand, Sir John Moore instantly galloped to the front; the troops every where stood to their arms, and were deployed into line, while the French, according to custom, advanced in long and deep columns, preceded by a cloud of light troops. Their onset, as at Vimiera, and in all the subsequent actions of the war, was extremely impetuous. A cloud of skirmishers led the way, which drove in the English advanced posts with great vigour; and, in the confusion of their retreat, made themselves masters of Elvina, directly in front of the centre. As they drew near to the British position, they deployed into line, and it soon appeared that they extended greatly beyond its extreme right; but the 4th regiment, which was there stationed, no ways discouraged by this alarming circumstance, threw back its right wing, and presenting a front in two directions, in which attitude it advanced, was soon warmly engaged with the enemy. Highly delighted with this display of presence of mind, and deeming the right secure when intrusted to such intrepid defenders, Sir John Moore rode up to Baird's division in the centre, which was now come to blows with Mermet's troops, who having carried Elvina, were bursting through the enclosures which lay between its houses and the British, with loud cries and all the exultation of victory. The action now became extremely warm along the whole line; the French and English centres advanced to within pistol-shot of each other, and after exchanging a few volleys, the 50th and 42d charged bayonets, and drove the enemy opposed to them in the most gallant style back again through Elvina, and a considerable way up the slope on the other side. But this furious onset being carried too far, and not adequately supported, met with a severe check; the victorious troops, when broken by the enclosures and stone-walls on the other side of the village, were assailed in their turn by fresh French regiments, and driven back a second time through its streets, Major Napier, who commanded the 50th, being wounded and made prisoner. But Moore was at hand to repair the disorder; instantly addressing the 42d regiment with the animating words, "Highlanders, remember Egypt!" and bringing up a battalion of the Guards to its support, he again led them forward to the charge. The shock was irresistible; borne back at the point of the bayonet, the enemy were again driven into Elvina, from whence, after a desperate struggle, they were finally expelled with great slaughter. In this decisive contest, however, Sir John Moore received a mortal wound from a cannon-

shot, and Sir David Baird, struck down at the head of his men, had been shortly before carried from the field in a senseless condition (1).

Foiled in this attempt to pierce the centre, Soult renewed his attacks with Delaborde's division on the left, while a heavy column endeavoured to steal unperceived round the British right, where they so greatly outflanked their opponents. But the ground on the left being in favour of the English, all his efforts were defeated with comparative ease; and General Hope, who commanded there, pressing forward in pursuit of the repulsed columns, carried the village of Palavio Abaxo, close under the enemy's original position, which remained in his hands at nightfall; while, on the right, General Paget, with the reserve, not only at once perceived and advanced to meet the column which was endeavouring to turn his flank, but assailed it with such vigour, that it was thrown back upon Lahoussaye's dragoons, and the whole driven in disorder to the foot of the hill, on which the great battery was placed. When night, arriving in that wintry season at an early hour, separated the combatants, the enemy was not only repulsed at all points, but the British line was considerably advanced, holding, on the left, Palavio Abaxo; on the centre, Elvina; and on the right, being advanced to the acclivity of their central battery. Had Fraser's troops, stationed on the coast road to St.-Jago on the extreme right, been at hand to support this splendid advance of the reserve, and an hour more of daylight remained, the enemy would have been routed; had the cavalry been on the field, and the horses not foundered, he would have been thrown back in irretrievable confusion on the swampy stream of the Mero, now flooded by the full tide, and traversed only by a single arch at El Burgo, and totally annihilated. Night, however, having supervened when the success was still incomplete, and the means of embarking unmolested having been gained by the enemy's repulse, General Hope, upon whom the command had devolved (2), did not conceive himself warranted in making any change in the preparations for departure, and after dark the troops were withdrawn into the town, where they were all got on board without either confusion or delay (3).

Death of
Sir John
Moore.

Sir John Moore received his death-wound while animating the 42d to the charge. A cannon-ball struck his left breast, and beat him down by its violence to the earth; but his countenance remained unchanged, not a sigh escaped his lips, and sitting on the ground, he watched with an anxious and steadfast eye the progress of the line. As it advanced, however, and it became manifest that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he reluctantly allowed himself to be led to the rear. Then the dreadful nature of the wound appeared manifest; the shoulder was shattered to pieces; the arm hanging by a film of skin, the breast and lungs almost laid open. As the soldiers placed him on a blanket to carry him from the field, the hilt of his sword was driven into the wound; an officer,

(1) General Hope's account of the battle. Ann. Reg. 1809, p. 372. Nap. i. 494, 496. Lond. i. 255, 256. Tor. ii. 201, 202.

(2) Hope's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1809, p. 373. Nap. i. 498, 499. Lond. i. 287. Tor. ii. 201, 202.

(3) The British loss at Corunna was from 800 to 1000 men; that of the French was stated by their own officers to Colonel Napier at 3000; Sir John Hope estimated it at 1600, but it was at least 2000; a number which would, doubtless, appear surprisingly large, if the murderous effect of the fire of the British infantry, from the coolness and discipline of the men, were not decisively proved by every action throughout the war. The total loss of the army during the retreat was 4033, of whom

1207 were missing before the position at Lago, and 2636 from that to the final embarkation of the army, including those who fell at Corunna—of this number 800 stragglers contrived to escape into Portugal, and, being united with the sick left in that country, formed a corps of 1876 men, which afterwards did good service, both at Oporto and Talavera. Six three-pounders which never were horsed were thrown over the rocks near Villa-Francia; the guns used at Corunna, twelve in number, were spiked and buried in the sand, but afterwards discovered by the enemy. Not one, from first to last, was taken in fight.—See the general returns quoted in *Naval Misc.* i. App. No. 26.

destined to celebrity in future times, CAPTAIN HARDINGE, attempted to take it off, but the dying hero exclaimed, "It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go off the field with me." He was carried by the soldiers towards the town, but though the pain of the wound soon became excessive, such was the serenity of his countenance, that those around him expressed a hope of his recovery. "No," said he, "I feel that is impossible." When approaching the ramparts, he several times desired his attendants to stop, and turn him round that he might again see the field of battle; and when the advance of the firing indicated that the British were successful, he expressed his satisfaction, and a smile overspread the features that were relaxing in death. The examination of his wound at his lodgings speedily foreclosed all hopes of recovery; but he never, for an instant, lost his serenity of mind, and repeatedly expressed his satisfaction when he heard that the enemy were beaten. "You know," said he to his old friend, Colonel Anderson, "that I always wished to die this way." He continued to converse in a calm and even cheerful voice on the events of the day, enquired after the safety of his friends and staff, and recommended several for promotion on account of their services during the retreat. Once only his voice faltered, as he spoke of his mother. Life was ebbing fast, and his strength was all but extinct, when he exclaimed, in words which will for ever thrill in every British heart,—“I hope the people of England will be satisfied : I hope my country will do me justice.” Released a few minutes after from his sufferings, he was wrapped by his attendants in his military cloak, and laid in a grave hastily formed on the ramparts of Corunna, where a monument was soon after constructed over his uncoffined remains by the generosity of Marshal Ney. Not a word was spoken as the melancholy interment by torch-light took place (1); silently they laid him in his grave, while the distant cannon of the battle fired the funeral honours to his memory (2).

Embarkation of the troops, and their return to England.
Jan. 17.

On the fall of Sir John Moore, and the wound of Sir David Baird, the command devolved upon General Hope, who conducted the remaining arrangements with that decision and judgment which afterwards became so conspicuous in the Peninsular war, and whose eloquent despatch announcing the battle of Corunna and the death of Sir John Moore, agitated so profoundly the heart of his country. The boats being all in readiness, the embarkation commenced at ten at night; the troops were silently filed down to the beach, put on board with admirable order, and the whole, except the rearguard, reached the transports in safety before day. GENERAL BERESFORD, at the head of the rearguard, two thousand, and GENERAL HILL, who was stationed on the promontory behind the town, both destined to celebrity in future times, were the last to be withdrawn; the latter did not embark till three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day.

(1) Moore's Narrative, 354, 371. Nap. i. 499, 500.

(2) This touching scene will live for ever in the British heart, embalmed in the exquisite words of the poet :—

“Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried:
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O'er the grave where our hero we buried.

“We buried him darkly at dead of night,
The sods with our bayonets turning:
By the struggling moonbeam's misty light,
And the lantern dimly burning.

“No useless coffin enclosed his breast,
Not in sheet or in shroud we bound him:
But he lay like a warrior taking his rest,
With his martial cloak around him.

“Few and short were the prayers we said,
And we spoke not a word of sorrow,
But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,
And we bitterly thought on the morrow.

“We thought, as we hollow'd his narrow bed,
And smooth'd down his lonely pillow,
That the foe and the stranger would tread o'er his head,
And we far away on the billow.

“But half of our heavy task was done,
When the clock struck the hour for retiring:
And we heard the distant and random gun
That the foe was sullenly firing.

“Slowly and sadly we laid him down,
From the field of his fame fresh and gory i:
We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone,
But we left him alone with his glory.”

The French gave them no annoyance, so strongly had the bloody repulse of the preceding day inspired them with respect for British valour. With a courage and generosity worthy of the highest admiration, the Spaniards manned the ramparts when the last of the English forces were withdrawn, and prolonged the defence for several days, so as to allow the whole sick, wounded, artillery, stores, and even prisoners, to be brought away. A few guns placed by the French on the heights of *Sto.-Lucie*, without the walls, which could not be maintained, alone occasioned, by the fire which they opened upon the vessels in the bay, great confusion among the transports, but without doing any

Nov. 19. serious damage. At length the last of the long files of baggage and stragglers were got on board, and the English fleet, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, stood to the northward, and were lost to the sight amidst the

Nov. 20. cold expanse of the watery main. Then, and not till then, the in-

Nov. 26. habitants of *Corunna*, feeling it in vain to prolong a defence which such a host had resigned in despair, and having honourably discharged every duty to their discomfited allies, capitulated to Marshal Soult, who, a few days afterwards, obtained possession, after a trifling resistance, of the important fortress of *Ferrol*, with seven sail of the line, and very extensive naval stores (1).

Extreme
gloom and
despon-
dency which
these events
produce in
the British
isles.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the gloom and despondency which prevailed in the British isles when intelligence of this long catalogue of disasters was received. In proportion to the warm and enthusiastic hopes which had been formed of a successful issue to the patriotic cause, had been the anxiety and interest which was felt when the crisis approached. In particular, when *Napoléon*, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops, burst through the *Pyrenees*, and the brave but undisciplined Spanish levies were brought in contact with his experienced veterans, the public anxiety became almost unbearable. The rout of *Espinosa*, the overthrow at *Burgos*, the defeat of *Tudela*, succeeding each other in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly, that the British nation had been led by the exaggerations of the public journals to form a most erroneous idea, both of the strength of the Spanish and the force of the French armies. Most of all, they were misled by the pleasing illusion, which the experience of every age has proved to be fallacious, but which is probably destined to the end of the world to mislead the enthusiastic portion of mankind, that a certain degree of popular excitement can supply the want of discipline and experience, and that general ardour is more to be relied on than organization and conduct. When, therefore, the Spanish levies, flushed with the trophies of *Baylen* and *Saragossa*, were dissipated with more ease than the regular armies of *Austria* and *Muscovy*; when the *Somo-sierra* pass was stormed by a charge of lancers, and *Madrid* fell within three weeks after the campaign had been opened by *Napoléon*, a sort of despair seized the public mind, and nothing seemed now capable of withstanding a power which beat down with equal ease the regular forces of northern, and the enthusiastic levies of southern Europe. A transient gleam shot across the gloom when Sir *John Moore* advanced to *Sahagun*, and the English journals confidently announced that seventy thousand English and Spaniards were rapidly interposing between the Emperor and the French frontier, and would possibly make him prisoner in the capital he had won. Proportionally deeper was the gloom when this hope also proved fallacious, when *Romana's* forty thousand men dwindled into a few thousand starving wanderers, and the British army, in-

stead of making Napoleon prisoner in the heart of Spain, was expelled, after a disastrous retreat, with the loss of its general, from the shores of the Peninsula.

Horror excited by the appearance of the army on its return.

The English had hitherto only known war in its holiday dress : their ideas of it were formed on the pomp of melodramatic representation, or the interest of pacific reviews : and though strongly impressed with a military spirit, they were, from their happy insular situation, strangers to the hardships and the calamities of actual campaigns. The inhabitants of the towns along the Channel had seen the successive expeditions which composed Sir John Moore's army embark in all the pride of military display, with drums beating and colours flying, amidst the cheers and tears of a countless host of spectators. When, therefore, they beheld the same regiments return, now reduced to half their numbers, with haggard countenances, ragged accoutrements, and worn-out clothing, they were struck with astonishment and horror ; which was soon greatly increased by a malignant fever which the troops brought back with them, the result of fatigue, confinement on ship-board, and mental depression, joined to the dismal and often exaggerated accounts which were spread by the survivors of the hardships and miseries they had undergone. These gloomy narratives riveted every mind by a painful but enchainning interest : they speedily made their way into the public newspapers, and were devoured with unceasing interest by the whole people ; the fate of these gallant men became a general subject of commiseration ; and the old cry, raised for factious purposes, began to resound through the land (1), that England could never contend on the Continent with France, and that the only rational policy for the prosecution of the war was to withdraw entirely behind our wooden walls.

Reflections on the campaign ; its chequered character, but on the whole eminently unfavourable to France.

And yet, to a dispassionate observer, it could not but be manifest, that though the campaign had to both parties been deeply chequered by misfortune, it had in reality been far more calamitous to the French than the allies : and that the power of Napoleon had received a shock sader than any which it had yet received since his accession to the supreme authority. The Spanish armies, it is true, had been dispersed on the Ebro, the Somo-sierra forced, Madrid taken, and the British, after a calamitous retreat, been driven to their ships ; but the Peninsula was still unsubdued ; Saragossa was fortifying its blood-stained battlements ; Catalonia was in arms : Valencia and Andalusia recruiting their forces : Portugal was untouched, and the British troops, though in diminished strength, still held the towers of Lisbon. No submission or subjugation had followed the irruption of three hundred thousand men into the Peninsula : driven from their capital, the Spaniards, like their ancestors in the Roman and Moorish wars, were preparing in the provinces to maintain a separate warfare ; while the number of their fortresses and chains of mountains, joined to the aid of England, promised them the means of there prolonging a desperate resistance. And what had happened in the same campaign to the hitherto invincible arms of France ? One whole corps had laid down its arms with unheard-of disgrace ; another had capitulated, and surrendered a kingdom to purchase its retreat ; foiled in more than one provincial expedition, the imperial arms had been driven from the capital behind the Ebro, and only regained their lost ground by denuding Germany of its defenders, and exposing for the Peninsular thrones the Rhine itself to inva-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1809, 22, 25. Nap. i. 529.

sion. The spell which held the world enchained had been broken, the dangerous secret had been disclosed that French armies could pass under the Caudine forks. Already the effects of the discovery had become manifest: Europe had been shaken from one extremity to the other by the Peninsular disasters, and Austria, which beheld unmoved the desperate strife of Pultusk and Eylau, encouraged by the immersion of the best French armies in the Peninsula, was preparing to renew the struggle on a scale of unprecedented magnitude.

Reflections
on the
campaign,
and the
effect of
Sir John
Moore's
movement.

The movement in advance by Sir John Moore to Sahagun, his rapid subsequent retreat, when surrounded by superior forces, to Benavente, the skill with which he re-organized his shattered army at Lugo, and the firmness with which, disdaining every proposal for a capitulation (1), he boldly fronted the enemy at Corunna, and met a glorious death on the field of victory, are worthy of the highest admiration, and will for ever secure him a place in the temple of British heroes. Nor is it merely the fond partiality of national gratitude, often mistaken or exaggerated in its opinions, which has secured this distinction: a calm consideration of the consequences of his campaign must, with all impartial observers, lead to the same result. In the whole annals of the Revolutionary War, there is not to be found a single movement more ably conceived, or attended with more important consequences. Levelled against the vital line of the enemy's communications, based on the principles which, unknown to the English general, Napoléon had so emphatically unfolded six months before in his secret despatch to Savary (2), it had literally paralysed every hostile army in Spain; snatched the Spanish monarchy from the verge of destruction, when its own resources were exhausted; and by drawing Napoléon himself, with his terrible legions, into the northern extremity of the Peninsula, it both gave time to the southern provinces to restore their armies and arm their fortresses, and averted the war from Portugal, till an opportunity of organizing fresh means of resistance within its frontiers was afforded. But for this bold and well-conceived advance, Andalusia would have been overrun, Valencia taken, Saragossa subdued, within a few weeks; and before the Emperor was recalled from the theatre of Peninsular warfare by the Austrian armaments, he would have realized his favourite threat of planting the French eagles on the towers of Lisbon. These great results, however, were attended with proportional dangers; Napoléon, with seventy thousand chosen troops, was speedily sweeping round the audacious enemy who had thus interrupted his designs, and but for the celerity and skill of the retreat to Astorga, the army which achieved them must speedily have been consigned to destruction (3).

Errors
which he
committed.

But, if in these particulars the conduct of Sir John Moore was worthy of unqualified admiration, there are others in which the impartial voice of history must deal out a different measure of eulogium: Admitting that the celerity of the retreat to Astorga was unavoidable, and saved the army from destruction; where was the necessity of the subsequent forced marches to Lugo, when Napoléon had retired with his guards from the pursuit, in dreadful weather, attended as it was with such ruinous effects upon the discipline and spirit of the troops? His ablest defenders admit that

(1) It was seriously pressed upon his consideration by several officers, when the absence of the transports on the first arrival at Corunna rendered it evident that a battle must be fought for the embarkation, but he indignantly rejected the proposal.—*Nap.* i. 492, 493; *South.* ii. 520.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 335.

(3) Napoléon subsequently said, at St. Helena, that nothing but the talents and firmness of Sir John Moore saved his army from destruction.—*O'Meara*, i. 55.

there were in the magazines of Villa Franca and Lugo provisions for fourteen days' consumption (1); and even if there had been nothing but the resources of the country to be had, subsequent events proved that they were sufficient for the maintenance of the army; for the French found wherewithal to live on and advance through it, even when following in the rear of the British soldiers. There was no necessity for hurrying on from the danger of being turned in flank, for Ney's corps were several days' march behind Soult's in the defile, and the rugged nature of the country rendered it totally impossible for his troops, worn out by a march of unexampled hardship and rapidity from Madrid, to attempt any threatening movement against the British flank: Every thing, then, counselled deliberation and order in the retreating columns, and the nature of the road through, which they passed, consisting of an ascent several leagues in length, up a bare slope, followed by tremendous passes, continuing for several days' journey, shut in on every side by steep or forest-clad mountains, offered the most favourable opportunities for stopping, by a vigorous resistance on the part of the rearguard, the active pursuit of the enemy (2). The rapid restoration of discipline and order, when battle was offered at Lugo, the issue of the fight at Corunna, leave no room for doubt as to what would have been the result of such a conflict; and the example of Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest, in 1796, was not required to show how effectually such a fierce aspect on the part of the retiring force saves the blood and secures the safety of the remainder of the army (3). The luminous fact, that the losses sustained by the rearguard when they arrived at Corunna, notwithstanding all the combats they had undergone, were less than those of any other division of equal number in the army (4), affords a decisive proof how much would have been gained upon the whole by fighting at an earlier period, when the strength and discipline of the army was still comparatively unbroken.

And of Sir
David
Baird.

But most of all, the step adopted by Sir David Baird, though a most gallant officer, in unison with Sir John Moore, in counselling the British government, instead of sending out the strong reinforcements which they projected, and had in preparation, to Galicia, to forward *empty transports* to bring away the troops, appears to have been unhappy in its consequences. These despatches were sent off in the course of December, and they were not acted upon by the British government without the most severe regret, but at their distance from the scene of action they had no alternative but acquiescence (5). But for this fatal step, the English army, upon their retreat to the sea-coast, would have found, instead of transports to bring them off, thirteen thousand fresh troops, sufficient to have enabled them to hold out these important fortresses against the enemy, and possibly take a bloody revenge on their pursuers. Ney and Soult would have been retained

(1) Nap. i. 474.

(2) Lond. i. 260, 261.

(3) *Ante*, iii. 84, 85.

(4) Nap. i. 488.

(5) "The troops which had been embarked on board the transports in England to reinforce Sir J. Moore's army," said Mr. Canning, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Parliament, "were disembarked in consequence of a distinct requisition from Sir David Baird, that he wanted a certain number of transports; and the transports from which these troops had been disembarked were sent out, pursuant to that requisition. It was an afflicting circumstance, that it had become necessary to retard these troops, and send out empty, for the purpose of bringing off the British army, those transports which had been fitted for the pur-

pose of reinforcement and assault. But at this distance from the scene of action, ministers could not venture to refuse to send out these transports. The sending them out empty cost government a severe pang; no resolution ever gave him more pain. Every dictate of the head was tortured, every feeling of the heart wrung by it; but ministers had no alternative, they were compelled to submit to the hard necessity." The troops so embarked, or in course of embarkation, were 13,000 men. What might not they have achieved, joined to the 17,000 whom Moore led back to Vigo and Corunna!—See *Parl. Deb.* xii. 1089, 1100. Sir John Moore also concurred in the propriety of withholding the reinforcements and sending out the transports empty.—See *SORTAET*, ii. 519.

in Galicia by the presence of thirty thousand men, intrenched in fortified sea-ports on its coast; the incursion of Soult to Oporto would have been prevented, the battle of Talavera have proved a decisive victory, and the march of Wellington to the Alberche, unmenaced by the descent of Soult, Ney, and Mortier in his rear, would have led him in triumph to Madrid. If the British could not have maintained their ground behind the strong battlements of Ferrol, or the weaker fortifications of Corunna, that might have afforded a good reason for bringing the troops round to Lisbon or Cadiz, but it was none for setting sail to England with the whole expedition, abandoning the contest in the Peninsula as hopeless, when the south was still unsubdued, and leaving ten thousand English soldiers, still in Portugal, to their fate (1).

It was public opinion which was really to blame.

In truth, this desponding conduct on the part of such able and gallant officers, affords decisive proof that it was a much deeper and more general cause which was in operation, and that England was now paying the penalty, not of the incapacity of its generals, but of the long-established, and, till the Peninsular war opened, discreditable prudence in military transactions of its government. Accustomed only to land on the Continent for transient expeditions, and to look always, not to their guns and bayonets, but to their ships, as their ultimate refuge, the whole English nation were ignorant of the incalculable effects of invincible tenacity of purpose upon public undertakings, and regarded the strength of the state as consisting chiefly in its naval power, when, in reality, it possessed a military force capable of contending, with fair chances of success, even against the conqueror of Continental Europe. Like the bulk of mankind in all ages, they judged of the future by the past, and were unaware of those important modifications of the lessons of experience, which the rapid whirl of events in which they were placed was every hour bringing into action. In Sir John Moore's case, this universal, and perhaps unavoidable error, was greatly enhanced by his connexion with the Opposition party, by whom the military strength of England had been always underrated, the system of Continental operations uniformly decried, and the power and capacity of the French Emperor, great as they were, unworthily magnified. Almost all his despatches, in the later stages of the campaign, evince in the clearest colours the influence of this depressing feeling, to which the false exaggerations and real disasters of the Spaniards afforded at the time too much confirmation. Instead, therefore, of casting a shade on the memory of any of the gallant officers intrusted with the direction of the campaign, let us regard its calamitous issue as the forfeit paid by the nation for the undue circumspection of former years, which had become so universal as to have penetrated the breast and chilled the hopes even of its most intrepid defenders, and inspired them with that disquietude for their country's safety which they would never have felt for their own. Nations, like individuals, never yet withdrew from the ways of error, but by the path of suffering; the sins of the

(1) — "The road from Astorga to Corunna," says General Jomini, "traverses a long defile of thirty leagues, bounded by high mountains on either side. A slender rearguard would have sufficed to defend that chaussee, and it was impracticable to manœuvre on either flank of it. That rendered it impossible for Soult to get at the enemy; and Ney, entangled behind him in the defile, could do nothing. This was the more unfortunate as the English army, having prepared nothing on that line, stood in want of every thing, and was in a frightful state of disorder, in consequence of the forced marches which it took for no conceivable

reason. He cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned three or four thousand stragglers or dying men, when their line of operations was never menaced. It is impossible to conceive why the English did not defend Corunna. It is not, indeed, a Gibraltar; but against an enemy who had nothing but field-pieces, it surely could have been maintained for some time, the more especially as they could, at any time, throw in succor by sea. I could never understand their haste on that occasion, which the nation, it is true, has well wiped off in subsequent times, but was inferior to no other of the same description."

fathers are still visited upon the children : the retreat of Sir John Moore was the transition from the paralysed timidity which refused succours to the Russians after Eylau, to the invincible tenacity which gave durable success to Wellington's campaigns. Happy the nation which can purchase absolution for past errors by so trivial a sacrifice, which can span the gulf from disaster to victory with no greater losses than those sustained in the Corunna retreat; and to whom the path of necessary suffering, commencing by the gift of a momentous benefit, is terminated by a ray of imperishable glory.

Reflections
on the character
of the British and
French
armies, as
evinced in
their first
serious continental
campaign.

The peculiar character of the British and French troops had already clearly manifested itself in the course of this brief but active campaign. In every regular engagement, from first to last, the English had proved successful; they had triumphed equally over the conscripts of Junot and the Imperial Guards of Bessières; the heroes of Austerlitz and Friedland had sunk and quailed beneath the British steel. Considering how inexperienced almost all the English regiments were, and that most of the troops engaged at Roliça, Vimiero, and Corunna, there saw a shot fired for the first time in anger, these successes were extremely remarkable, achieved as they were, sometimes over veteran troops of the enemy, always over those who had the discipline and experience gained by fifteen years of victory to direct their organization and animate their spirits. They point evidently to what subsequent experience so clearly verified, a greater degree of courage at the decisive moment, arising either from some inherent peculiarity of race, or the animating influence of a free constitution and a long train of historic glory. But in other respects the superiority of the enemy was manifest, and all the good effects of achieved victory were liable to be lost on the English army, by the want of due discipline and docility in the troops, or of remissness and inexperience on the part of the officers. Place them in a fair field in front of the enemy, and both would honourably discharge their duty; but expose them to the fatigues of a campaign; subject them to the frozen snow or the dripping bivouac: require them to recede before the enemy, and bear the galling reproaches of a pursuer or ally in expectation of the time when the proper season for action arrived, and it was evident that they had still much to learn in the military art. Above all, intoxication, the inherent national vice, too often loosened the bonds of discipline, and exposed the army to the most serious disasters. These disorders explain the calamities of Sir John Moore's retreat, and go far to render blameless his gloomy presentiments as to the issue of the campaign. In sobriety, durable activity, perseverance under fatigue, care of their horses, versatility of talent, and cheerfulness in disaster, the French were evidently and painfully the superiors of their undaunted rivals; the British army could never, in the same time and with the same array, have made Napoleon's march from Madrid to Astorga. Such were the varied excellences of the two armies who were destined, in six successive campaigns, to emulate each other's virtues and shun each other's defects; and such the aspect of the war when Great Britain, throwing off the unworthy timidity of former years, first descended as a principal into the fight, and Wellington, alternately the Fabius and Marcellus of the contest, prepared, in the fields illustrated by a former Scipio, the triumphs of a second Zama.



